“THE CHURCH SHARES YOUR JOY”: A THOMISTIC ACCOUNT OF THE AFFECTIONS OF THE WILL AND COLLECTIVE WORSHIP

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"What do you have that you did not receive?" (1 Cor 4:7)

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ABBREVIATIONS

ST	Summa Theologiae
In Phil.	Super Epistolam B. Pauli ad Philipenses lectura
In Gal.	Super Epistolam B. Pauli ad Galatas lectura
SCG	Summa contra Gentiles
In Eph.	Super Epistolam B. Pauli ad Ephesios lectura
In Rom.	Super Epistolam B. Pauli ad Romanos lectura
DA	Sentencia libri De anima
In Phys.	Commentaria in octo libros Physicorum
In Psalmos	In psalmos Davidis expositio
In Heb.	Super Epistolam B. Pauli ad Hebraeos lectura
In Matt.	Super Evangelium S. Matthaei lectura
In Ioan.	Super Evangelium S. Ioannis lectura
De veritate	Quaestiones disputatae de veritate
De virtutibus	Quaestiones disputatae de virtutibus
In II Cor.	Super II Epistolam B. Pauli ad Corinthios lectura
In Met.	Sententia libri Metaphysicae
De malo	Quaestiones disputatae de malo
Catena in Ioan.	Catena aurea in quatuor Evangelia: Expositio in Ioannem
In Iob.	Expositio super Iob ad litteram
In Philem.	Super Epistolam B. Pauli ad Philemonem lectura
In Ethica	Sententia libri Ethicorum
DP	Quaestiones disputatae de potentia
DDN	In librum B. Dionysii De divinis nominibus expositio
De regno	De regno ad regem Cypri
In Pol.	Sententia libri Politicorum
CI	Liber contra impugnantes Dei cultum et religionem
In I Cor.	Super I Epistolam B. Pauli ad Corinthios lectura
CT	Compendium theologiae
In I Tim.	Super I Epistolam B. Pauli ad Timotheum lectura
In Isaiah	Expositio super Isaiam ad litteram
In Col.	Super Epistolam B. Pauli ad Colossenses lectura
In Sym.	Expositio in Symbolum Apostolorum
In I Thess.	Super I Epistolam B. Pauli ad Thessalonicenses lectura

INTRODUCTION

"The Church shares your joy." With these words the celebrant at a wedding greets the bride and groom in the Roman Rite of the Catholic Church.[1] They are words that set an affective tone for the remainder of the ceremony. On a closer view, however, they appear somewhat cryptic. What is being claimed in this statement? How can the Church be joyful? Is everyone in the worldwide Church included, whether they are aware of the wedding or not? Is this declaration of joy merely aspirational, or does it purport to describe an emotion that the Church truly holds? In the alternative greeting, the claim is slightly different: "We have come rejoicing into the house of the Lord for this celebration, dear brothers and sisters."[2] In this case, the celebrant does not seem to be speaking of the entire Church, but only of those present at the ceremony. Even then, the use of "we" seems to amount to a claim that everyone present holds the same emotion. Ambivalent in-laws, jealous friends, doubtful siblings: all present are apparently rejoicing.

Beyond the questions that this phrase immediately provokes, there is a deeper issue as to the very possibility of collective emotions. It is one thing for the same emotion to be shared by the individual members of a small group, say a basketball team. It is another to ascribe a sole emotion to the group itself, particularly when the group is significantly larger, as in the case of a corporation, nation, or church. If collective emotions are to signify something more than a guess at the emotions of a majority of a group's members, there must be some way to treat a group as a moral agent, independently from the agency of the individuals that comprise it.

To this issue of collective emotions, we may add a yet more fundamental one. The phrase identifies an emotion, joy. On one common view, a bodily change, such as in the heart rate or facial expression, is an essential component of an emotion. If there is no bodily change, on this view we should query whether the emotion truly exists. Another approach to emotion, however, requires no such bodily change, and views emotion instead as a matter of judgment

[1] International Commission on English in the Liturgy, "The Order of Celebrating Matrimony Within Mass," *The Order of Celebrating Matrimony*, 2nd ed. (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 2016), sec. 53.

[2] *The Order of Celebrating Matrimony*, sec. 52.

and action. This is not an entirely separate issue to that of collectivity. If an emotion must be embodied, then collective emotions are either not conceptually possible, or there must be some collective bodily element to the emotion.

Further, we may ask what role the phrase is playing in the Rite of Marriage. Why is the phrase even there in the first place? A similar phrase is found in the Rite of Baptism: "the Church of God receives you with great joy."[3] There is surely a pedagogical reason for these statements. Words and gestures have been carefully chosen in these rites to convey the Church's beliefs about marriage and baptism. But these particular words are going further and expressing not just a belief, but an *emotion*. Why?

This thesis is an attempt to address these questions. The emotive phrases I have cited are more important than they seem on a first reading. They are examples of a widespread affectivity throughout the Church's worship. My argument is that that the Church forms us in the moral life through our participation in collective worship, particularly through its collective affectivity—what we could call the "emotional" aspect of worship. My principal study and guide will be St Thomas Aquinas, to whom the term "emotion" was unknown. I have nevertheless chosen him because he provides us with the necessary vocabulary and distinctions to address the questions raised by the phrase "the Church shares your joy." I construct my argument in three steps. In the first, I introduce Aquinas's category of affection, and specifically affections of the will. In the second step, I demonstrate how we can understand collective affectivity according to Aquinas's thought. In the third, I apply the first two steps to an analysis of the Church's collective worship.

Peppered throughout Aquinas's works are two terms, *affectus* and *affectio*, both of which we may translate as "affection", and which may signify, though not exclusively, movements of the will. A love of learning or a hatred of travel are examples of affections of the will. There is no separate treatise on the affections in Aquinas's work, nor even a distinct question or article, but the prevalence of the affections throughout his work is such that he evidently saw

[3] International Commission on English in the Liturgy, The Order of Baptism of Children (New Jersey: Catholic Book Publishing Corp., 2020), n. 79.

them as indispensable to the structure, motivations, decisions, and destiny of the human person.

Three factors can obscure the place of the affections in Aquinas's corpus. The first is that his more prominent study of affectivity is the so-called Treatise on the Passions, found in qq. 22-48 of the *Prima secundae* of the *Summa Theologiae.* These 27 questions have attracted much attention in the secondary literature, with several major works and dissertations from the 2000s onwards.[4] But it is impossible to study Aquinas on the passions without having one's attention drawn to the other category of the affections, as he periodically reminds his readers that although love, desire, anger and the like are passions, they are also affections. There is the passion of love and the affection of love, the passion of anger and the affection of anger, and so on.

What is the difference between a passion and an affection? I will cover this in greater depth in Chapter 1, but there are some basic differences that I can briefly recount here. First, a passion is caused by an object that can be apprehended through the senses, either through the five exterior senses, or through the interior senses, which include imagination and memory. Secondly, the object provokes a bodily reaction in the one undergoing the passion, such as a faster heart rate, sweaty palms, or chills, hence many of our common metaphors for passion: boiling with rage, weak-kneed with fear, burning with desire. A third difference follows from these two, though Aquinas does not explicitly state it: the passions tend to be episodic, meaning that in standard human experience people alternate between experiences of anger, delight, desire and so on, according to the objects they apprehend.

The passions explain much affective experience, from what a person goes through in an average day, to the high and low moments of that person's life. But they do not explain it all.

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[4] Three books were published in the US within three years: Diana Fritz Cates, *Aquinas on the Emotions: A Religious-Ethical Inquiry* (Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2009); Robert Miner, *Thomas Aquinas on the Passions* (NY: Cambridge University Press, 2009); Nicholas Lombardo, *The Logic of Desire* (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2011). See in particular Lombardo's work at Chapter 3, "The Affections of the Will". Another work that treats the affections of the will is Stephen A. Chanderbhan, "That Your Joy May Be Full: Emotions in the Thought of Thomas Aquinas," PhD diss., (St Louis University, 2012), in particular Chapter 2. Chanderbhan comments at p. 112: "An account of Aquinas's thoughts on the affective life of humans is incomplete without paying attention to the affections."

People often talk of their passion for truth or justice. Are they wrong? Can one boil with rage at injustice in general? If someone desires a promotion, or hates a relative, but with no bodily reaction, what are we to call this desire and hatred if they are not passions? Aquinas's category of affections of the will addresses precisely these questions. The affections have universals as their objects, which are known by the intellect rather than the senses. They do not necessarily bring about a bodily reaction; rather, they can be a simple act of the will. Finally, affections need not come and go depending on the activity of the senses. An affection can certainly be momentary, but it can also endure across decades.

The second factor is that the translation of *affectu/affectio* with the English "affection" comes with many drawbacks. English dictionaries will usually define "affection" along the lines of a moderate feeling or sentiment of warmth, tenderness, or fondness. These words are not inconsistent with the affection of love, but for Aquinas the affections embrace a significantly greater range in breadth and depth. In breadth, because although the affections include those like love and desire, which connote a positive appreciation, they also include anger, hatred, and despair. In depth, because the affections embrace a range of intensity. They may well be moderate, but may also be vehement. A modern English speaker would be unlikely to associate hatred, anger, or despair with the word "affection".

The third factor is that translators often reach for other words and phrases in place of "affection", perhaps to avoid the sentimentality that it may convey. The Shapcote translation of the *Summa Theologiae*, originally made from 1911 to 1925, with a revised version published in 2012, renders *affectu* and *affectio* variously as emotion, appetite, movement, disposition, will, love, fondness, feeling, intention, sense, sentiment, devotion, desire, thought, inclination, attachment, mind, conviction, condescension, presence of mind, undivided allegiance, fervour, and heart.[5] On one hand, the range of translations emphasises

[5] See for example, Emotion: *ST* I-II 31.1; 31.7; 31.8; 33.1; 59.2; 59.5; 60.2; II-II 123.10; 129.3 ad. 3; 154.5; 158.1 ad. 1; 159.2; III 85.2 obj. 1. Appetite: *ST* II-II 7.2 ad. 1; 26.1 ad. 2; 175.2; 180.7 ad. 1; III 85.5. Movement: *ST* I-II 56.3 ad. 1. Disposition: *ST* I-II 108.4 ad. 1; II-II 154.5; 157.3 ad. 1. Will: *ST* I-II 113.1 ad. 2; III 18.5 sc; III 86.1. Love: *ST* II-II 24.12 obj. 2; 153.5; III 66.12. Fondness: *ST* II-II 32.2 ad. 1. Feeling: *ST* II-II 41.1 ad. 3; 157.1 ad. 3; 157.3 ad. 3; III 50.1 ad. 1. Intention: *ST* II-II 72.2; III 2.6. Sense: *ST* II-II 72.3 ad. 2; 104.3 sc. Sentiment: *ST* II-II 76.1; 76.3; 82.4 ad. 3; 110.3 ad. 3. Devotion: *ST* II-II 91.2; 184.3 ad. 1; 188.4 sc. Desire: *ST* II-II 110.3 ad. 3; 186.3 ad. 2; III 21.2; 21.3; 21.4 ad. 4; 59.1 ad. 3; 66.12. Thought: *ST* II-II 118.8. Inclination: *ST* II-II 157.4; III 41.4. Attachment: *ST* II-II 168.3; 169.1; 185.7; 186.3 ad. 2. Mind: *ST* III 1.4 obj.

the breadth of affective experiences contained in *affectus/affectio*. For an English reader, however, it also diminishes the impression of just how regularly the category of affection appears.

Translators sometimes opt for "emotion" for *passio*, *affectus*, and *affectio*, but there are two reasons to avoid this. First, the term is itself of relatively recent coining, dating from the seventeenth century, and only becoming an established category for systematic study in the mid-nineteenth century.[6] Even the philosophers of the early modern era wrote their treatises on the passions, not on the emotions. When we use the term emotion in relation to Aquinas, we are using a term nowhere to be found in the literature of his day. Secondly, even within contemporary philosophical literature there is debate on what constitutes an emotion, particularly over whether it implies a bodily reaction. There is the risk that using such a disputed term throws confusion into an already complicated topic. Nevertheless, there is sufficient conceptual overlap between, first, the affections and passions in Aquinas's work, and secondly, the emotions as they are treated in philosophy and psychology, for us to draw on the literature on the emotions in this study, with the caveat that the fundamental question, "What is an emotion?", is never far away.

The purpose of Chapter One, "Affections of the Will", is to establish why the affections of the will are worthy of the attention this thesis gives them. The chapter will be in two sections. In the first, I give an overview of the importance of the affections to Aquinas's thought, following the thread of the affections through the different aspects of human action, such as the basic inclinations of the human person, the role of the affections in good and bad actions, and the capacity of the sacraments to direct the affections. To explain why Aquinas does not only speak of passion, but also affections, I turn to some contemporary philosophical and psychological literature on the emotions. The discussion in this section of intellectual emotions, dispassionate affections, and standing emotions all demonstrate the inadequacy of

3. Conviction: *ST* III 1.4 obj. 3. Condescension: *ST* II-II 80.1 ad 2. Presence of mind: *ST* III 30.3 ad. 3. Undivided allegiance: *ST* III 38.5 ad. 2. Fervor: *ST* III 57.1 ad. 3. Heart: *ST* III 59.5. St Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, trans. Laurence Shapcote, ed. John Mortensen and Enrique Alarcón, vols. 13-22 (Lander, WY: The Aquinas Institute for the Study of Sacred Doctrine, 2012).

[6] See Thomas Dixon, ""Emotion": The History of a Keyword in Crisis," *Emotion Review* 4, vol.4 (2012), 338.

a narrow, "embodied" concept of emotion, and by analogy the limitations of Aquinas's category of passions fully to explain affectivity. In the second section I offer some definitions and distinctions that will be critical for the remainder of the thesis, such as the difference between the sensitive and intellectual appetites, and the concept of "overflow" between the appetites. An important point of discussion is whether and how affections of the will are superior to the passions.

I end the chapter with a summary of the different terms that Aquinas uses to describe affective movements in general. There are four: *affectus*, *affectio*, *actus voluntatis* (act of the will), and *passio* (passion). The important conclusion of this section is that *affectus* is an umbrella term that can also encompass *affectio* and *actus voluntatis*, for movements of the will, as well as *passio*, for movements of the sensitive appetite. In other words, a passion is a particular kind of affection. There are nevertheless some differences as to when Aquinas will use one term rather than the other.

In Chapter Two, "Particular Affections", I investigate whether Aquinas considers each of the eleven passions to have analogues as affections of the will. In one of his articles on the will in the *Summa Theologiae*, he suggests this possibility:

> Love, concupiscence, and the like are taken in two ways. Sometimes as they are certain passions, namely, when coming forth from some disturbance of the soul. And thus they are commonly taken, and in this way they are only in the sensitive appetite. Another way signifies simple affection, without passion or disturbance of the soul. And thus they are acts of the will.[7]

The question is, how far does "and the like" (*huiusmodi*) extend? Does it refer to all eleven of the passions that Aquinas will go on to identify in the succeeding questions? In similar passages elsewhere, in addition to love and concupiscence Aquinas further includes anger, fear, sorrow, and joy as acts of the will either in the separated soul of the human being, or in

[7] ST I 82.5 ad. 1: "amor, concupiscentia, et huiusmodi, dupliciter accipiuntur. Quandoque quidem secundum quod sunt quaedam passiones, cum quadam scilicet concitatione animi provenientes. Et sic communiter accipiuntur, et hoc modo sunt solum in appetitu sensitivo. Alio modo significant simplicem affectum, absque passione vel animi concitatione. Et sic sunt actus voluntatis."

demons, or in God.[8] That leaves us with hatred, aversion, daring, hope, and despair so far unaccounted for.

We could assume that *huiusmodi* will cover everything that Aquinas names as a passion, particularly as in the *Commentary on the Sentences* he observes: that things pertaining to the sensitive appetite are transferred to the intellectual appetite, "like the names of the passions"; that "fear and other passions are ascribed to the intellectual appetite"; and further, that "an affection of the will is named by the names of the passions."[9] Authorities including Michel Labourdette, H.-D. Noble, and Marcos Manzanedo also affirm that to each passion there is an equivalent affection of the will, though that view is not universally held.[10] The safer approach, then, is to examine each passion singularly to arrive at an understanding of the relevant affection. We are helped by the fact that for some passions (love, delight, and hope) Aquinas has separate articles specifically dealing with the analogues to these passions in the intellectual appetite.[11]

In the second section of the chapter I will focus on the affection of wonder. This affection sits apart from the affections of the will that we will consider in the first section. Since it does not pertain to the sensitive appetite, by Aquinas's criteria wonder cannot be a passion, and he therefore does not include it among his passions of the soul. Wonder is solely an affection of

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[8] *ST* I 3.2 obj 2, ad 2; *ST* I 20.1 ad 1; *ST* I 82.5 ad 1; *ST* I-II 22.3 ad 3; *ST* III 84.9 ad 2; *SCG* I 90, n. 2; *SCG* II 80, n. 16. Although the affections of the will have direct applicability to the subject of emotion in God, that is not a subject I will be addressing in this thesis. Some important works on this subject include Marcel Sarot, "God, Emotion, and Corporeality: A Thomist Perspective," *The Thomist* 58, vol. 1 (1994): 61-92; and Daniel Westberg, "Emotion and God: A Reply to Marcel Sarot," *The Thomist* 60, no. 1 (1996): 109-121. See also the discussions in Cates, *Aquinas on the Emotions*, 92-95; and Lombardo, *The Logic of Desire*, 82-83. A more recent work is Emmanuel Durand, *Les Émotions de Dieu: indices d'engagement* (Paris: Cerf, 2019).

[9] *In III Sent*. d. 27 q. 2 a. 1 co.: "Ea autem quae ad sensitivum appetitum pertinent, ad intellectivum transferuntur, sicut nomina passionum." *In IV Sent*. d. 14 q. 1 a. 3 qc. 4 co.: "timor et aliae passiones dantur in intellectivo appetitu." *In IV Sent*. d. 17 q. 2 a. 1 qc. 2 ad 1: "affectus voluntatis nominatur per nomina passionum." See also *De veritate* q. 25, a. 3, co: "appetitus vero superior habet aliquos actus similes inferiori appetitui, sed absque omni passione. Et sic operationes superioris appetitus sortiuntur interdum nomina passionum."

[10] Labourdette, *Les actes humains*, 282; Noble, *Les passions*, 124; Marcos F. Manzanedo, *Las pasiones según Santo Tomás* (Salamanca: Editorial San Esteban, 2004), 239. Peter King asserts that all of the passions have dispassionate analogues: "The whole panoply of the passions found in the sensitive appetite is replicated at the level of the intellective appetite." King, "Dispassionate Passions," 24. John Dryden, by contrast, asserts that none of the irascible passions have an affection analogue but that all of the concupiscible passions do: "Passions, Affections, and Emotions: Methodological Difficulties in Reconstructing Aquinas's Philosophical Psychology." *Literature Compass* 13, no. 6 (2016), 349.

[11] *ST* I-II 26.3; *ST* I-II 31.4; *In III Sent*., d. 26, q. 1, a. 5, co.

the will, though it may overflow into the sense appetite. Even though Aquinas uses a sole term for wonder (*admiratio*), he uses it in different ways, which I distinguish with the terms philosophical wonder, admiration, and awe, and I draw on examples from philosophy and other fields to explain why these distinctions between different varieties of wonder are justified. We will see later in the thesis that wonder is a prevalent religious affection, often expressed through praise. In this section of the thesis, however, it serves as a case study to demonstrate why we must go beyond the treatise on the passions to grasp more fully Aquinas's thought on affectivity.

Discussion of affective experience is often confined to the individual, personal level. But there is a social element to affectivity that can also influence affectivity at the individual level. This is what I study in Chapter Three, "Collective Affections." My aim in this chapter is to show how the Church can have and express affections. This is not something that Aquinas directly discusses, given that the great majority of his focus is on the passions and affections of individuals. To introduce some of the issues in collective affectivity, as opposed to individual affectivity, I first move away from Aquinas to the fields of philosophy, psychology, and sociology, where collective affectivity has become a particularly fertile area of recent study. A substantial edited volume, *Collective Emotions*, was devoted to the topic in 2014, with a similar volume in French appearing in 2020.[12] I trace the genesis of the modern interest in collective emotions back to Gustave Le Bon's work on the behaviour of crowds, and Émile Durkheim's concept of collective effervescence. There are some necessary distinctions to be made between collective and shared emotions, and collective and group-based emotions. These distinctions help us to clarify that statements ascribing emotions to groups (such as a headline reading "A Nation Mourns" or a politician saying, "Unions are angry") need not reflect the emotions of all, or even a majority, of these groups' members.

In the discussion that follows, some issues will re-emerge that by then will be familiar. How can a collective have an emotion if it does not have a single body? Does an emotion require feelings? I then consider how collective emotions are established, the purpose they serve, and

[12] *Collective Emotions*, ed. Christian von Scheve and Mikko Salmela (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014); *Les émotions collectives*, ed. Laurence Kaufmann and Louis Quéré (Paris: Éditions de l'EHESS, 2020).

some of the ways in which collectives can show emotion. A question naturally emerges once we make a distinction between individual and collective emotions: What happens when a member of a group does not personally share the emotions of the group? This is the issue of normativity, and it has practical implications for collective worship—how, and to what extent, is an individual worshipper to have the emotions that are expressed collectively in worship?

In the second section of the chapter I return to Aquinas, to show that although he does not directly offer a theory of collective affectivity, he does ascribe affections to groups, notably to the crowd in his Gospel commentaries. There are also counterparts in his thought to aspects of Durkheim's theory of collective effervescence, such as the concept of ecstasy (*extasis*), which is one of the effects of love. From his treatments of collective agency, and the actions of societies, including the society that is the Church, I will show that Aquinas provides the foundations for a theory of collective affectivity.

Having explored affections of the will and collectivity, it will remain for us to turn to collective worship, which I do in Chapter Four, "Religious Affections". For Aquinas, the affections are critical to the external acts of worship, such as vocal prayer and bodily gestures, which are done for the sake of our affections. In his commentaries on the Mass in the *Commentary on the Sentences* and the *Summa Theologiae*, he interprets many of the elements of the Mass according to the affections that they are intended to elicit and express. Eight religious affections are prominent in his discussion of worship. They include some that we will have already discussed in the earlier chapters, such as wonder and hope, and others that I discuss for the first time, such as devotion and reverence. With these affections identified, I survey some of the Church's liturgies, paying attention to the language of worship, to demonstrate the extent of worship's affectivity.[13] I also briefly consider some ancillary questions such as the difference between affectivity and sentimentality, and whether the Church's affections impose normative expectations on the affections of its members.

[13] I am focusing in this thesis on collective worship in the Latin Rite of the Catholic Church. The principles could easily be transferred across the various rites of the Catholic Church, beyond the Catholic Church itself into other forms of Christian worship.

The title of this chapter requires some clarification. An alternative could well have been "Ecclesial Affections", which would encompass much of what I discuss, but would not capture with precision that my specific focus is the Church's public worship. I am not considering ecclesial affections extraneous to public worship, such as joy at the election of a new pope, or fear of a rupture in the Church's unity. Other alternative titles would include "Liturgical Affections" and "Ritual Affections", and while each could certainly be used in contexts of worship, "Religious Affections" has two qualities that these terms lack. The first is that it preserves a connection with the long usage of the term in Protestant scholarship, notably in the treatise of the same name by Jonathan Edwards, and continuing with scholars that Edwards has influenced, such as Don Saliers.[14] More importantly, however, the term emphasises that these affections pertain to the virtue of religion, either because Aquinas specifically mentions them in that context, or because elsewhere he demonstrates their role in ordering us to God.

To argue for a positive role for emotion in worship is to enter dangerous territory. Some dispute that emotion should have any place at all in faith. Monsignor Ronald Knox, the great twentieth-century preacher and apologist, articulated well this suspicion: "It is possible to argue that the true business of faith is not to produce emotional conviction in us, but to teach us to do without it."[15] Knox's suggestion was understated—"it is possible to argue." But in even raising the possibility, Knox put his finger on a certain suspicion towards the place of emotion in faith, and one that is not uncommon. That suspicion, if articulated, would run along something like the following lines. Emotions can certainly play a role in faith, granted. The disciples on the road to Emmaus were clearly emotionally moved as they heard the scriptures explained by the risen Christ. "Did not our hearts burn within us?" they exclaimed

[14] Jonathan Edwards, *Religious Affections*, ed. John E. Smith (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959). One of Saliers' stated goals is to "defend the importance of religious affections against those holding them in ill-repute." Don E. Saliers, *The Soul in Paraphrase: Prayer and the Religious Affections*, 2nd ed (Cleveland, OH: OSL Publications, 1991), 5.

[15] Ronald Knox, *A Retreat for Lay People* (London: Sheed and Ward, 1955), 35. Knox was, however, contrasting John Wesley's faith, a faith fixed "firmly on the emotions", to the faith of Samuel Johnson, who accepted the beliefs of the Anglican Church "with a firm direction of the will and intellect."

(Lk 24:32). The disciples' hearts may well have burned, but surely not all the time. Emotions come and go. They are unpredictable. They shift and shuffle from moment to moment, and so prove themselves unstable elements of faith. We should therefore free ourselves from their influence, and instead ground our faith in acts of intellect and will, that endure over and above our passing emotions.

This suspicion is tenable, however, only if one sees emotions as embodied and ephemeral. It is more a suspicion of sentimentality than of emotion. If emotions can be longer-lasting and seated in the will, we would surely view them more positively. Donald Saliers calls such emotions "deep emotions", and comments:

> Whatever else it may include, the Christian faith is a pattern of deep emotions. It is gratitude to God for creation and redemption, awe and holy fear of the divine majesty, repentant sorrow over our sins, joy in God's steadfast love and mercy, and love of God and neighbor. To confess faith in God is to live a life characterized by these emotions.[16]

These "deep emotions" are, I suggest, more accurately called affections of the will, and in relation to worship, "religious affections". Saliers' point nevertheless holds. The Christian faith is a pattern of affections of the ill, including gratitude, awe, fear, sorrow, joy, and love.

I am offering this as a thesis in the discipline of moral theology. It strays—in my view quite rightly—into areas of ecclesiology, liturgy, and sacramental theology. A strict separation between disciplines of theology can be pedagogically useful, but it is nonetheless artificial. The good life, and specifically the good Christian life, cannot be separated from who or what one worships, and the many questions that follow: how one worships, and when, where, and with whom. All of these are moral questions, which the Church answers as a moral teacher, not simply in its proclamation of the Scriptures, its doctrine, and its magisterial teaching, but in its worship.

[16] Saliers, *The Soul in Paraphrase*, 9.

CHAPTER ONE – AFFECTIONS OF THE WILL

SECTION 1 – AQUINAS AND THE AFFECTIONS

When Aquinas drew on the category of affection, he was following a long tradition. Damien Boquet and Piroska Nagy have traced the usages of *affectus* and *passio* from the classical pagan authors through to their use in Christian works. The Christian authors of late antiquity tended to draw their emotional vocabulary from Cicero, Seneca, and Quintilian, who used *passio* only rarely, and usually in the sense of suffering.[17] Cicero, however, used many terms for the Greek *pathos*, including *affectio*, while Seneca and Quintilian both used *affectus*. What followed, for Latin Christian writers, was variation in the terminology, where as well as the neutral terms of *affectus* and *affectio*, there were also *pertubatio* and *passio*, both of which suggested trouble and disorder in the soul.[18] *Affectus* and *affectio*, though, were the dominant terms used by the early Christian writers. Boquet and Nagy explain why, in their view, these writers preferred *affectus* to *passio*:

> The first was better able to marry all the stages of the affective process, from the initial emotional shock to the lasting implantation of a sentiment, while the second could only describe the final state of embedded emotion and also had connotations of disturbance, which likewise posed a problem. It is why the dialogue between theologians and philosophers was not always easy, since, using the same term *affectus*, they sometimes spoke of different emotional realities. We must remember that from the fifth century, the term *affectus*, the most commonly used to describe emotion, was capable, according to the context in which it was used, of describing emotional states that were very varied in their nature and their manner of expression.[19]

Aquinas's use of *affectus* and *affectio* therefore came to his texts with a long history. These were terms that he was familiar with from his own reading of these ancient authors, and they were able to convey meaning that the term *passio* could not. A writer he quotes often, Augustine of Hippo, surveyed the different affections that Jesus displayed during his earthly life, such as anger (Mk 3:5), gladness (Jn 11:15), sorrow (Jn 11:35), and desire (Lk 22:25), and saw these examples of right affection essential to a good life.[20] Augustine viewed people

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[17] Damien Boquet and Piroska Nagy, *Medieval Sensibilities: A History of Emotions in the Middle Ages*, trans. Robert Shaw (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2018), 19.

[18] Bouquet and Nagy, *Medieval Sensibilities*, 22.

[19] Bouquet and Nagy, *Medieval Sensibilities*, 24.

[20] *St Augustine: City of God, Christian Doctrine*, vol. 2 of *A Select Library of the Nicene and post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church*, ed. Philip Schaff (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1971), Book XIV, ch. 9.

who took pride in being unmoved by their affections as having lost their humanity rather than having found peace.[21] He summed up the importance of the affections for the good life: "since we must live a good life in order to attain to a blessed life, a good life has all these affections right, a bad life has them wrong."[22]

1. The importance of the affections

Aquinas gives the affections an all-encompassing role in human life. In his commentary on Paul's Letter to the Philippians, he summarises the importance of the affections:

> Life conveys a certain motion. For those things are said to be alive which are moved by themselves. And from this is what seems to be at the root of man's life, what is the principle of motion in him. But this is what the affection (*affectus*) is united to as to an end, because from this man is moved towards anything.[23]

Taking Paul's words, "For me, to live is Christ" (Phil 1:21), he explains that there can be some objects that so dominate our affections that that they constitute life itself: "For some call that from which they are moved to activity their life, as hunters do hunting, and friends friendship. In such a way, therefore, Christ is our life, because the whole principle of our life and activity is Christ."[24] In another commentary, this time on the Letter to the Galatians, Aquinas is even stronger about this point, stating that "a man is said to live according to that in which he principally establishes his affection, and in what he is delighted in the most."[25]

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[21] "If some, with a vanity monstrous in proportion to its rarity, have become enamored of themselves because they can be stimulated and excited by no emotion, moved or bent by no affection, such persons rather lose all humanity than obtain true tranquillity. For a thing is not necessarily right because it is inflexible, nor healthy because it is insensible." Augustine, *City of God*, Book XIV, ch. 9. "Et si nonnulli tanto inmaniore, quanto rariore uanitate hoc in se ipsis adamauerint, ut nullo prorsus erigantur et excitentur, nullo flextantur atque inclinentur affectu: humanitatem totam potius amitunt, quam ueram adsequuntur tranquillitatem. Non enim quia durum aliquid, ideo rectum, aut quia stupidum est, ideo sanum": Augustini, *De Civitate Dei libri XI-XXII*, Corpus Christianorum Series Latina 48, edited by Mark Adriaen (Turnhout: Brepols, 1960), 430.

[22] Augustine, *City of God*, Book XIV, ch. 9. "Quae cum ita sint, quoniam recta uita ducenda est, qua perueniendum sit ad beatam, omnes affectus istos uita recta rectos habet, peruersa peruersos." Augustini, *De Civitate Dei*, 429.

[23] *In Phil*, cap. 1, lect. 3: "Vita enim importat motionem quamdam. Illa enim vivere dicuntur, quae ex se moventur. Et inde est quod illud videtur esse radicaliter vita hominis, quod est principium motus in eo. Hoc autem est illud, cui affectus unitur sicut fini, quia ex hoc movetur homo ad omnia." Unless otherwise indicated, all translations in this thesis are my own.

[24] *In Phil*. cap. 1, lect. 3: "Unde aliqui dicunt illud, ex quo moventur ad operandum, vitam suam, ut venatores venationem, et amici amicum. Sic ergo Christus est vita nostra, quoniam totum principium vitae nostrae et operationis est Christus."

[25] *In Gal*. cap. 2, lect. 6: "homo quantum ad illud dicitur vivere, in quo principaliter firmat suum affectum, et in quo maxime delectatur. Unde et homines qui in studio seu in venationibus maxime delectantur, dicunt hoc eorum vitam esse."

For an example that he uses in both these commentaries, he turns to hunting, the principal sport of his day. We could propose instead any number of latter-day pursuits: a profession, football, social media, film. Any of these can so dominate our affections that everything we do, including sleeping and eating, is directed towards this one pursuit. It will also determine what challenges us, what evokes our anger, what tempts us to despair, what we take delight in, what we consider when making decisions.

Aquinas's observations here find an echo in the work of a much-later thinker, Jonathan Edwards, who devoted an entire treatise to the subject of the affections and their place in the Christian life. This eighteenth-century divine wrote a lengthy work, *A Treatise concerning Religious Affections*, in which he placed the affections at the foundation of all human activity:

> We see the world of mankind to be exceedingly busy and active; and the affections of men are the springs of the motion: take away all love and hatred, all hope and fear, all anger, zeal and affectionate desire, and the world would be, in a great measure, motionless and dead; there would be no such thing as activity amongst mankind, or any pursuit whatsoever.[26]

Edwards's aim in the treatise was to demonstrate how affections are similarly fundamental to Christianity:

> As in worldly things, worldly affections are very much the spring of men's motion and action; so in religious matters, the spring of their actions are very much religious affections; he that has doctrinal knowledge and speculation only, without affection, never is engaged in the business of religion.[27]

If Aquinas and Edwards are right, then when we look at our material surroundings—which perhaps include a desk, lamps, a computer, books—every man-made object we see exists because of affections, ranging from a fear of starvation to the desire for praise. The same is true further afield in the material and abstract objects that are the pursuits of human life: marriage, red wine, gardening, politics, music, ballet. The affections account for how we spend each moment of every day, hence Edwards's image of affection as the spring of human motion and action. It is evident, then, how wide-ranging is the place of the affections in the moral life. If they are the reason why we are moved towards any activity at all, then it is

[26] Edwards, *Religious Affections*, 101.
[27] Edwards, *Religious Affections*, 101.

impossible to conceive of any voluntary action, however mundane, that is not motivated by affections. As Edwards argued, there would be no human activities or pursuits of whatever kind without the affections. And if affections are the principle of a person's actions, the affections can be evaluated morally, and everything that goes into creating, feeding, and sustaining the affections also has a moral quality.

2. The purpose of the affections

Although Aquinas gives the affections a defining role in determining in what one's life consists, this does not of itself answer the question of what the affections are *for*. In his discussion of the divine government of the world, he explains that it pertains to the divine goodness to lead things to their perfection.[28] The end, or goal, of God's government of the world is the essential good, and all things tend towards this essential good by likeness and participation.[29] There are two effects of this government: things are preserved in their goodness, and they have a motion towards the good.[30] Within this sweeping vision, Aquinas situates the rational creature, which governs itself by intellect and will, but which also must be ruled and perfected by God's intellect and will.[31] Later, when he considers the human person in particular, he states in his first article that the object of the will (and therefore the affections of the will) is the good.[32] We may conclude that the affections, together with reason, are participations in God's government of the world. Through the faculty of will, human beings participate in the divine ordering of creation towards the good, seeking their own perfection, and seeking the end of all actions and affections—God, the supreme good.[33]

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[28] *ST* I 103.1: "Ultima autem perfectio uniuscuiusque est in consecutione finis. Unde ad divinam bonitatem pertinet ut, sicut produxit res in esse, ita etiam eas ad finem perducat. Quod est gubernare."

[29] *ST* I 103.4: "Finis autem gubernationis mundi est bonum essentiale, ad cuius participationem et assimilationem omnia tendunt."

[30] *ST* I 103.4: "duo sunt effectus gubernationis, scilicet conservatio rerum in bono, et motio earum ad bonum."

[31] *ST* I 103.5 ad 3: "creatura rationalis gubernat seipsam per intellectum et voluntatem, quorum utrumque indiget regi et perfici ab intellectu et voluntate Dei. Et ideo supra gubernationem qua creatura rationalis gubernat seipsam tanquam domina sui actus, indiget gubernari a Deo."

[32] *ST* I-II 1.1: "Obiectum autem voluntatis est finis et bonum." See also *ST* I-II 8.1 ad. 2; *ST* I 82.4; *SCG* II 27, n. 2.

[33] *ST* I 103.4: "Uno modo, ex parte ipsius finis, et sic est unus effectus gubernationis, scilicet assimilari summo bono."

For comparison and contrast we may take Robert Solomon's explanation of emotions as being about and directed to the world.[34] He defined emotions as "subjective engagements with the world" (which was a revision of his earlier "bumper-sticker" slogan about emotions, that "emotions are judgments").[35] He continued: "a judgment is not a detached intellectual act but a way of cognitively *grappling* with the world. It has as its very basis and as background a complex set of aspirations, expectations, evaluations ("appraisals"), needs, demands, and desires."[36] This way of understanding the purpose of emotions—to engage with the world—is certainly consistent with the affections in Aquinas's work. But Solomon leaves open the question of the purpose of that engagement, and indeed the purpose of the world. Aquinas, by contrast, situates the affections within a vision of reality that has a structure and a purpose.

3. The thread of the affections

Another way to gauge the importance of affections is by a glance at the range of areas of human life that Aquinas explains with reference to them, and the consistency with which he does so. We can begin with the basic inclinations of the human being. Most fundamentally, the affections aid in the preservation of being. Given that all things seek to exist, everything has a "natural affection" for those things by which its being is preserved.[37] Preservation of being is one of the natural inclinations that Aquinas lists in his question on the natural law.[38] The others are the propagation of the species through the union of male and female and the bringing up of children, which the human person has in common with other animals, and the inclinations that are proper to it according to the nature of reason: to know the truth about God and to live in society.[39] The affections also aid in fulfilling these natural inclinations,

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[34] Robert C. Solomon, "Emotions, Thoughts, and Feelings," in *Thinking about Feeling*, ed. Robert C. Solomon (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 77.

[35] Solomon, "Emotions, Thoughts, and Feelings," 77.

[36] Solomon, "Emotions, Thoughts, and Feelings," 77.

[37] *SCG* III 131, n. 3: "Naturalem affectum habent omnia ad ea quibus esse suum conservatur, inquantum omnia esse appetunt."

[38] *ST* I-II 94.2: "Et secundum hanc inclinationem, pertinent ad legem naturalem ea per quae vita hominis conservatur, et contrarium impeditur."

[39] *ST* I-II 94.2: "Secundo inest homini inclinatio ad aliqua magis specialia, secundum naturam in qua communicat cum ceteris animalibus. Et secundum hoc, dicuntur ea esse de lege naturali quae natura omnia animalia docuit, ut est coniunctio maris et feminae, et educatio liberorum, et similia …. Tertio modo inest homini inclinatio ad bonum secundum naturam rationis, quae est sibi propria, sicut homo habet naturalem inclinationem ad hoc quod veritatem cognoscat de Deo, et ad hoc quod in societate vivat."

through the affection of husband and wife, through the love of friendship, and through the natural desire for knowledge.[40] More generally, Aquinas follows Dionysius in holding that the soul receives more from a thing according to affection than according to the intellect.[41]

When we turn to the moral life, Aquinas explains good and bad actions and habits by reference to the affections. The object of a good act is either the true, being the object of the intellect, or the good, being the object of the affections.[42] As to the act itself, he sees two things as required for a good action: that the affection be inclined to the good, and that reason perfect the good of virtue through prudence.[43] Virtue itself is the ruling by reason of the interior affections and the use of corporeal things.[44] We find the thread of affection also in the realm of evil. The temptation of the enemy results from suggestions that concern things about which we have an affection.[45] Through venial sin man's affections are hindered, so that they are not prompt in tending towards God.[46] It is also by sin that the appropriate order of our affections is impeded.[47]

The thread continues when we turn to those aspects of life associated with Christian discipleship, beginning with the incarnation itself. Aquinas explains that the incarnation was intended to dispose human affections towards desiring the enjoyment of the divine, by

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[40] On the propagation of the species, see *In Gal*. cap. 4, lect. 7: "Nec tamen peccavit Abraham ad eam accedens, quia accessit ad eam coniugis affectu et ordinatione divina." Also *In Eph*. cap. 5, lect. 10: "Notandum hic est quod in praedicta auctoritate triplex coniunctio viri ad mulierem designatur. Prima per affectum dilectionis, quia est tantus affectus utriusque ut patres relinquant." On friendship (life in society), see *ST* I-II 28.2: "quantum ad vim appetitivam, amatum dicitur esse in amante, prout est per quandam complacentiam in eius affectu, ut vel delectetur in eo, aut in bonis eius, apud praesentiam; vel in absentia, per desiderium tendat in ipsum amatum per amorem concupiscentiae; vel in bona quae vult amato, per amorem amicitiae; non quidem ex aliqua extrinseca causa, sicut cum aliquis desiderat aliquid propter alterum, vel cum aliquis vult bonum alteri propter aliquid aliud; sed propter complacentiam amati interius radicatam." On the desire for knowledge, see for example *SCG* III 50, n. 3: "Non quiescit igitur sciendi desiderium, naturaliter omnibus substantiis intellectualibus inditum, nisi, cognitis substantiis effectuum, etiam substantiam causae cognoscant."

[41] *In III Sent.*, d. 15, q. 2, a. 1, qc. 2, co.: "unde magis recipit anima a re secundum affectum, et vehementius movetur, quam secundum intellectum; sicut dicit Dionysius."

[42] *In Philip*. cap. 4, lect. 1: "Obiectum autem boni actus, vel est obiectum cognitionis, vel affectionis. Quantum ad intellectum est verum, quantum ad affectum est bonum."

[43] *ST* I 113.1 ad. 2: "ad bene operandum duo requiruntur. Primo quidem, quod affectus inclinetur ad bonum, quod quidem fit in nobis per habitum virtutis moralis. Secundo autem, quod ratio inveniat congruas vias ad perficiendum bonum virtutis, quod quidem philosophus attribuit prudentiae."

[44] *SCG* III 121, n. 3: "Virtus autem in hoc consistit, quod tam interiores affectiones, quam corporalium rerum usus, ratione regulentur."

[45] *ST* III 41.4: "tentatio quae est ab hoste, fit per modum suggestionis, ut Gregorius dicit. Non autem eodem modo potest aliquid omnibus suggeri, sed unicuique suggeritur aliquid ex his circa quae est affectus."

[46] *ST* III 87.1: "per peccatum autem veniale retardatur affectus hominis ne prompte in Deum feratur."

[47] *In Rom.* cap. 5, lect. 2: "per peccatum debitus ordo affectionum excluditur."

demonstrating God's love for man.[48] In other aspects of relationship with God, we continue to find the affections: repentance is about a change in the affections;[49] we approach and draw away from God through the affections of the mind;[50] we are joined to him and subject ourselves to him through our intellect and affections.[51] Among the theological virtues, charity unites our affections to God, and the affection of hope allows us to esteem beatitude as something possible to have; this hope is imprinted on our affections through grace.[52] Faith is a matter of the intellect rather than the affections, but even then, faith is what makes God present to the affections.[53]

As we shall see more fully in the later chapters of this thesis, the affections are also present in the ecclesial aspects of faith, chiefly through worship, which Aquinas holds to be both internal and external.[54] Interior worship consists in the soul being united to God by intellect and affection, and the external actions of worship correspond to the different ways in which the intellect and affection of the worshipper are united to God.[55] On the question of why we use our bodies in worship, Aquinas explains that exterior acts of adoration are done for reason of interior adoration, as when we make signs of humility to stir up the affections to subject ourselves to God.[56] The sacraments, too, are intended to redirect the affections, through returning the affection man has for sensible things to God.[57] Finally, Aquinas defines

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[48] *SCG* IV 54, n. 5: "Cum beatitudo hominis perfecta in divina fruitione consistat, oportuit affectum hominis ad desiderium divinae fruitionis disponi: sicut videmus homini beatitudinis desiderium naturaliter inesse … Nihil autem sic ad amorem alicuius nos inducit sicut experimentum illius ad nos."

[49] *SCG* I 89, n. 11: "Poenitentia mutationem affectus importat."

[50] *ST* I 3.1 ad 5: "ad Deum non acceditur passibus corporalibus, cum ubique sit, sed affectibus mentis, et eodem modo ab eo receditur."

[51] *In Rom.* cap. 14, lect. 2: "Deo autem coniungimur et subdimur per interiorem intellectum, et affectum."

[52] *ST* II-II 17.6 ad. 3: "caritas proprie facit tendere in Deum uniendo affectum hominis Deo, ut scilicet homo non sibi vivat sed Deo." *SCG* III 153, n. 5: "Ad hoc igitur quod aliquis pergat in finem aliquem, oportet quod afficiatur ad finem illum tanquam possibilem haberi: et hic est affectus spei. Cum igitur per gratiam dirigatur homo in ultimum finem beatitudinis, necessarium fuit ut per gratiam imprimeretur humano affectui spes de beatitudine consequenda."

[53] *SCG* III 40, n. 6: "Fit tamen per fidem Deus praesens affectui, cum voluntarie credens Deo assentiat."

[54] *ST* I-II 101.2: "Est autem duplex cultus Dei, interior, et exterior."

[55] *ST* I-II 101.2: "Consistit autem interior cultus in hoc quod anima coniungatur Deo per intellectum et affectum. Et ideo secundum quod diversimode intellectus et affectus colentis Deum Deo recte coniungitur, secundum hoc diversimode exteriores actus hominis ad cultum Dei applicantur."

[56] *ST* II-II 84.2: "exterior adoratio fit propter interiorem, ut videlicet per signa humilitatis quae corporaliter exhibemus, excitetur noster affectus ad subiiciendum se Deo."

[57] *In IV Sent.* d. 1, q. 1, a.2: "necessaria fuit sacramentorum institutio, per quae homo ex sensibilibus de spiritualibus eruditur; et haec est secunda causa quam Magister ponit: per quae etiam affectum, qui sensibilibus subjicitur, in Dei reverentiam referret."

prayer as the directing of the affections towards God. In the *Commentary on the Sentences*, he defines prayer as follows:

> The affection is directed towards God, as the one in whom the affection of the desiring mind is satisfied, and this directing of the affection to God reason does in the aforementioned way, applying to him that which the affection desires; and the very directing of affection to God is prayer.[58]

The above are only some examples of Aquinas's employment of the category of affection. If we expanded the analysis to encompass the broader category of appetite, or more specific categories such as love and desire, we would find affectivity even more present.

4. Aquinas's terminology

In addition to *affectus*, and *affectio,* Aquinas also draws upon a third term to describe affective movements: *actus voluntatis,* or act of the will. A neat division of these terms would be something like the following. *Affectio* is the term that Aquinas uses for an emotion that has an abstract object, such as the scientist rejoicing over solving a problem. This may have a bodily effect, but the point is that the object of the emotion is not something that can be sensed. *Actus voluntatis* is the term Aquinas uses for an emotion where there is no bodily effect, such as the person with the fear of heights who simply avoids heights. And *affectus* refers to standing emotions, such as a lifelong love of literature.

This would indeed be a neat application of the three terms, and it would allow us to map Aquinas's thought with some precision onto questions that arise in the literature on the emotions. The problem is that he can be quite fluid in his use of these terms. He describes simple affections (*affectus*) as acts of the will.[59] There are passages where he switches from *affectus* to *affectio* from one sentence to another with no apparent change in meaning, as when he refers to delight (*delectatio*) being in the *affectionibus animae* and then two

[58] *In IV Sent*., d. 1, q. 1, a. 2, qc. 1, co.: "Alio modo affectus in Deum dirigitur, ut in illum quo affectus mentis desiderantis explendus est; et hanc directionem affectus in Deum facit ratio praedicto modo, applicando ad ipsum illud quod desiderat affectus; et ipsa directio affectus in Deum oratio est." See also how the Lord's Prayer guides our affections, at *ST* II-II 83.9: "haec oratio non solum instruat postulare, sed etiam sit informativa totius nostri affectus."

[59] *ST* I 82.5 ad. 1: "Alio modo significant simplicem affectum, absque passione vel animi concitatione. Et sic sunt actus voluntatis."

sentences later places it in the *affectibus animae*.[60] Elsewhere he says that in the scriptures, sometimes people are called brothers because they are brothers by affection (*affectione*), and so all who are friends and have the same affection (*affectum*) are called brothers.[61] Likewise, he comments on the need to have one's affections (*affectiones*) straight, so spiritual health is in the ordering of one's affections (*affectuum*).[62] Whatever distinctions he is making in these passages are subtle indeed.

Do *affectus* and *affectio* therefore mean the same thing? Although he wrote several centuries later, Erasmus of Rotterdam's varying views on this question suggest that one could make an argument either way. At one point Erasmus wrote: "There is no difference between *affectio* and *affectus*, except that Cicero liked the former and Quintilian the latter."[63] But as Kirk Essary shows, Erasmus had earlier held the view that there is a great difference between them.[64] Other scholars agree that there is most definitely a difference. Rita Copeland notes that the twelfth century rhetorician Matthew of Vendôme follows Cicero in treating *affectio* as a "sudden and passing alteration of mind and body", whereas Matthew and others employ *affectus* for an emotional disposition.[65] Taking examples from Franciscan contemporaries of Aquinas, Tomas Zahora concludes that:

> We can conclude that *affectus* and *affectio* as used by thirteenth-century Franciscans are distinctly not the same thing. While *affectio* is an aspect of the soul consistent with the term *passio* as discussed by Thomas Aquinas, and referred to in the historiography of the emotions, *affectus* refers to an internal movement attached to the will, which underlies or motivates a morally relevant action.[66]

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[60] *ST* I-II 31.8: "delectatio in affectionibus animae … Unde et contingit in affectibus animae duas delectationes esse contrarias."

[61] *In Gal*., cap. 1, lect. 5: "Affectione, et sic omnes amici, et qui habent eumdem affectum dicuntur fratres."

[62] *In Heb*., cap. 12, lect. 3: "Qui ergo vult illas duas curvitates cavere, habeat pedes et affectiones rectas … Sicut enim sanitas corporis consistit in contemperatione humorum, ita sanitas spiritualis in ordinatione affectuum."

[63] Cited in Kirk Essary, "The Renaissance of *affectus*? Biblical Humanism and Latin Style," in *Before Emotion: The Language of Feeling, 400-1800*, ed. Juanita Feros Ruys, Michael W Champion, and Kirk Essary (New York: Routledge, 2019), 156.

[64] Essary, "The Renaissance of *affectus*?" 157.

[65] Rita Copeland, "Affectio-affectus in Latin Rhetoric up to c.1200," in *Before Emotion: The Language of Feeling, 400-1800*, ed. Juanita Feros Ruys, Michael W Champion, and Kirk Essary (New York: Routledge, 2019), 46.

[66] Tomas Zahora, "Affect, Affectiones, and Spiritual Capital in the Thirteenth Century," in *Before Emotion: The Language of Feeling, 400-1800*, ed. Juanita Feros Ruys, Michael W. Champion, and Kirk Essary (New York: Routledge, 2019), 115.

Taking a different view is Nicholas Lombardo, who treats *affectus* and *affectio* as synonymous, and Thomas Dixon, who does the same.[67] Who is right? Aquinas uses the terms together when in citing Augustine, who notes that what the Greeks called *pathe*, Cicero called commotions (*perturbationes*), other Latin writers called *affectiones* or *affectus*, and some others, more faithful to the Greek, called *passiones*. From which, he concludes, "it seems that *passiones* of the soul are the same as *affectiones*."[68] On one view, Aquinas could be saying that all these terms refer to the same thing. There is, though, no further mention of *affectus* in this passage after it is first cited, so one could argue that Aquinas is open to identifying the category of *passio* with *affectio*, but is implying nothing about *affectus*. This seems the likely explanation, especially when in his *Commentary on John* he says that the *affectiones* of the sensitive appetite are called passions, and goes on to use the terms interchangeably ("*affectiones seu passiones*").[69]

Yasmin Haskell and her colleagues consider Aquinas's usage of the two terms and conclude:

> There might be a slight difference between *affectio* as the actualisation of the appetitive power, and *affectus*, which seems to be the very ontological disposition that constitutes such appetitive power. *Affectus* denotes the (often spiritual, and in any case voluntary in that it engages the will) *source* of all *affectiones*-as-volitions.[70]

In my view, this interpretation is correct. There are multiple occasions where Aquinas will use the terms in close proximity to each other, but in a way that suggests that *affectus* is the umbrella term for a general affective disposition, whereas *affectio* is a particular instance of an *affectus*; for example, love is an *affectio*, and together with the other *affectiones* it is an

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[67] Lombardo, *The Logic of Desire*, 75; Thomas Dixon, *From Passions to Emotions: The Creation of a Secular Psychological Category* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 48.

[68] *ST* I-II 22.2: "Augustinus dicit, in IX de Civ. Dei, quod motus animi, quos Graeci pathe, nostri autem quidam, sicut Cicero, perturbationes, quidam affectiones vel affectus, quidam vero, sicut in Graeco habetur, expressius passiones vocant. Ex quo patet quod passiones animae sunt idem quod affectiones. Sed affectiones manifeste pertinent ad partem appetitivam, et non ad apprehensivam. Ergo et passiones magis sunt in appetitiva quam in apprehensiva."

[69] *In Ioan*., cap. 13, lect. 4: "Inter omnes autem affectiones seu passiones appetitus sensitivi, tristitia magis vim commotionis habet." See also *In II Sent*., d. 7, q. 2, a. 1, ad 1, where he uses *affectio* as an umbrella category for the irascible and concupiscible passions: "Omnis enim defectus animae qui in nobis accidit, vel est ex phantasia quantum ad cognitionem, cujus proprium est falsitas, secundum philosophum, vel ex passionibus irascibilis et concupiscibilis quantum ad affectionem."

[70] Yasmin Haskell, Michael Champion, Juanita Ruys, and Raphaele Garrod, "But Were They Talking about Emotions? Affectus, Affectio and the History of Emotions," *Rivista Storica Italiana* 128, no. 2 (2016), 533. They note in fn 46: "The permeability between *affectus* (as initial disposition) and *affectiones* (as its actualization) is important in the *Prima secundae*, so the distinction suggested here is not a hard and fast one."

instance of *affectus*.[71] Likewise, the object of a good act is the object either of cognition or affection (*affectionis*): to the intellect it is the true; to the affection (*affectum*) it is the good.[72] This would suggest that an *affectio* is a particular movement of the will which is also explicable by reference to an *affectus*. For example, someone might love music in the *affectus*, but the joy in listening to a piece of music is an *affectio*. This interpretation would be consistent with how he speaks of the harmful affections (*affectiones*) that can pertain to the *affectus*.[73] In a similar case, he states that the soul that is separated from earthly delights holds fast by affection (*affectum*) to invisible things, and has invisible actions and affections (*affectiones*).[74] Finally, in at least one place he appears to use *affectio* to speak of affections that can come and go episodically, when he comments that a person praying can change his mode of speaking throughout the prayer according to different affections (*affectibus*).[75] Taken together, these observations suggest that if Aquinas wants to speak of an affection that endures, he will use *affectus*, if he wants to speak of an affection that is momentary or episodic, he will use *affectio*.[76]

Such are some of the differences between the terms. There are, however, important similarities in how he employs them. First, in several passages he will refer to passions such as love, joy, and anger, and then say that these are not only passions, but can also be movements of the will, with the names of the passions being transferred to these movements. In these passages he will usually refer to them as an act of the will, such as a simple act of the will without passion, but he will also describe them as a simple *affectus*, and when speaking of them in relation to God he says that they refer to *affectio* in God.[77] The second similarity is

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[71] *In III Sent*., d. 27, q. 1, a. 3, co.: "quod inter alias affectiones animae amor est prior. Amor enim dicit terminationem affectus per hoc quod informatur suo objecto."

[72] *In Philip*., cap. 4, lect. 1: "Obiectum autem boni actus, vel est obiectum cognitionis, vel affectionis. Quantum ad intellectum est verum, quantum ad affectum est bonum."

[73] *ST* II-II 188.8: "quantum ad affectum, ut scilicet noxiae affectiones hominis reprimantur exemplo et correctione aliorum."

[74] *In Psalmos*, Ps 38, n. 7: "anima separata a carnalibus delectationibus, inhaeret per affectum rebus invisibilibus, et facit operationes et affectiones invisibiles."

[75] *In Psalmos*, Ps 4, n. 1: "per modum orantis, ubi ex diversis affectibus mutat homo loquendi modum."

[76] For an instance of the enduring nature of *affectus*, see how he speaks of *affectus* "adhering" to an object: *In III Sent*., d. 27, q. 1, a. 1, co.: "quando affectus vel appetitus omnino imbuitur forma boni quod est sibi objectum, complacet sibi in illo, et adhaeret ei quasi fixus in ipso; et tunc dicitur amare ipsum."

[77] *In III Sent*., d. 15, q. 2, a 3, Ex.5: "amor, timor, et hujusmodi, omnia aequivoce sumuntur: quandoque enim nominant passionem proprie dictam; et sic sunt in parte sensitiva; et ideo non possunt esse sine corpore: quandoque autem sumuntur pro actu voluntatis aliquid eligentis vel repudiantis; et sic possunt esse sine corpore

that, for each term, Aquinas maintains that love is the first of the movements, and that all are ultimately reducible to love. For example, "Love is the root and principle of all affections (*affectiones*)", a point he makes in similar passages about *affectus* and acts of the will.[78] We will develop this notion further in chapter 2 when we discuss the affection of love and how the different affections are related. A third similarity is that Aquinas is prepared to use *affectus* and *affectio* to describe movements of the will where there is passion by way of "overflow", a phenomenon which we will explain in the next section of this chapter. He never says this of an act of the will, however, which is why *actus voluntatis* is so suited to correspond to disembodied emotions.[79]

A final question is whether passions are in fact particular kinds of affection. The textual evidence suggests that they are. In several passages Aquinas states that either *affectus* or *affectio* in the sensitive appetite is termed passion, suggesting that he could use one of the former terms, but to be more precise he uses passion.[80] He is also prepared to use *affectus* to refer to movements of the sensitive appetite: our *affectus* are accustomed to bodily delights;[81] *affectus* may be an affection of reason or of passion;[82] and man's *affectus* can be one of passion (*affectum passionis*).[83] We even read that Christ prays expressing the *affectus* of his

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sicut et voluntas." See also *In IV Sent*., d. 15, q. 2, a. 1, qc. 1, ad 4: "nomina passionum sensibilium aliquando"; *SCG* II 80, n. 16; *ST* I 59.4 ad. 2; *ST* I 82.5 ad. 1; *In IV Sent*., d. 17, q. 2, a. 1, qc. 2, ad 1; *SCG* I 91, n. 9: "Patet igitur ex praedictis quod de nostris affectionibus nulla est quae"; *DA*, Bk 1, lect. 10, n. 17

[78] *ST* I-II 62.2 ad. 3: "omnis autem affectionis radix et principium est amor"; *SCG* IV cap. 19, n.6: "omnis actus voluntatis in amore radicatur"; *ST* I 20.1: "amor naturaliter est primus actus voluntatis et appetitus"; *ST* I 60: "omnis actus appetitivae virtutis ex amore seu dilectione derivatur"; *In III Sent*., d. 27 q. 1 a. 3 co.: "inter alias affectiones animae amor est prior"; *SCG* III 151, n. 4: "omnis motus affectus ab amore derivatur: nullus enim desiderat, aut sperat, aut gaudet, nisi propter bonum amatum; similiter autem neque aliquis refugit, aut timet, aut tristatur, aut irascitur, nisi propter id quod contrariatur bono amato"; *ST* I-II 70.3: "Prima autem dispositio mentis humanae ad bonum, est per amorem, qui est prima affectio et omnium affectionum radix"; *In II Cor*., cap. 7, lect. 3: "tristitia et gaudium et communiter omnis affectio, ex amore causatur"; *In Met*., Bk 1, lect. 5, n. 10: "in nobis amor ad actiones movet, et quia est omnium affectionum principium."

[79] See also *SCG* II 60, n. 5, where he explains that an act of the will pertains to choice, not passion: "Propter quod et actus concupiscibilis et irascibilis cum passione sunt: non autem actus voluntatis, sed cum electione."

[80] *De malo*, q. 3 a. 9 co.: "affectiones appetitus sensitivi, quae passiones dicuntur; *In III Sent*., d. 15, q. 2, a. 1, qc. 2, co.: "adhuc magis proprie dicuntur passiones illae affectiones sensitivae ad quas sequitur tristitia, vel etiam quae sunt cum vehementia sive delectationis sive tristitiae"; *ST* III 15.4.

[81] *In IV Sent*., d. 49, q. 3, a. 5, qc. 1, co.: "propter dispositionem affectus nostri, qui est assuetus delectationibus corporalibus."

[82] *ST* I-II 102.6 ad 8: "affectus hominis est duplex, unus quidem secundum rationem; alius vero secundum passionem."

[83] *ST* I-II 102.6 ad 8: "Quantum vero ad affectum passionis, movetur affectus hominis etiam circa alia animalia."

sensuality.[84] We would not expect such fluidity if *affectus*/*affectio* were confined to movements of the will alone, and *passiones* to movements of the sensitive appetite. I therefore agree with Nicholas Lombardo that "all passions of the soul are affections, but not all affections are passions."[85]

5. Affection is more than passion

To illustrate further why affectivity must encompass more than the passions of the soul, I turn now to some of the philosophical and psychological literature on the emotions. This permits us to consider by analogy how the criteria that separate passions from affections of the will are treated in relation to emotion. Must emotion, for example, always entail a bodily reaction? If it does, then the concept of emotion would certainly correspond to passion as Aquinas understands it, and not to affections of the will. If it does not, then emotion would also correspond to affections of the will. This will be important later in the thesis for the discussion of liturgical affectivity and liturgical emotion. Does emotion in worship, for example, require a bodily reaction, or is there are broader ways of approaching emotion? The following section permits us to answer such questions.

5.1. Intellectual emotions

In the philosophical and psychological literature on the emotions, there is ample support for the existence of emotions that have an abstract object, beyond sensory experience. Often these are called "intellectual emotions." The authors pay particular attention to variations in the intensity of these emotions, and whether they have a bodily effect. William James wrote about feelings of pleasure and displeasure, interest and excitement, that are "bound up with mental operations, but having no obvious bodily expression for the consequence", such as a quickened pulse or breathing, or movements of either the body or the face.[86] He first considers the emotions aroused by certain arrangements of sounds, lines, and colours, but he notes that these arrangements are either themselves bodily sensations or the images of these

[84] *ST* III 21.3: "exprimendo affectum sensualitatis."
[85] Lombardo, *The Logic of Desire*, 76. See also fns 4 and 5 on the same page.
[86] William James, *What Is an Emotion?* In *The Emotions*, ed. Knight Dunlap (Baltimore: Waverley Press, 1922), 12.

sensations. He turns secondly to sequences of ideas, which "seem to depend on processes in the ideational centres exclusively."[87] Of these, he comments: "It is a real intellectual delight to get a problem solved, and a real intellectual torment to have to leave it unfinished."[88]

Although James acknowledges the reality of the intellectual delight and torment, he is still speaking of a delight or torment that does not have an obvious bodily expression. In order to see whether intellectual emotions *can* really be so intense as to elicit a bodily reaction, we need only read further in James's text.[89] He writes there of objects including not just the sounds, lines, and colours he has mentioned before, but also "logical consistencies" and "teleological fitnesses". He continues:

> Unless in them there actually be coupled with the intellectual feeling a bodily reverberation of some kind, unless we actually laugh at the neatness of the mechanical device, thrill at the justice of the act, or tingle at the perfection of the musical form, our mental condition is more allied to a judgment of right than to anything else. And such a judgment is rather to be classed among awarenesses of truth: it is a cognitive act. But as a matter of fact the intellectual feeling hardly ever does exist thus unaccompanied. The bodily sounding-board is at work, as careful introspection will show, far more than we usually suppose.[90]

This passage raises two issues that will recur in this thesis. The first is the bodily expression of intellectual emotion. James asserts that intellectual emotions have far more frequent bodily expressions than we are aware of. He does not elaborate on this point, which appears to be that if we took the time to analyse what our body is doing in different intellectual states, we would find a great correspondence between the body and the mind. His appeal to "careful introspection", that is to say, personal human experience, is a common one in treatment of intellectual emotions. Michael Stocker notes that James evidently sees nothing strange or problematic in these "nonstandard emotions", as Stocker calls them; on the contrary, he expects his readers to recognise what he is talking about.[91] The expectation is legitimate. People who have been frustrated at their inability to solve a mathematics problem or a

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[87] James, *What Is an Emotion?* 12.

[88] James, *What Is an Emotion?* 12.

[89] I agree with Michael Stocker that James significantly changes his view about intellectual emotions over the course of the text, notwithstanding his use of the word "obvious". Stocker, "Intellectual and Other Nonstandard Emotions," in *On Emotions: Philosophical Essays*, ed. John Deigh (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 105.

[90] James, *What Is an Emotion?* 26.

[91] Stocker, "Intellectual and Other Nonstandard Emotions," 109.

crossword or a riddle would recognise the experience that James describes. Likewise, someone who solves the same problems may express delight by everything from fist pumps to exclamations of joy. Further examples come from the early twentieth century French psychologist, Théodule Ribot. Noting that intellectual emotion can have the true characteristics of intense emotion, Ribot gives examples of reactions to intellectual discoveries through history, where great thinkers and scientists—Pascal, Malebranche, and others—danced in their laboratories or nearly suffocated from excitement while reading great works.[92] A less sublime example makes the same point: an advertisement on Australian television for the accounting firm H&R Block showed a tax agent smiling and giving a subtle fist pump as she found a tax saving for her client.[93] The point in all these examples is that, even though the senses may in some way be engaged (say by the blank squares in a crossword where the answer should be), the excitement or frustration is provoked by the intellectual problem itself.

The second issue that James raises is a scepticism, which many authors share, towards emotions with no bodily expression. Are they *really* emotions, or are they simply judgements? James is being entirely consistent with his definition of an emotion, which gives priority to a bodily feeling:

> My thesis on the contrary is that *the bodily changes follow directly the* PERCEPTION *of the exciting fact, and that our feeling of the same changes as they occur* IS *the emotion* … Without the bodily states following on the perception, the latter would be

[92] Cited in Stocker, "Intellectual and Other Nonstandard Emotions," 110. Adam Morton gives the example of a scientist charged with determining whether certain chemicals used in baby bottles are carcinogenic: You will have difficult decisions to make about which possibilities to investigate. You are likely to *worry* about some of them; you will *be haunted* by the thought that some subtle interaction may have gone unnoticed. You will feel *responsible* for the accuracy of your results and the performance of your team; you will be *concerned* about anomalies for which you have no good explanation. You will be *fascinated* by preliminary results that suggest that the picture is not what you originally thought, though you may also be worried by them. You will be *attracted to* lines of investigation that might settle questions that arise during the project, and *wary* of others because of their potentiality to distract your attention or waste your time. You will be *satisfied* that you have ruled out some worrying possibilities, and *unsatisfied* with respect to your investigation of others. Worry (haunting, obsession), concern (responsibility), interest (fascination, attraction, wariness), (dis)satisfaction. These are epistemic emotions that are linked to a common theme." Adam Morton, "Epistemic Emotions," in *The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Emotion*, ed. Peter Goldie (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 393.

[93] The accompanying narration emphasised the intellectual emotion: "You might find this boring, but for Irene Johnson this is very exciting. In fact, she's having the time of her life. She's tackling a detailed negative gearing issue, and has just found a way to get a better deduction for her client." For many professions, including what Adam Morton calls "professional knowers", certain emotions relating to the discovery of truth may be desirable. See Morton, "Epistemic Emotions," 390.

> purely cognitive in form, pale, colourless, destitute of emotional warmth. We might then see the bear, and judge it best to run, receive the insult and deem it right to strike, but we could not actually feel afraid or angry.[94]

A conclusion naturally follows from this: no bodily feeling, no emotion. Since this is James's stance, it is no surprise that he should hold that judgements without "bodily reverberation" are simply "awarenesses of truth." But what if we are not committed to James's definition of emotion? What if, too, there are other ways of measuring the effect of emotions than by their bodily expression?

5.2. Dispassionate affections

Theorists who adopt a Jamesian approach to emotion, emphasising the embodiment of emotion, eventually come up against the problem that the embodiment sometimes appears to be missing. As well as emotions where there is dancing and fist pumps, there are emotions that are calmer and more enduring. Jesse Prinz, who advances an "embodied appraisal theory" of emotion, defends his theory against the objection of "disembodied emotions", including calm passions like loneliness and aesthetic appreciation.[95] He responds with two arguments (a third we shall return to later). First, some alleged disembodied emotions are not emotions at all, because an emotion must represent a core relational theme *and* be embodied: "If it isn't embodied, we can rule that it isn't an emotion."[96] Pre-empting the obvious objection that this is question-begging, Prinz argues that loneliness and calm aesthetic responses are not clear enough counterexamples to challenge his definition of an emotion. The second argument is that supposedly disembodied emotions may have bodily changes that are hard to detect. This may be true, but the impression of an each-way bet is unavoidable—there must be bodily changes for an emotion to exist, and if there are no bodily changes, they are probably there anyway. Prinz's defence underscores that if we presume from the outset that embodiment is essential to the definition of emotion, that presumption will be very difficult to shake.

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[94] James, *What is an Emotion?* 13. The emphases are James's.

[95] Jesse Prinz, "Emotions, Psychosemantics, and Embodied Appraisals," in *Philosophy and the Emotions*, ed. Anthony Hatzimoysis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 82-83.

[96] Prinz, "Emotions, Psychosemantics, and Embodied Appraisals," 82.

We find a similar approach in some secondary literature on the passions in Aquinas, where acts of the will like anger and joy are called by terms such as "pseudopassions" and "dispassionate passions".[97] These *dispassionate affections*, as I believe it would be more accurate to call them, have their doubters. Diana Fritz Cates says that it is difficult to imagine anger simply being an act of the will, and that if we describe someone who is not disturbed or excited as still being "angry", we are stretching the ordinary meaning of the term.[98] Further, if we say that this person is experiencing "emotion", we are stretching the ordinary meaning of the term "emotion" as well.[99] Peter King, for similar reasons, criticises the idea that "dispassionate passions" are emotions, rather than simply volitional directives:

> They seem to leave out the feeling that is essential to emotion. A well-programmed android could likewise evaluate situations are likely to cause damage and therefore take action to avoid them without having any feelings about it. We can recognize that the android evaluates and responds to its circumstances in an appropriate way, but then, so does a well-designed thermostat. The philosophical question at issue here is whether Aquinas's pseudopassions have enough of the features we might associate with emotions to be deserving of the name in their own right. Clearly Aquinas's pseudopassions provide their subject with motivational force, though of a different character and order from that provided by the passions — namely to motivate dispassionately — and hence are analogous to the passions in being affections, in Aquinas's technical sense. But this may not be enough. At best, we might think, Aquinas can only offer a pale volitional counterfeit of the real thing.[100]

There is an unmistakeable echo here of William James. These criticisms turn on the inability to imagine what an emotion might be like without bodily experience of it, or a "feeling". They begin with a concept of emotion that demands a bodily effect, then conclude that because these acts of the will do not have a bodily effect, they cannot be emotions. If we are to pair Aquinas with the term "emotion" at all, a better approach is to stay close to the etymology of the term, and focus instead what it says about *motion*. One scholar who does this is Daniel Westberg, who argues:

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[97] Both terms were coined by Peter King. "Aquinas on the Passions," in *Aquinas's Moral Theory*, ed. Scott MacDonald and Eleonore Stump (London: Cornell University Press, 1998), 105 n.7; "Dispassionate Passions," in *Reason and Emotion in Medieval and Early Modern Philosophy*, ed. Martin Pickavé and Lisa Shapiro (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 9.

[98] Cates, *Aquinas on the Emotions*, 94.

[99] Cates, *Aquinas on the Emotions*, 94.

[100] Peter King, "Dispassionate Passions," 28.

> The essence of emotion has to do with being a moral agent, not with bodily existence. Any moral being (including angels and other spirits, God and human beings) has emotion … Beings that have intellect and will (or rational appetite) have emotion; that is, they are capable of being "moved" towards (or away from) an object by appetite.[101]

The doubts that an agent can truly have an emotion without a bodily expression rest on a fallacy that according to Westberg needs exposing: "Human emotion is the way in which human beings react and operate as moral agents, but it is not a requirement for personal agents in general."[102] The joy of angels over one repentant sinner is therefore not a mere metaphor; rather, "it refers to spiritual beings, with intellect and will, who see something take place that they had been hoping for and are pleased by it."[103] Likewise, they may recognise the possibility of a dreaded outcome, but without the rush of adrenaline that humans and other animals experience in the presence of imminent disaster.[104] Westberg gives other examples of how human beings may act from fear without a perceptible change in bodily sensation. In refraining from saying something hurtful, or in phoning the stockbroker to sell shares, statements such as "I hated to offend my host" or "I was afraid the stock market would fall further" are not merely fictional uses of emotional terms, but express real fear and aversion.[105]

This latter example of fear is an illuminating example of how someone can have dispassionate affections without a bodily change. William James and Jesse Prinz might argue that there are probably bodily changes occurring in these examples anyway. Other than responding by trying to prove a negative, we can turn to an insight from Anthony Kenny,

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[101] Daniel Westberg, "Emotion and God: A Reply to Marcel Sarot," *The Thomist* 60, no. 1 (1996), 110. Fritz Cates, commenting on the first sentence cited above, comments: "The claim seems to be that emotion is *essentially* a motion of the intellectual appetite or will. As we have seen, Aquinas thinks that *passio* has *essentially* to do with bodily existence—with the way in which soul-body composites entertain and are altered by certain sensory images and impressions. The implication of Westberg's view thus seems to be that the term "emotion" corresponds most properly to what Aquinas calls *affectus* (and to other motions of the will), and it corresponds only indirectly—if at all—to what Aquinas calls *passio*." Cates, *Aquinas on the Emotions*, 95. Westberg, however, goes on immediately to say that for human beings, "the paradigm experience of emotion is the feeling of arousal (such as anger or fear) by which one is suddenly ready for response. The quickened heartbeat, the rush of adrenaline, the experience of these bodily responses is the sign of the experience of emotion." Ibid, 110-11. The issue is whether we should consider the paradigm experience alone as worthy of being called *emotion*.

[102] Westberg, "Emotion and God," 114.

[103] Westberg, "Emotion and God," 112.

[104] Westberg, "Emotion and God," 114.

[105] Westberg, "Emotion and God," 114-115.

when he poses the question of how to measure the intensity of an emotion.[106] One criterion is the violence of the bodily changes associated with the emotion, changes that are capable of measurement by psychologists. The second criterion, much harder to measure, is the influence of the emotion on someone's behaviour. Kenny expresses the criterion in this way: "We may regard one emotion as stronger than another if it has a greater influence on voluntary action over a comparatively long period of time."[107] Kenny categorises these two kinds of emotions as emotions of feeling and emotions of motive. The emotion of rage or the fear of snakes could be measured by the first criterion; the emotion of ambition or the fear of inflation by the second. Could an emotion be measurable by both methods? Kenny answers yes, giving the example of a fear of heights. His explanation merits quotation at length:

> Fear of heights, for instance, might be measured either by the violence of the bodily phenomena occurring when the subject is placed on a height, or by the amount of trouble which he will take to avoid having to stand on exposed high places. If we measure a man's fear of heights by the number of times in his life he has feelings of such fear, we shall obtain a result quite contrary to that which we obtain if we measure the strength of the fear by the effect which it has on his behaviour. A man who is very afraid of heights will never climb mountains, ascend towers, or look over beetling cliffs, and so will very rarely display the feelings of fear which heights cause. On the other hand, a mountaineer may sometimes suffer from sinking stomach, incipient trembling, and a watery sensation in the knees, without thereby being frightened off an ascent. When both come to die, the mountain-climber's biography will contain more records of feelings of fear of heights than that of the man who was timidly anchored to sea-level. [108]

Such examples of fear can be multiplied. Fear of flying may limit someone's ability to travel. Fear of public speaking can exert a crippling influence over one's career choices. Fear of punishment may be the sole reason why a citizen continues to pay taxes. In none of these cases is it necessary that someone frequently experience public speaking, flying, or being confronted by tax officials, whether in reality, or in the imagination or memory, to continue to experience the emotion. In all likelihood, those who have a longstanding pattern of behaviour on account of a fear will also have had some experience of the bodily effect of

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[106] Anthony Kenny, *Action, Emotion, and Will* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Limited, 1963), 36.

[107] Kenny, *Action, Emotion, and Will*, 36.

[108] Kenny, *Action, Emotion, and Will*, 36. Kenny points out further at p. 37 that, "A motive is strong if it governs prolonged or dramatic tracts of a man's behaviour; its intensity is measured by the frequency and importance of acts done out of it."

fear, but it is not essential that the effect continue, or even recur infrequently. If I have a fear of flying, I may simply accept this fear and decide that henceforth I will travel by ocean liner, giving no further thought to the prospect of flying.

