



Does expansion of higher education lead to trickle-down growth?



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ABSTRACT

The paper revisits the debate on trickle-down growth in view of the widely discussed changes in the distribution of earnings and income that followed a massive expansion of higher education. We propose a dynamic general equilibrium model to dynamically evaluate whether economic growth triggered by an increase in public education expenditure on behalf of those with high learning ability eventually trickles down to low-ability workers and serves them better than redistribution through labor income taxation or education policies targeted to the low-skilled. Our results suggest that promoting higher education implies that low-skilled workers first lose in terms of consumption and income but eventually gain. Policies that aim at expanding the skills of low-ability workers make them better off only moderately because of adverse general equilibrium effects. Low-ability workers typically benefit most from redistribution.

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“Since 1979, our economy has more than doubled in size, but most of that growth has flowed to a fortunate few.”

[Barack Obama, December 4, 2013]

1. Introduction

Whether economic growth trickles down to the socially less fortunate has been a key debate for many decades in the US and elsewhere (e.g. Kuznets, 1955; Thornton et al., 1978; Hirsch, 1980; Aghion and Bolton, 1997; Piketty, 1997). In particular, social desirability and choices of growth-promoting policies may critically depend on their expected trickle-down effects. For instance, massive expansion of high school and college education throughout the 20th century has led to a surge in the relative supply of skilled labor (Goldin and Katz, 2008; Gordon,

2013). Goldin and Katz (2008) document the important role of the public sector for this development, particularly between 1950 and 1970.¹ They also argue that the evolution of skill premia can be explained by the pace at which the relative supply of skills keeps track with the relative demand for skills as driven by skill-biased technological change. However, there may be a feedback effect of rising skill supply from expansion of higher education via endogenous and possibly skill-biased technological change, altering the demand for various skills in absolute and relative terms. It is thus not evident whether and when workers with only basic education benefit from increased public education spending targeted to higher education institutions.² In fact, despite steady economic growth, median (full-time equivalent) earnings of males have almost stagnated from the 1970s onwards (e.g. Katz and

¹ For instance, the fraction of college students in publicly controlled institutions gradually increased between 1900 and 1970. Between 1950 and 1970, it increased from 0.5 to almost 0.7 among students with four years of college attendance (Goldin and Katz, 2008; Fig. 7.7).

² Che and Zhang (2014) argue that the higher education expansion in China in the late 1990s had a causal positive effect on technological change particularly in human capital intensive industries, suggesting that technical change endogenously benefits primarily high-skilled workers.

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Murphy, 1992; Acemoglu and Autor, 2012; DeNavas-Walt et al., 2013). Moreover, earnings of less educated males fell considerably (Acemoglu and Autor, 2011, Table 1a).

We propose a suitable dynamic general equilibrium framework with endogenous technical change that is directed to complement particular skills, heterogeneous agents, and a key role of human capital for economic growth to evaluate the effects of public expenditure reforms on the evolution of living standards over time. We investigate, in particular, whether economic growth triggered by an increase in public education expenditure on behalf of those with high learning ability eventually trickles down to low-ability workers. Moreover, we also wish to assess whether expansion of higher education serves low-skilled workers better than redistribution through labor income taxation or education policies targeted to them specifically. Hence, the following public expenditure policies are comparatively examined: (i) education subsidy on behalf of high-ability workers (e.g. post-secondary and tertiary education), (ii) income transfers towards individuals who do not acquire more advanced education (e.g. because of limited ability), and (iii) public education finance targeted to low-ability workers (e.g., qualification and training programs for low-skilled workers).³

Whether and when growth promoted by expansion of higher education trickles down to low-skilled workers is a key question for at least two reasons. First, the evolution of the earnings distribution has recently provoked an intensive policy debate in the US and elsewhere (e.g. Stiglitz, 2012; Deaton, 2013; Mankiw, 2013; Piketty, 2014).⁴ For instance, in a widely received speech (December 4, 2013), US President Barack Obama referred to it as “the defining challenge of our time”, criticizing that “a trickle-down ideology became more prominent”.⁵ He also urged that “we need to set aside the belief that government cannot do anything about reducing inequality”. In fact, the tax-transfer system in the US is rather unsuccessful to improve living standards of the working-poor, compared to other advanced countries (Gould and Wething, 2012). Second, upward social mobility has been proved severely limited by intergenerational transmission of learning ability and/or human capital, implying that a significant fraction of individuals may not acquire more than basic education for a long time to come (Corak, 2013).⁶ It is thus important to know whether those individuals can profit from stimulating economic growth by promoting human capital expansion of high-ability workers. We focus on the economic situation of low-ability individuals by deliberately ruling out the possibility of social mobility and comparatively examine economic policy alternatives on behalf of those who will stay disadvantaged. That is, rather than investigating economic inequality per se, we analyze trickle-down growth in a strict sense.⁷

