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Pragmatic perspectives on disagreement

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The introduction to this special issue provides an overview of the notion of disagreement in relation to argumentative practices and presents the rationale for investigating disagreement management in argumentative discourse from a pragmatic perspective. It describes how existing accounts of disagreement in argumentation have focused on limited instances of the phenomenon, both in terms of its pragmatic embedding (which has predominantly focused on assertive speech acts) and of its scope (which usually covers the normative dimension of argumentative quality). The contributions to this special issue are then presented and contextualised within this broader topic to expound how each of them addresses key pragmatic aspects of disagreement management in argumentative discourse.

Keywords: pragmatics, argumentation, disagreement, meaning-making resources

1. Disagreement, argumentation, and pragmatics

When people argue, they usually do so on the grounds of some recognised or anticipated disagreement, be it about what to eat for dinner, which candidate to vote in, who is the greatest of all time at basketball,¹ or which theory best explains a given phenomenon, to name but a few examples. Recognising and making manifest that we do not agree with our interlocutor, in addition to having an interest in wanting them to see things our way, is one of the major prompts to engage in argumentation – by some accounts, disagreeing is in fact a necessary condition for arguing (see below).

The management of disagreement through argumentative behaviour has traditionally been at the core of mainstream argumentation scholarship (see e.g., Aikin and Talisse 2018; Castro Amenábar 2022; van Eemeren and Grootendorst 2004; Jacobs 1987). Yet, the field has not so far consistently tackled pragmatic aspects of disagreement, especially in what regards the pragmatic expression of disagreement (namely its pragmatic embedding, from explicitness to implicitness and non-verbal expressions) and its scope. Contemporary approaches have indeed mostly investigated the way people communicatively manage—or should manage in a normatively sound fashion—disagreements over expressed propositional contents, or, in speech act-theoretic terms, disagreements over *assertives*.² Disagreements are typically taken to arise when interlocutors do not agree on a given option relative to a given *norm*, which is either explicitly or implicitly referred to in the arguments that people put

¹ This particular question incidentally generates much disagreement online (see Imam 2017).

² Many approaches to argumentation draw on Austin's and Searle's speech act theoretic account of communication (Austin 1962; Searle 1969) to construe argumentation (see also Oswald 2023a for an overview).

forward to justify their disagreement. Accordingly, argumentative studies of disagreement have predominantly tended to adopt a normative perspective, through their characterisation of normative concepts such as soundness, validity, reasonableness or cogency (see esp. chapter 4 in Zenker et al. 2023).

This special issue explores a different, yet related, area and considers disagreement from a pragmatic perspective, both in terms of the ways in which disagreement can be pragmatically expressed and in terms of the range of issues people may disagree over in argumentative exchanges. To this end, the contributions gathered here can be said to broadly explore the notion of *disagreement space*, which Jackson defines as “[t]he entire complex of reconstructible commitments” (Jackson 1992, 261) that can be ascribed to speakers on the grounds of their conversational contributions and with which their addressees may disagree. Crucially, the notion of disagreement space encompasses disagreements about the legitimacy, relevance, or appropriateness of *any* possible type of speech act—from directives to commissives, declaratives and expressives, but, crucially, beyond mere assertives. Such a pragmatic perspective accordingly allows us to consider that “[a]ny presupposed belief or intention associated with an act can be challenged and can give rise to argument” (Jackson 1992, 262), meaning that language users may disagree over (the relevance, legitimacy, etc. of) proposed courses of actions, conversational moves, communicative intentions, speech acts and many more communicative phenomena speakers commit themselves to. At the same time, this opens the door to a reflection about what kinds of norms language users appeal to when they disagree with each other (Zenker et al. 2023). But what is more important for our purposes, once this possibility is recognised, is that this allows disagreement to become a pragmatic object of study, amenable to contemporary pragmatic models which can then contribute to our understanding of the way disagreements are communicatively constructed and expressed in argumentative contexts. The contributions to this special issue thus explore how disagreement management may draw on various pragmatic resources and appeal to different sets of pragmatic norms as speakers engage in argumentation.

In order to provide the scientific context and justification for the set of articles collected here, section 2 will review existing work on disagreement in argumentation that pays specific attention to its linguistic and pragmatic dimensions. Section 3 is then devoted to presenting an overview of the contributions to this special issue.