5.3. Standing emotions

Fears of the kind we have just discussed are capable of lasting for decades. These long-term, or "standing" emotions have also been discussed in the literature on the emotions. Peter Goldie warns against reducing emotional life to episodic, short-term emotions, thus excluding the rest of our emotional life by what is "more or less a definitional fiat."[109] If we were to take, for example, the description of emotions that Thomas Lewis, Fari Amini, and Richard Lannon offer in their *A General Theory of Love*, then emotions cannot be otherwise than short and fleeting: "The momentousness of emotions in human lives stands in befuddling contrast to their impossible brevity. Emotions are mental mayflies, rapidly spawned and dying almost as quickly as they arise."[110] Goldie's contrasting approach is to distinguish between emotions as episodes and emotions as dispositions. In a similar vein to Kenny's example, Goldie takes envy as an emotion that may be both episodic and dispositional. One may have an occurrent emotion of envy towards someone, involving feelings, or one may have a dispositional attitude of envy, such that one may truthfully be described as envious even if at a given moment one is not feeling envious.[111]

What is the utility of considering emotional dispositions as well as episodes? Goldie's first point is that these emotional dispositions make up what he terms our "psychic economy".[112] Whether they be our fears, hatreds, or sympathies for universals (oppression, large dogs, the homeless), or our loves for children or parents, our emotional dispositions make us what we

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[109] Peter Goldie, "Intellectual Emotions and Religious Emotions," *Faith and Philosophy* 28 vol. 1 (January 2011), 95.

[110] Thomas, Lewis, Fari Amini and Richard Lannon, *A General Theory of Love* (New York: Vintage Books, 2000), 43.

[111] Goldie, "Intellectual Emotions," 98. Lewis et al give an analogous account, though they distinguish between emotions and moods, with a mood being "a state of enhanced readiness to experience a particular emotion. Where an emotion is a single note, clearly struck, hanging for a moment in the still air, a mood is the extended, nearly inaudible echo that follows." Thus what Goldie would see as being an emotion that is a disposition, they see as being not an emotion but a mood. See *A General Theory of Love*, 44.

[112] Goldie, "Intellectual Emotions," 98.

are.[113] He further observes that emotional dispositions are not simply dispositions to have a single kind of emotion:

> Your enduring love of your children or parents is not just a disposition to have loving feelings towards them when they are in the offing. It can be expressed in a complex structure of possible responses: delight if they succeed in their endeavours; anger if you hear them insulted behind their backs; fear and concern if you think they might be ill; hope if you think that their illness might have a cure; and so on. Even my envy of Mary's successes isn't just a disposition to feel envy; it can be expressed in a feeling of delight when I hear that her latest success looks after all as if it's turning into something of a poisoned chalice; I wouldn't be feeling this delight if I weren't envious of her.[114]

Goldie's account of emotional dispositions and their relation to episodes is persuasive, but it still leaves much of what constitutes a standing emotion unexplained.[115] The very choice of the word "disposition" provokes the question, disposition to what? If the response is "a disposition to have episodic emotions", then the implication is that standing emotions can only be explained by reference to short-term episodic emotions, which leaves us back where we started. Jesse Prinz even claims that long-standing, disembodied emotions are dispositions as a way of arguing *against* the claim that they are truly emotions:

> That I love my spouse all the time is an enduring disposition to have occurrent states of love … I would add that long-standing love does not count as love *unless* it carries a disposition to such embodied states. If someone says, 'I love my spouse, but I never experience flutters or giddiness or cuddly tenderness in relation to him' we would doubt her sincerity. As with itchiness, standing emotions are parasitic on their embodied manifestations.[116]

Prinz's argument covers similar ground to Goldie's, the difference being that Goldie thinks emotional dispositions disprove the definitional fiat that emotions are episodic, whereas Prinz

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[113] The examples are Goldie's: "Intellectual Emotions," 98.

[114] Goldie, "Intellectual Emotions," 98.

[115] Goldie is offering what Sin Yee Chan calls a "Sophisticated Disposition View", which can point to the effects of a standing emotion, but tells us nothing about the constituent elements of the emotion. Chan divides dispositional accounts into simple accounts (in which the disposition of anger is a disposition to have episodes of anger), and sophisticated accounts, of which Goldie's is a good example. Chan argues, though, that no dispositional accounts fully capture what she terms "standing emotions," because these accounts make dispositions correspond to the effects of the standing emotion, and then identify the standing emotion with the disposition. This is to mistake the dispositions for the emotions themselves: "Dispositions are good clues to the presence of standing emotions, but they are not identical to the emotions themselves." It is necessary instead to try to capture the constituents of the standing emotion. Sin Yee Chan, "Standing Emotions," *The Southern Journal of Philosophy* 37, vol. 4 (Winter 1999), 499.

[116] Prinz, "Emotions, Psychosemantics, and Embodied Appraisals," 83. For clarity, this is Prinz's third argument against disembodied emotions.

thinks they support it. Again, if our starting point is that emotions must be embodied, our argument for emotional dispositions is unlikely to overturn that presumption. Kenny's example of the man with the fear of heights, however, is not about someone with a disposition to have the episodic emotion of fear. It is rather that he has a disposition to act in a certain way that is explained by his fear of heights. In fact, Kenny does not offer the example to defend the idea of a disposition at all, but to explain how emotions may be manifested and measured.

Standing emotions remain a problem for a strict embodiment theory of emotions, and those who define emotions as episodic. Lewis, Amini, and Lannon, along with their metaphor of mayflies, add that emotions have "the evanescence of a musical note", and shortly afterwards liken an emotion to the ghost of Hamlet's father, appearing suddenly, nudging players in the proper direction, then dissolving into nothingness and leaving a vague impression behind.[117] They acknowledge that people can seem to have longer emotions, but to explain these they reach for the analogy of pointillism, where dimensionless dots form a uniform line or graceful curve: "The smooth impression of a lengthy emotion is often created by serial evocation, a repetitive string of one brief feeling that rings out its plangent tones again and again."[118] The analogy is lyrically made, but it depends on episodes of emotions-as-feelings being the dots that make up the image, and requires these episodes to be close enough to each other for a pattern to be made out. In the limited examples they give of being "sad all morning or frustrated all day", we can well-imagine how recurrent episodes of those emotions might give a pattern to that short period of time. The longer the period, however, and the greater the interludes between the episodes, the less discernible such a pattern would become, even if the emotions arose from the same object. Acts of will, such as repeatedly avoiding heights over many decades, would not feature in this image at all, being reduced instead to the white space between the dots. An account of standing emotions would have far greater clarity (something more akin to realism than pointillism), if it looked beyond the

[117] Lewis et al, *General Theory*, 44.
[118] Lewis et al, *General Theory*, 45.

instances of emotion that are most obvious, like episodes of anger and desire, and filled in the rest of the image with movements of the will.

CONCLUSION

The purpose of this survey of some of the debates around emotion has been to show that there are many aspects to emotion that a narrow definition cannot capture, despite the many defenders of emotions as episodic and embodied events. My argument is that the narrow approach to emotion corresponds to Aquinas's teaching on passion, whereas the broader approach encompasses both his category of passion and the affections of the will.

SECTION 2 – THE STRUCTURE OF THE AFFECTIONS

INTRODUCTION

The aim of the second section of this chapter is to explain some of the terminology Aquinas uses, so that we may have a clearer idea of the affections and their structure. There are three terms in particular that require close attention: appetite, apprehension, and motion. Whenever Aquinas speaks of passions or affections, whether in general or in particular, these are the categories that he reaches for to make whatever distinctions are necessary. I will end this section with a survey of two issues pertaining to the relationship between the passions and the affections. The first is the question of whether affections are superior to the passions. The second concerns what Aquinas calls "overflow", where an affection of the will has the same physical effect as a passion.

1. Appetite

The concept of appetite underpins both the passions and the affections of the will. Appetite is best understood as the tendencies that something has, whether it be an inanimate object or an angel. It is the basic propensity that everything has to interact in a particular way with the reality surrounding it. Aquinas defines appetite as "nothing other than an inclination of one desiring towards something."[119] Even before we consider how interactions within reality occur as they do, which may take us into the human or natural sciences, there is the more basic principle that things have a tendency to behave in a certain way, and not in others, according to their natures.

The three kinds of appetite are the natural, sensitive, and intellectual appetites. Things that lack knowledge possess only a natural appetite.[120] These include stones, which have an inclination to move downwards.[121] The natural appetite includes also an inclination towards that which is suitable and away from that which is harmful, as well as to resist anything that

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[119] *ST* I-II 8.1: "Cuius ratio est quia appetitus nihil aliud est quam inclinatio appetentis in aliquid."

[120] *ST* I 80.1: "In his enim quae cognitione carent, invenitur tantummodo forma ad unum esse proprium determinans unumquodque, quod etiam naturale uniuscuiusque est. Hanc igitur formam naturalem sequitur naturalis inclinatio, quae appetitus naturalis vocatur."

[121] *SCG* II 47, n. 2: "appetitus in his quidem quae cognitione carent, dicitur naturalis appetitus: sicut dicitur quod lapis appetit esse deorsum."

seeks to impede it. For example, fire has a natural inclination to rise upwards, and to resist what is destroying and impeding it.[122] In things possessing knowledge, they have first a sensitive appetite corresponding to their sensitive knowledge. Finally, those with intellectual knowledge have an intellectual appetite that corresponds to that knowledge.[123]

Central to the notion of appetite is passivity. The appetite, for Aquinas, is a passive power, meaning that it is moved, or acted upon, by a mover.[124] This mover may be a stronger object, as in the case of a stone whose journey to the lowest place at the bottom of the hill is diverted or arrested by large boulders. In the case of things that have knowledge, appetite means that they have an inclination to be moved by external objects, which may be as earthly as bread and cheese, or as elevated as justice and wisdom.

1.1. The sensitive appetite and the passions

The sensitive appetite is an inclination to move towards, or away from, an object that can be sensed; for example, an inclination towards a drink that one loves, or away from a spider that one fears. The senses include not simply the five exterior senses, but also the interior senses. The four interior senses (or sensory powers) are the common sense, the imagination (also called the phantasy), the estimative power (also called in human beings the cogitative sense, or the particular reason), and the memorative power. The common sense is what apprehends all of the objects sensed by the exterior senses, the imagination is the repository of these forms, the estimative power is for the apprehension of intentions that are not received through the senses, and the memorative power is what preserves these intentions.[125] These senses (or sensory powers) are what allows an animal to apprehend something not only when it is physically present, but also to apprehend it as present through memory and imagination. In his commentary on the *De anima,* Aquinas notes how things perceived in the interior senses

[122] *ST* I 81.2: "Sicut ignis habet naturalem inclinationem non solum ut recedat ab inferiori loco, qui sibi non convenit, et tendat in locum superiorem sibi convenientem; sed etiam quod resistat corrumpentibus et impedientibus."

[123] *SCG* II 47, n. 2: "In his vero quae intelligunt, dicitur appetitus intellectualis seu rationalis, qui est voluntas."

[124] *ST* I 80.2: "appetitus autem movens motum."

[125] See *ST* I 78.4.

can be desired or thought of as horrible as if they were actually present.[126] The strength of the interior senses is evident in cases of traumatic memories, where the person experiences the remembered event as if it is actually taking place in the present moment.[127] For our purposes, the critical point is that not everything that takes place in the mind is an act of the rational appetite. When I imagine standing on a 10-metre diving platform, I am engaging the interior sense of imagination, by constructing a new image informed by the pools and diving platforms that I have sensed exteriorly in the past, even if I have never actually stood on a diving platform. Likewise, if I remember an experience of being spoken to harshly, it is the memorative power that makes the sensory experiences present. In these cases, the fear and sadness that I experience is in the sensitive appetite.

We turn now to the term "passions of the soul." Aquinas specifies in a number of places that passion is most properly spoken of in relation to a bodily change (or "transmutation") in the sensitive appetite. For example, "all things pertaining to the sensitive part plainly take place with some transmutation of the body, hence they are called passions of the soul."[128] The bodily transmutation is the material element of the passion, which is in conformity with and proportionate to the movement of the appetite, which is the formal element.[129] A bodily change (or a "somatic effect", as Robert Miner calls it), is therefore a necessarily element of the passion. These effects include the racing heart, weak knees, chattering teeth and so on, that supply much of our colloquial and poetic manner of speaking about the passions. Aquinas will at times outline the specific physical effects of the passion, though the utility of his explanations is constrained by his knowledge of human physiology. The requirement of a somatic effect immediately suggests the sort of questions that were raised in Section 1. Can

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[126] *DA,* Bk 3, lect. 12, n. 14: "Aliquando autem ex phantasmatibus, aut intelligibilibus quae sunt in anima, ratiocinatur, et deliberat futura aut praesentia, tamquam si actu videret."

[127] Bessel van der Kolk comments: "When people remember an ordinary event, they do not also relive the physical sensations, emotions, images, smells, or sounds associated with that event. In contrast, when people fully recall their traumas, they "have" the experience." *The Body Keeps the Score* (New York: Penguin, 2015), 263.

[128] *SCG* II 82, n. 18: "Nam omnia quae ad appetitum sensitivae partis pertinent, manifeste cum transmutatione aliqua corporis fiunt: unde et passiones animae dicuntur."

[129] *ST* I-II 37.4: "Est autem attendendum in omnibus animae passionibus, quod transmutatio corporalis, quae est in eis materialis, est conformis et proportionata motui appetitus, qui est formalis, sicut in omnibus materia proportionatur formae."

we be angry or fearful without any bodily change taking place? From Aquinas's account of passion, the answer can only be "yes" if we are prepared to think of anger and fear in a way that takes us outside the category of passion.

A further division comes when Aquinas divides the sensitive appetite into the concupiscible power and the irascible powers.[130] Through the concupiscible power the soul is inclined to move towards an object that is suitable or to move away from an object that is harmful. This movement towards and from is an easy one. There are no difficulties in the acts of the concupiscible powers. If I am at a bakery and I desire a croissant, I can simply order and eat the croissant; if the seller suggests a quiche, which I dislike, I can simply refuse. The seller offering the quiche may mention that she made it herself, in which case refusing it becomes (for most people) more difficult, because I now fear hurting her feelings. What distinguishes the irascible power is exactly this further element of difficulty—there is something that hinders the action of the appetite. The object of the irascible power is something that one considers arduous, obtainable or avoidable only with difficulty.[131] It need only be a minor complication that prevents us from easily obtaining what we love or avoiding what we hate, but it is sufficient to bring about an essential difference in the appetite.

The division of powers gives also gives us a basic division among the passions. The concupiscible passions comprise first love, desire, and delight, in respect of an object apprehended as good. The passions of hatred, aversion, and sorrow are the corresponding passions in respect of an object apprehended as bad, or evil.[132] The irascible passions are structured differently. They comprise: hope and despair, in respect of an object apprehended as a future good that is difficult to obtain; fear and daring, in respect of an object apprehended as a future evil that difficult to avoid; and anger, in respect of a present evil.[133] I will explain

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[130] *ST* I 81.2.

[131] *ST* I-II 23.1: "Quaecumque vero passiones respiciunt bonum vel malum sub ratione ardui, prout est aliquid adipiscibile vel fugibile cum aliqua difficultate, pertinent ad irascibilem."

[132] *ST* I-II 23.2. The words "evil" and "hatred" may seem comically strong when applied to objects that are in themselves good. Someone who does not like geraniums does not think that they are "evil". There do not, however, seem to me to be better English terms to capture these negative movements of the soul. It is better to accept these terms as having a specific meaning in Aquinas's work that may, but not always, align with these terms' common usages.

[133] *ST* I-II 23.2.

each of the eleven basic passions more fully in Chapter 2. The classification of the passions comes from their essential differences, but there are also differences that are accidental to the passion, such as its intensity. Fury, for example, is an intense form of the passion of anger. Other differences are accidental to the object of the passion. Embarrassment is a form of fear, but specifically a fear of rebuke or mockery.[134]

1.2. The intellectual appetite and the affections

The intellectual appetite, also called the rational appetite, and more generally called the will, differs from the sensitive appetite on account of their different objects. The object of the sensitive appetite is a particular good or evil: this strudel, this charming building, that annoying sound, that spider on the wall. The intellectual appetite, by contrast, is concerned with universals: strudel in general, architecture, music, spiders. The will can certainly tend towards, or away from, individual things, but it does so by considering them under the aspect of the universal.[135] I may desire a scone in my sensitive appetite, on account of the colour and texture of scones, my memory of the scones of years past, my imagination of how a scone would taste were I to bite into one. But I can also desire it as an instance of "scone", which I believe to be good. If I have an allergy to flour, I will consider the scone universally as, for me, an evil, knowing that I will have an adverse reaction should I follow the desire in my sensitive appetite. In this instance the rational appetite and the sensitive appetite are in conflict.

All three terms—rational appetite, intellectual appetite, and will— are synonymous when we apply them to human beings, but beyond this application there are some important distinctions. While human beings and angels can both possess an intellectual appetite, only human beings possess a rational appetite. Since angels know intellectually, without reasoning, their intellectual appetite is not a rational appetite.[136] A second distinction, between rational appetite and will, turns on the source of the will's movements, and is critical

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[134] See *In III Sent*, d. 26, q. 1, a. 3, co.

[135] *ST* I 80.2 ad. 2: "appetitus intellectivus, etsi feratur in res quae sunt extra animam singulares, fertur tamen in eas secundum aliquam rationem universalem; sicut cum appetit aliquid quia est bonum."

[136] See *ST* I 58.3 on the non-discursive knowledge of angels.

for understanding the different movements in the affections of the will. Aquinas explains that the will can be moved by two movers: the apprehended good object which moves the appetite; and that which interiorly moves the will to the act of willing, which is nothing other than the will itself.[137] As with the other appetites, the will is a passive power, meaning that it can be moved by an external apprehended object.[138] Yet although the will is passive as regards the object, it also exercises control. As Aquinas puts it, the will is the power by which we are the "masters of our own actions."[139]

Having considered the sensitive appetite and its passions, and now the will, what are the affections of the will? Aquinas, in fact, never outright defines an affection of the will. The closest he comes to a definition is in the *Summa Contra Gentiles*, where he says of the soul, "the affection is a certain inclination [of the soul] towards something, for the very inclination of a natural thing we call natural appetite."[140] On its own, this may suggest that affection is synonymous with appetite, especially given how central we have seen that the definition of appetite is to the idea of inclination: "nothing other than an inclination of one desiring towards something."[141] In the *Summa Theologiae*, however, while he again links affection to appetite, he provides some further nuance: "the act of the appetitive power is by means of this, that the affection is inclined to something external."[142] The affections of the will, then, are specific acts or movements of the intellectual appetite. Thus for both the sensitive or intellectual appetites, there is some object—abstract or material—that elicits specific affections and passions.

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[137] God can also be the one who moves the will inwardly to will. *ST* I-II 80.1: "Voluntas autem, sicut supra dictum est, a duobus moveri potest, uno modo, ab obiecto, sicut dicitur quod appetibile apprehensum movet appetitum; alio modo, ab eo quod interius inclinat voluntatem ad volendum. Hoc autem non est nisi vel ipsa voluntas, vel Deus, ut supra ostensum est."

[138] *ST* I 80.2: "Potentia enim appetitiva est potentia passiva, quae nata est moveri ab apprehenso, unde appetibile apprehensum est movens non motum, appetitus autem movens motum."

[139] See *In II Sent*., d. 41, q. 2, a. 1, co.: "potentia secundum quam nostrorum actuum domini sumus, est voluntas." See also *ST* I 82.1. obj. 3 and ad. 3. For a comprehensive account of the will as a passive and active power, see Gallagher, "Thomas Aquinas on the Will as Rational Appetite," *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 29 no. 2 (October 1991): 559-584.

[140] *SCG* I 68, n. 6: "Cum igitur cogitatio animae sit per informationem quandam ipsius; affectio autem sit quaedam inclinatio ipsius ad aliquid, nam et ipsam inclinationem rei naturalis appetitum naturalem dicimus; relinquitur quod Deus cogitationes et affectiones cordium cognoscat."

[141] *ST* I-II 8.1: "voluntas est appetitus quidam rationalis. Omnis autem appetitus non est nisi boni. Cuius ratio est quia appetitus nihil aliud est quam inclinatio appetentis in aliquid."

[142] *ST* I 59.3 ad. 2: "Sed actus appetitivae virtutis est per hoc quod affectus inclinatur ad rem exteriorem."

1.3. Apprehension

The next element to consider is apprehension, which is so essential to the notion of appetite that it is the precondition to every operation of an appetite.[143] The relationship between apprehensive and appetitive powers of the soul is one of movement, where the apprehensive power relates to the appetitive power as the mover to the movable.[144] There cannot be any movement of the appetite without a preceding apprehension of an object: "appetite follows apprehension."[145]

Since an appetible object does not move the appetite except as apprehended, we are able to work backwards from apprehensible objects to derive the different appetitive powers. As Aquinas explains: "differences in the thing apprehended are in themselves differences in the appetible. Hence the powers of the appetite are distinguished according to the diversity of things apprehended, as according to their proper objects."[146] This quotation allows us to see more clearly why Aquinas makes so many distinctions both between appetites and within appetites. The sensitive appetite apprehends good or evil according to the senses, whereas the intellectual appetite apprehends good or evil simply.[147] There must therefore be an intellectual appetite as well as a sensitive appetite, because what is apprehended by the intellect and sensation are generically different.[148] Likewise, when the sensitive appetite apprehends something as easily obtainable, it is a different power from whether it apprehends something as difficult to obtain, hence the need to distinguish between the concupiscible and irascible powers. Apprehension also explains why there are distinctions between the passions. Whether someone apprehends something as good or bad, present or future, obtainable or unobtainable, avoidable or unavoidable, will determine which passions the person undergoes.

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[143] *In IV Sent.* d. 49, q. 3, a. 2, co.: "cum delectatio sit in appetitu, et omnis passio vel operatio appetitus praeexigat apprehensionem; oportet quod bonum conjunctum quod delectationem causat, sit apprehensum."

[144] *SCG* II 47, n. 5: "in habentibus cognitionem vis apprehensiva se habet ad appetitivam sicut motivum ad mobile."

[145] *ST* I 79.1 ad. 2: "appetitus sequitur apprehensionem."

[146] *ST* I 80.2 ad. 1: "differentiae apprehensi sunt per se differentiae appetibilis. Unde potentiae appetitivae distinguuntur secundum differentiam apprehensorum, sicut secundum propria obiecta."

[147] *SCG* I 90, n. 2: "intellectivus appetitus respicit bonum vel malum simpliciter, appetitus autem sensitivus bonum vel malum secundum sensum."

[148] *ST* I 80.2: "Quia igitur est alterius generis apprehensum per intellectum et apprehensum per sensum, consequens est quod appetitus intellectivus sit alia potentia a sensitivo."

The significance of apprehension goes far beyond it being a mere step in the mechanism of appetite. A first consequence is that there is a subjectivity to the affections. The reason why someone experiences fear or desire before an object is determined by how that person subjectively apprehends it. The person may apprehend the object differently five minutes from now, and differently again from another person apprehending the same object at the same time. Secondly, if the same object can move people differently, then the object that moves the appetite is not in fact the object itself, but the object *as apprehended*. For the will to tend to something, it is therefore not necessary that the object be good in fact, but that it be apprehended as good.[149] Thirdly, if appetite follows apprehension, then we can shape or control our affections through apprehension. If we ever desire to hold particular affections, to be strengthened in them, or to rid ourselves of them, the point of departure is always how we apprehend the objects in question. Fourthly, the relationship between apprehension and the passions and affections is circular. If I express fear before an audience, that will affect the way that I apprehend public speaking, which will in turn determine the nature of the affection that I have for public speaking.

Much of contemporary discussion of the emotions has been provoked by the fact that they appear to have a cognitive component, but also, at least at times, a bodily component. Aquinas accounts for the cognitive component through apprehension. We could certainly view the appetitive movements that follow as judgements: that an object is good or bad, is to be pursued and avoided, and so on. The alternative view in the emotion debate, that emotions are feelings, finds its analogue in Aquinas's approach in the somatic effects of the passions. But as we saw in Section 1, there is a whole other angle to emotions, where there is no somatic effect, yet the person's acts are truly emotional. The affections of the will (movements of the intellectual appetite) permit Aquinas to explain these kinds of acts. So, in what sense are affections of the will *movements*? This brings us to motion, the final element of the structure of the affections.

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[149] *ST* I-II 8.1: "Ad hoc igitur quod voluntas in aliquid tendat, non requiritur quod sit bonum in rei veritate, sed quod apprehendatur in ratione boni." Also *ST* I-II 13.5 ad. 2: "cum obiectum voluntatis sit bonum apprehensum, hoc modo iudicandum est de obiecto voluntatis, secundum quod cadit sub apprehensione. Et ideo sicut quandoque voluntas est alicuius quod apprehenditur ut bonum, et tamen non est vere bonum."

2. Motion

Aquinas follows Aristotle's theory of motion, according to which the genera of quantity, quality, and place, correspond to augmentation, alteration, and local motion.[150] Although he does not specify which motions he has in mind when he is speaking of appetitive movements, there are two possibilities: alteration, for example in the change from hope to despair; and augmentation, where hatred, for example, becomes more or less intense. In the case of the passions, there is also motion involved in the accompanying bodily change, which is either a change of alteration (such as blood moving to a particular part of the body) or of local motion (such as jumping with excitement).[151] Since in the case of affections of the will, there is no necessity of motion in the body (though there may be through "overflow", which we will come to shortly), we are left only with these movements of alteration and augmentation in the appetite.

Aquinas gives another approach to motion when he first introduces the category of affection in the *Summa Theologiae*. In answering the question of whether God has a body, he raises the objection that God is spoken of in terms of place, such that people can approach God and withdraw from God.[152] Aquinas responds that we approach or withdraw from God by the affections of the mind, and this approach and withdrawal designates spiritual affection, by a likeness (*similitudinem*) to local motion.[153] If I change from avoiding God to desiring him, the appetitive movement can be expressed metaphorically, with a reference to local motion; for example, rather than running away from God, I am now running towards him.[154] It is not clear that the metaphor of local motion adds anything to motion that is not already contained in alteration and augmentation, nevertheless, expressions like "turning away", "turning

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[150] See for example *In Phys.*, Bk 3, lect. 1, n. 8; lect. 2, n. 4.

[151] *SCG* III 103, n. 4: "Huiusmodi autem passiones accidunt cum aliquo determinato motu cordis, ex quo consequitur ulterius immutatio totius corporis, vel secundum motum localem vel secundum alterationem aliquam."

[152] *ST* I 3.1 obj. 5.

[153] *ST* I 3.1 ad. 5: "ad Deum non acceditur passibus corporalibus, cum ubique sit, sed affectibus mentis, et eodem modo ab eo receditur. Et sic accessus et recessus, sub similitudine localis motus, designant spiritualem affectum."

[154] Similarly in Francis Thompson's *The Hound of Heaven*, there is a transformation from "I fled Him down the nights and down the days" to "Rise, clasp my hand, and come."

towards", "drawing closer" and the like can more evocatively express the appetitive movements of alteration and augmentation.

This metaphorical approach to motion helps us to understand one of Aquinas's repeated interpretations: whenever he arrives at the word "feet" in his biblical commentaries or citations, he almost always interprets it allegorically as meaning the affections. For example, he interprets the words, "He set my feet upon a rock" (Ps 39:3), as meaning either the affections by which one advances in the spiritual way, or the affections that one sets on Christ.[155] The metaphor is capable of more creative interpretation depending on what other details the scriptures add to the feet. When the author of the Letter of the Hebrews exhorts his readers to "make straight (*rectos*) paths for your feet" (Heb 12:13), Aquinas interprets these as "right (*rectas*) affections". He continues: "For as the feet carry the body, so the affections carry the mind. Straight feet are therefore right affections: "their feet were straight feet" (Ez 1:7). Therefore, set right the affections, by which the whole body is carried spiritually."[156] In his *Commentary on Matthew*, Aquinas comments on Jesus's command to the disciples to shake the dust of their feet as they leave an unwelcoming village. He interprets the dust as signifying anything "temporal" that can remain in the affections, and further that venial sins such as vainglory can be present in the affections.[157]

As with the distinction between the movements of the sense appetite and the somatic effects that accompany them, it is also important to distinguish between the movements of the intellectual appetite and whatever action may follow the movement of the appetite. Although they are distinct, these actions can point to the appetitive movements that precede them. Aquinas holds that affections are manifested in the subsequent deliberate movements that follow the affection. In his commentary about the woman at the well in John 4, Aquinas sees

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[155] *In Psalmos*, Ps 39, n. 1: "statuit super petram pedes meos, id est affectus meos quibus procedendum est in via spirituali. Petra dicitur fundamentum divini auxilii: 2 Reg. 22: dominus petra mea. Vel petra dicitur Christus; 1 Cor. 10: petra autem erat Christus. Et sic firmavit supra petram, id est divinum auxilium. Vel supra Christum pedes meos, id est affectus meos."

[156] *In Heb.*, cap. 12, lect. 13: "Sicut enim pedes portant corpus, ita mentem portant affectiones. Recti ergo pedes sunt affectiones rectae. Ez. I, 7: pedes eorum, pedes recti. Rectificate ergo affectiones, quibus totum corpus portatur spiritualiter." See also *In Rom.,* cap. 10, lect 2.

[157] *In Matt.*, cap. 10, lect. 1: "Tertia ratio est, quia per pulverem significantur temporalia, per pedes affectus, ad significandum quod in affectibus eorum nihil debet remanere temporale."

significance in the fact that she leaves her pot behind when she goes into the city, namely, that it makes her affections (*affectus*) apparent in two ways.[158] First, her devotion was so great that she abandoned the water and the pot, as if she forgot the reason why she had come to the well. Secondly, the woman was now not caring about her own bodily interests but the interests of others. Like the apostles leaving behind their nets to follow the Lord, the water symbolises a worldly way of life that one leaves behind to follow the Lord. This brief exposition supports Kenny's example of how a fear of heights can be known from the repeated efforts to avoid them. Again, these are the manifestations of the movements of the appetite that precede them.

3. The relationship between the appetites

The distinction between the appetites provides a means of approaching the kind of affective experiences that, as we saw in Section 1, so bedevil those who have the single and narrowly-defined category of emotion. It allows us to analyse how affective movements may have vastly different objects and durations. The danger is that we treat the appetites as too neatly distinct, whereas they interact and overlap in important ways.[159] The will, for example, is not confined to universal goods as its objects, but it can also be moved by goods apprehended by sense.[160] I can eat a salad because of its taste, but also because I apprehend it as "healthy". The will can be moved towards a particular good irrespective of whether the sensitive appetite is or not. These movements are particularly apparent when there is a conflict between the appetites, such as when an athlete feels pain but continues running for the sake of glory, or a dieter drinks a distasteful concoction for the sake of health. During these instances of conflict, each appetite has the capacity to influence the other. Neither appetite of necessity dominates the other. On the one hand, the sensitive appetite is subject to the will as the superior power. Aquinas observes that whereas a sheep will flee a wolf at once, as it has

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[158] *In Ioan.*, cap. 4, lect. 3.

[159] Diana Fritz Cates gives a comprehensive treatment of the relationship between the appetites from multiple perspectives, particularly throughout chapters 5-9 of *Aquinas on the Emotions.*

[160] *ST* I-II 10.3 ad. 3: "voluntas non solum movetur a bono universali apprehenso per rationem, sed etiam a bono apprehenso per sensum."

no superior counter-acting appetite, in human beings the sensitive appetite cannot cause movement unless the will consents.[161]

The sensitive appetite, however, can also move the will. It does this first through apprehension. We can apprehend something as suitable in a state of passion—Aquinas cites here the passion of anger—that does not seem so good when we are without the passion.[162] The will also encounters difficulty in resisting the movements of the sensitive appetite. One reason is that when the attention of one power of the soul in applied to one thing, another power is diminished or totally impeded.[163] In this way, the sensitive appetite moves the will when a passion draws attention away from what the rational appetite may otherwise attend to. A second reason is that the passions can interfere with judgement—it is difficult to turn the imagination away from an object of the sensitive appetite when one is in a state of passion.[164]

The relationship between the powers can also be friendly—it is not all about the will ruling and resisting the power of passion. The will can call on the passions for help, as when someone chooses by a judgement of the reason to be affected by a passion, in order to work more promptly, cooperating with the sensitive appetite.[165] People committed to the work of justice may recall specific acts of injustice, including the sights and the sound, in order to maintain their commitment. Imagining enjoyable rewards for completing an unpleasant task is another common example. Aquinas's insight on this point alone allows us to see why the formation and transformation of habits is so grounded in the relationship between the appetites.

A passion can also strengthen the will by being an effect of a movement of the will, thus reinforcing the will in its movement. Aquinas raises this issue in a question on whether

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[161] *ST* I 81.3. He qualifies this, however, taking Aristotle's image of the intellect ruling the appetite by a political and royal power. The substance of the analogy is that, just as citizens of a city remain free to resist the commands of a governing power, so the sensitive power is able to resist what the higher power commands, for example, by imagining something as pleasant which reason forbids. See *ST* I.81.3 ad. 2, also *ST* I-II.9.2 ad. 3.

[162] *ST* I-II 9.2: "homo est in passione aliqua, videtur sibi aliquid conveniens, quod non videtur extra passionem existenti, sicut irato videtur bonum, quod non videtur quieto."

[163] *ST* I-II 77.1: "necesse est quod quando una potentia intenditur in suo actu, altera in suo actu remittatur, vel etiam totaliter impediatur."

[164] *ST* I-II 77.1: "videmus quod homines in aliqua passione existentes, non facile imaginationem avertunt ab his circa quae afficiuntur."

[165] *ST* I-II 24.3 ad. 1: "alio modo, per modum electionis, quando scilicet homo ex iudicio rationis eligit affici aliqua passione, ut promptius operetur, cooperante appetitu sensitivo."

passion always diminishes the goodness of an act.[166] There he gives a brief exegesis of Psalm 83.3 ("My heart and my flesh exulted in the living God"), explaining that we may understand "heart" as the intellectual appetite, and "flesh" as the sensitive appetite. He concludes from this that if we are to be perfected in moral good, we should be moved to good not only in the will, but also in the sensitive appetite, by what he elsewhere calls "consequent passions".[167] This position undermines any claim that we should seek a state of what we could term "pure affection", in which we love, hate, desire, rejoice, and so on, solely as movements of the will that are free from passion. This brings us to the concept of "overflow", one of the most distinctive aspects of Aquinas's teaching on the appetites.

3.1. Overflow

The idea of overflow is this: that when the higher part of the soul is moved intensely towards an object of the intellectual appetite, the lower part of the soul follows that movement.[168] For example, the desire for wisdom may be so strong that there is an overflow (*redundantia*) into the lower appetite, such that there is a somatic effect.[169] Aquinas sees this effect as a sign of the intensity of the will, which as such indicates greater moral goodness.[170] Moreover, the strength of this overflow into the sensitive appetite can be so strong that it can overwhelm other passions that have arisen in the sensitive appetite alone. Even if someone is feeling bodily pain, the pleasure of contemplation of truth can be so great as to mitigate the pain of the senses.[171] Not only does Aquinas see the overflow as a sign of the intensity of the will, he

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[166] *ST* I-II 24.3.

[167] *ST* I-II 24.3: "Sicut igitur melius est quod homo et velit bonum, et faciat exteriori actu; ita etiam ad perfectionem boni moralis pertinet quod homo ad bonum moveatur non solum secundum voluntatem, sed etiam secundum appetitum sensitivum." *ST* II-II 2.10: "etiam passio consequens in virtutibus moralibus est signum promptioris voluntatis."

[168] *ST* I-II 24.3 ad. 1: "Uno modo, per modum redundantiae, quia scilicet, cum superior pars animae intense movetur in aliquid, sequitur motum eius etiam pars inferior. Et sic passio existens consequenter in appetitu sensitivo, est signum intensionis voluntatis."

[169] *ST* I-II 30.1 ad. 1: "appetitus sapientiae, vel aliorum spiritualium bonorum, interdum concupiscentia nominatur, vel propter similitudinem quandam, vel propter intensionem appetitus superioris partis, ex quo fit redundantia in inferiorem appetitum, ut simul etiam ipse inferior appetitus suo modo tendat in spirituale bonum consequens appetitum superiorem,"

[170] *ST* I-II 24.3 ad. 1: "Et sic passio existens consequenter in appetitu sensitivo, est signum intensionis voluntatis. Et sic indicat bonitatem moralem maiorem."

[171] *ST* I-II 38.4 ad. 3: "in viribus animae fit redundantia a superiori ad inferius. Et secundum hoc, delectatio contemplationis, quae est in superiori parte, redundat ad mitigandum etiam dolorem qui est in sensu."

also sees it as a *condition* of intensity. The will cannot be moved to anything intensely without stirring up passion in the sensitive appetite.[172]

Aquinas returns to overflow in multiple passages: happiness in the soul overflows into happiness in the body;[173] vocal prayer is overflow from the soul to the body because of vehement affection;[174] the desire for wisdom and other spiritual goods can be so intense that it overflows into the lower appetite.[175] In these cases Aquinas seems to make the overflow a direct result of the movement of the will, not one that is first mediated by sensitive apprehension. In a different vein is his comment about the blessed who see the essence of God after the resurrection. In this state, there will be an overflow from the intellect to the lower powers and to the body, because: "according to the rule itself of the divine vision, the soul turns toward phantasms and sensible things."[176] On this account, overflow is simply the sensitive appetite turning to concrete examples of the insensible good in which the intellect rejoices. There is a weight of texts, however, that make overflow a direct result of a movement of the intellectual appetite. In his *Commentary on the Psalms*, he states that the greatest sorrow is that which is because of sin, but it is not sensed as great, since the sensitive appetite is moved only by the apprehension of sensible things, *unless by an overflow from the reason*.[177] Three examples from the *Commentary on the Sentences* will advance the point. First, on the subject of vocal prayer: if the devotion of the one praying is strong, the movement of the superior powers also overflows to the inferior, so that external expressions

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[172] *ST* I-II 77.6: "passio appetitus sensitivi trahit vel inclinat rationem et voluntatem, ut supra dictum est. Consequenter autem, secundum quod motus superiorum virium, si sint vehementes, redundant in inferiores, non enim potest voluntas intense moveri in aliquid, quin excitetur aliqua passio in appetitu sensitive."

[173] *ST* I-II 4.6: "ex beatitudine animae fiet redundantia ad corpus, ut et ipsum sua perfectione potiatur."

[174] *ST* II-II 83.12: "adiungitur vocalis oratio ex quadam redundantia ab anima in corpus ex vehementi affectione."

[175] *ST* I-II 30.1 ad. 1: "appetitus sapientiae, vel aliorum spiritualium bonorum, interdum concupiscentia nominatur, vel propter similitudinem quandam, vel propter intensionem appetitus superioris partis, ex quo fit redundantia in inferiorem appetitum, ut simul etiam ipse inferior appetitus suo modo tendat in spirituale bonum consequens appetitum superiorem, et etiam ipsum corpus spiritualibus deserviat."

[176] *ST* II-II 175.4 ad. 1: "post resurrectionem in beatis Dei essentiam videntibus fiet redundantia ab intellectu ad inferiores vires, et usque ad corpus. Unde, secundum ipsam regulam divinae visionis, anima intendet et phantasmatibus et sensibilibus."

[177] *In Psalmos*, Ps 37, n. 10: "dolor de peccato est maximus; sed non magis sentitur, quia appetitus sensitivus non movetur nisi ex apprehensione sensibilium, nisi per redundantiam rationis." My emphasis.

such as tears and sighs follow.[178] Secondly, on sorrow in contrition: where the inferior powers have their proper objects which move them more vehemently than does the overflow from the higher powers, just as the pain in the sensitive part from a sensible injury is greater than what overflows from reason.[179] Thirdly, when he compares bodily and spiritual delights: from bodily delights and pains a bodily change follows immediately, but a bodily change does not follow from spiritual delights and sadnesses, unless they are strong to such a point that they overflow into the sensitive appetite.[180]

The fact that overflow can be relatively weak, and expressed in such movements as sighs, shows that the point of overflow is the vehemence of the movement of the superior appetite, not the vehemence of the movement in the sensitive appetite. The latter movement may be as faint as a grimace, a quick uptake of breath, or as Aquinas says, a sigh. It could also involve shouts, dancing and so on. This is consistent with William James's claim in Section 1 that intellectual emotions are expressed bodily far more often than we might suppose. It is also consistent with common experience of the way people speak of abstract things that they love or hate intensely. A tax lawyer may talk about her great love for corporate tax reform; an adolescent about his love for engineering; a politician about her hatred of injustice. The intensity of their affections towards these abstract goods may be expressed physically. In trembling voices, flushed faces, shaking fists, their passion is palpable. The use of the word "passion" here is precisely what the theory of overflow allows for—their affection for these subjects is so great that it provokes a passion.

How, though, does this overflow actually work? Several scholars take the view that in order for there to be a sensory effect, sensory apprehension must be engaged. Nicholas Lombardo,

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[178] *In IV Sent*., d. 15, q. 4, a. 2, qc. 1, co.: "ex vehementia devotionis in orante vox sequitur; quia motus superiorum virium, si sit fortis, etiam ad inferiores redundat; unde et cum mens orantis per devotionem accenditur, in fletus et suspiria et jubilos et voces inconsiderate prorumpit."

[179] *In IV Sent*., d. 17, q. 2, a. 3, qc. 1, co.: "vires inferiores vehementius moventur ab objectis propriis, quam ex redundantia superiorum virium; et ideo quanto operatio superiorum virium est propinquior objectis inferiorum, tanto magis sequuntur earum motum; et ideo major dolor est in sensitiva parte ex laesione sensibili quam sit ille qui in ipsa redundat ex ratione; et similiter major qui redundat ex ratione de corporalibus deliberante quam qui redundat ex ratione considerante spiritualia."

[180] *In IV Sent*., d. 49, q. 3, a. 5, qc. 1, co.: "ex delectationibus et doloribus corporalibus statim sequitur corporis transmutatio; non autem ex delectationibus et tristitiis spiritualibus, nisi sint adeo fortes quod ex eis fiat redundantia in appetitum sensibilem."

noting that Aquinas is vague about the precise mechanism of the overflow, reconstructs it in this way: "The will first moves the intellect by the vehemence of its affections regarding some object, so that the intellect causes the particular reason to form an intentional object that engages the passions. This new intentional object then immediately prompts a response from the sense appetite."[181] The intellect grasps an immaterial concept though an interior image, and so the concept becomes directly related to sense experience.[182] The particular reason and imagination, we recall, are sensory powers. Diana Fritz Cates takes a similar view, arguing that overflow must take place through the medium of sensory apprehension."[183] The intense motion of the will is such that the imagination is engaged: "Typically, while one considers an object's value, one considers related images or impressions of sensible goodness, so that the object one has in mind appears to be good on intellectual and sensory levels at the same time."[184] H-D Noble goes into some detail in his explanation. Having noted that "abstract ideas leave our will asleep" because the will lacks a concrete and immediate goal[185], he nominates imagination as the intermediary of the overflow:

> This attention, in its turn, provokes an ensemble of corresponding images, and this is because it is normal that our ideas wrap themselves in the images from which they are abstracted. Our most spiritual thoughts, like our purest feelings, are carried in us through the sensible representations of the realities that correspond to them.[186]

We can consider several further examples of how this might work. The budding engineer, while speaking excitedly of his love for engineering, thinks of the model bridge he has built in his backyard, or the skyscraper he hopes to build in the future. The politician thinks of the

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[181] Lombardo, *The Logic of Desire*, 90.
[182] Lombardo, *The Logic of Desire*, 90-91.
[183] Cates, *Aquinas on the Emotions*, 222.
[184] Cates, *Aquinas on the Emotions*, 223.
[185] "Les idées abstraites laissent notre volonté en sommeil. Celle-ci ne se tend qu'en face d'un but qui se montre saisissable et de moyens qui soient aptes à le conquérir. Plus le but sera concret et immédiat et plus la volonté se portera avec force à sa réalisation." Henri-Dominique Noble, *Les passions dans la vie morale*, vol. 1 (Paris: P. Lethielleux, 1931), 167.
[186] "Maintenant, la question se pose de savoir comment s'effectue, psychologiquement parlant, cette excitation de l'appétit inférieur par l'appétit supérieur … C'est l'imagination qui est l'intermédiaire de cet influx … ces pensées et ces considérations existant dans la conscience y alimentent des sentients qui s'emparent de notre attention. Cette attention, à son tour, provoque en ensemble d'images correspondantes, et cela parce qu'il est normal que nos idées s'enveloppent des images d'où elles sont abstraites. Nos pensées les plus spirituelles comme nos sentiments les plus épurés, sont portés en nous par les représentations sensibles des réalités qui leur répondent. Que ces pensées affluent par le fait d'un sentiment fort qui absorbe la conscience, et voici l'imagination qui se remplit d'images affectives, et par conséquent voici la sensibilité éveillée, remuée, exaltée." Noble, *Les passions dans la vie morale*, 169-170.

family she visited the previous week who could not afford healthcare. The tax lawyer imagines specific people who benefit unjustly from the failings of the present system. In each of these cases, the abstract good is incarnated in a specific, concrete example that people are able to sense.

Aquinas gives a similar account of this mechanism in the *De veritate*, where he suggests two ways in which something apprehended by the intellect can lead to a passion in the lower appetite. The first is when what is understood universally by the intellect is formed in the imagination in particular.[187] He gives the example of punishment after death. The believer may assent to this belief intellectually, but the passion of fear is aroused when the believer forms phantasms of the pains of hell, imagining the fires and worms associated with hell. The problem is that he also suggests a second way, which he does not elaborate upon, in which a passion can follow from something apprehended by the intellect—through overflow.[188] To be clear, one way in which the lower appetite follows the higher is through the imagination, the second is through overflow. This, it seems, leaves us none the wiser as to how the overflow occurs. We can be sure, though, that overflow for Aquinas does *not* mean that the imagination functions as an intermediary. It is clear that when Aquinas speaks of overflow from the higher appetite to the lower, he has something in mind other than the imagination or particular reason forming concrete images of abstract ideas.

The concept of overflow therefore presents a twofold problem. First, Aquinas holds that the formation of phantasms is essential to the act of understanding, so any act of understanding will involve the interior senses.[189] Secondly, the intellectual and sense appetites are distinct on account of generic differences in apprehension.[190] How then to explain overflow while

[187] *De veritate*, q. 26, a. 3, ad 13: "Uno modo in quantum id quod intelligitur universaliter per intellectum, formatur in imaginatione particulariter, et sic movetur inferior appetitus; sicut cum intellectus credentis accipit intelligibiliter futuras poenas, et earum phantasmata format imaginando ignem urentem et vermem rodentem et alia huiusmodi, ex quo sequitur passio timoris in appetitu sensitivo."

[188] *De veritate*, q. 26, a. 3, ad 13: "Alio modo in quantum ex apprehensione intellectus movetur appetitus superior, ex quo, per quamdam redundantiam vel imperium, appetitus inferior commovetur."

[189] *ST* I 84.7; also *ST* I 86.1.

[190] *ST* I 80.2.

keeping these two principles in mind, and preserving the distinction between the appetites and their respective powers of apprehension?

One possibility is that in overflow the sensory apprehension is engaged, but the sensed objects are considered under the aspect of the universal.[191] An example would be someone who is intellectually convinced that God is good, and who inspired by this conviction then apprehends everything surrounding her as evidence of God's goodness. From books sitting on the shelf to birds singing in the trees, there is nothing that she can see or otherwise sense that does not seem to her an instance of God's goodness. Even a plate of very simple food (and which does not engage the passion of delight on that account) is yet another concrete example of God's goodness, and so intensifies the affection of joy. By contrast, someone who has determined that everything is meaningless may look at the same objects and see only change and decay. The birds singing in the trees will soon be dead. The books will be mostly unread and forgotten. The plate of food is a means of energy that will only prolong the meaninglessness. There is sensory apprehension in all these cases, but it is the intellectual apprehension that determines whether they are apprehended as objects of joy or sadness.

These kinds of examples allow for the mind to turn to sensory images, but preserve the fact that it is the intellectual apprehension that is moving the appetite. They are different to what Aquinas proposes in his first example in *De veritate,* where someone who believes in hell then imagines a horrific image. In this case the movement of the sensitive appetite is wholly explicable by the sensory apprehension. Even someone who does not believe in hell could imagine being burned or consumed by worms and find the prospect sufficiently horrific that it provokes at least a shudder. But if a particular movement of the sensitive appetite can be explained independently of the movement of the intellectual appetite, then evidently that is not what Aquinas has in mind for overflow. On his account, the superior appetite is moved by an object of intellectual apprehension and from this movement (*ex quo*), the lower appetite is roused (*commovetur*).[192] The choice of *commovere* (literally, "to move with") suggests that

[191] *ST* I 80.2 ad. 2.

[192] *De veritate*, q. 26, a. 3, ad 13: "Alio modo in quantum ex apprehensione intellectus movetur appetitus superior, ex quo, per quamdam redundantiam vel imperium, appetitus inferior commovetur."

the movement of the lower appetite is accompanying the movement of the superior appetite. Can the appetites be so closely intertwined that the appetite of one power can follow the appetite of the other? This would complicate the neat division of the powers of the soul into the appetites with their own apprehension, but that is the point. It explains why Aquinas never accounts with precision how overflow works, even though he refers to it frequently and explains other movements of the appetite so carefully.

The connection of the appetites certainly looms large when Aquinas turns to overflow elsewhere in the *De veritate*. While discussing the movements of the appetites in Christ, he explains overflow by reference to the unity of the powers of the soul and the unity of the soul and the body, and specifies that what superabounds in one power flows out into the others.[193] This unity helps to preserve the humanness of intellectual affection. Someone's act of intellect is the act of the whole human person, which necessarily entails a physiological accompaniment to higher-level thought. The body has to be doing *something* while the rational appetite is engaged, even if this be continuing in a state of equilibrium, with a resting heart rate. If that equilibrium be disturbed on account of an intense intellectual apprehension, that is all that is required for overflow, and holding one's breath or a change in the heart rate are the somatic effects that may follow. An example Aquinas offers is that of the "animal powers" being withdrawn or impeded from their acts on account of the intensity of contemplation.[194] As Noble points out, the issue here is not the superior sentiment that causes a corporeal reaction, but its greater-than-usual intensity, absorbing the mind's focus is it does.[195]

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[193] *De veritate*, q. 26, a. 10, co.: "Ad cuius evidentiam sciendum est, quod secundum naturae ordinem, propter colligantiam virium animae in una essentia, et animae et corporis in uno esse compositi, vires superiores et inferiores, et etiam corpus invicem in se effluunt quod in aliquo eorum superabundant." See also *De veritate*, q. 13, a. 3, ad 3: Secus autem est in aliis hominibus, in quibus ex quadam colligantia potentiarum animae ad invicem sequitur de necessitate quod fiat redundantia vel impedimentum ex una potentia in aliam."

[194] *De veritate*, q. 26, a. 10, co.: "Similiter ex viribus superioribus fit redundantia in inferiores; cum ad motum voluntatis intensum sequitur passio in sensuali appetitu, et ex intensa contemplatione retrahuntur vel impediuntur vires animales a suis actibus."

[195] "Mais voici que ce sentiment de la présence de Dieu ainsi possédé se prolonge, s'échauffe, grandit, et absorbe le champ de la conscience, il devient alors tout naturel que la sensibilité inférieure participe à cet émoi de toute l'âme et que des réactions somatiques se produisent. Chez les saints, l'extase et le ravissement peuvent à ce point influer sur l'organisme que les principales fonctions physiologiques en sont troublées et momentanément arrêtées. Ici, ce n'est pas précisément le sentiment supérieur qui a provoqué la réaction

Again, the key point that Aquinas insists upon is the intensity of the movement of the superior appetite.[196] So what might give rise to an intensity of will towards a universal? Aaron Ben-Ze'ev gives some guidance of what creates emotional intensity, which can be applied to affections of the will, though these are not his specific concern. He identifies two sets of variables, the first relating to the impact of an event, and the second set relating to the background circumstances of the person involved. The event's strength, degree of reality, and relevance, all create greater emotional significance and hence intensity. The person's background circumstances include variables such as responsibility, invested effort, readiness, unexpectedness, and deservingness.[197] These all go towards explaining why a scientist might dance around his laboratory, or an accountant might give a fist-pump, as we saw in Section 1. To illustrate, we might take the example of a mathematician attempting to solve a problem, which undoubtedly belongs to the intellectual order. The problem itself is difficult, well-known, and, if solved, will be important for a range of fields beyond mathematics. The mathematician himself has a great love of the subject of mathematics. He has known about this particular problem since his childhood, and has long nursed an ambition to be the one to solve it. On occasions when he thought he had solved it but realised he had failed, he had periods of depression, where he needed to regather his emotional strength to dare to approach the problem again. In this situation, the appetitive background of affections and passions with their somatic effects are now gathered into focus for this one problem. The mathematician is primed, body and soul, to respond to the apprehension of an intellectual good with a joyous celebration.[198]

3.2. Superiority

corporelle, mais son intensité supranormale." H-D Noble, "Le plaisir et la joie," *Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques* 5, vol. 4 (1911), 698.

[196] On the requirement for intensity or vehemence, see *ST* I-II 24.3 ad. 1; *ST* I-II 77.6.

[197] Aaron Ben-Ze'ev, "The Thing Called Emotion," in *The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Emotion*, ed. Peter Goldie (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 50-54.

[198] Albert Einstein spoke of a similar affective background to his discoveries in relativity: "In the light of knowledge attained, the happy achievement seems almost a matter of course, and any intelligent student can grasp it without too much trouble. But the years of anxious searching in the dark, with their intense longing, their alternations of confidence and exhaustion and the final emergence into the light—only those who have experienced it can understand that." *Ideas and Opinions*, ed. Carl Seelig, trans. Sonja Bargmann (New York: Crown Publishers Inc., 1954), 289-90.

Overflow raises further questions about the relationship to each other of the affections and passions. Are we able to say that one appetite is superior to the other, and that affections are superior to passions and vice versa? Aquinas treats this question succinctly by saying that the will is more excellent "simply" than the sensitive appetite, but for someone whom a passion is dominating, the sensitive appetite is preeminent.[199] He expands on this summary when he turns to the passion of delight (*delictatio*), often also translated as pleasure. One of his distinctions, which he considers at length in *ST* I-II 31.5, is between bodily and sensible pleasures on the one hand, and spiritual and intellectual pleasures on the other. Which are greater? He gives two ways of answering this. On one hand, bodily pleasures are greater (in that they are more vehement), for three reasons: sensible things are more familiar to us; there is a bodily change that accompanies a sensible pleasure; and bodily pleasures are sought as remedies of a kind against bodily defects or troubles. But following Aristotle, who held that the greatest pleasure is in the operation of wisdom, he gives two sets of arguments for why intellectual and spiritual pleasures are greater. First, they are greater in their very actions, because there is more pleasure in knowing something through understanding than through sense perception. He notes here, citing Augustine, that we would all prefer to lose our bodily vision rather than our intellectual vision. They are superior also because the intellectual faculty that they are joined to is more noble and knowing than the sensitive faculty. His second approach is in the pleasure itself. Spiritual goods are superior to and more loved than sensible goods, shown by the fact that people will abstain from bodily pleasures rather than lose the intellectual good of honour. Finally, when the intellect joins to a good, the union with the good is more intimate, more perfect, and firmer than when the sensitive faculty does, because the intellect penetrates through to what a thing is, rather than stopping at its external accidents.

This argument and its conclusions are consistent with how the wisdom literature emphasises that wisdom is more desirable than the most delightful sensible goods.[200] We shall see in

[199] *ST* I-II 9.2 ad. 1: "Voluntas igitur simpliciter praestantior est quam appetitus sensitivus, sed quoad istum in quo passio dominatur, inquantum subiacet passioni, praeeminet appetitus sensitivus."

[200] See for example Prov 3:13-18; Wis 7:7-14.

Chapter 2 that Aquinas often draws on quotations from the wisdom literature to demonstrate the existence of certain affections, including love, desire, and joy. It would be inconsistent for Aquinas to hold that the greatest bodily pleasures are in any way superior to spiritual pleasures, except along the lines of vehemence that he followed. More notable, though, is the conclusion that Aquinas does *not* draw. He does not say that, by virtue of their superiority, spiritual pleasures should be pursued and sensible pleasures rejected, nor that a state of spiritual pleasure free from sensible pleasure is the ideal. He could hardly draw the latter conclusion given his position that overflow is a sign of greater moral goodness.

Robert Miner addresses this question of the superiority of the affections, and other questions touching on the relationship between the appetites, in an attempt to dispel what he calls the *Summa Theologiae*'s "simple teaching" on *affectus* and *passio*—a teaching that Miner believes is antithetical to Aquinas's deepest teachings on the subject.[201] On Miner's account, the simple teaching presents *affectus* solely as acts of the will, and insists on their superiority to the passions of the sensitive appetite. This division carries the implication that *affectus* as such cannot be felt, and that the *affectus* of the rational appetite are superior to the mere passions of the sensitive appetite. So, for the simple teaching, "the truly rational approach would be to cultivate the godlike *affectus* and downplay the passions, which belong to a lower order."[202]

The simple teaching does indeed do violence to Aquinas's teaching on *affectus* and *passio*, so Miner is right to reject it.[203] More important, though, is Miner's concern with refuting the simple teaching's implication of "clear superiority of intellectual *affectus* to sensible *passiones* in human beings."[204] Miner takes Aquinas's treatment of *dilectio*, the love that is an act of will, and *amor*, which signifies all forms of love, but particularly the passion of love

[201] Robert C. Miner, "*Affectus* and *Passio* in the Summa Theologiae of Thomas Aquinas," in *Before Emotion: The Language of Feeling, 400-1800*, ed. Juanita Feros Ruys, Michael W Champion, and Kirk Essary (New York: Routledge, 2019), 125.

[202] Miner, "*Affectus* and *Passio*," 126. For consistency I have not used the macron in *affectūs* as Miner does throughout his essay.

[203] It is far from clear, though, that it is in fact a widespread interpretation in the secondary literature. I have not seen this simple teaching offered anywhere, and Miner offers no examples. It is worth pre-emptively refuting the simple teaching nonetheless.

[204] Miner, "*Affectus* and *Passio*," 126.

in the sensitive appetite.[205] In this article, Aquinas responds to a passage he quotes from Pseudo-Dionysius in the *sed contra,* that for some saints it seems that the name of *amor* is "more divine" than the name *dilectio*. Aquinas's response is to clarify in what sense this is true—that since *amor* conveys (*importat*) a certain passion, whereas *dilectio* presupposes a rational judgement, someone can be drawn to God passively by *amor* better than he can lead himself to God through his own reason. It is in this sense that *amor* is more divine than *dilectio*.[206]

Miner concludes, first: "This passage is sufficient to show that for Thomas, purely intellectual *affectus* are not necessarily superior to *passiones*."[207] We have seen the ways in which Aquinas considers the question of superiority. It is not at all clear that he is doing the same thing in this particular reply. His focus is rather about connotations—what the words *amor* and *dilectio* themselves suggest. While *dilectio* concerns the choice that (fallen) man makes as the initiator of love, *amor,* with its connotation of passivity, throws the focus on external movers, including God. At root it is a question of whether the action of God is greater than human reason. If one term for love allows for the action of God and the other is restricted to human reason, it is evident which should be considered more "divine".[208] We can also look further afield to see how Aquinas speaks of how we are drawn to God passively, by *amor*. In his commentary on John's Gospel, Aquinas considers how Christ draws us to himself, namely "by a wonderful delight and love (*amor*) of the truth, which is the Son of God himself." He goes on to say that we will be drawn to Christ "if we delight in truth, blessedness, justice, eternal life, all of which is Christ. Therefore, if we would be drawn by

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[205] *ST* I 26.3.

[206] *ST* 1 26.3: "ideo aliqui posuerunt, etiam in ipsa voluntate, nomen amoris esse divinius nomine dilectionis, quia amor importat quandam passionem, praecipue secundum quod est in appetitu sensitivo; dilectio autem praesupponit iudicium rationis. Magis autem homo in Deum tendere potest per amorem, passive quodammodo ab ipso Deo attractus, quam ad hoc eum propria ratio ducere possit, quod pertinet ad rationem dilectionis, ut dictum est. Et propter hoc, divinius est amor quam dilectio."

[207] Miner, "*Affectus* and *Passio*," 127.

[208] Michel Labourdette similarly comments that the word *love*, signifying as it does passion, or at least initial passivity, adapts itself better to the divine reality of a supernatural love that God infuses into us and by which he draws us, than the word *dilection* which, suggesting ideas of deliberation and choice, expresses rather a love at the level of human reason. "Le mot *amour* parce qu'il signifie passion, ou au moins passivité initiale, s'adapte mieux à la réalité divine d'un amour surnaturel que Dieu nous infuse et par lequel il nous attire, que le mot *dilection* qui, suggérant les idées de délibération et de choix, exprime plutôt un amour à hauteur de raison humaine." *Les actes humains* (Paris: Parole et Silence, 2016), 298-299.

him, let us be drawn by love (*dilectio*) of the truth."[209] We see that Aquinas is prepared to use *amor* when speaking of love in the rational appetite, but is also prepared to use *dilectio* for love of the same object. Together they demonstrate that God is capable of drawing us to himself through the objects of the rational appetite. It remains the case that *amor* is more suggestive of the action of God than *dilectio*.

Miner's second conclusion about the simple teaching is that "it generates the suspicion that such *affectus* are highly questionable."[210] His first reason for suspicion is a moral one, and is essentially that volitions that involve no passion are for human beings "incomplete and defective", because an affection of the will that is to be fully itself, completely good, will naturally give rise to a motion of the sensitive appetite, through overflow.[211] As we have seen, Aquinas's view is that it is a sign of greater intensity in the will if an affection of the will is also followed by overflow into the sensitive appetite. But it is notable that what he does *not* do is criticise passionless affection. Miner's second suspicion of passionless affections is that the idea of two separate entities, an *affectus* and its corresponding *passio*, is possibly too dualistic, suggesting the presence of a "soul-event", which may then bring about a very different and separate "body-event". Miner favours a single motion of the soul/body composite that coheres better with the hylomorphism in Aquinas's texts.[212]

There would be some situations in which these suspicions would be well-placed, but there is also reason to be cautious in suggesting that *affectus* that are followed by *passiones* are always and everywhere superior to *affectus* with no effect in the sensitive appetite. There may be very good reasons for why such an effect should be resisted. Someone at a funeral may have great spiritual joy at the thought of the salvation and future resurrection of the deceased. But co-existing with this thought may well be sadness at the thought of never seeing the person again in this earthly life, as well as a shared sadness at the sight of other people

[209] *In Ioan.*, cap. 6, lect. 5: "Sic ergo trahuntur a Patre, sua maiestate allecti; sed trahuntur etiam a Filio, admirabili delectatione et amore veritatis, quae est ipse Filius Dei. Si enim, ut dicit Augustinus, trahit sua quemque voluptas, quanto fortius debet homo trahi ad Christum, si delectatur veritate, beatitudine, iustitia, sempiterna vita, quod totum est Christus? Ab isto ergo si trahendi sumus, trahamur per dilectionem veritatis."
[210] Miner, "*Affectus* and *Passio*," 127.
[211] Miner, "*Affectus* and *Passio*," 127.
[212] Miner, "*Affectus* and *Passio*," 128.

grieving, and an aversion to manifesting joy in the presence of those who are grieving. These other affections by no means undermine the reality of the person's joy. Likewise, someone may be angry at an injustice, whilst grateful that the injustice has been revealed, sorry at the actions of both the victim and the aggressor, and feeling guilty for not having recognised the injustice earlier. The mind may dance between different reflections, and different objects of the will, with great rapidity. A scenario where the will has a sole object that demands only one body/soul response is certainly possible. Much human experience, however, involves a far greater variety of affections.

As we saw in Section 1, one of the virtues of the category of *affectus* is that it allows us to consider the affective experience more broadly than isolated episodes or acts. After discussing his suspicions with the simple teaching, Miner comments: "If the radical suspicion is well placed, there is in reality only a single unified act, even if that act can be analysed into intellectual and sensual components."[213] On certain occasions, particularly when the sensitive appetite is immediately engaged, we can consider affective experiences in a single unified act. The sudden appearance of a spider on one's shoulder will trigger an immediate response that can be analysed as a frozen-in-time, discrete act. The affections of the will are much less profitably analysed as discrete acts. Again, in some situations, such as contemplation, or solving a mathematical problem, it is possible to place brackets around the experience and consider it as an act, or event, or episode. But if we are to consider affections that endure, perhaps while a succession of different objects draws the attention of the sensitive appetite, the notion of a single unified act is less realistic.

Miner is correct to warn that, "any counsel to cultivate *affectus* that are simply disconnected from passions would be a sad confusion of what is natural for angels with what is appropriate for embodied intellects."[214] We might further illuminate the problem, however, by flipping it around. What would we make of counsel to cultivate *affectus* that *are* followed by passions; that is, intellectual affections that are so strong as to have a bodily overflow? The answer can only be—it depends. It depends on the other current or possible objects of the sensible and

[213] Miner, "*Affectus* and *Passio*," 128.
[214] Miner, "*Affectus* and *Passio*," 128.

intellectual appetite. It depends (recall the funeral example) on the relevant circumstances of time and place. To expect, demand, or aim for a reaction in the sensitive appetite to an intellectual affection risks introducing sentimentality into Aquinas's thought.

CONCLUSION

One of the many virtues of Aquinas's account of affectivity is that he allows us to explain the full range of affective experience. We can account for someone's love of a particular song and a love of music in general, for a short-term episode of fear and a life-long fear, for an explosion of rage and an act of calm anger. An important discovery has been the way that Aquinas speaks of acts of the will synonymously with affection. Given that the will is engaged in every voluntary human action, does this not mean that every human action is affective? Or (if we want to use the term "emotion") are we acting from emotion during all our waking hours? In a word, yes. As we saw Daniel Westberg point out, there is a "motion" contained in any emotion, and since appetitive movements are constitutive of human action, all human action is affective.

One might object that in doing so we are defining emotion so broadly as to strip the term of what makes it distinctive. To that, two responses suffice. First, there is still room, as Westberg noted, for "paradigm examples" of emotion.[215] These would be emotions that have a great intensity, and which involve a bodily change. Secondly, the objection highlights the limitations of using one word to explain such a broad range of affective experience. This is precisely what Aquinas's more sophisticated terminology allows him to avoid. To examine more closely how he does this, we turn now to study particular affections of the will.

[215] See fn. 101 on page 32.

CHAPTER 2 – PARTICULAR AFFECTIONS

INTRODUCTION

We saw in Chapter 1 that in his Treatise on the Passions Aquinas names eleven basic passions. The six concupiscible passions are love, desire, and delight, together with their counterparts hatred, aversion, and sorrow. The five irascible passions are hope and despair, fear and daring, and finally anger. In the first section I take each of these passions and ask whether there are analogous movements of the will. I follow Aquinas's structure of the passions, which includes the distinction between the passions of the concupiscible and irascible powers. This is not a distinction that Aquinas strictly allows for in the intellectual appetite, since the powers of the soul are distinguished by their objects, and the will regards the good as good simply.[1] That said, Aquinas does allow for the use of the terms concupiscible and irascible in relation to the will, so long as they are understood as being used by likeness (*similitudinem*) to the sensitive powers, rather than actually designating two separate powers in the will.[2]

In the second section I go beyond the Treatise on the Passions and focus on the affection of wonder. In the literature on the emotions, wonder is well-recognised as an emotion, but difficult to categorise. Much of the debate circles around questions that Aquinas had already raised and resolved, if only implicitly. I begin by dividing his treatment of wonder into philosophical wonder, admiration, and awe, with an extended discussion of each. I then discuss some aspects of the moral role of wonder, and its relation to humility, wisdom, contemplation and reverence.

SECTION 1 – ANALOGUES TO THE PASSIONS

1. Concupiscible passions

1.1. Love

The first affection is love. Aquinas uses the term *amor* when speaking of the principal movement towards an end in the natural, sensitive, and rational appetites.[3] Given how broad

[1] *ST* I 78.1; *ST* I 82.5. See also *ST* I 59.4.

[2] *De veritate* q. 25, a. 3, co: "Et eadem ratione, ipsa voluntas, quae hos actus producit, dicitur interdum irascibilis et concupiscibilis, non tamen proprie, sed per quamdam similitudinem; nec tamen ita quod in voluntate sint aliquae vires diversae similes irascibili et concupiscibili." See also *ST* I 82.5 ad 2.

[3] *ST* I-II 26.1: "In unoquoque autem horum appetituum, amor dicitur illud quod est principium motus tendentis in finem amatum."

is the concept—an inclination of the appetite towards anything that one apprehends as good—the terminology is also necessarily broad. The same word can used for love of a toothpaste as for love of a virtue. In modern English, when people speak of what they "like" and "appreciate", they are using terms that express *amor,* where the appetite is in harmony with an object that they apprehend as suitable. Aquinas uses other terms, such as friendship and charity, when the love is of a particular kind, though they all amount to variants of *amor*.[4]

The term "intellectual love" (*amor intellectivus*) denotes the harmony (*consonantia*) of the will with an object suitable to it.[5] Aquinas gives an example in the first objection of *ST* I-II 26.1, on whether love is in the concupiscible power, citing Wisdom 8:2: "This, namely wisdom, I have loved and sought from my youth." How can the passion of love have an object so abstract as wisdom? His brief response is that, since wisdom is not apprehended by the senses, these words refer to intellectual or rational love.[6] Here we have the first instance of a pattern that recurs throughout Aquinas's questions on the passions. Even though ostensibly he is confining himself to the movements of the sensitive appetite, he repeatedly observes how the principles also apply to the intellectual appetite. The pattern develops in his next article, specifically on love as a passion, where he again extends his account of the passion of love to intellectual love. His concise definition of passion—"the effect of the agent on the patient"—says nothing about the need for a bodily change; rather, his description of the changes and movements of love applies to all the appetites.[7] From the fact that there is a change worked in the appetite, Aquinas concludes that love is a passion, which properly is in the concupiscible faculty, but which generally and in an extended sense is in the will.[8] This is a critical acknowledgement of a broader meaning to passion, which alone should dissuade us from viewing the affections of the will as devoid of passivity.[9]

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[4] See for example *ST* I-II 26.3; *ST* I-II 26.4.

[5] *ST* I-II 18.10 ad. 3: "Sic igitur et in appetitu animali, seu in intellectivo, amor est consonantia quaedam appetitus ad id quod apprehenditur ut conveniens." Other translations for *consonantia* might include consonance, attunement, or agreement.

[6] *ST* I-II 26.1 ad 1: "auctoritas illa loquitur de amore intellectivo vel rationali."

[7] *ST* I-II 26.2: "passio est effectus agentis in patiente."

[8] *ST* I-II 26.2: "cum amor consistat in quadam immutatione appetitus ab appetibili, manifestum est quod amor et passio, proprie quidem, secundum quod est in concupiscibili; communiter autem, et extenso nomine, secundum quod est in voluntate."

[9] For a brief summary of passivity in the will, see Fritz Cates, *Aquinas on the Emotions*, 194.

We briefly discussed in chapter 1 the love that Aquinas terms dilection (*dilectio*). He twice confirms that in the intellectual appetite, *amor* is the same as *dilectio*, however, while *amor* is used of love in the intellectual appetite as well as the other appetites, *dilectio* is only used for love in the intellectual appetite.[10] The word implies in addition to love a choice (*electio*) made beforehand. Rather than my affections being responses, guided or not by reason, to whatever objects I apprehend, I can *choose* that my affection towards those objects will be love. For a particular good, this means that I choose to apprehend it under the aspect of the universal good. I can, for example, choose to love a member of my family whom I find repellent. I can also choose to love a virtue that I aspire to possess. One should not, however, misconceive dilection as amounting to a forcing of the will. In his *Commentary on John's Gospel*, Aquinas explains that *amor* is a movement of the appetite, which, when it is regulated by reason, is the love in the will that is properly called dilection.[11] It follows that when reason confirms a passive movement of *amor*, it is now a love that has been chosen, and so even though it is truly *amor*, it is more accurately called *dilectio*.

Since dilection is a choice to be in harmony with the good, it is also a choice to remain receptive to any further goodness that I may apprehend about the object. This receptivity is captured in the metaphor of "melting", which Aquinas names as one of the effects of love, together with enjoyment, languor, and fervour.[12] These four effects are not limited to love as a passion, but can also be attributed to love in the will.[13] He describes the effect of melting as follows:

> It pertains to love that the appetite be fitted for a certain reception of the beloved good, just as the beloved is in the lover … Hence the freezing or hardening of the heart is a disposition incompatible with love, but melting conveys a certain softening of the heart, by which the heart shows itself prepared that the beloved enter it.[14]

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[10] *ST* I-II 26.3 ad 1: "Dionysius loquitur de amore et dilectione, secundum quod sunt in appetitu intellectivo, sic enim amor idem est quod dilectio." *ST* I-II 26.3 ad 2 : "In parte tamen intellectiva idem est amor et dilectio."

[11] *In Ioan*, cap. 21, lect. 3: "Amor enim est motus appetitus, et si quidem reguletur appetitus ratione, sic est amor voluntatis, qui proprie est dilectio, quia sequitur electionem."

[12] *ST* I-II 28.5.

[13] *ST* I-II 28.5: "isti quidem sunt effectus amoris formaliter accepti, secundum habitudinem appetitivae virtutis ad obiectum. Sed in passione amoris, consequuntur aliqui effectus his proportionati, secundum immutationem organi."

[14] *ST* I-II 28.5: "Ad amorem autem pertinet quod appetitus coaptetur ad quandam receptionem boni amati, prout amatum est in amante, sicut iam supra dictum est. Unde cordis congelatio vel duritia est dispositio

This effect is capable of a wide metaphorical interpretation, and in a similar passage in the *Commentary on the Sentences* Aquinas gives a lengthier account of how all four of these terms function as metaphors.[15] Elsewhere he demonstrates further the coherence of *amor* and *dilectio*, citing Augustine, who comments on John 6:44: "no one can come to me, unless the Father, who sent me, draws him." Augustine is concerned with dispelling the idea that one can be drawn to Christ against one's will. Instead, he says, "you are drawn by the will"—that is, by desire and delight, and the pleasure of the heart (*voluptas cordis*) that one has in God.[16] Augustine concludes that we are drawn by the delight we take in truth, happiness, justice, and eternal life. Aquinas summarises Augustine's point: "if we are to be drawn by Christ, may we be drawn by love (*dilectio*) of the truth."[17] For both Augustine and Aquinas, as contemplators of the truth, abstract objects like truth and justice are not abstracted from being objects of love. On the contrary, these universals are capable both of acting on the will and of being chosen as objects of our love. Less sublime universals can also be objects of love. Someone who loves beer and cricket as universal goods loves them intellectually.

More generally, and returning to Aquinas's point about hunting and friendship that we saw in Chapter 1, the objects of love are revelatory of who people are and how they spend their time. This is true of the affections as a whole, but they begin with love as the primary affection, where someone has a love for nature, fitness, jazz, or politics, and so develops associated desires, hatreds, and so on. Aquinas often makes the point that love is the first of the affections, with every other affection being able to be traced back in some way to love:

> The principal perfection in the affections is love (*dilectio*). A sign of this is that every movement of affection is derived from love, for no one desires, or hopes, or rejoices, except on account of a beloved good. Similarly, someone does not avoid, or fear, or

repugnans amori. Sed liquefactio importat quandam mollificationem cordis, qua exhibet se cor habile ut amatum in ipsum subintret."

[15] *In III Sent*., d. 27, q. 1, a. 1, ad 4.

[16] *Catena in Ioan*., cap. 6, lect. 6: "non enim ad Christum ambulando currimus, sed credendo; nec motu corporis, sed voluntate cordis accedimus: ergo voluntate traheris. Quid est autem trahi voluntate? Delectare in domino, et dabit tibi petitiones cordis tui. Est quaedam voluptas cordis, cui dulcis est panis ille caelestis. Porro si poetae dicere licuit: trahit sua quemque voluptas, quanto fortius nos dicere debemus trahi hominem ad Christum, qui delectatur veritate, beatitudine, iustitia, sempiterna vita, quod totum Christus est?"

[17] *In Ioan*., cap. 6, lect. 5: "Si enim, ut dicit Augustinus, trahit sua quemque voluptas, quanto fortius debet homo trahi ad Christum, si delectatur veritate, beatitudine, iustitia, sempiterna vita, quod totum est Christus? Ab isto ergo si trahendi sumus, trahamur per dilectionem veritatis."

> be saddened, or get angry, except on account of that which opposes the beloved good.[18]

Three final points about love deserve mention. First, love is unitive. It is the affection whereby the one who loves apprehends an object as belonging to his well-being. The loved object then dwells in the lover "through a kind of complacency [*complacentiam*] in his affections."[19] This image of dwelling conveys well the stability of affections across time—the "standing emotions" that we have seen previously. We do not love objects, even objects that are a collation of experiences, such as a week of camping, without connecting them to similar objects or experiences. Rather, we abstract from the particular so that we have a stable, perhaps lifelong love of camping. Secondly, love in the will is capable of greater or lesser intensity.[20] Although the passion of love is the kind most often associated with intensity, intellectual love shares a like capacity to grow or to weaken. Finally, because love is unitive, it is stronger than the other affections. When Aquinas explains why love is more vehement than desire and delight, he points out that in love the appetible object informs the appetite, giving to love a continuity that endures whether or not the beloved object is present.[21]

1.2. Desire

The affection following love is desire, also called concupiscence, which Aquinas defines as the appetite for a pleasurable good.[22] He immediately poses a question about desire in the

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[18] *SCG* III 151, n. 4: "Principalis autem perfectio affectus est dilectio. Cuius signum est, quod omnis motus affectus ab amore derivatur: nullus enim desiderat, aut sperat, aut gaudet, nisi propter bonum amatum; similiter autem neque aliquis refugit, aut timet, aut tristatur, aut irascitur, nisi propter id quod contrariatur bono amato." *In III Sent*., d. 27, q. 1, a. 3, co.: "inter alias affectiones animae amor est prior." *In Iob*, cap. 1: "affectionis est amor principium."

