Do cost-sharing and entry deregulation curb pharmaceutical innovation?
BP2-STS
- Grossmann, Volker ORCID University of Fribourg, CESifo, IZA
- 2013
Published in:
- Journal of Health Economics. - Elsevier BV. - 2013, vol. 32, no. 5, p. 881-894
English
This paper examines the role of both cost-sharing schemes in health insurance systems and the regulation of entry into the pharmaceutical sector for pharmaceutical R&D expenditure and drug prices. The analysis suggests that both an increase in the coinsurance rate and stricter price regulations adversely affect R&D spending in the pharmaceutical sector. In contrast, entry deregulation may lead to higher R&D spending of pharmaceutical companies. The relationship between R&D spending per firm and the number of firms may be hump-shaped. In this case, the number of rivals which maximizes R&D expenditure per firm is decreasing in the coinsurance rate and increasing in labor productivity.
- Faculty
- Faculté des sciences économiques et sociales et du management
- Department
- Département d'économie politique
- Language
-
- English
- Classification
- Economics
- License
- Rights reserved
- Open access status
- green
- Identifiers
-
- DOI 10.1016/j.jhealeco.2013.06.001
- ISSN 0167-6296
- Persistent URL
- https://folia.unifr.ch/unifr/documents/322915
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