Reducing the heterogeneity of payoffs: an effective way to promote cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game
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Jiang, Luo-Luo
Department of Modern Physics, University of Science and Technology of China, Hefei, China
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Zhao, Ming
Department of Modern Physics, University of Science and Technology of China, Hefei, China
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Yang, Han-Xin
Department of Modern Physics, University of Science and Technology of China, Hefei, China
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Wakeling, Joseph Rushton
Department of Physics, University of Fribourg, Switzerland
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Wang, Bing-Hong
Department of Modern Physics, University of Science and Technology of China, Hefei, China - The Research Center for Complex System Science, University of Shanghai for Science and Technology and Shanghai Academy of System Science, China
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Zhou, Tao
Department of Modern Physics, University of Science and Technology of China, Hefei, China - Department of Physics, University of Fribourg, Switzerland
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Published in:
- Physical Review E. - 2009, vol. 80, p. 031144
English
In this paper, the accumulated payoff of each agent is regulated so as to reduce the heterogeneity of the distribution of all such payoffs. It is found that there exists an optimal regulation strength at which cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game is optimally promoted. If the heterogeneity is regulated to be either too weak or too strong, the promotive effect disappears and the evolution of cooperation may even be impaired if compared to the absence of the proposed regulatory mechanism. An explanation of the observed results is provided. In particular, it is found that cooperators on the spatial grid are not isolated but form compact clusters and that the distribution of these clusters is crucial for the promotion of cooperation. Our work provides insights into relations between the distribution of payoffs and the evolution of cooperative behavior in situations constituting a social dilemma.
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Faculty
- Faculté des sciences et de médecine
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Department
- Département de Physique
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Language
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Classification
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Physics
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License
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License undefined
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Identifiers
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Persistent URL
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https://folia.unifr.ch/unifr/documents/301373
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