[19] *ST* I-II 28.2: "quantum ad vim appetitivam, amatum dicitur esse in amante, prout est per quandam complacentiam in eius affectu." See also *ST* I-II 28.1: "Quod enim dicit copulans, refertur ad unionem affectus, sine qua non est amor"; *In III Sent*., d. 27, q. 1, a. 1, ad 2: "Unde amor dicitur virtus unitiva formaliter: quia est ipsa unio vel nexus vel transformatio qua amans in amatum transformatur, et quodammodo convertitur in ipsum." As Michael Sherwin explains, the term "complacency" does not adequately capture the meaning of *complacentia*, which is better understood as a "pleasing affective affinity for some object judged to be good, whether an action, person, or thing." Sherwin, "If Love It Is: Chaucer, Aquinas, and Love's Fidelity," in *On Love and Virtue: Theological Essays* (Steubenville, OH: Emmaus Academic, 2018), 51.

[20] *In Gal*., cap. 6, lect. 2: "Potest ergo aliquis alium magis alio diligere, aut quia vult ei maius bonum, quod est obiectum dilectionis, aut quia magis vult ei bonum, id est ex intensiori dilectione."

[21] *In III Sent*., d. 27, q. 1, a. 3, ad 2: "Unde quando appetitus informatur per appetibile, est quasi conjunctio continuitatis et concretionis … Quando autem est omnino absens secundum rem, tunc maxime affligit; sicut ex divisione continui sequitur dolor, quia amor est continuativa vis, ut dictum est; et inde dicitur, quod amor languere facit. Quando autem est secundum aliquid praesens, et secundum aliquid absens, tunc habet delectationem admixtam afflictioni."

[22] *ST* I-II 30.3: "concupiscentia est appetitus boni delectabilis."

rational appetite, as he had done in relation to love. The issue, again, is wisdom. If it is possible to have concupiscence for wisdom, as the Book of Wisdom states (Wis 6:21), then surely concupiscence is not in the sensitive appetite alone. The same would be true of desire for the commandments of God, a point he makes in the next objection. In his response, we read what is already a familiar distinction: properly speaking, concupiscence is in the sensitive appetite.[23] It is only "properly speaking" because the Latin *concupiscentia* implies (*sonat*) something pertaining to both the soul and the body, so concupiscence "seems" to be the appetite for a sensible good.[24] Aquinas does not hold strictly to this position in the face of objections. In his responses, he confirms that desire can also be in the higher appetite, where it means a simple movement towards the thing desired, but there can also be a concupiscence for wisdom, or other spiritual goods. His preference, though, is to restrict the term concupiscence to the sensitive appetite alone, and use the broader term desire (*desiderium*) for either the sensitive or the rational appetite.[25]

The fact that Aquinas uses such a similar example for love and desire invites the question of whether there is a meaningful distinction between love and desire. He certainly appears to think so, given that he distinguishes between love as complacency in good, and desire and concupiscence as movement towards the good.[26] Nicholas Lombardo, however, sees some ambiguity in this distinction, namely, if love is already a movement towards complacency in a good, why is there a need for another movement that we call desire?[27] He asks further: "Could desire and love be distinguished by saying that desire prompts voluntary action, but

[23] *ST* I-II 30.1 ad 2: "dicendum quod desiderium magis pertinere potest, proprie loquendo, non solum ad inferiorem appetitum, sed etiam ad superiorem."

[24] *ST* I-II 30.1: "Talis autem delectationis appetitus videtur esse concupiscentia, quae simul pertineat et ad animam et ad corpus, ut ipsum nomen concupiscentiae sonat."

[25] *ST* I-II 30.2. We also read in the reply to obj. 3 that concupiscence properly consists in the desire for something delightful to the senses. Casagrande comments that it is no coincidence that Aquinas sometimes uses the same terms for different acts, given that passions and acts of the will are both acts of an appetite, with the same direction and sometimes the same end. "Certes, les mots sont ambigus, mais ce n'est pas un hasard si les mêmes termes reviennent pour désigner des actes différents. Passions et actes de volonté sont les actes d'un appétit, l'appétit sensible pour les passions, l'appétit rationnel pour les actes de la volonté ; ils ont la même direction et parfois le même but." Carla Casagrande, "*Transmutatio corporalis*: Le corps et les passions selon Thomas d'Aquin," *Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques* 103, no. 4 (2019), 667-668.

[26] *ST* I-II 25.2: "Ipsa autem aptitudo sive proportio appetitus ad bonum est amor, qui nihil aliud est quam complacentia boni; motus autem ad bonum est desiderium vel concupiscentia; quies autem in bono est gaudium vel delectatio." Also *ST* I-II 26.2: "Prima ergo immutatio appetitus ab appetibili vocatur amor, qui nihil est aliud quam complacentia appetibilis; et ex hac complacentia sequitur motus in appetibile, qui est desiderium."

[27] Lombardo, *The Logic of Desire*, 59.

love simply rests in the good without prompting voluntary action? Perhaps, but then it would be impossible to distinguish love from pleasure."[28]

The difficulty can be resolved by considering the different modes of union with an object. Love is first of all a suitability or connaturality with the object, which is itself an affective union, and which is the principle of the movement of desire.[29] Desire is a further movement towards a real union with the object, which therefore has to be in some way absent, or at any rate not yet fully possessed.[30] The movement towards possession of the good in real union is what Aquinas calls the love of concupiscence.[31] Aquinas explains these distinctions in the *De veritate*: "Love is said to be a certain union of the lover with the beloved. But that which has been united in such a way is sought further, that it may be united really; namely, so that the lover may enjoy the beloved fully. And so is born the passion of desire."[32]

An important distinction pertaining to desire helps to distinguish the love of concupiscence from another kind of love, the love of friendship.[33] In the former, the object of love is a good that one desires, whether for oneself or another. In the latter, one simply wills the other's good, most fundamentally that the other exist and live.[34] This movement of the will is proper

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[28] Lombardo, *The Logic of Desire*, 59.

[29] *ST* I-II 25.2 ad 2: "Alia autem est unio affectiva, quae est secundum aptitudinem vel proportionem, prout scilicet ex hoc quod aliquid habet aptitudinem ad alterum et inclinationem, iam participat aliquid eius. Et sic amor unionem importat. Quae quidem unio praecedit motum desiderii." See also *ST* I-II 32.3 ad 3: "amor est quaedam unio vel connaturalitas amantis ad amatum."

[30] *ST* I-II 28.1 ad 2: "Et haec est unio realis, quam amans quaerit de re amata." *ST* I-II 23.4: "Secundo, si bonum sit nondum habitum, dat ei motum ad assequendum bonum amatum, et hoc pertinet ad passionem desiderii vel concupiscentiae"; *ST* I-II 25.2 ad 1: "Effectus autem amoris, quando quidem habetur ipsum amatum, est delectatio, quando vero non habetur, est desiderium vel concupiscentia"; *ST* I-II 28.1 ad 1: "obiectio illa procedit de unione reali. Quam quidem requirit delectatio sicut causam, desiderium vero est in reali absentia amati, amor vero et in absentia et in praesentia"; *ST* I-II 30.2: "ipsum delectabile secundum sensum, inquantum appetitum sibi adaptat quodammodo et conformat, causat amorem; inquantum vero absens attrahit ad seipsum, causat concupiscentiam; inquantum vero praesens quietat in seipso, causat delectationem"; *SCG* III 26, n. 12: "desiderium secundum quod voluntas tendit in id quod nondum habet"; *SCG* IV 19, n. 13: "Ex hoc enim quod aliquid amamus, desideramus illud si absit"; *In III Sent*., d. 26 q. 2 a. 3 qc. 2 co.: "desiderium autem importat motum in ipsum amabile nondum habitum."

[31] Regarding Lombardo's second question, the difference between love and pleasure arises from the difference between the good apprehended in itself (the affective union) and the good apprehended as possessed (the real union).

[32] *De veritate* q. 26, a. 4, co.: "amor dicitur esse quaedam unio amantis et amati. Id autem quod sic aliqualiter coniunctum est, quaeritur ulterius ut realiter coniungatur: ut amans scilicet perfruatur amato; et sic nascitur passio desiderii."

[33] See *ST* I-II 26.4. See also *In II Sent*., d. 3, q. 4, a. 1, co.: "quod est sibi bonum secundum aliquem modum."

[34] *ST* II-II 25.7: "amicus primo quidem vult suum amicum esse et vivere." See also the discussion in Sherwin, *By Knowledge and By Love*, 93.

to the love of friendship. If someone desires the presence of a friend for the delight one takes in the other's company, that is love of concupiscence, and not itself the love of friendship. In the love of concupiscence, one is loving one's self rather than the other, whereas in the love of friendship one loves the other for the other's sake.[35] This distinction can illuminate some of the mysteries about what we are loving when we love. The seventeenth-century poet Alexander Brome discards several explanations that do not account for the love he has for his beloved: "'Tis not her birth, her friends, nor yet her treasure / Nor do I covet her for sensual pleasure." Yet while summing up the insufficiency of the love of concupiscence ("Sure he that loves his lady 'cause she's fair / Delights his eye, so loves himself, not her") he overlooks the love of friendship—of willing the beloved's good—as accounting for his "Love Unaccountable".[36] Later in this thesis, the love of friendship will re-emerge as critically important, when we look more closely at the affections of members of the church.

A final distinction that Aquinas makes is between natural and non-natural concupiscence, the latter of which it is possible to confuse with an affection of the will. Natural concupiscence is for goods that are suitable to the nature of an animal.[37] These include food and drink, and for a human, clothing. Non-natural concupiscence is for goods that a human being has come to apprehend as suitable through the exercise of reason.[38] These concupiscences are acquired and particular. A coffee drinker may have started drinking coffee for the sake of friendship with other coffee drinkers, but over time comes to love its smell and taste, and so he now desires coffee sensorily. Aquinas's point here is not the same as he makes elsewhere, that we can desire a particular object under the aspect of the universal.[39] It is rather that we acquire desires in the sensitive appetite because of reasoning, and, although he does not state this

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[35] *In Ioan*., cap. 15, lect. 4: "Et ideo magis diligit in hoc se quam illum: sicut qui diligit vinum quia est sibi delectabile, se potius quam vinum diligit. Sed amor amicitiae est potius rei amatae quam amantis, quia diligit aliquem propter ipsum dilectum, non propter ipsum diligentem."

[36] Alexander Brome, "Love Unaccountable", in *The Pageant of English Poetry*, ed. R.M. Leonard (London: Henry Frowde, 1909), 29.

[37] *ST* I-II 30.3: "Uno modo, quia est conveniens naturae animalis, sicut cibus, potus, et alia huiusmodi.

[38] *ST* I-II 30.3: "secundae concupiscentiae sunt propriae hominum, quorum proprium est excogitare aliquid ut bonum et conveniens, praeter id quod natura requirit. Unde et in I Rhetoric., philosophus dicit primas concupiscentias esse irrationales, secundas vero cum ratione."

[39] *ST* I 80.2 ad 2: "appetitus intellectivus, etsi feratur in res quae sunt extra animam singulares, fertur tamen in eas secundum aliquam rationem universalem; sicut cum appetit aliquid quia est bonum."

explicitly, through the affections of the will.[40] Jack London gives an illuminating account of non-natural concupiscences in his "Alcoholic Memoirs", where he narrates how he becomes, "in the heart and the deeps of me, desirous of alcohol", even though he dislikes its taste:

> Alcohol was an acquired taste. It had been painfully acquired. Alcohol had been a dreadfully repugnant thing—more nauseous than any physic. Even now I did not like the taste of it. I drank it only for its "kick." And from the age of five to that of twenty-five I had not learned to care for its kick.[41]

An affection for friendship was critical in how he came to acquire this taste: "Drinking together, glass in hand, put the seal on comradeship. It was the way of life … I didn't in the least want a drink, but I did want to be a good fellow and a good comrade."[42] London's experience demonstrates how one can develop non-natural concupiscences through an affection of the will. Non-natural concupiscences, however, are *not* affections of the will. The difference between them is most evident when there is a conflict between a non-natural concupiscence and an affection of the will. Someone who has acquired the non-natural desire to drink coffee may also have acquired a hatred of coffee-drinking at the level of reason, believing that it interferes with sleep. Here the affection of hatred conflicts with the passion of concupiscence. Aquinas's account of non-natural desires is brief and under-developed, but helpful for understanding how affections of the will come to influence our desires even at the level of the sensitive appetite.

1.3. Joy

The preceding movements of the appetite terminate in joy (*gaudium*), also called delight (*delectatio*). Delight arises from the presence of the object that is suitable to the appetite; that is, the object that one loves and desires has been attained.[43] The distinction between the passion and the affection is not as neat as one might wish, where, for example, delight would be in the sensitive appetite and joy in the intellectual appetite. For one thing, Aquinas

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[40] Lombardo comments: "Aquinas does not work out the details of how nonnatural desires come to be formed, but it seems that natural desires are shaped over time into nonnatural desires by a combination of reason and intellectual affection." *The Logic of Desire*, 88.

[41] Jack London, *John Barleycorn* (New York: The Century Company, 1913), 6.

[42] London, *John Barleycorn*, 149.

[43] *ST* I-II 31.1: "ponitur causa delectationis, scilicet praesentia connaturalis boni."

repeatedly refers to joy as a passion, while saying the same about delight.[44] To further complicate matters, Aquinas also speaks of enjoyment (*fruitio*) in the will, without ever clarifying what makes *fruitio* different from *gaudium* and *delectatio*.[45]

The umbrella term for all these appetitive movements is delight, which can be used for both the sensitive and intellectual appetites.[46] Soon in his exposition of delight, Aquinas raises the question of whether delight differs from joy. His answer harks back to the distinction he had made between natural and non-natural concupiscences, from which he derives a distinction between two kinds of delight. The delight in an object of natural concupiscence is called a bodily delight, or simply a delight.[47] If the object is one of non-natural concupiscence—a reasoned desire—the delight is termed joy.[48] In other words, joy is a reasoned delight. Just as non-natural concupiscences are objects of the sensitive appetite, it follows that joy can be both in the sensitive appetite as well as in the intellectual appetite, provided the object is one of reasoned desire.

Fruitio sits somewhat apart from these distinctions. In human beings, *fruitio* is a movement of rest in the appetite, but one which refers more specifically to the delight taken in the ultimate end.[49] The nature of the ultimate end is the subject of Aquinas's first question in the *Prima Secundae*, where he argues that that we all desire our own perfection, and all have a greatest desire, though we differ in what that last end is.[50] Although wealth and pleasure are commonly held as last ends, Aquinas holds that the true last end for all rational beings is knowing and loving God.[51] For human beings, then, *fruitio* is a movement of the intellectual

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[44] Joy: *In IV Sent*., d. 49, q. 3, a. 1, qc. 4, co.: "passio gaudii cum dilatatione cordis perficitur." See also *In IV Sent*., d. 44, q. 3, a. 3, qc. 2, ad 5; *SCG* III 103, n. 4; *ST* I-II 23.1; *ST* I-II 23.1 ad 1; *ST* I-II 23.2; *ST* I-II 23.4; *ST* I-II 25.1; *ST* I-II 25.1; *ST* I-II 25.2; *ST* I-II 25.3; *ST* I-II 25.3; *ST* I-II 25.4; *ST* I-II 26.2; *ST* I-II 60.4. Delight: *In IV Sent*., d. 49, q. 3, a. 1, qc. 1, co.; *ST* I-II 23.4; *ST* I-II 31.1.

[45] *ST* I-II 11.1–11.4.

[46] *In IV Sent*., d. 49, q. 3, a. 1, qc. 1, co.: "delectatio quae est in appetitu sensitivo, quaedam passio est; non autem delectatio quae est in intellectivo, nisi passione large accepta."

[47] *ST* I-II 31.3 ad 1.

[48] *ST* I-II 31.3 ad 1.

[49] *ST* I-II 11.3: "solius ultimi finis est fruitio."

[50] *ST* I-II 1.7: "ad rationem ultimi finis, omnes conveniunt in appetitu finis ultimi, quia omnes appetunt suam perfectionem adimpleri, quae est ratio ultimi finis, ut dictum est. Sed quantum ad id in quo ista ratio invenitur, non omnes homines conveniunt in ultimo fine."

[51] *ST* I-II 1.7: "Sed quantum ad id in quo ista ratio invenitur, non omnes homines conveniunt in ultimo fine, nam quidam appetunt divitias tanquam consummatum bonum, quidam autem voluptatem, quidam vero

appetite. The complicating point is that irrational animals can also enjoy their ends, just as they enjoy their food. He concludes that rational animals can enjoy their ends perfectly, whereas in irrational animals their enjoyment is imperfect.[52] The key question is whether the object is apprehended as an ultimate end.[53] To summarise, there are bodily delights and the passion of joy in the sensitive appetite, and the affection of joy in the intellectual appetite. If the object in question is apprehended in relation to the ultimate end, we may also call the delight *fruitio*.[54]

The affection of joy in the intellectual appetite follows the apprehension of reason, and without passion it is a mere movement of the will.[55] Once again, he gives wisdom as an example, citing Aristotle that "the greatest delight is in the operation of wisdom."[56] There are also what Aquinas calls "delights of the soul" and "spiritual delights" that are in the mind.[57] Joy taken in learning and storytelling, in a poem and a well-crafted sentence, in forgiveness and a clear conscience, are all instances of this joy in the intellectual appetite. There is also joy that one takes in an activity, which makes it easier to focus attention, and thus accomplish the activity better.[58] He develops this last point when commenting on Aristotle's teaching on the delight that one takes in activity. Aquinas's reasoning here is syllogistic: delight perfects activity, life itself is activity, therefore delight perfects life itself.[59]

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quodcumque aliud." *ST* I-II 1.8: "homo et aliae rationales creaturae consequuntur ultimum finem cognoscendo et amando Deum."

[52] *ST* I-II 11.2 ad 4.

[53] We can speak of *fruitio* in relation to an intermediate end, but only insofar as it participates in the final end. See Aquinas's explanation of enjoying good things "in the Lord", prompted by v. 20 of the *Letter to Philemon*. He interprets this as meaning that when we delight in creatures we are enjoying the divine good in then. See *In Philem.*, lect. 2; also *ST* I-II 11.3 ad 1.

[54] For a like interpretation, see Juan Vicente Cortés Cuadra. "*Gaudium y fruitio*: la cuestión medieval del goce en la *Ética* de Spinoza." *Ideas y Valores* 66, no. 164 (2017), 140-141. See also Manzanedo, *Las pasiones*, 145-146. For a different view, see De Haan, who argues that *fruitio* is the pleasure resulting from the will's rest in the good, whereas *delectatio* and *gaudium* are differentiated by different kinds of sensory knowledge: Daniel De Haan, "*Delectatio, gaudium, fruitio*: Three Kinds of Pleasure for Three Kinds of Knowledge in Thomas Aquinas," *Quaestio* 15 (2015), 544.

[55] *ST* I-II 31.4.

[56] *ST* I-II 31.5: "maxima delectatio est quae est secundum operationem sapientiae."

[57] *ST* I-II 31.3 ad 1; *ST* I-II 31.5 ad 3.

[58] *In IV Sent*., d. 49, q. 3, a. 3, qc. 3, ad 3: "propria delectatio et operantem expedit, eum quodammodo corroborando, inquantum est conveniens, et attentionem ejus facit inhaerere ad operationem delectabilem." For an account of the necessity of pleasure and joy in the moral life, see Cornelius Williams, "The Hedonism of Aquinas," *The Thomist* 38, no. 2 (1974): 257-290, especially 285-290.

[59] *In Ethica*, Bk 10, lect. 6: "cum delectatio perficiat operationem, ut supra dictum est, consequens est quod perficiat ipsum vivere, quod omnes appetunt. Et ita rationabile est quod omnes appetant delectationem, ex eo

The distinctions between the varieties of delight become cloudier when the object is a particular good, say the joy that one takes in a glass of scotch. Whether this delight is *delictatio*, *gaudium*, or *fruitio* will depend on whether the object is one of acquired desire, and whether it is apprehended as an ultimate end. Robert C. Roberts addresses similar questions as Aquinas and reaches similarly layered conclusions. He begins by noting that there are pure physical pleasures, such as the pleasure of having one's back rubbed. He then turns to what he calls "spiritual pleasures", by which he broadly means pleasures that go beyond the physical. He observes that spiritual pleasures are pleasures in meaning:

> When your doctor tells you that your newborn baby is perfectly healthy, you take pleasure in the *news*, in the fact that your baby is healthy … It is not a sensation, but a delight in the way the world is: my darling baby is in good shape and I am so pleased. We call this emotion joy.[60]

Roberts's observation about pleasures in meaning captures well the notion of joy in the rational appetite. Delight in "the way the world is" is another way of speaking of delight following the apprehension of reality. Someone who delights in truth or wisdom is delighting in the content and structure of reality. To delight in music is to delight in the fact that music is part of human life and a part of one's life personally. What of the more complicated cases where the pleasure is both physical and spiritual? Here again, Roberts notes that while physical pleasures differ from spiritual ones, in a human being they interact and influence one another. He arrives at precisely the same multi-layered division into bodily delight, sensitive joy, and intellectual joy that Aquinas identifies.

> The pleasure of a fine port is enhanced by the thought of the port's fineness. More importantly, for us, sexual intercourse is never just a matter of sensations. It is always a matter of the meaning that the partner and the act have for oneself. So the pleasure one takes in intercourse is enhanced by one's joy in the beloved, and one's joy in the beloved is enhanced by the pleasure of intercourse.[61]

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quod perficit vivere, quod est omnibus eligibile." See also his insistence on spiritual joy for proficiency in the spiritual life. *In Phil*., cap. 4, lect. 1: "Necessarium est enim cuilibet volenti proficere, quod habeat spirituale gaudium."

[60] Robert C. Roberts, *Spiritual Emotions: A Psychology of Christian Virtues* (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2007), 116.

[61] Roberts, *Spiritual Emotions*, 117.

As with the other affections, delight in the intellectual appetite is nothing other than a simple movement of the will, unaccompanied by any corporeal transmutation.[62] It also admits of variation in intensity, however, where intense joy can overflow into the sensible appetite.[63] Aquinas names three different effects of joy: rejoicing, exultation, and joyfulness. In each of these cases, there is an interior or exterior effect of joy. In interior rejoicing (*laetitia*), the affections themselves are expanded (dilated) as if being reinforced and perfected from union with the desired object. Exultation (*exultatio*) expresses the breaking forth of joy externally as a sign of interior joy. Joyfulness (*jucunditas*) is also an external expression of interior joy, but one that excites others to be joyful.[64] These external expressions would themselves admit of variation in intensity, from a smile of enjoyment to dancing for joy. Aquinas gives some specific examples of overflow in his *Commentary on the Psalms*, such as joyful speech and the clapping of hands.[65] These effects of joy should not mislead us into concluding that intellectual joy is necessarily a moral good. The point established in chapter 1 bears repeating—affections follow subjective apprehensions, and they are not of themselves in accordance with right reason.[66]

1.4. Hatred

We turn now to the movements of the soul away from an evil, each of which is a counterpart to the movements towards the good, beginning with hatred, the opposite affection to love. In Aquinas's system the word *odium* has a more general meaning than what is conveyed by the English word *hatred*.[67] It is best understood as a lack of harmony between the appetite and an object. Aquinas draws on aural imagery to contrast hatred with the harmony of love:

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[62] *ST* I-II 31.5

[63] See *ST* I-II 59.5, on the overflow into the sensitive appetite of joy in the perfection of justice.

[64] *In IV Sent*., d. 49, q. 3, a. 1, qc. 4, co.: "Laetitia quidem effectum interiorem, secundum quod ipse affectus dilatatur quasi roboratus et perfectus ex appetibilis conjunctione … exultatio exprimit ulterius effectum gaudii exterius prorumpentem in signum interioris gaudii … Jucunditas vero ulterius importat effectum gaudii exterius prorumpentem, qui non solum demonstrat interius gaudium, sed etiam excitat aliquos ad gaudendum." See also *ST* I-II 31.3 ad 3, where Aquinas adds that these terms are only used of rational natures.

[65] See *In Psalmos,* Ps 9, n. 2; *In Psalmos,* Ps 15, n. 6; *In Psalmos,* Ps 30, n. 5; *In Psalmos,* Ps 34, n. 18; *In Psalmos,* Ps 39, n. 7; *In Psalmos,* Ps 46, n. 1.

[66] Noble comments: "The most vulgar sensitive pleasure may be moral, and an intellectual joy not be." "Le plaisir sensible le plus vulgaire peut être moral, et une joie intellectuelle ne l'être pas." H.-D. Noble, "L'état agréable," *Revue des Sciences philosophiques et théologiques* 4 vol.4 (1910), 662.

[67] The same is true of the French *la haine*: Corvez, *Les passions de l'âme*, vol. 1, 232.

> In the animal appetite, or in the intellectual, love is a certain harmony (*consonantia*) of the appetite with that which is apprehended as suitable. Hatred, however, is a certain dissonance (*dissonantia*) of the appetite with that which is apprehended as repugnant and harmful. Moreover, as every suitable thing, insofar as it is suitable, has the notion of good, so every repugnant thing, insofar as it is repugnant, has the notion of evil. And for that reason, as the good is the object of love, so evil is the object of hatred.[68]

A key article for our purposes is *ST* I-II 26.6, in which Aquinas asks whether anything can be the object of universal hatred. He notes that if hatred is a passion of the sensitive appetite, and the senses cannot apprehend the universal, then a thing cannot be an object of universal hatred. So runs the first objection. His solution is to distinguish two ways of speaking about the universal. In one way, the universal is considered purely as a universal, such as the universal man or wolf. In the second way, a thing, such as a particular man or wolf, is considered as an instance of the universal. Hatred in the sensitive appetite can only regard the universal in this second way. A sheep hates a wolf because of its common nature with all other wolves, and so the sheep does hate the wolf universally, but as an instance of the universal. In the intellectual appetite, however, hatred can regard the universal in both ways: to hate all wolves, and to hate this particular wolf as a wolf.[69]

To elaborate, we may take the example from Aristotle that Aquinas cites on multiple occasions, that we hate robbers and thieves in the universal.[70] Once one has a concept of a thief and robber, one can develop a hatred for thieves and robbers even without ever having crossed the path of a thief or a robber. This is only possible, though, thanks to a preceding

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[68] *ST* I-II 29.1: "in appetitu animali, seu in intellectivo, amor est consonantia quaedam appetitus ad id quod apprehenditur ut conveniens, odium vero est dissonantia quaedam appetitus ad id quod apprehenditur ut repugnans et nocivum. Sicut autem omne conveniens, inquantum huiusmodi, habet rationem boni; ita omne repugnans, inquantum huiusmodi, habet rationem mali. Et ideo, sicut bonum est obiectum amoris, ita malum est obiectum odii."

[69] A consequence of being able to hate in the first way is that, if I hate all thieves and I meet a person who I am unaware is a thief, I hate him without realising it. Aquinas uses this distinction to explain Jesus's words, "he who hates me hates my Father also." *In Ioan.*, cap. 15, lect. 5: "sicut si audiam aliquem esse furem, odio eum, non quia ipsam eius personam cognoscam vel odiam, sed quia communiter odio omnem furem: unde si esset fur, et ego eum furem esse nescirem, haberem eum odio, nec tamen scirem me eum odire. Iudaei autem habebant odio Christum, et veritatem quam praedicabat. Unde cum ipsa veritas, quam Christus praedicabat, esset in voluntate Dei Patris, et opera quae Christus faciebat; similiter sicut Christum, odio habebant Patrem, licet ipsi nescirent illa esse in voluntate Patris." See also *SCG* II 60, n. 5; *SCG* III 85, n. 15; *De malo* q. 12, a. 4, ad 3; *De virtutibus*, q. 1, a. 12, arg. 18.

[70] *ST* I-II 46.7 ad 3: "odium potest esse ad aliquod genus, sicut habemus odio omne latronum genus, sed ira non est nisi ad aliquod singulare. Cuius ratio est, quia odium causatur ex hoc quod qualitas alicuius rei apprehenditur ut dissonans nostrae dispositioni, et hoc potest esse vel in universali, vel in particulari."

love, in this case a love of justice. As with other affections, hatred has a relationship of causation to love: "every hatred is caused by love."[71] It differs, however, in that the relationship is one of necessity. To love some things is to hate others: "the fervour of dilection of necessity has joined with it the hatred of the contrary."[72] That is, intense rational love for justice, for example, necessarily implies hatred of injustice. By extension, as long as loves endure, so does hatred of their contraries. We can therefore derive objects of hatred in the rational appetite from objects of love. If I love truth, I will hate multiple objects that are inconsistent with truth, not merely lying, but other variants like dissimulation, exaggeration, and propaganda.

A more familiar manner of deriving objects of hatred is where the experience of hating a concrete instance of something provokes a hatred of that thing in the universal. If we have witnessed a particular injustice, we can abstract from that instance into a hatred of injustice in the universal, including thieves and robbers in the abstract, plus vices, sins, evil itself, and anything that is dissonant with our rational appetite. This abstraction will not necessarily accord with right reason. Someone who has studied and disliked a handful of poems at school may claim a lifelong hatred of poetry. More globally, the tendency to universalise into hatreds of nationalities, races, and religions is often the affective underpinning of violence. This capacity to hate at the level of the universal is, however, critical for ordering affections towards the good, by eliminating evils as possible objects of desire.

There is no different term for hatred as a rational choice, so Aquinas does not explicitly consider whether there can be an equivalent to dilection in respect of an evil. There may, however, be good reasons to choose to hate something.[73] For reasons of health or justice one

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[71] *ST* I-II 29.2: "omne odium ex amore causatur."

[72] *In IV Sent*., d. 17, q. 1, a. 3, qc. 4, ad 1: "fervor dilectionis de necessitate secum conjunctum habet odium contrarii."

[73] For a good account of justifiable hatred and its distinction from the vice of hatred, see Keith Green, "Aquinas on Attachment, Envy, and Hatred in the *Summa Theologica*," *Journal of Religious Ethics* 35, no. 3 (2007): 403-428. He comments at 426: "Hatred can arise as sorrow and resistance to vicious traits and willful misdeeds in others, especially when these traits render them hostile or otherwise a genuine threat. Here, however, their good is not merely wrongly believed to be an evil. Instead, their traits or actions *are* evil. Hatred is a natural and justified response to genuine evil … the sketch he gives us of hatred as a natural emotion is a rich and suggestive one that runs counter to the modern and postmodern inclination to pathologize hatred as "phobic" and simply irrational. It also *demands* that we treat hatred as an essentially moral issue, and that we can understand it only in relation to conceptions of the good."

may choose to apprehend something as evil and to dispose oneself to regard it as such. St Paul's command to "hate what is evil" (Rom 12:9) appeals to this decision to hate. If the hatred is misplaced, however, the choice to regard something as evil will then circumscribe the capacity to be moved by the object's goodness.

1.5. Aversion

Following hatred is aversion, which Aquinas defines in one of his introductory articles on the passions as a movement away from an evil, a movement contrary to the way concupiscence or desire moves towards the attainment of a beloved good.[74] In his earlier treatment of aversion in the *Commentary on the Sentences*, he had commented that "the movement away from evil is unnamed, but let it be called flight."[75] In the *Summa Theologiae*, however, he gives two terms to this movement, *fuga* and *abominatio*, without specifying any difference between them.[76] Maurice Corvez suggests that *fuga*, like flight, designates an exterior movement to escape an evil, whereas *abominatio* signifies contempt, horror, or detestation.[77] The point is that aversion adds a further movement to the dissonance of hatred. This movement may be an interior movement of the appetite and no more, but it may also be exteriorly manifested by a shudder or a grimace. Someone may even physically lean away from a hated object.

Aquinas does not explicitly name aversion as also existing as an affection of the will, so it is left to us to extrapolate from the affection of hatred.[78] His silence on this point is not

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[74] *ST* I-II 23.4: "si bonum sit nondum habitum, dat ei motum ad assequendum bonum amatum, et hoc pertinet ad passionem desiderii vel concupiscentiae. Et ex opposito, ex parte mali, est fuga vel abominatio."

[75] *In III Sent*., d. 26, q. 1, a. 3, co.: "Motus autem concupiscibilis in bonum, dicitur desiderium: in malum autem est innominatus, sed dicatur fuga."

[76] *ST* I-II 23.4. He does not use the term *aversio* in the treatise on the passions, reserving it more for aversion from God through sin (as opposed to conversion). See for example *ST* II-II 10.3: "every sin consists formally in aversion from God."

[77] "*Fuga*, comme *fuite*, désigne, au sense propre, l'éloignement pour échapper extérieurement à quelque mal ; *abominatio* signifie mépris, horreur ou détestation." Maurice Corvez, *Les passions de l'âme*, vol. 1. Translation of, explanatory notes, and appendices to *Somme théologique* I-II 22-30 (Paris: Desclée et Cie, 1949), 195.

[78] Manzanedo comments that there must be a corresponding affection in the intellectual order. He offers no textual authority for this, but follows the principles established earlier in his work about the characteristics of the different levels of appetite. "En cuanto a los sujetos de la aversión debemos decir que en los animales brutos sólo pueden darse la de orden sensitivo, y que en el hombre puede darse la misma aversión, y además el afecto correspondiente de orden intelectivo (recordemos que la "aversión natural" es común a todos los seres). Todo esto es claro después de lo dicho anteriormente sobre las diversas clases de apetito." Manzanedo, *Las pasiones*, 142, also fn. 15.

surprising. Aversion is an oddity in the treatise on the passions, inasmuch as Aquinas does not devote an article to it. Why does he give such little treatment to aversion? One possibility is that aversion simply is not very important compared to the other concupiscible passions. If one does not like something, and can easily avoid it, there is little further to say. As Corvez notes: "one does not make a big issue about an easily avoidable evil."[79] Another possible reason is that many acts of aversion, particularly those of flight, are more fully explicable by fear (which includes an aversion to the feared object), or alternatively, by desire.[80] If I have an aversion to a colleague, and take a different route to my office to avoid him, my aversion is buried under fear and desire. I am avoiding him because I have a fear of getting stuck talking to him, but I also have both a desire not to meet my colleague and a desire to be elsewhere. In cases where I have to choose between objects, such as a course of study or a place to live, my aversion to various options may barely register, since my choice can be comprehensively explained by my desire for that which I love, whether it not it is also motivated by aversion for that which I hate.[81]

As was the case with love and desire, there is a question of whether their counterparts hatred and aversion can be meaningfully distinguished. Lombardo again poses the difficulty: "it is hard to understand how hatred could be a movement from an indifferent state towards dissonance with an object, and yet not involve any movement away from it."[82] The same distinction between affection and real union that allowed us to distinguish love from desire is relevant here. In hatred someone has an affective dissonance with the hated object, whereas in aversion the person deliberately resists closer union with the hated object. Noble explains

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[79] Corvez, *Les passions de l'âme*, vol. 1, 237: "On ne fait pas grand cas du mal facilement évitable."

[80] See *ST* I-II 30.2 ad 3, where he states that the passion that is opposed to concupiscence has no name, but is sometimes called fear. The fact that Aquinas wavers between naming this appetitive movement and describing it as "unnamed" (*innominata*) may seem to reinforce that the view sits uneasily among the passions, hence the need to clarify that whatever it is called, it should not be collapsed into other passions. On the confusion surrounding aversion, Corvez comments: "Close relative of fear, aversion is sometimes confused with it, and designated by it: it is nevertheless really distinct." "Proche parente de la crainte, l'aversion est parfois confondue avec elle, et désignée par elle : elle n'en est pas moins réellement distincte." Corvez, *Les passions de l'âme*, vol. 1, 237.

[81] Manzanedo argues that the explanation of aversion is contained in a certain way in the teachings on hatred and fear, which is why Aquinas does not expressly study flight or aversion. "Así pues, la explicación de esta pasión intermedia se contiene en cierto modo en la doctrina sobre el odio y en la doctrina sobre el temor propiamente dicho." Manzanedo, *Las pasiones*, 140.

[82] Lombardo, *The Logic of Desire*, 60.

that aversion adds to hatred "the abdication of all resistance" before the detested evil, from which one tries to escape by flight.[83] But what if, instead of trying to escape, one chooses to stay and to confront the evil? In this case hatred has given rise to daring, which is a movement towards an evil. Again, therefore, hatred can exist without aversion.[84]

1.6. Sorrow

Unlike the previous two affections, sorrow (*tristitia*) is about an evil that is present, when the appetite resists the present evil to which it is in some way united.[85] There must be a resistance of the appetite to the object, otherwise delight would follow, rather than sorrow. But if either in the will or the sensitive appetite, the contrary inclination remains, then pain and sorrow result.[86] Aquinas captures this contrary inclination in citations from Augustine, that sorrow is "the will in dissent from the things that we do not wish," and elsewhere, that pain is caused when the will resists a stronger power.[87]

As with delight being the umbrella term for joy and other forms of delight, sensible and intellectual, the relevant umbrella term for sorrow is pain (*dolor*), whether we are speaking of the sensible or intellectual orders.[88] The stricter application of the term, however, is for bodily pains, and more particularly those pertaining to the sense of touch.[89] To illustrate with the sense of hearing, there is a difference in the apprehension of a sound that is disagreeable to the ears, like the buzzing of a mosquito, and a sound that is so loud that it is painful. Once

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[83] "Ce mouvement d'aversion ajoute quelque chose à la haine: c'est l'abdication de toute résistance devant le mal détesté, auquel on tente d'échapper par la suite." Noble, *Les passions*, 100.

[84] "Il arrive, au contraire, que la haine suscite l'audace, c'est-à-dire la volte-face et la riposte directe au mal et au danger. On voit, par là, que la haine et l'aversion sont bien distinctes, puisque la première peut subsister sans la seconde." Noble, *Les passions*, 100.

[85] *ST* I-II 25.4: "de malo praesenti est tristitia." *ST* I-II 36.4: "Manifestum est autem hoc esse contra inclinationem appetitus, ut malo praesentialiter inhaereat."

[86] *ST* I-II 36.4: "si aliqua potestas maior intantum invalescat quod auferat inclinationem voluntatis vel appetitus sensitivi, ex ea non sequitur dolor vel tristitia, sed tunc solum sequitur, quando remanet inclinatio appetitus in contrarium … si enim non resisteret, sed cederet consentiendo, non sequeretur dolor, sed delectatio."

[87] *ST* I-II 35.3: "tristitia autem est voluntas in dissensione ab his quae nolumus." *ST* I-II 36.4: "voluntas resistens potestati fortiori."

[88] *In III Sent*., d. 15, q. 2, a. 3, qc. 2, co.: "Quandoque tamen tristitia, large loquendo, dolor dicitur; unde Augustinus distinguit dolorem animae secundum se, qui proprie dicitur tristitia, et dolorem animae per corpus, qui proprie dicitur dolor."

[89] *In III Sent*., d. 15, q. 2, a. 3, qc. 2, co.: "Secundo quantum ad perceptionem: quae quidem in dolore semper est secundum sensum tactus." *In IV Sent*., d. 49, q. 3, a. 3, qc. 1, ad 3: "sed quia dolor proprie accipitur in sensu, et praecipue in sensu tactus."

a sound is painful we have arrived at the sense of touch. Beyond these bodily pains, sorrow is the term used for pain apprehended through the interior senses or the intellect.[90] There is no neat division into the passion of pain and the affection of sorrow. Rather, there is a sorrow of the sensible order and a sorrow of the intellectual order, leaving us with a threefold division for pain: bodily pain, sensitive sorrow, and intellectual sorrow.[91]

For this third variety of sorrow that is the affection of the will, its objects will be whatever is also an object of intellectual hatred. Someone who hates injustice will sorrow at the presence of injustice. In his account of sorrow's causes, Aquinas fills out in more detail the background to the apprehension of a present evil. He discusses across several articles how sorrow arises when a good that one desires has been delayed or taken away, including the love and desire for unity.[92] These causes hold true for the rational appetite as well as the sensitive. If one can be joyful at "the way the world is", as Roberts noted, one can also be sorrowful at the way the world is. Someone who is upset at a recent political development, or who bemoans the decline of architecture, is exhibiting an intellectual sorrow that follows the comparisons, contrasts, and predictions that one makes in apprehending a situation, how it was in the past, and how it could otherwise be. A further condition for sorrow is that the presence of the evil is due to the action of a stronger power.[93] This can simply mean that there is something about a situation that I apprehend as unchangeable. If a television programme is tedious and I am watching it alone, I can simply switch it off. If I am at a tedious theatre performance with my prospective in-laws who have bought my ticket, the social expectations are the stronger power—I must suffer through it. One must continue to have a contrary inclination in the appetite for the passion or affection of sorrow to endure,

[90] *In Iob*, cap. 7: "ubi duplicem dolorem distinguit: unum quidem carnis in apprehensione sensus, alium autem animae ex apprehensione intellectus vel imaginationis qui proprie dicitur tristitia et hic luctus nominatur."

[91] See for example *In III Sent*., d. 18, q. 1, a. 4, qc. 2, co.: "laesio corporis ad animam pertingit quodammodo, inquantum est forma ejus; vel per operationem propriam; sive illa sit communis animae et corpori, sicut in delectationibus et tristitiis, quae sunt secundum partem sensitivam; sive sit propria ipsi animae, sicut in delectationibus et tristitiis intellectivae partis."

[92] *ST* I-II 36.1-3.

[93] *ST* I-II 36.4: "Quod autem est contra inclinationem alicuius, nunquam advenit ei nisi per actionem alicuius fortioris."

otherwise the stronger power will have succeeded in removing repugnance from the appetite.[94]

Aquinas affirms that sorrow can exist as a simple act of the will.[95] Some of the effects of sorrow that he recounts also have no somatic component, such as the way that inward sorrow attracts the soul's focus, preventing clear thought and the ability to learn.[96] It also affects one's apprehension of reality—to the sorrowing person everything seems to be darkened.[97] His treatment of sorrow, however, is more notable for the detail in which he develops the connection between the body and soul. Aquinas gives many examples of overflow in the affection of sorrow. When one is sorrowing intensely, the effect is depressive, in the sense that it weighs down (*aggravat*) the soul.[98] In some cases this depressing effect can be so strong as to impede the movement of the body, prompting one to keep one's eyes downcast, and even causing the prostration of the entire body.[99] Although the pain in the body is greater from a sensible injury than that which overflows to it from reason, it is nevertheless the case that sorrow "dries up the bones" (Prov 17:22), with "bones" being a biblical image for strength.[100] Aquinas probably has in mind this capacity of sorrow to sap one's strength and vitality, when he observes that a person seems to grow old when sad.[101] The effect of sorrow on speech can also be wide-ranging. Although moderate sorrow can lead to sighs, and vehement sorrow to wailing, a sorrow that absorbs the soul can even remove the power of

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[94] "He loved Big Brother".

[95] *In IV Sent*., d. 44, q. 3, a. 3, qc. 2, ad 5: "amor, gaudium et tristitia et hujusmodi, dupliciter accipiuntur. Quandoque quidem secundum quod sunt passiones appetitivae sensibilis ... alio modo secundum quod sunt actus voluntatis, quae est in parte intellectiva." *In III Sent*., d. 26, q. 1, a. 5, ad 5: "ex parte ista delectationi quae est in parte intellectiva, potest esse tristitia contraria, non quae sit passio, ut dictum est."

[96] *ST* I-II 37.1; *In Iob*, cap. 9, lect. 4.

[97] *In Psalmos,* Ps 17, n. 16: "Sicut quando homo est laetus, videntur sibi clara omnia; quando est tristis, videntur sibi omnia obscurari."

[98] *ST* I-II 37.2: "Dicitur enim homo aggravari, ex eo quod aliquo pondere impeditur a proprio motu. Manifestum est autem ex praedictis quod tristitia contingit ex aliquo malo praesenti. Quod quidem, ex hoc ipso quod repugnat motui voluntatis, aggravat animum, inquantum impedit ipsum ne fruatur eo quod vult."

[99] *In Iob*, cap. 29: "solent enim homines maerore depressi oculos ad terram demersos habere." *In Iob*, cap. 1: "homines dolentes magis soleant prosterni." See also *ST* I-II 35.8 on torpor.

[100] *In IV Sent*., d. 17, q. 2, a. 3, qc. 1, co.: "major dolor est in sensitiva parte ex laesione sensibili quam sit ille qui in ipsa redundat ex ratione." *In IV Sent*., d. 17 q. 2 a. 5 qc. 2 ad 2: "Ad secundum dicendum, quod sicut gaudium interius redundat etiam ad exteriores corporis partes, ita etiam et dolor interior ad exteriora membra derivatur; unde dicitur Prov. 17:22: spiritus tristis exsiccat ossa." On the metaphor of bones for strength: *In Iob*, cap. 7, lect. 3: "solet enim per ossa in Scriptura id quod est in homine roboris designari." *In Psalmos,* Ps 34, n. 7: "per ossa quippe intelligitur virtus."

[101] *In Psalmos*, Ps 27, n. 7: "homo in tristitia videtur senescere."

speech entirely.[102] A passage from *Sense and Sensibility* includes many of these effects that Aquinas identifies—lying prone, sharing the burden, shedding tears, wailing, inability to speak:

> Marianne stretched on the bed, almost choked by grief, one letter in her hand, and two or three others lying by her. Elinor drew near, but without saying a word; and seating herself on the bed, took her hand, kissed her affectionately several times, and then gave way to a burst of tears, which at first was scarcely less violent than Marianne's. The latter, though unable to speak, seemed to feel all the tenderness of this behaviour, and after some time thus spent in joint affliction, she put all the letters into Elinor's hands; and then covering her face with her handkerchief, almost screamed with agony. Elinor, who knew that such grief, shocking as it was to witness it, must have its course, watched by her till this excess of suffering had somewhat spent itself.[103]

The relation of the body to the soul means that sorrow can also be alleviated by the same connection. When Aquinas turns to the remedies for sorrow, he comments that any pleasure at all helps to alleviate any kind of sorrow.[104] His remedies are a mixture of the bodily and the spiritual, the individual and the social. On the level of reason, he favours speaking with oneself about the matter while reflecting on it according to reason, spending time with friends and family, and contemplation.[105] Sensitive remedies include shedding tears, sleep, and baths.[106] It is notable that these bodily remedies all require little effort, probably in recognition of the paralysing effect of sorrow.

Given his account of how debilitating sorrow can be, Aquinas takes on balance a negative view of sorrow, and holds that all sadness should be fled from in itself.[107] Though he describes it as "human" for sorrow to touch the heart, he goes on to observe that when sorrow

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[102] *In Iob*, cap. 3. *ST* I-II 35.8.

[103] Jane Austen, *Sense and Sensibility* (1811; reis. Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin, 1969), 195.

[104] *ST* I-II 38.1: "quaelibet delectatio remedium affert ad mitigandam quamlibet tristitiam, ex quocumque procedat." It does however take a great joy to take away sorrow entirely. See *In II Cor*., cap. 7, lect. 2: "Licet enim ex aliquibus delectationibus diminuatur tristitia, non tamen totaliter tollitur, nisi gaudium sit magnum."

[105] Reflection: *In Iob*, cap. 7: "homines enim sapientes quando solitarii sunt et a tumultibus hominum et negotiorum semoti, tunc magis secum loqui possunt secundum rationem aliquid cogitando." Friends: *ST* I-II 38.3. Friends and family: *In III Sent*., d. 14, q. 1, a. 3, qc. 6, ad 2: "ex colloquio et praesentia amicorum et familiarium homo naturaliter confortatur in tristitiis." *In Iob*, cap. 2: "quod amicorum compassio consolativa est, vel quia adversitas quasi onus quoddam levius fertur quando a pluribus portatur, vel magis quia omnis tristitia ex admixtione delectationis alleviatur: delectabilissimum autem est experimentum sumere de amicitia alicuius, quod maxime sumitur ex compassione in adversis, et ideo consolationem affert." See also *In Rom.*, cap 12, lect. 3; Contemplation: *ST* I-II 38.4.

[106] Tears: *ST* I-II 38.2; *In Psalmos*, Ps 41, n. 2; Sleep and baths: *ST* I-II 38.5; *In Psalmos*, Ps 29, n. 4; *In Iob*, cap. 7. Doubtless a cup of tea would have featured among these remedies had he written in a later era.

[107] *In III Sent*., d. 15, q. 2, a. 2, qc. 1, ad 3: "omnis tristitia … inquantum in se est, fugienda est, inquantum hujusmodi." See also *In IV Sent*., d. 49, q. 3, a. 4, qc. 2, ad 3.

fills the heart it disturbs the reason.[108] Further, sorrow is an impediment to activity, and makes a person more easily angered.[109] He does, however, allow that sorrow can play a positive role, namely, when the object is one's sins. This sorrow, termed penitence, or mercy when it regards someone else, can even be an affection that one chooses, inasmuch as it orders the penitent to the good of salvation.[110]

2. Irascible passions

2.1. Fear

Throughout this section, we have approached each affection by first examining the elements of the underlying passion. Aquinas affirms this methodology in his treatment of fear in the *Commentary on the Sentences,* where he states that to understand fear in general we should begin with fear as a passion, given that the names of the passions are transferred to the operations of the superior appetite.[111] His fullest treatment of the passion of fear comes in questions 41 to 44 of the *Summa Theologiae,* where one of his first concerns is how to distinguish fear from the other passions that pertain to evil, such as sorrow. One distinction is that sorrow is about a present evil, whereas fear is about a future evil that cannot be easily resisted, repelled, or avoided.[112] Fear also implies that the evil has a sort of victory over a good, on account of a greater power in the object than in the one who fears.[113] In short, the person who fears something apprehends that thing as a threat.

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[108] *In Ioan.,* cap. 16, lect. 2: "Sed quia humanum est quod tristitia cor tangat, vitiosum autem quod cor impleat, quia per hoc ratio turbatur."

[109] *In IV Sent*., d. 49, q. 3, a. 3, qc. 3, ad 3: "omnis tristitia operationem aliquam impedit." *In Psalmos*, Ps 6, n. 5: "Tristitia enim est causa irae; et ideo tristis irascitur de facili."

[110] *In III Sent*., d. 15, q. 2, a. 2, qc. 1, ad 3: "potest tamen eligi tristitia inquantum ad aliquod bonum ordinat, sicut tristitia poenitentis ad salute." Also *ST* III 85.1; *In Psalmos*, Ps 37, n. 3; Ps 42, n. 1. On mercy see *ST* I 21.3; *ST* II-II 30.1; *In III Sent*., d. 26, q. 1, a. 3, co.; *In IV Sent*., d. 15, q. 2, a. 1, qc. 1, ad 4.

[111] *In III Sent*., d. 34, q. 2, a. 1, qc. 1, co.: "definitio data, secundum Damascenum, convenit omni timori. Sed quia nomina passionum a passionibus sensitivae partis ad operationes superioris partis transferuntur, ut supra dictum est, ideo videamus primo qualiter dicta definitio competat timori qui est passio sensitivae partis."

[112] *ST* I-II 23.2: "malum arduum habet rationem ut vitetur, inquantum est malum, et hoc pertinet ad passionem timoris"; *ST* I-II 41.2 ad 3: "timor nullo modo est in concupiscibili, non enim respicit malum absolute, sed cum quadam difficultate vel arduitate, ut ei resisti vix possit"; *ST* I-II 41.4: "timor est de futuro malo quod excedit potestatem timentis, ut scilicet ei resisti non possit."

[113] *ST* I-II 41.1: "Et importat etiam habitudinem ad malum, secundum quod malum habet quodammodo victoriam super aliquod bonum"; *ST* I-II 41.4: "timor est de futuro malo quod excedit potestatem timentis."

The added elements to fear allow us to distinguish it from hatred and aversion. Someone may hate household cats, but not fear them. With lions, though, there are the difficulties of resisting them and easily avoiding them, so that one apprehends a lion as having power over the goods of bodily integrity and human life. Particularly when it is a simple act of the will, fear may look similar to aversion. The difference lies in whether the object is apprehended as a threat. A person who avoids flying with an airline because of its overly-jocular stewards does so from aversion, but if the reason is the airline's bad safety record, the avoidance is due to fear.

There are several places where Aquinas addresses fear in the intellectual appetite. In the *Summa Contra Gentiles,* Aquinas places fear in both the intellectual appetite and the sensitive appetite.[114] Elsewhere, when he discusses the distinction that John Damascene makes between six species of fear, each consists of the will recoiling from objects apprehended rationally: in relation to work, laziness; to disgrace in a deed yet to be done, shamefacedness; to disgrace in a deed already done, shame; to a great evil exceeding our comprehension, wonder; to an unusual evil, stupor; to future misfortunes, anxiety.[115] In the *Commentary on the Sentences*, he gives a metaphor for understanding fear as a movement of the will, when he explains how in the passion of fear the heart contracts, retreating into itself and remaining there.[116] He comments further that in spiritual things fear can be spoken of in the same way, when "the motion of the will shrinks back from something and remains in itself."[117]

A fear of particular universals, such as heights, as we saw in Kenny's example, or other common fears such as a public speaking or an economic recession, causes the will to contract

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[114] *SCG* I 90, n. 2: "sicut enim per passionem timoris, quae est in appetitu sensitivo, refugit quis malum futurum, ita sine passione intellectivus appetitus idem operatur." He also holds that fear (along with joy and sorrow) cannot exist in demons, since it requires a sensitive appetite. It can, however, exist in demons to the extent that it denotes a simple act of the will. *ST* I 64.3: "timor, dolor, gaudium, et huiusmodi, secundum quod sunt passiones, in daemonibus esse non possunt, sic enim sunt propriae appetitus sensitivi, qui est virtus in organo corporali. Sed secundum quod nominant simplices actus voluntatis, sic possunt esse in daemonibus."

[115] *ST* I-II 41.4.

[116] *In III Sent*., d. 34, q. 2, a. 1, qc. 1, co.: "Contractio autem significat motum alicujus ab alio, a quo retrahitur in seipsum, ubi quodammodo congregatur; et ideo importat dispositionem cordis quae est debilitas, per quam aliquas ab alio deficit, in seipso consistens."

[117] *In III Sent*., d. 34, q. 2, a. 1, qc. 1, co.: "per hanc similitudinem dicitur etiam timor in spiritualibus, dum motus voluntatis ab aliquo resilit, et in seipso consistit." See also *ST* I-II 44.1: "in timore ex parte corporis, contractio caloris et spirituum ad interiora."

and refrain from choices that it would make in the absence of the fear. The image of a "comfort zone" captures how the will recoils from threatening objects, as when someone opts not to apply for a promotion through fear of failure, or to ask a question in public for fear of ridicule. Evacuation from a danger zone and practising social distancing during a pandemic are equally instances of the will recoiling from a feared object.[118] Aquinas's own example is of citizens who withdraw from the outskirts of the city for the interior.[119] This external movement could be made with the passion of fear, but could equally be a passionless act of the will, when people calmly move to a position of safety.

In the affection of fear the mutually reinforcing relationship between affection and apprehension is on clear display. Fear follows the apprehension of a threat, but then influences what a person apprehends and in what way. Robert Solomon gives the examples of a man afraid of his supervisor and an abused woman who lives in terror of her husband: "These are not just tendencies to have fear that occasionally get triggered by a specific circumstance. They are ongoing structures of a person's experience and personality that one might literally claim to be operative every waking moment of their day."[120] These structures of experience and personality—excellent examples of enduring affections—are also structures of apprehension, by which particular encounters, tones of expression, even what the feared person does *not* say, are then interpreted by reference to the fear.

2.2. Daring

After fear we turn to the inverse appetitive movement of daring. It is an inverse movement not because it has a different object, but because the same object is apprehended differently. In the concupiscible passions, opposing movements are in respect of contrary terms (love of good is contrary to hatred of evil), whereas in the irascible passions, contrary movements of approach and withdrawal are in respect of the same term.[121] The object of both fear and

[118] The fear may be of authorities rather than of the pathogen, but the effect of recoiling is the same.

[119] *ST* I-II 44.1: "videmus etiam in civitatibus quod, quando cives timent, retrahunt se ab exterioribus, et recurrunt, quantum possunt, ad interiora."

[120] Robert C. Solomon, *True to Our Feelings: What Our Emotions Are Really Telling Us* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 37.

[121] *ST* I-II 23.2: "Invenitur ergo in passionibus irascibilis contrarietas secundum contrarietatem boni et mali, sicut inter spem et timorem, et iterum secundum accessum et recessum ab eodem termino, sicut inter audaciam

daring is therefore the same object: an arduous evil that is not yet present.[122] But whereas fear considers the evil as something to be avoided, daring tends towards the evil, due to something about the evil that provides a reason for tending towards it.[123] That something is the hope of victory over the threat.[124] It is by hope of overcoming the imminent object of fear that one dares attack it rather than flee from it. Daring is therefore a passion that follows hope. In the absence of the hope of overcoming the threat, fear will follow, but if there are reasons to believe victory is possible, hope gives rise to daring.[125] If I have the passion of daring, I believe I can win in the encounter with the threatening object.

Why do I believe I can win? Aquinas describes how factors such as one's own power, bodily strength, experience of dangers, and wealth can lead to the belief that victory is possible. He adds also the powers of others, such as when we have a great number of friends or other means of help, including divine help.[126] He does not mention the strengths and weaknesses of one's opponent, but these would also add to whether or not one believes victory is possible. Calculations about objects of the rational appetite can be made about the sort of factors just mentioned. Someone with a fear of flying who books a ticket on a plane is acting from the affection of daring, having apprehended that she will overcome the anxiety that she may, or will, experience while flying. In intellectual, scientific, and artistic daring, a person is confident of overcoming the threats of failure and criticism. Edward Farnsworth wrote lyrically of the musical daring of the composers Schumann, Chopin, and Strauss, likening them to explorers: "The genius of Strauss, like that of Whitman, is essentially the genius of the explorer. Each of these burned to reach the limits of his art and plant victorious feet upon the pole. As in the material world, so here, such daring spirits are necessary if we would

et timorem." *ST* I-II 40.4: "Alio modo, per accessum et per recessum respectu eiusdem termini, et talis contrarietas invenitur in passionibus irascibilis."

[122] *ST* I-II 23.4: "Respectu autem mali nondum iniacentis, est timor et audacia."

[123] *ST* I-II 23.2: "habet etiam rationem ut in ipsum tendatur, sicut in quoddam arduum, per quod scilicet aliquid evadit subiectionem mali, et sic tendit in ipsum audacia."

[124] *ST* I-II 45.1: "audacia aggreditur periculum imminens, propter victoriam sui supra ipsum periculum."

[125] *ST* I-II 45.2: "audacia consequitur ad spem, ex hoc enim quod aliquis sperat superare terribile imminens, ex hoc audacter insequitur ipsum." For an account of the relationship between daring and hope, see Scott Cleveland, "Courageous Activity and the Virtue of Courage", PhD. diss., (Baylor University, 2014), 90-92.

[126] *ST* I-II 45.3: "provocatur spes causans audaciam, per ea quae faciunt nos aestimare quod possibile sit adipisci victoriam; vel secundum propriam potentiam, sicut fortitudo corporis, experientia in periculis, multitudo pecuniarum, et alia huiusmodi; sive per potentiam aliorum, sicut multitudo amicorum vel quorumcumque auxiliantium, et praecipue si homo confidat de auxilio divino."

know the geography of the world of tone."[127] The same could be said of daring across different fields: politics, litigation, business, exploration, surgery, evangelisation. Manzanedo gives the example of a preacher speaking publicly against a tyrant.[128] Although the sensitive appetite may at times be engaged, particularly through the imagination, daring in these examples is properly an act of the will.

Aquinas notes that the sensitive power cannot make comparisons, nor inquire into the particular circumstances of something.[129] Reason, however, can assess all the difficulties of a situation. He relates how those who face danger with deliberation, following the judgement of reason, at first seem casual (*remissi*) because they are not facing the danger from passion. In the midst of the danger, however, they experience nothing unforeseen that they have not already deliberated upon, and so they are more persevering.[130] The example emphasises the different possible experiences one may have in the passion and affection of fear. The woman with a fear of flying may have booked her ticket through a passionless act of the will, only to find panic setting in while walking through the terminal. This is why Aquinas notes the importance of the imagination in considering future evils beforehand, so that in the moment when the person actually confronts the object, the passion of fear will not override the earlier judgement made from the affection of daring.[131] In many such cases, the threat to overcome will not be the apparent object of a plane crash or a tyrant, but the threat of one's own fear.[132]

2.3. Hope

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[127] Edward Farnsworth, *Three Great Epoch-Makers in Music*, (Portland: Smith & Sale, 1912), 100. Earlier he had written: "Schumann had gone even farther, but not to the utmost of daring, for this was the deed of Chopin. He, the Columbus of composers, gave to Harmony a new world. He, and he alone, first dreamed and then beheld its isles of Paradise, tropic and enticing, embowered and restful, fit for lone and pensive musing till suddenly the sun is darkened, the winds make wail, and a dread note of thunder foretells the bursting storm. Many times a voyager, many times an explorer, he brought continually, for the world's wonder and delight, the fantastic, the weird, the exquisite." Farnsworth, *Three Great Epoch-Makers*, 68.

[128] Manzanedo, *Las pasiones*, 239.

[129] *ST* I-II 45.4: "Virtus autem sensitiva non est collativa nec inquisitiva singulorum quae circumstant rem, sed subitum habet iudicium."

[130] *ST* I-II 45.4: "Sed ratio est discussiva omnium quae afferunt difficultatem negotio. Et ideo fortes, qui ex iudicio rationis aggrediuntur pericula, in principio videntur remissi, quia non passi, sed cum deliberatione debita aggrediuntur. Quando autem sunt in ipsis periculis, non experiuntur aliquid improvisum; sed quandoque minora illis quae praecogitaverunt."

[131] *ST* I-II 45.4.

[132] See *ST* I-II 42.4, on whether fear itself can be object of fear.

The passion of hope presupposes desire, but adds the aspects of possibility and difficulty. If there is no possibility of obtaining what one desires, there can be no hope for it. Or if the object of desire is easy to obtain, there is no *need* to hope for it. One does not hope to obtain the book that is near at hand on a shelf, but one does hope to obtain a book that is rare, out-of-print, or possibly unavailable at the library. The object of hope is therefore a possible future good that one also apprehends as arduous and difficult to obtain.[133] Aquinas's examples of hope being in dumb animals makes the point—when a dog sees a hare that is too far away to be caught, it will make no movement to catch it, whereas if it is nearer, the dog will move towards it, as it does have a hope of catching it.[134]

Much of Aquinas's discussion of objects of hope in the rational appetite relates to the theological virtue of hope. There he presents hope not as a passion but as a habit of the mind, which resides in the will, since its object is not a sensible good but a divine good.[135] The same elements of the affection of hope are also required for the virtue, so it follows that neither the blessed nor the damned can have hope, since they cannot apprehend happiness as a future possible good.[136] Aside from hope in the highest goods of God and eternal happiness, we could suggest numerous possible goods of the rational appetite that are commonly objects of hope: world peace, career success, honour, marriage, and parenthood among them.[137]

In his articles on hope as an irascible passion at *ST* I-II 40, Aquinas gives no indication of whether or how hope may be also an act of the will, although elsewhere he describes hope as an act of the will tending towards a good that is not yet possessed.[138] In the *Commentary on*

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[133] Aquinas analyses each of these elements—future, good, possible, and difficult—at *ST* I-II 40.1.

[134] *ST* I-II 40.3: "Si enim canis videat leporem, aut accipiter avem, nimis distantem, non movetur ad ipsam, quasi non sperans se eam posse adipisci, si autem sit in propinquo, movetur, quasi sub spe adipiscendi."

[135] *ST* II-II 17.1 ad 1: "Quamvis spes de qua nunc loquimur non sit passio, sed habitus mentis"; *ST* II-II 18.1: "Actus autem virtutis spei non potest pertinere ad appetitum sensitivum, quia bonum quod est obiectum principale huius virtutis non est aliquod bonum sensibile, sed bonum divinum. Et ideo spes est in appetitu superiori, qui dicitur voluntas, sicut in subiecto, non autem in appetitu inferiori, ad quem pertinet irascibilis."

[136] *ST* II-II 18.3: "Unde patet quod non possunt apprehendere beatitudinem ut bonum possibile, sicut nec beati ut bonum futurum."

[137] Robert Miner has an excellent short reflection on the influence of parents, teachers, priests, coaches and the like in influencing our estimations of what is possible, thus generating hopes and despairs: Miner, *Aquinas on the Passions*, 221-222.

[138] *ST* I 20.1: "Sunt autem quidam actus voluntatis et appetitus, respicientes bonum sub aliqua speciali conditione, sicut gaudium et delectatio est de bono praesenti et habito; desiderium autem et spes, de bono nondum adepto." *ST* I-II 4.3

the Sentences, however, he devotes a lengthy article to the question of whether hope can also exist in the intellectual part of the soul.[139] The first objections pose the problems that would follow if we considered hope to be a passion of the sensitive appetite and nothing more; for example, passions are in the sensitive part of the soul, hope is a passion, therefore it cannot exist in the intellectual part of the soul.[140] In response, he again recounts how the names of the activities of the sensitive part of the soul are transferred to the intellectual appetite. In the sensitive part of the soul, hope names a material passion, whereas in the intellectual part, "it is a simple operation of the will tending immaterially toward something arduous."[141]

The question of what would constitute an "arduous" good has been disputed, particularly over whether it includes goods whose attainment is uncertain, with no other impediments to their attainment.[142] If it does not, then buying a lottery ticket and placing a bet would not be acts of hope but merely acts of desire. It would be wrong to say that I hope a book will be at the library when I am not sure if someone else has borrowed it. Likewise, Robert Miner's example of hoping there is a Diet Coke in the fridge (when it is uncertain that there is) would also be misplaced, as would his explanation that "the presence of doubt suffices to introduce some difficulty in the attainment of the good."[143] It seems at odds with how we commonly speak of hope to say that I cannot hope for fine weather, hope to win a coin toss, hope that someone will come to a party, and hope that the air-conditioning will not break down. Christopher Bobier argues, however, from an analysis of Aquinas's use of the term "arduous", that its meaning includes difficulty, often a high degree of difficulty, but does not seem to include uncertainty.[144] Further, the term "consistently refers to things that are very

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[139] *In III Sent*., d. 26, q. 1, a. 5.

[140] *In III Sent*., d. 26, q. 1, a. 5, arg. 1.

[141] *In III Sent*., d. 26, q. 1, a. 5.

[141] *In III Sent*., d. 26, q. 1, a. 5, co..: "Sic ergo spes in parte sensitiva nominat quamdam passionem materialem, sed in parte intellectiva simplicem operationem voluntatis immaterialiter tendentis in aliquod arduum."

[142] See the discussion in Christopher A. Bobier, "Aquinas on the Emotion of Hope: A Psychological or Theological Treatment?" *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* 94, no. 3, (2020): 379-404.

[143] Miner, *Thomas Aquinas on the Passions*, 217.

[144] Bobier, "Aquinas on the Emotion of Hope", 385. Bobier acknowledges at 391 that in examples such as hoping for fine weather, people use the term "hope" to refer to desirable but uncertain future things that are not otherwise apprehended as arduous to attain.

difficult for the agent: the arduous object requires significant effort on the part of the agent", such as the way animals seek food through fighting or hunting.[145]

Is there another way of approaching "arduousness"? An animal fighting or chasing another animal for food is certainly hoping to attain an arduous object, but a dog loitering meaningfully by the table at a family barbecue is also surely exhibiting hope and not merely desire. A different approach would be that arduousness may certainly imply effort, but that more generally whatever cannot be easily attained is "arduous", regardless of whether it requires effort on the part of the agent or not. Effort is only one possible indication that the good is not easily attained. This interpretation is supported by the way Aquinas grounds hope in expectation. In the *Commentary on the Sentences,* Aquinas explains that *expectare* is when the appetite extends towards an object and rests there, without fleeing or retreating from it.[146] This requirement for resting in the object is because there is a difficulty about the object, meaning that it cannot be had easily: "what is had easily is acquired without hindrance (*mora*)."[147] *Mora* can mean hindrance, delay, or obstacle, any of which can create the apprehension of difficulty, because one cannot easily attain an object where there is a hindrance, delay, or obstacle. The hindrance, in the examples of uncertainty, are circumstances that are outside of one's control: actions of other people, weather patterns, the good working of mechanisms. If what I desire does not depend on my action alone, this will inevitably create the apprehension of difficulty, so long as I cannot rely on the other circumstances unfolding as I would wish.[148]

"Arduousness" is therefore not limited to goods that require great effort on my part or another's to attain them. The question is rather whether there are any obstacles to my attaining the good easily. Whether the book I desire is on the library shelf or not depends on

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[145] Bobier, "Aquinas on the Emotion of Hope", 384.

[146] *In III Sent*., d. 26, q. 1, a. 3, ad 1: "expectare importat protensionem appetitus in aliquid cum quiete privante fugam vel recessum."

[147] *In III Sent*., d. 26, q. 1, a. 3, ad 1: "Haec autem quies contingit ex difficultate ejus in quod motus appetitus tendit, sed non in promptu est ut habeatur: quod enim in promptu est, sine mora acquiritur."

[148] Aquinas deals with this kind of situation briefly in *ST* I-II 40.2 ad 1, when he states that when a man hopes to obtain something by someone else's power, he is properly said to expect it (*expectare*). His point is that the man looks ahead (*spectare*) not only at the object but also at the power—not his own—by which he intends to get it. He clarifies that this is still a movement of hope that is sometimes called expectation.

the actions of other borrowers and library staff. I can certainly place a Diet Coke in the fridge and desire it twenty minutes later, but if I placed it there several weeks ago and have no idea if it is still there, I will not apprehend it as easily attainable, however easy it is to walk to the fridge and check. Likewise, it does make sense to hope for fine weather, because despite doing all I can to ensure fine weather by choosing the date carefully and consulting weather patterns, the weather is out of my control, and I cannot apprehend it as easily attainable. By contrast, if my air-conditioning system is reliable, such that it has never broken in twenty years, I will not hope that the room will be cool for a summer party. The good that I desire—a cool room—I apprehend as something that I can have easily, by pressing a button. If the system has a history of breaking down, it is no longer just a matter of pressing a button, but of relying on the working of a mechanism that I do not understand and cannot fix. Bobier is aware of this line of argument: "There is nothing I personally can do to ensure that Sophie shows up at the party. The object of my hope in this case is arduous because the hoped-for good is important and exceeds my agential power—it is impossible for me to bring about her voluntary attendance."[149] He does not believe, though, that it establishes arduousness as Aquinas understands it: "The problem with this response, however, is that the object of my hope is not *cognized* as exceptionally difficult."[150] He further states: "So in order for Sophie's attendance to count as arduous, it needs to be cognized as difficult according to my power or her power, and this is what seems to be lacking in the case."[151] Again, though, the proper question is not whether there is something difficult that I must do, but whether the desired result is easily obtainable.

The point of this excursion into uncertainty is to defend the role that it plays in determining whether someone looks towards a future object with hope. Uncertainty can add to the difficulty of an object, and can even constitute the difficulty itself. In some cases the uncertainty that arises from other people's free cooperation, as when proposing marriage or applying for a coveted job, adds to the preciousness of the hoped-for object. It also helps to

[149] Bobier, "Aquinas on the Emotion of Hope", 387.
[150] Bobier, "Aquinas on the Emotion of Hope", 387.
[151] Bobier, "Aquinas on the Emotion of Hope", 387, fn 16.

preserve the distinction between the passion and affection of hope, and the theological virtue of hope. In the latter, the object of hope is a good—God himself—beyond my powers but where with the certainty of faith I can rely on God's own power.[152] The same strength of certainty does not obtain for other objects of hope.

2.4. Despair

Despair is the contrary movement to hope, and a passion to which Aquinas pays little attention. His explicit treatment of despair is confined to one article tucked among his eight articles on hope.[153] Just as fear and daring are movements in respect of the same term, so are hope and despair. All objects of hope in the rational appetite can therefore also be objects of despair. The difference between the two consists in whether one apprehends the arduous future good as possible to attain.[154] If so, this apprehension leads to hope; if not, it leads to despair. Aquinas emphasises that despair is not simply the cessation of hope, but it implies a movement of retreat from the object.[155] This makes despair unique among the passions, since it is the only passion that is a movement *away* from a good. It is not on account of the good, however, that the appetite withdraws from the objection, but on account of the evil of the difficulty in attaining the good.[156]

As a passion, despair could be characterised by such somatic effects as slumped shoulders and groaning. When we considers also that Aquinas treats despair—when it is opposed to the theological virtue of hope—as a sin, we can see why despair might have a bad reputation among the passions.[157] Michael Miller argues that although the other ten passions can have beneficial roles for right action, despair "can never be felt rightly because it always eradicates

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[152] *ST* II-II 17.1: "Inquantum igitur speramus aliquid ut possibile nobis per divinum auxilium, spes nostra attingit ad ipsum Deum, cuius auxilio innititur." *ST* II-II 18.4: "spes certitudinaliter tendit in suum finem, quasi participans certitudinem a fide, quae est in vi cognoscitiva." Bobier argues by contrast that by excluding uncertainty from arduousness Aquinas can account for the similarity between the passion of hope and the virtue of hope: "Aquinas on the Emotion of Hope", 401.

[153] *ST* I-II 40.4.

[154] *ST* I-II 40.1 ad 3: "spes differt a desperatione secundum differentiam possibilis et impossibilis."

[155] *ST* I-II 40.4 ad 1: "desperatio non importat solam privationem spei; sed importat quendam recessum a re desiderata, propter aestimatam impossibilitatem adipiscendi."

[156] *ST* I-II 23.2: "Bonum autem arduum sive difficile habet rationem ut in ipsum tendatur, inquantum est bonum, quod pertinet ad passionem spei; et ut ab ipso recedatur, inquantum est arduum vel difficile, quod pertinet ad passionem desperationis."

[157] *ST* II-II 20.1.

hope."[158] Further, while sorrow, aversion, fear, anger, and hatred can all engender feelings of love and hope, despair "kills hope; the destruction of hope—by its very nature—is the effect of despair. Despair, therefore, leads to paralysis and nothing more."[159] He concludes that despair "essentially stops all movement, both of the body and the soul."[160]

Miller's critique turns first of all on the belief that hope is always a good thing, and so that its eradication is always a bad thing. There are, though, many ways in which hope can be misdirected, as when the object is not truly desirable, or not worthy of my desire. Alternatively, the object may be desirable, but not possible. When discussing despair as a sin, Aquinas gives some examples of how, at the level of nature, there is no sin in the despair of obtaining what one is not intended to obtain, or what one is not bound to obtain, as when a physician despairs of curing someone who is sick, or someone despairs of becoming rich.[161]

To return to the example Aquinas gives of the dog not chasing after the hare, the dog accepts the fact that the hare is too far away to be caught. There may be borderline situations, though, where the hope at first is legitimate, and only with the passage of time does it become clear that the grounds for hope are unwarranted.[162] Not every conceivable object of hope is a realistic object for everyone, but the fact that an object is not realistic may not be immediately obvious. It may even have been realistic at one point, but circumstances have since changed. New information, the passage of time, failing powers—all of these can influence whether we apprehend an object as possible or not. One reaches a point where some hopes are misplaced, dated, or irrational. Hence as an act of the will despair can be a straightforward, matter-of-fact acceptance of the reality that the previously hoped-for object is no longer possible. It is easy to conceive of ways in which continuing to hope in an object

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[158] Michael R. Miller, "Aquinas on the Passion of Despair," *New Blackfriars* 93 (July 2012), 395.
[159] Miller, "Aquinas on the Passion of Despair," 395.
[160] Miller, "Aquinas on the Passion of Despair," 396.
[161] *ST* II-II 20.1 ad 3.
[162] Jeffrey Froula points out that if a cheetah continued to chase an antelope that is impossible to catch it would lead to the death of the cheetah. It is better to turn away from this good due to the difficulty rather than attend only to its desirability. Jeffrey P. Froula, "Aquinas on the Moral Neutrality of the Passion of Despair," *New Blackfriars* 97 (May 2016), 320-321. For a persuasive and fuller account of the moral value of despair, see Christopher Bobier, "Revisiting Aquinas on the Passion of Despair," *New Blackfriars* 102 (January 2021): 123-138. He comments at 134: "That despair paralyzes the soul and eradicates hope is irrelevant to its moral standing; what is relevant to its moral standing is whether it relates in the right way to judgement and will."

would be debilitating, if I am not prepared to accept that as much as I would wish it were otherwise, the object is not possible for me.[163] There is an opportunity cost to misplaced hopes. The positive role of despair is therefore to help one to stay within the bounds of what is truly possible. Like a sign along the road directing us that we have taken a wrong turn, despair allows us to continue our movement towards the pursuit of the good, distinguishing possible goods from impossible, and realistic hopes from unrealistic.

