Book chapter

Judging and the Scope of Mental Agency

    2009
Published in:
  • Mental Actions / Soteriou, Matthew. - Oxford University Press, reproduced by permission of Oxford University Press (linked below). - 2009, p. 38-71
English What is the scope of our conscious mental agency, and how do we acquire self-knowledge of it? Both questions are addressed through an investigation of what best explains our ability to form judgemental thoughts in direct response to practical reasons. Contrary to what Williams and others have argued, it cannot be their subjection to a truth norm, given that our failure to adhere to such a norm need not undermine their status as judgemental. Instead, it is argued that we cannot form judgements at will because we subjectively experience them as responses to epistemic reasons, and because this is incompatible with our experiential awareness of direct mental actions, such as imagining. However, this latter awareness does not extend to indirect agency, which relies on epistemic or causal processes as means. Judging may therefore still count as an indirect action — just like, say, breaking a window by throwing a stone.
Faculty
Faculté des lettres
Department
Département de Philosophie
Language
  • English
Classification
Philosophy
License
License undefined
Identifiers
Persistent URL
https://folia.unifr.ch/unifr/documents/304058
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