³ The literature on the effectiveness of programs to promote basic education on behalf of low-income earners is mixed. Some evidence suggests that their success is limited unless governments intervene at a very young age (Cunha et al., 2006). However, the negative view on programs targeted to adolescents and young adults has been qualified. Schochet et al. (2008) evaluate the Job Corps program, which targets economically disadvantaged youth aged 16 to 24. They find positive effects on skill development but mixed effects on earnings. Osikominu (2013) provides encouraging evidence on long term active labor market policy in Germany. Kautz et al. (2014) argue that education interventions targeted to adolescents and young adults are successful if they involve mentoring and emphasize non-cognitive skills.

⁴ The earnings distribution has changed markedly also in Continental Europe, although later than in the US; see e.g. Dustmann et al. (2009) for evidence on Germany.

⁵ See the following URL (retrieved on May 25, 2015): <https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/12/04/remarks-president-economic-mobility>.

⁶ There is overwhelming evidence for the hypothesis that the education of parents affects the human capital level of children. For instance, Plug and Vijverberg (2003) and Black et al. (2005) show that children of high-skilled parents have a higher probability of being high-skilled.

⁷ A comprehensive discussion of inequality dynamics should in fact allow for social mobility. This would, however, come at the cost of losing the focus on our research question. Social mobility in the US is indeed quite low, as demonstrated by Chetty et al. (2014). We also abstain from modeling early intervention programs targeted to young children from disadvantaged households (e.g., Kautz et al., 2014).

Our framework rests on the following features: (i) the government can extend redistribution through labor income taxation or promote education targeted to high-ability workers (higher education) via subsidies or targeted to low-ability workers via public provision (e.g., training programs targeted to low-skilled adult workers or second-chance programs for high-school drop outs); (ii) low-ability households rely on the public education system, may receive income transfers, and potentially benefit from subsidies on higher education via various general equilibrium effects; (iii) there are distortionary taxes on (labor and capital) income and capital gains that are adjusted to finance policy interventions; (iv) growth is endogenously driven by directed technological change that potentially favors different types of skills asymmetrically; (v) only high-ability workers can be employed in R&D or education activities; (vi) the accumulation of physical capital, human capital and R&D-based knowledge capital interact with public policy in determining the evolution of living standards over time.

Our key findings may be summarized as follows. First, when the government raises public funds devoted to higher education, earnings, consumption and net income of low-ability workers initially decrease compared to the baseline scenario without policy reform. Consistent with empirical evidence, expansion of higher education is followed by rising inequality and temporarily lower wages at the bottom of the earnings distribution. Only after considerable time elapsed, the economic situation of low-skilled workers improves and they eventually become better off. Second, an equally sized increase in public education expenditure targeted to low-ability workers raises their earnings at all times, allowing them to raise consumption. However, adverse general equilibrium (growth) effects driven by tax distortions and high opportunity costs in terms of high-skilled labor use that are associated with low education returns imply that the positive effects of low-skilled workers are moderate. Third, low-skilled workers are best off by increasing redistributive transfers (equally sized) both in the shorter and in the longer run.

We now turn to the related literature. Our paper borrows from Von Weizsäcker (1966) and Acemoglu (1998, 2002) to introduce the idea that the relative demand for different types of workers via technological change is endogenous to the supply of human capital. Standard analyses of directed technological change models are inadequate to enter the trickle-down growth debate, however, because they exclusively focus on the long run and assume that skill supply is exogenous. For instance, as acknowledged by Acemoglu and Autor (2012), such analyses are unsuccessful to explain falling earnings at the bottom of the distribution of income. Rather, we focus on transitional dynamics to dynamically evaluate the impact of public policy reforms when both the formation of human capital and the extent and direction of technological change are endogenous to public policy reforms. Galor and Moav (2000) examine distributional effects of biased technological change in a dynamic model of endogenous skill supply. There are two main differences to our work. First, whereas Galor and Moav (2000) are interested in the evolution of wage inequality when the rate of (by assumption ability-biased) productivity growth starts below steady state, we evaluate public policy reforms. In particular, we consider the effects on income dynamics of a publicly financed expansion of education on behalf of high-ability individuals versus redistributive transfers and publicly financed promotion of skills on behalf of low-ability individuals. Second, in our model, technological change is based on R&D decisions that are potentially skill-biased endogenously.