2.5. Anger

We turn finally to the affection of anger, the last of the irascible passions. Anger follows the apprehension of a difficult, present evil. Rather than succumbing to the evil in the passion of sadness, anger is a movement of attack.[164] This movement towards the evil is only one movement of anger; the other is a movement towards what Aquinas calls vengeance (*vindicta*).[165] He combines these two movements when he explains that anger desires evil as a means of just vengeance.[166] A love of justice is integral to anger. When Aquinas states that all the causes of anger can be reduced to the infliction of a slight, he observes that what provokes anger always has a notion of injustice.[167] Even the kind of anger that we would normally term 'frustration' follows an expectation of how things *should* be. When I am frustrated that certain expected results do not follow from my efforts, I have a sense of injustice, even if it is about struggling to get a remote control to work.[168]

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[163] As Kevin Johnson sang in "Rock and Roll (I Gave You the Best Years of My Life)", of the influence of a woman the narrator meets: "She followed me when, finally, I sold my old guitar / And she tried to help me understand, I'd never be a star." And in "Les Plus Belles Années De Ma Vie", the French version from Joe Dassin: "Quand j'ai vendu ma vieille guitare / C'est elle qui m'a aidé à comprendre enfin que ça ne marcherait jamais."

[164] *ST* I-II 23.3: "appetitus … habet motum ad invadendum malum laesivum, quod pertinet ad iram."

[165] *ST* I-II 46.2: "motus irae tendit in duo, scilicet in ipsam vindictam, quam appetit et sperat sicut quoddam bonum, unde et de ipsa delectatur, tendit etiam in illum de quo quaerit vindictam, sicut in contrarium et nocivum, quod pertinet ad rationem mali."

[166] *ST* I-II 46.7: "ira appetit malum, inquantum habet rationem iusti vindicativi."

[167] *ST* I-II 47.2: "omnes causae irae reducuntur ad parvipensionem … Iusta autem vindicta non fit nisi de eo quod est iniuste factum, et ideo provocativum ad iram semper est aliquid sub ratione iniusti." For a good exposition of the relationship between injustice and contempt (*mépris*), see Martin Blais, "La colère selon Sénèque et selon saint Thomas," *Laval théologique et philosophique* 20, no. 2 (1964), 270-272.

[168] Solomon gives the examples of attempting to thread a needle and the frustration when a flight is delayed. He notes: "I will argue that anger is basically a judgment that one has been wronged or offended. Typically (but certainly not always) it is directed at another person, most often for a specific offense or, perhaps, a sequence of offenses. Often, too, it is directed at a situation or a task thwarted, as frustration, for instance, when I try unsuccessfully to thread a needle or when my flight is inexcusably delayed. But even in a relatively brief and impersonal bout of anger, for instance during my unsuccessful attempts to thread the needle, there will almost

In his description of the bodily changes that accompany the passion, Aquinas cites Gregory the Great who lists several effects: palpitating heart, trembling body, stammering tongue, fiery face, rough eyes.[169] Those who are angry become unrecognisable and do not know what they are saying.[170] Aquinas likens all these movements to the action of heat, and comments that the fact that anger consumes itself and dies away quickly demonstrates its fervour, like a great fire burning its fuel quickly.[171] The image of heat prompts the question of whether there can be cold anger. Aquinas and Gregory's account of the heat of anger is certainly familiar, but so is the cold shoulder and an icy tone of voice. Aquinas discusses a passionless variety of anger when he distinguishes between three varieties of anger: the vice, the passion, and the anger that is in the will, when one wills to be avenged against a wrongdoer.[172] He offers this distinction when asking whether there was anger in Christ, and notes that this third kind of anger is in God and the blessed, and was in Christ.[173] In a similar passage while discussing the vice of anger, he comments that when anger is a simple movement of the will, one inflicts punishment not from passion, but from a judgment of the reason.[174] An apt example is in Charles Dickens's *Hard Times*, when Sissy Jupe directs her married friend's would-be seducer to leave town. She displays a passionless act of anger that follows the apprehension of injustice and the desire to see justice restored, as seen in the italicised words that follow:

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always be a series of thoughts and judgments (as well as shifting feelings), from one-word epithets to questions (probably just to myself) such as "why do they make this so difficult?" or "why am I so clumsy?"" Solomon, *True to Our Feelings*, 18.

[169] *ST* I-II 48.2: "irae suae stimulis accensum cor palpitat, corpus tremit, lingua se praepedit, facies ignescit, exasperantur oculi, et nequaquam recognoscuntur noti, ore quidem clamorem format, sed sensus quid loquatur, ignorat."

[170] *ST* I-II 48.2: "nequaquam recognoscuntur noti, ore quidem clamorem format, sed sensus quid loquatur, ignorat." The citation is still Gregory's.

[171] *ST* I-II 48.2 ad 2: "Tamen hoc ipsum quod ira cito consumitur, attestatur vehementi fervori ipsius. Sicut enim ignis magnus cito extinguitur, consumpta materia; ita etiam ira, propter suam vehementiam, cito deficit."

[172] *In III Sent*., d. 15, q. 2, a. 2, qc. 2, co.: "Alio modo dicitur ira voluntas vindicandi aliquod malefactum; et sic ira non est passio, proprie loquendo, nec est in irascibili, sed in voluntate."

[173] *In III Sent*., d. 15, q. 2, a. 2, qc. 2, co.: "et sic ira est in Deo et beatis, et in Christo fuit."

[174] *ST* II-II 158.8: "sed ex iudicio rationis poenam infligit." *ST* II-II 158.8: "ira dupliciter potest intelligi. Uno modo, simplex motus voluntatis … Alio modo accipitur ira pro motu appetitus sensitivi, qui est cum passione et transmutatione corporali." It is not the case that anger that is a simple movement of the will is necessarily more virtuous than anger that is a passion. As Aquinas points out in this passage, it may in fact demonstrate a weakness of will. Elsewhere, he calls the anger in the sensitive appetite that is against vice and in accordance with reason "zeal": *ST* II-II 158.1 ad. 2. For a comprehensive account of anger's relationship to reason, including its morality, see Luc-Thomas Somme, "La colère en question(s)," in *Saint Thomas d'Aquin: Les Cahiers d'Histoire de la Philosophie*, ed. Thierry-Dominique Humbrecht (Paris, Cerf, 2010), 370-376.

> "Mr Harthouse," returned Sissy, with a blending of gentleness and steadiness that quite defeated him, and with a simple confidence in his being bound to do what she required, that held him at a singular disadvantage, "the only *reparation* that remains with you, is to leave here immediately and finally. I am quite sure that you can *mitigate* in no other way the *wrong and harm* you have done. I am quite sure that it is the only *compensation* you have left it in your power to make. I do not say that it is much, or that it is enough; but it is something, and it is *necessary*. Therefore, though without any other authority than I have given you, and even without the knowledge of any other person than yourself and myself, I ask you to depart from this place tonight, under an *obligation* never to return to it.[175]

Corrections, punishments, criticisms, and plans for revenge could all be further examples of these passionless acts of anger. Refusing to take phone calls and ignoring attempts at reconciliation require no somatic changes, yet they too are wholly explicable as acts of anger. The affection can also last for much longer than brief episodes. Robert Solomon describes what it can be like to be angry at someone for years:

> One can be angry with an offensive neighbor for as long as he or she remains a neighbor, and long after that, too. And this does not just refer to a disposition to be angry, that is, whenever one is reminded of the neighbor one then gets angry. The anger rather becomes a continuous structure of one's life, always in the background but easily brought to the center of one's attention … It is a structure that includes one's thinking and behavior, what one pays attention to, what one remembers, what one imagines, even what one dreams, the metaphors one uses, and the way one engages in the neighborhood.[176]

The potential for anger to endure is explicable by the potential of injustice to endure. As long as someone rationally apprehends that an unjust situation continues to exist, the affection of anger can endure, and as Solomon explains, other thoughts and actions will be explicable by reference to this enduring affection of anger.

If anger is ordered towards justice, it may seem evident that anger can have a universal as its object. In fact, it is not so straightforward. We have seen previously how Aquinas cites Aristotle's claim that hatred may be towards a class, as when we hate an entire class of thieves, but anger is directed only towards something singular. I can hate robbery and robbers in general, but I will be angry about *this* act of robbery, and towards *this* robber. I can hate lying and liars, but I will be angry about *this* lie and *this* liar. How to reconcile this with the

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[175] Charles Dickens, *Hard Times* (1854; reis., London: Collins, 1954), 227. My italics.
[176] Solomon, *True to Our Feelings*, 17.

fact that justice and injustice can be about someone's relations with a class of people or a community, as when the state hurts someone? Aquinas's response is that in such a case, the state is treated as one individual.[177] A community, as the name implies, does possess unity, and can act with unity. It can therefore be treated according to its unity by being the object of anger. This approach surely leaves open other ways in which someone may be angry at a universal, not simply where a corporate entity is capable of acting as a unity, but also where it is possible to ascribe injustice to a universal itself. People who are angry at colonialism or pollution surely apprehend these universals as unjust. The anger will doubtless be provoked by particular instances of injustice, but these injustices will be ascribed to the universal itself.

Aquinas's treatment of anger encompasses a great combination of affections. Anger arises due to a person having undergone some sorrow, who then has the desire and hope for revenge. This desire for revenge is a desire for the good of justice. When we consider that there may also be a fear of greater injustice if the wrong is not set right, and the need to overcome difficulty in addressing the evil, requiring daring, we can see that each of the other ten affections is potentially at play in the affection of anger. Aquinas acknowledges this complexity to anger when he explains that the object of anger is both good and evil, and notes that it is a passion somewhat composed from contrary passions.[178]

CONCLUSION

The purpose of this first section of the chapter was to see whether we can conclude that for each passion of the soul there is an equivalent affection of the will. We certainly can make that conclusion. Even for the few passions where Aquinas makes no explicit statement that there is an equivalent affection, it is evident from the study of apprehension and movement in the other passions that each movement of the sensitive appetite has a like equivalent in the rational appetite.

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[177] *ST* I-II 46.7 ad 3: "Cum autem tota civitas nos laeserit, tota civitas computatur sicut unum singulare."

[178] *ST* I-II 46.2: "passio quodammodo composita ex contrariis passionibus." See also *ST* I-II 46.1 ad 2: "ex hoc ipso quod ira causatur ex contrariis passionibus, scilicet a spe, quae est boni, et a tristitia, quae est mali, includit in seipsa contrarietatem, et ideo non habet contrarium extra se."

We are better placed now to answer the question, sometimes floated, of why Aquinas did not write a separate treatise on the affections.[179] The answer, I suggest, is that any such treatise would be derivative of the treatise on the passions. He reminds us regularly, including among his first questions on the passions (*ST* I-II 22.3), that there are like movements of the intellectual appetite without passion. He sometimes even elaborates on what the relevant affection is. One could lament that he did not provide more examples along the way of objects of intellectual affection, but Aquinas never does all the work for the reader. He is even sparing with examples for the movements of the sensitive appetite. The better approach is precisely the one that he has taken: to start with what is more familiar and more fully experienced—the passions—and explain the affections by analogy.

This tour through the passions and affections has been limited to the eleven core passions. These, though, are only the building blocks of affectivity. Among the eleven passions themselves, there are some that are composites; aversion presupposes hatred, for example, and hope presupposes desire. Other passions and affections exist which are defined either according to their object or their intensity. The question is, is there any such affection that would merit closer attention, given its role in Aquinas's texts and in the moral life? That is what I consider in the next section of this chapter.

[179] Miner, "*Affectus* and *passio*," 129.

SECTION 2 – THE AFFECTION OF WONDER

1. What is wonder?

There is no single question or article of the *Summa Theologiae* or other texts that Aquinas devotes to explaining the nature of wonder. We must instead gather his thought as we find it scattered throughout his texts, such as in his question on whether wonder is a cause of pleasure (*ST* I-II.32.8). It becomes clear as we do so that there are varieties of wonder, each of which is composed of other affections of the will. It pays therefore to be cautious towards treating any of Aquinas's statements about wonder as exhaustive definitions.

We may begin with *ST* III.15.8, which asks whether there was wonder in Christ. The article appears amid a discussion of Christ's possible defects of soul, including whether he experienced passions such as sorrow, fear, and anger. Aquinas devotes a further article to the affection (*affectus*) of wonder. The first two objections introduce the main authorities that he repeatedly draws upon in his treatment of wonder. The first is Aristotle, who states in his *Metaphysics* that "wonder is caused from the fact that someone sees an effect and is ignorant of the cause."[180] The second is John Damascene, who defines wonder as "fear resulting from the imagination of something great."[181] The substance of the objections is that in Christ there were no limitations such as ignorance that should have led him to wonder. In the *sed contra* Aquinas recalls that Jesus wondered at (*miratus est*) the words of the centurion in chapter 8 of the Gospel of Matthew.

Aquinas resolves the Christological objections by distinguishing between the different kinds of knowledge in Christ. There was no wonder in his divine, beatific, and infused knowledge. In his empiric knowledge, however, he could encounter things that were new and unusual, like the faith of the centurion.[182] Aquinas clarifies that when Christ marvels at the greatness of the centurion's faith, it is because it is great with respect to others, not with respect to Christ himself.[183] This response is not the mere clever manoeuvre it may seem to be at first

[180] *ST* III 15.8 obj 1: "admiratio causatur ex hoc quod aliquis videt effectum et ignorat causam."
[181] *ST* III 15.8 obj 2: "admiratio est timor ex magna imaginatione."
[182] *ST* III 15.8: "admiratio proprie est de novo aliquo insolito."
[183] *ST* III 15.8 ad 2: "Christus admirabatur de fide centurionis non ea ratione quod esset magna quantum ad ipsum, sed quia erat magna quantum ad alios."

sight. Admiring relative greatness is a common enough occurrence. A professional violinist admiring the excellence of a six-year-old beginner, and a primary teacher admiring the understanding of a gifted student, are both admiring with reference to the capabilities of the children's peers, not the adults' own capabilities.[184] Far from diminishing the importance of Christ's wonder, Aquinas states rather that Christ assumed this affection for our instruction, to teach us to wonder in the same way.[185] The sources in this article all become recurrent authorities for three varieties of wonder. From Aristotle we have the connection of wonder with ignorance of a cause. From Damascene, wonder as a kind of fear in the presence of something great. The biblical source suggests another variety, which is to wonder *at* something.

Aquinas uses the same word, *admiratio*, for all these varieties. Evidently, they have something in common that permits the same word to be used for all of them. To distinguish them, however, I have chosen to translate the three varieties respectively as *philosophical wonder*, *admiration*, and *awe*, while using the word *wonder* as the umbrella term for all three.[186] This approach is consistent with contemporary philosophical and psychological research, where scholars must first define the emotion in question and distinguish it from similar emotions. Is the object of research wonder or awe? Astonishment or puzzlement? And what of surprise, stupor, or curiosity? Many scholars resolve the difficulty by presenting wonder as a family of experiences with many members, and then making appropriate distinctions as needed.[187] It seems from the range of ways in which Aquinas employs

[184] The analogy does not break down if their admiration is with reference to their own capabilities at the same age, because the comparison is still with another child.

[185] *ST* III 15.8: "Et assumpsit hunc affectum ad nostram instructionem, ut scilicet doceat esse mirandum quod etiam ipse mirabatur."

[186] I follow here the divisions made by Guy Godin, who divides *admiratio* into three groups: *l'admiration*, *l'admiration-louange*, and another unnamed group which is *admiratio* as a species of fear: Guy Godin, "La notion d'admiration," *Laval théologique et philosophique* 17, no. 1 (1961), 48-63.

[187] Anders Schinkel comments that wonder is a family of experiences with many members: "Wonder, Mystery, and Meaning," *Philosophical Papers* 48, no. 2 (July 2019), 294. See also Sophia Vasalou's discussion of wonder, awe, amazement, and surprise in *Wonder: A Grammar*, (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2015), 27-29. She comments: ""Wonder" itself would seem to carry a commitment, a shade of deeper, more positive feeling and indeed a more enduring effect, that "astonishment" and even "amazement"—while lacking the brevity of "surprise"—do not involve, though its freight would seem lighter than the one carried by awe." Vasalou, *Wonder*, 28.

admiratio that he adopted the same approach. When he comments at one point that not every kind of wonder is a species of fear, it is implicit that wonder comes in many forms.[188]

2. Philosophical wonder

We have seen that philosophical wonder arises from the apprehension of an effect where one does know its cause. In the *De Potentia*, Aquinas adds another requirement: a difference in what we perceive from what we should expect to perceive.[189] This second requirement explains what elicits a movement of the appetite. There might be many effects that we observe daily whose cause we do not know, yet we do not wonder about them, nor perhaps do we particularly care. It is the difference in perception from what one expects that attracts our attention and leads us to wonder about a cause.

Aquinas's fullest account of philosophical wonder is in his commentary on the *Metaphysics*, where Aristotle gives wonder pride of place as the beginning of philosophy. To escape from ignorance, philosophers pursue knowledge, first about obvious causal problems and then about more hidden ones.[190] Aquinas does not explicitly connect wonder with desire in this text. Given, though, that Aristotle begins the *Metaphysics* with, "All men naturally desire to know", we may infer that what drives the search for causes is the affection of desire.[191] In the *Summa Theologiae* there is no need for inference, as Aquinas is explicit about the role of desire. There he describes wonder as arising from the natural desire to know the cause when considering an effect.[192] The following is a representative text: "wonder is a certain desire for knowledge which takes hold of a man when he sees an effect and is ignorant of the cause,

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[188] See *ST* I-II 41.4 ad 4: "non quaelibet admiratio et stupor sunt species timoris, sed admiratio quae est de magno malo, et stupor qui est de malo insolito."

[189] *DP*, q. 6, a. 2, co.: "quorum unum est, quod causa illius quod admiramur, sit occulta; secundum est quod in eo quod miramur, appareat aliquid per quod videatur contrarium eius debere esse quod miramur."

[190] *In Met*., Bk I, lect. 3: "Quod autem ignorantiam fugere quaerant, patet ex hoc, quia illi, qui primo philosophati sunt, et qui nunc philosophantur, incipiunt philosophari propter admirationem alicuius causae: aliter tamen a principio, et modo: quia a principio admirabantur dubitabilia pauciora, quae magis erant in promptu, ut eorum causae cognoscerentur: sed postea ex cognitione manifestorum ad inquisitionem occultorum paulatim procedentes incoeperunt dubitare de maioribus et occultioribus."

[191] *In Met*., Bk I, lect. 1: "Omnes homines natura scire desiderant." The requirement of desire to know the hidden cause helps us to distinguish wonder from surprise. A difference in perception from what one expected will evoke surprise, but the reason for the difference may be immediately evident, or the surprised person may have no desire to know the hidden cause. Wonder implies the desire to know why the surprising thing happened.

[192] *ST* I 12.1: "Inest enim homini naturale desiderium cognoscendi causam, cum intuetur effectum; et ex hoc admiratio in hominibus consurgit."

when the cause has such an effect that it exceeds his knowledge or capacity."[193] This place of desire in wonder is a critical point of difference from the thought of a later writer on wonder, René Descartes, who gives wonder first place in his treatment of the passions. The object of wonder is one that takes us by surprise, or that is very different from what we had known previously.[194] Because this can happen before we know whether the object is fitting or suitable for us or not, Descartes sees wonder as the first passion of all.[195] For Aquinas, wonder presumes a desire for knowledge, and any further apprehension of an object as good or bad is impossible without first having this desire.

After offering the preceding definition, Aquinas goes on to explain that wonder causes delight. How can wonder be delightful if its precondition is the evil of ignorance? In response, Aquinas shifts focus from ignorance to knowledge. The delight of wonder comes from the desire of learning the hidden cause. This desire then brings delight, since it includes a hope of obtaining that desired knowledge, and inasmuch as the wonderer delights in learning something new.[196] The affection of philosophical wonder is therefore a composite of three affections: the desire itself, the hope of the desire being realised, and delight. Is there possibly a fourth affection at play? Aquinas gives brief attention to the role of fear in philosophical wonder, though its role is more important than the space allotted to it would suggest. In his article on John Damascene's six species of fear (*ST* I-II.41.4), he raises the objection that wonder cannot be a species of fear, because fear moves one more towards flight than inquiry.[197] In response, he notes that a person wondering about something flees at

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[193] *ST* I-II 32.8: "Est autem admiratio desiderium quoddam sciendi, quod in homine contingit ex hoc quod videt effectum et ignorat causam, vel ex hoc quod causa talis effectus excedit cognitionem aut facultatem ipsius."

[194] "Lors que la premiere rencontre de quelque objet nous surprent, et que nous le jugeons estre nouveau, ou fort different de ce que nous connoissions auparavant, ou bien de ce que nous supposions qu'il devoit estre, cela fait que nous l'admirons et en sommes estonnez." René Descartes, *Passions de l'ame*, in *Oeuvres de Descartes*, ed. Charles Adam and Paul Tannery, 291-497, vol. 11 (Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1974), Article LIII.

[195] "Et pour ce que cela peut arriver avant que nous connoissions aucunement si cet objet nous est convenable, ou s'il ne l'est pas, il me semble que l'Admiration est la premiere de toutes les passions". Descartes, *Passions de l'ame*, Article LIII.

[196] *ST* I-II 32.8 ad 1: "admiratio non est delectabilis inquantum habet ignorantiam, sed inquantum habet desiderium addiscendi causam; et inquantum admirans aliquid novum addiscit, scilicet talem esse quem non aestimabat."

[197] *ST* I-II 41.4 obj 5: "Timor autem non movet ad inquirendum, sed magis ad fugiendum. Ergo admiratio non est species timoris."

first from forming a judgement, fearing deficiency (*timens defectum*), but in the future he does inquire. Aquinas contrasts this with the affection of stupor, where one fears both to judge at present and to inquire in the future. He concludes that whereas wonder is the beginning of philosophical research, stupor is an impediment to it.[198]

This could suggest that philosophical wonder is composed of two movements, flight and approach. Must it be that way? And does fear remain integral to philosophical wonder, or is it an affection that wonder leaves behind? At first glance, it seems more faithful to Aquinas's explanation to conclude that there is first fear, then the hopeful inquiry, with fear left behind. But this does not seem consistent with the reason for the fear. If I refrain from forming an immediate judgement about a cause, through fear of my defective judgement, my fear should persist so long as I am ignorant of the cause, irrespective of the fact that I am searching for the cause and hoping to find it.[199] The point is clearer if we add further consequences to the error. A space engineer who watches a shuttle disintegrate will surely baulk at explaining the failure on the spot. The consequences of error are too great to form an immediate judgement. If his judgement is erroneous even after inquiry into a cause, not only is he still ignorant of the cause, but he is ignorant of his ignorance. Even as the engineer searches for the cause and draws closer to a conclusion, he may still conclude wrongly, and so the same lot may befall the next shuttle. There is therefore a greater role for fear in philosophical wonder than simply being a first hurdle to be jumped.

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[198] *ST* I-II 41.4 ad 5: "Unde admiratio est principium philosophandi, sed stupor est philosophicae considerationis impedimentum."

[199] Louis-Émile Blanchet comments: "Forasmuch as the cause of a phenomenon or of an effect escapes it, as long as every explanation fails, the intelligence is faced with the unknown, which easily takes on a mysterious tinge; it feels powerless, overtaken by something superior to it. This presence of an unknown aspect and of a mysterious element will be able to, in certain circumstances, provoke a certain fear when, notably, the phenomenon itself appears under a terrifying aspect that the observer will be inclined to interpret as a threat to its safety." "Simples réflexions sur le désir de connaître," *Laval théologique et philosophique* 27, no. 1 (1971), 17. "Pour autant que la cause d'un phénomène ou d'un effet lui échappe, aussi longtemps que toute explication fait défaut, l'intelligence se trouve en face de l'inconnu qui se colore facilement de mystérieux, elle se sent impuissante, dépassée par quelque chose de supérieur à elle. Cette présence d'un aspect inconnu et d'un élément mystérieux pourra, dans certaines circonstances, provoquer une certaine crainte lorsque, notamment, le phénomène lui-même apparaît sous des dehors terrifiants que l'observateur sera incliné à interpréter comme une menace à sa sécurité." In my view Blanchet is correct, but it is worth clarifying that on Aquinas's account the mysterious unknown provokes fear even before whatever fear is provoked by the (possibly) terrifying and threatening phenomenon itself. The first fear would therefore persist even if there is nothing *per se* terrifying about the phenomenon itself. My example of the space shuttle is intended to show how the two are separate.

If one can be fearful even while advancing with hope towards desired knowledge, then the approach-and-withdrawal image that maps so well the movements of the sensitive appetite is not so applicable in the rational appetite. Guy Godin first tries to preserve this twofold movement, suggesting that wonder is transitory and unstable, oscillating between hope and fear. But "more exactly", he adds, "the act of the rational appetite realises in unity these aspects that are found divided in the passions of the sensitive appetite."[200] In the end, however, hope dominates fear, which is why wonder is characterised by pleasure.[201] Given the difficulty of the search for the cause, it seems better to characterise this hope as daring.[202] At the risk of failing to discover the truth, and therefore continuing in ignorance, a person seeks the truth anyway. Such is the strength of the desire that accompanies philosophical wonder.

If philosophical wonder is the delightful, hopeful desire of escaping from ignorance and discovering the hidden cause of an effect, we might query what is left for wonder once we discover the cause. Aquinas takes the motivation of escaping ignorance to its conclusion: that we no longer wonder once we know the hidden cause. Further, it is in fact the very aim of metaphysics that "in knowing causes, we do not wonder at their effects."[203] The geometrician, for example, who knows the explanation for why a diagonal is

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[200] "C'est un acte de nature transitoire et instable, qui oscille entre les deux tendances opposées de la crainte et de l'espoir. Ou plus exactement, l'acte de l'appétit rationnel réalise dans l'unité ces aspects qu'on trouve divisés dans les passions de l'appétit sensible": Godin, "La notion d'admiration," 71.

[201] "Il peut paraître curieux que saint Thomas définisse l'admiration comme une sorte de crainte tout en lui donnant pour effet le plaisir, car l'effet immédiat de la crainte est la tristesse. Mais c'est justement parce que l'espoir domine que, tout compte fait, l'admiration se caractérise par le plaisir" : Godin, "La notion d'admiration," 70-71. With an alternative view, Marie George states that "there is a reason why it is more appropriate to rank wonder as a form of fear, namely, that of the three emotions, the absence of fear poses a greater danger to learning the truth than does the absence of desire and hope; for lack latter two leave one in ignorance, whereas lack of fear leads to error. Those lacking in desire and hope do not generally precipitate and end up in error as do those who lack fear": Marie I. George, "Philosophical Wonder as a Species of Fear: the Position of Thomas Aquinas," *Angelicum* 72, no. 2 (1995), 213-214.

[202] Sophie Vasalou, while not using the term "daring" (rather, "hopeful zeal") takes this approach. She comments: ""Wonder" will be the passion that successfully overcomes this despairing fear through a hopeful zeal, surmounting what moves us *away* from inquiry so that what moves us *toward* prevails … If wonder is pleasurable, that must be seen as an ethical attainment: it is the result of conquering the fear that wonder also harbors through the hope that understanding is nevertheless, despite these obstacles, possible." Vasalou, *Wonder*, 73.

[203] *In Met*., Bk I, lect. 3: "Erit ergo finis huius scientiae in quem proficere debemus, ut causas cognoscentes, non admiremur de earum effectibus."

incommensurable with a side no longer wonders about this.[204] Aquinas makes the same point in other texts, such as with his example of an astronomer before an eclipse:

> We wonder at something when, seeing an effect, we are ignorant of the cause. And because one and the same cause sometimes is known to some and unknown to others, it happens that, seeing at the same time some effect, some wonder and some do not. For an astronomer does not wonder seeing an eclipse of the sun, because he knows the cause, however, someone ignorant of this science must have wonder, not knowing the cause.[205]

The conclusion seems clear: wonder cannot survive the explanation of a cause. Aquinas is surely correct that the astronomer and the layperson do not both gaze at the eclipse wondering *how* it happens, but the idea that astronomers do not wonder when they see an eclipse does not quite ring true. The many accounts of people chasing after eclipses suggests that knowledge of the cause does not dampen the wonder they experience after having viewed multiple eclipses. So in what way does wonder survive after discovery of the cause?

3. Admiration

In an influential article on wonder, Ronald Hepburn lists several ways in which wonder can be compatible with a causal explanation.[206] One way is when the explanation is complex enough not to habituate or condition perception. Geologists may be able to explain why a sudden mass of rock should suddenly appear in a landscape, but the phenomenon still goes against perceptual expectations, so the causal explanation does not dissipate wonder. The same holds for wonder-inducing sensory impressions, like a dazzling sheet of mountain ice. Hepburn explains that in these cases it is not the genesis of the phenomenon that elicits the wonder, but the phenomenon itself.

Hepburn's first point about perceptual expectations is contrary to Aquinas's account of the two elements of philosophical wonder: a hidden cause and a conflict in perceptions. On Aquinas's account, the conflict between perception and expectations only provokes wonder

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[204] *In Met*., Bk I, lect. 3: "Ut geometer non admiratur si diameter sit incommensurabilis lateri. Scit enim causam huius."

[205] *SCG* III 101, n. 1: "Et quia causa una et eadem a quibusdam interdum est cognita et a quibusdam ignota, inde contingit quod videntium simul aliquem effectum, aliqui mirantur et aliqui non mirantur: astrologus enim non miratur videns eclipsim solis, quia cognoscit causam; ignarus autem huius scientiae necesse habet admirari, causam ignorans."

[206] R.W. Hepburn, "The Inaugural Address: Wonder," *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 54 (1980), 9.

as long as the cause remains unknown.[207] This would be open to dispute. Even someone who knows very well how a magic trick is performed may still wonder at the sleight of hand of the performer. Aquinas could well respond, though, that in that case we are talking about a different kind of wonder. Rather than wondering *about* or wondering *why*, we would be wondering *at.*

Hepburn's second example of the mountain ice deals exactly with this other variety of wonder— admiration—and finds clearer affinity in Aquinas's texts. In his *Commentary on Matthew,* Aquinas expands upon the same encounter between Jesus and the centurion that he cites in the *Summa Theologiae*:

> Why does it say, "Jesus wondered"? For wonder does not occur in God, because it does not happen except from ignorance of a cause, which cannot be in God. There is likewise the apprehension of the greatness of an effect, which results from the imagination and phantasm of some great effect, and so can occur even in Christ. Whence "Jesus wondered", that is, considered it great, and this he pointed out to the crowds following.[208]

Aquinas does not pursue here the question of Christ's empirical knowledge as he does when considering the same passage in *ST* III.15.8. He puts altogether to one side the question of Christ's ignorance. There is also no aspect of fear in this kind of wonder; Damascene makes no appearance as an authority in this passage. The sole requirement for wonder to arise in the subject is the perception of greatness in the object.

Aside from the centurion's great faith, what else might be worthy of admiration? First, there are the divine attributes. In an article of the *Summa contra Gentiles,* Aquinas makes the case for meditating on the various excellences of God, as they can be known through his creation. He argues that this is how we are able to wonder at and consider the divine wisdom and the great power of God.[209] Elsewhere, in his *Commentary on Romans,* he turns to this verse from

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[207] *DP,* q. 6 a. 2 co.: "Secundum se autem aliquid est mirum vel admirabile, cuius causa simpliciter est occulta, et quando in re est contraria dispositio secundum naturam effectui qui apparet."

[208] *In Matt*., cap. 8, lect, 2: "Sed quid est quod dicit admiratus est? Quia admiratio non cadit in Deo; quia non fit nisi ex ignorantia causae, quae non potest esse in Deo. Item est apprehensio magnitudinis effectus, quod fit ex imaginatione et phantasia alicuius effectus magni, et sic potest cadere etiam in Christo: unde admiratus est, idest magnum reputavit, et hoc turbis sequentibus ostendit."

[209] *SCG* II 2, n. 2: "Primo quidem, quia ex factorum meditatione divinam sapientiam utcumque possumus admirari et considerare." The other reasons are that we are inflamed with a love of God's goodness, and that we receive a likeness to God's perfection.

St Paul: "O the depth of the riches and wisdom and knowledge of God! How unsearchable are his judgments and how inscrutable his ways!" (Rom 11:33). Here Aquinas points to the divine wisdom itself as an object of wonder, as well as the excellence of divine knowledge in its depth, fullness, and perfection.[210]

Aquinas also allows for admiration at human excellence. Without giving specific examples, he provides a basic distinction between wonder and love in the presence of human excellence. While noting that it is pleasant to be loved and admired by others, Aquinas observes that, "love is for something good, and wonder is for something great."[211] It seems we could apply this quasi-aphorism to anything great, anything worthy of praise. But the connection with love prompts a question: why is the affection of admiration not simply a more intense form of love? Is there such a difference between good and great that it elicits a different affection? Here we can return to the principle that differences in affections are attributable to differences in apprehension. Jean-Paul Audet points out that even though the rising and setting of the sun hardly astonish us anymore, we are not impermeable to wonders in the sky: the least curious among us will look up at a meteor.[212] But would everyone look up if there were meteors in the sky every night? On Aquinas's view, we would not, because then they would be common, and the extra ingredient necessary for us to apprehend an object as great, rather than good, is that the object should have some rarity about it. Aquinas opens his reply in the question about wonder in Christ with this insistence on rarity: "Wonder is properly about what is new and unusual."[213] He expands on this requirement when discussing the reasons behind the ceremonial precepts of the Old Testament, pertaining to holy things like the temple, tabernacle coverings, and candlesticks.[214] His response is that we revere less

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[210] *In Rom.*, cap. 11, lect. 5.

[211] *ST* I-II 32.5: "amor est alicuius boni, et admiratio est alicuius magni." Aquinas's connection of admiration with greatness would exclude the possibility that this variety of wonder could be evoked by something exceptionally bad. So also Hepburn is right to suggest that we can wonder at the brain of Mozart, but not at cancer cells proliferating in a child's brain, because wonder presupposes value in the object: Hepburn, "Wonder", 11-12.

[212] "Le lever et le coucher du soleil ne nous étonnent plus guère …. Il va de soi, néanmoins, que nous ne sommes pas imperméables. Qu'un météore s'allume dans la nuit et le moins curieux d'entre nous lèvera la tête, s'arrêtera." Jean-Paul Audet, *Admiration religieuse et désir de savoir* (Montréal: Institute d'Études Médiévales, 1962), 13.

[213] *ST* III 15.8: "admiratio proprie est de novo aliquo insolito."

[214] *ST* I-II 102.4

those things that are common and indistinct from others, but we admire and revere more those things that have some excellence separating them from others.[215] Hence the special seasons, dwellings, vessels, and ministers ordained for the worship of God.

The condition of rarity means that if that which was worthy of wonder is stripped of its rarity, it is reduced to the common, and so no longer excites wonder. When there are hundreds of works by Grand Masters in a European art gallery, they do not individually have the impact on the viewer that they would if there were only five such works. In this case, the object itself has become less common, but the same object can also become familiar to one's subjective apprehension. Gregory the Great had earlier made this observation in his *Moralia*, commenting that incomprehensible wonders become worthless to human eyes that are accustomed to them.[216] He gives the examples of daily marvels such as the birth of children, the growth of trees and grain, and the production of wine:

> All wondered seeing water once turned into wine; every day the moisture of the earth, drawn to the root of the vine, by the grape is turned to wine, and no one wonders. Wonderful therefore are all things that men neglect to wonder at, because towards closely considering things, as we have said, they have grown numb.[217]

Ralph Waldo Emerson noted the same in his short essay *Nature*, by way of a creative thought-experiment: "If the stars should appear one night in a thousand years, how would men believe and adore; and preserve for many generations the remembrance of the city of God which had been shown! But every night come out these envoys of beauty, and light the universe with their admonishing smile."[218] We could conclude from these observations that the familiar is the enemy of wonder. Yet all is not lost if would still wish to admire everyday

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[215] *ST* I-II 102.4: "Habet autem hoc humanus affectus, ut ea quae communia sunt, et non distincta ab aliis, minus revereatur; ea vero quae habent aliquam excellentiae discretionem ab aliis, magis admiretur et revereatur."

[216] "sed tamen mirari negligimus, quia ea quae incomprehensibili indagatione mira sunt, humanis oculis usu viluerunt." Gregory the Great, *Moralia in Iob libri I-X*, Corpus Christianorum Series Latina 143, edited by Mark Adriaen (Turnhout: Brepols, 1979), 296.

[217] "Quid ergo est difficile, ut puluis in membra redeat, dum conditoris potentiam cotidie cernimus, qui et ex grano ligna mirabiliter et adhuc mirabilius fructus ex lignis creat? Dicat ergo : *Qui facit magna et inscrutabilia, et mirabilia absque numero*, quia diuinorum operum magnitudo nec ex qualitate ualet discuti, nec ex quantitate numerari." Gregory, *Moralia in Iob*, 297. It is no refutation of Gregory to point out that parents marvel at the birth of their own children. Were the birth of children to come to a pause, wonder at a single birth would be widespread well beyond the parents involved.

[218] Emerson, "Nature", 5.

wonders, as Anders Schinkel notes: "Wonder as often as not concerns the familiar; it defamiliarises the familiar, making it appear in a new light, as if seen for the first time."[219] Patrick Sherry makes a similar point. He cites G.K. Chesterton's observation that the object of the artistic and spiritual life is to dig for a "submerged sunrise of wonder; so that a man sitting in a chair might suddenly understand that he was actually alive, and be happy."[220] Sherry comments:

> I do not think that such an account contradicts the common-sense assumption that wonder is directed only at the extraordinary, for we are being encouraged to look at the ordinary with new eyes and so to regard it as being extraordinary and even as exciting. There is the fascination of the known as well as of the unknown.[221]

To my knowledge, Aquinas does not explicitly refer to this experience of seeing familiar things anew, but it is by no means inconsistent with his thought, provided that we recall that apprehension precedes affection. To be able to look at the ordinary with new eyes requires being receptive to the possibility that there is more about the object than one may have noticed so far; that is, there is more to apprehend, or a different way of apprehending it.

4. Awe

The third variety of wonder appears makes a brief appearance in the treatise on the passions, in the same article that Aquinas devotes to John Damascene's species of fear (*ST* I-II 41.4). The fear in this variety of wonder, which I call *awe*, is different from the fear of falling into error when seeking the cause of an effect. Aquinas speaks here instead of a fear that arises when "an external thing exceeds man's faculty of resistance by reason of its magnitude; namely, when someone considers some great evil of which he is unable to consider a solution, and so there is awe (*admiratio*)."[222] A similar definition comes later in his discussion of contemplation: "Awe (*admiratio*) is a species of fear following the

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[219] Anders Schinkel, "The Educational Importance of Deep Wonder," *Journal of Philosophy of Education* 51, no. 2 (2017), 543.

[220] Patrick Sherry, "The Varieties of Wonder," *Philosophical Investigations* 36, no. 4 (2013), 347-348.

[221] Patrick Sherry, "The Varieties of Wonder," 348.

[222] *ST* I-II 41.4: "ratione suae magnitudinis, cum scilicet aliquis considerat aliquod magnum malum, cuius exitum considerare non sufficit. Et sic est admiratio."

apprehension of something exceeding our faculties. Thus awe is an act following contemplation of the sublime truth."[223]

From these extracts we can distil the two necessary elements for the affection of awe: the presence of something great, whether a great good or a great evil, and the awareness of one's inability to comprehend it (or more colloquially, "to take it all in"). These elements allow us to distinguish awe from admiration. Both affections arise in the presence of something great, but awe can also follow something apprehended as an evil, like a tsunami.[224] The object may also be a great good, in which case it is the second element, the inability to comprehend, that distinguishes awe from admiration. The awareness that the object is beyond our comprehension is what elicits fear.[225] Whether we experience the affection of awe as good or bad will depend on the presence of other affections, such as love and joy in the presence of a good, or hatred and sorrow in the presence of an evil.

Aquinas's account of awe is consistent with Dacher Keltner and Jonathan Haidt's thesis that there are two elements in prototypical cases of awe: vastness and accommodation. Vastness refers to "anything that is experienced as being much larger than the self, or the self's ordinary level of experience or frame of reference."[226] It can refer to physical size, but also to social awe, when we become aware of our littleness in the presence of people that we

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[223] *ST* II-II 180.3 ad 3: "admiratio est species timoris consequens apprehensionem alicuius rei excedentis nostram facultatem. Unde admiratio est actus consequens contemplationem sublimis veritatis."

[224] Aquinas comments in the *Commentary on John* that we wonder at what is unusual and great, whether this be good or evil: "non ea quae frequenter fiunt, et secundum communem modum miramur; sed insolita et ardua, sive bona, sive mala sint, admiramur. Nam insolita bona et ardua admiramur … admiramur etiam ardua mala." *In Ioan*., cap. 9, lect. 3. The context is the blind man of John 9 marvelling at the Pharisees' hardness of heart. To wonder at an unusual and great evil could only fall under the affection of awe or philosophical wonder, not admiration, for example when we wonder, or more usually "marvel", at extraordinary stupidity, or a particularly bad artistic performance.

[225] The presence of fear in the affection of awe is evident in the experience of people before an eclipse. Kate Russo comments: "many natural events can elicit awe in people. However, there is something qualitatively different about the awe experience during say, a sunset, and the experience of totality. Perhaps it is the presence of primal fear, that feeling of 'wrongness' that makes eclipse chasers feel under threat. Perhaps it is the intensity of the euphoria that is felt during totality—our brains are being flooded with feel-good hormones that make it a natural high, but more so than other experiences that also elicit awe. Perhaps it is because the experience is immersive and alive. It would follow that anyone wanting to research the awe experience can easily do this with eclipse chasers, as awe is central to the totality experience and eclipse chasers experience awe repeatedly." *Total Addiction: The Life of an Eclipse Chaser* (Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag, 2012), doi: 10.1007/978-3-642-30481-1, 62.

[226] Dacher Keltner and Jonathan Haidt, "Approaching awe, a moral, spiritual, and aesthetic emotion." *Cognition and Emotion* 17, no. 2 (2003), 303.

perceive as great due to their fame, authority, or prestige.[227] Keltner and Haidt point out that symbolic markers such as a lavish office can trigger this sense of vastness. The second element, accommodation, refers to the process of "adjusting mental structures when they cannot assimilate a new experience."[228] They go on to summarise awe as follows: "We propose that prototypical awe involves a challenge to or negation of mental structures when they fail to make sense of an experience of something vast."[229] Aquinas anticipated both these elements in the brief accounts of awe that we have already seen—the greatness of the object, and the object being beyond our faculties.

Aquinas's grasp of the affection of awe and its effects is most evident in his *Commentary on Job*. The biblical text itself provides multiple instances of objects that inspire wonder and awe, particularly as the book reaches its denouement where Job confesses his ignorance before the wisdom of God. In Eliud's speech, spanning chapters 32-37, he explicitly urges Job to stand still and consider the wonders of God (37:14). He lists instances of wonder in creation (thunder, snow, whirlwinds), which cause in Eliud himself a trembling heart (37:1). Eliud's reasoning, says Aquinas, is that God in his excellence exceeds our knowledge: "no one is so wise that his knowledge is not greatly exceeded by the excellence of divine clarity."[230] We cannot know God except through his works, which are infinitely removed from the excellence of his essence, and yet we do not even know these works perfectly.[231] Eliud's argument is one designed precisely to inspire awe: "He shows the magnitude of God's works, which exceed human reason."[232] When Eliud recounts the greatness of God's justice, Aquinas lists three effects of our apprehension of the greatness of God: we can

[227] Keltner and Haidt, "Approaching awe," 303.
[228] Keltner and Haidt, "Approaching awe," 304.
[229] Keltner and Haidt, "Approaching awe," 304.
[230] *In Iob*, cap. 36: "nullus est adeo sapiens cuius cognitio non multum vincatur ab excellentia claritatis divinae."
[231] *In Iob*, cap. 36: "cognitio hominis longe distat a perfecta comprehensione divinae essentiae, tum quia non potest homo nisi per opera cognoscere quae in infinitum distant ab excellentia essentiae eius, tum quia etiam opera eius perfecte homo non cognoscit."
[232] *In Iob*, cap. 36: "Ostendit autem consequenter magnitudinem operum. Dei quae humanam rationem excedunt."

neither reflect about God sufficiently, nor speak about him sufficiently, and, as a result, praise of God is fearful.[233]

The theme recurs in the Lord's lengthy speech out of the whirlwind from chapter 38 to 41, when he recounts the marvels of his creation in earth, sea, and sky, and questions Job about them. The aim of the speech is for Job to realise his ignorance. If Job cannot even explain the effects in creation that he can perceive with his senses, how much less is he equipped to inquire into matters beyond the senses?[234] The constant theme of this *tour-de-force* is the excellence and magnitude of the wonders in creation that exceed human reason: "And from all these things it is given to be understood that your reason fails in comprehension of divine works."[235]

These two speeches appeal primarily to awe, but in fact to all three varieties of the affection of wonder. First, they alert Job to his ignorance of the causes behind the effects that he can perceive in creation. Secondly, they impress upon him the excellence of these works. Thirdly, their overall aim is for Job to grasp the vast gap between his comprehension and God's grandeur. The effect is one that is typical of awe: "Job, having heard about so many of the wonders of the divine effects, was stunned and silent."[236]

Being stunned and silent is one effect of awe. Aquinas identifies other effects in the *Commentary on Job*. The first is trembling. Eliphaz relates having trembled when he first heard the word of God during the night: "fear seized me, and trembling, which made all my bones shake." (Job 4:14) Aquinas explains that being struck with fear is a common initial reaction to what is unusual, such as strange revelations, and moreover, the shaking bones

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[233] *In Iob*, cap. 37: "propter suam magnitudinem nec mente cogitare nec ore sufficienter de eo loqui possumus, unde subdit *et enarrari non potest*, scilicet digne ab homine. Et haec est causa quare est eius laudatio formidolosa, unde subdit *ideo timebunt eum viri*, scilicet quantumcumque fortes, propter fortitudinis magnitudinem."

[234] *In Iob*, cap. 38: "quidem interrogatio Dei non est ut addiscat sed ut hominem de sua ignorantia convincat. Interrogat autem ipsum de suis effectibus qui humanis sensibus praesto sunt, quos cum homo ignorare ostenditur multo magis convincitur sublimiorum scientiam non habere."

[235] *In Iob*, cap. 38: "ex his omnibus datur intelligi quod tua ratio deficit a comprehensione divinorum operum."

[236] *In Iob*, cap. 39: "Iob auditis tot mirabilibus divinorum effectuum stupens siluit."

show that the trembling was not superficial, but violent.[237] The second bodily effect is goose bumps, caused by the hairs of the flesh standing on end. Eliphaz relates also having had this reaction in his nocturnal vision: "A spirit glided past me, the hairs of my flesh stood up." (4:14) Aquinas is wholly unsurprised:

> For it is reasonable that, in the presence of one with greater power, the one with lesser power is astounded (*obstupescat*). It is manifest that the power of the spirit is greater than the power of the flesh, and so it is no marvel that the hair of the flesh bristle up in the presence of the spirit, which happens by reason of sudden fear, and especially when the presence of the spirit is felt in some unusual bodily sign, for unusual things usually induce wonder and fear.[238]

The phenomena of trembling and goose bumps, both when someone is afraid as well as in the presence of something powerful, is a familiar example of the overflow into the sensitive appetite of an affection of the will. They further demonstrate, too, the overlap between fear and awe. An object that evokes fear but not awe can lead to trembling and goose bumps. They can, however, also be caused by awe-inspiring objects like speeches and pieces of music.[239]

5. Wonder as an affection of the will

These and other examples of overflow, such as gasps of breath and exclamations, are more likely to arise when one is "struck" with wonder. Beyond this episodic variety, wonder is also capable of being a long-term affection, motivating philosophical research and sustaining an attitude of appreciation towards the world, even towards the fact of the world's existence.

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[237] *In Iob*, cap. 4: "homines enim ad insolita pavere consueverunt, unde quando alicui fiunt insolitae revelationes in principio timorem patiuntur … ad magnificandum huiusmodi tremorem subiungit *et omnia ossa mea perterrita sunt*, quasi dicat: tremor non fuit superficialis sed vehemens."

[238] *In Iob*, cap. 4: "rationabile enim est quod ad praesentiam maioris virtutis minor obstupescat; manifestum est autem virtutem spiritus esse maiorem quam carnis, unde non est mirum si ad praesentiam spiritus carnis pili inhorrescunt quod ex subito timore procedit, et praesertim cum praesentia spiritus aliquo corporali indicio insolito sentitur: quae enim insolita sunt admirationem et timorem inducere solent."

[239] For a study analysing the triggers of goose bumps, see David R. Schurtz, Sarai Blincoe, Richard H. Smith, Caitlin A. J. Powell, David J. Y. Combs, and Sung Hee Kim, "Exploring the social aspects of goose bumps and their role in awe and envy," *Motivation and Emotion* 36 (2012): 205–217. They observe that there is a high variability in the stimuli that cause goose bumps, including also social awe and aesthetic awe. They comment: "When we feel awe, it is likely that the quick physiological response of goose bumps (and the awareness of this response) is often a key piece of initial information that denotes that the unfolding emotion episode is categorically distinct from something invidious and antagonistic. Ultimately, the appraisal process can lead to positively-experienced wonder, respect, and a general attitude of deference to the powerful other's wishes (i.e., awe) rather than an envy-inspired motivation to usurp or undermine the hierarchical status quo." 207

Hepburn terms this "existential wonder", and a "generalized interrogative attitude" towards the sheer existence of the world.[240] Anders Schinkel also describes wonder as capable of being "an enduring, dispositional wonder, wonder as a more or less stable ingredient of one's cognitive–affective composition at any moment in time that it is object-centered."[241]

All varieties of wonder follow the apprehension in the rational appetite of something extraordinary. But if wonder can be prompted by sensory experience, in what sense is it an affection of the will? It is true that the objects that give rise to wonder can be perceived through the senses. But as Guy Godin explains in relation to philosophical wonder, it is not the sensible object as such that is the object of wonder, but the hidden cause that explains the effect.[242] That cause is the intellectual good that stirs the appetite.[243] Godin acknowledges that acts of the sensitive appetite may well accompany the act of the rational appetite, but this reflects the complexity of the movements and the "existential unity" of the agent. Strictly speaking, he concludes, wonder is an act of the rational appetite, because the good in question is of this order, not of the sensitive order.[244]

Philosophical wonder, by which one desires to know a cause, and therefore to know the relations that exist between objects, is evidently a rational desire. The same is true of admiration. The perception of something as great requires the making of rational comparisons with like objects.[245] Likewise, the awe that one experiences before a mountain arises not from

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[240] Hepburn, "Wonder," 10.

[241] Schinkel, "The Educational Importance of Deep Wonder," 38.

[242] "Rien n'empêche toutefois que le fait qui suscite l'admiration soit d'ordre sensible. En effet, dans un phénomène provoquant l'admiration ce n'est pas l'aspect sensible comme tel qui fait l'objet de la recherche, mais la cause cachée qui l'explique. Autrement dit, c'est à propos d'un bien intellectuel que l'appétit est mis en branle par l'admiration, même si un bien ou un mal sensible peuvent s'y joindre." Godin, "La notion d'admiration," 65.

[243] Through this stirring of the appetite, wonder invokes from us a desire to exercise our rationality. Robert Fuller comments: "Just as curiosity propels children to sustain their inquiries into the causal workings of physical reality, wonder is a prime motivating factor in the acquisition of higher-order conceptions of reality. The experience of wonder is characterized by the disruption of previous cognitive schemata. Wonder, then, is an emotional experience that invites us to entertain belief in the existence and causal activity of an order of reality that lies beyond or behind sensory appearances." Robert C. Fuller, *Wonder: From Emotion to Spirituality* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006), 13.

[244] "L'admiration comporte donc un ensemble de mouvements complexes, comme c'est le cas de tout acte vital, en raison de l'unité existentielle du sujet qui pose l'acte. Mais à strictement parler, elle se définit par un acte de l'appétit rationnel, car le bien en cause est de cet ordre." Godin, "La notion d'admiration," 66.

[245] William James comments about the role of perception of relations in admiration, and the overflow into the body: "In every art, in every science, there is the keen perception of certain relations being right or not, and there is the emotional flush and thrill consequent thereupon. And these are two things, not one. In the former of

the size of the mountain, but from the apprehension of one's littleness before it. Awareness of one's inability to comprehend an object demands a self-reflection that is proper to reason.

The fact that wonder pertains to the rational appetite is of the highest importance for Aquinas's Christology. He refutes the Apollinarianist heresy, which held that Christ had a divine mind but not a human mind, by pointing out that wonder cannot be in God, because we wonder at things whose causes we do not know.[246] Wonder also cannot be in the sensitive part of the soul, since it does not inquire into knowing the causes of things. Thus, besides his divinity and a sensitive soul, there must be something else that made it possible for Christ to wonder—a human mind.[247]

Given that wonder is in the rational appetite, it follows that we can dispel wonder through rational calculations that change the way that we apprehend an object. Frank Ramsey, for example, claimed to feel no awe before the stars:

> Where I seem to differ from my friends is in attaching little importance to physical size. I don't feel in the least humble before the vastness of the heavens. The stars may be large, but they cannot think or love; and these are qualities which impress me far more than size does. I take no credit for weighing nearly seventeen stone. My picture of the world is drawn in perspective, and not like a model to scale. The foreground is occupied by human beings and the stars are all as small as threepenny bits. I don't really believe in astronomy, except as a complicated description of part of the course of human and possibly animal sensation.[248]

Ramsey's apparent indifference before an object that usually evokes awe helps us to grasp the dual aspect of wonder as a movement of the will, where the will is both mover and moved. At

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them it is that experts and masters are at home. The latter accompaniments are bodily commotions that they may hardly feel, but that may be experienced in their fulness by cretins and Philistines in whom the critical judgment is at its lowest ebb." James, *What Is an Emotion?* 27.

[246] *SCG* IV 33, n. 5; *ST* III 5.4.

[247] *SCG* IV 33, n. 5: "nec admiratio animae sensitivae competere potest: cum ad animam sensitivam non pertineat sollicitari de cognitione causarum. In Christo autem admiratio fuit, sicut ex Evangeliis probatur: dicitur enim Matth. 8:10, quod *audiens Iesus* verba centurionis *miratus est*. Oportet igitur, praeter divinitatem verbi et animam sensitivam, in Christo aliquid ponere secundum quod admiratio ei competere possit, scilicet mentem humanam. Manifestum est igitur ex praedictis quod in Christo verum corpus humanum et vera anima humana fuit." See also *In Ioan*., cap. 1, lect. 7: "admiratio autem est passio animae rationalis et intellectivae, cum sit desiderium cognoscendi causam occultam effectus visi. Sic igitur, sicut tristitia cogit in Christo ponere partem animae sensitivam, contra Arium, ita admiratio cogit ponere in ipso partem animae intellectivam, contra Apollinarem."

[248] Frank Plumpton Ramsey, *The Foundations of Mathematics and other Logical Essays*, ed. R.B. Braithwaite (Totowa, NJ: Littlefield, Adams & Co., 1965), 291. Lest we doubt Ramsey's sensibility, he went on to say: "Humanity, which fills the foreground of my picture, I find interesting and on the whole admirable. I find, just now at least, the world and pleasant and exciting place." Ramsey, *The Foundations of Mathematics*, 291.

first glance, wonder poses a problem to the notion that the affections of the will can be moved by the will itself. Can someone really choose to wonder? The role of choice is evident first in the fact that the will must consent to being moved by the object. Perhaps through cynicism or laziness, someone can choose not to inquire into causes, or admire excellence, or be in awe of something. But the will can also command these affections. For philosophical wonder, we can deepen our wonder when we go to the limits of our knowledge by choosing to ask questions about why nature is as it is, and to pursue the hidden causes behind effects. For admiration, we can choose to be attentive to a masterpiece, so that we may notice the details and the components of what makes it great. For awe, in trying to answer the same questions put to Job, we can remind ourselves of our smallness before the greatness of creation.

Why, though, would anyone *want* to command the affection of wonder? What is desirable about it? These questions lead us to consider the role that wonder plays in the pursuit of the good.

6. The moral role of wonder

Aquinas's comment that Christ assumed the affection of wonder as an example to us, to wonder at what he himself wondered at, gives a hint of its importance in the moral life.[249] Aside from this, since Aquinas rarely directly addresses the broader role that wonder can play in the moral life, it is left to us to infer this role. As with all affections, wonder requires the moderation of reason to be oriented towards the true good. Philosophical wonder needs the virtue of studiousness, which belongs to temperance and which moderates the desire for knowledge.[250] Otherwise, wonder can descend into the vice of curiosity, which, among other things, takes one away from the study that is a duty.[251] We could extrapolate from this for admiration and awe—if they are motivated by pride or take us from our proper duties, they are not oriented towards our good.

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[249] *ST* III 15.8: "Et assumpsit hunc affectum ad nostram instructionem, ut scilicet doceat esse mirandum quod etiam ipse mirabatur."

[250] *ST* II.II 166.2.

[251] *ST* II.II 167.1: "Uno modo, inquantum per studium minus utile retrahuntur a studio quod eis ex necessitate incumbit."

Wonder could also be, rather than an affection, an affectation. Samuel Butler in *The Way of All Flesh* accuses Felix Mendelssohn of exaggerating his admiration for the Uffizi Gallery, casting glances at the other visitors to see if they had noticed him passing two hours in the same room:

> I wonder how many chalks Mendelssohn gave himself for having sat two hours on that chair. I wonder how often he looked at his watch to see if his two hours were up. I wonder how often he told himself that he was quite as big a gun, if the truth were known, as any of the men whose works he saw before him, how often he wondered whether any of the visitors were recognizing him and admiring him for sitting such a long time in the same chair, and how often he was vexed at seeing them pass him by and take no notice of him. But perhaps if the truth were known his two hours was not quite two hours.[252]

Butler may be very unfair to Mendelssohn, but it is certainly possible to desire that one's admiration be admired. Rudolf Allers makes the same observation in a similarly caustic fashion:

> Certain people seemingly enjoy art, music, or poetry, whereas in truth the only thing they enjoy is their capacity of enjoying. They are, to put it rather crudely, continuously admiring themselves for their understanding of art etc. It is as if they were continuously saying to themselves: "How wonderfully do I appreciate this." And thus, they are focused mainly on themselves and not on the object. This object is to them a mere opportunity for displaying, chiefly before the audience of their own consciousness, their capacity for appreciation.[253]

A further complication to the moral role of wonder is Aquinas's observation that the magnanimous man does not wonder, a point that he adopts from Aristotle. Although it does not seem a stance that he is strongly committed to—he does not refer to it at all in his eight articles on magnanimity in *ST* II-II 129—he does advance it positively in several places, as when he states that the thought of the magnanimous man is for doing great things, so nothing to him seems uncommon.[254] In his commentary on the *Ethics*, he modifies this somewhat, saying that the magnanimous man is not quick to show wonder, and adding a further reason:

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[252] Samuel Butler, *The Way of all Flesh*, (New York: E.P. Dutton & Company, 1915), 18.

[253] Rudolf Allers, "The Cognitive Aspect of Emotions," *The Thomist* 4, no. 4 (1942), 637.

[254] *In II Sent*., d. 42, q. 2, a. 4, arg. 4: "magnanimo omnia parva videntur, non quia bona aliorum despiciat, sed quia nihil est in humanis actibus quod tamquam insolitum admiretur, cum cogitatio sua sit ad faciendum maxima quaeque."

that the life of the magnanimous man is turned towards the great goods of the inner life.[255] The point is that the magnanimous man is concerned with the goods of the soul, and so judges external goods by reference to the goods of the soul. In practice, this means that one may indeed admire someone else's excellence in a profession, sport, or art, but will also recognise that there are far more important concerns: how that person treats others, whether the person is humble and grateful, how the ability functions in the rest of the person's life, whether the excellence is in fact worthy of the effort that has evidently been given to it. The magnanimous man is not easily impressed, because he allows these deeper perspectives to temper his admiration.

Despite these caveats, wonder displays a positive orientation of the appetite towards creation. It is an affection by which we seek and appreciate the good, and are even captivated by it. This means that wonder is intertwined with other affections that are also acts of the appetite. We could elaborate upon many of these possible connections, such as the effects of wonder on the virtues of compassion, gentleness, kindness, and generosity.[256] There are four areas, however, where Aquinas himself notes a positive connection with wonder: humility, wisdom, contemplation, and reverence.

6.1. Humility

Aquinas presents humility as the virtue by which we restrain ourselves from being borne towards that which is above us, for which reason we must know our disproportion to what exceeds our capacity.[257] From this explanation, the relationship between awe and humility is immediately evident, given that awe follows the apprehension of one's littleness before the

[255] *In Ethica*, Bk 4, lect. 10: "magnanimus non est promptus ad admirandum, quia admiratio est de rebus magnis, sed magnanimo non est aliquid magnum eorum quae exterius occurrere possunt, quia tota intentio sua versatur circa interiora bona quae sunt vere magna."

[256] For a summary of research into effects of awe including connectedness, positive mood and well-being, life satisfaction, and pro-social effects, see Summer Allen, "The Science of Awe," (Berkeley: Greater Good Science Center, 2018), 24-37. Ronald Hepburn also identifies affinities between wonder and compassion, gentleness and humility. He comments that there is "a close affinity between the attitude of wonder itself—non-exploitative, non-utilitarian—and attitudes that seek to affirm and respect other-being": Hepburn, "Wonder", 15.

[257] *ST* II-II 161.2: "ad humilitatem proprie pertinet ut aliquis reprimat seipsum, ne feratur in ea quae sunt supra se. Ad hoc autem necessarium est ut aliquis cognoscat id in quo deficit a proportione eius quod suam virtutem excedit. Et ideo cognitio proprii defectus pertinet ad humilitatem sicut regula quaedam directiva appetitus." It was, in fact, Mendelssohn's observation of the Tribune at the Uffizi Gallery that "This is a spot where a man feels his own insignificance and may well learn to be humble" that prompted Butler's response: *The Way of all Flesh*, 18.

greatness of the object. Godin describes awe as "the first antidote to pride", which allows one to submit to the excellence of truth.[258] From the humbled response of Job after the shock-and-awe discourses, to the sense of smallness that many express before phenomena such as eclipses, humility is one of awe's most obvious effects.[259] One could even take Aquinas's observation that "humility makes a man give little weight to himself following the consideration of his own deficiency", replace the word "humility" with "awe", and it would remain consistent with his portrayal of awe in the *Commentary on Job*.[260]

Philosophical wonder also provokes humility, since one must first acknowledge one's ignorance before searching for hidden causes. The fear of deficiency (*timens defectum*) that wonder evokes creates precisely the knowledge of one's deficiency (*cognitio propria defectus*) that pertains to humility.[261] Admiration can also lead to humility, given that admiration directs attention away from oneself. Several authors emphasise this selflessness of wonder. John Dewey comments:

> It is directed outward; it can find its satisfaction only in an outgoing activity of self. Intellectual feeling, considered in this aspect, is *wonder*. Wonder is the attitude which the emotional nature spontaneously assumes in front of a world of objects. The feeling is utterly incomprehensible as a purely personal or selfish feeling.[262]

Ronald Hepburn likewise argues that "the attitude of wonder is notably and essentially *other-acknowledging*."[263] Acknowledging greatness in something other than oneself aids in the task—essential to humility—of keeping one's self-assessment in proportion.[264]

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[258] "Dans l'ordre de la connaissance, la crainte admirative est donc le premier antidote de l'orgueil." Guy Godin, "L'admiration, principe de la recherche philosophique," *Laval théologique et philosophique* 17, no. 2 (1961), 240.

[259] Kate Russo cites multiple accounts of people's experiences before eclipses. A common theme is a feeling of insignificance. She observes, though: "Our eclipse chasers are united in their accounts that the realisation of insignificance during totality is not a negative experience. It is not a feeling that they do not matter in this world as a person. Instead it seems to result in a strengthened feeling and one where you realise that you are not alone." Russo, *Total Addiction*, 132.

[260] *ST* II-II 129.3 ad 4: "Humilitas autem facit quod homo seipsum parvipendat secundum considerationem proprii defectus." For a survey of studies showing a relationship between awe and a sense of "the small self", see Allen, "The Science of Awe," 26-28.

[261] *ST* II-II 161.2: "ad humilitatem proprie pertinet ut aliquis reprimat seipsum, ne feratur in ea quae sunt supra se. Ad hoc autem necessarium est ut aliquis cognoscat id in quo deficit a proportione eius quod suam virtutem excedit."

[262] John Dewey, "Psychology," in *The Early Works of John Dewey, 1882-1898, vol. 2* (1887; reis., London: Carbondale and Edwardsville, 1967), 261-262.

[263] Hepburn, "Wonder", 14. See also Fuller, "Spirituality in the Flesh," 39.

[264] The relationship has also been subject to empirical testing. See Jennifer E. Stellar et al, "Awe and Humility," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 114, no. 2 (2018): 258–269.

6.2. Wisdom

The second relationship is between wonder and wisdom. Aquinas holds that if we consider God's creation, we are wondering at the wisdom of God, since his wisdom is spread in a communication of his likeness through his works.[265] This would be true of all three varieties of wonder, which are concerned with relations and proportions between things, the knowledge of which is necessary for the ordering of things that is proper to wisdom.[266] Given that wisdom is the knowledge of causes, and philosophical wonder is the affection by which we desire to know causes, the connection between philosophical wonder and wisdom is fundamental.[267] The affection of admiration aids us in knowing what makes an object stand out from similar objects on account of its excellence. Awe gives us a sense of the greatness of an object, but also the apprehension of how we relate to the object, in our smallness before the object's magnitude.

In all varieties of wonder, the fact that the objects engage the affections, even sometimes to the extent of overflow to the senses, means that the causality and relations that we apprehend make a greater impression upon us. Through wonder, the gap that emerges between expectations and reality helps us to avoid being satisfied with our present grasp of reality, and to remain instead receptive to further knowledge and experience of goodness. This receptivity suggests that, if we have a knowledge of causes and a habit of seeking causes, we would be

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http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/pspi0000109. Paul K. Piff et al, "Awe, the Small Self, and Prosocial Behavior," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 108, no. 6 (2015), 883-899. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/pspi0000018.

[265] *SCG* II 2, n. 2: "ex factorum consideratione divinam sapientiam colligere possumus, sicut in rebus factis per quandam communicationem suae similitudinis sparsam."

[266] "To order is for the wise man to do. For the ordering of things cannot be done unless through knowledge of the condition and proportion of the things being ordered to each other, and to something higher, which is their end; for the order of things to each other is on account of their order to the end." *SCG* II 24, n. 4: "ordinare sapientis est: ordinatio enim aliquorum fieri non potest nisi per cognitionem habitudinis et proportionis ordinatorum ad invicem, et ad aliquid altius eius, quod est finis eorum; ordo enim aliquorum ad invicem est propter ordinem eorum ad finem."

[267] *In Met.*, Bk I, lect. 2: "Philosophus ostendit quod sapientia sit quaedam scientia circa causas existens. For a comparison of Aquinas and Descartes on wisdom and wonder, see Jason Nehez, "In Pursuit of True Wisdom: How the Re-Emergence of Classical Wonder Should Replace Descartes's Neo-Averrostic Sophistry," *Studia Gilsoniana* 9, no. 2 (April–June 2020): 287–315.

more likely to experience wonder, so as well as wonder disposing us to wisdom, wisdom also disposes us to wonder.[268]

6.3. Contemplation

A third effect of wonder is contemplation. For Aquinas, contemplation is not simply an act of the intellect. He places both the motive and the terminus of contemplation in the affections.[269] Wonder is the motive for contemplation because it is what attracts contemplation in the first place.[270] Aquinas notes that in order for things to be worthy of contemplation and of the wonder that attracts it, their majesty and dignity have to be apparent.[271] Contemplation, in its turn, also leads to wonder. We have seen that Aquinas describes awe as "a kind of fear that follows the contemplation of sublime truth."[272] Moreover, the act of contemplation itself consists in part in admiring the divine majesty and wisdom in created things.[273] So wonder precedes contemplation, flows from contemplation, and is even contemplation itself.

This contemplative aspect of wonder is the appetite's complacency in the object.[274] Hepburn relates how wonder has "a questioning and questing aspect, it rests in its objects, once they are judged in some way *worthy* of wonder".[275] Since wonder begets contemplation and vice

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[268] See the discussion of studies dealing with tolerance of ambiguity and wisdom in Allen, "The Science of Awe," 21-22.

[269] *ST* II-II.180.1: "Et quia unusquisque delectatur cum adeptus fuerit id quod amat, ideo vita contemplativa terminatur ad delectationem, quae est in affectu, ex qua etiam amor intenditur." *ST* II-II 180.2 ad 1: "vita contemplativa habet motivum ex parte affectus, et secundum hoc dilectio Dei et proximi requiritur ad vitam contemplativam."

[270] Descartes similarly sees wonder as causing us to consider objects attentively, to learn them and to retain them in our memory. Descartes, *Passions de l'ame*, Article LXX, LXXV.

[271] *In III Sent*., d. 34 q. 1 a. 6 co.: "ipsorum contemplabilium, scilicet divinorum, majestas et dignitas appareat; alias contemplatione et admiratione quae contemplationem allicit, digna non essent." Descartes similarly sees wonder as causing us to consider objects attentively, to learn them and to retain them in our memory. Art 70, 75.

[272] *ST* II-II 180.3 ad 3: "admiratio est species timoris consequens apprehensionem alicuius rei excedentis nostram facultatem. Unde admiratio est actus consequens contemplationem sublimis veritatis."

[273] *In III Sent*., d. 35 q. 1 a. 2 qc. 3 co.: "contemplativus considerat alia, inquantum ad Dei contemplationem ordinantur sicut ad finem, puta creaturas, in quibus admiratur divinam majestatem et sapientiam et beneficia Dei, ex quibus inardescit in ejus amorem."

[274] See *ST* I-II 34.4: "Id autem habetur pro fine, in quo voluntas quiescit. Quies autem voluntatis, et cuiuslibet appetitus, in bono, est delectatio."

[275] Hepburn, "Wonder", 4. Many other scholars emphasise that wonder leads to a desire not to possess the object but to rest in contemplation it. Anders Schinkel, for example, makes this the basis of the distinction between wonder and curiosity: "curiosity implies an active, eager 'grasping' movement from the self towards the object wonder always entails a certain reflective and 'respectful' distance from its object. Wonder is receptive— even inquisitive wonder is characterized by repeated stopping and waiting to see or listen": "Wonder, Mystery, and Meaning," *Philosophical Papers*, 48, no. 2 (July 2019), 299, fn 7.

versa, this questing and resting movement of wonder need not end as long as there is more at which to wonder. In the presence of an object of wonder that can never be fully comprehended, namely God, there will be both a rest and dynamism in his presence. Aquinas comments in the *Summa contra gentiles* that "nothing that is considered with wonder can be distasteful, because as long as there is wonder, it still moves the desire. But any created intellect whatever always looks with wonder on the divine substance, since no created intellect comprehends it."[276] It is only bodily weariness that diminishes the joy of contemplating God.[277] Freed therefore from bodily limitations, the wonder-filled contemplation of God is an affection of the will that will endure in heaven.

6.4. Reverence

A final effect is reverence. Aquinas explicitly connects wonder with reverence, noting that to admire the sublime power of God as we know it in his creation leads to a reverence for God.[278] Elsewhere he terms this wonder at the great and incomprehensible works of God the "wonder of devotion", which is to be encouraged.[279] Wonder could also lead to reverence for the created object of wonder itself. Robert Fuller recounts the role that wonder and awe played for John Muir and Rachel Carson in their efforts at conservation and environmental protection.[280] For Carson, wonder produced a reverence for life, since "the more clearly we can focus our attention on the wonders and realities of the universe about us, the less taste we have for destruction."[281]

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[276] *SCG* III 62, n. 9: "Nihil quod cum admiratione consideratur, potest esse fastidiosum: quia quandiu admiratione est, adhuc desiderium movet. Divina autem substantia a quolibet intellectu creato semper cum admiratione videtur: cum nullus intellectus creatus eam comprehendat. Impossibile est igitur quod substantia intellectualis illam visionem fastidiat. Et ita non potest esse quod per propriam voluntatem ab illa visione desistat."

[277] *ST* I-II 35.5: "Sed quia mens humana utitur in contemplando viribus apprehensivis sensitivis, in quarum actibus accidit lassitudo; ideo indirecte admiscetur aliqua afflictio vel dolor contemplationi."

[278] *SCG* II 2, n. 3: "haec consideratio in admirationem altissimae Dei virtutis ducit: et per consequens in cordibus hominum reverentiam Dei parit."

[279] *In Ioan*., cap. 3, lect. 2: "Duplex est admiratio. Una devotionis, secundum quod aliquis magnalia Dei considerans, cognoscit ea sibi incomprehensibilia esse: unde relinquitur admirationi locus .. . et ad hanc homines sunt inducendi, non prohibendi. Alia est infidelitatis, dum quis ea quae dicuntur non credens, miratur." As a latter example of the wonder of disbelief, Aquinas cites the countrymen of Jesus in Matthew 13, who are astonished at Jesus but take offense at him.

[280] Fuller, *Wonder*, chs 3 and 7.

[281] Cited in Fuller, *Wonder*, 107.

The same holds for wonder at human life. Always a possible object of wonder, our knowledge of human physiology has given us more scope for wonder and so for what Fuller terms an "ethics of appreciation."[282] Hepburn gives an example of how this ethic could heighten our reverence for the human person: "The more intense a person's wonder at the human brain, so inadequately modelled by any of our favoured mechanical analogies, the less bearable becomes the thought, for instance, of wantonly putting a bullet through it or crushing it with a rifle-butt."[283] The same could be said of other activities, such as boxing, and more generally, it could be said of the wonder of human life.[284] The human person is worthy of wonder, and as worthy of wonder, worthy too of reverence.

CONCLUSION

The purpose of this second section has been to draw attention to an affection that is somewhat neglected in studies of Aquinas's teaching on affectivity. Why is his teaching on wonder not better-known and disseminated? One reason is that it requires more than a little searching and parsing to give his thought a structure. Had he included in the *Summa Theologiae* a question on wonder, with several articles devoted to the distinctions that he makes through his texts, no doubt his thought would have become a more influential point of reference. A second reason is that some of Aquinas's most revelatory observations about wonder are found in his less-read texts. We must turn to his commentaries on Aristotle and the scriptures to fill out our understanding of awe and admiration that are less developed in the *Summa Theologiae*. A final and related reason is the priority that the passions of the soul receive in the study of affectivity in Aquinas. Unless we also pay attention to the frequency of *affectus* in his texts,

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[282] Fuller, *Wonder*, 106. See also Gregory the Great's comment that God has gathered in the human being another, rational world. "quod hominem fecit, ut ita dixerim, in brevi colligens mundum alterum, sed rationale." Gregory, *Moralia in Iob*, 296.

[283] Hepburn, "Wonder", 15. Rudolf Allers sums up pithily the effect of wonder on reverence for human dignity: "Wonder reveals to him the greatness of being and, to some extent, his own greatness too. It is man's prerogative that he may ask questions." Allers, "The Cognitive Aspect of Emotions," 611.

[284] See for example Eugene Hillman's discussion of the impact of boxing on the brain: "The Morality of Boxing," *Theological Studies* 12, no. 3 (1951), 309-314. He later comments at 316: "Real and serious wounds are inflicted on man's most delicate vital organ, and the natural beauty of the human face is directly attacked by the boxer who aims blows at the head of another in an attempt to win a fight for the sake of money and fame. In such an action there is no just proportion between the bad effect (permanent wounds on the brain with progressive impairment of functions and loss of mental power) and the good effect (a sum of money and a measure of "popularity")."

the prominence he gives to the passions can cause one to treat the affections as afterthoughts, rather than as vital and ever-present elements of one's affective life.

CHAPTER 3 – COLLECTIVE AFFECTIONS

INTRODUCTION

So far in this thesis the attention has been on the affections of the individual human person. In this chapter we shift focus to collective affections. The reason for this shift is to explore how it is possible to attribute an affection to a group such as the Church. Aquinas does not explicitly broach the topic of collective affectivity. As I will show, he does attribute affections to collectives, but it could not be said to be a developed aspect of his thought.

Elsewhere, however, particular in the fields of philosophy and sociology, there has been some more advanced study of collective affectivity. That is what I turn to in the first part of the chapter, when I survey of some of the issues in the philosophical literature on collective emotions. This will bring into focus why they are an object of study, and what the major questions of study are. We shall see that the same questions of embodiment that I discussed in Chapter 1 are pertinent to collective emotions, and that a strict embodiment account of emotion raises multiple problems for collective emotions.

In the second section I consider some of the ways in which Aquinas does indirectly approach collective affectivity, and I assemble the principles that we can build upon if we are to analyse affection at the collective level. I then apply the same considerations to the Church, discussing in particular the role of affections in preserving the Church's unity.

SECTION 1 – COLLECTIVE EMOTIONS

1. What are collective emotions?

Collective emotions refer to the emotions of a group of people *as a group*, beyond the emotions of the individual persons who comprise the group.[285] Those who speak about

[285] Some scholars define collective emotions as a sharing of emotion; see for example Mikko Salmela, "Les émotions peuvent-elles être collectives?", in *Les émotions collectives*, ed. Laurence Kaufmann and Louis Quéré (Paris: Éditions de l'EHESS, 2020), 36-37. Bennett Helm sees the term "collective emotion" as encompassing a range of phenomena, and suggests two dominant models in the philosophical literature: the *shared emotion model*, and the *plural subject model*. The latter refers to emotions that are attributed to the group itself. I believe the plural subject model best allows us to distinguish between individual and collective emotions. See Bennett W. Helm, "Emotional communities of respect," in *Collective Emotions*, ed. Christian von Scheve and Mikko Salmela (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 47.

groups often invoke emotions to describe a collective experience: a political leader claims that the nation is hurting after an act of violence; a sports coach comments that the team is overjoyed after a win; a union leader claims that the union is angry. These are not claims that each and every person in the nation, team, or union is experiencing the emotion, nor even a majority of people. The emotion, rather, is ascribed to the nation, team, and union itself.

