The Agency Structure of Loan Syndicates
BP2-STS
- François, Pascal ORCID HEC Montréal
- Missonier-Piera, Franck ORCID ESSEC Business School
- 2007
Published in:
- The Financial Review. - 2007, vol. 42, p. 227-245
English
Leaders of loan syndicates often delegate some administrative tasks to banks known as co-agents. One reason is that co-agents are specialized banks that help split the costs of managingthe syndicate. Another reason is that co-agents monitor the leader on behalf of syndicatemembers to mitigate informational asymmetry problems. Large sample tests on the Dealscandatabase provide support for both arguments. Evidence of repeated contracting between thesame banks explains the moderate magnitude of monitoring effects.
- Faculty
- Faculté des sciences économiques et sociales et du management
- Department
- Département des sciences du Management
- Language
-
- English
- Classification
- Economics
- License
- License undefined
- Persistent URL
- https://folia.unifr.ch/unifr/documents/320178
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