Another strand of literature examining the interplay between economic growth and economic outcomes for less educated individuals focuses, different to our work, on the role of credit constraints.⁸ In their seminal paper, Galor and Zeira (1993) argue that these result into suboptimally low human capital investments. If the wedge between the borrowing and the lending rate is sufficiently large, inequality

⁸ We calibrate our model to the US, for which empirical evidence suggests a minor role of binding credit constraints for education finance (Lochner and Monge-Naranjo, 2011).

is not only harmful for growth but may also increase over time, i.e., growth does not trickle down. [Aghion and Bolton \(1997\)](#); [Piketty \(1997\)](#) and [Matsuyama \(2000\)](#) examine the evolution of wealth distribution under imperfect credit market with fixed investment requirements for entrepreneurial projects. They identify conditions under which growth may trickle down and argue that (lump sum) wealth redistribution to the poor may speed up this process by mitigating credit constraints. In contrast to this literature, our focus is on the interplay between physical capital accumulation, human capital accumulation and technological change directed to different types of workers. Most importantly, we stress the role of the public sector for education and redistribution, both financed by distortionary taxation. Finally, [Fernandez and Rogerson \(1995\)](#) argue, based on a setup where all individuals would benefit from education and differ in initial endowments, that under majority voting incomplete education subsidies emerge that exclude the poor from education because of credit constraints. As in our model, education subsidies are tax-financed. Thus, there is redistribution from the poor towards the rich. We do not aim to provide a positive explanation of the policies we consider. Our setup is, however, consistent with the view that the poor may support higher education subsidies because they benefit from it in the longer run.

The paper is organized as follows. In [Section 2](#), we set up a comprehensive growth model. [Section 3](#) characterizes its equilibrium analytically. [Section 4](#) presents the calibration strategy. In [Section 5](#) we employ numerical analysis to dynamically evaluate the trickle-down dynamics of policy reforms. The last section concludes.

2. The model

Consider an infinite-horizon, Ramsey-type growth model in continuous time with three growth engines: (i) physical capital accumulation, (ii) education, and (iii) endogenous, directed technical change. These growth engines interact with each other and are affected by various public policy instruments.

2.1. Firms

There is a homogenous final good with price normalized to unity. Following [Acemoglu \(2002\)](#), final output is produced under perfect competition according to

$$Y = \left[(X_H)^{\frac{\varepsilon-1}{\varepsilon}} + (X_L)^{\frac{\varepsilon-1}{\varepsilon}} \right]^{\frac{\varepsilon}{\varepsilon-1}}, \quad (1)$$

$\varepsilon > 0$. X_L and X_H are composite intermediate inputs. They are also produced under perfect competition, combining capital goods (“machines”) with high-skilled and low-skilled labor, respectively. Formally, we have

$$X_H = \left(H^X \right)^{1-\alpha} \int_0^{A_H} x_H(i)^\alpha di, \quad (2)$$

$$X_L = \left(L^X \right)^{1-\alpha} \int_0^{A_L} x_L(i)^\alpha di, \quad (3)$$

$0 < \alpha < 1$, where $x_H(i)$ and $x_L(i)$ are inputs of machines, indexed by i , which are complementary to the amount of human capital in this sector, H^X , and low-skilled labor, L^X , respectively. The mass (“number”) of machines, A_H and A_L , expands through horizontal innovations, as introduced below. The initial numbers of both types of machines are given and positive; $A_{H,0} > 0$, $A_{L,0} > 0$.

In each machine sector there is one monopoly firm – the innovator or the buyer of a blueprint for a machine. They produce with a “one-to-one” technology by using one unit of final output to produce one

machine unit. The total capital stock, K , in terms of the final good, thus reads as

$$K = \int_0^{A_H} x_H(i) di + \int_0^{A_L} x_L(i) di. \quad (4)$$

Machine investments are financed by bonds sold to households. In each machine sector there is a competitive fringe which can produce a perfect substitute for an existing machine (without violating patent rights) but is less productive: input coefficients are higher than those of the incumbents by a factor $\kappa \in (1, \frac{1}{\alpha}]$ in both sectors.⁹ Parameter κ determines the price-setting power of firms and allows us to disentangle the price-mark up from output elasticities, which is important for a reasonable calibration of the model. Physical capital depreciates at a rate $\delta_K \geq 0$.