The study of collective emotions has emerged relatively recently in comparison with the attention that philosophers have long paid to the emotions of individuals. Two areas of study in particular have been influential in bringing collective emotions into focus as an object of study in their own right: crowd behaviour, and the emotional aspects of ritual.

1.1. Crowds

The study of crowd behaviour, particularly in the wake of eighteenth and nineteenth-century European revolutions, was prompted by the observation that people are capable of thinking and acting very differently in crowds to how they think and act when alone. This was not a new observation. Plato had offered many warnings about the threats crowds pose both to democracy and to philosophy, having as they do the power to compel people to say what the crowd says and do what the crowd does. In the *Republic*, Socrates asks:

> When many of them are sitting together in assemblies, courts, theaters, army camps, or in some other public gathering of the crowd, they object very loudly and excessively to some of the things that are said or done and approve others in the same way, shouting and clapping, so that the very rocks and surroundings echo the din of their praise or blame and double it. In circumstances like that, what is the effect, as they say, on a young person's heart? What private training can hold out and not be swept away by that kind of praise or blame and be carried by the flood wherever it goes, so that he'll say that the same things are beautiful or ugly as the crowd does, follow the same way of life as they do, and be the same sort of person as they are?[286]

The unity of a crowd's behaviour that Plato here identifies was a particular concern of Gustave Le Bon, who in his 1895 work *The Crowd*, made a study of what he called a

[286] Plato, *Republic*, trans. G.M.A. Grube and C.D.C Reeve, in *Plato: Complete Works*, ed. John M. Cooper and D. S. Hutchinson, 971-1223, (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1997), 492c. See also his earlier discussion of the power of the crowd in 488a-e, and his critique in the *Gorgias* of oratory and the flattery of a crowd: Plato, *Gorgias*, trans. Donald J. Zeyl, in *Plato: Complete Works*, ed. John M. Cooper and D. S. Hutchinson, 791-869, (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1997), 464c-465e.

"psychological crowd". This crowd was not simply a collection of people, rather it had some particular characteristics:

> Under certain given circumstances, and only under those circumstances, an agglomeration of individuals presents new characteristics very different from those of the individuals composing it. The sentiments and ideas of all the people in the gathering take one and the same direction, and their conscious personality vanishes. A collective mind is formed, doubtless transitory, but presenting very clearly defined characteristics.[287]

Le Bon elaborated on those characteristics of a collective mind and collective sentiment. He argued that everything that belongs to the realm of sentiment becomes common property in crowds, and that individuals acquire a sentiment of invincible power, losing entirely the sense of responsibility that controls individuals.[288] One of Le Bon's theories was of "contagion", where emotions spread from one person to another like a virus: "In the case of people collected in a crowd all emotions are very rapidly contagious, which explains the suddenness of panics."[289] This theory of contagion has remained in the literature, with some modifications. Studies of emotional mimicry, for example, which demonstrate that we laugh more when watching a funny movie with friends, are addressing the same issues of individual and group behaviour that preoccupied Le Bon.[290]

The French Revolution and the Crusades furnished Le Bon with many of his examples, as did the behaviour of juries. He pointed out that while crowds were capable of acting viciously, they could also act virtuously and heroically.[291] Yet although he gave attention to some of the more extreme instances of irrational crowd behaviour—what we might refer to as the "mob"—his concerns were more fundamentally with the collective *per se*, and how one's individual thoughts and emotions are influenced by membership of the collective.

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[287] Originally published in 1895 as *Psychologie des foules*. Gustave Le Bon, *The Crowd: A Study of the Popular Mind* (New York: Viking Press, 1960), 23-24.

[288] Le Bon, *The Crowd*, 28-29.

[289] Le Bon, *The Crowd*, 126.

[290] See the discussion of emotional mimicry in Ursula Hess, Stephanie Houde, and Agneta Fischer, "Do we mimic what we see or what we know?" in *Collective Emotions*, ed. Christian von Scheve and Mikko Salmela (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 98-99. Gavin Brent Sullivan makes a useful distinction between "emotional contagion", where one's emotions change and are intensified by the emotions of other people, and "emotional congruence", where one's emotions become ordered, along with the emotions of others, towards a common object of attention: in "Collective Emotions," *Social and Personality Psychology Compass* 9 no. 8 (2015), 387.

[291] Le Bon, *The Crowd*, 19.

1.2. Collective Effervescence

Le Bon's contemporary, Émile Durkheim, covered similar ground. In *The Rules of Sociological Method*, published the same year as *The Crowd*, he observed the following:

> A collective emotion which bursts forth suddenly and violently in a crowd does not express merely what all the individual sentiments had in common; it is something entirely different, as we have shown. It results from their being together, a product of the actions and reactions which take place between individual consciousnesses; and if each individual consciousness echoes the collective sentiment, it is by virtue of the special energy resident in its collective origin. If all hearts beat in unison, this is not the result of a spontaneous and pre-established harmony but rather because an identical force propels them in the same direction.[292]

Durkheim insists here, as Le Bon had done, on a difference between the emotions (or sentiments) of the crowd and the emotions that the individuals hold in common. Even if a collective phenomenon is common to all members of society, it is only common because it is collective: "It is in each part because it is in the whole, but far from being in the whole because it is in the parts."[293] As we shall see, the relationship between the parts and the whole is ever-present in collective emotions.

In his later and most famous work, *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life*, Durkheim turned to the role of collective ritual, and specifically to the common emotional experiences of ritual that he termed "effervescence."[294] His preferred term, rather than a *crowd*, was an *assembly*.[295] He argued that an assembly can be animated by a common passion, in which "we become susceptible of acts and sentiments of which we are incapable when reduced to our own forces."[296] He gives the same example that Le Bon had given—the collective

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[292] Émile Durkheim, *The Rules of Sociological Method*, trans. Sarah A. Solovay and John H. Mueller, ed. George E. G. Catlin (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1938), 9-10. The French original speaks of "un sentiment collectif" rather than "une emotion collective": Émile Durkheim, *Les règles de la méthode sociologique* (Paris: Éditions Payot & Rivages, 2009), 70.

[293] Durkheim, *The Rules of Sociological Method*, 9.

[294] For example: "the very idea of a religious ceremony of some importance awakens the idea of a feast. Inversely, every feast, even when it has purely lay origins, has certain characteristics of the religious ceremony, for in every case its effect is to bring men together, to put the masses into movement and thus to excite a state of effervescence, and sometimes even of delirium, which is not without a certain kinship with the religious state. A man is carried outside himself and diverted from his ordinary occupation and preoccupations." Émile Durkheim, *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life*, trans. Joseph Ward Swain (New York: Collier, 1961), 427-428.

[295] Eduardo Cintra Torres argues that Durkheim deliberately chose the term *assemblée* rather than *foule* in order to distance himself from earlier crowd theorists, including Le Bon: "Durkheim's Concealed Sociology of the Crowd", *Durkheimian Studies* 20 (2014), 90-91.

[296] Durkheim, *Elementary Forms*, 240.

decision of the French nobility to renounce their privileges on the night of 4 August 1789.[297] Further, while Le Bon had commented, "Doubtless a crowd is often criminal, but also it is often heroic," Durkheim distinguished between actions of "superhuman heroism or of bloody barbarism", giving the same examples of the Crusades and the French Revolution: "Under the influence of the general exaltation, we see the most mediocre and inoffensive bourgeois become either a hero or a butcher."[298]

Such passages display striking similarities.[299] The difference is that, while Le Bon's emphasis was specifically on the behaviour of crowds, Durkheim's emphasis was religious. He saw the French Revolution as an occasion when society regarded itself as a god, commenting, "a god is not merely an authority upon whom we depend; it is a force upon which our strength relies."[300] It was an instance, which one also sees in religious rituals, of how a collective force acts on participants through exterior means, such as the offering of sacrifices, as well as through the individual consciousnesses of the participants, allowing them to reach emotional heights that they cannot reach alone.[301] He argued that religious practices such as rituals, totems, and sacred calendars all develop from this experience of collective effervescence.

Durkheim's insights have been influential because they are applicable to any ritual, whether explicitly religious or not. David Knottnerus gives the examples of political, military and civic rituals, sporting events, weddings and receptions, retreats, and special group activities within institutions. He calls these "special collective ritual events", meaning events that have

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[297] Durkheim, *Elementary Forms*, 240; Le Bon, *The Crowd*, 33.

[298] Durkheim, *Elementary Forms*, 241-242; Le Bon, *The Crowd*, 34.

[299] There is a (to my mind surprising) dispute about whether Durkheim was influenced by Le Bon. Mary Douglas argues that Durheim freely drew on Le Bon's thought, citing the similarities between Le Bon's crowd mind and Durkheim's observations about the emotional force of totemic ceremonies: *Purity and Danger: An Analysis of the Concepts of Pollution and Taboo* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1966), 20. Douglas's view has been criticised as baseless: see Steven Lukes, *Émile Durkheim, His Life and Work: A Historical and Critical Study* (London: Penguin, 1973), 462, fn. 54; see also W.S.F. Pickering, *Durkheim's Sociology of Religion: Themes and Theories* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1984), 403. Gerhard Wagner, however, argues that Durkheim in fact "considered Le Bon a serious social scientist and made full use of his studies": see "Who's Afraid of "Dr. Lebon"?", *Sociological Theory* 11, vol. 3 (1993), 322. In my view Douglas and Wagner are correct. The similarities in such passages as those I have cited would be very unlikely were Durkheim not influenced by Le Bon's own observations and examples.

[300] Durkheim, *Elementary Forms*, 240. Again, Le Bon had earlier made a similar point: "People are not religious solely when they worship a divinity, but also when they put all the resources of their minds, the complete submission of their will, and their fervent ardour of fanaticism at the service of a cause which (or an individual who) becomes the goal and guide of their thoughts and actions." Le Bon, *The Crowd*, 73.

[301] Durkheim, *Elementary Forms*, 240.

multiple participants, occur in a regularised fashion, involve stylised activities, and are separate from everyday occurrences.[302] This, though, does not mean that they are rare. A school student who must attend a weekly school assembly will engage in academic rituals of varying solemnity all the way through to graduation. When we add sports events, concerts, parties, and structured meetings, we can see rituals and collective emotions emerge as a recurring feature of human social life.

2. Some distinctions

In the literature on collective emotions there is a flux in the terminology which requires us to make some distinctions. The first is between *collective emotions* and *shared emotions*.[303] Although both terms refer to emotions with collective properties, and they are sometimes treated as synonymous, they are as different as the collective is from the individual. Collective emotions pertain to a group, while shared emotions remain the emotions of individuals, regardless of how many people have the emotion. Two or more people share an emotion if each has the same emotion in response to the same object, and they are aware that the others have the same emotion in response to the same object.[304] If three unhappy trumpeters in an orchestra have the same emotions of hatred and aversion towards a conductor, each being unaware that the others are experiencing the same emotions, these are individual emotions purely and simply. If they somehow communicate these emotions to each other, so that each becomes aware of the other's emotions, they are then shared emotions. We may certainly say that these emotions have collective properties, as would be

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[302] J. David Knottnerus, "Religion, ritual, and collective emotion," in *Collective Emotions*, ed. Christian von Scheve and Mikko Salmela (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 312-313.

[303] For an example of the shared/collective distinction, see Thomas Szanto, "Collective Emotions, Normativity, and Empathy: A Steinian Account," *Human Studies* 38, no. 4 (2015), 510-513. Shared emotions are sometimes also called *aggregate emotions*. See Steven Connor, who writes: "I will distinguish collective emotions from 'aggregate' emotions, in which members of a group (football crowd, theatre audience) come to have, or feel the pressure to manifest, emotions in common, an idea which is both wholly unobjectionable and may indeed do very useful work." Steven Connor, "Collective Emotions: Reasons to Feel Doubtful," The History of Emotions annual lecture given at Queen Mary, University of London, 9th October 2013, accessed at http://stevenconnor.com/collective.html.

[304] See Mikko Salmela and Michiru Nagatsu, "How does it really feel to act together? Shared emotions and the phenomenology of we-agency," *Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences* 16, vol. 3 (2017), 457. The authors treat shared and collective emotions as synonymous, because their account of collective emotions is based on synchronisation of individual emotional responses. In my view they nevertheless offer a good definition of a shared emotion.

evident in sentences such as, "The trumpeters are angry", but they remain individual—albeit shared—emotions.

In order for the emotions to be collective, one must go beyond the emotions of each trumpeter and ascribe the emotion instead to the group of which each forms a part. That is, instead of speaking of the aggregation of shared individual emotions ("All the trumpeters are angry"), one attributes a single emotion of anger to the group ("The trumpet section is angry"). If collective emotions and shared emotions are treated as synonymous, then "the nation is hurting" must mean that each and every member of the nation is hurting, and the "the Church shares your joy", means likewise every member of the Church. A condition for accurately ascribing an emotion to a group would be unanimity among the members, or at least that the emotion is held by a majority of members. In either case, one is not actually attributing the emotion to the whole rather than the parts.

A second distinction is between *collective emotions* and *group-based emotions*. A group-based emotion is one that a person has on account of an event or object that is relevant for a group.[305] When someone watching sport on television is happy when the team he supports wins, he belongs to the group in the extended sense of the team and its supporters, and is happy on that account. To have group-based emotions, one may not in fact belong to the group in any sense at all, as when someone is sad on account of a persecuted people on another continent. But the distinction between collective and group-based emotions becomes especially important when someone *does* belong to a group, for example, when the person's individual group-based emotions do not coincide with what he or she perceives as the emotions of the group. The group is disappointed but I am happy, the group is fearful but I am confident, and so on. In this case, as Goldenberg et al argue, someone's "emotional nonconformity" may lead to a number of responses.[306] The person may adjust his own emotion to match that of the collective. He may also accept the burden of having the emotion

[305] Amit Goldenberg, David Garcia, Eran Halperin, and James J. Gross, "Collective Emotions," *Current Directions in Psychological Science* 29, vol. 2 (2020), 155; also Amit Goldenberg, Tamar Saguy, and Eran Halperin, "How Group-Based Emotions Are Shaped by Collective Emotions," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 107, no. 4 (2014), 581.

[306] Goldenberg et al, "How Group-Based Emotions Are Shaped", 582-583.

that the collective *ought* to have, if he is of the view that the collective emotion is inappropriate to the situation. I would suggest another possibility, namely that the person attempts to persuade the other members of the group that the collective emotion should be different to what it is.

We may therefore distinguish between the *collective* emotions of the group, as well as the *shared* and *group-based* individual emotions among the members of the group. To return to the example of a sports team, this would mean: the team itself has emotions; the players have shared emotions with each other; and the players have group-based emotions on account of the team's performance. To this we could add that players will have individual emotions based on their individual performances and other events taking place in their lives. Thus a player may be sad for the team but thrilled that he or she played well. Much of the activity of a group is found in this interplay between individual emotions and other variations of emotions with collective properties. The tale of a group's formation, conflicts, success, or demise will also invariably be a tale of individual, group-based, shared, and collective emotions.

3. Difficulties with collective emotions

If we attribute emotions to a group of people, on the understanding that this emotion is something more than an aggregate of the emotions of group members, this immediately suggests some difficulties. The essential difficulty is how a group can have an emotion. I will first note these difficulties before returning to discuss how we might approach them.

3.1. Collective Minds

If emotions must follow some sort of apprehension or appraisal, does ascribing an emotion to a group imply that the group itself is capable of cognition? And does it therefore follow that we must posit the existence of a collective mind? Le Bon, for one, seemed willing to do exactly that, to the extent that he held that the conscious personality of individuals in a crowd vanishes, and a "a collective mind is formed", which is "subjected to the *law of the mental*

unity of crowds."[307] Several passages later, Le Bon's position has slightly changed, from having said that conscious personality has vanished, to saying that individuals continue to feel, think, and act, only differently:

> The most striking peculiarity presented by a psychological crowd is the following: whoever the individuals who compose the crowd are, however like or unlike their mode of life is, whatever their occupations, their characters, or their intelligence, the fact that they have been transformed into a crowd puts them in possession of *a sort of collective mind* which makes them feel, think, and act in a manner quite differently from that in which each individual would feel, think, and act were that person in a state of isolation.[308]

Le Bon's qualification—"a *sort of* collective mind"—is telling. Does he really believe that this mind exists? Does it have existence apart from the minds of individuals? He is clear in the above passage that he does not mean that the individuals cease to have their own individual minds, despite what we could have inferred from his earlier comments. So the difficulty remains of whether there is any apprehension or cognition that we may ascribe to the group as a whole over and above that of the parts. If yes, must we posit the existence of a collective mind that overpowers the thoughts and actions of individuals?

3.2. The Problem of Embodiment

If there are difficulties in attributing a single mind to a group, there are certainly difficulties in attributing a single body to a group. For one sceptic of collective emotions, Steven Connor, this is one of the principal reasons for his scepticism that a group can be the subject of an emotion: "There will be many reasons to feel dubious about such an idea, but I will be saying that one of the strongest of these is that it would entail the production not just of a group mind, but a group mind *lodged in a group body*."[309] This objection returns us to the familiar theme of this thesis—the question of whether an emotion implies embodiment. We could certainly speak about a group using metaphorical bodily expressions, as if we said a nation is on its knees in despair. But we will have difficulty in ascribing desires, fears and the like to

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[307] Le Bon, *The Crowd*, 23-24. Emphasis in text. The French original speaks of a collective soul, "une âme collective", but Le Bon still speaks of the soul possessing a mental unity, so this does not impede us from pursuing the problem of the collective mind.

[308] Le Bon, *The Crowd*, 27. My emphasis.

[309] Connor, "Reasons to Feel Doubtful."

groups—other than for rhetorical effect—if we hold to a strict embodiment theory of emotion. If we maintain that an emotion must entail a bodily response, we would then be required to search for that response among all, or perhaps some, of the individual members of the group. In that case, though, we risk confusing collective emotion with individual emotion.

In the literature on collective emotions, as in that of emotions generally, one often encounters an explicit or implied false dichotomy: either one is committed to an embodiment account of emotion, or one is committed to a "strong cognitivism."[310] The possibility that emotions could encompass both bodily and non-bodily motion is conspicuously absent.

3.3. Corporations' Feelings

We may further illustrate this problem of embodiment by taking a study from Joshua Knobe and Jesse Prinz, who researched people's willingness to ascribe mental states to group agents.[311] They begin by observing that it seems quite natural to say that Microsoft intends, wants, or believes something, but we would never say that Microsoft is feeling depressed. This, for Knobe and Prinz, is an instance of the "puzzling phenomenon" that we ascribe some types of mental states to group agents but not others.[312] Respondents to their study also reported that statements such as "Acme Corp. is feeling upset" or "Acme Corp. is feeling regret" are statements that sound "weird." In contrast, "Acme Corp. is upset about the court's recent ruling", and "Acme Corp. regrets its recent decision" are statements that sound "natural."[313] Knobe and Prinze comment:

> It seems clear that people are not showing an across-the-board tendency to reject ascriptions of upsetness and regret to group agents. On the contrary, it seems that people are perfectly willing to say that a group agent can be in a state of upsetness or regret. The problem is simply that it cannot *feel* upset or *feel* regret.[314]

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[310] See for example Mikko Salmela, "Collective Emotions and Normativity," *Protosociology: An International Journal of Interdisciplinary Research* 35 (2018), 138. Salmela argues for an understanding of emotion that is "multicomponential", but among the necessary components are "physiological changes."

[311] Joshua Knobe and Jesse Prinz, "Intuitions about consciousness: Experimental studies," *Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences* 7, vol. 1 (2008): 67–83.

[312] Knobe and Prinz, "Intuitions," 73.

[313] Knobe and Prinz, "Intuitions," 77-78. The rating is in fact across a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 "sounds weird" and 7 "sounds natural".

[314] Knobe and Prinz, "Intuitions," 78.

The authors go on to make conclusions about behavioural prediction and moral judgments.[315] In my view, the insight of the article is rather that it demonstrates that people are prepared to ascribe to a corporation: cognition ("Acme Corp. believes/knows …"), will ("Acme Corp. intends/wants/has just decided …"), and emotion ("Acme Corp. is upset"). They are not, however, prepared to ascribe anything that implies embodiment, or indeed any kind of sensation. Even a sentence invoking interior sensation ("Acme Corp. is now vividly imagining a purple square") is considered to sound weird.

The virtue of such a caricatured example as "Acme Corp." is precisely that it is so impersonal and abstract. Acme Corp. has no "flesh and blood", which could give some coherence to ascriptions of feeling. The problem with a group "feeling" something is that it suggests sensation, and more specifically an embodiment that is inappropriate to a collective agent.[316] Yet given that, according to the respondents, corporations are still capable of desiring and being upset, this suggests that the solution to understanding emotions in collectives lies in a concept of emotion that does not demand embodiment as a constitutive element.

4. Establishment of a Collective Emotion

With those difficulties acknowledged, how are collective emotions established? This requires us first to consider what makes a group a group, and then what makes a group capable of collective action.

4.1. A common goal

For a group to be a group in the first place, there must be a goal or concern that unites two or more members into the group. In other words, the group must have some reason to exist. The goal may be formally stated in the foundational statements of the group (as in a constitution

[315] In my view the study suffers from the authors' shift mid-study to an example that turns on whether fish have memory or whether fish feel anything. From this example they then revert to their question about "upsetness", concluding that ascriptions of upsetness serve primarily to facilitate behavioural prediction, whereas ascriptions of phenomenal consciousness serve to facilitate moral judgement. To my mind this not only entails a separation of morality from behaviour, but misses the main insight of the article, which relates to the place of sensation and embodiment in collective emotion. This, however, was not the issue the authors had set out to address—the word "emotion" appears nowhere in their article.

[316] Knobe and Prinze may have had different results had they included smaller, less abstract groups: for example, "the trumpet section feels angry", or even "the board of Acme Corp. feels upset." I suspect, however, that such results would have fed the confusion between collective emotions and shared emotions.

or mission statement), or it may be implicit from verbal and non-verbal behaviour: to have lunch together, to live together in peace, and so on. A group may be highly structured, as in a corporation, or very loosely structured, as with three friends out for a walk. As Tracy Isaacs explains, the degree of structure does not necessarily correlate to the size of the group—there can be large mobs and small well-structured organisations.[317] In theory a group may even have a single member, as when there is a sole remaining member of a tribe or a club, provided that this group with its "residual member" is theoretically open to having more members join.[318]

The requirement for a goal says nothing itself about the duration of the group. In a formal dance where dancers swap partners throughout the dance, the fact that a group may band and disband in the space of seconds does not diminish the fact that these are real groups, each with a common goal. Thus there are groups that are large and long-lasting, groups that are small and long-lasting, groups that are small and transient, and groups that are large and transient. Margaret Gilbert acknowledges that enduring groups would tend to have a greater impact on their members, but she advocates focusing on small, transient groups in order to find the crucial details of what constitutes a group.[319] I would add that the emotional dimensions of belonging to a group can be more keenly felt in smaller, transient groups than in larger, enduring groups. A person with anxiety may be well at ease with being a citizen of his or her country, a shareholder in a company, or a member of a global religion, but experience the emotional demands of group life more acutely in transient social settings, with their greater intimacy and at times unpredictability.

4.2. Collective intentions

The next issue is how the group is capable of collective action. If we reject the possibility of a literal collective mind, how exactly is a group capable of acting this way and not that way?

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[317] Tracy Isaacs, "Intentional Collective Action," in *Moral Responsibility in Collective Contexts* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 24.

[318] For this discussion of how small a club may be, and the notion of residual members, see Chapter 6, "Social Groups: Starting Small," in Margaret Gilbert's *A Theory of Political Obligation: Membership, Commitment, and the Bonds of Society* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 99-100.

[319] Gilbert, "Social Groups: Starting Small," 97.

Tracy Isaacs argues that a group, regardless of its size, is capable of a "collective intention", which she defines as:

> A state of affairs in which agents understand themselves as members of a collective and in relation to others, aiming as a group for the achievement of a collective goal, intend individually to do their part in the achievement of the collective goal, and mutually understand one another as doing the same.[320]

This concept allows us to ascribe terms such as appraisal and apprehension to a group, without positing the existence of a collective mind. Isaacs argues that both highly structured organisations and loosely-structured "goal-oriented collectives" (she gives the example of hockey fans doing a wave) have a collective intentional structure, which gives rise to collective intention and collective action. Because they are able to act intentionally, they qualify as moral agents.[321]

The force of Isaacs's article lies in how she demonstrates that in both kinds of collective, the intentions of the collective transcend the intentions of the members.[322] In highly-structured organisations, even though there is still a goal that unites members (in the sense that it explains why the organisation exists), it is not the case that each member needs to share a commitment to the goals of the collective. It is enough that their actions contribute to those goals. Intentional action in these institutional settings is produced by procedures, mission, role definitions, and structures of authority.[323] This certainly requires the conscious involvement of individuals, yet organisations are capable of pursuing a course of action, a result of comprise and negotiation, that no single person intended for it to pursue. Even in a small goal-oriented collective, collective intentions are not simply aggregates of individual intentions. Similarly, the intentions of each member concerning the collective goal are not collective intentions, but individual intentions with collective content.[324]

The fact that there are two levels of intentions in a collective—those of the members, and those of the collective itself—has several implications. First, there may be a disparity

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[320] Isaacs, "Intentional Collective Action," 48.
[321] Isaacs, "Intentional Collective Action," 27.
[322] Isaacs, "Intentional Collective Action," 31, 35.
[323] Isaacs, "Intentional Collective Action," 31.
[324] Isaacs, "Intentional Collective Action," 40.

between the goals, as is not uncommon in the case of employment, given that what brings employees into a company may simply be the common goal of earning a living, rather than a commitment to the goal of the company.[325] Conceivably, the employees may not even be aware of what it is the company actually does. But in these cases the employees still perform a function that contributes to the common goal. Secondly, the collective can, through its decision-making, take on further goals beyond the common goal of the collective, that is, beyond its basic reason for existence. An ice-cream company can decide that it does not simply want to make good ice-cream but also wants to effect political change. If individual members disagree with these collective goals and wish to change them, they must do so through influencing the intentional structures of the collective.

These first two implications suggest a third, which is that a collective can have degrees of collectivity. Isaacs comments that not all collectives are equally cohesive, and that collectives become "tighter" when the collective intention is strong.[326] We may contrast a company where each employee is united only by the desire for a pay check with one where each employee knows what the goals of the company are, contributes towards their articulation, personally works towards realising them, and where there is a mutual understanding among members that they are working towards a goal. In the latter case, where the company's attainment of its goal depends on the free cooperation of its members, the tighter the collective, the more likely it will attain its goal.

4.3. The Formation and Role of Collective Emotions

With this basic intentionality of collectives established, we are able to discuss how collectives may have emotions. We can begin by first recalling the role of emotions for an individual. We saw in Chapter 1 Robert Solomon's view that the role of emotions is to help us make our way through the world, pursuing what is good, avoiding what is bad, and so staying active and healthy. Likewise, collective emotions contribute to the life and flourishing of a group, with reference to its collective goal. They do this in five ways: the establishment of the

[325] Isaacs, "Intentional Collective Action," 31.
[326] Isaacs, "Intentional Collective Action," 41.

group; the maintenance of the group; the solidarity of the group; the identification of individuals with the group; and the motivation of action.

4.3.1. Forming the Group

For a group to come into existence in the first place, emotions will inevitably have played a role. A union may develop because of anger about workplace injustice; a heritage society from love of old buildings and disdain for the buildings that replace them; an audience will gather in a concert hall from a joy in music. The fact that the group has a goal already implies emotion—the goal is the object of desire; the shared activity is (one hopes) an object of enjoyment.

From its collective goal, we may derive a number of collective appraisals about things that for the group are good or bad, desirable or undesirable, even if they are as simply expressed as: "When a heritage building is preserved, that is a good thing. When it is knocked down, that is a bad thing." For groups that are formally structured, with explicit mission statements and the like, the emotions that one might attribute to them, such as love, desire, and hope, can be derived from those stated goals. Collective emotions therefore contribute to the goals of the group, but also, as Mikko Salmela points out, to the values and evaluative beliefs that are partially constitutive of those groups.[327] We might think of a monarchists' league, for example, which will have a love of the monarchy, an aversion to change to a republic, a desire to win any relevant referenda, predictable ways of appraising events pertaining to the monarchy, and so on.

Less formally-defined groups may be more fluid in their beliefs and thus will be capable of changing emotions according to shifts in external events. This is what makes crowds such an interesting study for collective emotions, not simply because of the extreme and apparently irrational instances of crowd behaviour that so engaged Le Bon, but for the more fundamental question of how a crowd can be a group at all. The common purpose of a crowd is usually short-lived. For a crowd of people wandering through a mall, it is difficult to attribute any

[327] Mikko Salmela, "The Functions of Collective Emotions in Social Groups," in *Institutions, Emotions, and Group Agents*, ed. Anita Konzelman Ziv and Hans Bernhard Schmid (Dordrecht: Springer, 2014), 160.

common purpose to them at all, given the multitudinous possible reasons for being in the mall. If one isolates some of the crowd members, such as a small crowd listening to a busker, they do have a common end—to listen to the busker—but their purpose of listening to the busker is even then more accurately a shared purpose rather than a common purpose. For a crowd's emotions to change from shared to collective, there must be something that establishes its beliefs *as a group*. This might be an exchange with a speaker, the emergence of a leader or leaders, and the experience of being addressed as a group. Applause or booing can also establish the emotions of the group, at which point those who do not share those emotions may detach themselves from the crowd.

4.3.2. Maintaining the group

The second role is a continuation of the first, since collective emotions can help remind the group of what its goal or goals are, by presenting them as desirable, lamentable, worthy of celebration and so on. The emotions that brought the group into existence may well be insufficient to maintain the group's existence. Since people often belong to many different groups, with varying degrees of commitment, the group's common goal may compete for attention among members' concerns. Thus Páez and Rimé argue that collective gatherings serve to return shared beliefs to the forefront of people's consciousness, after those shared beliefs have vanished in the course of daily individual life.[328] For like reasons, Durkheim holds that groups have regular gatherings in order that "members may revivify their common faith by manifesting it in common." [329] His use of the term "revivifying" suggests that we think of collective emotions as preserving the group's life, and conversely, that a group without the common expression and recollection of its emotions risks its demise.

As well as saving a group from its own torpor, collective emotions serve to protect the group from threats. If a group is in some way attacked, such as through a media campaign, collective emotions of fear, anger, and daring can help the group to survive the threat to its

[328] Dario Páez and Bernard Rimé, "Collective Emotional Gatherings: Their Impact upon Identity Fusion, Shared Beliefs, and Social Integration," in *Collective Emotions*, ed. Christian von Scheve and Mikko Salmela (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 207.
[329] Durkheim, *Elementary Forms*, 240-241.

life. Collective emotions may themselves be the subject of a process of agreement, even of formal decision-making, where the emotions themselves are the subject of procedure and debate.[330] Members may agree that an object is good or bad, desirable or undesirable for the group, following processes that would encompass debate and persuasion, ritual, and informal conversation. The research of facts will also influence how the group appraises a situation, as when a team studies the points system of a soccer tournament to determine which of the other teams to support in other matches. Through these sorts of means, a group establishes its beliefs about what is good, what it should pursue and what it should avoid, which in turn establish the group's collective apprehension of subsequent events. In the example of the soccer tournament, if team A determines that in order for it to reach the final, team B must defeat team C in another match, that influences the way that team A will appraise the match between teams B and C.

4.3.3. Integration of Members

A third role of collective emotions is to integrate members into the group. Emotions do this first of all through education or formation, by teaching potential or current members what matters to the group and what does not. Even when the broad goals of the group are clear to members, emotions can serve to situate turns of events within those broad goals. To illustrate, if someone is taken along as a spectator to a sport with which she is unfamiliar, she can learn what the sport is essentially about, including some of its rules and strategy, by observing how the group (the team and its supporters) reacts emotionally to the events. One can also be integrated into the group by seeing emotions directed at other group members. When students see pride and delight directed at the achievements of graduates, or an employee sees the company celebrating employees' birthdays, or when members celebrate the entrance of new

[330] A common example in parliamentary democracies is condolence motions. In another example, David McMillan reviews some statements issued by Christian denominations in response to the 1998 Belfast Agreement. The statements, expressing dismay, hopes, desires, and other emotions, were the subject of much debate and dissent within those groups, such that one might find a statement being issued as a majority statement. David J. McMillan, "Convictions, Conflict and Moral Reasoning," PhD diss., (Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, 2019), 145-177.

members into the club, one learns that one's own efforts and very existence matter to the group.

In addition to formation, emotions integrate members into the group by way of what Páez and Rimé call "identity fusion." This refers to how participants in collective gatherings perceive that their emotions and identities are united to those of the group.[331] Particularly when these individual emotions are strong, members' commitments to the group will be deepened as the group becomes the context in which people experience emotions.[332]

Often a collective event will be the occasion for conveying the emotions of the group to its members, and providing the setting for members to experience matching individual emotions. The ritual—and we may suggest at this point, the *liturgical*—aspects to the event are all directed at establishing and expressing an emotion. When a corporation's new product is extolled by the CEO in a choreographed spectacle, it is the corporation's way of establishing the emotion "we are excited." Likewise, a political campaign launch may establish "we are confident", or a graduation "we are proud." Individual emotions that are appropriately aligned with these collective emotions will be encouraged. At a given collective event, it is nevertheless possible for there to be widely different emotional experiences. Hans Schmid gives the example of the performance of a symphony, noting that emotions will depend on people's position, character, and roles. The conductor, the musician playing the triangle, and the audience may all have very different emotions according to the nature of their contributions.[333] The same would hold for a corporation's product launch. The product's designers are likely to be substantially more emotionally invested in the event than a junior accountant. But the emotions of the event still serve to convey what the product means to the

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[331] Dario Páez and Bernard Rimé, "Collective Emotional Gatherings: Their Impact upon Identity Fusion, Shared Beliefs, and Social Integration," in *Collective Emotions*, ed. Christian von Scheve and Mikko Salmela (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 204-216.

[332] See also Knotterus, who points out that collective emotional states increase commitment to the ritualised actions and beliefs of the group. In "Religion, ritual, and collective emotion," 319-320. Also Lawler et al show how collective emotions reinforce and strengthen individually felt emotional states. Edward J. Lawler, Shane R. Thye, and Jeongkoo Yoon, "The emergence of collective emotions in social exchange," in *Collective Emotions*, ed. Christian von Scheve and Mikko Salmela (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 201.

[333] Hans Bernhard Schmid, "The Feeling of Being a Group: Corporate Emotions and Collective Consciousness," in *Collective Emotions*, ed. Christian von Scheve and Mikko Salmela (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 12.

company, and they at least implicitly invite the accountant to have the same emotions, and so be more committed to the collective goal.

4.3.4. Solidarity

If the third role concerns the relationship of members to the group, the fourth role concerns the relationship of members to each other, and can be expressed by terms such as solidarity, bonding, fusion, and the like. The fact of having joined a group of people with a common goal is itself an instance of this solidarity, but Durkheim points out that the emotions that members share are capable of weakening, thus he identifies another purpose to collective gatherings: "To strengthen those sentiments which, if left to themselves, would soon weaken, it is to bring those who hold them together and to put them into closer and more active relations with each other."[334] Collective rituals, as well as having the purposes we have already seen, are perhaps most importantly directed at this aim of bringing members together and strengthening their bond. Randall Collins has introduced into the literature the notion of "interaction rituals", by which members are able, through their individual and shared emotions, to be more closely united to the group, and more committed to the group's goals. Rituals have a unique capacity to effect solidarity, providing as they do a common focus which becomes the object of the collective emotion. Collins adds to the mutual focus of attention the experience of "rhythmic entrainment", which serves to transform any shared emotions into solidarity. He comments: "The successful ritual, by bringing about mutual focus of attention and rhythmic entrainment, transmutes any shared emotions into a new emotion: the collective effervescence of solidarity."[335]

Collins' point highlights the role of shared emotions and how they relate to collective emotions. Just as the members' commitment to the group is strengthened when their individual emotions match those of the collective, so it is when shared emotions among group members match the emotions of the group. Páez and Rimé present a survey review of empirical evidence showing that, "when collective behaviors are coordinated, participants

[334] Durkheim, *Elementary Forms*, 240-241.

[335] Randall Collins, "Interaction ritual chains and collective effervescence," in *Collective Emotions*, ed. Christian von Scheve and Mikko Salmela (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 300.

manifest an increase of their sense of unity or fusion and a feeling of emotional communion or perceived emotional synchrony, based on synchronized behavior and sharing emotions by emotional contagion."[336] For example, when individuals perform a task involving synchrony, such as walking around together or listening to music together, they show greater cooperation in economic tasks afterwards.[337] Members not only learn what is important to a group by observing a collective emotion, but they deepen their commitment to each other by the shared experience of this emotion.

4.3.5. Motivation

This latter observation leads to a fifth role for collective emotions, namely that they help to motivate action when individuals identify more strongly with the group and its goal. Salmela and Nagatsu argue that strongly collective emotions can motivate jointly intentional action, by providing "motivating reasons for the group members to act in accordance with the action tendency of their collective emotion."[338] For example, those who experience positive emotions at an election rally will be more likely to hand out how-to-vote cards on election day, and the team with hope for a successful season will be more likely to train hard.

Collective emotions can even be so strong as to bring about collectively intentional action more or less instantly. It was precisely this phenomenon that Le Bon and Durkheim noticed about the actions of the nobles during the French Revolution. Durkheim remarked that the assembly took a course of action that they had refused the day before, and they had been surprised at their decision the day after—such is the power of collective effervescence, to raise people to heights of act and emotion well above their ordinary level.[339] This example demonstrates how emotions influence action in groups as well as in individuals. They both shape and follow what a group and its members see as worth being emotionally committed to, giving their time to, desiring, fearing, and the like.

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[336] Páez and Rimé, "Collective Emotional Gatherings," 206.

[337] Páez and Rimé, "Collective Emotional Gatherings," 206-207. See also Janice R. Kelly, Nicole E. Iannone, and Megan K. McCarty, "The function of shared affect in groups," in *Collective Emotions*, ed. Christian von Scheve and Mikko Salmela (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 181.

[338] Mikko Salmela and Michiru Nagatsu, "Collective Emotions and Joint Action," *Journal of Social Ontology* 2, no. 1 (2016), 45.

[339] Durkheim, *Elementary Forms*, 240.

5. How Collectives Show Emotion

If a collective cannot express its emotion through bodily feelings or anything implying sensation, in what way can one know what emotions it holds? If Acme Corp. is upset, how does it express this emotion? One way is through what it says about itself, in media releases and like statements. But another way is through its subsequent actions, where if a corporation is upset it will act in ways that are consistent with it being upset. This is what Gunner Björnsson and Kendy Hess argue for when considering how collectives such as corporations can be moral agents, and more particularly "fully fledged" moral agents, capable of their own "reactive attitudes" including guilt and indignation.[340] They argue that corporations are capable of consistently rational behaviour, which extends to acting in a way that reflects guilt and indignation, and, further, "good will, basic moral cognition and motivation." In an observation reminiscent of Jonathan Edwards calling affections the "springs of men's motion and action", they argue that corporations can act on the basis of their own "motivational springs."[341]

Just as Isaacs had distinguished between the intentions of the collective and those of the members, Björnsson and Hess stress that such attitudes must be attributable to the corporate agent itself, and not simply the members of the corporate agent. They also use the example of a fictional Acme, giving the example of the discovery that Acme has polluted a river. In response to this discovery, the actions set in train by the company's board demonstrate that it reacts with guilt. These actions include reprimanding managers, donating to environmental causes, and evaluating and remediating the pollution. The authors point out that such steps can be taken without any individual members believing that they did anything wrong, or even that Acme itself did anything wrong. In a further example, they show how Acme is capable of acting from indignation when it materialises that it has been falsely accused. They conclude:

> Corporate agents like Acme can react appropriately and non-strategically to situations in which they take themselves to be either wrong or wronged, and do so from states

[340] Gunna Björnsson and Kendy Hess, "Corporate Crocodile Tears? On the Reactive Attitudes of Corporate Agents," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 94, vol. 2 (2017), 289-291.
[341] Björnsson and Hess, "Corporate Crocodile Tears?" 282

> morally equivalent to guilt and indignation, independently of corresponding guilt or indignation on the part of their members.[342]

An important counter-argument to Björnsson and Hess's article comes from Mark LeBar, who argues that their "functional account" is insufficient for demonstrating that a corporate body can have full membership in the moral community. As a case study, LeBar takes Mitsubishi's 2015 apology to James T. Murphy, who in 1944-45 was forced as a prisoner of war to work in tortuous conditions in a metal mine owned by Mitsubishi. Prisoners of war, Murphy included, had previously deemed an apology from the Japanese ambassador to be inadequate. That apology had been directed broadly to "many people, including prisoners of wars", who had undergone tragic experiences.[343] At the 2015 apology, however, seven Mitsubishi executives made a private apology to Murphy, which recounted specific aspects of the prisoners' maltreatment. The apology ended with the seven executives rising and bowing to Murphy, who later recounted about the apology: "It was almost embarrassing. I wasn't expecting so much feeling to be put into it."[344]

What made this apology acceptable and even moving for Murphy? LeBar draws attention to the apology's feeling or emotional content: "the feeling dimension of the apology was manifested or realised in the persons of the seven Mitsubishi executives."[345] He summarises the problem that he sees this as generating:

> Mitsubishi itself could seemingly have articulated its thoughts in any number of ways, including issuing a formal apology through its various channels of communications. But that is not what happened. Instead, its executives—individual moral agents—personally and bodily appeared before James Murphy to express that apology. That is not something a corporate entity itself is capable of doing. Somehow the abstract had to be rendered *literally* corporate: bodily and capable of the embodied expression of the relevant reactive attitudes. It follows that, if Mitsubishi itself is incapable of the reactive attitudes its representatives were capable of, it cannot be a full-fledged member of the moral community.[346]

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[342] Björnsson and Hess, "Corporate Crocodile Tears?" 291

[343] The text can be found at U.S. Congress, House, HR 324, 112th Cong., 1st sess., introduced in House June 20, 2011. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/BILLS-112hres324ih/html/BILLS-112hres324ih.htm, accessed 19 May 2022.

[344] Mark LeBar, "Corporations, Moral Agency, and Reactive Attitudes," *Georgetown Journal of Law & Public Policy* 17, vol. 3 (2019), 817-819.

[345] LeBar, *Corporations*, 818.

[346] LeBar, *Corporations*, 819.

It does not seem to me that LeBar has demonstrated that a corporation is incapable of the reactive attitude of guilt. There is an important distinction between guilt and its different forms of expression. An agent may be genuinely sorry for past actions, and still deliver an apology that the victim judges as inadequate. To return to the earlier example from Björnsson and Hess, Acme may take all of the functional measures mentioned above and thus demonstrate its guilt, but delivering an adequate apology to victims of the pollution is an entirely separate question. Conversely, an apology must be consistent with the functional elements of guilt. If Mitsubishi had made its apology, while also refusing to pay compensation, denying the abuses in legal cases and other fora, one would see the importance of the functional elements brought into clearer relief.

LeBar's conclusion is that the moral agency that we ascribe to corporations cannot be merely functional, rather: "it seems that full membership in the moral community requires actual flesh-and-blood human beings to be involved as moral agents, bearing in their persons the authorized reactive attitudes of the corporation."[347] Again, his example does not go so far as to demonstrate this. If a corporation is angry, as Acme is when it is falsely accused of pollution, its anger will be well-established by its actions. When, however, the corporation wishes to communicate its attitudes to particular people (such as apologies to victims, or expressions of thanks to employees), it will do this best (as will a human agent) through recourse to displays that are recognised as such by the recipients of that communication.

In my view the major contribution of LeBar's article lies in something to which he does not himself draw attention, namely, the place of ritual in conveying the beliefs and emotions of a collective. The synchronised bow of the Mitsubishi executives was a collective, organised, traditional, coordinated, and restrained gesture, the meaning of which Murphy immediately recognised. While I suggest that LeBar has not demonstrated that a corporation is incapable of reactive attitudes, he has strengthened the argument that in some situations the best way in which a collective demonstrates its beliefs and emotions is through ritual.

6. Normativity in Collective Emotions

[347] LeBar, *Corporations*, 827.

A final issue concerns normativity in collective emotions. If collective emotions have such a comprehensive role to play for groups, does it follow that there are normative expectations for whether and how collective emotions should be experienced? There are two parts to this question that we shall consider in turn: whether certain emotions are expected of the group itself, and whether certain emotions are expected of the members of the group.

6.1. Expectations of the Collective

Margaret Gilbert offers an example of collective emotion ascription in everyday life that gives us a fruitful entrée into discussing normativity. The example is of three friends, Alice, Ben, and Chris, who discuss the news that their friend Stella has won a prize. By a brief conversation in which they speak excitedly and say things such as "That's terrific!" and "It's definitely matter for celebration!", Gilbert argues that they establish the collective emotion: "We are excited by the news about Stella."[348] On Gilbert's account, this has occurred through a joint commitment, which she formulates as follows, with "E" standing for the emotion: "Persons X, Y, and so on, (or: members of population P) are collectively E if and only if they are jointly committed to be E as a body."

In the case of collective excitement, Gilbert formulates this as: "Persons X, Y, and so on, are collectively excited if and only if they are jointly committed to be excited as a body."[349] In other words, the normative expectation for a group of friends comes from their having made a joint commitment to be excited. Gilbert's example demonstrates well that collective emotions can be quickly and implicitly established in an informal group setting. Her explanation, however, does not fully capture how the three friends have established their collective emotion. They have not simply *arrived* at the emotion by way of a joint commitment.

This point will be clearer if we think instead of more organised groups with formal decision-making procedures. For example, Acme is delighted at the court's ruling because the board has passed a resolution that it is delighted. The parliament of Ruritania mourns the death of its prince because it has passed a condolence motion. In these examples the voluntarism of

[348] Margaret Gilbert, "How We Feel," in *Collective Emotions*, ed. Christian von Scheve and Mikko Salmela (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 22.
[349] Gilbert, "How We Feel," 23.

the joint commitment account becomes clearer. It is worth recalling the principle we established earlier in the thesis, that emotions follow some sort of apprehension or appraisal. This is implicit in Gilbert's example, as the friends' brief conversation establishes the way that they collectively appraise the object of Stella having won the prize. In short, they have established the collective belief: "Stella has won the prize, and that is a good thing." Their collective emotion of excitement is inseparable from this belief.

We may further demonstrate the inseparability of collective emotion from collective beliefs and appraisal by a counter-example. If a fourth friend, Kat, approaches Alice, Ben, and Chris to ask why they are excited, it is hardly illuminating to respond: "We are excited because we have agreed to be." The collective emotion is justified not by their commitment to the emotion but by their belief that the prize is a good thing for Stella. A more illuminating response would be, "We are excited because Stella has won the prize," which carries the implication "and that is a good thing." If Kat lets them know that actually this prize is a known career-killer, or worse, that the five previous winners of the prize have died in mysterious circumstances, the collective emotion, "We are excited," risks becoming incoherent. Whether the group continues to be excited depends on the weight it accords to new information. If Kat is a measured person who would not say such things lightly, their excitement will be at least suspended. If she has a track record of being undependable, they may decide that their excitement can continue unabated.

The fact that emotions follow appraisals means that a group member can not only change the group's emotion by introducing new information, but also by arguing that certain emotions *should follow* from the group's beliefs. Kat challenges the collective emotion, "We are excited," not by challenging the emotion itself, but by challenging the underlying beliefs. A normative expectation is essentially an "ought"—we *ought* to be excited, angry or so on. But an ought implies beliefs from which the ought follows. Kat's objection—that the prize imperils Stella's career and possibly her life—carries with it an implied *ought*; that is, given these facts, we *ought not* be excited as a group.

Once the beliefs have been established and the appropriate emotion agreed upon, the expression of the emotion can certainly establish a norm. The statement, "We celebrate birthdays because that is what we do here", is not incoherent, because it is based on the underlying belief that the anniversary of someone's birth is a good thing, worthy of celebration. If a workplace routinely celebrates birthdays for employees, that creates a normative expectation that it will celebrate every employee's birthday.

6.2. Expectations of Individual Members

Assuming a group establishes a collective emotion, what sort of obligations does this impose on members of the group? Gilbert argues first of all that the establishment of a collective emotion gives members of a group the standing to rebuke one another for behaviour that is not in the spirit of the collective emotion. Thus when Alice exclaims, "Why did Stella have to win *another* prize?", Ben and Chris have the standing to rebuke her.[350] There is therefore a negative norm—that group members will not act inconsistently with the collective emotion. Again, this negative norm only has force if the group has collectively established its belief that it is a good thing for Stella to have won the prize. If Ben and Chris do rebuke Alice it will surely be by reference to these beliefs: that the award is prestigious, that Stella worked so hard for it, and so on.

Does a collective emotion establish positive norms? If the collective emotion is excitement, is one required to be personally excited? Gilbert argues that commitment to a collective emotion does *not* entail that each person is required to match the emotion of the group. The sole requirement is of an adequate "public performance", as Gilbert calls it. The public performance here may be simply the words and gestures (a smile, a thumbs-up) with which one communicates an emotion to the group. The important distinction is that while Gilbert does not hold there is an obligation to have an individual emotion, she maintains nevertheless that one is committed to "emulate" the group emotion: "the parties are jointly committed to

[350] Gilbert, "How We Feel," 22-23.

emulate, by virtue of their several actions and utterances, a single subject of the emotion in question, in relevant circumstances."[351]

Why would one commit to an emotion that one does not have? Gilbert lists three possible reasons.[352] First, it may be practically wise. If one wants the group to succeed in an endeavour, it would be helpful if every group member's emotions were directed towards this goal. Secondly, the commitment may follow a social norm that keeps in check some of the more painful emotions, such as unhappiness about someone else's success, so that success may be rewarded. Thirdly, there may be coercion, where people display the only emotions that an authority will tolerate. These are all persuasive as possibilities, however, the distinctions made earlier in this chapter between personal emotions and individual group-based emotions can also point to reasons for emulation. Thomas Szanto gives the example of someone who is grieving the loss of a grandfather, but celebrates a team victory anyway.[353]

We can address this apparent emotional inconsistency through apprehension. As we have seen earlier in this thesis, people are capable of apprehending the same object under different aspects. Just as a bridesmaid can be disappointed for herself but happy for her sister, depending on what state of affairs is the object of apprehension, the same applies here. The team member is sad when apprehending the loss of his grandfather, but is also capable of apprehending the goodness of the victory for the team. In situations such as this there is an emotion that one may display out of commitment to the collective cheering, following, to use Szanto's phrase, an "emotional script", irrespective of one's own emotional dispositions.[354]

Would not such emulation amount to faking an emotion? Gilbert anticipates this objection, and responds: "No one is pretending to feel the personal emotion in question. Rather, each is indicating to the others which collective emotion he is ready to establish."[355] If Chris is not in

[351] Gilbert, "How We Feel," 25.
[352] Gilbert, "How We Feel," 27-28.
[353] Thomas Szanto, "Collective Emotions, Normativity, and Empathy: A Steinian Account," *Human Studies* 38, no. 4 (2015), 518.
[354] Szanto, "A Steinian Account," 518-519.
[355] Gilbert, "How We Feel," 28.

fact personally excited about Stella's win, he can certainly smile and praise Stella, because it is the joint commitment that drives Chris's expression, not his personal emotion:

> That is not to say that he could be personally so excited. It is just that the existence of the complex comprising the pertinent joint commitment and behavior on his part that is solely responsive to it does not entail that he, personally, is excited about Stella's win.[356]

The ever-looming question—"What is an emotion?"—is again present in questions of normativity and emulation. Mikko Salmela criticises Gilbert's account, arguing that a joint commitment cannot produce a "genuine emotion". He reasons that a genuine emotion entails "physiological and behavioral changes, action tendencies, and affective phenomenology."[357] The spectre of embodiment reappears: there must be a bodily response for an emotion to be genuine. Salmela is aware that Gilbert's account of emulation does not require feelings, but for him this is a resort to "strong cognitivism" in order to evade the problem that emulated emotions are not true emotions.[358]

CONCLUSION

The literature on collective emotions raises many of the same issues that we have seen emerging throughout this thesis, and we can see in that literature why those issues remain important. How one defines a term at the outset will influence the way that one can develop and further apply that term. Philosophers of emotion will inevitably speak across each other if their beliefs differ as to what an emotion is. If one is in the cognitivist camp, emulation of an emotion is possible; if one is in the embodiment camp, emulation of emotion cannot be a genuine emotion. Salmela may criticise Gilbert's "strong cognitivism", but a "strong embodiment" account, where an emotion demands physiological changes, can be just as limiting. If we return instead to the point suggested in Chapter 1, that it is better to see emotion as entailing *motion*, then one's capacity to understand collective emotions and emulation is largened.

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[356] Gilbert, "How We Feel," 29.
[357] Mikko Salmela, "Collective Emotions and Normativity," *Protosociology* 35 (2018), 138.
[358] Salmela, "Collective Emotions and Normativity," 138.

Establishing how collective emotions, which I shall call in the next section *collective affections*, can function from a Thomistic perspective will be fruitful for extending his insights into other areas of life, including the Church. I will be focusing on collective rather than individual and shared emotions, because it seems to me that group-based individual emotions and shared emotions are easily assimilated into the existing framework for affections that we have already seen. If one is joyful or sad on behalf of another subject, such as a friend or a group, then one simply apprehends the object from the perspective of the friend or group. But collective affections are something different altogether. We have not seen so far in Chapters 1 and 2 what in Aquinas's system would make a group capable of having affections. That is the question to which we now turn.

SECTION 2: COLLECTIVE AFFECTIONS IN AQUINAS

1. Analogues to Developments in Collective Emotions

We saw in the previous section that research on collective emotions was prompted by two areas of study: crowd behaviour, and "collective effervescence". Before turning to the elements of Aquinas's thought on collectivity, it is worth considering how Aquinas approaches these two of its aspects. This will serve to demonstrate that, although Aquinas does not have a developed theory of collective affections, he nevertheless recognises a collective dimension to action and will.

1.1. Crowd behaviour

Aquinas discusses the behaviour of crowds in his Gospel commentaries, as well as, in particular, his sermon *Osanna filio David*, on the entrance of Jesus into Jerusalem on Palm Sunday. We find in these texts that Aquinas attributes to the crowd (*turba*) or crowds (*turbae*) common apprehension, affection, and action.[359] On the whole, Aquinas has a low opinion of the crowds' apprehension of Jesus and his teaching, commenting that "the crowds" are those who cannot apprehend truth with the mind, in contrast to the disciples, who can.[360] An example is when Peter tells Jesus the opinion of the crowd concerning who Jesus is, and then makes his own profession of faith. Aquinas comments here that there is a difference in the way that the disciples consider (*aestiment*) the humanity of Christ to the way that the crowd does.[361]

Such passages may suggest that the crowd has a unified apprehension, but elsewhere there is evidence of division. When Aquinas discusses how the crowd understands the heavenly

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[359] On the question of whether there is a difference between the singular *crowd* and the plural *crowds*, the distinction is found in the original Greek, between ὄχλος and ὄχλοι. Aquinas followed the Vulgate translation and does not that I can see distinguish between *turba and turbae*. For a survey of some of the arguments over Matthew's use of both the singular and plural, see J.R.C. Cousland, *The Crowds in the Gospel of Matthew* (Leiden: Brill, 2007), 37-39. Cousland sums up at p. 39 his own position: "It is best, therefore, simply to conclude that Matthew provides no sufficient basis for distinguishing between the singular and the plural forms of ὄχλος."

[360] *In Matt*., cap. 23, lect. 1: "Sciendum autem quod quidam audiunt eum ut discipuli, quidam ut turbae: ut discipuli, qui veritatem percipiunt mente … Ut turbae, qui veritatem mente apprehendere non possunt. Ideo quandoque convertit sua verba ad turbas, quandoque ad discipulos, quandoque ad utrosque; et diversimode."

[361] *In Matt*., cap. 16, lect. 2: "Hoc ergo dicit, ut humanitatem Christi aliter aestiment quam turbae."

voice, "I have glorified it, and I will glorify it again" (Jn 12:28-29), he shows some of his understanding of the disparities of crowd behaviour. In John's narrative, the crowd had said that the voice from heaven "thundered", while others said that an angel had spoken to Jesus. This could point to a difference between the crowd and "others", but Aquinas places the difference within the crowd itself: "Indeed, in any crowd, and in all crowds, some were coarse and slow in understanding, some however were perceptive, yet all fell short at recognising the voice itself."[362] This passage demonstrates that despite his readiness on occasion to treat the crowd as a unified body with common apprehension, he is also prepared to acknowledge its diversity of apprehension. When the crowd in John's Gospel queries Jesus about his statement, "The son of man must be lifted up" (Jn 12:34), Aquinas gives an extended explanation of their reasoning, questioning, and doubting, and on this occasion criticises the crowd for its slowness (*tarditas*).[363] Elsewhere, however, when preaching on the crowd's welcome of Jesus to Jerusalem, he remarks on the crowd's astuteness in connecting the origins of Christ as the son of David and his role as saviour.[364]

In some places Aquinas attributes to the crowd or crowds a common affection, noting in particular their wonder and devotion. The crowd, he says, heard the teaching of Christ and wondered at it, but were not scandalised.[365] He comments on the wonder of the crowds, and of the whole city, when Jesus entered Jerusalem before his Passion.[366] Aquinas particularly draws attention to the devotion of the crowd before, during, and after the multiplication of the loaves in Matthew 14. He cites St Jerome's suggestion that one of the reasons Jesus withdrew

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[362] *In Ioan*., cap. 12, lect. 5: "in qua quidem turba, et in omni turba, quidam erant grossioris et tardioris intellectus, quidam vero acutioris; quamvis omnes imperfecte se haberent ad ipsius vocis cognitionem. Nam desidiosi et carnales non perceperunt vocem ipsam nisi quantum ad sonum; et ideo dicebant tonitruum factum esse."

[363] See the discussion in *In Ioan*., cap. 12, lect. 6, for example where he comments: "In this they deserve to be reprimanded for their dullness, because even though they had seen and heard so many great things, they still had doubts about his being the Christ": "In hoc autem reprehendenda est eorum tarditas: quia adhuc dubitant post tot visa, tot audita, an ipse esset Christus."

[364] *Sermo Osanna filio David*: "Turbae vero sagaciter egerunt coniungentes ista duo, scilicet quod qui erit de semine David salvabit nos et quod salvabit nos Dominus in adventu eius."

[365] *In Matt*., cap. 7, lect. 2: "Quidam mirabantur, sed non scandalizabantur, ut turbae." For other instances of the crowd's wonder, see *In Matt*., cap. 5, lect. 2; cap. 8, lect. 3; cap. 12, lect. 2; cap. 21, lect. 1.

[366] *In Matt*., cap. 21, lect. 1: "Et primo ponitur admiratio turbarum *et commota est universa civitas*, idest admirata."

to a lonely place was to demonstrate the crowd's devotion, because they were prepared to follow him even in danger to hear the word of God.[367]

This is one of many examples where Aquinas interprets the crowd's action by reference to underlying affections. When the crowds have followed and remained with Jesus, even into the evening, Aquinas attributes this to their devotion, and their love and reverence for Christ.[368] After the multiplication of the loaves, he remarks upon their affection, and specifically the ardour with which they followed Jesus.[369] He again draws attention to their devotion as Jesus enters Gennesaret and crowds bring their sick to him and seek to touch the hem of his garment.[370] In his *Commentary on John*, Aquinas particularly emphasises the crowds' collective behaviour in greeting Jesus at his entrance into Jerusalem, ascribing to them a collective motive, collective action, and collective praise.[371] Treating the same event in the *Sermo Osanna filio David*, he speaks of the crowds humbling their affection, and desiring (*affectabant*) salvation.[372]

To summarise, Aquinas attributes to the crowds a common apprehension, affection, doubt, wonder, devotion, ardour, love, and reverence. This scattered treatment demonstrates that he is prepared to recognise at least some form of collective apprehension, action, and affection. The utility of this treatment also lies in emphasising what is missing among the crowds. Theirs appears to be a loose unity, sometimes believing, sometimes not, sometimes in harmony, sometimes not.

1.2. Collective Effervescence

[367] *In Matt*., cap. 14, lect. 1: "Quare secessit? … Item, ut ostenderet quanta devotione audiebant turbae verbum Dei, quia etiam in periculo sequebantur eum."

[368] *In Matt*., cap. 14, lect. 2: "Et in hoc significatur devotio turbarum, item dilectio et reverentia ad Christum, quia non recesserunt ab eo, quamvis vespere esset."

[369] *In Matt*., cap. 14, lect. 2: "Item ostendit affectum turbarum, scilicet cum quo ardore sequebantur eum."

[370] *In Matt*., cap. 14, lect. 2: "Deinde sequitur devotio turbarum … quia non solum suos infirmos obtulerunt, sed miserunt pro extraneis. Unde cum cognovissent per famam et per doctrinam, miserunt pro infirmis, et obtulerunt ei; unde omnes credebant in eum, tantae erat virtutis sermo eius."

[371] See for example the commentary following *In Ioan*., cap. 12, lect. 3: "Hic ponitur devotio turbae obviantis Christo."

[372] *Sermo Osanna Filio David*: "videte quod turbae ita humiliabant affectum suum quia a Christo salutem affectabant dicentes: *osanna*."

Despite the fact that "collective effervescence" was a term that Durkheim coined, there are multiple ways in which Aquinas addresses many of the same phenomena on which Durkheim had drawn for his theory.

1.2.1. Ecstasy

The closest counterpart in Aquinas's thought to Durkheim's "collective effervescence" is ecstasy (*extasis*), a concept on which Aquinas was heavily influenced by Dionysius. Aquinas cites ecstasy as one of the effects of love, defining it as being placed outside one's self.[373] It can take place in the apprehensive power, such as when one is lifted up to grasp things beyond sense and reason, and in the appetitive power when the appetite is carried out from itself towards something else.[374] When the intellectual appetite tends entirely to divine things, this can be so absorbing that one even overlooks the movements of the sensitive appetite.[375]

Aquinas reaches for different metaphors to explain this experience. He takes Dionysius's image of boiling as a property of love, and explains that nothing can be transformed into something else without first withdrawing from its own form. Thus "love is said to cause ecstasy and to boil, since that which boils bubbles out from itself and evaporates."[376] Elsewhere he likens ecstasy to drunkenness. When commenting on the overflowing cup in Psalm 23, he interprets this as the gift of divine love which inebriates, so that someone is acting under the influence of this divine ecstasy, just as a drunk man acts under the influence

[373] *ST* I-II 28.3: "extasim pati aliquis dicitur, cum extra se ponitur." See also *DDN.*, cap. 4, lect. 10: "Sic igitur talis amor extasim facit, quia ponit amantem extra seipsum." For a comprehensive treatment of *extasis* across Aquinas's texts, see Peter A. Kwasniewski, *The Ecstasy of Love in the Thought of Thomas Aquinas* (Steubenville, OH: Emmaus Academic, 2021).

[374] *ST* I-II 28.3: "homo, dum elevatur ad comprehendenda aliqua quae sunt supra sensum et rationem, dicitur extasim pati, inquantum ponitur extra connaturalem apprehensionem rationis et sensus." *ST* I-II 28.3: "Secundum appetitivam vero partem dicitur aliquis extasim pati, quando appetitus alicuius in alterum fertur, exiens quodammodo extra seipsum."

[375] *ST* II-II 175.2 ad. 2: "quando appetitus intellectivus totaliter in divina tendit, praetermissis his in quae inclinat appetitus sensitivus."

[376] *In III Sent.*, d. 27, q. 1, a. 1, ad 4: "dicitur amor extasim facere, et fervere, quia quod fervet extra se bullit, et exhalat."

of wine.[377] Such similes have much in common with the way that Durkheim likens the experience of effervescence to "delirium."[378]

The vital point about the way Aquinas places ecstasy in the context of love is that ecstasy is inherently relational; it is about *something*, and more properly *someone*. Ecstasy is caused in the apprehensive power by the lover thinking about the beloved to the exclusion of all other things.[379] In the appetitive power, one kind of ecstasy is caused by the love of concupiscence, when someone is satisfied with the good that he has but seeks to take delight in a good beyond himself.[380] But another form of ecstasy is caused by the love of friendship, in which one's affection goes out from one's self simply, because the lover wills and works for the friend's good on the friend's account.[381]

Durkheim's account of effervescence certainly suggests something similar to what Aquinas describes, and in fact when recounting very intense religious experience he does call this state "ecstatic."[382] Elsewhere he recounts precisely the experience of being placed outside oneself, commenting that in a state of effervescence, "a man is carried outside himself and diverted from his ordinary occupation and preoccupations."[383] The power that Durkheim saw as effecting this exaltation is society itself, which can only make its influence felt if the individuals are assembled together and act in common.[384] When they are together, even if there is ecstatic enthusiasm or other collective sentiments such as extreme dejection, there is "a communion of minds and a mutual comfort resulting from this communion."[385]

Should we therefore wish to explain Durkheim's collective effervescence from Aquinas's perspective, the explanation will be based on ecstasy, but even more fundamentally on

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[377] *In Psalmos*, Ps 22, n. 2: "Hic calix est donum divini amoris qui inebriat: quia ebrius non est in se, nec secundum se loquitur, sed secundum impetum vini; sic ille qui est plenus divino amore, loquitur secundum Deum: est enim in extasim factus."

[378] Durkheim, *Elements*, 258.

[379] *ST* I-II 28.3: "Primam quidem extasim facit amor dispositive, inquantum scilicet facit meditari de amato, ut dictum est, intensa autem meditatio unius abstrahit ab aliis."

[380] *ST* I-II 28.3: "in amore concupiscentiae, quodammodo fertur amans extra seipsum, inquantum scilicet, non contentus gaudere de bono quod habet, quaerit frui aliquo extra se."

[381] *ST* I-II 28.3: "in amore amicitiae, affectus alicuius simpliciter exit extra se, quia vult amico bonum, et operatur, quasi gerens curam et providentiam ipsius, propter ipsum amicum."

[382] Durkheim, *Elements*, 258-259.

[383] Durkheim, *Elements*, 428.

[384] Durkheim, *Elements*, 257, 465, 473.

[385] Durkheim, *Elements*, 460.

friendship, and the shared experience of apprehending the same object. Apprehension and affection, specifically friendship, would give us the tools to explain the social phenomenon of collective effervescence, including in contemporary settings unknown to both Aquinas and Durkheim, such as rock concerts and the highly-choreographed theatre of modern sports.

1.2.2. Friendship

These latter references of Durkheim's to a communion of minds and collective emotional experience also have counterparts in Aquinas's thought. Aquinas is familiar, for instance, with the difference between joy that is shared and the individual experience of joy. He cites a gloss on the *Letter to the Hebrews*, that all will rise together at the final resurrection, "so that the joy of each one be made greater by the common joy of all."[386] Shortly afterwards he again comments that joy is made greater when it is common among many.[387] In this latter observation he follows Augustine in the *Confessions*, that "when many men rejoice together, there is a richer joy in each individual, since they enkindle themselves and they inflame one another."[388]

Aquinas grounds his account of shared joy in *concord*—a kind of friendship that makes someone rejoice in the good of others.[389] This takes us into the foundations of collective affectivity, because in friendship there is a union of affection, which, as we saw in Chapter 2, Aquinas sees as an essential element of love, literally love's *sine qua non*.[390] Elsewhere he states explicitly that friendship unites affections.[391] This carries an important implication for the love of friendship, namely that the objects of one's friend's affections become the objects of one's own affections: "when a man loves someone with the love of friendship, he wills good for him, just as he wills good for himself: whence he apprehends him as another self,

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[386] *In IV Sent.* d. 43, q. 1, a. 3, qc. 1, s.c. 2: "Glossa: *ut communi gaudio omnium majus fieret gaudium singulorum.*"

[387] *In IV Sent.* d. 45, q. 2, a. 4, qc. 2, co.: "caritas non minuitur, si dividatur effectus ejus in multos; immo magis augetur; et similiter etiam gaudium, quando pluribus est commune, fit majus, ut dicit Augustinus."

[388] Augustine of Hippo, *The Confessions*, trans. John K. Ryan (Garden City, NY: Image Books, 1960), Book VIII, ch. 4, p.187.

[389] *In Rom.*, cap. 12, lect. 3: "In bonis quidem, ut aliquis bonis aliorum congaudeat."

[390] *ST* I-II 28.1: "unionem affectus, sine qua non est amor."

[391] *SCG* IV 21, n. 4: "Est autem hoc amicitiae proprium, quod amico aliquis sua secreta revelet. Cum enim amicitia coniungat affectus, et duorum faciat quasi cor unum."

inasmuch as, namely, he wills good for him as for himself."[392] Since the other affections proceed from love, this implies being sad when my friend is sad, hopeful when my friend is hopeful, and so on. And Aquinas does indeed state that it is proper to friendship that friends have the same wishes and preferences, joys and pains, and that they rejoice in being in each other's presence, spending time together and speaking with one another.[393] We may take as a representative passage his comments on the "extension" which is an effect of delight: "dilation pertains to love by reason of a certain extension, inasmuch as the affection of the lover is extended to another, so that he cares not only about what is his own, but about what is others'."[394]

On this point, it is useful to return to Margaret Gilbert's example of Stella and her prize. Gilbert argues that the affective obligations of friendship may arise from a social norm that requires certain collective emotions. She states, "it may be incumbent upon a person's friends to be collectively excited on hearing about her success."[395] On Aquinas's account, however, the very fact that they are friends means that Alice, Ben, and Chris delight in Stella's good as they would their own. They are not excited for her because they are following social expectations, but because they love her with the love of friendship, and so they delight in her good as their own. Even if one of the friends is disappointed at Stella winning the prize, it can still be on account of their friendship. Ben may think Stella would have greater success in another career, and so is disappointed that this prize is likely to confirm Stella in her current career choice. But in that case his disappointment is only on account of the fact that he genuinely wills good for Stella. Aquinas's account of apprehension is well able to encompass the sort of mixed affective responses that friends might have in such a situation. In Gilbert's example, where Alice is upset that Stella has won "*another* prize", this apparent jealousy is

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[392] *ST* I-II 28.1: "cum aliquis amat aliquem amore amicitiae, vult ei bonum sicut et sibi vult bonum, unde apprehendit eum ut alterum se, inquantum scilicet vult ei bonum sicut et sibi ipsi."

[393] *SCG* III 151, n. 3: "Quae est proprius effectus dilectionis: nam amicorum proprium est idem velle et nolle, et de eisdem gaudere et dolere." *SCG* I 91, n. 6: "propter similitudinem vel convenientiam amantis et amati, affectus amantis sit quodammodo unitus amato, tendit appetitus in perfectionem unionis, ut scilicet unio quae iam inchoata est in affectu, compleatur in actu: unde et amicorum proprium est mutua praesentia et convictu et collocutionibus gaudere."

[394] *ST* I-II 33.1 ad. 1: "dilatatio pertinet ad amorem ratione cuiusdam extensionis, inquantum affectus amantis ad alios extenditur, ut curet non solum quae sua sunt, sed quae aliorum."

[395] Gilbert, "How We Feel," 28.

certainly inconsistent with a union of affection. If, however, Alice had wanted to win the same prize, there is no inconsistency in Alice being disappointed for herself while being delighted for Stella.

1.2.3. Concord

Turning more closely to the notion of concord, as we saw this was at the basis of Aquinas's account of shared joy. It is a term that Aquinas gives to friends willing the same thing and rejecting the same thing, and recalls the way that Durkheim sees a "communion of minds" in a state of shared exaltation. Does this mean that friends have to think the same way? Aquinas answers that a difference of opinions is not opposed to friendship or concord, but that a difference of wills is.[396] This might suggest that any dispute about the conception of the good is incompatible with friendship. He clarifies, though, that as long as there is concord about principal goods, disagreement about some goods is not opposed to charity, so long as those goods are unimportant. His reason is that it comes down to a difference of opinion as to whether the good that they disagree about pertains to the good that they do agree about.[397]

To illustrate, in the case where Stella thinks that a certain career is where she would have most success, and Ben thinks otherwise, the difference of opinion is consistent with friendship. So if Ben is upset that Stella has won a prize in investment banking because he thinks she should rather pursue her love of marine biology, this difference is not contrary to charity. What Ben wants is for his friend to find the career that would best suit her. Stella thinks that it is banking, Ben thinks otherwise. This is a difference of opinion that is not contrary to their friendship.

We will see further along that friendship is essential to the account of collective affections that we construct from Aquinas's thought. It bears emphasising at this point that friendship's significance for our purposes is for *collective* affections, not *shared* affections. Friends may

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[396] *In II Sent*., d. 11, q. 2, a. 5, ad. 1: "amicitiae vel concordiae non repugnat diversitas opinionum, sed solum diversitas voluntatum." See also *ST* II-II 29.3 ad. 2.

[397] *ST* II-II 29.3 ad. 2: "Procedit enim talis dissensio ex diversitate opinionum, dum unus aestimat hoc de quo est dissensio pertinere ad illud bonum in quo conveniunt, et alius aestimat non pertinere." Schwarz has an extended discussion of whether friendship can survive disagreement according to Aquinas's account of concord. See Daniel Schwarz, *Aquinas on Friendship* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), ch. 2, and particularly 31-34.

certainly have the same loves, dislikes, hopes and so on, which will have brought about the friendship in the first place. But once the union of affection is established, the friends then have affections on account of the union of affection that is their friendship. That is, it is *because* of their union of affection that Stella's friends are delighted for her, even if apart from their friendship the prize would mean nothing to them individually.

2. Elements of a Group

So far we have seen that Aquinas does attribute affections to groups. We turn now to consider the elements of his thought by which he would arrive at this position. We will begin with the question of what is a group.

2.1. Groups

Underlying Aquinas's discussion of groups are two principles: unity and order. There are several ways in which something is said to be "one". The primary way is that a thing is one in its substance.[398] This first approach is based on indivisibility—that which has substantial unity cannot be divided.[399] The second way is based on division, where something has a single form, but is a totality composed of ordered parts.[400] Aquinas addresses these questions of unity early in the *Summa Theologiae* when, in the course of asking whether there can be unity in God, he points to two different manners of thinking of a whole.[401] The first is a homogenous whole, where each part has the form of the whole, as is the case with water, in

[398] *In Met*., Bk 5, lect. 8, n. 4: "primo dicuntur unum illa quae sunt unum secundum suam substantiam."

[399] *In Met*., Bk 5, lect. 8, n. 1: "illa quae sunt penitus indivisibilia, maxime dicuntur unum." See also *ST* I 11.2: "ratio unius consistit in indivisibilitate, ratio vero multitudinis divisionem continet."; and *In Met*., Bk 5, lect. 8, n. 1: "universaliter hoc est verum, quod quaecumque non habent divisionem, secundum hoc dicuntur unum, inquantum divisionem non habent."

[400] *In Met*., Bk 5, lect. 8, n. 5: "non sumitur ex ratione indivisionis sicut praedicti, sed magis ex ratione divisionis; et dicit, quod quandoque aliqua dicuntur unum propter solam continuitatem, quandoque vero non, nisi sit aliquod totum et perfectum; quod quidem contingit quando habet aliquam unam speciem, non quidem sicut subiectum homogeneum dicitur unum specie quod pertinet ad secundum modum positum prius, sed secundum quod species in quadam totalitate consistit requirens determinatum ordinem partium."

[401] *ST* I 11.2 ad. 2: "Ad secundum dicendum quod duplex est totum, quoddam homogeneum, quod componitur ex similibus partibus; quoddam vero heterogeneum, quod componitur ex dissimilibus partibus. In quolibet autem toto homogeneo, totum constituitur ex partibus habentibus formam totius, sicut quaelibet pars aquae est aqua, et talis est constitutio continui ex suis partibus. In quolibet autem toto heterogeneo, quaelibet pars caret forma totius, nulla enim pars domus est domus, nec aliqua pars hominis est homo. Et tale totum est multitudo. Inquantum ergo pars eius non habet formam multitudinis, componitur multitudo ex unitatibus, sicut domus ex non domibus, non quod unitates constituant multitudinem secundum id quod habent de ratione indivisionis, prout opponuntur multitudini; sed secundum hoc quod habent de entitate, sicut et partes domus constituunt domum per hoc quod sunt quaedam corpora, non per hoc quod sunt non domus."

