Firm-specific information and explicit collusion in experimental oligopolies
BP2-STS
- Gomez-Martinez, Francisco University of Fribourg
- Onderstal, Sander University of Amsterdam
- Sonnemans, Joep University of Amsterdam
- 2015
Published in:
- European Economic Review. - Elsevier BV. - 2015, vol. 82, p. 132-141
Cournot oligopoly
Cartels
Information
Experiments
Laboratory Experiment
Collusion
Industrial Organization
English
We experimentally study the effect of information about competitors’ actions on cartel stability and firms’ incentives to form cartels in Cournot markets. As in previous experiments, markets become very competitive when individualized information is available and participants cannot communicate. In contrast, when communication is possible, results reverse: Markets become less competitive and cartels become more stable when individualized information is available. We also observe that the extra profits that firms obtain thanks to the possibility to communicate are higher when individualized information is present, suggesting that firms have greater incentives to form cartels in that situation.
- Faculty
- Faculté des sciences économiques et sociales et du management
- Department
- Département d'économie politique
- Language
-
- English
- Classification
- Economics
- License
- Rights reserved
- Open access status
- green
- Identifiers
-
- DOI 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2015.11.002
- ISSN 0014-2921
- Persistent URL
- https://folia.unifr.ch/unifr/documents/323686
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