There is free entry into two kinds of competitive R&D sectors. In one sector, a representative R&D firm directs human capital to develop blueprints for new machines used to produce the human capital intensive composite input, X_H , the other sector to produce X_L . To each new idea a patent of infinite length is awarded. Following [Jones \(1995\)](#), ideas for new machines in the R&D sectors are generated according to

$$\dot{A}_H = \tilde{\nu}_H (A_H)^\phi H_H^A, \quad \tilde{\nu}_H = \nu \cdot \left(H_H^A \right)^{-\theta}, \quad (5)$$

$$\dot{A}_L = \tilde{\nu}_L (A_L)^\phi H_L^A, \quad \tilde{\nu}_L = \nu \cdot \left(H_L^A \right)^{-\theta}, \quad (6)$$

where H_H^A and H_L^A denote human capital input in the R&D sector directed to the human capital intensive and low-skilled intensive intermediate goods sector, respectively. $\nu > 0$ is a R&D productivity parameter. $\theta \in (0, 1)$ captures a negative R&D (“duplication”) externality, discussed in [Jones and Williams \(2000\)](#). It measures the gap between privately perceived constant R&D returns of human capital and socially decreasing returns. We assume that $\phi \in (0, 1)$. $\phi > 0$ captures a positive (“standing on shoulders”) knowledge spillover effect (for empirical support, see e.g. [Audretsch and Feldman, 1996](#)).¹⁰

2.2. Households

There are two types of dynastic households, high-ability “type- h ” and low-ability “type- l ” households, who inelastically supply their human capital to a perfect labor market. Their population sizes, N_h and N_l , grow at the same and constant exponential rate, $n \geq 0$, i.e. N_l/N_h is time invariant. Type- l individuals can only work as low-skilled workers in the respective machine sector, whereas type- h individuals can be employed in all alternative uses. We rule out social mobility to capture the intergenerational transmission of learning ability in a pointed form and to deliberately model an unfavorable situation for type- l individuals, motivated by our interest in trickle-down dynamics.¹¹

Households own machine firms by holding equity and purchasing bonds. Equity finances blueprints for machine producers, whereas bonds provide capital that serves as input for machine producers.

⁹ See [Aghion and Howitt \(2005\)](#), among others, for a similar way of capturing a competitive fringe.

¹⁰ Two remarks are in order: First, [Acemoglu \(1998, 2002\)](#) employs the “lab-equipment” approach with capital investment in R&D. Since empirically R&D costs are mainly salaries for R&D personnel, we prefer specifications (7) and (11). Second, $\phi < 1$ implies that growth is “semi-endogenous” ([Jones, 1995](#)), i.e. would cease in the long run if population growth were absent.

¹¹ This simplifying assumption seems in fact empirically plausible: In 2012, the proportion of young students (20–34 year-olds) in tertiary education whose parents have below upper secondary education (12% of the total population) was 8%. Among those with tertiary educated parents (48% of the total population), it is 58% ([OECD, 2014](#), Table A4.1a).

2.2.1. Human capital formation

Skill formation depends on the (rival) human capital input of type- h individuals devoted to education (“teachers”). Let h_h^E and h_l^E denote the teaching input in educational production per type- h and type- l individual, respectively. Human capital levels of type- h and type- l individuals depreciate at the same constant rate $\delta_H > 0$ and evolve according to

$$\dot{h} = \xi (h_h^E)^\beta h^\eta - \delta_H h, \quad (7)$$

$$\dot{l} = \xi (h_l^E)^\gamma l^\eta - \delta_H l, \quad (8)$$

where $\xi > 0$, $\beta, \gamma \in (0, 1)$, $\eta \geq 0$, and $\beta + \eta < 1$. Initial levels $h_0 > 0$ and $l_0 > 0$ are given. If $\eta > 0$, there is intergenerational human capital transmission for both types. Our human capital accumulation process of type- h individuals is similar to Lucas (1988). However, Lucas (1988) assumes the change of human capital is proportional to the stock (in our formulation, holding if $\eta = 1$). This would mean that individual human capital levels grow without bounds, a possibility that we rule out. Type- h individuals decide on their demand for educational input, h_h^E , which is met by a perfectly competitive (zero-profit) private education sector. Examples include post-secondary and tertiary education. The educational input on behalf of low-ability workers, h_l^E , is publicly financed. Examples are qualification and training programs for low-skilled adolescents.

