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Texte intégral
Journal article

Transparency and imagining seeing

    2010
Published in:
  • Philosophical Explorations. - Taylor & Francis. - 2010, vol. 13, no. 3, p. 173-200
disjunctivism
hallucinations
imagination
intentionalism
object awareness
perception
transparency
visualising
English In his paper, The Transparency of Experience, M.G.F. Martin has put forward a wellknown – though not always equally well understood – argument for the disjunctivist, and against the intentional, approach to perceptual experiences. In this article, I intend to do four things: (i) to present the details of Martin’s complex argument; (ii) to defend its soundness against orthodox intentionalism; (iii) to show how Martin’s argument speaks as much in favour of experiential intentionalism as it speaks in favour of disjunctivism; and (iv) to argue that there is a related reason to prefer experiential intentionalism over Martin’s version of disjunctivism.
Faculty
Faculté des lettres et des sciences humaines
Department
Département de Philosophie
Language
  • English
Classification
Philosophy, psychology
License
License undefined
Identifiers
Persistent URL
https://folia.unifr.ch/unifr/documents/304021
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