Aquinas's example, or a blob of cookie dough. The second is a heterogenous whole, in which no part has the form of the whole. The hour hand of a watch is a part of the watch, but it does not itself have the form of a watch. Further, in contrast to cookie dough, one cannot rearrange the parts of a watch without damaging the identity of the whole.[402]

A group—or *multitude*, to use Aquinas's term—is a heterogenous whole. That which unites the elements of a heterogenous whole is *order*. For Aquinas, any use of a collective term implies, first, a plurality of individual substances, and a unity of some sort of order.[403] Thus a "people" is a multitude of persons comprehended under a certain order, and this order is what makes the group one, since it does not have substantial unity: "The whole that is the civil multitude or the domestic family has only a unity of order, according to which it is not one simply."[404] This unity of order is what permits an orchestra composed of dozens of musicians, each playing his or her own instrument, to be an orchestra. In Aquinas's own example, if the parts of a shoe are put together in no matter what order, it is not a shoe, because it is not properly one thing.[405]

For a multitude of people, there is therefore a twofold order—the order of the multitude to a common end, and the order that the parts of the multitude have with each other according to their own ends.[406] The latter element, that the parts have an order to each other, is what

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[402] *In IV Sent*., d. 44, q. 1, a. 1, qc. 3, co.: "in homine possunt accipi diversae partes totius dupliciter. Uno modo diversae partes homogenei, sicut diversae partes carnis, vel diversae partes ossis; alio modo diversae partes diversarum specierum totius heterogenei. Si ergo dicatur quod pars materiae redibit ad aliam partem speciei ejusdem, hoc non facit nisi varietatem in situ partium: situs autem partium variatus non variat speciem in totis homogeneis; et sic si materia unius partis redeat ad aliam, nullum praejudicium generabitur identitati totius."

[403] *ST* I 31.1 ad. 2: "nomen collectivum duo importat, scilicet pluralitatem suppositorum, et unitatem quandam, scilicet ordinis alicuius."

[404] *ST* I 31.1 ad. 2: "populus enim est multitudo hominum sub aliquo ordine comprehensorum"; *In Ethica*, Bk 1, lect. 1, n. 4: "Sciendum est autem quod hoc totum quod est civilis multitudo vel domestica familia habet solam ordinis unitatem, secundum quam non est aliquid simpliciter unum."

[405] *In Met*., Bk 5, lect. 8, n. 5: "sicut patet quod non dicimus unum aliquid, ut artificiatum, quando videmus partes calceamenti qualitercumque compositas, nisi forte secundum quod accipitur unum pro continuo; sed tunc dicimus esse unum omnes partes calceamenti, quando sic sunt compositae, quod sit calceamentum et habeat aliquam unam speciem, scilicet calceamenti."

[406] *In III Sent*., d. 33, q. 3, a. 1, qc. 4, co.: "Sed quia in qualibet multitudine est duplex ordo, ut in 12 Metaph. dicitur: unus quo ordinatur tota multitudo ad finem communem; alius quo singulariter partes multitudinis ordinantur ad invicem secundum fines proprios; ideo politica habet duas partes: unam quae regi civitatis competit, cujus est bonum commune totius multitudinis conjectare, et haec dicitur regnativa, quae est experientia ejus quod est gubernare multitudinem innocue, vel legis positiva, ut in 6 Ethic. dicitur. Alia est quae competit cuilibet de civitate, secundum quod ad bonum commune ordinatur; et haec politica dicitur, nomen commune retinens. Et ideo dicit philosophus, quod legis positiva est architectonica, quia fines proximi

distinguishes a king from citizens, or players in an orchestra from each other. The musicians all have the same common end—to play orchestral music well—but their attainment of this end also depends on how they are ordered to each other. If the different musicians pay no attention to the conductor and each other, it is not properly an orchestra, and will not attain its end of playing orchestral music well. A point to clarify here is that unity of order makes both the group and the group's action possible, but it is not essential that the group act, only that it has the *capacity* for action. This is well-explained by John R. Lee, who points out that groups such as baseball teams may have extended periods where there are no group acts taking place, but the group still exists. He goes on to explain that one can still speak of a unity of order towards the end of playing, enjoying, and winning baseball games, without that order terminating in group acts. As soon as the unity of order ceases to exist, however, the baseball team ceases to exist.[407]

In a passage of the *De regno,* Aquinas offers a pithy observation on the effect of unity on a group. He notes that a power (*virtus*) that is united is more effective than one that is divided, giving the example of many persons together being able to drag something which none of them could do by acting individually.[408] If that power is working for good, it is therefore useful that it be more united; conversely, if it is working for evil, it is more harmful when it is united.[409] This brief observation underscores the place of unity in a social group—the more united it is, the better it can attain its end.

2.2. Community

After multitude, there are two terms that Aquinas uses, society and community, which he sometimes appears to use interchangeably.[410] He distinguishes between three different kinds

ordinantur ad finem communem. Et similiter potest dividi militaris in ductivam; quae competit duci exercitus, et militarem simpliciter; et similiter oeconomica in paternam, quae competit patrifamilias; et oeconomicam simpliciter."

[407] John R. Lee, "Is "Social Justice" Justice? A Thomistic Argument for "Social Persons" as the Proper Subjects of the Virtue of Social Justice," PhD diss., (Baylor University, 2008), 101-102.

[408] *De regno*, Bk 1, cap. 4: "virtus unita magis est efficax ad effectum inducendum quam dispersa vel divisa: multi enim congregati simul trahunt illud quod divisim per partes singulariter a singulis trahi non posset."

[409] *De regno*, Bk 1, cap. 4: "Sicut igitur utilius est virtutem operantem ad bonum esse magis unam, ut sit virtuosior ad operandum bonum, ita magis est noxium si virtus operans malum sit una quam divisa."

[410] *SCG* III 135, n. 15: "Non enim hoc est inconveniens, ut qui sua dimisit propter aliquid quod in utilitatem aliorum vergit, de his quae ab aliis dantur sustentetur. Nisi enim hoc esset, societas humana permanere non posset: si enim aliquis circa sua propria tantum sollicitudinem gereret, non esset qui communi utilitati deserviret.

of community.[411] The first is the household, encompassing the conjunctions of husband and wife, parent and child, and master and slave. The second is the *civitas* (city), which is formed for the necessities of human life, and which we may interpret as referring more broadly to state authorities.[412] The third kind of community is the kingdom, which is composed of many cities making up the one kingdom.

The affections are integral to each of these kinds of community. A household is brought into existence from the love of husband and wife, which Aquinas characterises as a form of friendship.[413] A *civitas* is also founded on friendship. He argues that a *civitas* is preserved by friendship, particularly friendship among citizens.[414] Another relevant affection for a *civitas* is fear. The affection of fear is implicit in how the rulers of a *civitas* give precedence to friendship among citizens rather than to justice, as when they decide against imposing punishment in order to avoid preserve political friendship, so removing the threat of sedition that is inimical to the health of the *civitas*.[415] The purpose of all human laws is that there be

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Opportunum est igitur humanae societati quod illi qui, praetermissa propriorum cura, utilitati communi deserviunt, ab his quorum utilitati deserviunt, sustententur: propter hoc enim et milites de stipendiis aliorum vivunt, et rectoribus reipublicae de communi providetur." *Societas* and *communitas* have multiple synonyms in medieval literature, including *collegium*, *corpus*, *congregatio*, *collectio*, and *universitas*. See I.Th. Eschmann, "Studies on the Notion of Society of St Thomas Aquinas. I. St Thomas and the Decretal of Innocent IV *Romana Ecclesia: Ceterum*," *Mediaeval Studies* 8 (1946), 8-9.

[411] *In Matt.* cap. 12, lect. 2: "Triplex est communitas: domus, sive familiae, civitatis, et regni. Domus est communitas consistens ex his, per quos fiunt communes actus; ideo consistit ex triplici coniugatione, ex patre et filio, ex marito et uxore, ex domino et servo. Communitas civitatis omnia continet quae ad vitam hominis sunt necessaria: unde est perfecta communitas quantum ad mere necessaria. Tertia communitas est regni, quae est communitas consummationis. Ubi enim esset timor hostium, non posset per se una civitas subsistere; ideo propter timorem hostium necessaria est communitas civitatum plurium, quae faciunt unum regnum. Unde sicut vita in quolibet homine ita pax in regno; et sicut sanitas nihil est nisi temperantia humorum, sic pax est cum unumquodque retinet ordinem suum. Et sicut, recedente sanitate, tendit homo ad interitum; sic de pace; si a regno discedit, tendit ad interitum. Unde ultimum quod attenditur, est pax. Unde Philosophus: *sicut medicus ad sanitatem, sic defensor reipublicae ad pacem*."

[412] As Nicholas Aroney points out, sometimes *civitas* is used in an abstract way where it would be better translated as "state" rather than "city". Nicholas Aroney, "Subsidiarity, Federalism and the Best Constitution: Thomas Aquinas on City, Province and Empire," *Law and Philosophy* 26, vol. 2 (2007), 196. For that reason I will leave *civitas* in the Latin rather than translate it by city.

[413] *SCG* III 123, n. 6: "Amicitia, quanto maior, tanto est firmior et diuturnior. Inter virum autem et uxorem maxima amicitia esse videtur: adunantur enim non solum in actu carnalis copulae, quae etiam inter bestias quandam suavem societatem facit, sed etiam ad totius domesticae conversationis consortium." See also *In IV Sent*., d. 41, q. 1, a. 1, qc. 1, co.: "Uno modo per carnis propagationem; alio modo per conjunctionem ad carnis propagationem ordinatam; unde ipse ibidem dicit, quod amicitia viri ad uxorem est naturalis."

[414] *In Ethica*, Bk 8, lect. 1, n. 5: "per amicitiam videntur conservari civitates. Unde legislatores magis student ad amicitiam conservandam inter cives quam etiam ad iustitiam, quam quandoque intermittunt, puta in poenis inferendis, ne dissensio oriatur."

[415] *In Ethica*, Bk 8, lect. 1, n. 5: "Et hoc patet per hoc quod concordia assimilatur amicitiae, quam quidem, scilicet concordiam, legislatores maxime appetunt, contentionem autem civium maxime expellunt, quasi

friendship among the citizens, and any laws that dilute friendship put the security of the *civitas* in danger.[416] Thus fear and friendship go together in the life of a *civitas*. When Aquinas turns to the third kind of community, he names fear as the dominant reason for the formation of a kingdom, since different cities form a kingdom through fear of their enemies.[417]

We recall from Section 1 of this chapter that emotions are essential to the formation and maintenance of the group. The same is true of Aquinas's account of community. If all the members of a group have a common end, this common end is an object of the will, and thus an object of the appetite or affections.

2.3. Society

Turning now to the term *society*, Aquinas's fullest account of societies, and of groups more broadly, is found in his *Liber contra Impugnantes Dei Cultum et Religionem*, or *A Defence of the Religious Orders*. This work was provoked by a series of events in which Aquinas was personally implicated: the conflict between the professors and secular professors at the University of Paris in the 1250s, which both preceded and immediately followed Aquinas's appointment as a Master of Theology in 1256.[418] The conflict gave rise to practical questions of who belongs to a group, what the group's aims are, and what makes membership of one group compatible or not with membership of another group. He sought to address the objection that, because religious and seculars are different in profession, they cannot share in the one office of teaching. He begins his response by defining a society. This he does twice, giving two slightly different emphases: a society is the bringing together of men, first, for

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inimicam salutis civitatis." *In Ethica*, Bk 9, lect. 6, n. 7: "Est enim amicitia politica circa utilia et circa ea quae conveniant ad vitam humanam, circa qualia dicimus esse concordiam."

[416] *In Pol*., Bk 2, lect. 3, n. 5: "Omnes enim communiter putamus, quod amicitia sit maximum bonum in civitatibus; quia si sit amicitia inter cives, minime facient seditiones; et ad hoc intendunt omnes legislatores, ut civitas sit sine seditionibus. Unde omnes, qui ponunt rectas leges, ad hoc tendunt, ut sit amicitia inter omnes cives."

[417] *In Matt*., cap. 12, lect. 2: "Ubi enim esset timor hostium, non posset per se una civitas subsistere; ideo propter timorem hostium necessaria est communitas civitatum plurium, quae faciunt unum regnum."

[418] Aquinas had to give his inaugural lecture under royal guard, and demonstrators prevented listeners from entering. For an account of the conflict, see Jean-Pierre Torrell, *Saint Thomas Aquinas, Volume 1: The Person and His Work*, trans. Robert Royal (Washington DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 1996), 75-84.

something to be done in common, and secondly, for bringing something about.[419] These two definitions, rather than muddying the waters, help to clarify that the purpose of a group is found in its activity. A group that is not doing what it was established to do is therefore not realising its purpose.

As he does with community, Aquinas makes several distinctions between kinds of society. The first is between public societies, such as a city or a kingdom, and private societies established by a few persons for a private end, such as a business partnership. The second distinction is between perpetual and temporary societies. The notion of perpetual and temporary may seem clear enough, though one might enquire just how temporary is "temporary." Would our ballroom dancers of Section 1 be establishing a new group every few seconds? On this account, yes—they are forming temporary private societies, with a common end and unity of order. Likewise, students who decide one afternoon to go together for coffee are forming a new group.

Taking the perpetual-temporary and public-private distinctions together, we arrive at four varieties of groups, each of which can be established by merely two or three people.[420] First, a perpetual public society, such as a city, where those who establish a society choose a city as their permanent abode, thus establishing a political society. Secondly, a perpetual private society, meaning household relationships such as a marriage. Thirdly, a temporary private society, for which Aquinas gives the example of two associates managing an inn. Fourthly, a temporary public society, where people form a society for some temporary public activity, such as a market day.

This lesser-known text differs from his earlier classifications of the kinds of community, but it is not inconsistent with them. There is also an important continuity between the two accounts, since Aquinas identifies an affective thread running through each variety of society,

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[419] *CI* II, cap. 2, co.: "cum societas nihil aliud esse videatur quam adunatio hominum ad unum aliquid communiter agendum"; *CI* II, cap. 2, co.: "Est enim societas, ut dictum est, adunatio hominum ad aliquid unum perficiendum."

[420] The requirement for "two or three" individuals is a point Aquinas makes several times. For example, *CI* II, cap. 2, co: "duo vel tres societatem ineunt ut simul negotientur;" "Illud enim ad quod aliqua multitudo, vel etiam duo aut tres colligantur, quandoque est perpetuum." See also *CI* II, cap. 2 ad. 9.

namely friendship. He notes that Aristotle had distinguished friendship according to the reason for which different societies were established.[421] The friendship of those raised in the same family differs from the friendship of those engaged in the same business. While Aquinas is sparing with examples of societies, from the essential elements that he identifies (two or more people ordered towards a common end) and the few examples that he does provide, we have a framework that we can apply to any human society.

3. Collective Agency

We turn now to the activities of a group. Here we shall consider two questions: whether a group can be an agent, and if so, how. The first can be answered swiftly in the affirmative, due to two important passages. The first is from Aquinas's discussion of original sin in the *De malo*, where we find one of his most important passages on collectivity:

> Any individual man can be considered in two ways: in one way according to what he is as an individual person; in another way according to what he is as part of a particular society (*collegii*), and an act can pertain to him in both ways. For instance, that act that he does by his own choice and by himself pertains to him inasmuch as he is an individual person. But inasmuch as he is part of a society, a certain act can pertain to him that he does not do himself nor by his own choice, but which is done by the whole society, or by many of the society, or by the leader of the society; as that which the leader of a city does, the city is said to do, as the Philosopher says. For such a human society is considered as one man, as different men in different offices are ordered as different members of one natural body, as the apostle determines about the members of the Church. (1 Cor 12:12).[422]

This passage establishes that Aquinas is willing to treat a community as an agent: the community can act as if one human being, and it is distinct as an agent from the many individual agents that comprise it. The second passage is from the *Commentary on the Ethics*,

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[421] *CI* II, cap. 2, co.: "inde est quod philosophus in 8 Ethic., diversas communicationes distinguit; quae nihil aliud sunt quam societates quaedam, secundum diversa officia in quibus homines sibi invicem communicant: et secundum has diversas communicationes amicitias distinguit; sicut eorum qui simul nutriuntur, vel qui simul negotiantur, aut aliquod aliud negotium exercent."

[422] *De malo* q. 4, a. 1, co.: "aliquis homo singularis dupliciter potest considerari: uno modo secundum quod est quaedam persona singularis; alio modo secundum quod est pars alicuius collegii, et utroque modo ad eum potest aliquis actus pertinere. Pertinet enim ad eum in quantum est singularis persona, ille actus quem proprio arbitrio et per se ipsum facit; sed in quantum est pars collegii, potest ad eum pertinere actus aliquis quem per se ipsum non facit nec proprio arbitrio, sed qui fit a toto collegio vel a pluribus de collegio vel a principe collegii; sicut illud quod princeps civitatis facit, dicitur civitas facere, ut philosophus dicit. Huiusmodi enim collegium hominum reputatur quasi unus homo, ita quod diversi homines in diversis officiis constituti sunt quasi diversa membra unius corporis naturalis, ut apostolus inducit de membris Ecclesiae, I Cor. XII, 12."

in which Aquinas explains a consequence of a political group or family possessing a unity of order, rather than absolute unity:

> A part of this whole can have an activity that is not the activity of the whole, as a soldier in the army has an activity that is not of the whole army; nevertheless, the whole itself has a certain activity that is not proper to any of the parts but to the whole, for instance, a conflict of the whole army; and the rowing of a boat is the activity of the multitude rowing the boat.[423]

The example of men rowing a boat is a favoured example across many of Aquinas's texts. The key point in the above passage is that there is an operation of the whole army and the whole crew. In the *Summa contra Gentiles* he is explicit that even if there are many agents doing a single action, such as many men rowing a boat, they are all made one agent by their union in the one action.[424] In the *Summa Theologiae*, he states that the rowers are one mover, inasmuch as all their powers are joined in making one movement.[425] Again, whether the agents in the action have similar or dissimilar parts, they combine together in one power.[426]

The latter mention of dissimilar parts makes clearer the distinction between the parts and the whole. If we were to make the boat a racing boat with a cox and eight rowers, on this account the cox forms part of the unity of order, without ever pulling an oar. The actions of the cox—calling commands, steering and the like—are not the actions of the whole crew, but of the cox alone. Likewise, the rowing of the boat is not proper to the cox and the eight other individual rowers, but to the crew as a whole. Thus we see that a group can be an agent, and the actions of this agent are not reducible to its parts.

3.1. Collective intellect

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[423] *In Ethica*, Bk 1, lect. 1, n.5: "pars huius totius potest habere operationem quae non est operatio totius, sicut miles in exercitu habet operationem quae non est totius exercitus; habet nihilominus et ipsum totum aliquam operationem quae non est propria alicuius partium sed totius, puta conflictus totius exercitus; et tractus navis est operatio multitudinis trahentium navem."

[424] *SCG* II 30, n. 14: "Nec ad propositum differt utrum agens sit unus tantum ad actionem sufficiens per suam formam vel oporteat multos agentes ad unam actionem agendam congregari, sicut multi homines ad trahendam navim: nam omnes sunt ut unus agens, qui fit actu per adunationem eorum ad actionem unam."

[425] *ST* I 52.3: "Nec habet instantiam de pluribus trahentibus navem, quia nullus eorum est perfectus motor, cum virtus uniuscuiusque sit insufficiens ad movendum; sed omnes simul sunt in loco unius motoris, inquantum omnes virtutes eorum aggregantur ad unum motum faciendum."

[426] *SCG* IV 7, n. 20: "Quae quidem virtus quandoque congregatur ex diversis virtutibus in diversis agentibus inventis, sicut patet in multis trahentibus navem: omnes enim similiter trahunt, et quia virtus cuiuslibet imperfecta est et insufficiens ad istum effectum, ex diversis virtutibus congregatur una virtus omnium, quae sufficit ad trahendum navem."

To clarify more particularly how a group can be a *moral* agent, we must investigate whether the same components of individual human action—intellect and will—can be attributed to a group. When discussing the relationship between intellect and will, Aquinas gives the example of a king aiming at the common good of his kingdom, who by his rule then moves all the governors of cities.[427] The king in this analogy stands for the intellect, the implication being that the king understands what the common good of the kingdom is. Commenting on this analogy, John R. Lee explains its application for society generally: "The general distinction at work is that between the element of political society that understands the common good of society and the element (or elements) whose duty it is to seek the common good, in all its particularities."[428]

Beyond political society, we can extend to other groups the notion of a group member or members or understand the group's common good. John Finnis explains this in terms of a "policy", which may be "implicit, 'unstated', informal, and privy to the group itself", but which the members then choose to participate in carrying out.[429] Finnis extends the example to other "rulers" of a group such as directors and coaches, or whoever sets a policy for that society. He explains: "it belongs to rulers and their delegates to initiate group action by words and deeds which define what shall be the public policy co-ordinating the future actions of relevant members of the group."[430]

It is in this locus of policy that we find the collective equivalent to apprehension, because the group's process of decision-making determines its stance in relation to objects of the group's "intellect," and whether those objects are good, desirable, possible, or otherwise. We could multiply examples from formal and informal contexts: a general forms the view that a war is approaching and that the war can be won; a board of directors concludes that the economic situation is precarious and that it is too risky for the company to expand; a figure-skating duo decides that a particular musical piece will accompany its routine and bring the greatest

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[427] *ST* I 82.4.

[428] John R. Lee, "Is "Social Justice" Justice? A Thomistic Argument for "Social Persons" as the Proper Subjects of the Virtue of Social Justice," PhD diss., (Baylor University, 2008), 113.

[429] John Finnis, *Aquinas: Moral, Political, and Legal Theory* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 28.

[430] Finnis, *Aquinas*, 28.

chance of success. For an ""implicit, 'unstated', and informal policy that is privy to the group itself", we need only return to Gilbert's example of the group of friends. Their short discussion establishes the group's "policy" towards Stella having won a prize. When Kat arrives to share the grim backstory to the prize, she is implicitly proposing a change in policy, and therefore a change in how the group apprehends Stella's prize.

3.2. Collective will

Aquinas's example of the king and governors also furnishes us with the means for addressing collective will. The king moves the governors of the city, which in Aquinas's analogy stands for the intellect moving the will. We can extrapolate from this that the will is the element of society that implements the public policy.[431] If the wary board decides instead to be daring and expand, certain employees of the company will undertake tasks directed at precisely this. It is not necessary, as Isaacs pointed out regarding collective intentionality, that the employees know what the policy is and how their tasks relate to it. As Finnis explains, the individual members of a large and complex military force typically have no plan for how the war will be won, nor what progress is being made towards the victory.[432] Their actions are guided by the rules and particular orders, which carry out the plan of the supreme commander. In summary, the decision-making authority (the intellect) decides what is to be done, and each part of the whole acts to carry out this plan (the will). To see how this may apply more specifically to affections of the will, we may take again Margaret Gilbert's example. The intellect here would correspond to the decision-making implicit in the friends' brief discussion, by which they establish the facts—Stella has won a prize—apprehend it as good, and as a result they are excited about it. Their decision to be excited rather than mildly satisfied is itself a decision of the group, but a decision that is also dependent on apprehension.

With this understanding of how a group can form and execute policies, we can address the objection that collective affections would demand the existence of group minds. Mary

[431] See Lee, "Is "Social Justice" Justice?" 147.
[432] Finnis, *Aquinas*, 33.

Dolores Hayes argues that Aquinas's position allows us to avoid two extremes. At one end are the group mind theorists such as Le Bon, and at the other, nominalists for whom society is nothing other than a name for an aggregation of individuals. She comments:

> Society is a union of individuals ordered according to various capacities and contributions, not an absorption of them into a single unity. Some fail to distinguish unity from unions. Society is not a unity of mind, but a harmony or concord of many minds working in unison and striving for a common purpose.[433]

Aquinas's account of group action therefore does not require turning to a group mind or absolute unity, nor is a group simply an aggregation of individual actions. Rather, the orientation of the group towards a common end, structured by a unity of order, allows both for the indispensable role of individuals as well as their distinction from the actions of the whole.

3.3. Constructing collective affectivity

With intellect and will, in the form of policies and execution, we have the elements of collective affectivity. As with Isaacs' account, Aquinas's also allows us to distinguish between the intentions of the collective and those of its members. Anselm Spindler encapsulates well the relationship between the parts and the whole in Aquinas's account of group agency:

> While the political community thus emerges as a subject of agency because it has an intentional orientation toward the common good that is distinct from the intentional orientation of any of its individual members, it does not fully absorb the intentional agency of its individual members. Therefore, the citizens' individual agency survives their incorporation into a political community. And that is the reason why the constitution of the political community as a subject of agency results in the kind of intentional differentiation that Aquinas denies in the case of individual human beings. Actions can be attributed to the political community as a whole that cannot be attributed to any of its individual members. And actions can be attributed to its individual members that cannot be attributed to the political community as a whole.[434]

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[433] Mary Dolores Hayes, "Various Group Mind Theories Viewed in the Light of Thomistic Principles," PhD diss., (The Catholic University of America, 1942), 168. She elsewhere comments, at p. 160: "Various minds may have the same thoughts, common ideals and purposes, but fusion of individual minds is not necessary to account for these. Group activity is always a plurality and not a unity of activities. The group mind concept is illegitimate, for the individual has psychological primacy always, and all group behavior is, in the last analysis, personal behavior."

[434] Anselm Spindler, "Politics and Collective Action in Thomas Aquinas's *On Kingship*," *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 57, no. 3 (2019), 438. For another worthy contribution to the limited literature on this

At this point we may consider some ways in which the affections are present in the life of groups. We have seen that the affection that Aquinas singles out for a kingdom is fear. It is a way of answering the question: what is the reason for the existence of this kingdom? The common end may well be expressed differently—for example, so that the citizens of the kingdom may continue to live in peace—but the explanatory affection is fear. In groups that exist so that the members may enjoy something together, the threefold affections of love, desire, and delight explain the group's existence. Those groups committed to study, sport, or music, as well as civil communities seeking to live in peace, love what they do, desire that it continue, and delight in it when it does.

The irascible distinction to the passions and affections is also illuminating, because some groups are established precisely to overcome the difficulty in attaining a good or avoiding an evil. Thus kingdoms and security alliances form due to fear, and if armies and coalition forces form specifically to take on a threat, then they are formed from the affection of daring. Anger is a common reason for establishing societies. Unions, societies for preventing cruelty to animals, and any group that forms for the purpose of righting an injustice or preserving justice has been brought into existence through anger.

What of the three concupiscible passions and affections of hatred, aversion, and sorrow? I would suggest that sorrow is a very common reason for a group's existence, but rarely the explanatory reason. There may be some groups where sorrow is the dominant affection, such as bereavement groups, and groups directed at works of compassion. But if the group's action is also directed at righting an injustice, or eradicating a threat, the dominant affection is rather anger. The same holds for aversion which would often be accompanied by the affection of fear. Likewise, hatred will play a role in bringing groups into existence, but will co-exist with another, more explanatory affection, like fear, daring, or anger. A racist group gathers not simply from reasons of hatred, but usually to work towards eliminating perceived threats or righting perceived injustices. The principle that objects of the concupiscible appetite are easily obtained or avoided explains why certain concupiscible affections pertaining to an evil

topic, see Joshua Harris, "Collective Action and Social Ontology in Thomas Aquinas," *Journal of Social Ontology* 7, no. 1 (2021): 119-141.

object are unlikely to be the dominant affection for a group—if evils are easily avoided, there is no need to form a group to avoid them. It does, however, make sense to form groups to enjoy things together or grieve together, so that joy may be shared and sorrow alleviated.

Contained in the formation of all these groups with a difficult goal is the hope that the group will achieve its end. Much intra-group motivation and ritual is directed at arousing and maintaining hope. We saw in Chapter 2 that despair can also serve a positive function, despite its negative reputation. The same is true for groups in their policy-making, in clarifying which goals are attainable and which are not.

Many of the principles that Aquinas sets out in his Treatise on the Passions are therefore also applicable to groups. This claim carries the not-insubstantial caveat that since groups lack a common body, the physiological aspects of Aquinas's system cannot obtain for groups. But his structure of the relationship of the passions to good and evil, of the passions to each other, and the irascible/concupiscible distinction, all give an excellent vocabulary and grammar for explaining the life of groups.

Finally, as we saw in Chapter 1, Aquinas's view is that the affections have an all-encompassing role in life, such that what someone chiefly pursues is said to be his life. We may say the same for groups. The life of a group is precisely its affections. A group would not exist without affections. Further, when a group changes policies, leaders, directions, these changes are explicable by affections.

4. The Church as Group

Having considered the way that Aquinas approaches the topic of groups in general, we turn now to how he approaches the Church in particular. To give some limits to what is otherwise a vast question, I will return to the question posed at the beginning of this chapter: how is a minister at a wedding able to say, "The Church shares your joy"?[435]

[435] Benoît-Dominique De La Soujeole poses a similar question about the question "the faith of the Church," and sets out the sorts of derivative questions that are at stake, one of which is that in the liturgy the Church is the acting subject of many actions. His approach is to identify the ways in which the Church can be considered as a person. Benoît-Dominique De La Soujeole, *Introduction to the Mystery of the Church*, trans. Michael J. Miller (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2014), 499ff.

The Church is a heterogenous whole, possessing a common end and unity of order. Beyond this, it is not easy to say, using the categories of groups that we have seen, what sort of group the Church is.[436] In the *Commentary on the Sentences,* Aquinas states that of the two kinds of community, the economic and the political, the church resembles a political community (*congregationi*), whereas different convents or parishes within a diocese resemble families.[437] In his *Commentary on Ephesians,* he takes a slightly different approach. Taking as his text Ephesians 2:19-22, he comments that the community of the faithful (*collegium fidelium*) is partly a civil community and partly a domestic community, having as it does "something of the *civitas* and something of the home."[438] It is a home, for example, when one considers that the leader of the community, God the Father, is a father. But if one considers the subjects of this community, it is like a *civitas*. His reasoning is that members of a civil community share in public acts. In the case of the church, these public acts are the acts of faith, hope, and charity.[439] This observation is important for two reasons. First, it presents the acts of the members of the church as collective acts. Secondly, with the mention of charity, it hints at the place of affections in establishing the Church. We established earlier that political friendship is essential to a *civitas.* The same is true for the Church, though the friendship is more specifically charity.

Aquinas further develops the analogy of the Church as *civitas* later in the same commentary, when he arrives at Ephesians 4:5-6: "one Lord, one faith, one baptism, one God and Father of us all, who is above all and through all and in all."[440] This is a critical passage, where Aquinas sees Paul as showing to the Ephesians the form of the Church's unity. He comments that since the Church is like a *civitas* it is something that is one and distinct, though it is not

[436] On the insufficiency of sociological categories to grasp the mystery of the Church, see Jean C.-M. Travers, *Valeur sociale de la liturgie d'après Saint Thomas D'Aquin* (Paris: Les éditions du Cerf, 1946), 156.

[437] *In IV Sent*., d. 20, q. 1, a. 4, qc. 1, co.: "Sed cum Ecclesia sit congregatio fidelium; congregatio autem hominum sit duplex; scilicet oeconomica, ut illi qui sunt de una familia; et politica, sicut illi qui sunt de uno populo; Ecclesia similatur congregationi politicae, quia ipse populus Ecclesia dicitur; sed conventus diversi vel parochiae in una diocesi similantur congregationi in diversis familiis vel in diversis officii."

[438] *In Eph*., cap. 2, lect. 6: "Sic igitur collegium fidelium aliquid habet de civitate, et aliquid de domo."

[439] *In Eph*., cap. 2, lect. 6: "vero sunt de collegio civitatis, communicant sibi in actibus publicis … Si vero ipsos subditos consideres, sic civitas est, quia communicabant sibi in actibus praecipuis, scilicet fidei, spei et caritatis."

[440] *In Eph*., cap. 2, lect. 6: "civitas est, quia communicabant sibi in actibus praecipuis, scilicet fidei, spei et caritatis. Et hoc modo si fideles considerentur in se, est collegium civitatis; si vero rector collegii attendatur, est collegium domus."

one simply, but composed of different parts. He argues that for the unity of any city there must be four common things: one ruler, one law, the same symbols, and the same end. Following Paul, he recounts how all of these are present in the Church: the one ruler is Christ; the one law is the law of faith; the same symbols are the sacraments; the same end is God.

These can all be reduced to the two elements of a group: a common end and a unity of order. The common end of the Church is God, and specifically God the Father—"one God and Father of us all"—to whom the Son leads us.[441] This common end is possessed in different ways according to whether one is on earth or in heaven. Aquinas comments in the *De virtutibus* about these two ways of belonging to this *civitas*:

> Man is not only a citizen of the earthly city, but is a sharer in the heavenly Jerusalem, of which the ruler is the Lord, and the angels and all the saints are fellow citizens, whether reigning in glory and resting in the homeland, or still sojourning on earth, according to the apostle, Ephesians 2:19: "You are fellow citizens of the saints, and members of the household of God." But that a man be a sharer of this city, his nature is not sufficient, but that he be elevated to this by the grace of God.[442]

Jean Travers summarises the import of this passage, that the common good of the Church is God himself, possessed in glory or in grace, and continues: "More simply, one can say, this common good: it is glory, and it is grace."[443] The other three elements—Christ, the law of faith, and the sacraments—all pertain to a unity of order, which direct the members of the Church to its common end. Again, Travers summarises how the Church is built on these elements of a common end and unity of order:

> On this common good, a genuine society is built, the multitude is ordered. A unity of order is found in the Church depending on whether the members are dedicated to each other and whether they are ordered to God. Unity therefore on the horizontal plane of all the faithful among themselves, unity on the vertical plane of all the faithful to God.[444]

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[441] *In Eph*., cap. 4, lect. 2: "in Ecclesia est idem finis, qui est Deus. Filius enim ducit nos ad Patrem."

[442] *De virtutibus* q. 1, a. 9, co.. "Homo autem non solum est civis terrenae civitatis, sed est particeps civitatis caelestis Ierusalem, cuius rector est Dominus, et cives angeli et Sancti omnes, sive regnent in gloria et quiescant in patria, sive adhuc peregrinentur in terris, secundum illud Apostoli, *Ephes.* II, 19: *Estis cives sanctorum, et domestici Dei*, et cetera. Ad hoc autem quod homo huius civitatis sit particeps, non sufficit sua natura, sed ad hoc elevatur per gratiam Dei."

[443] "La conclusion s'impose: le bien commun de la société religieuse est Dieu lui-même, possédé dans la gloire ou dans la grâce. Plus simplement, peut-on dire, ce bien commun, c'est la gloire, est c'est la grâce." Travers, *Valeur sociale de la liturgie*, 152.

[444] "Sur ce bien commun, une société veritable s'édifie, la multitude s'ordonne. Une unite d'ordre se trouve dans l'Église selon que les membres se dévouent les uns aux autres et selon qu'ils s'ordonnent à Dieu. Unité

Finally, in the passage quoted earlier from the *De malo*, we saw Aquinas argue that a human society can be considered as one man. Importantly, Aquinas ended that passage citing 1 Corinthians 12:12: "For just as the body is one and has many members, and all the members of the body, though many, are one body, so it is with Christ." This leads to what is for our purposes a critical conclusion: the Church can be considered as an agent, with acts that are proper to it. As Benoît-Dominique De La Soujeoule points out, the acts of the Church are acts of the ordered intellects and wills of its members as members of the Church.[445] But equally, he adds, using French culture as an analogy, there is an activity belonging to the group that cannot be attributed exclusively to any part.[446] Again, we see the necessary distinction between the acts of the whole and the parts that has re-emerged continually throughout this chapter. Approaching the mystery of the Church has not required us to abandon what we have seen so far about the structure of human societies. The Church is different to a city, a corporation, an orchestra, but following the examples of Paul and Aquinas we can draw on these other forms of society to understand the society that is the Church.

5. Affections Establish the Church

Given what we have seen Aquinas say so far about different societies being established out of affections, such as fear and friendship, it is no surprise that Aquinas sees the affections as integral to establishing and maintaining the Church. When commenting on Paul's exhortation to the Corinthians to "be of one mind, have peace," (2 Cor 13:11), Aquinas explains that there is a twofold union necessary for uniting members of the Church. The first is an interior union, where members have the same mind through faith: as to the intellect, this means believing the same things, and as to affection, loving the same things with the affection of

donc au plan horizontal de tous les fidèles entre eux, unite au plan vertical de tous les fidèles à Dieu." Travers, *Valeur sociale de la liturgie*, 155.

[445] De La Soujeole, *Mystery*, 506.

[446] De La Soujeole, *Mystery*, 506. He later explains at p. 508 that there is a twofold way in which we can understand the acts of the subject "Church." We must ultimately refer the supreme acts of the Church's activity to God. Therefore the quality of its acts such as the continuance of the infallible preaching the Gospel and the uninterrupted celebration of the sacraments can be attributed to the Holy Spirit. But the more "ordinary" acts of the Church, while benefiting from the assistance of the Holy Spirit, can be attributed to the Church as a distinct subject and secondary cause.

charity.[447] Here Aquinas offers one of his most profound observations about the affections, all the more notable because he says it of members of the Church: "True wisdom is when the activity of the intellect is perfected and completed by repose and delight in the affections."[448] Life in the Church is not about a numbing of the mind and a deadening of our affections, but about the flourishing of both these faculties of intellect and will. The second union is the exterior union of peace.[449] He takes Paul's command, "have peace," as referring to peace among the members of the Church.

Aquinas's comments here are consistent with similar passages where he discusses unity in the Church. In his commentary on the Letter to the Philippians, for example, he discusses Paul's reference to a "society of the Spirit", where he exhorts the Philippians: "fulfil my joy, that you have the same mind, having the same charity, having full accord, thinking together." (Phil 2:2). In commenting on this verse, Aquinas points to the special society among men who share things, such as soldiers sharing weapons. The "society of the Spirit", however, is a sharing in spiritual goods, such as joy and comfort.[450] The force of these passages is how they place affectivity directly at the centre of what it means to belong to the Church. The affections are not something ancillary to the Church, but essential to its nature.

6. Affections and unity

We saw in Section 1 that emotions not only establish a group, but also maintain it and preserve solidarity among the members. When Aquinas discusses affections in the Church, it emerges that he sees the maintenance and unity of the Church as going hand-in-hand. If a unity of order is essential to the Church existing in the first place, this unity must be

[447] *In II Cor*., cap. 13, lect. 3: "Est autem duplex unio necessaria ad membra Ecclesiae unienda. Una est interior, ut scilicet idem sapiant per fidem, quantum ad intellectum, idem credendo, et per amorem, quantum ad affectum, idem diligendo."

[448] *In II Cor*., cap. 13, lect. 3: "Et ideo dicit idem sapite, id est idem sentiatis de fide, et idem diligatis affectu caritatis. Quia tunc est vera sapientia, quando operatio intellectus perficitur et consummatur per quietationem et delectationem affectus."

[449] *In II Cor*., cap. 13, lect. 3: "Alia est exterior, scilicet pax."

[450] *In Philip*., cap. 2, lect. 1: "ex speciali societate, et haec est inter homines, qui communicant in rebus. Sicut socii in bellicis armis, ita boni spirituales, quae sibi communicant in spiritualibus bonis. Et ideo dicit *si qua societas Spiritus*, scilicet est mihi ad vos, implete meum gaudium."

preserved in order for the Church to continue, and more importantly to have strength and vitality.

He develops this point in his commentary on the Letter to the Philippians, where Paul encourages the Philippians to mutual charity (Phil 2:2). Aquinas again sees this unity as consisting interiorly and exteriorly, in affections and in deeds. He stresses that Paul's exhortation to be "of one mind" refers to the object of charity, in other words, "have the same mind in regard to things of faith."[451] This comment is important for the emphasis that it places on common apprehension—unity of affection presumes unity of apprehension, and the objects of apprehension for members of the Church are the things of faith.

In his commentary on John's Gospel, he stresses that Jesus' prayer to the Father in John 17, "that they may all be one", is a prayer not merely for the apostles but for the entire assembly of the faithful.[452] He twice notes that something is preserved in existence only as long as it remains one, and when it is divided it ceases to be. Importantly for our purposes, he places this unity in common apprehension and affection: "And indeed in the Father and the Son who are one, we are one. Because if we seek different things to believe and desire, our affections are diffused into many things."[453]

Unity in things of faith is also critical because it provides the Church with its unity of order. Here we may turn to Paul's metaphor of the Church as a body, which is his dominant image for the unity of the Church. An example is Ephesians 4:6: "from whom the whole body, joined and knit together by every joint with which it is supplied, when each part is working properly, makes bodily growth and upbuilds itself in love." Aquinas explains that there are three ways in which one body is composed of many members: through its structure or union, just as the natural body has structured body parts; through its connections, as the natural body has ligaments and tendons; and through its mutual activity and support, as the members of the

[451] *In Philip*., cap. 2, lect. 1: "quasi dicat: idem sapiatis circa ea quae sunt fidei."
[452] *In Ioan*., cap. 17, lect. 5: "Petit autem pro toto coetu fidelium."
[453] *In Ioan*., cap. 17, lect. 5: "Et quidem in Patre et Filio qui sunt unum, sumus unum]: quia si diversa quaerimus credendo et desiderando, affectus noster diversificatur ad multa."

body support each other.[454] Faith in Christ, the head of the body, provides the body with its structure, and this faith as well as charity is what joins the members of the mystical body to one another for their mutual support.[455]

This mutual ordering of the members to each other—the "horizontal" aspect to the Church's order—remains essential for the preservation of the Church. For a body to be preserved and ordered, the members must be mutually ordered. By analogy, Aquinas comments that neither the Church nor the members of the Church can be preserved (or maintained) unless they are mutually ordered and united.[456] We may say then that mutual support is a core reason for maintaining unity in the Church: each member contributes to the structure that unites other members, and members mutually support each other.

At this point we may return to the concept of concord. We have seen that concord is a form of friendship. It is also a form of peace, conveying the union of appetites among different people and in the same person (*ST* II-II 29.1).[457] This point dovetails well with the image of the Church as a body, which also suggests an affective unity. An effect of concord is that one rejoices together with others in their good, and sorrows in their evil.[458] Aquinas argues that this solicitude of the members for one another keeps the members within the unity of the body—that they suffer with each other and rejoice with each other (1 Cor 12:26).[459] Elsewhere he emphasises that the purpose of one member receiving a particular gift is for the

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[454] *In Eph*., cap. 4, lect. 5: "Spiritualiter ergo, sicut unum corpus efficitur ex multis his tribus modis, scilicet per compactionem seu adunationem, per ligationem et per mutuam operationem et subventionem: ita et omnia, quae sunt a capite corporali, scilicet compactio, nervorum ligatio, ad opus motio, fluunt a capite nostro Christo in corpore Ecclesiae."

[455] *In Eph*., cap. 4, lect. 5: "primo, compactio per fidem; unde dicit ex quo, scilicet Christo, qui est caput nostrum, ut modo dictum est, totum corpus compactum est, id est, coadunatum." *In Eph*., cap. 4, lect. 5: "fluit a Christo capite in corpus Ecclesiae suae mysticum connexio et colligatio, quia oportet adunata aliquo nexu vel vinculo necti, vel colligari. Et propter hoc dicit et connexum per omnem iuncturam subministrationis, id est per fidem et caritatem, quae connectunt et coniungunt membra corporis mystici ad mutuam subministrationem."

[456] *In II Cor*., cap. 13, lect. 3: "Et haec duo ita se habent, quod unum est exterius, aliud interius. Constat enim quod corpora non possunt servari et ordinari, nisi membra ordinentur ad invicem. Similiter nec Ecclesia, nec Ecclesiae membra, nisi ordinentur et uniantur ad invicem."

[457] *ST* II-II 29.1: "Unde concordia importat unionem appetituum diversorum appetentium, pax autem, supra hanc unionem, importat etiam appetituum unius appetentis unionem."

[458] *In Rom*., cap. 12, lect. 3: "Concordia autem potest dupliciter attendi. Uno modo quantum ad effectum in bonis et in malis. In bonis quidem, ut aliquis bonis aliorum congaudeat … In malis autem, ut aliquis tristetur de malis alterius."

[459] *In I Cor*., cap. 12, lect. 3.

sake of others: "As long as each one of the faithful serves another according to the grace given to him, he is made the other's member."[460]

CONCLUSION

The elements of collective affections are certainly present in Aquinas's thought, even if a developed theory is not. His account of the affections of crowds suggests at least an awareness of collective affectivity. In taking his statements about collective affections and asking how they work, I suggest that the answer lies in the lines that I have traced—in a common end, unity of order, and group policies and action. It also lies in preserving the distinction between the acts of the whole and the acts of the parts, which has been such a recurring theme of this chapter.

One important contribution of the collective emotions literature is its emphasis on ritual. The example of the Mitsubishi apology shows that rituals have a unique capacity to communicate affection, and to elicit an affective response. The recipient of this communication may be someone outside the group, such as James T. Murphy, or onlookers at the ritual. The recipients may also however be the members of the group themselves, who participate in the expression of the collective affection, and in doing so have their own affections formed at an individual level. It is in this aspect of moral formation through affective participation in the rituals of the Church that merits much deeper exploration. Thus we turn in the next chapter to study how the church expresses its affections through collective worship.

[460] *In Rom.*, cap. 12, lect. 2: "Unde dum unusquisque fidelis secundum gratiam sibi datam alteri servit, efficitur alterius membrum."

CHAPTER 4: RELIGIOUS AFFECTIONS

INTRODUCTION

The aim of this chapter is to study the place of affections in the Church's collective worship. We established in Chapter 3 that ritual is a privileged place where collectives express their affections and where individual members are formed in the affections of the collective. This is especially true for the Church and its worship. The chapter will be in four sections. In Section 1 I establish that affectivity is central to Aquinas's understanding of worship. In Section 2 I look more closely at eight of the affections that recur in his discussion of worship, which I term "religious affections." In Section 3 I take some liturgical texts and study how the Church expresses its affections, on what occasions, and with what language. In Section 4 I turn to the question of normativity, asking whether members of the Church ought to have particular religious affections, and what they might do if those affections are absent or weak.

SECTION 1: General Principles concerning Worship

In this section I establish in four steps how Aquinas approaches affectivity in worship. The first step is to demonstrate that the virtue of religion consists in interior acts of the will as well as external acts. The second is to show that even exterior acts of worship always pertain to the affections. The third is to examine the place of affectivity in prayer. The fourth is to trace the attention that Aquinas gives to the affections in his explanation of the parts of the Mass.

1. The Virtue of Religion

Aquinas situates worship within the virtue of religion, which itself is a part of the virtue of justice, concerning the obligations one has to benefactors, parents, society, and others.[461] The virtue of religion specifically is about what one owes to God. The obligation to worship God is ultimately grounded in causality: all things owe their being to a highest beginning

[461] *ST* II-II 80.1.

(*principium*), and so the human mind must recognise this by offering to that highest beginning, God, something that it offers to no one else. That something is worship.[462]

The virtue of religion has several acts, both interior and exterior, by which God is worshipped. The interior acts are devotion and prayer. The external acts are adoration, where one uses one's body to reverence God; sacrifice, where some external thing is offered to God; and external acts where something belonging to God is taken, either a sacrament, or the name of God, such as by an oath or a vow.[463]

Two things about the virtue of religion help to situate worship within moral formation. The first is that, given it falls under the virtue of justice, it is a moral virtue. This means that just as one acquires a moral virtue through repeated acts pertaining to the virtue, one acquires the virtue of religion through repeated acts of religion. Someone who prays to God once every ten years could not be said to have the virtue of religion, understood as a stable disposition toward the good of honouring God. The virtue requires repetition and regularity. The second is that, for Aquinas, the virtue of religion is not simply one moral virtue among many. Rather, all moral virtues are about ordering us to God, and since the acts of the virtue of religion order us to God directly and immediately, it has a preeminent place among the moral virtues.[464]

2. Internal and external aspects of worship

Aside from his articles on the virtue of religion, another key text is Chapter 119 of Book III of the *Summa contra Gentiles*, entitled: "That by certain sensible things our mind is directed to God." The chapter is aimed at answering the question of why we worship, and specifically why our worship requires the use of sensible things, whether they be movements of the body, particular words, food and drink—everything, in a word, that is expressed by the body or perceived by the senses in divine worship.

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[462] *SCG* III 120, n. 5: "animus hominis excitandus ad hoc quod aestimet esse unum summum rerum principium, per hoc quod ei aliquid exhibeat quod nulli alteri exhibetur. Et hoc dicimus latriae cultum." See also *ST* II-II 81.1 ad. 4: "specialis honor debetur Deo, tanquam primo omnium principio, etiam specialis ratio cultus ei debetur."

[463] *ST* II-II 82.

[464] *ST* II-II 81.6: "religio praeeminet inter alias virtutes morales."

Aquinas's explanation places worship in both a divine and anthropological context. Divine, because worship is of divine institution, and its purpose is that man's thoughts may be on divine things. Anthropological, because he gives here a brief account of the relationship between the physical and the spiritual, the acts of the body and the acts of the soul, all while explaining why sensible things are employed in the liturgy. A crucial passage is the following, where he argues that external acts of worship are done for the sake of affection:

> Certain sensible actions are performed by man, not to arouse God by them, but to prompt man himself by them to divine things: such as prostrations, genuflexions, vocal exclamations, and singing. These are not done as if God needed them, who knows all things, and whose will is unchangeable, and who recognises the affection of the mind and not the movement of the body. But we do them for ourselves, so that by these sensible actions our intention be directed to God, and the affection kindled. At the same time by these means we declare that God is the author of our soul and body, to whom by both spiritual and corporal things we show homage.[465]

He develops this point further when he states that heretics who criticise bodily worship forget that they are men, because they do not see sensible objects as necessary for interior knowledge and affection. His conclusion is an appeal to the experience of worship: "for by experience it is evident that through acts of the body the soul is excited to a certain knowledge or affection. Therefore, it is clear that we may also use certain bodily things for the raising of our minds to God."[466]

This latter point is significant for the way that Aquinas presents worship as a moral teacher. In arguing for the moral goodness of bodily worship, his authority is an appeal to the interior experience of worship. In these and like passages, for example when he explains the reasons for the ceremonial precepts of the old law in the *Summa Theologiae*, he gives primacy to interior worship:

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[465] *SCG* III 119, n. 4: "Exercentur etiam ab hominibus quaedam sensibilia opera, non quibus Deum excitet, sed quibus seipsum provocet in divina: sicut prostrationes, genuflexiones, vocales clamores, et cantus. Quae non fiunt quasi Deus his indigeat, qui omnia novit, et cuius voluntas est immutabilis, et affectum mentis, non motum corporis propter se acceptat: sed ea propter nos facimus, ut per haec sensibilia opera intentio nostra dirigatur in Deum, et affectio accendatur. Simul etiam per haec Deum profitemur animae et corporis nostri auctorem, cui et spiritualia et corporalia obsequia exhibemus."

[466] *SCG* III 119, n. 5: "experimento apparet quod per corporales actus anima excitatur ad aliquam cogitationem vel affectionem. Unde manifestum est convenienter etiam corporalibus quibusdam nos uti ad mentis nostrae elevationem in Deum."

> As the body is ordered to God through the soul, so exterior worship is ordered to interior worship. But interior worship consists in this, that the soul is united to God by the intellect and affection. And for that reason, according to the different ways in which the intellect and affection of a worshipper of God are properly united to God, his exterior acts are accordingly applied in different ways to the worship of God.[467]

Aquinas does not refer to apprehension in these passages, but he does explain that the movement of one's mind in worship is by way of intention (*intentio*).[468] This has a particular meaning for Aquinas, where the intellectual power of the soul directs what it apprehends to the knowledge or operation of something else.[469] It follows, however, that the new object is not only an object of the intellect but also of the will, and is therefore capable of being apprehended as good or bad, desirable or undesirable, and so on. To illustrate, if someone sees a crucifix—an object of sensible apprehension—and from the crucifix is moved by way of intention to contemplate God's sacrificial goodness, then God's sacrificial goodness becomes the object of intellectual apprehension. We may say then that the purpose of external worship is to apprehend divine things intellectually: "it has been provided by God that sensible things be made a reminder to man of divine things, so that through this the intention of man may be better recalled to the divine."[470] Aquinas is explicit about this mental aspect to worship, stating that exterior sacrifice is "a representation of the interior true sacrifice according to which the human mind offers itself to God. Moreover our mind offers itself to God as the principle of its creation, as the author of its activity, as the end of its happiness."[471]

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[467] *ST* I-II 101.2: "sicut corpus ordinatur in Deum per animam, ita cultus exterior ordinatur ad interiorem cultum. Consistit autem interior cultus in hoc quod anima coniungatur Deo per intellectum et affectum. Et ideo secundum quod diversimode intellectus et affectus colentis Deum Deo recte coniungitur, secundum hoc diversimode exteriores actus hominis ad cultum Dei applicantur."

[468] *SCG* III 119, n. 4: "ea propter nos facimus, ut per haec sensibilia opera intentio nostra dirigatur in Deum, et affectio accendatur."

[469] *ST* I 79.10 ad. 3: "id quod apprehendit, ordinat ad aliquid aliud cognoscendum vel operandum, et hic vocatur intentio."

[470] *SCG* III 119, n. 1: "provisum est divinitus homini ut etiam in sensibilibus rebus divinorum ei commemoratio fieret, ut per hoc hominis intentio magis revocaretur ad divina."

[471] *SCG* III 120, n. 9: "Exterius autem sacrificium repraesentativum est interioris veri sacrificii, secundum quod mens humana seipsam Deo offert. Offert autem se mens nostra Deo quasi suae creationis principio, quasi suae operationis actori, quasi suae beatitudinis fini.

3. The Affectivity of Prayer

In one of Aquinas's pithiest observations on prayer, he states: "prayer interprets our desires before God."[472] This short statement contains the essence of his teaching on affectivity in prayer. It is not that prayer *is* desire, but it is an *interpretation* of desire. The context for this observation is a question on the Lord's Prayer, by which, he says, we not only ask for all that it is right to desire, but also the order in which we ought to desire those things. He concludes: "this prayer not only teaches us to ask, but also directs all our affections."[473]

A fuller and entirely consistent account is found in the *Commentary on the Sentences*, where Aquinas sets out the place of the affections in prayer, while arguing that prayer is an act of the reason. Authoritative statements about the affectivity of prayer in fact form the principal objections. For example, Augustine defines prayer as "the pure affection of the mind directed to God."[474] For Hugh of St Victor, prayer is "a certain devotion proceeding from compunction", which Aquinas immediately follows with the observation that devotion pertains to affection.[475] Does it not follow from this that prayer is in the affections rather than the reason? Aquinas's reply does not contradict these authorities and objections. He clarifies, however, that if prayer is about demonstrating our wishes to God, this demonstration is an act of reason.[476] Likewise, deciding what is fitting to ask from God involves the ordering of one thing to another, and since putting things in order is an act of reason, so is prayer. This insistence on the role of reason does not diminish the affectivity of prayer, because the act of reason is to bring forward the will's desire to God. He affirms Augustine's above definition of prayer as the "pure affection of the mind directed to God", but it is precisely this *directing* of the affections that is prayer.[477]

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[472] *ST* II-II 83.9: "Quia enim oratio est quodammodo desiderii nostri interpres apud Deum, illa solum recte orando petimus quae recte desiderare valemus."

[473] *ST* II-II 83.9: "haec oratio non solum instruat postulare, sed etiam sit informativa totius nostri affectus."

[474] *In IV Sent*., d. 15, q. 4, a. 1, qc. 1, arg. 1: "oratio est purus affectus mentis in Deum directus."

[475] *In IV Sent*., d. 15, q. 4, a. 1, qc. 1, arg. 2: "Hugo de s. Victore dicit quod oratio est devotio quaedam ex compunctione procedens. Sed devotio ad affectum pertinet. Ergo et oratio."

[476] *In IV Sent*., d. 15, q. 4, a. 1, qc. 1, s.c.1: "dicit Glossa, quod oratio est quando vota nostra Deo pandimus. Sed pandere, sive demonstrare, est actus rationis. Ergo et orare."

[477] *In IV Sent*., d. 15, q. 4, a. 1, qc. 1, ad 1: "ipsa directio affectus in Deum oratio est." Elsewhere he stresses again the affectivity of prayer. In his *Compendium on Theology*, prayer makes us intimate with God, since the soul "is raised up to God and converses with him in spiritual affection." *CT*, Bk II, cap. 2: "ipsa oratio quae ad

Given how much of collective worship is vocal, Aquinas's comments on the role of the voice in prayer deserve attention, since much of what he says of prayer in general is also true of prayer in collective worship. When he asks whether prayer should be vocal, he answers this question from two perspectives: common prayer and individual prayer. In the case of common prayer (by which here he means prayer offered by the ministers of the Church on behalf of the people), vocal prayer allows everyone to know what is being prayed for.[478] This brief observation highlights the importance of language in collective worship. Unless there is some enunciation of what the community is praying for, whatever prayers are offered will only be in the silence of one's heart; that is, in the hearts of individuals. Without vocal prayer, the prayers of the collective as a collective go unstated. As to individual vocal prayer, Aquinas touches first on the themes of apprehension and affection:

> In order to excite interior devotion, whereby the mind of the person praying is raised to God, because by means of external signs, whether of words or of deeds, the human mind is moved as regards apprehension, and consequently also as regards the affections.[479]

This first reason for using the voice in prayer is consistent with his observations about worship generally. The words of prayers have the capacity to move our affections by moving our apprehension. His second reason for the use of the voice is that we serve God with our bodies—specifically here through our voice—and not simply our minds. The third reason is that the voice is used from an overflow of devotion into the body.[480] In a similar passage elsewhere he adds a fourth reason, that we maintain our concentration by uniting words to the

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Deum emittitur, familiares nos Deo facit, dum mens nostra elevatur ad ipsum, et quodam spirituali affectu Deo colloquitur."

[478] *ST* II-II 83.12: "oportet quod talis oratio innotescat toti populo, pro quo profertur. Quod non posset fieri nisi esset vocalis."

[479] *ST* II-II 83.12: "Adiungitur tamen vox tali orationi triplici ratione. Primo quidem, ad excitandum interiorem devotionem, qua mens orantis elevetur in Deum. Quia per exteriora signa, sive vocum sive etiam aliquorum factorum, movetur mens hominis et secundum apprehensionem, et per consequens secundum affectionem." A similar passage is in *In I Tim*, cap. 2, lect. 2: "Augustinus: quod exterius orando agimus, facimus ut affectus noster interius excitetur. Genuflexiones enim et huiusmodi non sunt per se acceptae Deo, sed quia per haec tamquam per humilitatis signa homo interius humiliatur, sicut elevatio manus significat elevationem cordis."

[480] *ST* II-II 83.12: "Tertio, adiungitur vocalis oratio ex quadam redundantia ab anima in corpus ex vehementi affectione."

affections of prayer.[481] Affectivity is therefore the clear thread running through the reasons for vocal prayer.

Aquinas's comments about public prayer are repeated elsewhere, and echo the theme of the parts and the whole that ran through Chapter 3. For example, when commenting on Jesus' teaching about praying in one's room with a closed door, and not on the street corner, he distinguishes between prayer that seeks the good of the individual and prayer that seeks the good of the multitude.[482] He comments that in public prayer what is sought is not only the good of the individual, but also the good of the multitude, which is why the Church instituted chant.[483] This short observation, seemingly made almost as an afterthought, hints at the powerful role that music can play in shaping collective affections in worship, but also reinforces the point that the collective has ends in prayer that are distinct from the ends of individuals.

4. Affectivity in the Mass

We can study the place of affections in worship in more detail by turning to Aquinas's commentaries on the Mass, which are found in both the *Commentary on the Sentences* and in the *Summa Theologiae*.[484] In both passages, he is commenting on the words of the Mass as a whole, having considered the precise words of the rite of consecration elsewhere in the texts. His treatment in the *Commentary on the Sentences* is the more extensive, so I shall analyse that text principally.

Aquinas divides the Mass into three main parts: the first is from the beginning of Mass until the collect; the second and largest part runs from the epistle until the reception of communion, the third part is the thanksgiving after communion, which includes the communion antiphon and the closing prayer. In every main part of the Mass, and in almost

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[481] *In IV Sent*., d. 15, q. 4, a. 2, qc. 1, co.: "ut intentionem custodiat ne evagetur; magis enim tenetur ad unum, si verba etiam orantis affectui conjungantur."

[482] *In Matt*, cap. 6, lect. 2.

[483] *In Matt*, cap. 6, lect. 2: "quia per huiusmodi clamores ad devotionem excitantur aliqui, ideo instituti sunt cantus."

[484] *In IV Sent*., d. 8, q. 2, a. 4, qc. 3, expos.; *ST* III 83.4.

every further division he makes within those parts, he explains the part with reference to an affection.

Taking the first part, he recounts how the people are prepared for the opening prayer of the Mass, called the Collect. This preparation is by way of devotion, contrition, and hope. Devotion is aroused by the Introit, also called today the Entrance Antiphon or Entrance Chant. The text of the Introit in some way pertains to the particular solemnity that the people are celebrating, "in the devotion of which the people are assembled."[485] Does he mean that those attending Mass are doing so out of their common devotion? Or does he mean that the Introit itself brings about the devotion? The answer, practically and textually, must surely be both. If people know what the celebration is (the memorial of a saint, the Solemnity of the Assumption, Ash Wednesday, and so on), they may well be gathered from their devotion for that celebration. But the Introit also gives expression to that devotion, as well as exciting it in those who do not have it.[486]

The second way in which the people are prepared for prayer is humility, namely through the *Kyrie eleison*, in which the one entreating mercy expresses contrition for his sins. Finally, there is the *Gloria*, which Aquinas first explains as "right intention directed to the heavenly fatherland and glory", and which later in the text he describes as pertaining to hope.[487] Already in this first part of the Mass, then, we see the people being assembled from common affections and with the purpose of expressing those affections.

The second part of the Mass begins with the scriptural readings. Aquinas accounts for this part of the Mass by reference to the object of the people's attention. The greeting "The Lord

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[485] *In IV Sent*., d. 8, q. 2, a. 4, qc. 3, expos.: "Primo per devotionem, quae excitatur in introitu; unde et sumitur ex aliquo pertinente ad solemnitatem, in cujus devotionem populus congregator." In the *Summa* he takes a different approach, commenting that the Introit is a preparation for the sacrament by way of divine praise. His reasoning is that the Introit is frequently chosen from a Psalm, and as Dionysius comments, the psalms express through praise whatever is contained in sacred scripture. See *ST* III 83.4.

[486] Congregation for Divine Worship and the Discipline of the Sacraments, "General Instruction of the Roman Missal", *Roman Missal*, n. 142: "The purpose of this chant is to open the celebration, foster the unity of those who have been gathered, introduce their thoughts to the mystery of the liturgical season or festivity, and accompany the procession of the priest and ministers."

[487] *In IV Sent*., d. 8, q. 2, a. 4, qc. 3, expos.: "per rectam intentionem, quae ad caelestem patriam et gloriam dirigenda es." *In IV Sent*., d. 8, q. 2, a. 4, qc. 3, expos.: "*gloria in excelsis*, quod pertinet ad spem."

be with you", for example, is there to remind people of the divinity of Christ.[488] Likewise, whether the readings are from the Old or New Testament, the teachings direct us to Christ. When he comes to the Alleluia, he comments that it expresses our hope in eternal things, and that during Eastertide when there are two alleluias, these are said "on account of the joy of the resurrection of the head and of the members."[489] In the *Summa*, he explains the Alleluia as expressing spiritual joy, and when the Alleluia is replaced by a tract, it expresses spiritual groaning.[490] This explanation of the joy behind the Alleluia, that it is on account of the resurrection, recalls our critique of Margaret Gilbert's example of the friends who decide to be excited. The word "Alleluia" is not simply *there* in the Mass, the product of an arbitrary judgement. It is there to express an affection, and the affection is on account of the Christian belief in the resurrection. From that belief follows the hope and joy that the word "Alleluia" expresses.

We turn next to the offertory, which Aquinas sees as consisting in three elements, all of which are affective. First, the preparation for the offertory is in the exultation of those making the offering. He cites St Paul's claim that, "God loves a cheerful giver" (2 Cor 9:7). Next is the petition of the offering itself. As we shall see, prayers of petition express the affection of hope. The third part is the priest's self-humbling and contrition, in the words, "with humble spirit and contrite heart." Aquinas connects these three elements by apprehension, observing that each requires the raising of the mind to God, hence each is preceded by "The Lord be with you" or "Pray brethren."[491]

Following the offertory is the Preface, by which the people are aroused to praise by a threefold exchange with the priest. This includes the imperative, "Lift up your hearts", and the call to gratitude, "Let us give thanks to the Lord our God." Again, Aquinas give reasons for each of these affections. He repeatedly uses the word *ratione* to give the doctrinal

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[488] *In IV Sent*., d. 8, q. 2, a. 4, qc. 3, expos.: "quia Christus non solum est homo, sed Deus; ideo diaconus praemittit: Dominus vobiscum, ut ad Christum quasi ad Deum homines attentos faciat."

[489] *In IV Sent*., d. 8, q. 2, a. 4, qc. 3, expos.: "Tempore autem resurrectionis duplex alleluja dicitur propter gaudium resurrectionis capitis, et membrorum."

[490] *ST* III 83.4: "tractus, in officiis luctuosis, qui significat spiritualem gemitum."

[491] *In IV Sent*., d. 8, q. 2, a. 4, qc. 3, expos.: "quia haec tria praedicta exigunt mentis erectionem ad Deum, ideo omnibus tribus praemittitur: Dominus vobiscum, loco cujus quando oratio secreta facienda est, dicitur: orate fratres."

"rationale" behind the different words of praise.[492] Affections in the Mass, it bears repeating, are never arbitrary—they always follow from a belief that the Church collectively holds.

A point of difference between the two accounts of the Mass comes in his explanation of the exchange of peace, the *pax*. In the *Commentary on the Sentences*, the reason for the *pax* is charity; in the *Summa Theologiae*, it is unity and peace.[493] The two accounts are not inconsistent. We saw in Chapter 3 how the bond of charity unites the church. Aquinas sees the exchange of peace as being an enactment of this reality. His focus on unity in the *Summa* comes from Augustine's description of the Eucharist as the "sacrament of unity",[494] and Aquinas elaborates that the Eucharist is "the sacrament of ecclesiastical unity", in which "many are one in Christ."[495] The *pax*, as a sign of charity, is therefore a preparation for receiving the sacrament of unity.

The third principal part of the Mass, and the briefest, is the thanksgiving, which consists first of the communion antiphon, which calls to mind the benefit received, and then of thanksgiving in the concluding prayer. The brevity of this part does not detract from its importance. In fact, Aquinas sees it as the conclusion of a circular pattern to our work and worship: "since all our work is begun by God, it should, in a circular fashion, be ended in him; for that reason, the office of the Mass starts by prayer and is ended in thanksgiving."[496]

SECTION 2: Religious Affections

In this brief account of the Mass we saw Aquinas mention several affections, some of which we have analysed in detail earlier in this thesis, like joy, and some of which we have mentioned but not yet studied further, like devotion. In this section, I discuss eight affections that Aquinas refers to in the context of worship, and which I therefore term "religious affections": devotion, reverence, contrition, wonder, gratitude, joy, hope, and charity. There

[492] e.g. *In IV Sent*., d. 8, q. 2, a. 4, qc. 3, expos.: "salutare, ratione redemptionis (unde subdit: per Christum Dominum nostrum)."

[493] *In IV Sent*., d. 8, q. 2, a. 4, qc. 3, expos.: "pax Domini, quod pertinet ad caritatem; *ST* III 83.4: raeparatur populus per pacem, quae datur dicendo, agnus Dei, est enim hoc sacramentum unitatis et pacis."

[494] See *ST* III 82.2 obj. 3.

[495] *ST* III 82.2 ad. 3: "Eucharistia est sacramentum unitatis ecclesiasticae, quae attenditur secundum hoc quod multi sunt unum in Christo."

[496] *In IV Sent*., d. 8, q. 2, a. 4, qc. 3, expos.: "quia omnis nostra operatio a Deo inchoata, circulariter in ipsum terminari debet; ideo Missae officium incipit ab oratione, et terminatur in gratiarum actione."

is some overlap here with the religious affections that Kendra G. Hotz and Matthew T. Mathews give in their study *Shaping the Christian Life*. They list twelve: awe, humility, gratitude, a sense of mutuality and interdependence, a sense of rightness, a sense of well-being, delight, a sense of obligation, self-sacrificial love, hope, and a sense of direction.[497] The differences are mainly in the affections beginning with "a sense of". For Aquinas, these would be explained more by justice and peace, which concern an order to the affections, but which are not affections themselves.

Hotz and Mathews make several general points about religious affections that are worth noting before we look at each affection in more detail. First, religious affections endure whether or not we are experiencing particular emotions. By emotions they mean "feelings that come and go."[498] A religious affection, by contrast, they define as "a deep, abiding feature of the human personality that grounds and orients us in all that we know, do, and feel."[499] The authors stipulate that emotions are not utterly separable from religious affections, and indeed influence them. As they put it, however, "the main current of the religious affections runs far deeper than the eddies of emotion that swirl on the surface of daily experience."[500] This account coheres with what we have seen from Chapter 1 onwards, that affections are enduring and passions are episodic, yet they mutually influence each other. While overflow into the senses can and does happen in worship, Hotz and Mathews's description of religious affections as "deep and abiding" contrasts well with the temporary, even fleeting nature of passion.

1. Devotion

We turn now to consider each religious affection in greater detail, beginning with devotion, which Aquinas in some places calls the affection of devotion (*devotionis affectum).*[501] Elsewhere he defines it as a special act of the will by which one is ready to do what pertains

[497] Hotz and Mathews, *Shaping the Christian Life*, 8.
[498] Hotz and Mathews, *Shaping the Christian Life*, 8.
[499] Hotz and Mathews, *Shaping the Christian Life*, 8-9.
[500] Hotz and Mathews, *Shaping the Christian Life*, 9.
[501] *In III Sent*., d. 9, q. 1, a. 2, qc. 2, ad 3: "Tertio ad excitandum devotionis affectum qui ex visis efficacius incitatur quam ex auditis." *In Isaiah*, cap. 2, lect. 3: "in ipso est intrandum per devotionis affectum." *In Ioan*., cap. 11, lect. 4: "devotionis affectum quem Christo exhibuit."

to the worship or service of God.[502] He does not elaborate on what he means by this "readiness", but he offers Livy's example of soldiers being devoted to their idols even to the death, for the welfare of their army. Román Bustinza comments that this readiness implies "an availability, a subjection, and a total surrender to everything relating to worship."[503] In contemporary language we would speak of people who are *committed*. The person with the religious affection of devotion is committed to the service and worship of God.

The principal cause of devotion is God, but Aquinas notes that there must also be an intrinsic cause within us of our devotion.[504] That cause takes us into the domain of apprehension. Given that appetite follows apprehension, Aquinas explains that every act of the will proceeds from some consideration, since the good understood is the object of the will.[505] From this he concludes that the cause of devotion must be meditation or contemplation, specifically of God's goodness and good works, as well as of one's own defects. These considerations together lead one to give oneself over to God's service.[506]

We can view the importance of devotion from two angles. The first is the place that it holds in Aquinas's structure of the acts of religion. Because interior acts of religion have primacy over the external, and devotion is the principal interior act of religion, devotion is the premier and principal act of religion, by which the will offers itself, and all of one's powers and acts.[507] Even though there are seventeen articles that he addresses to prayer, in contrast to the four articles where he addresses devotion, prayer is an expression *of* devotion and exists *for* devotion. Michel Labourdette observes that all the other acts of religion are derived from and

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[502] *ST* II-II 82.1: "devotio nihil aliud esse videtur quam voluntas quaedam prompte tradendi se ad ea quae pertinent ad Dei famulatum … Manifestum est autem quod voluntas prompte faciendi quod ad Dei servitium pertinet est quidam specialis actus. Unde devotio est specialis actus voluntatis." Also *ST* II-II 82.1 ad. 1: "cum devotio sit actus voluntatis hominis offerentis seipsum Deo ad ei serviendum."

[503] "Esta prontitud implica una disponibilidad, una sujeción y entrega total para todo lo referente al culto." Román Bustinza, "La religion y el actuar humano, en la "Suma Teologica" de Santo Tomas de Aquino," *Teología* 11, vol. 23-24 (1974), 124.

[504] *ST* II-II 82.3.

[505] *ST* II-II 82.3: "Omnis autem actus voluntatis ex aliqua consideratione procedit, eo quod bonum intellectum est obiectum voluntatis."

[506] *ST* II-II 82.3: "Et ideo necesse est quod meditatio sit devotionis causa, inquantum scilicet per meditationem homo concipit quod se tradat divino obsequio. Ad quod quidem inducit duplex consideratio. Una quidem quae est ex parte divinae bonitatis et beneficiorum ipsius … Alia vero est ex parte hominis considerantis suos defectus."

[507] For a good explanation of this, see Michel Labourdette, "Vertus rattachées à la justice," vol. 13 of *Cours de théologie morale*, unpublished notes, Toulouse, année scolaire 1960-1961, p. 308.

contained in devotion, though they remain distinct from it. He continues that each of these other acts has its religious worth from the devotion that animates it, "to the extent that, cut off from devotion, it would be dead and worthless."[508]

A second angle to devotion's importance is the prominence it holds in Aquinas's biblical commentaries, where he frequently turns to devotion to explain the sense of texts. When he takes the verse, "Hear, Lord, my voice, with which I cried to you, have mercy on me and hear me" (Ps 26:7), he comments: "Devotion is the reason for which someone is heard by God. Devotion is a cry of the heart which stirs God to hear."[509] Given how much of worship consists of prayers being offered in the hope that God will hear then, and indeed of asking to be heard by God ("Lord, hear our prayer"), by this criterion alone devotion is the primary religious affection. In his Gospel commentaries, too, devotion is one of his principal ways of interpreting how people interact with Jesus. This is particularly evident across chapters 11 and 12 of the Gospel of John, where Aquinas repeatedly interprets the words and actions of Martha, Mary, the crowd, and others by reference to their devotion to Jesus. He comments, for example, that Mary shows her devotion in her words to Jesus ("If you had been here, my brother would not be dead") and in her actions, falling at his feet.[510]

In passages such as this, one could surely also explain the actions of the characters by reference to their charity. Is there a meaningful distinction between devotion and charity? Aquinas addresses this directly when he poses the objection that, since giving oneself over to God is done by charity, devotion should be classed as an act of charity rather than of religion. In reply, he clarifies that while charity consists in giving oneself immediately to God, giving

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[508] "Par rapport à ce premier acte, tous les autres seront ou des dérivations plus ou moins prochaines, comme la prière, ou des expressions suscitées par lui comme l'hommage de telle ou telle puissance, du présent ou de l'avenir, etc. Tous ces actes, la dévotion les contient éminemment, non pas en ce sens qu'ils se confondraient avec elle ou ne lui ajouteraient qu'un élément accidentel: au contraire, ils en sont spécifiquement distincts et ils sont dus à Dieu pour leur propre compte, en leur particularité, mais en ce sens que chacun d'eux tient sa valeur religieuse de l'animation de la devotion qui le suscite, au point que, coupé d'elle, il serait mort et sans valeur." Labourdette, "Vertus rattachées à la justice," 308.

[509] *In Psalmos,* Ps 26, n. 7: "Devotio est causa quod audiatur a Deo aliquis. Devotio est clamor cordis qui excitat Deum ad audiendum."

[510] *In Ioan*., cap. 11, lect. 5.

oneself to God for works of divine worship pertains immediately to religion.[511] Since charity is the principle of religion, however, the relationship between charity and devotion is close, to the point that together they make a virtuous cycle, where charity causes devotion and devotion causes charity. He takes fire as the biblical image for charity, and fatness as the image for devotion.[512] Fatness here has a positive meaning. It is a metaphor that he frequently returns to, even to the point of likening people without devotion (without fat) to a spider.[513]

Already one can see what Maxime Allard, discussing Aquinas's account of devotion, describes as its "emotive complexity."[514] As Allard notes, this complexity is most on display when Aquinas details the effects of devotion, consisting of two opposite affections, sorrow and joy. How could it have such opposing effects? The explanation could be that, if the object of consideration is God's goodness, then what follows is the affection of joy, and if the object is one's failings, what follows is sorrow. Aquinas does in fact argue this, but adds to each consideration secondary effects. Yes, considering God's goodness causes joy, but it also causes sorrow in those who do not enjoy God fully, precisely because they do not enjoy God fully. Likewise, considering one's failings causes sorrow, but also gladness (*laetitia*) at the hope of God's help.[515]

Devotion is an affection that raises many of the issues about the relationship between the appetites that we discussed in chapters 1 and 2. Even though Aquinas is clear that devotion is a movement of the intellectual appetite, caused by the consideration of non-sensory objects such as God's goodness and one's own deficiencies, he is conscious of the limitations of relying solely on objects of intellectual apprehension for exciting movements of the will. It is not necessarily the case that the higher objects of contemplation—things pertaining to the divine—arouse the greatest devotion, even though in themselves they are the greatest

[511] *ST* II-II 82.2 ad. 1: "ad caritatem pertinet immediate quod homo tradat seipsum Deo adhaerendo ei per quandam spiritus unionem. Sed quod homo tradat seipsum Deo ad aliqua opera divini cultus, hoc immediate pertinet ad religionem, mediate autem ad caritatem, quae est religionis principium."

[512] *ST* II-II 82.2 ad. 2.

[513] *In Psalmos,* Ps 38, n. 7: "caret pinguedine devotionis sicut aranea."

[514] Maxime Allard, "L'acte de devotion chez Saint Thomas d'Aquin," *La Maison-Dieu* 218 vol. 2 (1999), 61.

