Journal article

The Agency Structure of Loan Syndicates

BP2

  • 2007
Published in:
  • The Financial Review. - 2007, vol. 42, p. 227-245
English Leaders of loan syndicates often delegate some administrative tasks to banks known as co-agents. One reason is that co-agents are specialized banks that help split the costs of managingthe syndicate. Another reason is that co-agents monitor the leader on behalf of syndicatemembers to mitigate informational asymmetry problems. Large sample tests on the Dealscandatabase provide support for both arguments. Evidence of repeated contracting between thesame banks explains the moderate magnitude of monitoring effects.
Faculty
Faculté des sciences économiques et sociales et du management
Department
Département des sciences du Management
Language
  • English
Classification
Economics
License
License undefined
Persistent URL
https://folia.unifr.ch/unifr/documents/320178
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