Dynamical instabilities in a simple minority game with discounting
- Challet, Damien Institute for Scientifc Interchange (ISI), Torino, Italy - Physics department, University of Fribourg, Switzerland
- De Martino, Andrea CNR/INFM SMC, Dipartimento di Fisica, Universita di Roma, Italy
- Marsili, Matteo The Abdus Salam International Centre for Theoretical Physics, Trieste, Italy
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2008
English
We explore the effect of discounting and experimentation in a simple model of interacting adaptive agents. Agents belong to either of two types and each has to decide whether to participate a game or not, the game being profitable when there is an excess of players of the other type. We find the emergence of large fluctuations as a result of the onset of a dynamical instability which may arise discontinuously (increasing the discount factor) or continuously (decreasing the experimentation rate). The phase diagram is characterized in detail and noise amplification close to a bifurcation point is identified as the physical mechanism behind the instability.
- Faculty
- Faculté des sciences et de médecine
- Department
- Département de Physique
- Language
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- English
- Classification
- Physics
- License
- License undefined
- Identifiers
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- RERO DOC 8905
- DOI 10.1088/1742-5468/2008/04/L04004
- Persistent URL
- https://folia.unifr.ch/unifr/documents/300590
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