Journal article

Do cost-sharing and entry deregulation curb pharmaceutical innovation?

BP2-STS

  • 2013
Published in:
  • Journal of Health Economics. - Elsevier BV. - 2013, vol. 32, no. 5, p. 881-894
English This paper examines the role of both cost-sharing schemes in health insurance systems and the regulation of entry into the pharmaceutical sector for pharmaceutical R&D expenditure and drug prices. The analysis suggests that both an increase in the coinsurance rate and stricter price regulations adversely affect R&D spending in the pharmaceutical sector. In contrast, entry deregulation may lead to higher R&D spending of pharmaceutical companies. The relationship between R&D spending per firm and the number of firms may be hump-shaped. In this case, the number of rivals which maximizes R&D expenditure per firm is decreasing in the coinsurance rate and increasing in labor productivity.
Faculty
Faculté des sciences économiques et sociales et du management
Department
Département d'économie politique
Language
  • English
Classification
Economics
License
Rights reserved
Open access status
green
Identifiers
Persistent URL
https://folia.unifr.ch/unifr/documents/322915
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