2. Pragma-linguistic aspects of disagreement in argumentative frameworks

2.1 Disagreement in the pragma-dialectical approach to argumentation

Within pragma-dialectics (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 2004, 1984), which is a prevalent contemporary theory of argumentation, disagreement is construed as a necessary condition of argumentative discourse, since the latter is said to be borne out of disagreement.³ In other words, disagreement is what prompts the need for argumentation, since as soon as conflicting opinions become public, people are likely to start exchanging arguments to defend their own positions and refute those of their opponent’s. The pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation combines a normative approach which supplies criteria for reasonable argumentation with a more pragmatically oriented approach to account for the way arguers use language to manoeuvre within the argumentative exchange. In the pragma-dialectical

³ However, note that sometimes argumentation can also arise for reasons other than disagreement: as Aikin and Casey (2022b) point out, people can argue to maintain an agreement.

ideal model of the critical discussion, the argumentative process unfolds in four stages, which all play a part in the management of disagreement. In the first stage, the confrontation stage, the parties involved in the discussion realise that they have opposing views, and the disagreement becomes apparent. The parties then proceed to the second stage, the opening stage, where the role of each participant of the critical discussion is defined. The disagreement crystallises even more there as the position of each person becomes clearer. The arguers then move on to the crucial argumentation stage, as people elaborate on their disagreements, providing arguments for their respective positions and reacting to the views conveyed by their opponents. In the last stage of the ideal model for critical discussion, the concluding stage, the disagreements should ideally be resolved. Thus, disagreement is not limited to one stage of the critical discussion but is the core element of a conflict of opinion that needs to be managed and ultimately resolved: argumentative practices, within this model, boil down to regulative procedures employed to manage disagreement. Furthermore, in order to promote one's rhetorical goal of winning the argument while still remaining reasonable, it is only natural for people to *strategically manoeuvre* within these procedures (van Eemeren 2010, 39-43; van Eemeren and Houtlosser 2006). In other words: when people disagree, they argue, and when they argue, they must make linguistic choices to convey their arguments, walking the fine line between rhetorically succeeding and dialectically remaining within the scope of reasonableness. It is precisely around this fine line between being rhetorically effective and being reasonable that the role of meaning-making resources can be witnessed, as different linguistic and pragmatic formats may become rhetorically advantageous, compared to their explicit and literal equivalents (see de Oliveira Fernandes and Oswald 2022 for an overview).

2.2 Studying meaning-making resources for the study of disagreement in argumentation

Pragma-dialecticians have thus shown that argumentation cannot be exclusively studied from a normative point of view that excludes the pragmatic dimension of communication. Moreover, many contemporary argumentative approaches routinely stem from the assumption that argumentative practices are a subset of communicative practices, which means that whatever principles govern the latter should also regulate the former. These observations justify the need for a deeper understanding of the role of pragmatic features that contribute to the argumentative success of argumentative speech acts.

Viewing argumentation as a type of pragmatic and conversational activity which is greatly shaped by contextual and communicative constraints is a research programme that has sparked considerable interest, for instance within the subfield of *normative pragmatics* (see e.g., Goodwin 2001; Goodwin and Innocenti 2019; Jacobs 2000; van Eemeren et al. 1993; Innocenti 2022; Jacobs and Jackson 1982; Kauffeld 1998; Weger and Aakhus 2005) and more recently in conversational approaches to argument (Rocci et al. 2020; Mundwiler and Kreuz 2018; Luginbühl and Kreuz 2020; Jacobs, Jackson, and Zhang 2022; Jacobs and Jackson 1992) or linguistic and pragmatic approaches to argumentation more broadly (Boogaart, Jansen, and van Leeuwen 2021; Oswald, Herman, and Jacquin 2018; Hinton 2021; Herman, Jacquin, and Oswald 2018; Herman and Oswald 2014; Pollaroli et al. 2019; Bermejo Luque and Moldovan 2021; Lewiński et al. 2023; Oswald 2022). This growing body of research consistently investigates the pragmatics and argumentation interface, and, to a large extent, this special issue can be seen as participating in this linguistic turn in argumentation scholarship.

