Anti-competitive conduct, in-house R&D, and growth
BP2-STS
Published in:
- European Economic Review. - Elsevier BV. - 2008, vol. 52, no. 6, p. 987-1008
English
Incumbent firms have two basic possibilities to improve their competitive position in the product market: Investment in R&D and the creation of entry barriers to the disadvantage of potential rivals, e.g. through lobbying activities, campaign contributions, bribes or the adoption of incompatible technologies. This paper proposes a simple oligopoly model which raises the possibility that such anti-competitive conduct and R&D investment are complementary activities for incumbents. Consequently, an institutional framework or technological possibilities which encourage anti-competitive conduct, although impeding entry of potential rivals and accentuating standard oligopoly distortions, may foster R&D-based growth and welfare. However, this outcome is less likely if entrants exert technological spillover effects, e.g. through foreign direct investment. Stronger protection of intellectual property rights, although triggering anti-competitive conduct and thereby impeding market entry as well, is more likely to foster economic growth.
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Faculty
- Faculté des sciences économiques et sociales et du management
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Department
- Département d'économie politique
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Language
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Classification
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Economics
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License
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Rights reserved
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Open access status
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green
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Identifiers
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Persistent URL
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https://folia.unifr.ch/unifr/documents/323700
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