[515] *ST* II-II 82.4.

incentive to love and therefore to devotion.[516] The reason is the weakness of the human mind, which needs guiding to the knowledge and love of divine things by means of sensible things that are known to us. In first place among these is the humanity of Christ, through which are guided towards devotion to that which is divine.[517] Aquinas offers this as his sole example, but Christianity's long tradition of iconography, architecture, statuary, candles, incense, to name a few examples, all find their *raison d'être* in guiding us to devotion. We saw earlier that one of Aquinas's reasons for vocal prayer and chant is the role they play in exciting devotion.[518] The same would go for biblical imagery and preaching that evokes the interior senses. One can certainly meditate on the truth that God is merciful, but may be more moved to devotion by parables such as the Prodigal Son and his father, and other concrete instances of his mercy.

Aquinas attributes many external signs of devotion—including tears, cries of the heart, and running—to overflow from the will to the lower appetite.[519] The most explicit instance is when he speaks of the use of the voice in prayer:

> The voice follows from vehemence of devotion in the one praying; because the movement of the higher powers, if it be strong, also overflows into the lower; and so when the mind of the one praying is set on fire by devotion, it breaks out with abandon in weeping and sighs and rejoicing and cries.[520]

We will see that devotion plays a prominent role in the liturgy, but more generally Aquinas sees it as an indispensable affection for relationship with Christ and for making contact with the sacraments.[521]

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[516] *ST* II-II 82.3 ad. 2: "ea quae sunt divinitatis sunt secundum se maxime excitantia dilectionem, et per consequens devotionem, quia Deus est super omnia diligendus."

[517] *ST* II-II 82.3 ad. 2: "Et ideo ea quae pertinent ad Christi humanitatem, per modum cuiusdam manuductionis, maxime devotionem excitant, cum tamen devotio principaliter circa ea quae sunt divinitatis consistat."

[518] *ST* II-II 91.2: "salubriter fuit institutum ut in divinas laudes cantus assumerentur, ut animi infirmorum magis provocarentur ad devotionem."

[519] *ST* II-II 82.4 ad. 3; *In Ioan*., cap. 7, lect. 3; *In Ioan*., cap. 20, lect. 1.

[520] *In IV Sent*., d. 15, q. 4, a. 2, qc. 1, co.: "ex vehementia devotionis in orante vox sequitur; quia motus superiorum virium, si sit fortis, etiam ad inferiores redundat; unde et cum mens orantis per devotionem accenditur, in fletus et suspiria et jubilos et voces inconsiderate prorumpit."

[521] *In Isaiah*, cap. 2, lect. 3: "Bernardus exponit de Christo. Petra enim erat Christus, I ad Cor. X 4; in ipso est intrandum per devotionis affectum." See also for example on the sacrament of baptism, and making contact with it through the intellect by faith, and the affections by devotion. *In IV Sent*.,. d. 4, q. 3, a. 2, qc. 2, co.: "recipiens sacramentum quodammodo contingat ipsum et per intellectum quem quidem contactum facit fides et per affectum quem contactum facit devotion."

2. Reverence

The next affection, reverence, is one that Aquinas sometimes pairs with devotion, though they are not synonymous. Their difference is evident even in everyday examples—one may be very devoted to an object of love, say a pet, but not revere it.[522] Reverence is a separate affection because it entails not only love but fear. In some places Aquinas even uses fear interchangeably with reverence, as when he takes the words "I will adore towards your holy temple in your fear" (Ps 5:7), and interprets the words "in your fear" as "namely, with reverence."[523] Elsewhere he calls the "fear of the Lord" the reverence that one owes to God, and the fear possessed by angels as the interior affection of reverence towards God.[524]

The presence of fear in relation to an object of love poses a problem. We saw in Chapter 2 that fear is a movement of the appetite *away* from an object. The reverence that is fear of the Lord must surely therefore imply a movement away from God. But as we saw in the study of awe in Chapter 2, an affection can follow the apprehension of an object under different aspects. In the case of awe, the affection follows not only the apprehension of the object's greatness, but also the apprehension of one's incapacity to comprehend the greatness of the object. This is akin to the place of fear in the affection of reverence. So what specifically is the apprehended evil in the affection of reverence? Aquinas is certainly alert to this problem; he knows that speaking of fear in relation to God demands clarification. When discussing the gift of fear in his *Commentary on the Sentences,* he describes fear as the motion of fleeing from God when someone, through the consideration of God's majesty, shrinks back to his own smallness.[525] Here he has given an account of the movement of reverence, but he has not in fact identified the object of fear. Two other passages better express what constitutes the object of filial fear. The first is from the *De veritate*:

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[522] For an example of devotion and reverence being taken together, see *In IV Sent*., d. 12, q. 3, a. 1, qc. 2, co.: "cum majori reverentia et devotione postmodum accederet." See also *ST* III 64.2 ad. 1; *ST* III 80.10; *ST* III 83.5; *In Ioan*., cap. 6, lect. 7.

[523] *In Psalmos,* Ps 5, n. 4: "*in timore tuo*, scilicet cum reverentia."

[524] *In Iob*, cap. 6, lect. 2: "*timorem domini derelinquit*, idest reverentiam quam debet habere ad Deum." *In Iob*, cap. 26, lect. 1: "Non est autem putandum quod in sanctis angelis sit timor poenalis, sed eorum reverentia ad Deum hic timor nominatur, et sic pavor refertur ad affectum, tremor autem ad exteriorem effectum."

[525] *In III Sent*., d. 23, q. 1, a. 5, ad. 1: "timor non dicit motum in Deum, sed magis fugam ab ipso, inquantum homo ex ipsius majestatis consideratione per reverentiam resilit in propriam parvitatem."

> Filial fear entails a certain flight; not however flight from God, but flight from separation from God, or making oneself equal to God, according to which fear implies a certain reverence by which man does not dare to compare himself to the divine majesty, but makes himself subject to it.[526]

We have in this passage an object of fear that coheres well with Aquinas's seminal references to God's majesty and one's own smallness in the *Commentary on the Sentences*. His negative use of the affection of daring—that one *does not dare*—draws attention to the object of fear. Comparing oneself to the divine majesty, equalling oneself to God—these are things to be feared, and the affection of reverence follows the apprehension of these as evils to be retreated from.

The concepts in these early texts are drawn together and situated more metaphysically in the *Summa Theologiae*. The following passage is prompted by the question of how the gift of fear can remain in heaven. His answer situates fear in the context of the order that creatures have to God:

> Fear implies flight from a possible arduous evil, for small evils do not induce fear. Now as each thing's good is that it remain in its own order, so each thing's evil is in departing from its order. But the order of a rational creature is that it be under God and above all other creatures.[527]

The fear in reverence, then, is the fear of departing from one's order, of not being subject to God. This non-subjection to God is the evil that leads the reverent person to stay within the right bounds of his or her smallness. Commenting on this passage, Francis B. Sullivan gives a good account of why this fear in heaven is continuous with fear on earth:

> Here we have this sentiment described in its purest form, the exemplar for reverence on earth. Charity will have reached its perfection and all the baser elements of fear will have been cleansed away. Yet still the act of reverence remains, the act of holding oneself in lowly subjection to God; one avoids the evil of rising up and placing oneself on a level with God. What is the motive for the act? The fact that one is still a *creature*.[528]

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[526] *De veritate*, q. 28, a. 4, ad 4: "quod timor filialis includit aliquam fugam; non tamen fugam Dei, sed fugam separationis a Deo, vel adaequationis ad Deum, secundum quod timor importat quamdam reverentiam per quam homo non audet divinae maiestati se comparare, sed ei se subiicit."

[527] *ST* II-II 19.11: "importat timor fugam mali ardui possibilis, parva enim mala timorem non inducunt. Sicut autem bonum uniuscuiusque est ut in suo ordine consistat, ita malum uniuscuiusque est ut suum ordinem deserat. Ordo autem creaturae rationalis est ut sit sub Deo et supra ceteras creaturas."

[528] Francis B. Sullivan, "The Notion of Reverence," *Revue de l'Université d'Ottawa* 23 (1953), 27.

Sullivan goes on to explain that reverence, the awareness of one's "creatureliness", is always present in the soul that knows and loves God.[529] Further, it is not only entirely consistent with loving God, but is a perpetual *condition* for loving God:

> It spells disaster for love to begin putting God on the same footing with ourselves, to get "chummy" in our relations with Him. True love for God must always have an element of "separation" in it, in the sense that we love Him *above* everything else, keeping ourselves in reverent subjection to Him and not striving after equality with Him.[530]

Reverence need not have God himself as its immediate object, but also other objects that lead one to apprehend God's greatness. Aquinas discusses in the *Compendium of Theology* the contemplation of heavenly bodies, such as planets and stars, and argues that the way they serve man is to demonstrate the excellence of their Creator by their splendour and greatness, so that by considering them one may be brought to reverence for God.[531] This recalls a passage from the *Summa contra Gentiles* that we already discussed in relation to awe, and which is worth revisiting. He observed there that to meditate upon God's works in his creation brings about awe at the sublime power of God, which then leads to reverence for God in our hearts. He goes on, speaking of the heavens, the stars, and the elements of the world, that when we perceive and admire the power of God in his works, *as a consequence* it brings forth reverence for God.[532] This passage clarifies that while awe and reverence have the apprehension of the object's greatness and of one's smallness in common, reverence is a distinct movement of the appetite. One is aware of one's inability to comprehend the object, and for that reason one fears not subjecting oneself to the object's greatness.

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[529] Sullivan, "The Notion of Reverence," 30.

[530] Sullivan, "The Notion of Reverence," 32. For Jesus Christ (one who is not a creature), the apprehension of the eminence of God gave rise to this fear of the Lord. Thus Aquinas explains that the Holy Spirit led Christ towards God in the affection of reverence: "For this affection of reverence to God, Christ, as a man, had before all others and to the full. And so Scripture attributes to him the fullness of the fear of the Lord." *ST* III 7.6: "Hunc enim affectum reverentiae ad Deum Christus, secundum quod homo, prae ceteris habuit pleniorem. Et ideo ei attribuit Scriptura plenitudinem timoris domini."

[531] *CT*, Bk I, cap. 170: "deserviunt tamen homini inquantum ex eorum specie et magnitudine excellentiam sui Creatoris demonstrant: unde frequenter in Scripturis admonetur homo ad considerandum caelestia corpora ut ex eis adducatur in reverentiam divinam."

[532] *SCG* II 2, n. 3: "haec consideratio in admirationem altissimae Dei virtutis ducit: et per consequens in cordibus hominum reverentiam Dei parit."

As with other affections, the affection of reverence can overflow into the sensitive appetite. Aquinas interprets Paul's exhortation to "fear and trembling" (Eph 6:5) as referring to reverence, consisting in interior fear and exterior trembling.[533] Aside from these bodily effects, however, I suggest that reverence can also be expressed by the ways in which one stays within one's physical limits. Aquinas does state that we should show reverence to God not only with our minds but also with our bodies.[534] We saw above that staying within the limits of one's creatureliness is an interior movement of the appetite, but this can also be expressed in external movement. A stamp dealer will not comport himself haphazardly with rare stamps, handling them as he would a magazine, but he will handle them carefully and slowly, possibly wearing gloves.[535] Likewise in divine worship, reverence is not only displayed (and brought about) by postures such as kneeling and prostration, but it also leads to a manner of walking, speaking, and generally moving about that is careful and measured. One does not move in divine worship as one moves about in the living room. It is not convention and respectability that demands this, but it is inherent to reverence itself.

For Aquinas, the entirety of worship exists so that man may have reverence for God.[536] The same extends to the many human institutions used in worship, such as the vessels, the altar, and practices such as washing hands.[537] One of the reasons why the sacraments make use of sensible things is that the sacraments redirect affection from sensible things to reverence for God.[538] Among the sacraments, the greatest reverence should be reserved for the Eucharist.[539]

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[533] *In Eph*., cap. 6, lect. 2: "Monet eos ad reverentiam, dicens cum timore, interius. Mal. I, 6: si ego dominus, ubi est timor meus? Et tremore, exterius. Ps. II, 11: servite Domino in timore, et cetera."

[534] *In IV Sent*., d. 15, q. 4, a. 2, qc. 1, co.: "Deo, cui reverentia exhibetur, non solum mente, sed etiam corpore serviendum est."

[535] Witness the reverence displayed by the stamp dealer—the only character who grasps the stamps' preciousness— in the 1963 film *Charade*, as he handles and speaks about the stamps.

[536] *ST* I-II 102.4: "totus exterior cultus Dei ad hoc praecipue ordinatur ut homines Deum in reverentia habeant." *SCG* III 120, n. 5: "cultus exterior homini necessarius est ad hoc quod anima hominis excitetur in spiritualem reverentiam Dei."

[537] *ST* III 64.2 ad. 1: "illa quae aguntur in sacramentis per homines instituta, non sunt de necessitate sacramenti, sed ad quandam solemnitatem, quae adhibetur sacramentis ad excitandam devotionem et reverentiam in his qui sacramenta suscipiunt"; *ST* III 65.1 ad. 6: "consecratur altare et vasa propter reverentiam Eucharistiae"; *In IV Sent*., d. 9, q. 1, a. 4, qc. 2, co.: "celebrantes, vel tractaturi aliquod sacramentum, propter reverentiam manus lavant." *ST* III. 65.1 ad. 6: "ablutio manuum fit in celebratione Missae propter reverentiam huius sacramenti."

[538] *In IV Sent*., d. 1, q. 1, a. 2, qc. 1, co.: "quae etiam affectum, qui sensibilibus subjicitur, in Dei reverentiam referret; et haec est prima causa."

[539] *In IV Sent*., d. 8, q. 1, a. 4, qc. 1, s.c. 2: "hoc sacramentum cum magna reverentia sumendum est."

The practice of fasting before receiving the Eucharist is also for the sake of reverence, and the objects used in worship should be of rarity, again in order to preserve reverence.[540] This recalls a point that we noted in Chapter 2 in the context of wonder. Just as familiarity is the enemy of wonder, it seems that for Aquinas frequency can be the enemy of reverence. He argues that the frequent reception of the Eucharist can cause someone to have less reverence for the sacrament, and in that case one should receive it rarely.[541]

3. Contrition

We turn now to contrition, which is an affection that Aquinas links with humility, such as when he states that we are healed from spiritual sickness through "humility and contrition."[542] He also refers to humility when defining contrition, following two authorities, Isidore and Gregory the Great. The former defines contrition as: "compunction and humility of mind with tears, coming from the memory of sin and fear of judgment."[543] For the latter, contrition is "the humility of spirit annihilating sin, between hope and fear."[544] Aquinas adopts Gregory's definition that contrition is humility of spirit, and elaborates on Isidore's, noting that when a contrite person is drawn away from his senses (meaning his sensitive appetites), he is humbled.[545]

One could argue that in a list of religious affections, humility should be treated as an affection in its own right, and we saw that Hotz and Mathews include it in their list of religious affections. Occasionally Aquinas does indeed refer to humility as an affection, commenting that when one bends down to the feet of a brother, the affection of humility (*humilitatis affectus*) is either stirred up in his heart, or if it is already there he is strengthened

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[540] *In IV Sent*., d. 8, q. 1, a. 4, qc. 1, co.: "quod oportet in reverentiam tanti sacramenti, praecipue propter tria institutum esse"; *ST* I-II 102.4: "Et propter hoc oportuit ut aliqua specialia tempora, et speciale habitaculum, et specialia vasa, et speciales ministri ad cultum Dei ordinarentur, ut per hoc animi hominum ad maiorem Dei reverentiam adducerentur."

[541] *In I Cor*., cap. 11, lect. 7: "Si vero ex frequenti sumptione sentiat aliquis in se minus reverentiam huius sacramenti, monendus est ut rarius sumat."

[542] *In III Sent*., d. 1, q. 1, a. 4, ad 3: "per humilitatem et contritionem spiritus sanatur."

[543] *In IV Sent*., d. 17, q. 2, a. 1, qc. 1, co.: "contritio est compunctio et humilitas mentis cum lacrymis, veniens de recordatione peccati et timore judicii."

[544] *In IV Sent*., d. 17, q. 2, a. 1, qc. 1, co.: "contritio est humilitas spiritus annihilans peccatum, inter spem et timorem."

[545] *In IV Sent*., d. 17, q. 2, a. 1, q. 1: "sicut per superbiam aliquis in sensu suo rigidus redditur, ita per hoc quod a sensu suo contritus recedit, humiliatur."

in it.[546] We might think of someone being "humbled", whether by a personal advancement or a humiliation.

The first reason why I do not include humility among the religious affections is that the dominant way in which Aquinas presents humility is as a moderating virtue on the movement of the appetite.[547] Humility is less an affection than a proper order to the affections. In his commentary on the Gospel of Matthew, Aquinas points out that pride consists in an inordinate affection and an inordinate estimation of oneself, whereas in humility it is the converse: an ordinate affection and ordinate estimation of oneself.[548] The second reason is that in worship these appetitive movements can be more immediately attributed to other religious affections. Aquinas sees it as essential to humility to know one's lack of proportion to what exceeds one's powers, and to know also one's failings.[549] Thus other religious affections are integral to humility, such as the awe and reverence that follows the apprehension of the greatness of God. He comments that humility properly regards the reverence by which man is subject to God. The same would hold even if the object is not God himself. If someone is humbled by the immensity of a basilica, or at the thought of the generations of Christians who have sat in the same pews and prayed in the same church, this movement is primarily accounted for by the affection of wonder, specifically awe.

I therefore take contrition as one of the religious affections, and acknowledge the role it can play in humility. Contrition is a species of sorrow, specifically sorrow in the will, which has for an object one's own faults, vices, and sins. In one place Aquinas describes it as an

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[546] *In Ioan*., cap. 13, lect. 3: "Cum enim ad pedes fratris inclinatur corpus, etiam in corde ipso vel excitatur, vel si iam inerat, confirmatur humilitatis affectus." See also his comment on the affection of Jesus being present in both his humility and his thanksgiving. *In Ioan*., cap. 6, lect. 1: "In affectu autem Iesu reficientis primo quidem attenditur humilitas; secundo vero gratiarum actio." He also describes humility as an interior movement of the soul. See *ST* II-II 161.1 ad. 2: "humilitas, secundum quod est virtus, in sui ratione importat quandam laudabilem deiectionem ad ima … Quandoque autem fit secundum interiorem motum animae."

[547] See *ST* II-II 161.2: "humilitatem proprie pertinet ut aliquis reprimat seipsum … humilitas proprie est moderativa motus appetitus."

[548] *In Matt*., cap. 18, lect. 1: "caritatem necessario comitatur humilitas. Et potestis hoc videre si consideretis, quis sit humilis. Sicut enim in superbia sunt duo, affectus inordinatus, et aestimatio inordinata de se: ita, e contrario, est in humilitate, quia propriam excellentiam non curat, item non reputat se dignum."

[549] *ST* II-II 161.2: "necessarium est ut aliquis cognoscat id in quo deficit a proportione eius quod suam virtutem excedit. Et ideo cognitio proprii defectus pertinet ad humilitatem sicut regula quaedam directiva appetitus."

affection of the heart.[550] Elsewhere, it is a breaking or crushing of the hardness of the will.[551] This image, he notes, preserves the dual aspects of act and passion in the will itself. When the rigidity of the will is dissolved, it is as though contrition is something that the will undergoes, but it can also occur voluntarily, in which case it is the will doing the crushing.[552]

The connection between humility, contrition and tears is pithily captured in the hymn *Come Down, O Love Divine*: "true lowliness of heart, which takes the humbler part, and o'er its own shortcomings weeps with loathing." This practice of weeping tears of contrition leads us again to the concept of overflow. Just as there is sorrow in both the will and the sensitive appetite, as we saw in Chapter 2, the same holds for contrition. Contrition can be purely an affection of the will, a displeasure that one takes in sins of one's past.[553] It can, however, also be a passion, either through overflow, or when someone voluntarily excites sorrow in the sensitive part.[554] We will see later that occasionally the Church in its worship evokes the movement of sorrow in the sensitive appetite, praying for tears of contrition, but as a rule the contrition expressed is an affection of the will.

Contrition is not an isolated affection in the Church's worship, rather it is always linked to other affections. We have seen earlier how Aquinas sees the statement of contrition in the *Kyrie eleison* as preparing the people for prayer. The Roman Missal explicitly states this in the introduction to the Penitential Rite: "Let us acknowledge our sins, and so prepare ourselves to celebrate the sacred mysteries."[555] In this case, contrition is a pre-condition for properly entering into the joy of divine worship. The Penitential Rite also ends, however, in

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[550] *In IV Sent*., d. 17, q. 2, a. 5, qc. 2, s.c. 1: "cordis affectum, qui est contritio."

[551] *In IV Sent*., d. 17, q. 2, a. 2, qc. 2, co.: "contritio, ut dictum est, est dolor respiciens, et quodammodo comminuens voluntatis duritiem; et ideo de illis solis peccatis esse potest quae ex duritia nostrae voluntatis in nos proveniunt. Et quia peccatum originale non nostra voluntate inductum est, sed ex vitiata origine naturae contractum; ideo de ipso non potest esse contritio, proprie loquendo; sed displicentia potest esse de eo, vel dolor." See also *In IV Sent*., d. 17, q. 2, a. 1, qc. 2, co.

[552] *In IV Sent*., d. 17, q. 2, a. 1, qc. 2, ad 2: "quando transfertur ad actum voluntatis, quae seipsam nata est movere, salvatur ibi similitudo et actionis et passionis in ipsa voluntate. Inquantum enim ille rigor quo propriam voluntatem quis secutus est, dissolvitur, sic ipsius voluntatis quasi quaedam passio est contritio; inquantum autem non alio cogente, sed sua sponte hoc accidit, seipsam conterere dicitur."

[553] *In IV Sent*., d. 17, q. 2, a. 3, qc. 1, co.: "Unus in ipsa voluntate, qui est essentialiter ipsa contritio, quae nihil aliud est quam displicentia praeteriti peccati."

[554] *In IV Sent*., d. 17, q. 2, a. 3, qc. 1, co.: "Alius dolor est in parte sensitiva, qui causatur ex primo dolore, vel ex necessitate naturae, secundum quod vires inferiores sequuntur motum superiorum; vel ex electione, secundum quod homo poenitens in seipso voluntarie excitatur ut de peccatis doleat."

[555] "The Order of Mass", *Roman Missal*, n. 4.

the affection of hope: "May almighty God have mercy on us, forgive us our sins, and bring us to everlasting life."[556] Hotz and Mathews, taking a similar prayer of confession in the *Book of Common Worship*, comment that genuine contrition is always accompanied by hope, preventing contrition from degenerating into self-hatred or fuelling the impulse toward self-negation.[557] Public rituals of contrition therefore do not end until we have affirmed our hope that God does pardon.[558]

4. Gratitude

Gratitude is one of the religious affections—the others being hope and charity—which Aquinas treats as both a virtue and an affection. He discusses gratitude at greatest length in his treatment of the virtue of justice.[559] On the surface, gratitude across these articles is a question of debt, more particularly a moral debt that one owes to benefactors. This may somewhat obscure its affective dimensions, but affection is in fact constitutive of gratitude. Elsewhere in his texts, Aquinas refers to gratitude specifically as an affection (*affectus gratias*), while using such phrases as *gratiarum actione* to refer to the act of gratitude that we would translate as "thanksgiving."[560]

The starting point for understanding the affectivity of gratitude is the favour (such as a good deed or a gift) that precedes it. Two things that should be considered in the bestowal of a favour upon someone: the affection, and the gift or action itself.[561] The need for both these elements can be recognised intuitively. A beautiful and costly gift may be given with contempt, and an inexpensive gift given with great love. Which is more important, the affection or the gift? Aquinas addresses precisely this question, asking whether we should attend to a benefactor's affection (*affectus*) or the deed (*effectus*). He answers that the important element is the affection of the giver, because every moral act depends on the will, so while materially a favour consists in the deed, formally and principally it consists in the

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[556] "The Order of Mass", *Roman Missal*, n.4.
[557] Hotz and Mathews, *Shaping the Christian Life*, 109.
[558] Hotz and Mathews, *Shaping the Christian Life*, 110.
[559] *ST* II-II 106.
[560] See for example *In IV Sent*., d. 8, q. 1, a. 4, qc. 3, co.; *In IV Sent*., d. 22, q. 1, a. 2, qc. 2, arg. 1; *ST* II-II, q. 106.2.
[561] *ST* II-II 106.4.

will.[562] The critical point for our purposes is when he states that the same things that should be considered in a favour—the affections and the gift itself—should be considered in repaying the favour.[563] In the case of a poor man who is unable to repay a gift, for example, repayment consists more in the affections, just as an act of kindness consists more in the affections than in the deed.[564]

Two passages serve together to define gratitude. One is from the *Commentary on the Sentences,* in which Aquinas cites Aristotle as stating that gratitude contains "the memory of another's friendship and services, and the will to repay them."[565] The other is when he takes Colossians 3:14-15 ("And above all these have charity … and be grateful."), and comments that gratitude, along with peace and joy, is an act of love.[566] We may combine these definitions and conclude that gratitude is the loving memory of another's friendly deeds and services, a definition that accords well with Georg Simmel's pithy summation of gratitude as "the moral memory of mankind."[567]

Gratitude is intimately linked to joy, which I shall discuss in more detail shortly. Aside from the benefit of joy, Aquinas identifies several other effects of gratitude. One is that through gratitude we are led to recognise that everything we have comes from God.[568] A second is that it enables us to retain the spiritual goods such as faith that we do receive.[569] A third is that through gratitude we become worthy to receive further blessings.[570] He comments: "to

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[562] *ST* II-II 106.5, also ad. 1. Aquinas clarifies that this is in a friendship of virtue. In a friendship of utility repayment considers the utility of the favour.

[563] *ST* II-II 106.4.

[564] *ST* II-II 106.3 ad. 5; also ad. 6.

[565] *In III Sent.*, d. 33, q. 3, a. 4, qc. 1, co.: "Est enim gratia in qua amicitiarum et obsequiorum alterius memoria, et remunerandi voluntas continentur."

[566] *In Col*., cap. 3, lect. 3: "monet ad actus caritatis. Et ponit duos actus, scilicet pacem et gratitudinem, et tertium innuit, scilicet gaudium."

[567] Georg Simmel, "Faithfulness and Gratitude", in *The Sociology of Georg Simmel*, trans. and ed. Kurt H. Wolff, (Glencoe, IL: The Free Press, 1950), 388.

[568] *In Eph*., cap. 5, lect. 7: "Tertius effectus est gratiarum actio: quia ex hoc quod aliquis sic affectus est ad Deum, recognoscit se omnia habere a Deo."

[569] *In Col*., cap. 2, lect. 2: "monet eos ad haec servanda. Et primo ad proficiendum, secundo ad persistendum, tertio ad gratias agendum."

[570] *In Rom*., cap. 1, lect. 5: "Non enim est dignus beneficium consequi qui de acceptis beneficiis gratias non agit."

the source from which blessings come forth they go back, that is, through gratitude, in order that they flow again, that is, through the delivery of repeated blessings."[571]

It is that first benefit—recognising that everything we have comes from God—that is at the heart of gratitude as a religious affection. In his commentary on the Creed, he again emphasis this when he comes to the words, *Creator of heaven and earth*: "Because God is indeed the Creator of all things, it is certain that what we are and what we have is from God."[572] The scriptural passages he quotes in support are instructive: "What do you have that you did not receive?" (1 Cor 4:7); "The Lord's is the earth and its fullness; the sphere of the earth and the whole world that dwells on it" (Ps 23:1); and, "What shall I render to the Lord for all that he has rendered me?" (Ps 115:12). He cites three passages here; he could have cited many others. Scriptural expressions of gratitude furnish Aquinas with multiple opportunities to comment on what God has done for us and how we should give thanks in response. In his *Commentary on First Thessalonians,* he distils three things that should be present in gratitude: it should be directed to God; it should be offered always; and it should be universal, that is, for everyone and in all things.[573] The words of many of the prefaces of the Mass reflect these three elements: "It is truly right and just, our duty and our salvation, always and everywhere to give you thanks, Lord, holy Father, almighty and eternal God."

Since gratitude is both an affection and a virtue, it is possible to have the affection of gratitude without the virtue, as when one is grateful for things for which gratitude is not due, or when someone is excessively grateful.[574] We may think of someone who promises lifelong fealty to a stranger who once held a door open for him. As with all the moral virtues, gratitude requires right reason—to be grateful to the right person, in the right place, at the right time, with the right means, and so on. But whether Aquinas is defining the virtue of gratitude or explaining the elements of thanksgiving, he insists on the primacy of the

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[571] *In Rom.*, cap. 1, lect. 5: "Eccle. I, 7: *ad locum unde exeunt flumina revertuntur*, quia ad principium unde proveniunt beneficia revertuntur, scilicet per gratiarum actiones, ut iterum fluant, scilicet per iteratam beneficiorum exhibitionem."

[572] *In Sym.*, a. 1: "enim Deus est creator omnium rerum, certum est quod quidquid sumus et quidquid habemus, a Deo est."

[573] *In I Thess.*, cap. 1, lect. 1. He is commenting on 1 Thess 1:2: "We give thanks to God always for you all, constantly mentioning you in our prayers."

[574] *ST* II-II 107.2.

affections. Raymond Hain noted this in his study of the virtue of gratitude, where he commented that "the *affectus* is the measure of gratitude", and that the aim of a return gift "is to demonstrate by some concrete means the affection which the recipient has for his benefactor."[575] Gratitude's affectivity allows us to draw fruitfully upon studies from philosophy and psychology on the emotion of gratitude, many of which demonstrate its positive effects of gratitude.[576]

Holding a different view is Stephen Jones, who laments the decline of the discourse around gratitude from treating it as a virtue to treating it as an emotion.[577] He comments that gratitude "is ultimately incoherent when characterised in affective terms."[578] Although Jones does acknowledge that gratitude is affective, he maintains that for Aquinas, "gratitude is *not* an emotion or feeling", and that Aquinas would hold that "one can indeed be grateful *without* feeling grateful."[579] The question, as always, is what one means by "emotion". Jones' position is explicable from the way he equates emotions with passions, and even affectivity more generally with movements of the sensitive appetite, rather than as also encompassing movements of the will.[580] If we do not impose these limitations (as Aquinas does not), then to characterise gratitude in affective terms is not only coherent, but faithful to Aquinas's own account.

In his commentary on Paul's letter to the Ephesians, Aquinas discusses at length Paul's encouragement to sing psalms and hymns and spiritual canticles (Eph 5:19), and ends by commenting that these are the means by which the Holy Spirit prompts someone to recognise

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[575] Raymond Hain, "The Virtue of Gratitude according to St. Thomas Aquinas," PhD diss., (Pontificium Institutum Angelicum, 1953), 74; 93-94.

[576] See for example the collected chapters in Robert A. Emmons and Michael E. McCullough (eds), *The Psychology of Gratitude* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004). For a survey of some of the empirical research into gratitude, including its individual and social effects, see Summer Allen, "The Science of Gratitude," (Berkeley: Greater Good Science Center, 2018), 28-50.

[577] Stephen Andrew Jones, "The Virtue of Gratitude According to St Thomas Aquinas," PhD diss., (Heythrop College, 2014), 35-37.

[578] Jones, "The Virtue of Gratitude," 18. In contrast, Saliers comments, "To say that a person has a deep sense of gratitude is to remark upon his or her character. To understand that emotion in its depth, we must see what is true of that individual in various situations year upon year. The evidence of such gratitude will be found in his or her actions, perceptions, and feelings. Such a deep sense is what we shall call an emotion or an affection. It is not a feeling as such since it cannot be an episodic event "inside" the person." Saliers, *The Soul in Paraphrase*, 15.

[579] Jones, "The Virtue of Gratitude," 37

[580] Jones, "The Virtue of Gratitude," 37. See his observation that charity is not affective.

that everything he has is from God, thus leading to thanksgiving. Further, the more he is affected by God and knows him, the more he sees God as greater and himself as smaller, "or more correctly close to nothing," in comparison with God.[581] We have seen already in this thesis how the knowledge of one's smallness is related to humility and awe, and more recently to reverence. In this passage, Aquinas connects it with gratitude.

5. Wonder

In the extensive case study on the affection of wonder in Chapter 2, we examined its different varieties, which included awe and admiration. The liturgies of the Church frequently express awe at God, his majesty, his creation and other works. We shall see some examples later in this chapter. The most prevalent variety of wonder in worship, however, is admiration, expressed in the act of praise.

Praise is an act of *latria*—an exterior act of worship that belongs to the virtue of religion.[582] It is also an act of admiration, following the perception of greatness in an apprehended object. When Aquinas discusses what provokes praise, he repeatedly refers to the good, the great, and excellent; for example: "nothing is praiseworthy or praised, except the good."[583] He notes also that the goodness of God and his greatness are the same thing, thus it is the same thing to "magnify" the Lord and to praise him.[584] God is praised because of the excellence of his nature, and his greatness both in his dignity and his works.[585] He cites Psalm 144:3 ("The Lord is great and exceedingly praiseworthy, and of his greatness there is no end"), to illustrate that God is praised in the scriptures as "great and existing in greatness."[586] In some

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[581] *In Eph*., cap. 5, lect. 7: "aliquis sic affectus est ad Deum, recognoscit se omnia habere a Deo. Quanto enim aliquis magis afficitur ad Deum, et ipsum cognoscit, tanto videt eum maiorem et se minorem; imo prope nihil, in comparatione ad Deum."

[582] *In IV Sent*., d. 17, d. 17, q. 3, a. 2, qc. 3, co.; *ST* II-II 3.1 ad. 1.

[583] *In II Sent*., d. 41, q. 1, a. 2, s.c. 2: "nihil laudabile est vel laudatur, nisi bonum." See also *In Psalmos*, Ps 12, n. 5.

[584] *In Psalmos*, Ps 33, n. 4: "Idem est magnificare et laudare Deum, quia idem est bonitas Dei et magnitudo." Also *In Psalmos*, Ps 47, n. 1: "magnitudo ejus est immensitas ejus bonitatis."

[585] *In Psalmos*, Ps 49, n. 1: "commendatur ab excellentia naturae." See also *DDN*, cap. 8, lect. 3 on praising God for the excellence of his powers: "Et non solum ista Deo conveniunt, sed excellenter ea habet; unde subdit: quod adhuc amplius possumus laudare Deum, sicut supereminenter habentem virtutem. *In Psalmos*, Ps 47, n. 1: "Ex dignitate … Ex operibus … Laus proprie respicit opera."

[586] *DDN*., cap. 9, lect. 1: "Deinde, cum dicit: *igitur magnus* etc., ostendit quod praemissa de Deo dicantur: laudatur enim in sacra Scriptura *Deus* sicut *magnus et in magnitudine existens*, secundum illud Psalm. 144: magnus dominus et laudabilis nimis et magnitudinis eius non est finis."

instances Aquinas pairs admiration with praise, expressing both the interior and exterior acts of the appetite, as when he states that the angels are always speaking to God in praising and admiring him.[587]

Some sort of rational comparison is always taking place in praise, where the apprehension of an object as good, great, or excellent is in relation to other objects or to some sort of standard. Thus one might praise a four-year-old for playing a lullaby on the piano, but not a professional pianist. Likewise, when many instances of excellence are assembled, say the finalists in an Eisteddfod, all performances may be worthy of praise in themselves, but to judge what is worthy of highest praise requires the making of rational comparisons. Aquinas stresses this relation, or ordering, in the apprehension that precedes praise, when he observes that praise is for things "whose goodness is considered in an order to something else."[588]

For an example of the connection between admiration and praise, we may take Aquinas's *Commentary on the Psalms*. When he relates the joyful entrance of the people into the temple in Psalm 41, he comments: "There will be the confession of the favours of grace, for they will acknowledge that they obtained them through the grace of God: and thus they will confess the wonders of God, and there follows thanksgiving and the voice of praise."[589] In this latter reference to thanksgiving we see an instance of the interplay between wonder, gratitude, and praise. Psalm 8 contains such verses as: "O Lord our Lord, how wonderful is your name in all the earth" (v.1), "I will behold your heavens, the works of your fingers: the moon and the stars that you established" (v.4), and "What is man that you are mindful of him? Or the son of man that you call upon him?" (v.5). Aquinas characterises the psalm primarily as a psalm of gratitude.[590] He sees it, however, also as a psalm of two parts, in which the psalmist first

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[587] *ST* I 107.3 ad. 2: "locutione qua angeli loquuntur Deo laudantes ipsum et admirantes, semper angeli Deo loquuntur." See also *In Matt*., cap. 17, lect. 2, where he lists Christ's meekness, poverty, and providence in paying the tribute to Caesar as being worthy of being "praised and admired": "in hac solutione tria laudanda et admiranda notantur."

[588] *In Ethica*, Bk 1, lect. 18, n. 7: "laus est eorum quorum bonitas consideratur in ordine ad aliquid aliud." See also *In Ethica*, Bk 1, lect. 18, n. 3: "omne quod laudatur videtur esse laudabile ex duobus simul, ex hoc scilicet quod in se habet aliqualem dispositionem, et ex hoc quod habet aliqualem habitudinem ad aliquid aliud."

[589] *In Psalmos*, Ps 41, n. 4: "Secundo erit ibi confessio de beneficiis gratiae; quia agnoscent se illa obtinuisse per gratiam Dei: et ideo confitebuntur mirabilia Dei: et ideo sequitur ibi gratiarum actio, et vox laudis."

[590] *In Psalmos*, Ps 8, n. 1: "hic ponit psalmum ad gratiarum actionem … hic exprimit affectionem hominis considerantis beneficia Dei concessa humano generi, et gratias agentis."

wonders at the divine excellence, and next wonders at the divine mercy.[591] It terminates with the same words as it began ("O Lord our Lord, how wonderful is your name in all the earth!" (v.10)). Aquinas makes two comments about this. First, that with these words the psalm concludes in wonder, since "God is wonderful in the eminence of his majesty."[592] Secondly, that with these words the psalm concludes in praise.[593] It follows that words of wonder about the eminence of God simply *are* words of praise.

6. Charity

We turn next to charity, which is a theological virtue pertaining to affection, a point that Aquinas makes when distinguishing charity from faith: "Faith is in knowledge, whereas charity is in affection."[594] He will also, however, refer simply to the "affection of charity."[595] We saw multiple times in Chapter 3 that charity is the cause of unity in the Church, analogous to how political friendship brings about unity in a *civitas*. Charity is, in fact, a certain friendship of man for God.[596] This friendship makes us adhere to God, uniting our minds and affections to him.[597] As well as uniting members of the Church through love of God, it is also the affection by which we love others for the sake of God, and love them that they may be in God. Aquinas even sees love of God and love of neighbour as being of the same species of act.[598]

As we saw in Chapter 2, the object of an affection of the will is a universal, thus one can fear fear, hate hatred, and so on. Aquinas does not ask whether charity *can* be loved, though he

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[591] *In Psalmos*, Ps 8, n. 1: "Primo enim psalmista admiratur divinam excellentiam. Secundo ejus clementiam."

[592] *In Psalmos*, Ps 8, n. 5: "Sicut Deus est mirabilis eminentia majestatis, ita ostenditur ex clementia; et ideo concludit admirationem, domine dominus noster et cetera."

[593] *In Psalmos*, Ps 8, n. 4: "psalmum terminat in laudem, ibi, domine dominus noster et cetera." For a like account from a Gospel commentary, see the way Aquinas describes Nathaneal as wondering at the divine power, and breaking out in an expression of confession and praise: *In Ioan*., cap. 1, lect. 16: "Admirans enim Nathanael virtutem Dei in occultorum manifestatione, quia hoc solius Dei est … Statim autem Nathanael ad hoc conversus, et virtutem divinitatis in Christo cognoscens, in vocem confessionis et laudem prorumpit."

[594] *In IV Sent*., d. 1, q. 2, a. 6, qc. 1, ad 1: "fides in cognitione est, caritas autem in affectione."

[595] See for example his use of "affectus caritatis" in *ST* II-II 26.6, and "caritatis affectio" in *ST* II-II 26.7 SC.

[596] ST II-II 25.4.

[597] *ST* II-II 17.6: "Caritas igitur facit hominem Deo inhaerere propter seipsum, mentem hominis uniens Deo per affectum amoris." *ST* II-II 17.6 ad. 3: "caritas proprie facit tendere in Deum uniendo affectum hominis Deo, ut scilicet homo non sibi vivat sed Deo."

[598] *ST* II-II 25.1: "Unde manifestum est quod idem specie actus est quo diligitur Deus, et quo diligitur proximus"

does explain that love can reflect on itself.[599] Rather, his question is whether charity *should* be loved. He answers that in the love of friendship, we wish good things to the friend that we love, but we also love the good that we wish to the friend. Thus "charity is that good we wish for all whom we love from charity."[600] In a reply, he adds that charity "is itself a sharing in the spiritual life, by which one arrives at happiness. And therefore it is loved as the good desired for all whom we love from charity."[601]

Charity holds a special place among the affections, and not only the religious affections, because it orders and perfects all the affections. The ordering of affection goes together with its perfection, and Aquinas notes in a number of places this role that charity plays: for example, "charity perfects affection", and "interior affection is perfected by charity."[602] He devotes an article to the question of how charity itself can be perfect, meaning that one loves as much as one can.[603] He explains that aside from the state in which one's whole heart is always borne towards God, which is not possible in this life, there are two other ways in which charity may be perfect. First, when someone makes himself available for God and divine things, which not all who have charity do. Secondly, when a man sets his whole heart on God habitually, which is common to all who have charity. Worship is therefore integral to this perfection of charity, because it is the giving of one's self to God and divine things. Could we say that in regular worship we are giving our "whole heart" to God habitually? That, at least, is what worship, with its collective acts of contrition and adoration, is forming us to do.

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[599] *ST* II-II 25.2: "Amor autem ex natura potentiae cuius est actus habet quod possit supra seipsum reflecti."

[600] *ST* II-II 25.2: "caritas est illud bonum quod optamus omnibus quos ex caritate diligimus. Et eadem ratio est de beatitudine et de aliis virtutibus." Aquinas regards envy as a sin contrary to charity, because in envy one is saddened at the good of another, whereas in charity one should rejoice in the goods of another. See *ST* II-II 36.3; *In I Cor*., cap. 13, lect. 2.

[601] *ST* II-II 25.2 ad. 2: "caritas est ipsa communicatio spiritualis vitae, per quam ad beatitudinem pervenitur. Et ideo amatur sicut bonum desideratum omnibus quos ex caritate diligimus."

[602] *In I Cor*., cap. 13, lect. 4: "caritas perficiat affectum"; *In Philip*., cap. 1, lect. 2: "Affectus enim interior perficitur per caritatem."

[603] *ST* II-II 24.8.

While Aquinas defines virtue generally as "the ordering of the soul's affections", this is especially true of charity, which is essential for one's affections to be wholly ordered.[604] This ordering comes from being united to God, since charity orders us to each other through a unity of affection.[605] But such ordering also comes from God being our highest and final end: "the end of all human actions and affections is the love of God."[606]

7. Hope

The movements of the affection of hope derive from the affection of charity. It is the affection by which someone "hopes for good from God, as from a friend."[607] The conditions of hope that we discussed in Section 2—a possible, arduous, future good—also hold for the theological virtue of hope. Aquinas gives the following definition of the virtue of hope in the *Summa contra Gentiles*:

> No one is moved towards an end which he considers to be impossible to reach. Therefore, so that someone proceed to a certain end, it is necessary that he be impressed by that end as something possible to be had: and this is the affection of hope. Since man is directed by grace to the final end of beatitude, it was necessary that the hope of beatitude be imprinted by grace on human affection.[608]

The image of an imprint (or engraving) on the affections captures well two things about the virtue of hope. First, it is received from an outside agent. Elsewhere, while discussing the gift of grace, Aquinas explains that God establishes in man the light of grace, which as well as elevating the mind to grasp truths exceeding reason, also elevates affection. This grace raises the affections over everything created, to love God and to hope in him, and to do what love

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[604] *In III Sent*., d. 27, q. 2, a. 4, qc. 2, ad 1: "amor sumitur pro amore naturali, qui inest cuilibet potentiae respectu sui objecti, quem virtus determinat: quia est ordinatio affectionum animae"; *CT*, Bk I, cap. 1: "necessaria est caritas, per quam tuus affectus totaliter ordinetur."

[605] *In III Sent*., d. 29, q. 1, a. 1, ad 4: "caritas ordinat ad alium secundum quod unit per affectum quantum ad ipsum."

[606] *ST* II-II 27.6: "Finis autem omnium actionum humanarum et affectionum est Dei dilectio, per quam maxime attingimus ultimum finem."

[607] *ST* II-II 17.8 ad. 2: "Sed non omnis spes provenit a caritate, sed solum motus spei formatae, qua scilicet aliquis sperat bonum a Deo ut ab amico."

[608] *SCG* III 153, n. 5: "Nullus movetur ad finem ad quem aestimat esse impossibile perveniri. Ad hoc igitur quod aliquis pergat in finem aliquem, oportet quod afficiatur ad finem illum tanquam possibilem haberi: et hic est affectus spei. Cum igitur per gratiam dirigatur homo in ultimum finem: beatitudinis, necessarium fuit ut per gratiam imprimeretur humano affectui spes de beatitudine consequenda."

requires.[609] Secondly, the image of an engraving captures that this hope is enduring. It is not a momentary aspiration towards future bliss, rather, God is the stable object of one's hope.

We discussed earlier the place of the affections in prayer. On multiple occasions when commenting on the psalms, Aquinas will point out the connection between prayer and hope: That prayer depends upon hope;[610] that it is empty unless it rests on a firm hope;[611] that no one asks purposefully unless he hopes to be heard.[612] These observations help us to see the extent of the affectivity that is expressed in worship. If every prayer is grounded in hope, then whether or not a prayer explicitly expresses affection, the very fact of asking God for something—such as to send his Spirit, or to grant an increase of faith—is an act of hope.

When Aquinas considers how someone may lack the hope of obtaining happiness, he answers that either he does not consider it an arduous good, or he does not consider it possible to attain, either by himself or by another.[613] Aquinas introduces here the image of being able to "taste" (*sapere*) spiritual goods, a taste that it is possible to lose when one no longer considers spiritual goods to be good, to be worthwhile having, or worthy of desire. Someone can also no longer consider spiritual goods to be of great account, and so even if they are still good, they are not considered any more desirable than other goods. Aquinas places the blame for this loss of taste on the love of bodily pleasures, principally sexual pleasures, which cause people to disdain spiritual things, and so not to hope for them as arduous goods.[614] It follows

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[609] *CT*, Bk I , cap. 143: "Unde supra naturalem facultatem rationis imponitur divinitus homini lumen gratiae, per quod interius perficitur ad virtutes: et quantum ad cognitionem, dum elevatur mens hominis per lumen huiusmodi ad cognoscendum ea quae rationem excedunt, et quantum ad actionem et affectionem, dum per lumen huiusmodi affectus hominis super omnia creata elevatur ad Deum diligendum et sperandum in ipso, et ad agendum ea quae talis amor requirit."

[610] *In Psalmos*, Ps 30, n. 1: "oratio nititur spei."

[611] *In Psalmos*, Ps 30, n. 12: "oratio vacua est nisi certae spei innitatur."

[612] *In Psalmos*, Ps 39, n. 1: "Signum fiduciae est deprecatio: quia nullus finaliter rogat nisi quia sperat exaudiri." The theme continues across several articles in his *Compendium of Theology*, Book II of which is dedicated to hope. See *CT*, Bk II, cap. 2: "Habet enim hoc humana conditio ut aliquis interponat deprecationem ad obtinendum ab aliquo, praesertim superiori, quod per eum se sperat adipisci: et ideo indicta est hominibus oratio per quam homines a Deo obtineant quod ab ipso consequi sperant."

[613] *ST* II-II 20.4.

[614] *ST* II-II 20.4: "Dupliciter ergo potest in aliquo spes deficere de beatitudine obtinenda, uno modo, quia non reputat eam ut bonum arduum; alio modo, quia non reputat eam ut possibilem adipisci vel per se vel per alium. Ad hoc autem quod bona spiritualia non sapiunt nobis quasi bona, vel non videantur nobis magna bona, praecipue perducimur per hoc quod affectus noster est infectus amore delectationum corporalium, inter quas praecipuae sunt delectationes venereae, nam ex affectu harum delectationum contingit quod homo fastidit bona spiritualia, et non sperat ea quasi quaedam bona ardua."

that an effect of prayer, and specifically the prayers of petition that are made in the Church's worship, is to preserve this taste for spiritual goods. It reminds us that what is asked for in prayer is good and worthy of desire, ahead of the panoply of lesser goods that compete for our desire. It also reminds us that these goods are possible to have, obtained through the power of God.

8. Joy

Our final religious affection is joy. The elements of this affection that we saw in Chapter 2, namely, that joy's object is a good that is present, recur in his articles on spiritual joy in the *Summa Theologiae*. In this case, the beloved object is God, hence the first point that Aquinas makes, that spiritual joy is about God, whose goodness is himself, and is caused by the love of God that is charity.[615] We saw earlier that joy is also caused by devotion. They amount to the same cause: the goodness of God. To explain in what sense God is *present*, Aquinas turns for an authority to 1 John 4:6: "He who abides in charity, abides in God, and God in him."[616] God is present to the one who loves him by virtue of this love. An objection that joy follows from hope, as well as charity, prompts the further clarification that there are two ways of having spiritual joy about God. One is about the divine good considered in itself, and this joy proceeds principally from charity. The second is about the divine good as we participate in it, and this proceeds from the hope of enjoying this good in the future, and is obtained according to the measure of charity.[617] Joy therefore follows from three of the other religious affections we have so far named: devotion, charity, and hope.

Another passage, this time from his *Commentary on the Psalms*, adds a further angle to this discussion of spiritual joy. Psalm 50, the great psalm of penitence, contains the verse: "to my hearing you will give joy" (v. 10). Aquinas describes this as the "joy of conscience", which elsewhere he equates with interior joy (*intus gaudium*).[618] In elaborating on this joy of

[615] *ST* II-II 28.1.

[616] *ST* II-II 28.1. In a reply, he gives another way of expressing the same truth: he is present by the indwelling of grace: *ST* II-II 28.1 ad. 1: "Est autem praesens etiam se amantibus etiam in hac vita per gratiae inhabitationem."

[617] *ST* II-II 28.1 ad. 3.

[618] *In Matt*, cap. 25, lect. 1: "Multi sunt qui exterius abstinent et quaerunt intus gaudium, scilicet conscientiae, et ibi habent secum oleum."

conscience, he states that spiritual joy has three steps: the complacency of affection, the expansion of the heart, and progress towards external things.[619] Complacency comes from hearing what the Lord says; expansion of the heart refers to gladness, namely the soul being enlarged from the affection resting in the beloved thing, and being made capable of receiving further enlargement; the third element, progress towards exterior things, he takes as possibly referring to the overflow of joy into the body in our future glorified state.[620]

This passage goes together with, and somewhat fills out, the articles from the *Summa Theologiae*. Joy does not only come from the love of God considered in himself, but also from hearing his words. Just as one would rejoice in reading a letter or message from someone that one loves, hearing the word of God brings joy. The second two elements are also highly applicable for the life of worship. First, in the affection of joy we are prepared to receive further joy. Aquinas does not elaborate on what this may mean in practice, but we may suggest that if someone receives the word of God with joy, whether in reading the Scriptures or in hearing it preached, he or she is then more receptive to the word. Secondly, through spiritual gladness we grow in virtue, because delight in God and his goodness causes us to desire to live always in this goodness.

In several places Aquinas seems to equate joy and gratitude. In his *Commentary on Isaiah*, he interprets "sing out with joy, the ends of the earth", as referring to the giving of thanks from all creation.[621] In his *Commentary on Job*, too, he interprets Job's words "Blessed be the name of the Lord" (Job 1:21), as an act of thanksgiving, because "joy is the matter of thanksgiving."[622] He does not develop this latter observation in a systematic way, but it is consistent with his comments about joy elsewhere, as when he notes that the thanks Paul offers for the Thessalonians are offered "in all joy."[623] Why does Aquinas pair joy with

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[619] *In Psalmos*, Ps 50, n. 5: "Sed quantum ad gaudium conscientiae sciendum est, quod spirituale gaudium habet tres gradus. Primo existit in complacentia affectus; secundo in dilatatione cordis; tertio in progressu ad exteriora."

[620] *In Psalmos*, Ps 50, n. 5.

[621] *In Isaiah*, cap. 44: "pro reversione invitat totam creaturam ad gratiarum actionem." See also *In Isaiah*, cap. 61: "in secunda populus promissionem suscipit et gratias agit."

[622] *In Iob*, cap. 1, lect. 4: "Et quia gaudium est materia gratiarum actionis, ideo hanc tertiam rationem in gratiarum actionem concludit dicens "sit nomen Domini benedictum.""

[623] *In I Thess*., cap. 3, lect. 1: "Referendae sunt tamen gratiarum actiones in omni gaudio."

gratitude so often, even to the point of sometimes seeing one as synonymous with the other? Joy and gratitude are certainly distinct, as Robert C. Roberts explains:

> We have seen that gratitude is about givers, gifts, recipients, and the attitudes of giver and recipient toward one another. It is a deeply social emotion, relating persons to persons in quite particular ways. Joy, by contrast, has none of this structure. Instead, it is a construal of some situation as good, as satisfying some concern of the person. For example, to rejoice in the good weather on the day of our picnic is simply to construe it as wonderful, as satisfying a concern for good weather on this occasion, without any question of a giver, nor, consequently, of any gift. Joy involves no sense of being indebted for this good. One might, of course, see the good weather as a gift and oneself as a recipient, but this is not required for joy; and when one does construe the situation in such terms, the joy that one feels is not just joy, but gratitude.[624]

It is true that simply-speaking joy is about the presence of a desired good, and in all the discussions of joy and delight that we saw in Section 2 there was no suggestion that gratitude is an essential element of joy. But Aquinas's point is different – there *is* an aspect of gift and giver in all that is good. We can recall Paul's question—"What do you have that you did not receive?" (1 Cor 4:7)—which prompted Aquinas's own comment that what we are and what we have is from God. It follows that whenever there is a reason for joy, there is always a reason for gratitude. The joy that we have and express in worship, as with gratitude, is always about what God has done for us. This requires that we apprehend all good things as a gift, with a giver, with ourselves as recipients. Roberts comments that the acknowledgement with heart and voice of our status as recipients is a deep part of our worship.[625] In worship we remind ourselves that we are recipients, giving God thanks in all joy.

SECTION 3: The Language of Prayer

To consider how these eight religious affections are expressed in the Church's worship, we now analyse some of the language that the Church employs in that worship. There are other directions to which we could turn, such as music, liturgical colours, gestures, and the physical arrangements of churches. When we discuss the Divine Office, we will briefly touch on the way that there is a synchrony to this liturgy, through singing, breathing, and moving together, which itself expresses and forms the affections. Language, however, is uniquely placed to

[624] Robert C. Roberts, "The Blessings of Gratitude: A Conceptual Analysis", in Robert A. Emmons and Michael E. McCullough (eds), *The Psychology of Gratitude* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 65.
[625] Roberts, "The Blessings of Gratitude", 73.

convey the Church's affections, and so most of this section will focus on that. The liturgical prayers of the Church are often very ancient, or at least with ancient antecedents, such that successive generations have accepted, contributed to, and revised those prayers. Even when the prayers have been recently translated, they are commissioned and accepted through the Church's collective decision-making to express the mind of the Church. The result is that the language of worship gives us a vocabulary that expresses the Church's beliefs and affections. Don Saliers comments that learning the language of worship is like learning emotions and beliefs in their correlation.[626] As an example, the language of joy in worship during the season of Easter is on account of, and supports, the Christian belief in the resurrection. Saliers explains further that liturgical prayer evokes specific emotions and educates us in them, and so we come to regard God in certain affective patterns.[627] Such is the formative role that worship can play in forming our affections.

1. The Rites of the Church

In the rites of the Church, as well as in its other liturgies, we can variously find affective description, petition, and instruction. The last, affective instruction, is much rarer. An example is in the Rite of Ordination, where the ordinands are commanded to "carry out the ministry of Christ the Priest with constant joy and genuine love."[628] There are also, however, multiple petitions expressing the Church's hopes for the life and ministry of the priest.[629] Likewise, in the Rite of the Dedication of a Church, prayers of petition express the Church's hopes for the present and future worshippers in that church, such as, "May all here today, and all those in days to come, who celebrate your mysteries in this church, be united at last in the

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[626] Saliers, *The Soul in Paraphrase*, 23.

[627] Saliers, *The Soul in Paraphrase*, 24.

[628] International Commission on English in the Liturgy, "Rite of Ordination of a Bishop, of Priests, and of Deacons," *The Roman Pontifical* (Vatican City: Vox Clara Committee, 2012), n. 151. "Munus ergo Christi Sacerdotis perenni gaudio in vera caritate exple." *De Ordinatione Episcopi, Presbyterorum et Diaconorum, Editio Typica Altera* (Vatican City: Typis Polyglottis Vaticanis, 1990), n. 151 This is in the suggested homily for the bishop, so these words may not actually be said if the bishop preaches his own homily.

[629] See for example the concluding blessing, with petitions such as, "May he make you servants and witnesses in the world to divine charity and truth, and faithful ministers of reconciliation." "Rite of Ordination of a Bishop, of Priests, and of Deacons," *The Roman Pontifical*, n. 143. "Ipse divinae vos faciat caritatis et veritatis in mundo servos et testes, atque reconciliationis ministros fideles." *De Ordinatione Episcopi, Presbyterorum et Diaconorum*, n. 143.

holy city of your peace."[630] While the rites often petition God for certain affections, such as devotion and charity, the Rite of Confirmation contains a petition to *avoid* an affection, specifically shame. In the Prayer over the People, the bishop prays, "may they never be ashamed to confess Christ crucified before the world, and by devoted charity may they ever fulfill his commands."[631] The prayer therefore ends the entire celebration on a note of strength and confidence.

Since the eight religious affections are not exhaustive, others emerge in the Church's liturgies. An example is in the renunciation of sin, which occurs in the rites of baptism and confirmation, as well as at the Easter Vigil and Easter Sunday Mass. Implied in this renunciation are the affections of hatred and aversion. We saw in chapter 2 that hatred is by no means a "negative" affection; it is essential to love that we hate whatever threatens that love. The renunciation of sin through the affections of hatred and aversion is when members of the Church collectively turn away from what threatens their freedom and happiness.

To look in some more detail at the rites and their affections, I turn now to the rites for baptism, marriage, and funerals.

1.1. Baptism

The Rite of Baptism offers some of the clearest instances of the Church's collective affection. From the outset there are similar words to those of a wedding ("The Church shares your joy") which I cited in Chapter 3. The suggested words of greeting in the rite are the following:

> Dear parents and godparents: Your family has experienced great joy at the birth of your child, and the Church shares your happiness. Today this joy has brought you to the Church to give thanks to God for the gift of your child and to celebrate a new birth in the waters of Baptism. This community rejoices with you, for today the number of those baptized in Christ will be increased, and we offer you our support in raising your child in the practice of the faith.[632]

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[630] International Commission on English in the Liturgy, *Dedication of a Church and an Altar* (Washington, D.C.: United States Catholic Conference, Inc, 1989), n. 48. "nos autem cum omnibus fratribus qui in hac ecclesia divina celebrabunt mysteria, ad caelestum Ierusalem pervenire concedes." *Ordo Dedicationis Ecclesiae et Altaris, Editio Typica* (Vatican City: Typis Polyglottis Vaticanis, 1977), n. 48.

[631] International Commission on English in the Liturgy, *The Order of Confirmation* (London: Catholic Truth Society, 2016), n. 33. "ut et Christum crucifixum coram mundo confiteri non erubescant, et mandata eius devota caritate perficiant." *Ordo Confirmationis, Editio Typica* (Vatican City: Typis Polyglottis Vaticanis, 1973), n. 33.

[632] International Commission on English in the Liturgy, *The Order of Baptism of Children* (New Jersey: Catholic Book Publishing Corp., 2020), n. 75. This text was first introduced in the 2020 edition of *The Order of*

When the minister addresses the child shortly afterwards, the affection of joy is again a collective one: "The Church of God receives you with great joy."[633] There are many layers of collectivity to these greetings. First, there is the joy of the family itself, not simply the individual joy of the mother, father, siblings, and others. Secondly, there is the joy of the entire Church, which rejoices in the fact of the child's birth, affirming the natural goodness of human life, and also rejoices in receiving the child as a new member. Thirdly, there is the joy of the community present for the baptism, the object of the joy being that another member has joined the community of those who are baptised in Christ. Implicitly, these greetings may evoke individual group-based affections in those present. The mother of the child rejoices not simply as a mother, but as a member of a family, of the local Christian community, and of the entire Church. The extent of her joy, and possible angles to it, are hinted at by simply naming the different collectives to which she belongs, and to which her child now belongs.

The greeting serves to demonstrate how joy and gratitude go together as religious affections. We have seen that joy and gratitude are distinct, thus gratitude need not follow from joy. One can rejoice in the birth of a child simply as something to be joyful about in itself. But the greeting explicitly names the movement of joy to gratitude that follows when one believes in God as the giver of gifts: "This joy has brought you to the Church to give thanks to God for the gift of your child." These brief greetings establish the entire rite as a collective act of joy and gratitude, where the goodness of new life and a child's entry into the Church are celebrated. To see the moral formation that these words carry, one need only think of situations where the joy and gratitude may be muted, or even absent. The child may have been born with a serious illness, prompting consternation, fear, or anger among the family. There may be family members who subscribe to anti-natalism, seeing the child as only another carbon-emitting consumer. Many teachings are conveyed in these brief greetings and

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Baptism of Children, following the approval of adaptations proposed by the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops. At the time of writing it is not yet approved beyond the dioceses of the United States.

633 ICEL, *The Order of Baptism*, n. 79. "magno gaudio communitatis christiana vos excipit." *Ordo Baptismi Parvulorum, Editio Typica Altera* (Vatican City: Typis Polyglottis Vaticanis, 1986), n. 79. This was changed to "magno gaudio Ecclesia Dei vos excipit" in 2013 by a Decree of the Congregation of Divine Worship and the Discipline of the Sacraments: Congregatio de Cultu Divino et Disciplina sacramentorum, Decretum Prot. N. 44/13/L, 22 February 2013, *Notitiae* 49, no. 1 (2013), 54-56.

the affections named in them: human life is good, family is good, baptism is good, God is good.

The collectivity of the rite comes to the fore on two further occasions, when the faith of those answering on behalf of the child—the parents and godparents—is situated within the faith of the entire Church. The minister addresses the faith of the parents and godparents themselves: "If your faith makes you ready to accept this responsibility, then, mindful of your own Baptism, renounce sin and profess faith in Christ Jesus, the faith of the Church, in which children are baptized."[634] The minister addresses the parents and godparents here as individuals. The rejection of sin and profession of faith that follows is indeed *their* faith, the faith of these individuals, which they affirm with the words "I do." But it is also the faith of the collective that is welcoming a new member—"the faith of the Church." The words are repeated following the profession of faith, when the minister says: "This is our faith. This is the faith of the Church. We are proud to profess it in Christ Jesus our Lord."[635] The repetition in these statements is striking enough. But in the bold claim that it is a faith "we are proud to profess", the Church is forming its members affectively. As we saw in the Rite of Confirmation, for members of the Church, belief in God, the resurrection, and eternal life are not beliefs to be ashamed about, and thus apprehended under the aspect of evil. The affection of shame is expelled by the expression of collective pride. At the very entrance of a new member into the Church, the essential goodness of these beliefs is clearly stated.

The affection of hope recurs throughout the Rite of Baptism. There are many petitions of hope in the intercessions, such as that the Lord will make the child a faithful disciple and witness to the Gospel, and will lead the child by holiness to the joys of the heavenly kingdom.[636] This hope is reiterated when family members light a candle from the paschal candle, and the celebrant prays that the child "may walk always as a child of the light and,

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[634] ICEL, *The Order of Baptism*, n. 93. "Si ergo, fide vestra ducti, parati estis ad hoc munus suscipiendum, Baptismi vestri memores, peccato abrenuntiate et in Christum Iesum profitemini fidem, quae est fides Ecclesiae, in qua parvuli baptizantur." *Ordo Baptismi Parvulorum*, n. 93.

[635] ICEL, *The Order of Baptism*, n. 96. "Haec est fides nostra. Haec est fides Ecclesiae, quam profiteri gloriamur, in Christo Iesu Domino nostro." *Ordo Baptismi Parvulorum*, n. 96.

[636] ICEL, *The Order of Baptism*, n. 84. "Ut eum per Baptismum et Confirmationem fidelem discipulum et Evangelii tui testem efficere digneris … Ut eum per sanctitatem vitae ad caelestis regni gaudia perducere digneris." *Ordo Baptismi Parvulorum*, n. 84.

persevering in the faith, may run to meet the Lord when he comes with all the Saints in the heavenly court."[637]

The rite ends in the affection of gratitude, with the final blessings of the mother and father of the child. The blessing of the mother prays that "as she now gives thanks for the gift of her child", she may always be united with her child in thanksgiving.[638] The next two blessings, of the father, and of the community that is present, evoke gratitude by addressing God as the giver of gifts. The father is reminded that God is "the giver of life both in heaven and on earth", and the community is reminded that God "has given us new birth into eternal life."[639]

1.2. Rite of Matrimony

The Rite of Matrimony is particularly rich in affective language. We have already drawn attention to the collective joy in the greetings of the couple. Three other aspects of the rite are of particular interest for our purposes. The first aspect is that, whatever passionate love the couple has or will have, the love that the rite invokes is that of the will. Thus in the questions before the consent they are asked if they will love and honour each other as long as they both shall live.[640] Likewise in the consent itself they promise to each other, "to love you and to honour all the days of my life."[641] The sacrament elevates this love into the highest love of charity, as the Introduction to the rite explains, "their conjugal community is assumed into Christ's charity."[642] This finds an echo in one of the prefaces of the Nuptial Mass:

> For those you created out of charity
> you call to the law of charity without ceasing
> and grant them a share in your eternal charity.
> And so, the Sacrament of holy Matrimony,

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[637] ICEL, *The Order of Baptism*, n. 100. "ut parvulus iste, a Christo illuminatus, tamquam filius lucis indesinenter ambulet et, in fide perseverans, advenienti Domino occurrere valeat cum omnibus Sanctis in aula caelesti." *Ordo Baptismi Parvulorum*, n. 100.

[638] ICEL, *The Order of Baptism*, n. 105. "ut, aque de sobole gratias nunc agit accepta, perpetuo cum ipsa in gratiarum maneat actione." *Ordo Baptismi Parvulorum*, n. 105.

[639] ICEL, *The Order of Baptism*, n. 105. "qui vitam terrenam largitur et caelestem … qui nos ex aqua et Spiritu Sancto in vitam regeneravit aeternam." *Ordo Baptismi Parvulorum*, n. 105.

[640] International Commission on English in the Liturgy, *The Order of Celebrating Matrimony* (Strathfield, NSW: St Paul's, 2015), n. 60. "Estisne parati, Matrimonii viam sequentes, ad vos mutuo diligendos et honorandos, totius vitae decursu." *Ordo Celebrandi Matrimonium, Editio Typica Altera* (Vatican City: Typis Polyglottis Vaticanis, 1991), n. 60.

[641] ICEL, *The Order of Celebrating Matrimony*, n. 62. "ut te diligam et honorem omnibus diebus vitae meae." *Ordo Celebrandi Matrimonium*, n. 62.

[642] ICEL, *The Order of Celebrating Matrimony*, n. 7. "ita ut eorum coniugalis communitas assumatur in Christi caritatem ac ditetur eius sacrificii virtute." *Ordo Celebrandi Matrimonium*, n. 7.

> as the abiding sign of your own love,
> consecrates the love of man and woman.[643]

It follows that the love that husband and wife have for each other is henceforth itself the religious affection of charity. It will therefore be strengthened by the other occasions and ways that they express this religious affection.

The affection of love is a not-unexpected feature of the Rite of Marriage. What is perhaps less expected is the affection of wonder, which is the second aspect of our study, and a dominant affection in the first two prefaces of the Nuptial Mass. The first prays: "You accomplish the wonder of this twofold design: that, while the birth of children brings beauty to the world, their rebirth in Baptism gives increase to the Church."[644] The second contains a prayer that "the Sacrament we celebrate might draw us back more deeply into the wondrous design of your love."[645] The words here are both descriptive and generative. On one view, they observe that the design of God's love, including the birth and rebirth of children, is wonderful. But they also place this design before those present as an object to be wondered at, and to see the couple's love therefore as also an object of wonder.

The third aspect is the nuptial blessings, one of which gives a survey of the kinds of affections that the couple will encounter in their life together, and how they should orient those different affections toward God:

> In happiness may they praise you, O Lord,
> in sorrow may they seek you out;
> may they have the joy of your presence
> to assist them in their toil,
> and know that you are near
> to comfort them in their need.[646]

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[643] ICEL, *The Order of Celebrating Matrimony*, n. 236. "quem enim ex caritate creasti, eum ad caritatis legem vocare non desinis, ut aeternae tuae caritatis participem esse concedas. Cuius connubii sancti mysterium dum tuae dilectionis signum exsistit, amorem sacrat humanum." *Ordo Celebrandi Matrimonium,* n. 236.

[644] ICEL, *The Order of Celebrating Matrimony*, n. 234, Preface I. "Tua enim, Domine, providentia, tuaque gratia ineffabilibus modis utrumque dispensas, ut, quod generatio ad mundi produxit ornatum, regeneratio ad Ecclesiae perducat augmentum." *Ordo Celebrandi Matrimonium,* n. 234. "Wonder" here is a translation of the adjective *ineffabilibus*, which conveys a greatness in the apprehended object that cannot be adequately expressed.

[645] ICEL, *The Order of Celebrating Matrimony*, n. 235, Preface II. "ut ad ineffabile tui amoris consilium nos revocaret quod agitur sacramentum." *Ordo Celebrandi Matrimonium,* n. 235.

[646] ICEL, *The Order of Celebrating Matrimony*, n. 244. "Laeti te laudent, Domine, te maesti requirant ; te in laboribus sibi gaudeant adesse ut faveas, te sentiant in necessitatibus adstare ut lenias." *Ordo Celebrandi Matrimonium,* n. 244.

While these are first of all words of petition, as indicated by the word "may", they are also affective instruction for the couple, and in fact to all the present and future married couples looking on. The Church teaches the couple to respond to their affections with religious affections, offering praise and petition in times of happiness and sorrow. It further encourages them to apprehend the goodness of God's presence, and thus to derive joy and comfort from the knowledge of this presence.

1.3. Order of Christian Funerals

The Order of Christian Funerals is unique among the rites, in that it contains a version of sorrow that is not the sorrow of contrition, namely grief. The rite does not so much express grief as take it for granted. The wording of the rite is therefore descriptive. The Final Commendation notes the sadness of those who grieve for the deceased, explicitly stating that "there is sadness in parting", and that the congregation "will disperse in sorrow."[647] There is no suggestion that grief is out of place for a Christian, no claim that the joy of the resurrection should expunge all earthly sorrow. What it does do, however, is make the same connection of sorrow to hope that we saw with expressions of contrition, as in these words, also from the Final Commendation: "May our farewell express our affection for him/her; may it ease our sadness and strengthen our hope. One day we shall joyfully greet him/her again when the love of Christ, which conquers all things, destroys even death itself."[648]

This is a highly concentrated instance of affective formation. First, there is the desire that the congregation's farewell is an expression of affection. Next is the affirmation of sadness, the desire for comfort in that sadness, a petition that hope will be strengthened, and finally hope in our future joy at the triumph of love over death. There is also a collectivity that, while not as pronounced as in the previous two rites we have analysed, is nevertheless subtly instructive. The wording is not "those of us who have affection for him/her", or "those of us

[647] International Commission on English in the Liturgy, *Order of Christian Funerals* (New Jersey: Catholic Book Publishing Corp., 1998), n. 171 B. "Nostrum autem "vale" etsi tristitiam … quam nunc maesti in aula ecclesiae dimittimus." *Ordo Exsequiarum, Editio Typica* (Vatican City: Typis Polyglottis Vaticanis, 1969), n. 186.

[648] ICEL, *Order of Christian Funerals*, n. 171 A. "ut valedictio, quae in hoc loco postremum exprimitur, amorem significet, leniat dolorem, spem nostrum confirmet." *Ordo Exsequiarum*, n. 185. Note that the Latin text expresses more particularly *amorem*.

who are sad", but "our affection", "our sadness", "our hope". Just as the collective rejoices at a new member, it grieves at the loss of that member. The collectives, though, are not exactly the same. While the Church greets the child as a new member with great joy at baptism, there is no claim at a funeral that the Church has lost a member. Implicit, therefore, in the collective claims that the rite does *not* make, is the hope that the deceased is still a living member of the Church.

With the exception of these words of sorrow, there are similarities to the Rite of Baptism. Hope is also a dominant affection in this rite, particularly in the Final Commendation, with the repeated response in the Song of Farewell, "Receive his/her soul and present him/her to God the Most High."[649] The same hope is expressed in the Prayer of Commendation: "Into your hands, Father of mercies, we commend our brother/sister N. in the sure and certain hope that, together with all who have died in Christ, he/she will rise with him on the last day."[650] Finally, as with the Rite of Baptism, the rite ends with gratitude, as the prayer continues: "We give you thanks for the blessings which you bestowed upon N. in this life: they are signs to us of your goodness and of our fellowship with the saints in Christ."[651]

2. Prayers in the Mass

From considering affections in the rites of the Church, we turn now to the Mass. There is a vast and fertile ground here for the study of affections, which would include: the affections conveyed in the various antiphons throughout the Mass; the role that liturgical preaching can play in eliciting and forming affections; and the changes in affective language from one liturgical season to another.[652] I will limit this section to three areas of study: the orations of the Mass, the prefaces of the Mass, and the Easter Vigil.

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[649] ICEL, *Order of Christian Funerals*, n. 174. "Suscipientes animam eius: Offerentes eam in conspectus Altissimi." *Ordo Exsequiarum*, n. 47.

[650] ICEL, *Order of Christian Funerals*, n. 175 A. "In manus tuas, clementissime Pater, fratris nostri animam commendamus, spe certa suffulti eum, sicut omnes in Christo defunctos, cum Christo esse ressurrecturum in novissimo die", *Ordo Exsequiarum*, n. 48.

[651] ICEL, *Order of Christian Funerals*, n. 175 A. "Tibi gratias agimus, pro omnibus beneficiis, quibus famulum tuam in hac vita mortali ita cumulasti, ut eadem nobis signa tuae fierent bonitatis, et beatae sanctorum communionis in Christo." *Ordo Exsequiarum*, n. 48.

[652] An excellent brief study of the affectivity of liturgical prayer is Loris Della Pietra's "Il linguaggio degli affetti nell'eucologia del Messale Romano," in *Liturgia e emozione. Atti della XLII Settimana di Studio dell'Associazione Professori di Liturgia, Bocca di Magra, 25-29 agosto 2014*, ed. Luigi Girardi (CLV-Edizioni

2.1. Orations

With rare exceptions, there are three orations in every Mass: the Collect, the Prayer over the Offerings, and the Prayer after Communion. The Collect traditionally expresses the character of the celebration, summing up the Church's faith in relation to the particular feast or mystery being celebrated.[653] The orations are not always explicitly affective, though they are usually petitionary and therefore expressions of hope. Frequently, however, they do have an affective dimension. These take three angles: descriptive, petitionary, and formative.

The descriptive prayers are those that refer to the worshipper's affections. An example is in the references to their devotion. One prayer notes "our desire to serve you with devotion"[654], while another states that the worshippers are celebrating the mysteries "with constant devotion."[655] These descriptive prayers are particularly common on feast days. At Christmas the prayers state that "we joyfully welcome your Only Begotten Son as our Redeemer"[656], and "we honour with joyful devotion the Nativity of your Son."[657] The descriptions extend throughout the Mass. One prayer over the offerings begins, "We place before you with joy these offerings,"[658] while a Prayer after Communion states, "We have received this heavenly Sacrament with joy."[659]

Liturgiche: Rome, 2015), 109-143. Della Pietra notes at p. 110 a principle about the emotions of liturgical texts, namely that "the text finds its full truth only when it is done *actio*, or when from the written text it becomes alive once again in the historical practice of the assemblies that proclaim it or chant it." "Il testo trova la sua piena verità soltanto quando si fa *actio* ovvero quando da testo scritto ridiventa vivo nella prassi storica delle assemblee che lo proclamano o lo cantano."

[653] Congregation for Divine Worship and the Discipline of the Sacraments. "General Instruction of the Roman Missal", in *The Roman Missal*, 27 March 1975, 3rd ed (London: Catholic Truth Society, 2010), n. 54: "the priest says the prayer which is customarily known as the collect and through which the character of the celebration is expressed."

[654] *The Roman Missal*, Prayer over the Offerings, Eighth Sunday in Ordinary Time. "obláta devotióni nostræ servitútis ascríbis." *Missale Romanum. Editio Typica Tertia* (Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 2002), Super oblata, Dominica VIII Per annum.

[655] *The Roman Missal*, Prayer after Communion, Twelfth Sunday in Ordinary Time. "quod gerimus devotione frequenti, certa redemptione capiamus." *Missale Romanum*, Post communionem, Dominica VII Per annum.

[656] *The Roman Missal*, Collect, Vigil Mass of the Nativity of the Lord. "ut Unigenitum tuum, quem laeti suscipimus Redemptorem." *Missale Romanum*, Collecta, In Nativitate Domini, Ad Missam in Vigilia.

