Journal article

Non-inferentialism about Justification - the Case of Aesthetic Judgments

Published in:
  • The Philosophical Quarterly. - 2013, vol. 63, no. 253, p. 660-682
English In this article, I present two objections against the view that aesthetic judgements – that is, judgemental ascriptions of aesthetic qualities like elegance or harmony – are justified non-inferentially. The first is that this view cannot make sense of our practice to support our aesthetic judgements by reference to lower-level features of the objects concerned. The second objection maintains that non-inferentialism about the justification of aesthetic judgements cannot explain why our aesthetic interest in artworks and other objects is limited to only some of their lower-level features that realise their higher-level aesthetic qualities. Although my concern with the view that aesthetic judgements are subject to non-inferential justification is very general, my discussion is primarily structured around Sibley’s well-developed and influential version of this view.
Faculté des lettres et des sciences humaines
Département de Philosophie
  • English
Philosophy, psychology
License undefined
Persistent URL

Document views: 15 File downloads:
  • DorschNonInferentialismAestheticJustification_draft.pdf: 34