Journal article

Is it rational to internalize the personal norm that one should reciprocate?

BP2-STS

  • 2002
Published in:
  • Journal of Economic Psychology. - Elsevier BV. - 2002, vol. 23, no. 1, p. 27-48
English This paper shows in a simple game-theoretic model that it can be rational for non-altruistic individuals to adopt a personal value-based norm to reciprocate. Moreover, it is argued that such a behavioral commitment is feasible and thus self-binding. Reciprocal behavior has become a stylized fact in experimental labor markets. Our analysis suggests that in laboratory experiments “workers” may provide high effort either because they adopted the norm to behave reciprocally fair or because they fear to “work” with an “employer” who adopted the norm to punish unkind behavior.
Faculty
Faculté des sciences économiques et sociales et du management
Department
Département d'économie politique
Language
  • English
Classification
Economics
License
Rights reserved
Open access status
green
Identifiers
Persistent URL
https://folia.unifr.ch/unifr/documents/326069
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