Signalling in Auctions: Experimental Evidence
BP2-STS
- Bos, Olivier ENS Paris-Saclay
- Gomez-Martinez, Francisco University of Fribourg
- Onderstal, Sander University of Amsterdam
- Truyts, Tom UC Louvain
- 2021
Published in:
- Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. - Elsevier BV. - 2021, vol. 187, p. 448-469
English
We study the relative performance of the first-price sealed-bid auction, the second-price sealed-bid auction, and the all-pay sealed-bid auction in a laboratory experiment where bidders can signal information through their bidding behaviour to an outside observer. We consider two different information settings: the auctioneer reveals either the identity of the winning bidder only, or she also reveals the bidders’ payments to an outside observer. We find that the all-pay sealed-bid auction in which the bidders’ payments are revealed outperforms the other mechanisms in terms of revenue, while this mechanism underperforms in terms of efficiency relative to the winner-pay auctions.
- Faculty
- Faculté des sciences économiques et sociales et du management
- Department
- Département d'économie politique
- Language
-
- English
- Classification
- Economics
- License
- CC BY
- Open access status
- hybrid
- Identifiers
-
- DOI 10.1016/j.jebo.2021.04.001
- ISSN 0167-2681
- Persistent URL
- https://folia.unifr.ch/unifr/documents/323685
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