The Way Things Look: a Defence of Content
BHAP-PH
- Giananti, Andrea ORCID University of Fribourg
- 2018
Published in:
- Review of Philosophy and Psychology. - Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 2018, vol. 10, no. 3, p. 541-562
English
How does perceptual experience disclose the world to our view? According to an influential idea, perceptual experience is endowed with representational content: it represents things as being a certain way. In the first section, I discuss an argument given by Charles Travis (2004) against perceptual content. The second section is devoted to the phenomenon of perceptual constancy: in 2.1 I describe the phenomenon. In 2.2 I argue that the description given suggests a phenomenological distinction that can be deployed for a defence of content. In 2.3 I compare and contrast my view of perceptual content with that of Susanna Schellenberg (2008). Finally (2.4), I support my conception of content by means of an argument that links content to the way in which the mind-independent nature of material objects is manifest in perceptual experience.
- Faculty
- Faculté des lettres et des sciences humaines
- Department
- Département de Philosophie
- Language
-
- English
- Classification
- Philosophy, psychology
- License
- Rights reserved
- Open access status
- green
- Identifiers
-
- DOI 10.1007/s13164-018-0393-4
- ISSN 1878-5158
- Persistent URL
- https://folia.unifr.ch/unifr/documents/325290
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