The study of disagreement has oftentimes been conflated with the study of argumentation for the reasons exposed above, which perhaps explains why research in the

field specifically devoted to the notion of disagreement from a perspective that is grounded in pragmatic frameworks is relatively scarce. Schumann's (2022b) study on the perception of disagreement in argumentative contexts stands out in this respect because it experimentally assesses people's ability to detect disagreement when it is conveyed using a fallacious argument such as the straw man fallacy. When a straw man is performed, the speaker attacks their opponent by misrepresenting their initial standpoint (see e.g., Aikin and Casey 2022a; Schumann 2022a). The inherent disagreement to a straw man fallacy is thus expressed through the misrepresentation of the original content, and, interestingly, experimental results indicate that people are indeed sensitive to its presence, regardless of whether they were asked about the presence of agreement (positive formulation) or the presence of disagreement (negative formulation). While encouraging, in the sense that this work showcases that the pragmatic dimensions of disagreement can indeed be studied from an experimental perspective, this study is, to our knowledge, perhaps the only one which has attempted to investigate pragmatic aspects of disagreement empirically. It is our hope that the contents of this special issue will encourage further research in this direction, notably concerning the pragmatic manifestation of disagreement.

The expression of disagreement, just like any other content, may draw on all meaning-making resources that are available to language users, which cover verbal and nonverbal modes. Disagreement that is expressed explicitly is relatively easy to identify, because it is accompanied by argumentative indicators (in the sense of van Eemeren, Houtlosser, and Snoeck Henkemans 2007), i.e., linguistic marking manifested through the use of certain expressions such as "I disagree", "I do not think so", "on the other hand", or connectives such as "but", "whereas", or "conversely". Explicit disagreement may also be witnessed when speakers engage in open antagonism, for instance when they accuse others of normatively problematic behaviour in clear terms (as discussed by Liberatore in this special issue). In this case, linguistically marked antagonism, in the form of explicit name-calling or explicit attacks/condemnations, may also signal disagreement, which in turn helps the argumentation analyst to straightforwardly account for said disagreement within the argumentative exchange.

Accounting for disagreement might be more problematic when it is implicitly conveyed, however, if only because understanding that the speaker is implicitly disagreeing involves some sort of interpretative gamble, as the addressee is supposed to select contextual assumptions without the guarantee that the ones they end up selecting correspond to the ones that the speaker has indeed meant.⁴ Thus, when disagreement is implicitly conveyed, pragmatic efforts must be incurred to identify its nature and scope. This is the case, for instance, when the disagreement is expressed via the use of presuppositions or implicatures (as shown in the contributions by Masia and Lombardi Vallauri in this issue), by disagreeing with the way an event is metaphorically conceptualised (as illustrated by Pilgram and van Poppel), or by using disagreement as a speech act that structures discourse (for example in

⁴ Commitment attribution – and in this case rightly attributing to the speaker the commitment to disagree with their interlocutor – is arguably riskier on the grounds of implicit contents than on the grounds of explicit contents, since it is the addressee who is responsible for mobilising the intended contextual assumptions in the derivation of meaning. In the process, the addressee might misidentify the assumptions intended by the speaker, and this would trigger a misunderstanding of the speaker's communicative intention. This risk is greatly mitigated in the processing of explicit and literal meaning, since all relevant information is linguistically encoded by the speaker, thereby reducing the responsibility of the addressee in correctly identifying the speaker's communicative intentions (see Morency, Oswald, and de Saussure 2008; and Oswald 2016 for a relevance-theoretic account of commitment attribution).

campaign promises, as argued by Reijven in this issue). We take the wealth of research on pragmatic meaning, which has resulted in rich typologies of implicit meaning, to be extremely relevant to the study of disagreement, in so far as different types of implicit meaning are likely to trigger different types of rhetorical effects. In their study of the rhetorical effects of various implicit meaning-making resources, de Oliveira Fernandes and Oswald (2022) provide a detailed discussion about different types of implicit meaning—namely implicatures, presuppositions, insinuations and dogwhistles—and how these different types of contents can affect argumentative discourse in terms of speaker image (*ethos*), audience response (*pathos*), the message itself (*logos*), and the conversational dynamics of the argumentative exchange. It is not difficult to imagine how the expression of disagreement, depending on the speaker’s goals, may use different rhetorical advantages offered by diverse types of implicit meaning; for instance, a disagreement that is manifested through insinuation may be harder to attack or respond to, since (i) the speaker can always deny having meant it, and (ii) it puts extra pressure on its target, who might be compelled to defend themselves rather than dispute the truthfulness and relevance of the insinuated content, which might in turn be a rhetorically disadvantageous option for them.

