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Journal article

Nobody’s Innocent : The Role of Customers in the Doping Dilemma

  • Buechel, Berno Department of Economics, University of Hamburg, Hamburg, Germany
  • Emrich, Eike Department of Sports Economics and Sociology, Saarland University, Saarbrücken, Germany
  • Pohlkamp, Stefanie Department of Economics, University of Hamburg, Hamburg, Germany
    2016
Published in:
  • Journal of sports economics. - 2016, vol. 17, no. 8, p. 767-789
inspection game
doping
professional sports
scandals
cheating
English Customers who boycott an organization after some scandal may actually exacerbate the fraud problem they would like to prevent. This conclusion is derived from a game- theoretic model that introduces a third player into the standard inspection game. Focusing on the example of doping in professional sports, we observe that doping is prevalent in equilibrium because customers undermine an organizer’s incentives to inspect the athletes. Establishing transparency about doping tests is necessary but not sufficient to overcome this dilemma. Our analysis has practical implications for the design of anti-doping policies as well as for other situations of fraudulent activities.
Faculty
Faculté des sciences économiques et sociales et du management
Department
Département d'économie politique
Language
  • English
Classification
Economics
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License
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Identifiers
  • RERO DOC 327629
Persistent URL
https://folia.unifr.ch/unifr/documents/308226
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