Communication and Coordination in a Two-Stage Game
Published in:
- Economic Inquiry. - Springer. - 2016, vol. 54, no. 3, p. 1519-1540
English
We study the impact of communication on behavior in a two-stage coordination game with asymmetric payoffs. We test experimentally whether individuals can avoid a head-to-head confrontation by means of coordinated strategies. In particular we analyze whether and how quickly a conflict-avoidance take turn strategy can emerge. First, our results show that players learn to solve the conflict by choosing opposite options at both stages of the game. Second, many adopt a take turn strategy to sustain coordination over time and alleviate the inequality induced by the asymmetry of payoffs. Third, communication increases the likelihood of conflict resolution regardless of whether communication is unilateral or bilateral.
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Faculty
- Faculté des sciences économiques et sociales et du management
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Department
- Département d'économie politique
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Language
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Classification
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Economics
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License
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License undefined
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Identifiers
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Persistent URL
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https://folia.unifr.ch/unifr/documents/309513
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