2.2.2. Preferences

As will become apparent, labor income taxation distorts the human capital investment decision. We abstract, however, from capturing a labor–leisure choice. On the one hand, the elasticity of labor supply with respect to net wages is estimated to be positive in the shorter run. Hours worked have, however, declined over a longer time horizon in many growing economies (e.g. Lee et al., 2007), suggesting that the long run wage elasticities of labor supply are negative. In view of these conflicting findings, we assume that households do not draw utility from leisure.

Let subscript t on a variable index time (suppressed if not leading to confusion). Preferences of individuals of type $j \in \{h, l\}$ are represented by the standard, dynastic welfare function

$$U_j = \int_0^\infty \frac{(c_{jt})^{1-\sigma} - 1}{1-\sigma} e^{-(\rho-n)t} dt, \quad (9)$$

$\sigma > 0$, where c_{jt} is consumption of a type- j individual at time t . Observing the standard No-Ponzi game conditions, type- h individuals choose their consumption profile and the sequence of education inputs to maximize U_h s.t. (7) and their intertemporal budget constraint (7) stated below, whereas type- l individuals maximize U_l s.t. intertemporal budget constraint (11) stated below, over their consumption path.

2.3. Government

Let w_h and w_l denote the wage rate of type- h and type- l individuals per unit of human capital. We focus throughout on the case where type- l individuals earn (endogenously) less than type- h individuals at all times and have lower marginal tax rates. Formally, suppose that the marginal income tax rate is given by an increasing step-function $\tilde{\tau}(\cdot)$ fulfilling $\tilde{\tau}(w_h h) \equiv \tau_h > \tau_l \equiv \tilde{\tau}(w_l l)$. The step-function $\tilde{\tau}$ is such that τ_h and τ_l are time-invariant for the income ranges we consider.¹² Only type- l individuals earn sufficiently little to be eligible for a transfer payment, denoted by T .

¹² Ensuring this outcome may require that the mapping from income brackets to marginal tax rates is adjusted when income levels grow, i.e. function $\tilde{\tau}(\cdot)$ is adjusted over time.

The human capital levels of both type- h and type- l individuals are affected by public education policy. For type- l individuals, teaching input h_l^E is exclusively publicly financed. Examples include government-sponsored qualification and training programs on behalf of adolescents and young adults from disadvantaged backgrounds, such as the JOBSTART and Job Corps (Bloom, 2010), as well as longer-term active labor market programs, such as the Employment Training Panel, California, and the Literacy/Basic Skills Program, New Jersey (Crosley and Roberts, 2007).¹³ Type- h individuals receive a subsidy at rate θ on their education costs, $w_h h_h^E$, whereas the government directly controls and finances h_l^E . The government cannot save or incur debt.

The interest rate for bonds is denoted by r . Dividends from equity holdings and bond holdings are taxed by the same constant rate τ_r . Financial assets per dynasty member, a_h and a_l , evolve according to

$$\dot{a}_h = y_h - (1 - \theta)w_h h_h^E - c_h \quad \text{with } y_h \equiv [(1 - \tau_r)r - n]a_h + (1 - \tau_h)w_h h \quad (10)$$

$$\dot{a}_l = y_l - c_l \quad \text{with } y_l \equiv [(1 - \tau_r)r - n]a_l + (1 - \tau_l)w_l l + T, \quad (11)$$

respectively. Initial asset holdings, $a_{h,0} > 0$, and $a_{l,0} > 0$, are given.

An increase in τ_h distorts the education decision of type- h individuals. An increase in the tax rate on capital income, τ_r , distorts savings decisions of households and investment decisions of firms. We also allow for taxation of capital gains, taxed with constant rate τ_g , and paid by the shareholders of machine producers. An increase in τ_g distorts the portfolio decision of households (substituting equity for bonds), therefore affecting R&D investments.

3. Equilibrium analysis

This section provides a number of analytical results that are important to better understand the major implications for wage income of low-skilled workers. The equilibrium definition is standard and relegated to Appendix A.