As noted above, while some existing work covers part of its linguistic aspects, a rich *pragmatic* account of disagreement, which considers various kinds of pragmatic embedding, is yet to emerge. The contributions gathered in this special issue represent a step in this direction in so far as they all tackle different semiotic resources through which disagreement may be expressed and managed, from types of implicit meaning (e.g., presupposition and implicature) and types of metaphor exploitation to different kinds of speech acts (e.g., promises and accusations).

2.3 Pragmatic embedding and pragmatic scope of disagreement

This special issue offers contributions to the line of inquiry described above, which seeks to further explore the pragmatics and argumentation interface (Oswald 2023b), looking at disagreement from two main perspectives. First, they are interested in the way disagreement is *pragmatically embedded*, from its explicit to its implicit manifestations. As previously mentioned, some disagreements are situated at the propositional level, which is concerned with assertives. These conflicts of opinion relate to a position that has been explicitly asserted by interlocutors in a discursive situation, as illustrated by the following example: Mark and Carrie are discussing which restaurant to book for their father’s upcoming birthday party.

- (1) Mark: “We should go to Luigi’s since they serve homemade food.”
- (2) Carrie: “I disagree, we should not go there. It might be homemade, but they do not pay their staff enough.”

In this example, Mark and Carrie do not share the same opinion on the suggested restaurant: whereas Mark wants to book it for the party, Carrie does not. Both defend different standpoints for different reasons: Mark argues that the restaurant is a good choice given the presumed quality of their food and Carrie argues that the restaurant is not a good choice given the poor treatment of employees. Carrie’s disagreement, in this case, is explicitly marked through the use of “I disagree” and is accompanied by a proposal that goes against Mark’s. However, such explicit linguistic marking is not a necessary condition for disagreement. Imagine if Carrie had replied the following instead:

- (3) Carrie: “Do you even know our father?”

Given the context, (3) could be interpreted as insinuating that Mark is not aware of his father's preferences and tastes, which would also, down the inferential line, disqualify his proposal and, therefore, signal that Carrie is disagreeing with (1). Now, interestingly, (3) could be taken to run against two possible meaning components of (1), namely the proposal to go to an Italian restaurant and the argumentatively relevant proposal to select that restaurant *because* it serves homemade food. This means that (3) affords scenarios that (2) does not afford, and this is due to the fact that (2) drastically restricts the disagreement space (what Mark can then take issue with based on (2)) while (3) leaves it quite open. As a result, the argumentative possibilities of (3) outmatch those of (2), which is a fact of rhetorical importance for Carrie. With this example, it becomes apparent that the type of pragmatic embedding a speaker chooses to make their disagreement manifest might have decisive consequences on the nature of the ensuing argumentative exchange, with different rhetorical advantages or disadvantages being promoted depending on the format that has been selected.

The second perspective on disagreement addressed in this special issue is located on a meta-linguistic level and considers cases in which people disagree about norms for reasonable argumentation instead of disagreeing with the content of their interlocutor's contribution.⁵ In such cases, the object of disagreement is not the propositional content conveyed by the speaker, but their normatively problematic behaviour within the argumentative exchange. The focus thus shifts away from the actual content that is being discussed to the legitimacy of (expressing) said content with respect to a given norm, and the analysis of disagreement accordingly acquires a normative dimension. Situations of this type occur, for example, when a speaker is called out for being dishonest or impolite relative to politeness norms, or for not staying on topic, inventing an issue altogether, or trying to hide something, relative to conversational norms. Such communicative events do not allow for a reasonable discussion to proceed, as highlighting that the speakers' behaviour contravenes conversational principles such as cooperativeness (Grice 1975) or politeness (Brown and Levinson 1987; Leech 2014, amongst others) disrupts the argumentative exchange. Meta-linguistic disagreements of this kind can, therefore, emerge for many reasons and, crucially, may be pragmatically expressed in different formats. One example of this type of disagreement can be found in the case of the already mentioned straw man fallacy, in which a speaker misrepresents the original content of their opponent to create a version that is easier to attack (Aikin and Casey 2022a; Oswald and Lewiński 2014; Schumann 2022a). Another example would be when a speaker questions the legitimacy of another speaker's contribution implicitly, by boasting about their own qualities (see e.g., Herman and Oswald 2022, who analyse such a strategy, which they dub 'ethotic straw man'); in this sense, an implicit personal attack which delegitimises a speaker's contribution may be pragmatically conveyed through self-praise (see also Masia's and Lombardi Vallauri's contributions in this special issue).

