Journal article

Income inequality, voting over the size of public consumption, and growth

BP2-STS

  • 2003
Published in:
  • European Journal of Political Economy. - Elsevier BV. - 2003, vol. 19, no. 2, p. 265-287
English According to a standard argument, higher income inequality fosters redistributive activities of the government in favor of the median income earner. This paper shows that if redistribution is achieved by public provision of goods and services rather than by transfers, higher income inequality may imply a smaller size of the government in majority voting equilibrium. In addition to a static voting model, an endogenous growth model is analyzed to examine how saving decisions of heterogeneous individuals affect both the distributional incidence of proportional factor income taxes and the voting outcome.
Faculty
Faculté des sciences économiques et sociales et du management
Department
Département d'économie politique
Language
  • English
Classification
Economics
License
Rights reserved
Open access status
green
Identifiers
Persistent URL
https://folia.unifr.ch/unifr/documents/323688
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