3.1. Preliminaries

The transversality conditions of the household optimization problems and the requirement of finite intertemporal welfare levels U_h and U_l requires the following parameter restriction to hold

$$\rho - n + (\sigma - 1)g > 0 \quad \text{with } g \equiv \frac{n(1-\theta)}{1-\phi}. \quad (A1)$$

As will become apparent, g is the long run growth rate of individual consumption levels, individual income components, and knowledge measures A_h, A_l . Thus, in the long run, technological change turns out to be unbiased.

Profit maximization of non-R&D producers implies two intermediate results that remind us on the mechanics of directed technical change.

Lemma 1. Define $\psi \equiv \alpha + \varepsilon(1 - \alpha)$. The relative wage per unit of human capital between type- h and type- l individuals reads as

$$\frac{w_h}{w_l} = \left(\frac{H^X}{L^X}\right)^{-\frac{1}{\psi}} \left(\frac{A_h}{A_l}\right)^{\frac{\psi-1}{\psi}}. \quad (12)$$

All proofs are relegated to Appendix B. According to (12), ψ is the “derived” elasticity of substitution between high-skilled and low-skilled labor in production (Acemoglu, 2002). For given productivity

¹³ The effectiveness of these programs is discussed by Cunha et al. (2006); Schochet et al. (2008), and Kautz et al. (2014).

levels, an increase in relative amount of type-*h* human capital devoted to manufacturing, H^X/L^X , by one percent reduces the relative wage rate, w_h/w_l , by $1/\psi$ percent. Notably, if $\varepsilon > 1$, then $\varepsilon > \psi > 1$; if $\varepsilon < 1$, then $\varepsilon < \psi < 1$.

Let P_H^X and P_L^X denote the price of the high-skilled intensive and low-skilled intensive composite intermediate good used in the final goods sector, respectively. An increase in the relative knowledge stock of the high-skilled intensive sector, A_H/A_L , has two counteracting effects on relative wage rate as given by (12). First, the relative productivity of type-*h* human capital in the production of composite intermediates rises, w_h/w_l increases for a given relative price of intermediates, $P \equiv P_H^X/P_L^X$. Second, however, since relatively more of the high-skilled intensive composite good is produced when A_H/A_L rises, the relative price of composite goods, P , decreases for given labor inputs. Through this effect, the relative value of the marginal product of type-*h* human capital declines. If and only if the elasticity of substitution between the composite intermediates is sufficiently high, $\varepsilon > \psi > 1$, the first effect dominates the second one (vice versa if $\varepsilon < \psi < 1$).

The next result provides insights on relative R&D incentives in the two R&D sectors. The respective profits of intermediate good firms (symmetric within sectors) are denoted by π_H and π_L .

Lemma 2. The relative instantaneous profit of machine producers reads as

$$\frac{\pi_H}{\pi_L} = \left(\frac{A_H}{A_L}\right)^{-\frac{1}{\psi}} \left(\frac{H^X}{L^X}\right)^{\frac{\psi-1}{\psi}}. \tag{13}$$

There are counteracting effects of an increase in relative employment in composite input production, H^X/L^X , on relative R&D incentives. First, for a given relative price of the high-skilled intensive good, P , relative profits in the high-skilled intensive sector rise due to the complementarity between labor and machine inputs in (2) and (3) (“market size effect”). Second, however, P falls in response to an increase in relative output of the high-skilled intensive good (“price effect”). In the case where $\varepsilon > \psi > 1$, the first effect dominates the second one, and vice versa if $\varepsilon < \psi < 1$.

Moreover, as already discussed after Lemma 1, an increase in the relative knowledge stock of the high-skilled intensive sector, A_H/A_L , reduces the relative price P . Thus, relative profits π_H/π_L decline. The magnitude of the elasticity of π_H/π_L with respect to A_H/A_L is inversely related to the (derived) elasticity between high-skilled and low-skilled labor in production, ψ .

3.2. Balanced growth equilibrium

Empirical estimates suggest that the elasticity of substitution between high-skilled and low-skilled labor is larger than one (Johnson, 1997). Moreover, existence and uniqueness of a balanced growth equilibrium (BGE), in which all variables grow at a constant rate, requires that the elasticity of substitution, ψ , is bounded upwards. Formally, we may assume

$$1 < \psi \leq \frac{2-\phi-\theta}{1-\theta}. \tag{A2}$$

Let superscript (*) denote long run values (in BGE) throughout. Moreover, define the human capital level per type-*h* individual devoted to manufacturing by $h^X \equiv H^X/N_h$ and the fraction of human capital of type-*h* individuals devoted to education by $h_h^E \equiv h_h^E/h$.