With these observations in mind, which were meant to contextualise the contents of this special issue within the larger subfield of argumentation theory devoted to the investigation of disagreement management, we now provide a summary of the contributions to this special issue that makes explicit in what way each relates to the two pragmatic dimensions of disagreement management just described.

⁵ This idea can be traced to the difference between metalinguistic and substantive disagreements (see e.g., Chalmers 2011; Plunkett 2015; and Lewiński and Abreu 2022 for an overview).

3. Contributions to this special issue

Diane Liberatore's contribution, titled "Justifying the accusation: A descriptive comparative analysis of ordinary speakers' accusations of trolling and bad faith", explores the notion of disagreement in its refutational dimension, as she focuses on the justificatory aspects of accusations of trolling and bad faith in digitally mediated communication. In her corpus, collected from a critical thinking online forum, she focuses on the types of arguments and labels posters resort to when it comes to denouncing the behaviour of trolls and bad faith arguers. In addition, she examines the pragmatic resources on which forum posters draw to voice their disagreement with the behaviour of undesirable forum participants. Her analysis reveals that the choice of accusation does have an influence on the type of closure that any given instance of disagreement can lead to. Notably, the corpus shows that a willingness to stop the discussion is more typical after accusations of trolling, while a willingness to pursue the conversation seems to be more likely after accusations of bad faith. Liberatore then offers possible explanations behind the tendencies observed in her corpus by qualitatively assessing the differences between accusations of bad faith and accusations of trolling. All in all, this paper contributes valuable descriptive insights into the online behaviour of forum users who accuse others of uncooperative communicative strategies, and in this sense enriches current approaches to online disagreeing behaviours. One promising aspect of Liberatore's work, beyond the extension and development of existing typologies (like Hardaker's 2010), lies in her discussion of five important parameters (provability, charity, epistemic vigilance, frequency and definition) which are taken to explain the distribution of accusation strategies in her data: these not only connect to existing research in argumentation, but also lend themselves to further empirical investigation.

In "Aggression and disagreement in public communication: convincing third parties through implicit strategies", Edoardo Lombardi Vallauri considers an adversarial communicative context in which disagreements abound, namely political debates, in order to examine the interplay between implicit (i.e., presupposed and implicated) attacks and the strategies with which their targets try to fend them off. Lombardi Vallauri first provides a thorough overview of recent research on the persuasiveness of implicit meaning, before discussing a set of examples taken from contemporary Italian political debates. His analysis is meant to describe how and explain why the explicit interception of implicit meaning (i.e., the strategy of making explicit the implicit contents one's opponent has conveyed through their utterance) is likely to function as a strategy meant to express disagreement with the relevance or truthfulness of said implicit contents, which are typically face-damaging. What emerges alongside this pragmatic account of disagreement over the communication of implicit contents is also a context-dependent configuration of the dialectical situation: while the linguistic surface of the message reflects a dyadic setting in which the political actor addresses the party who has attacked them, in reality these messages are directed towards the audience members who witness the exchange between the two interlocutors. In the cases considered in this paper, these are the TV viewers sitting on their couch at home. This strategy of interception is described as an attempt to make manifest the problematic nature of implicit contents which might have failed to be identified as problematic (in terms of their truth or the appropriateness, from any normative perspective). Since implicit meaning is less likely to be critically scrutinised, such a strategy is likely to be rhetorically advantageous for the victims of implicit attacks.

In "The evidential dimension of implicitly conveyed disagreement in political debates", Viviana Masia offers an account of the use of presupposition and implicature in political disagreements that puts their different evidential profiles at its core. Just as

Liberatore and Lombardi Vallauri, Masia explores the realm of disagreement when it takes the form of a speaker's attack or criticism on an opponent, and, thus, she considers disagreement in terms of an evaluation of whether a given speaker observes or fails to observe certain normative principles of communication (which might have to do with politeness, truth-telling, etc.). The originality of her analysis consists in arguing that presuppositions and implicatures have different evidential profiles: while presuppositions, which introduce agreed upon contents, index both the speaker and the addressee as the sources that are evidentially responsible for the information that is presupposed, implicatures are distinct in that they only index the speaker as the source of the information. This crucial difference, in Masia's view, explains that presuppositions may be preferred to voice criticism and self-praise, which is what she found by comparing a corpus of balanced contributions of politicians to an Italian and an American political debate. Here, too, the notion of disagreement is discussed through a pragmatic lens which demonstrates that the features of different types of implicit meaning may be responsible for specific choices in the verbal manifestation of disagreement.

