Journal article

The Way Things Look: a Defence of Content


  • 2018
Published in:
  • Review of Philosophy and Psychology. - Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 2018, vol. 10, no. 3, p. 541-562
English How does perceptual experience disclose the world to our view? According to an influential idea, perceptual experience is endowed with representational content: it represents things as being a certain way. In the first section, I discuss an argument given by Charles Travis (2004) against perceptual content. The second section is devoted to the phenomenon of perceptual constancy: in 2.1 I describe the phenomenon. In 2.2 I argue that the description given suggests a phenomenological distinction that can be deployed for a defence of content. In 2.3 I compare and contrast my view of perceptual content with that of Susanna Schellenberg (2008). Finally (2.4), I support my conception of content by means of an argument that links content to the way in which the mind-independent nature of material objects is manifest in perceptual experience.
Faculté des lettres et des sciences humaines
Département de Philosophie
  • English
Philosophy, psychology
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