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Journal article

Condorcet winners on median spaces

    2014
Published in:
  • Social Choice and Welfare. - 2014, vol. 42, no. 3, p. 735-750
majority rule
median voter theorem
Condorcet winner
generalized single-peakedness
median spaces
Hotelling
Weber Point
English We characterize the outcome of majority voting for single-peaked preferences on median spaces. This large class of preferences covers a variety of multi-dimensional policy spaces including products of lines (e.g. grids), trees, and hypercubes. Our main result is the following: If a Condorcet winner (i.e. a winner in pairwise majority voting) exists, then it coincides with the appropriately defined median ("the median voter"). This result generalizes previous findings which are either restricted to a one- dimensional policy space or to the assumption that any two voters with the same preference peak must have identical preferences. The result applies to models of spatial competition between two political candidates. A bridge to the graph-theoretic literature is built.
Faculty
Faculté des sciences économiques et sociales et du management
Department
Département d'économie politique
Language
  • English
Classification
Economics
License
License undefined
Identifiers
Persistent URL
https://folia.unifr.ch/unifr/documents/308218
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