Governance, bureaucratic rents, and well-being differentials across US states
- Luechinger, Simon University of Lucerne
- Schelker, Mark University of Fribourg
- Stutzer, Alois University of Basel
-
2014
Published in:
- Oxford Economic Papers. - 2014, vol. 66, no. 2, p. 443-464
English
We analyse the influence of institutional restrictions on bureaucratic rents. As a measure for these rents, we propose subjective well-being differentials between workers in the public administration and workers in other industries. Based on data for the US states, we estimate the extent to which institutional efforts to strengthen bureaucratic accountability affect differences in well-being. We find that well-being differences are smaller in states with high transparency, elected auditors, and legal deficit carryover restrictions. These findings are consistent with limited rent extraction under these institutional conditions. No or weak effects are found for performance audits and regulatory review.
- Faculty
- Faculté des sciences économiques et sociales et du management
- Department
- Département d'économie politique
- Language
-
- English
- Classification
- Economics
- License
- License undefined
- Identifiers
-
- RERO DOC 330471
- DOI 10.1093/oep/gpt006
- Persistent URL
- https://folia.unifr.ch/unifr/documents/309362
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