[657] *The Roman Missal*, Prayer after Communion, Mass at Dawn of the Nativity of the Lord. "Filii tui nativitatem laeta devotione colentibus." *Missale Romanum*, Post communionem, In Nativitate Domini, Ad Missam in aurora.

[658] *The Roman Missal*, Prayer over the Offerings, Fourth Sunday of Lent. "Domine, laetantes offerimus, suppliciter exorantes." *Missale Romanum*, Super oblata, Dominica IV in Quadragesima.

[659] *The Roman Missal*, Prayer after Communion, Solemnity of Mary, the Holy Mother of God. "Sumpsimus, Domine, laeti sacramenta caelestia" *Missale Romanum*, Post communionem, Sollemnitas Sanctae Dei Genetricis Mariae.

These descriptive passages name the collective affections. They are the affections of the entire Church, and as such they are capable of forming individuals in the affections appropriate to the feast. Just as the language of joy at a baptism and wedding encourages people to consider the goodness that prompts these expressions of joy, so do the affections in these prayers. They set before the people the affections that follow from the beliefs that are often named in the same prayer. The sentence, "We joyfully welcome your Only Begotten Son as our Redeemer", carries an ensemble of beliefs about the Incarnation, redemption, and liturgical time, to which the Church teaches us that joy is the fitting response.

While some prayers describe affections, others ask for them. The Collect for the Sixth Sunday of Easter prays, "that we may celebrate with heartfelt devotion these days of joy."[660] The Latin text, here translated as "heartfelt devotion", is *affectu sedulo*. Dela Pietra notes this prayer as an example of where the *affectus* seems to be an essential condition for full participation in the mystery being celebrated.[661] A similar request is found in the Prayer after Communion for the Epiphany, which prays that the Lord will go before us, so that we may "revere with true affection the mystery in which you have willed us to participate."[662] Requests for joy abound throughout the prayers of the Mass: "fill your faithful with holy joy"[663]; "Grant us … the constant gladness of being devoted to you"[664]; "grant your peoples the gladness of lasting peace."[665]

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[660] *The Roman Missal*, Collect, Sixth Sunday of Easter. "Fac nos, omnipotens Deus, hos laetitiae dies, quos in honorem Domini resurgentis exsequimur, affectu sedulo celebrare." *Missale Romanum*, Collecta, Dominica VI Paschae.

[661] "Così l'*affectus* sembra essere condizione essenziale per la partecipazione piena al mistero, come si evince da alcune orazioni, atteggiamento peculiare e squisitamente religioso di chi non rimane al di qua dell'oggetto celebrato, ma ne è parte. Non a caso la colletta della VI domenica di Pasqua domanda di non diminuire la tensione emotiva dei « *laetitiae* dies » in onore del Cristo risorto, ma di continuare a celebrarli « *affectu* sedulo ». Della Pietra, "Il linguaggio degli affetti nell'eucologia del Messale Romano," 113.

[662] *The Roman Missal*, Prayer after Communion, Mass during the Day, The Epiphany of the Lord. "ut mysterium, cuius nos participes esse voluisti, et puro cernamus intuitu, et digno percipiamus affectu." *Missale Romanum*, Post communionem, Ad Missam in Die, In Epiphania Domini.

[663] *The Roman Missal*, Collect, Fourteenth Sunday in Ordinary Time. "fidelibus tuis sanctam concede lætítiam." *Missale Romanum*, Collecta, Dominica XIV Per annum.

[664] *The Roman Missal*, Collect, Thirty-Third Sunday in Ordinary Time. "Da nobis, quaesumus, Domine Deus noster, in tua semper devotione gaudere." *Missale Romanum*, Collecta, Dominica XXXIII Per annum.

[665] *The Roman Missal*, Collect, Wednesday of Christmastime after Epiphany. "da populis tuis perpetua pace gaudere." *Missale Romanum*, Feria quarta, Post sollemnitatem Epiphaniæ.

Other prayers evoke affections indirectly, through forming apprehension. For example, the prayer that begins, "O God, from whom all good things come," prepares the people to respond with gratitude.[666] Another notes that, "without you mortal frailty can do nothing", which elicits gratitude and reverence.[667] An earlier Collect, this time for the Twentieth Sunday, forms us in apprehending the objects of affection, to see both the extent and the limits of human love and desire:

> O God, who have prepared for those who love you
> good things which no eye can see,
> fill our hearts, we pray, with the warmth of your love,
> so that, loving you in all things and above all things,
> we may attain your promises,
> which surpass every human desire.[668]

The petition to "fill our hearts, we pray, with the warmth of your love" is unusual in the liturgical texts.[669] It is rare to find an oration that explicitly notes or demands a passion, or a sensory component to the affection. The few exceptions include the Collect for the Twenty-Fourth Sunday, which asks: "that we may feel the working of your mercy, grant that we may serve you with all our heart."[670] There is also a plea for overflow into the sensory appetite in one of the masses for the Forgiveness of Sins, in which each prayer asks that we may shed tears for our sins. For example, the Collect asks: "bring forth, we pray, from the hardness of

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[666] *The Roman Missal,* Collect for the Tenth Sunday in Ordinary Time. "Deus, a quo bona cuncta procedunt." *Missale Romanum,* Collecta, Dominica X Per annum.

[667] *The Roman Missal,* Collect for the Eleventh Sunday in Ordinary Time. "sine te nihil potest mortalis infirmitas" *Missale Romanum,* Collecta, Dominica XI Per annum.

[668] *The Roman Missal,* Collect for the Twentieth Sunday in Ordinary Time. "Deus, qui diligentibus te bona invisibilia praeparasti, infunde cordibus nostris tui amoris affectum, ut, te in omnibus et super omnia diligentes, promissiones tuas, quae omne desiderium superant, consequamur." *Missale Romanum,* Collecta, Dominica XX Per annum.

[669] Note above that in the Latin text the prayer is in fact for "amoris affectum", for which "warmth of your love" is a creative translation. It is not, however, inconsistent with the petition of the prayer. Germain Cozien comments about this prayer: "We are not only asking for love, but the disposition of love, the feeling, the taste of the love of God, not an icy or geometric charity, that fulfils its duty correctly and that is all. No. It is about a tender and devoted love, a true warmth of charity towards God and towards us." "nous ne demandons pas seulement l'amour, mais la disposition d'amour, le sentiment, le gout de l'amour de Dieu ; non pas une charité glaciale, géométrique, qui fait accomplir correcement son devoir, et c'est tout. Non. Il s'agit d'un amour tendre et dévoué, une vraie cordialité de charité envers Dieu et entre nous." Cited in Hala, *Habeamus Gratiam,* 97.

[670] *The Roman Missal,* Collect for the Twenty-Fourth Sunday in Ordinary Time. "ut tuae propitiationis sentiamus effectum, toto nos tribue tibi corde servire." *Missale Romanum,* Collecta, Dominica XXIV Per annum.

our heart, tears of sorrow, that we may lament our sins and merit forgiveness from your mercy."[671]

Certain prayers are particularly multi-layered and rich in their affectivity, the Collect for the Twenty-Second Sunday being a notable example:

> God of might, giver of every good gift,
> put into our hearts the love of your name,
> so that, by deepening our sense of reverence,
> you may nurture in us what is good
> and, by your watchful care,
> keep safe what you have nurtured.[672]

In his study of the collects of Ordinary Time, Patrick Hala notes how this prayer for the Twenty-Second Sunday highlights that everything that is good comes from God and is subject to his sovereignty.[673] He further points out the connection between the religious affections expressed in this prayer and moral action:

> Once he has established his love in our hearts, God can work there in stimulating our desire to serve him, as well as the spirit of piety which will help us to have a habitual connection with him. That is strictly speaking the domain of the virtue of religion which regulates our Christian duties towards God, with regards to worship and moral action.[674]

The formative prayers complement the descriptive and petitionary prayers. Together they teach that while the Church as a whole possesses hope, devotion, and so on, these affections are gifts of God's grace for individual believers to pray for, and they depend on what we believe to be true about God and the Christian life. The fact that we offer such prayers at each

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[671] *The Roman Missal*, Collect, Mass 38B for the Forgiveness of Sins. "educ de cordis nostri durítia lácrimas compunctiónis; ut peccáta nostra plángere valeámus, remissionémque eórum, te miseránte, mereámur accípere." *Missale Romanum*, Collect, Missa 38B pro Remissione Peccatorum.

[672] *Roman Missal*, Collect for the Twenty-Second Sunday in Ordinary Time. "Deus virtutum, cuius est totum quod est optimum, insere pectoribus nostris tui nominis amorem, et praesta, ut in nobis, religionis augmento, quae sunt bona nutrias, ac, vigilanti studio, quae sunt nutrita custodias." Note the translation of *religionis* as a "sense of reverence". *Missale Romanum*, Collecta, Dominica XXII Per annum,

[673] "Dieu est l'unique auteur de tout vrai bien et il n'est pas une parcelle de ce bien qui lui échappe." Hala, *Habeamus Gratiam: Commentaire des collectes du Temps ordinaire* (Éditions de Solesmes: Solesmes, 2002), 103

[674] "Une fois donc établi son amour en nos coeurs, Dieu pourra y travailler en stimulant notre désir de le server ainsi que l'esprit de piété qui nous aidera à avoir un contact habituel avec lui. Ce qui est à proprement parler le domaine de la vertu de religion qui règle nos devoirs de chrétien envers Dieu, pour ce qui regarde le culte et l'agir moral." Hala, *Habeamus Gratiam*, 104

liturgy reminds us that we are not fully and finally endowed with religious affection, but we are in a state of continual formation.

2.2. Prefaces

The purpose of the prefaces, according to the General Instruction of the Roman Missal, is "to bring out more fully the motives for thanksgiving within the Eucharistic Prayer and to set out more clearly the different facets of the mystery of salvation."[675] All prefaces begin with the affection of gratitude, in the exchange, "Let us give thanks to the Lord our God; It is right and just." What follows in each preface is an explanation, the "protocol", of what God has done, is doing, or will do for us, that makes the act of thanksgiving "truly right and just." It ends with a call to praise in the *Sanctus*. The words preceding the *Sanctus*, the "eschatocol", often prepare the people for praise by describing it as "the hymn of your glory", but will also appeal to the affection of joy ("as in joyful celebration we proclaim") or gratitude ("with all the Angels and Saints, we, too, give you thanks").[676]

The call to praise is usually introduced with the words "therefore" or "and so", showing that the praise follows from the beliefs contained in the doctrinal summary set out immediately beforehand. Sometimes it is the affections in general, as in Preface II of Lent, which prays that "freed from disordered affections", we may "so deal with the things of this passing world as to hold rather to the things that eternally endure."[677] More often, the preface names specific affections. In the following preface, with the explanatory title "The proclamation of the mystery of Christ", we read:

> His Death we celebrate in love,
> his Resurrection we confess with living faith,
> and his Coming in glory we await with unwavering hope.
> *And so*, with all the Angels and Saints,

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[675] *GIRM*, n. 364: "The purpose of the many prefaces that enrich The Roman Missal is to bring out more fully the motives for thanksgiving within the Eucharistic Prayer and to set out more clearly the different facets of the mystery of salvation." *GIRM* n. 78: "the Eucharistic Prayer, that is, the prayer of thanksgiving and sanctification."

[676] For the terminology of the different parts of the preface, see Anthony Ward and Cuthbert Johnson, eds., *The Prefaces of the Roman Missal: A Source Compendium with Concordance and Indices* (Rome: Congregation for Divine Worship, 1989), 14.

[677] *The Roman Missal*, Preface II of Lent, n. 40. "mente ab inordinatis affectibus expedita, sic incumberent transituris ut rebus potius perpetuis inhaererent." *Missale Romanum*, Praefatio II de Quadragesima, n. 40.

we praise you, as without end we acclaim.[678]

As we can see from this preface, there is affectivity also in this doctrinal summary. Different affections are expressed, described, or evoked in the prefaces. Frequently it is the affection of wonder. The following Sunday preface, in a manner evocative of the Book of Job, recalls some of the motives for awe in God's creation:

> For you laid the foundations of the world
> and have arranged the changing of times and seasons;
> you formed man in your own image
> and set humanity over the whole world in all its wonder,
> to rule in your name over all you have made
> and for ever praise you in your mighty works,
> through Christ our Lord.[679]

Many prefaces present the person and work of Jesus Christ as the object of wonder, particularly on feasts of the Lord. Preface III of the Nativity states, "the holy exchange that restores our life has shone forth today in splendour", and "by this wondrous union we, too, are made eternal."[680] In Preface I of the Passion, the Father's greatness and the Son's saving work on the cross are both spoken of with wonder:

> For through the saving Passion of your Son
> the whole world has received a heart
> to confess the infinite power of your majesty,
> since by the wondrous power of the Cross
> your judgment on the world is now revealed
> and the authority of Christ crucified.[681]

The following Sunday preface is similar, invoking the affection of wonder from different angles:

> For through his Paschal Mystery,
> he accomplished the marvellous deed,
> by which he has freed us from the yoke of sin and death,

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[678] *The Roman Missal*, Common Preface V, n. 76. "Cuius mortem in caritate celebramus, resurrectionem fide vivida confitemur, adventum in gloria spe firmissima praestolamur. Et ideo, cum Sanctis et Angelis universis, te collaudamus, sine fine dicentes." *Missale Romanum*, Praefatio Communis V, n. 76.

[679] *The Roman Missal*, Preface V of the Sundays in Ordinary Time, n. 56. "Qui omnia mundi elementa fecisti, et vices disposuisti temporum variari; hominem vero formasti ad imaginem tuam, et rerum ei subiecisti universa miracula, ut vicario munere dominaretur omnibus quae creasti, et in operum tuorum magnalibus iugiter te laudaret, per Christum Dominum nostrum." *Missale Romanum*, Praefatio V de Dominicis Per Annum, n. 56.

[680] *The Roman Missal*, Preface III of the Nativity of the Lord, n. 37. "Per quem hodie commercium nostrae reparationis effulsit … sed nos quoque, mirando consortio, reddit aeternos." *Missale Romanum*, Praefatio III de Nativitate Domini, n. 37.

[681] *The Roman Missal*, Preface I of the Passion, n. 43. "Quia per Filii tui salutiferam passionem sensum confitendae tuae maiestatis totus mundus accepit, dum ineffabili crucis potentia iudicium mundi et potestas emicat Crucifixi." *Missale Romanum*, Praefatio I de Passione Domini, n. 43.

> summoning us to the glory of being now called
> a chosen race, a royal priesthood,
> a holy nation, a people for your own possession,
> to proclaim everywhere your mighty works,
> for you have called us out of darkness
> into your own wonderful light.[682]

In many of the feasts of saints the prefaces speak of their lives with wonder, where the object of the affection is the power of God. The Preface of Saints states that "in the marvellous confession of your saints, you make your Church fruitful with strength ever new and offer us sure signs of your love."[683] The two prefaces for martyrs state that God's wondrous power is manifest in martyrdom: the blood of the martyrs shows forth God's "marvellous works" of perfecting his power in our weakness and bestowing strength on the feeble[684]; and the sufferings of the martyrs are "wonders of your might."[685] Likewise the Preface of Virgins and Religious states that it is right to celebrate the wonders of God's providence in the saints who consecrated themselves to Christ.[686]

The prefaces cite other affections that are appropriate to the liturgical occasion or season, but gratitude, joy, and wonder are the predominant religious affections in the prefaces of the Mass.

2.3. The Easter Vigil

The Easter Vigil has pride of place among the Church's liturgies, and is unique in the extent of its affectivity.[687] The first words of the priest's greeting, as the people gather around the

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[682] *The Roman Missal*, Preface I of the Sundays in Ordinary Time, n. 52. "Cuius hoc mirificum fuit opus per paschale mysterium, ut de peccato et mortis iugo ad hanc gloriam vocaremur, qua nunc genus electum, regale sacerdotium, gens sancta et acquisitionis populus diceremur, et tuas annuntiaremus ubique virtutes, qui nos de tenebris ad tuum admirabile lumen vocasti." *Missale Romanum*, Praefatio I de Dominicis Per Annum, n. 52.

[683] *The Roman Missal*, Preface II of Saints, n. 67. "Tu enim Sanctorum tuorum confessione mirabili Ecclesiam tuam nova semper virtute fecundas, nobisque certissima praebes tuae dilectionis indicia." *Missale Romanum*, Praefatio II de Sanctis, n. 67.

[684] *The Roman Missal*, Preface I of Holy Martyrs, n. 68. "Quoniam beati martyris N. pro confessione nominis tui, ad imitationem Christi, sanguis effusus tua mirabilia manifestat, quibus perficis in fragilitate virtutem, et vires infirmas ad testimonium roboras." *Missale Romanum*, Praefatio I de Sanctis Martyribus, n. 68.

[685] *The Roman Missal*, Preface II of Holy Martyrs, n. 69. "Quoniam tu magnificaris in tuorum laude Sanctorum, et quidquid ad eorum pertinet passionem, tuae sunt opera miranda potentiae." *Missale Romanum*, Praefatio II de Sanctis Martyribus, n. 69.

[686] *The Roman Missal*, Preface of Holy Virgins and Religious, n. 71. "In Sanctis enim, qui Christo se dedicaverunt propter regnum caelorum, tuam decet providentiam celebrare mirabilem." *Missale Romanum*, Praefatio de Sanctis Virginibus et Religiosis, n. 71.

[687] Paolo Tomatis observes about the Easter Vigil: "In the dialectical tension between a rite that cannot but move the emotions and a rite that must not seek out religious emotion, the Easter Vigil can constitute a

blazing fire, describe the vigil as "this most sacred night", thus immediately drawing out the affection of reverence.[688] The greeting ends by making a connection between the affections of devotion and hope, promising that if the participants listen to the Lord's word and celebrate his mysteries—an implicit reference to the affection of devotion—then they shall have the hope of sharing the Lord's triumph over death and living with him in God.[689] The blessing of the fire draws upon the imagery of the fire itself, praying that by the paschal celebrations the faithful may be "inflamed with heavenly desires."[690] Finally, at the entrance of the paschal candle into the church, a threefold expression of gratitude, "Thanks be to God", accompanies the proclamation of the candle as "The light of Christ."[691]

Already, several affections have been stated at the outset of the liturgy. What follows, however, is possibly the most affectively-charged prayer in the entirety of the Church's worship. The Exsultet, also called the Easter Proclamation, is a hymn of praise to God for his work of salvation symbolised in the paschal candle. It begins with repeated affective imperatives. In addition to the repeated command to "exult", in the first stanza alone we also hear: "Be glad, let earth be glad"; "Rejoice, let Mother Church also rejoice"; and "let this holy building shake with joy."[692] The remainder of the Exsultet primarily expresses gratitude and wonder. It is preceded by the same exchange of minister and congregation that commences a preface, thus the prayer is an act of gratitude for God's works in salvation history, the resurrection of Christ, and his ongoing work of salvation in the lives of Christian

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privileged and unique point of observation for a study of the liturgy from the perspective of emotions." "Nella tensione dialettica tra un rito che non può non emozionare e un rito che non deve andare alla ricerca dell'emozione religiosa, proprio la veglia pasquale può costituire un punto di osservazione privilegiato e singolare per uno studio della liturgia nella prospettiva delle emozioni." Paolo Tomatis, "Programmare l'inatteso: le emozioni nella veglia pasquale", in *Liturgia e emozione. Atti della XLII Settimana di Studio dell'Associazione Professori di Liturgia, Bocca di Magra, 25-29 agosto 2014*, ed. Luigi Girardi (CLV-Edizioni Liturgiche: Rome, 2015), 147.

[688] "Easter Time", *The Roman Missal*, n. 9. "hac sacratissima nocte." *Missale Romanum*, Tempus Paschale, n. 9.

[689] "Easter Time", *The Roman Missal*, n. 9. "Si ita memoriam egerimus Paschatis Domini, audientes verbum et celebrantes mysteria eius, spem habebimus participandi triumphum eius de morte et vivendi cum ipso in Deo." *Missale Romanum*, Tempus Paschale, n. 9.

[690] "Easter Time", *The Roman Missal*, n. 10. "caelestibus desideriis inflammari." *Missale Romanum*, Tempus Paschale, n. 10.

[691] "Easter Time", *The Roman Missal*, n. 15. "Lumen Christi; Deo gratias." *Missale Romanum*, Tempus Paschale, n. 15.

[692] "Easter Time", *The Roman Missal*, n. 19. "Exsultet iam angelica turba caelorum: exsultent divina mysteria ... Gaudeat et tellus tantis irradiata fulgoribus …Laetetur et mater Ecclesia, tanti luminis adornata fulgoribus: et magnis populorum vocibus haec aula resultet." *Missale Romanum*, Tempus Paschale, n. 19.

believers. It is also an act of praise—and therefore an act of wonder—for which the minister prepares the people, by asserting that they are "standing in the awesome glory of this holy light."[693] The Paschal candle itself, for its spreading of light and flame and as an icon of God's glory, is an object of admiration; the minister prays that he "may sing this candle's perfect praises."[694] But it is when the minister first addresses God directly that the affection of wonder is at its most expressive: "O wonder of your humble care for us! O love, O charity beyond all telling, to ransom a slave you gave away your Son!"[695]

The second part of the vigil is the Liturgy of the Word, consisting of nine readings, with the first seven all followed by a psalm and a prayer. The first reading is the creation account from Genesis 1:1-2:2. The two options for the prayer that follows both evoke wonder. One begins by stating that God "wonderfully created human nature and still more wonderfully redeemed it."[696] The other merits quotation in full:

> Almighty ever-living God,
> who are wonderful in the ordering of all your works,
> may those you have redeemed understand
> that there exists nothing more marvellous
> than the world's creation in the beginning
> except that, at the end of the ages,
> Christ our Passover has been sacrificed.[697]

The prayer following the third reading, which tells the story of the Exodus, again expresses wonder, beginning, "O God, whose ancient wonders remain undimmed in splendour even in our day", and adding that the freedom that God brought to the Hebrews, "now you bring about as the salvation of the nations through the waters of rebirth."[698] The alternative prayer

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[693] "Easter Time", *The Roman Missal*, n. 19. "astantes vos, fratres carissimi, ad tam miram huius sancti luminis claritate." *Missale Romanum*, Tempus Paschale, n. 19.

[694] "Easter Time", *The Roman Missal*, n. 19. "cerei huius laudem implere perficiat." *Missale Romanum*, Tempus Paschale, n. 19.

[695] "Easter Time", *The Roman Missal*, n. 19. "O mira circa nos tuae pietatis dignatio! O inaestimabilis dilectio caritatis: ut servum redimeres, Filium tradidisti!" *Missale Romanum*, Tempus Paschale, n. 19.

[696] "Easter Time", *The Roman Missal*, n. 21. "Deus, qui mirabiliter creasti hominem et mirabilius redemisti," *Missale Romanum*, Tempus Paschale, n. 21.

[697] "Easter Time", *The Roman Missal*, n. 24. Omnipotens sempiterne Deus, qui es in omnium operum tuorum dispensatione mirabilis, intellegant redempti tui, non fuisse excellentius, quod initio factus est mundus, quam quod in fine saeculorum Pascha nostrum immolatus est Christus." *Missale Romanum*, Tempus Paschale, n. 24.

[698] "Easter Time", *The Roman Missal*, n. 26. Deus, cuius antiqua miracula etiam nostris temporibus coruscare sentimus, dum, quod uni populo a persecutione Pharaonis liberando dexterae tuae potentia contulisti, id in salutem gentium per aquam regenerationis operaris, praesta, ut in Abrahae filios et in Israeliticam Dignitatem totius mundi transeat plenitudo." *Missale Romanum*, Tempus Paschale, n. 26.

is similar, beginning "O God, who by the light of the New Testament have unlocked the meaning of wonders worked in former times."[699] Both prayers are aimed at affective formation, that we may view our salvation through baptism with the same wonder that the Hebrews had for God's majestic works of salvation. The fifth prayer addresses God as the "sole hope of the world", and prays "graciously increase the longing of your people."[700]

Finally, the Collect is a petition for devotion:

> O God, who make this most sacred night radiant
> with the glory of the Lord's Resurrection,
> stir up in your Church a spirit of adoption,
> so that, renewed in body and mind,
> we may render you undivided service.[701]

The third part of the vigil is the Baptismal Liturgy, some of which I have already discussed in the section on the Rite of Baptism. One additional point at Easter is that, in the event that no one is to be baptised, the priest blesses the water that the people will be sprinkled with as a reminder of their baptism. The priest's blessing asks, "for us who recall the wondrous work of our creation and the still greater work of our redemption, graciously bless this water."[702]

The Liturgy of the Eucharist follows "in the usual way", as the Missal puts it.[703] The preface prayed is Preface I of Easter, which like the other four Easter prefaces, contains the words, "Therefore, overcome with paschal joy, every land, every people exults in your praise."[704] Among all the affective language that we have seen previously, "overcome with paschal joy"

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[699] "Easter Time", *The Roman Missal*, n. 26. Deus, qui primis temporibus impleta miracula novi testamenti luce reserasti." *Missale Romanum*, Tempus Paschale, n. 26.

[700] "Easter Time", *The Roman Missal*, n. 28. Omnipotens sempiterne Deus, spes unica mundi, qui prophetarum tuorum praeconio praesentium temporum declarasti mysteria, auge populi tui vota placatus, quia in nullo fidelium nisi ex tua inspiratione proveniunt quarumlibet incrementa virtutum." *Missale Romanum*, Tempus Paschale, n. 28.

[701] "Easter Time", *The Roman Missal*, n. 32. Deus, qui hanc sacratissimam noctem gloria Dominicae Resurrectionis illustras, excita in Ecclesia tua adoptionis spiritum, ut, corpore et mente renovati, puram tibi exhibeamus servitutem." *Missale Romanum*, Tempus Paschale, n. 32.

[702] "Easter Time", *The Roman Missal*, n. 54. "Domine Deus noster, populo tuo hac nocte sacratissima vigilanti adesto propitius: et nobis, mirabile nostrae creationis opus, sed et redemptionis nostrae mirabilius, emorantibus, hanc aquam benedicere tu dignare." *Missale Romanum*, Tempus Paschale, n. 54.

[703] "Easter Time", *The Roman Missal*, n. 59. "more solito incipit liturgiam eucharisticam." *Missale Romanum*, Tempus Paschale, n. 59.

[704] "Easter Time", *The Roman Missal*, n. 45. "Quapropter, profusis paschalibus gaudiis, totus in orbe terrarum mundus exsultat." *Missale Romanum*, Tempus Paschale, n. 45,

is the most passionate. It suggests an ecstatic force acting on the faithful such that they cannot help but to sing God's praises.

Finally, the liturgy ends with a solemn blessing, which connects the joy of the present feast with the joy to be hoped for in heaven: "May you who celebrate the gladness of the Paschal Feast come with Christ's help, and exulting in spirit, to those feasts that are celebrated in eternal joy."[705]

3. The Divine Office

Much of the above analysis of the prayers of the Mass could also be applied to the Divine Office, also called the Liturgy of the Hours and the Prayer of the Church. This collection of hymns, psalms, canticles, readings, intercessions, and orations is a liturgy prayed several times a day, especially by those for whom it is obligatory, including clerics and often those in religious vows. As a liturgy the Divine Office is a public and communal prayer.[706] It may be privately recited, but the *General Instruction on the Liturgy of the Hours* also emphasises that there is an ecclesial nature to the liturgy which is shown more clearly in communal celebrations, where hearts and voices are united.[707] The Instruction does not encourage mere common recitation, in which the liturgy is said, but that the Office be sung, again because it expresses a deeper union of hearts, and because many of the parts are of a lyrical nature and are given full expression only when sung.[708] The Instruction continues:

> Singing in the Liturgy of the Hours is not to be regarded as something merely ornamental or extrinsic to prayer. It springs from the depths of the person praying and praising God, and fully and perfectly reveals the communal character of Christian worship.[709]

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[705] "Easter Time", *The Roman Missal*, n. 68. "paschalis festi gaudia celebratis, ad ea festa, quae laetitiis peraguntur aeternis, ipso opitulante, exsultantibus animis veniatis." *Missale Romanum*, Tempus Paschale, n. 68.

[706] Congregation for Divine Worship, *General Instruction on the Liturgy of the Hours*, in *The Divine Office: The Liturgy of the Hours according to the Roman Rite, Volume I* (London: Collins, 2006), n. 1.

[707] *GILH*, n. 22, 33.

[708] *GILH*, n. 22, 268.

[709] *GILH*, n. 12.

Aside from this, the Instruction is clear that members of the Church should "enjoy" and take "delight" in singing this liturgy of praise.[710] These are the only notes that the Instruction makes about the affective difference between praying and singing in common as against praying (and even singing) alone. There is, however, illuminating support to be found further afield. Bessel van der Kolk, in his work on how communal rhythms and synchrony can help with emotional and physical healing from trauma, argues for the emotional benefits of choral singing, which fosters, along with other endeavours like team sports and dancing, a deep sense of communal pleasure and attunement.[711] He notes also the prevalence across religions of practices of breathing, chanting, and moving together.[712] An instance in the Christian religion would be the Mass, which has coordinated back-and-forth exchanges between the ministers and the people, and responses and prayers that are recited in synchrony. The best example, however, is the Divine Office, traditionally recited as it is from side-to-side (*chorus contra chorum*), with each side singing two or four lines of the psalm, and often with synchronised sitting and standing.

In a similar study, Thomas Lewis, Fari Amini, and Richard Lannon argue in *A General Theory of Love* that synchrony, which enables mutually responsive emotional interactions, is essential to emotional well-being from infancy onwards. Beginning with "limbic resonance", in which mammals are able to have communal connections, synchrony further enables emotional regulation and revision. An early example is the way that infants learn emotional responses from their mothers, and in doing so learn about the world.[713] Later when people seek the stability of being close and in harmony with other limbic brains, they turn to the "regulating affiliations" of clubs, groups, pets and the like, because "all carry at least the potential for emotional connection."[714] The significance of such studies for the Divine Office is that, even before we analyse the language of the liturgy, *how* the liturgy is prayed already

[710] *Institutio*, n. 270: "ut potissimum diebus festis Horas cum gaudio concinere valeant"; *Institutio*, n. 279: "Ad hoc enim primo enitendum, ut animi genuinæ studio orationis Ecclesiæ informentur et iucundum sit Dei celebrare laudem."

[711] Van der Kolk, *The Body Keeps the Score*, 146.

[712] Van der Kolk, *The Body Keeps the Score*, 247.

[713] Lewis et al, *General Theory*, 60-63.

[714] Lewis et al, *General Theory*, 170.

suggests a formative role, providing as it does in communal celebrations affectively beneficial experiences of synchrony.[715]

Turning now to the language of the Divine Office, we find psalms and canticles being repeated at fixed hours of the Office, bringing to that hour the religious affections they express. At the first hour of the day, the invitatory psalm, Psalm 94, begins the day's worship, with its opening lines: "Come ring out our joy to the Lord, hail the God who saves us. Let us come before him, giving thanks. With songs let us hail the Lord" (vv. 1-2). In that short excerpt alone are the affections of joy and gratitude, as well as wonder in the form of praise. There are similar affections in the other psalms that can be prayed in the place of Psalm 94, so someone who prays the Office daily always begins the day expressing affections of joy, gratitude, and wonder.[716]

Canticles are prayed in each major hour of the Office. The *Benedictus*, the Canticle of Zechariah (Lk 1:68-79) that is always prayed at Morning Prayer, evokes the affection of gratitude at the Lord having "visited his people and redeemed them" (v. 68), and hope in what the Lord will do in the future: "he will give light to those in darkness, those who dwell in the shadow of death, and guide us into the way of peace" (v. 79). Evening Prayer's counterpart to the *Benedictus* is the *Magnificat,* the Canticle of Mary (Lk 1:46-55), which also evokes gratitude, reverence and wonder at the displays of God's power: "The almighty works marvels for me … He puts forth his arm in strength, and scatters the proud-hearted." (vv. 49, 51) The affections of hope and reverence are also conveyed in the statement that the mercy of God is "from age to age on those who fear him." (v. 50) Finally, at the hour of Compline, or Night Prayer, is the *Nunc dimittis,* the Canticle of Simeon (Lk 2:29-32), which again evokes gratitude, that "my eyes have seen your salvation" (v. 30), and hope, that the salvation has been prepared "for all nations" (v. 31).

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[715] Michael Sherwin discusses *A General Theory of Love*, and notes that communal eating, singing, and dancing all have a privileged role in regulating and revising our emotions, and further comments: "Individuals in contemporary society spend far less time in formal meals and virtually no time singing or dancing with others as compared to previous generations. The loss of communal singing is perhaps the most striking of our contemporary emotional impoverishment." Sherwin, "If Love It Is", 60, but see generally 56-61.

[716] There are similar affections in the other psalms that one can pray in place of psalm 84, namely psalms 23, 66, and 99.

Compline is an hour of the Office with a consistent affective tone, with hope being the dominant affection in the psalms prayed during Compline. Almost all the psalms contain either a plea that God will be a "refuge" for the one praying, or else the psalm carries the assurance that God will indeed be a refuge. For example, Psalm 4, usually prayed on Saturday nights, begins: "When I call, answer me, O God of justice; from anguish you released me, have mercy and hear me" (v. 1). In a similar vein are: Psalm 90, usually prayed on Sunday nights ("under his wings you will find refuge", v. 4); Psalm 85, prayed on Monday ("you have saved me from the depths of the grave", v. 13); Psalm 142, prayed on Tuesday ("I have fled to you for refuge", v.9); Psalm 30, prayed on Wednesday ("Be a rock of refuge for me", v. 2); and Psalm 15, prayed on Thursday ("Preserve me, God, I take refuge in you", v. 1).[717]

Night Prayer also contains some of the most anguished psalms. On Wednesday night the second psalm prayed is the *De profundis* (Ps 129), beginning "Out of the depths I cry to you, O Lord." That psalm, at least, ends on a note of hope: "Israel indeed he will redeem from all its iniquity" (v. 8). Not so for Psalm 87, prayed on Friday night, which along with verses such as, "You have laid me in the depths of the tomb" (v. 6) and "my eyes are sunken with grief" (v. 9), ends "my one companion is darkness" (v. 18). This raises an important question. If someone does end the day feeling abandoned, hated, overwhelmed, and rejected even by God, the psalm is surely ideal for giving words to one's affections. What if, though, it has been a joy-filled day, full of encouragement and friendship? The Instruction addresses this difficulty directly. It notes that the words of the psalms often help us to pray, for example in words of thanksgiving, joy, or sorrow.[718] Moreover, whoever sings a psalm "opens his heart to those emotions [*affectibus*] which inspired the psalm."[719] But it also notes the possibility that one's own "feelings" [*affectibus*)] differ from those expressed by the psalmist: "for

[717] The second psalm for Saturday night (strictly, Night Prayer after Evening Prayer I of Sundays and Solemnities) is an outlier, being a psalm of praise and blessing (Ps 133(134)).

[718] *GILH*, n. 105.

[719] *GILH*, n. 106. "Qui psallit, cor suum aperit iis affectibus," We find in the English translation of the Instruction the same reluctance to translate *affectus* as *affection* as we saw in Chapter 1 for Aquinas's works. For example, "oratio psallentium affectus colligat et concludat" is translated as "the psalm-prayer sums up the aspirations and emotions of those saying them." *GILH*, n. 112.

example, if we find ourselves saying a psalm of jubilation, when we are worried or sad, or saying a psalm of lament, when in fact we feel in good spirits."[720] The Instruction counsels that the Divine Office is a public prayer, and therefore it is prayed on behalf of the collective rather than in one's own name:

> Even someone saying the Hour alone is not praying the psalms privately but recites them in the name of the Church and according to the sequence given in her public prayer. Whoever says them in the name of the Church can always find a reason for joy or sorrow, finding applicable to himself the words of the apostle: *Rejoice with those who rejoice and be sad with those in sorrow* (Rom 12:15); human weakness and selfishness is thus healed by charity so that the mind and heart may harmonize with the voice.[721]

The distinction between public and private prayer, the prayer of the collective and the prayer of the individual, is therefore essential to resolving the affective differences it is possible to encounter in collective worship. To explore this point further, we will turn in the next section to the question of normativity in the affections.

SECTION 4: Normativity

The previous survey has shown that the Church deems particular rites and feasts to demand fitting religious affections, frequently joy. The language in these texts is never qualified. The Church does not hedge its proclamations of joy at Christmas and Easter. But what if a member of the Church does not hold these affections? This dissonance can affect one's sense of belonging, and also cause people to question whether they truly believe: "If I really believed this, I would be joyful. Since I am not joyful, I must not really believe."

1. Aquinas on normativity

To approach this topic in Aquinas's work I will take three texts, the first a commentary on a letter of St Paul, the second a commentary on a psalm, and the third an Advent sermon. In each case the relevant affection is joy.

1.1. *"Rejoice in the Lord always."*

[720] *GILH*, n. 108. "Hæc si quis præ oculis habet, evanescunt difficultates, si forte animadvertat sensus sui cordis, dum psallit, discrepare ab iis affectibus quos psalmus exprimit, quando nempe, tristi et mærore affecto psalmus obvenit iubilationis, felici autem psalmus lamentationis.."

[721] *GILH*, n. 108.

St Paul's Letter to the Philippians contains an injunction to rejoice, made in the imperative form, *Gaudete*: "Rejoice in the Lord always; again I will say, Rejoice" (Phil 4:4). Aquinas elsewhere cites this verse as a precept, meaning that not only does the Church's worship encourage the affection of joy, but the scriptures command it.[722] When he addresses this verse, Aquinas gives a commentary on the conditions of spiritual joy. "Rejoice in the Lord always" he sees as urging towards progress in what is better, since spiritual joy is necessary for anyone wanting to progress.[723] This recalls the Aristotelian principle that we saw in our study of joy in Chapter 2, that it is easier to continue in an activity when we find joy in it.

Aquinas takes this verse and part of the succeeding verse 5, "Let your modesty be known to all men," and derives from them four conditions for true joy. The first is that it is not joy in a created good, but it is *in the Lord*, thus it is about the good that is proper to man, namely God. Secondly, it should be *always*, continuous. Sin interrupts one's joy, as does temporal sadness, demonstrating that joy is imperfect.[724] Aquinas sees the command's repetition, "Again I will say, rejoice", as meaning that joy should be multiplied; that is, if one rejoices in God, one finds other causes of joy: "If you rejoice in your own good, you will be inclined to rejoice similarly in the good of others; again, if you do so in the present, you will be inclined to do so in the future."[725] Finally, this rejoicing should be moderate, and not flow out into worldly pleasures, as happens in worldly joy.

After giving these conditions of spiritual joy, he turns to its cause: "the Lord is at hand" (v. 5b). He returns here to the theme of friendship, since one rejoices when a friend is around, and he then suggests several ways to see how our friend, the Lord, is near to us.[726] The first is in "the presence of his majesty."[727] He means by this God's omnipresence, since he cites Acts 17:27, "he is not far from each one of us." His second presence is his flesh, which, given the

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[722] ST II-II 44.3 ad. 2.

[723] *In Philip*., cap. 4, lect. 1: "Necessarium est enim cuilibet volenti proficere, quod habeat spirituale gaudium."

[724] *In Philip*., cap. 4, lect. 1: "Quod fit quando non interrumpitur peccato: tunc enim est continuum. Aliquando vero interrumpitur per tristitiam temporalem, quod significat imperfectionem gaudii."

[725] *In Philip*., cap. 4, lect. 1: "Item si gaudes de bono proprio, imminet tibi gaudere similiter de bono aliorum. Item si de praesenti, imminet etiam de futuro."

[726] *In Philip*., cap. 4, lect. 1.

[727] *In Philip*., cap. 4, lect. 1: "Dominus quidem prope est praesentia maiestatis."

scriptural authority that he cites, we may take as signifying the Eucharist: "now in Christ Jesus you who once were far off have been brought near in the blood of Christ" (Eph 2:13). The third and fourth ways are through indwelling grace, and through his mercy in hearing prayer.

What can we conclude so far about Aquinas's approach to normativity? First, there is the fact that Aquinas sees rejoicing as a precept, and so he affirms the normative aspect to joy in the strongest terms. One is not simply encouraged to rejoice always in the Lord, but is *commanded* to. Secondly, when he details the multilayered aspect to spiritual joy, he gives different objects of that joy. It is not just joy in the Lord himself, but also in what he has done for us, and what we have done in our own actions that we may attribute to the Lord. Thirdly, he shows how one may rejoice by attending to the different ways in which the Lord is near. Implicit in this is the principle that appetite follows apprehension. An affection such as joy does not simply happen; it follows the consideration of something as worthy of joy. And in this commentary Aquinas, following Paul closely but also with creative interpretations, suggests the things that one may consider to find and deepen one's joy. A Christian does not simply believe that God exists, but believes also that he is present to us, and the awareness of these different presences of our friend the Lord gives multiple causes of joy.

1.2. *"Rejoice in the Lord, O you just."*

The second text is Aquinas's commentary on Psalm 32, which begins "Rejoice, you just, in the Lord, for praise is fitting to the upright", and so gives a similar affective command to Philippians 4:4. It is instructive to see what is similar and dissimilar in Aquinas's comments on the texts. The first similarity is that Aquinas again sees a normative expectation to rejoicing, since there is a "should" (*debet*) about it—"man *should* rejoice."[728] Again, there are reasons for the "should", in this instance two: for the goods of grace already received, and for the goods of glory that are to come. Shortly afterwards, when he returns to the reasons for rejoicing, he gives another two reasons for joy and praise: God, and his effects.[729] The

[728] *In Psalmos*, Ps 32, n. 3: "de duobus debet homo exultare: scilicet de bonis gratiae susceptis, et de bonis gloriae expectatis."
[729] *In Psalmos*, Ps 32, n. 4.

reasons for rejoicing in God himself include his teaching, his promises, his fidelity, mercy, and justice.[730] Aquinas gives greater attention to the reasons for rejoicing in God's works, which cover vv. 6-8, and which he divides into works of the heavens, the waters, and the earth. Following both literal and mystical interpretations, he traces these works across the changing of the seasons, the power that the apostles received, the boundaries and immensity of the seas, the gathering of all peoples into the unity of the Church, the conversion of sinners, and the action of grace.[731] Since he is commenting on different scriptural texts, he gives different nuances in response to the text, but the reasons for rejoicing always in some way come down to God and what he does for us.

So far, then, his approach follows similar lines to his commentary on Philippians 4:4. The point of difference comes when he poses the question of why the psalmist says, "Rejoice, you just, in the Lord." Why only the just, and not everyone? The psalm itself provides the answer, "For praise is fitting to the upright," from which Aquinas explains the need to have one's affections ordered:

> The measure and rule of the human will is the divine justice and will. Therefore, those who do not have right affection cannot praise God well, because they are unwilling to to conform their will to the divine will, rather they want the divine will to conform to theirs. And for that reason God does many things of which they do not approve. But those who adapt themselves to the will of God rejoice in prosperity and adversity.[732]

We have here another angle to the norm. He equates rejoicing with praise, and argues that the reason why one cannot praise God well (that is, rejoice), is that one's affections are not ordered, meaning that one's will is at odds with God's. How, then, to order one's affections to God? His answer is music. To be sure, Aquinas is following the text of the psalm, and what prompts this answer is the line, "Praise the Lord with the harp." What follows, though, is a lengthy account of how human affection is influenced by music. For example:

> Now, it is understood that in the praise of God it is principally intended that the affection of man tend towards God and be set in order. Similarly, the consonance of

[730] *In Psalmos*, Ps 32, n. 4.
[731] *In Psalmos*, Ps 32, n. 4-6.
[732] *In Psalmos*, Ps 32, n. 1: "Mensura autem et regula voluntatis humanae est justitia et voluntas divina. Illi ergo qui non habent rectum affectum, non possunt bene collaudare Deum, quia nolunt voluntatem suam conformare voluntati divinae, sed divinam volunt potius conformari suae. Et ideo multa Deus facit, quae ipsi non approbant. Sed qui Dei voluntati se aptant, illi gaudent in prosperis et adversis."

> music changes man's affection … Hence it is envisioned that in all worship some musical consonances be practiced, that man's soul be roused up to God.[733]

Aquinas sees human affection as being directed by music in three ways: it can instil rectitude and firmness of soul; one can be carried away to the heights; and it can bring sweetness and rejoicing.[734] He offers some theories as to why certain instruments and modes of music are preferable to others, but his essential point is that music aids in drawing people away from earthly concerns to the divine praises. He does not elaborate on why exactly music has the effects that it does. It is rather an appeal to experience. When he asks in the *Summa Theologiae* whether song should be used in the praise of God, he comments simply that it is obvious that different melodies move the soul in different ways, and gives Aristotle and Boethius as authorities.[735] In the *Commentary on the Sentences*, he cites Augustine's account of how he wept at the sound of hymns, by which the truth in his heart was refined (*eliquabatur*).[736]

1.3. *Lauda et letare*

In the Advent sermon *Lauda et letare*, Aquinas takes as a text Zechariah 2:10: "Sing praise and be glad, O daughter of Zion; for behold, I come and I will dwell in the midst of you, says the LORD." He confesses to sharing the problem of Bernard of Clairvaux, who claimed to have felt upset when he thought of those who awaited Christ with such a fire of desire. Aquinas sums up the problem with having a lack of affection appropriate to the season of Advent: "For he who considers the sighs of those imploring, the desires of those awaiting, and the joy of those proclaiming the advent of the Saviour, can well become aware of his own tepidity about the benefit already gained from his advent."[737]

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[733] *In Psalmos*, Ps 32. n. 2: "Sciendum est autem quod in laude Dei praecipue intenditur quod affectus hominis tendat in Deum, et dirigatur. Item consonantiae musicae immutant hominis affectum … Inde est quod excogitatum est, quod in omni cultu aliquae consonantiae musicae exerceantur, ut animus hominis excitetur ad Deum."

[734] *In Psalmos*, Ps 32, n. 2: "Affectus enim hominis per instrumenta et consonantias musicas dirigitur, quantum ad tria: quia quandoque instituitur in quadam rectitudine et animi firmitate: quandoque rapitur in celsitudinem: quandoque in dulcedinem et jucunditatem."

[735] *ST* II-II 91.

[736] *In IV Sent*., d. 15, q. 4, a. 2, qc. 1, co.: "Augustinus dicit de seipso, quod flebat uberrime in hymnis et canticis suave cantantis Ecclesiae, et quod voces illae influebant auribus ejus, et eliquabatur veritas in cor ejus."

[737] *Lauda et letare* [7-11]: "Qui enim considerat suspiria postulancium, desideria expectancium, gaudia predicancium Saluatoris aduentum, satis potest aduertere tepiditatem propriam de beneficio iam percepto ex eius

He does not explicitly set out a goal for his sermon, but it appears to be an attempt, working solely from this single-verse text from Zechariah, to elicit the affection of joy among his listeners. Three phrases from this verse serve as a structure for the conditions for possessing gladness. In interpreting the first phrase, "daughter of Zion", Aquinas emphasises turning one's attention towards the benefits of God, and contemplating them. He sees "Zion" as signifying the soul of someone contemplating. This creative interpretation leads him to conclude that to be a "daughter of Zion" means to contemplate the benefits (the good deeds and works) of God. Joy and spiritual gladness will follow.[738]

The second phrase is the imperative "be glad", which he takes as referring to the enlargement of the affection through spiritual joy. He first reinforces the normative claim, adding that a faithful soul "ought" (*debet*) to rejoice, and ought even to flow out with an abundance of spiritual joys.[739] His reason: the soul is united with its divine consort, the Son of God, and so is made to be flowering and sprouting forth (*florens et germinans*). The soul also keeps the company of the assembly of the holy ones and the angels, a people that sings praise. While the whole human nature was sad when the heavenly door was closed, now it is opened and the power of the devil is suppressed, there is cause for rejoicing. Here Aquinas is giving prominence to something he has only touched on in the previous texts. Unity with Jesus in the company of other worshippers is a great reason for joy.

In his third argument, he takes the imperative *lauda*, and notes that it pertains to perfect happiness that the tongue be excited to the divine praise: "If from the intellect there is a grateful knowledge of God, and from the affection an inmost exultation, all that remains is that from the senses there be the chanting of praise."[740] What follows is a series of reasons why the soul should sing praise: the soul is satisfied and so praises its Redeemer; the Lord is

aduentu." References are to line numbers of the critical edition. Thomae de Aquino, Opera omnia, tomus 54/1, *Sermones*, ed. L.J. Bataillon (Rome: Commissio Leonina; Paris: Editions du Cerf, 2014), 21-25.

[738] *Lauda et letare* [33-37]: "Si enim consideres diligenter diuina beneficia, tunc eris filia Syon; si exultando decantes et collaudes diuine laudis preconia, tunc erit perfectum gaudium; si ex hac consideracione nascitur spiritualis leticia."

[739] *Lauda et letare* [73-76]ff: "Merito autem exultare debet anima fidelis, ymo humana natura tota debet affluere copia spiritualium gaudiorum, dum uidet se copulatam diuino consorcio."

[740] *Lauda et letare* [109-112]: "Ex quo enim in intellectu est grata Dei cognicio et in affectu intima exultacio, nichil aliud restat nisi quod in sensu sit laudis decantacio."

our powerful defender; he is just and merciful; he has restored us to everlasting life. After each doctrinal point he follows with a biblical example of people singing or giving thanks for that very reason. For example, he cites Paul relating God's mercy to the Colossians: "He has delivered us from the dominion of darkness and transferred us to the kingdom of his beloved Son." (Col 1:13). Aquinas is changing the imperative *lauda* away from being a mere command to explaining the biblical background to praise; that is, why did the biblical writers sing praise? His answer: because they had been beneficiaries of the goodness of God. Aquinas then shows how his listeners have received those same benefits.

In the second part of the sermon, Aquinas changes tack. This section is a multi-directional appeal to the affection of wonder, based on the words, "Behold, I come." The coming of the Lord in the form of humanity has the quality of being new and unheard-of (*inaudita*). The advent of the Lord should for this reason stir up our tepidity: "he demonstrates its newness, that we may pay attention and admire."[741] We saw in Chapter 2 that the variety of wonder that is admiration follows the apprehension of something that is new and unusual in its excellence. Aquinas prepares his listeners for this wonder by stressing these characteristics of the Advent of the Lord.

He also appeals to the variety of wonder that is awe, by drawing attention to the infinite greatness of the Advent of the Lord. He reminds his congregation that the Son of God came in his humanity but also in his divinity, displaying an "infinite sublimity".[742] He is the same God who has spoken through the prophets, who possesses eternal being and is before all things. He has immense power, perfect knowledge, and he governs everything. These are all interpretations that Aquinas gleans from the single subject pronoun "I", in "behold I come". It is an attempt to impress upon the congregation that it is God in all his greatness who comes to meet us, and that by speaking in this way, "he excites our tepidity, so that we run to meet him."[743]

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[741] *Lauda et letare* [153-154]: "Item demonstrat eius nouitatem ut attendamus et admiremur."

[742] *Lauda et letare* [164-165]: "<Venit quoque> personaliter in substantia diuinitatis in quo ostenditur infinita sublimitas."

[743] *Lauda et letare* [149-150]: "In hoc enim modo loquendi, excitat nostram tepiditatem ut occurramus."

When he takes the three words together, "behold, I come", he turns to the theme of friendship. We have seen him do this in the text from Philippians 4:5b, "the Lord is at hand". There, however, he cited the Lord's friendship as a cause of joy; here, it is a cause for awe. The reason for awe is that even though the Lord is so sublime and of such great dignity, he comes to us as a friend, showing the greatest love.[744] Finally, with the words "in the midst of you", Aquinas presents the Lord's humility as an object of admiration. After recounting the various ways that the Lord is in our midst, he ends by invoking joy and gratitude—that God dwelt among us to bring us the fullness of joy, and that he came as a great gift-giver.[745]

Across these three texts there is a consistency to how Aquinas approaches the affective norm of rejoicing. He does not play down or explain away St Paul's *Gaudete* imperative. He does, however, recognise that even such a great and passionate saint as Bernard of Clairvaux, and Aquinas himself, felt at times at odds with the affections appropriate to the Church's seasons. His response always is to propose objects of apprehension, suggesting to his readers and listeners things that may not have occurred to them, and so enlarging the possibility of finding reasons for rejoicing. We have seen earlier, too, that his teaching on apprehension also allows for a mixed affectivity. Someone who has just lost a job is unlikely to rejoice at Christmas in the same way as someone who has just found a job, since his rejoicing will be accompanied by the possible affections of sorrow, fear, anger, and the like. The reasons that Aquinas proposes for joy and wonder remain true, however, alongside the other events, joyful or otherwise, that occur in one's life.

2. Restrained Affectivity

It emerges when surveying the rites and liturgical prayers of the Church that its affective language is understated. Only in the Exultet, and in such lines as "overcome with Paschal joy" in the Easter prefaces, is the language highly emotional or passionate. Romano Guardini addresses this characteristic in his work *The Spirit of the Liturgy*. He argues that the Church's

[744] *Lauda et letare* [190-194]: "Tamen cum essem tam sublimis et tante dignitatis, *ecce ego uenio* amicabiliter cum ueste humilitatis. *Venio*, quasi dicat: non mitto angelum, non spiritum, non uicarium, sed uenio per memet ipsum, in quo ostenditur maxima caritas."

[745] *Lauda et letare* [255-256]: "Item fuit ut Dominus in praemiorum distribucione."

liturgy is full of emotion, but even though it sometimes breaks all bounds (he also cites the Exultet), it is as a rule restrained, controlled, and subdued, so much so that it can appear a cold, intellectual production:

> The liturgy as a whole is not favorable to exuberance of feeling. Emotion glows in its depths, but it smolders merely, like the fiery heart of the volcano, whose summit stands out clear and serene against the quiet sky. The liturgy is emotion, but it is emotion under the strictest control.[746]

Having seen the extent of religious affections in the Church's worship, we can certainly agree—with our usual caveats about the term—that "the liturgy is emotion." But Guardini's thought becomes particularly relevant to this study when he suggests *why* emotion in the liturgy is restrained. His explanation takes us straight to the theme of this and the previous chapter—collective emotions, and the relationship between the parts and the whole. Guardini argues that the liturgy's primary and exclusive aim is not the expression of the individual's reverence and worship for God, nor is it even about the congregation that is performing the act of worship. It is the worship of the Church as a whole, the entire body of the faithful.[747] This means, by necessity, that what pertains to the individual is diminished in favour of what belongs to the collective. Guardini extends this beyond the Church to any group at all, noting that exceptions play a greater part in the life of the individual than in that of the group. He comments:

> In a corporate body—composed of people of highly varied circumstances, drawn from distinct social strata, perhaps even from different races, in the course of different historical and cultural periods—the ephemeral, adventitious, and locally characteristic elements are, to a certain extent, eliminated, and that which is universally accepted as binding and essential comes to the fore.[748]

By "ephemeral", Guardini perhaps has in mind the events and preoccupations of the times we live in. But we may extend the term to include episodic emotions, or passions. Much of the first half of this thesis was devoted to demonstrating that while passions are episodic, affections endure. The Church's worship does concern itself with emotion, but not with

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[746] Romano Guardini, *The Spirit of the Liturgy*, trans. Ada Lane (Eastford, CT: Martino Fine Books, 2018), 16.

[747] Guardini, *The Spirit of the Liturgy*, 9.

[748] Guardini, *The Spirit of the Liturgy*, 26.

emotion of the ephemeral sort; its concern is with the enduring, God-oriented emotions that are religious affections.

Several consequences follow from the need for worship to be the prayer of the collective rather than of the individual. The first is that common prayer must be guided primarily by thought rather than emotion.[749] The need for this is evident even in individual devotion. A person's emotions are far too varied for one day to resemble another, and so an emotional prayer from one day will be unsuitable for the next unless the person happens to have the same emotional disposition from which the prayer was born. In a corporate body it becomes even clearer that prayer in common must be primarily directed by thought. Guardini comments: "It is only when prayer is sustained by and steeped in clear and fruitful religious thought, that it can be of service to a corporate body, composed of distinct elements, all actuated by varying emotions."[750]

Another consequence is that by virtue of common prayer being the everyday prayer of the entire body, it must be restrained. Guardini sees two possibilities for what follows if emotion in worship is unrestrained. The first is that people take the emotions seriously, with the risk that they feel obliged to force themselves into an emotion that they have perhaps never experienced or at any rate do not presently have, "thus perverting and degrading their religious feeling."[751] Another possibility is that they do not take the emotions seriously, and so what follows is indifference and depreciation of the language of worship.

If Guardini is sounding a warning about people acquiescing to an emotion that they do not have, what does this mean for Margaret Gilbert's account of emulation, which we discussed in Chapter 3? It is worth recalling that Gilbert had stipulated that when someone emulates the emotion of a collective, he or she is not claiming personally to have the emotion. It is rather a public performance, by which one indicates a preparedness to emulate, as a member of the collective, a single subject of the emotion. It is emulation of the emotion of the *collective*, not emulation of an individual emotion. The person who says "Amen" at the end of a prayer that

[749] Guardini, *The Spirit of the Liturgy*, 11-13.
[750] Guardini, *The Spirit of the Liturgy*, 12.
[751] Guardini, *The Spirit of the Liturgy*, 16.

expresses affections is not claiming personally to have those affections, rather, that they are affections of the Church that follow rightly from the Church's faith.

3. Sentimentality in Worship

With all that we have seen of affectivity in worship, to the point of agreeing with Guardini's formulation that "liturgy is emotion", is there perhaps a risk of an excessive focus on the affections? What would "too much" emotion look like in worship? I suggest that the answer would not lie in intensity of religious affection, but in sentimentality. David Pugmire, in *Sound Sentiments: Integrity in the Emotions*, argues that the idea of sentimentality being a vice rests on the intuition that the emotion is being aroused dishonestly or is being used.[752] He observes that the emotions that we are tempted to evoke sentimentally are the supposedly "profound" emotions: respect, sympathy, affection, indignant anger, sorrow, longing, and veneration.[753] This observation alone is highly pertinent to worship. To return to Guardini, he argues that the quality of emotion in liturgical prayer must express "the great fundamental feelings, both natural and spiritual", which include "adoration, longing for God, gratitude, supplication, awe, remorse, love, readiness for sacrifice, courage in suffering, faith, confidence."[754] The two lists do not correlate exactly, but there is enough similarity to reinforce the point that religious worship is fertile ground for sentimentality.[755]

Pugmire sets out to identify what makes an emotion sentimental. His first point is that sentimentality arises when the theme of the emotion is falsified, such that the emotion (or its intensity) simply does not follow from the truth about the object. He comments: "By disregarding what is essential about a theme to make it a means to a desired emotional

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[752] David Pugmire, *Sound Sentiments* (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2005), 127.

[753] Pugmire, *Sound Sentiments*, 129.

[754] Guardini, *The Spirit of the Liturgy*, 17.

[755] Luigi Girardi also notes the risk of falling into sentimentality and emotional manipulation if the liturgy gives too much emphasis to emotion. "In effetti, se si parlasse di una « liturgia emotiva », la qualificazione aggettivale verrebbe percepita anzitutto in una accezione negativa. Quando si dà troppo spazio all 'emozione nella celebrazione, i rischi sono presto individuabili: si teme di cadere in fonne di sentimentalismo, di ricerca di un puro appagamento estetico; addirittura si vede il rischio di essere manipolati o plagiati per via emotiva, oppure di imboccare una « via di fuga » rispetto alla realtà concreta, che richiederebbe invece decisioni di vita e impegni ben determinati." Luigi Girardi, "Introduzione", in *Liturgia e emozione. Atti della XLII Settimana di Studio dell'Associazione Professori di Liturgia, Bocca di Magra, 25-29 agosto 2014*, ed. Luigi Girardi (CLV-Edizioni Liturgiche: Rome, 2015), 5.

experience, the sentimentalist betrays an ultimate indifference to it."[756] We have just seen how Guardini warned against the same threat of indifference, though in his case it was indifference to the emotion. Pugmire points out that in sentimentality one is also indifferent to the underlying belief. The Church's worship protects against this in two ways. First, through restrained affectivity. Secondly, through always connecting affections to beliefs. It emerged in our study of the language of worship that affections are never simply asserted. They are always explained, often telegraphed by words such as "therefore", "and so", and "for", which ensures that the Church's affectivity follows from its beliefs.

What if the affections are explained, but the worship nevertheless demands a passionate response? We have seen that the Church's liturgical worship is restrained, but extra-liturgical collective worship may not necessarily be so restrained. Some might also demand that worship be more exciting, emotionally engaging, and the like. This brings us to the second point that Pugmire makes, noting that there are types of sentimentality where the problem is that the emotion does not follow from the theme, but that there is too much emphasis on the emotion: "the feeling looms larger than what it is the feeling for."[757] He notes that particularly when pathos is employed in the arts, as it often is in opera, the line between what is and is not sentimentality can be very fine indeed.[758] But a line is reached "when a theme is crafted *for* its pathos, not just *in* its pathos", when the interest is "not in the scene with its pathos but wholly in its pathos, where the primary effort is to make it as affecting as possible (as distinct from as affecting as it is)."[759] He contrasts operas that seek to commandeer the audience into feeling a certain way from those that simply present the situations of the characters and leave it to the audience to grasp the pathos.

If Pugmire is right, what should we say about the Exsultet? Is it sentimental? Can a prayer so repeatedly and strongly emotional *not* be sentimental? On Pugmire's example of operas that commandeer our feelings, the Exultet would at first glance appear to fall foul. It certainly does not leave it to the congregation to conclude for itself what emotion follows from the

[756] Pugmire, *Sound Sentiments*, 134.
[757] Pugmire, *Sound Sentiments*, 136.
[758] Pugmire, *Sound Sentiments*, 137.
[759] Pugmire, *Sound Sentiments*, 138.

theme; rather, it sets out the emotion from the first word and restates it multiple times. At the same time, however, it does not seem at all true that the Exultet is crafted *for* its emotion rather than *in* its emotion. And if we return to Pugmire's point that the problem with this kind of sentimentality is that the focus is on the emotion itself rather than the theme, the Exultet emerges free from sentimentality. We could not say that the feeling in the Exultet looms larger than what it is about. The prayer is focused on the narration of salvation history that the Paschal candle represents. It could even be considered as consisting in two parts, first the bold statement of emotion in the opening stanzas, and then the lengthy account of the reasons for the emotion. It bears noting that the Exultet is not a short prayer. It develops its theme across multiple stanzas, each containing statements of faith, all of which explain and justify the prayer's emotion.

Pugmire also sees sentimentality as having a "narcissistic dimension", where emotion is self-referential and self-absorbed, and thus one's perception of reality is obscured by one's feelings.[760] Importantly, he also identifies this is as a risk for collective emotion. We saw in Chapter 3 how collective emotion can strengthen the unity of a group. Pugmire comments that it is precisely this quality of collective emotion, where it acts as a kind of cement, that can cause it to acquire value in its own right.[761] Dissonance or departure from the collective emotion then comes to be unwelcome. Again, Guardini had recognised that unrestrained emotion in common prayer creates needless affective norms. What will preserve divine worship from this self-referential trap is an unwavering focus on God and his works. When the Rite of Baptism expresses joy that another member has joined the Church, it does not treat membership of the Church as an end in itself, but repeatedly recalls what the true end is.

CONCLUSION

In this chapter I set out to study the place of affections in the Church's collective worship. The first step was to demonstrate how in Aquinas's thought affectivity is central to the virtue of religion, to prayer, and to the Mass. The eight religious affections that I next identified

[760] Pugmire, *Sound Sentiments*, 139.
[761] Pugmire, *Sound Sentiments*, 140.

could each be more fully treated, and I have examined some of them, particularly wonder, at greater length earlier in this thesis. It suffices to note that in worship, where God and divine things are the object of affection, these eight are the affections that tend to recur. The study of the Church's language of worship, limited though it was, confirmed the choice of these affections as well the prominent place that Aquinas gives to affectivity in worship.

The essential point about the language of prayer in these texts is that they are the prayers of worshippers as a collective. Sometimes this collectivity is explicitly expressed in the prayers, other times it is implicit in the fact that the prayer is offered in the name of the whole Church. This collectivity is what ties together the last parts of the chapter, on normativity, restrained affectivity, and sentimentality. The normativity to religious affections arises from the fact that there are collective beliefs, and we have seen how Aquinas directs attention to these beliefs to help make one's own affections cohere with those of the Church. It is also because these religious affections are those of the collective that they must be restrained, and so undue emphasis should not be placed on the affections for their own sake.

CONCLUSION

The purpose of this thesis has been to draw attention to collective worship as a school of moral formation. Through worship's collective affectivity we can learn to be people of devotion and wonder, people that are reverent, contrite, grateful, joyful, hopeful, and loving. The word "can" requires some emphasis. Doubtless many people participate in the Church's collective worship without registering its affectivity, least of all finding a correspondence between the Church's affections and their own. Just as pupils in a school can learn much or little, worship is similar. If one brings to worship an appreciation of its affectivity, and a disposition for worship to evoke and order one's own affections, then the moral formation it gives will be richer than for the worshipper who brings neither.

The thesis began with a brief phrase from the *Order of Celebrating Matrimony*—"the Church shares your joy"—which epitomises the main themes of the thesis. The phrase is a strong affective declaration, but also an assertion that the joy is collectively held. It is the joy not simply of the individual members of the Church, but of the whole Church. Implicit, too, is a message to those present at the rite of marriage: the lifelong life-long partnership that the couple is commencing is a reason for joy. It is not something to be scorned or dishonoured; it is a good thing to be celebrated. That short phrase alone is therefore an instance of moral formation, encouraging the worshipper to participate in the entirety of the rite that follows with the affection of joy.

In Chapter 4 we saw that this phrase is just one instance of a ubiquitous affectivity in the Church's worship. Could we say that the Church's worship is "emotional"? The answer, as always, depends on what we mean by emotion. If, as many hold, emotion is synonymous with or at least demands bodily feelings, then the Church's worship is most definitely not emotional. In that case, too, a repudiation of emotion in worship is more likely a repudiation of sentimentality, where feelings are given an importance beyond their due. The adjective "affective" is less susceptible to such misunderstandings. Why exactly worship is affective could be reduced to a syllogism: prayer is affective, worship is prayer, therefore worship is affective. For our principal guide throughout this thesis, St Thomas Aquinas, prayer is the

interpretation and ordering of the affections. On the topic of worship, he appeals directly to experience for explaining how external acts of worship are done for the sake of the affections. It was therefore no surprise, once we turned to the language of worship, to see the extent to which the language of worship is a language of affection. We studied liturgies ranging across funerals to the Divine Office to the Mass, and across a range of texts within the Mass. Each liturgy has its own affective content and structure that could be studied further. The Roman Missal in particular, with its hundreds of prayers, would lend itself to a study of the many connections it makes between belief and affection.

The eight religious affections— devotion, reverence, contrition, wonder, gratitude, joy, hope, and charity— are not exhaustive, but those I have identified are prevalent both throughout Aquinas's works and throughout the language of worship. They would aid greatly in any systematic study of affectivity in worship. They could also contribute towards a better understanding of the disagreements around collective worship, which can be the locus of strong opinions and the cause of some disunity in the Church and communities within the Church. Religious affections would give a vocabulary and greater objectivity for explaining why worshippers are drawn to one liturgical rite rather than others, or why they prefer certain spiritualities, forms of devotion, and music styles. A form of worship in which praise is prominent would give greater emphasis to the religious affections of wonder, joy, and gratitude. Forms of worship that are characterised by their tradition and solemnity are more likely directed to the affections of devotion and reverence.

The religious affections can all be applied to individual worship. Someone praying privately in a church is in some way going to be expressing affections such as hope, devotion, sorrow, and gratitude. Liturgy, however, is collective worship. The collective nature of worship explains the need for the restrained affectivity that Guardini identified as a feature of the Church's liturgy. An unrestrained affectivity runs the risk of sentimentality, by which affections are emphasised for their own sake. As the brief study of Pugmire's work showed, worship is at particularly risk of sentimentality, given that the kinds of affections most likely to be evoked sentimentally are those that are expressed in worship. An unrestrained

affectivity also increases the risk of an affective dissonance between individual worshippers and the collective.

There should, therefore, be some correspondence between individual and collective affectivity. Where there is not, Aquinas's solution in his sermons is to propose multiple objects of apprehension for the celebration in question. We could term these "affective points of entry"—multiple aspects of the mystery, one of which may find resonance with the worshipper and allows his or her affections to correspond to those of the Church. Throughout this thesis, we have seen the recurring principle that appetite follows apprehension. It stands to reason that movements of the intellectual appetite would follow objects of intellectual apprehension, which is precisely what Aquinas proposes in the sermons that we studied.

Chapter 4 was made possible by Chapter 3, which, without focusing on collective worship, explored the principal issues of collective affectivity, and so aided us in grasping the unique affectivity of collective worship, as opposed to the affectivity of the individual worshipper. This is an undeveloped topic, both in Aquinas's own work, and in Thomistic scholarship on affectivity. Thus it was constructive to veer away from Aquinas's texts to review some recent work on collective emotions, where there is more explicit analysis of the collective experience of affectivity.

The survey of Le Bon's work on crowds, and Durkheim's work on collective effervescence, pointed out ways in which affectivity is different in a group setting. Some more recent work offers helpful distinctions, beginning with those between group-based, shared, and collective emotions. As we saw, some authors either do not make distinctions between these kinds of emotions, or they treat them as synonymous. There is an essential difference between them, however, namely that while group-based and shared emotions are the emotions of individuals, collective emotions are emotions of a collective, that is, a group. Tracey Isaacs' work on collective intentions clarifies how the intentions of a collective can transcend the intentions of its members, and so addresses the problem of how a collective can have its own "mind". Her explanation of how goal-oriented collectives have a collective intentional structure that gives them status as moral agents has considerable applicability to collective

worship, and to how a phrase such as "the Church shares your joy" can find its way into a liturgical text.

The section on the role of collective emotions suggests multiple reasons for why the Church's worship is as affective as it is. Those roles for emotions were in forming the group, maintaining the group, integrating members, building solidarity, and motivating members. Each of these roles is critical for the Church's worship. To take the example of integrating members into the group, the words of welcome and joy directed at a child to be baptised convey to the parents and godparents that the child's baptism matters to the Church—not just to those present, or even the local community, but to the whole Church. Likewise, just as new spectators at a sport learn the sport's rules and strategy by observing the crowd's emotional responses to the game, the seasons and feasts of the Church help to form its members in its beliefs and so integrate them into the Church. The affections that are expressed in worship can prompt the question: what are we celebrating and why? Many of the studies discussed briefly in this section, on, for example, synchrony and rhythmic entrainment, have the potential to illuminate the importance of collective affective practices in worship. These would include practices such as common gestures, common recitation of prayers, and processions, as well as lesser-known practices. The "*chorus contra chorum*" method of praying the Divine Office, observed in many religious communities, is a unique example of collective religious affectivity, as those praying do so in synchrony with others on the same side of the choir, and in a rhythmic exchange with those on the opposite side.

This chapter saw the appearance of a familiar question in this thesis—does an emotion require embodiment? We saw that emotions lacking embodiment were once again cast under suspicion, affecting the very possibility of collective emotions. The studies of language in collective emotions gave us another angle to this question, because while statements like "Microsoft feels upset" suggests an embodiment that is lacking in a collective agent, "Microsoft is upset" or "Microsoft regrets" suggest no such embodiment yet do convey emotion. Likewise, a phrase such as "the Church feels joyful" makes little sense when compared with the more restrained "the Church shares your joy."

The literature on collective emotions also helps to draw out some of the teaching on collective affectivity that is implicit in Aquinas's texts, particularly, again, around the *role* of collective emotions. Three of the five roles that I identified—establishing the group, maintaining the group, and creating solidarity among members—are consistent with Aquinas's teaching about group ends and the importance of unity in the affections. It is less evident where the roles of integrating members and motivating action would find parallels in his texts. Nevertheless, it is worth pursuing these further to see what collective affections can offer to moral formation in groups generally, and particularly in the Church.

Beyond these points, Aquinas has much else to offer the study of collective emotions. First, his distinction between affections of the will and the passions helps to avoid the confusion that the sole and disputed category of emotion brings. Secondly, Aquinas offers a coherent explanation of how groups come into being through a unity of order, and how a group can have a moral agency that transcends the agency of the members. Thirdly, his principle that appetite follows apprehension allows us to avoid the implicit voluntarism of Margaret Gilbert's joint commitment account of collective emotion. Collective emotions are dependent on beliefs that the collective has reached through what we have broadly called "policy-making," and which are agreed-upon formally and informally. This connection with beliefs is essential for the emotions to be judged as rational or irrational. Finally, the categories of apprehension and affection also help to clarify how one may participate affectively in the life of groups despite one's individual affective state. Faking collective emotions no doubt does take place—witness the fevered clapping after speeches in totalitarian states. But from the standpoint of apprehension, it need not be incoherent nor deceitful for a person to smile and applaud at collective events when for the most part the person is sad. We are capable of having multiple objects of apprehension, and the objects that dominate our apprehension (the death of a friend, a medical diagnosis), may not cohere with the object of the collective apprehension (a birthday celebration). But a part of the exercise of our rationality is judging which object to apprehend, and how to express one's affection appropriately.

The second half of the thesis, focusing on collective affectivity, was a shift away from the focus on individual affectivity that preceded them. These first two chapters treated the basic movements of the appetites that are also present in collective affections and religious affections. A statement of anger by a corporation, or the expression of desire in a prayer, can both be analysed according to Aquinas's teaching on anger and desire in individual affections and passions. For some of the passions, especially love, desire, and joy, Aquinas has much to say about these also as movements of the will. For others, such as daring, he does not elaborate greatly beyond what he has to say about daring as a passion. I nevertheless established that for each of the eleven passions of the soul there is an equivalent affection of the will. This first section of Chapter 2 served to further my argument that the passions explain nowhere near the whole of affectivity, and there is much human action which springs from the affections of the will.

The second section of the chapter, treating the affection of wonder, strengthened this case even further. Aquinas is explicit that wonder is a movement of the rational appetite, and writes about wonder at some length, though in a way that is dispersed and unsystematic. Guy Godin's division of wonder into three varieties, which in English I termed philosophical wonder, admiration, and awe, captures well the different ways in which Aquinas speaks of wonder, and allows us to explain how wonder can survive the discovery of a cause. There are many areas for further studies of wonder, including how it could be given more prominence in moral theology. A tendency in contemporary literature is to categorise wonder, and particularly awe, as a spiritual experience, not necessarily with moral import. It would be easy, too, for wonder to slip out of the categories on which fundamental moral theology is often based—wonder is not a commandment, it is not a virtue, it is not a passion, it is not a gift of the Spirit. How, then, would it find its way into a course or text in moral theology? Seeing as we did, however, that wonder is fundamental to wisdom, humility, and reverence, and can orient us towards what is good and great, it merits greater attention being paid to it in moral theology.

The affection of wonder lays the groundwork for the many ways in which it is expressed in liturgical praise as a religious affection. Prayers by which we give praise to God's glory, majesty, and greatness, all evoke and express the religious affection of wonder. But the religious affections are profitably studied first simply as affections of the will, with any number of possible objects. The affection of awe in front of a great landscape aids in grasping the expressions of awe in a prayer. One can better understand the admiration expressed in prayers of praise, including the Gloria, if admiration is first understood as an affective response to excellence, where the object of admiration may be the skill of a young musician. The same holds for affections such as devotion and gratitude. This case study on wonder could well have been on one of these affections instead, however, the primary aim was to demonstrate that Aquinas has much to say about affections beyond what he discusses in the Treatise on the Passions.

The approach to affectivity in collective worship that I have set out in this thesis is one that builds upon Aquinas's category of the affections of the will, which I introduced in Chapter 1. Why was this approach necessary when I could simply have employed the concept of emotion? The essential problem is that emotion is a much disputed and misunderstood term. Is an embodied reaction, a "feeling component", essential to emotion? My survey of some of the issues in philosophical discussion of emotion demonstrated the problem of assuming from the outset that embodiment is essential to emotion, in which case a human action or experience cannot be emotion if it lacks an accompanying bodily component. This point of view had a direct counterpart in the discission of Aquinas's "dispassionate passions" or "pseudopassions", where we saw Diana Fritz Cates and Peter King doubting whether these are truly emotions, given that they lack the bodily component that on their view is essential to emotion. The view that I favoured was that of Daniel Westberg, who defines emotion in terms of movement towards or away from an object by appetite. As we saw, Westberg and Anthony Kenny also give persuasive examples of how we may act from fear without necessarily experiencing fear as a feeling.

In the remainder of the chapter, we discussed some of the concepts pertinent to the affections. Of these, the most important is the distinction between the sensitive appetite in the one hand, and the rational appetite, intellectual appetite, or will on the other. There would be multiple areas for further study into the relationship between the sensitive and rational appetites, for example, in how to employ the interior senses of memory and imagination to strengthen affections of the will, and to weaken others. This holds true also for the religious affections, where devotion and gratitude, for example, can be strengthened by objects of both the internal and external senses, whether Church art and architecture, imaginative depictions of Gospel scenes, and concrete instances of the wonders of creation and God's goodness. Less obvious and less explored, however, is how moral formation takes place through collective affectivity, and specifically through the Church's collective worship. That, in my view, is a topic worthy of much greater study, and I offer this thesis as a contribution to that study.

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