The contribution of Menno Reijven, titled "'So I know how to do this.' The prototypical argumentative pattern in U.S.A. presidential debates" draws on argumentative (the pragma-dialectical account of argumentation schemes) and pragmatic (speech act theory) frameworks to describe the campaign promise argumentation scheme, which is the prototypical argumentative pattern at the core of US presidential debates that candidates recurrently use to manage disagreement. As an argumentative activity, political debates are inherently structured as disagreements: politician A argues that people should vote for them (and not for B), while politician B argues that people should vote for them (and not for A), with each of them subsequently providing arguments meant to showcase for the general public the benefits of their nomination. Crucially, through an analysis of examples taken from three US presidential debates, Reijven proposes that this process can be construed analogously to a promise each candidate makes, and, therefore, that the classical speech act-theoretic felicity conditions for promises can be adapted to and further specified for this particular argumentative activity. Thus, the arguments put forward by candidates to defend their bid for the presidency, which take the form of responses to the critical questions that opponents might raise, pragmatically function as evidence that the felicity conditions of the speech act are actually met. Candidates routinely give evidence that their promises are normatively sound (i.e., relevant, sincere and appropriate), which, from an argumentative perspective, boils down to a justification of the standpoint "vote for me". The advantage of grounding the analysis in a combined pragmatic and argumentative framework lies in its descriptive and predictive advantages: on the one hand it supplies a template to analyse all presidential debates in terms of how their inherent disagreement is actually managed by participants, and on the other it opens up research directions to investigate which pragmatic resources may be used to realise all the argumentative moves predicted by the model. As such, this paper offers an exemplary proposal to combine research at the pragmatics and argumentation interface.

In "Exploiting metaphor in disagreement", Lotte van Poppel and Roosmaryn Pilgram discuss different types of metaphor reuse, which is then analysed as a specific form of disagreement that can be observed in people's reactions to certain metaphorical framings found in public and political discourse. The authors first provide a valuable panorama of the phenomenon under scrutiny, which is typologically quite complex and extended in extant accounts. Their overview is articulated around three parameters: discursive function, (re)user of the metaphor, and similarity of source and target domains. In their typological overview, they single out metaphor exploitation, which denotes cases in which a re-user hijacks the

metaphor of the original speaker, thereby signalling a form of common ground in adopting the metaphorical mapping, but simultaneously also expressing disagreement with the original metaphorical representation: all instances of metaphor exploitation are thus defined as antagonistic, which makes them argumentative moves with specific rhetorical profiles. Through a study of 196 tweets collected in reaction to Boris Johnson's framing of Covid-19 as a mugger, the authors demonstrate the relevance and usefulness of their model, which allows them to describe in detail differences and similarities between cases of metaphor reuse, together with their argumentative and rhetorical affordances. All in all, this work provides valuable grounds to better understand the different possibilities of metaphor reuse when it comes to strategically manage disagreement.

All contributions gathered here tackle the pragmatic dimensions of disagreement in different but complementary ways. While some of them predominantly focus on the pragmatic embedding of disagreement by exploring explicit and implicit meaning-making resources, others also include reflections on broader normative concerns that lie at the core of disagreement management. Accordingly, the special issue offers a genuinely pragmatic contribution to the study of disagreement space which, it is our hope, will stimulate further research into how language users manage disagreement. To us, two related research directions naturally emerge from the contributions presented here. First, an experimental programme drawing on the pragmatic embedding of disagreement would contribute fundamental insights into the rhetorical aspects of disagreement management. Second, an argumentative study of the scope of disagreement, which would enlarge its normative toolkit to take on board insights from pragmatic research would itself deepen our understanding of the communicative elements (from intentions to values and claims) arguers can challenge and disagree with in argumentative exchanges. In a nutshell, we hope that the research collected here will continue to promote inquiries into the pragmatics and argumentation interface.

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