Preprint

Dynamical instabilities in a simple minority game with discounting

  • Challet, Damien Institute for Scientifc Interchange (ISI), Torino, Italy - Physics department, University of Fribourg, Switzerland
  • De Martino, Andrea CNR/INFM SMC, Dipartimento di Fisica, Universita di Roma, Italy
  • Marsili, Matteo The Abdus Salam International Centre for Theoretical Physics, Trieste, Italy
    2008
English We explore the effect of discounting and experimentation in a simple model of interacting adaptive agents. Agents belong to either of two types and each has to decide whether to participate a game or not, the game being profitable when there is an excess of players of the other type. We find the emergence of large fluctuations as a result of the onset of a dynamical instability which may arise... Show more…
Faculty
Faculté des sciences et de médecine
Department
Département de Physique
Language
  • English
Classification
Physics
License
License undefined
Identifiers
Persistent URL
https://folia.unifr.ch/unifr/documents/300590