Proposition 1. Under (A1) and (A2), there exists a unique BGE which can be characterized as follows:

- (i) $c_h, c_l, a_h, a_l, A_H, A_L, w_h, w_l$, and T grow with rate g ;
- (ii) $L^X, H^X, H_H^A, H_L^A, P_H^A, P_L^A$ and P_L^X grow with rate n ;

- (iii) X_H and X_L grow with rate $g + n$;
- (iv) r, P_H^X , and P_L^X are stationary;
- (v) the long run fraction of human capital of type-*h* individuals devoted to education and the long run human capital level are also stationary; they are given by

$$h_h^{E*} = \frac{1-\tau_h}{1-\vartheta} \frac{\beta \delta_H}{\rho-n+(\sigma-1)g+(1-\eta)\delta_H} \equiv \bar{h}_h^E(\vartheta, \tau_h), \tag{14}$$

$$h^* = \left(\frac{\xi \bar{h}_h^E(\vartheta, \tau_h)^\beta}{\delta_H}\right)^{\frac{1}{1-\beta-\eta}} \equiv \bar{h}(\vartheta, \tau_h), \tag{15}$$

respectively; thus, both h_h^{E*} and h^* are decreasing in labor income tax of high-earners, τ_h , and increasing in the education subsidy rate ϑ ;

- (vi) the long run skill level of type-*l* individuals, l^* , is given by

$$l^* = \left(\frac{\xi (h_l^E)^\gamma}{\delta_H}\right)^{\frac{1}{1-\eta}} \equiv \bar{l}(h_l^E); \tag{16}$$

thus, l^* is increasing in educational input h_l^E ;

- (vii) the long run level of human capital per type-*h* individual devoted to manufacturing, h^{X*} , is increasing in the tax rate of both capital income and capital gains, τ_r and τ_g , respectively, and decreasing in the amount of type-*h* human capital devoted to educating type-*l* individuals, h_l^E ; h^{X*} is increasing in the education subsidy ϑ and decreasing in labor income tax rate τ_h if and only if

$$h_h^{E*} < \frac{\beta}{1-\eta}. \tag{A3}$$

According to (1), Proposition 1 implies that also per capita income grows at rate g in steady state. The result parallels the well-known property of semi-endogenous growth models that the economy’s long run growth rate is policy-independent (e.g. Jones, 1995, 2005). By contrast, the human capital allocation is affected by policy parameters, with effects on the transitional dynamics. First, according to part (v) of Proposition 1, labor income taxation ($\tau_h > 0$) distorts educational investments of high-ability households. An increase in the rate of the education subsidy, ϑ , mitigates this distortion. Both policy parameters, τ_h and ϑ , affect the long run level and allocation of human capital through the effect on the long run fraction of human capital of type-*h* individuals devoted to education, h_h^{E*} . An increase in h_h^{E*} has two counteracting effects on the steady state level h^{X*} of human capital of type-*h* workers employed in manufacturing. On the one hand, h^{X*} rises, as the amount of human capital expands (increase in h^*). On the other hand, employing more teachers to educate type-*h* individuals means a reallocation of existing human capital of type-*h* workers away from manufacturing. If h_h^{E*} is sufficiently small, the first effect dominates the second one. In this case, low-ability individuals gain from raising the education subsidy rate ϑ via the complementarity of composite inputs in (1). Empirically, expansion of higher education has undoubtedly raised the human capital input in all uses. Moreover, taxation of capital income and capital gains negatively affect R&D investment decisions, thus raising manufacturing input. Finally, promoting skill development of type-*l* workers reallocates human

capital of type- h workers from manufacturing to teaching, thus reducing h^{X^*} (part (vii) of Proposition 1).¹⁴

The next result shows the effects of changes in policy instruments affecting the long run human capital input in higher education on the steady state wage income level of low-skilled workers, $W_l^* \equiv w_l^* l^*$.

Proposition 2. Under (A1)–(A3), wage income of type- l individuals in the long run, W_l^* , is decreasing in τ_h and increasing in ϑ .

Because employment of type- h workers in manufacturing is complementary to low-skilled employment through the imperfect substitutability of composite inputs in final goods production, the long run wage rate per skill unit of type- l workers, w_l^* , critically depends on τ_h and ϑ through its impact on the long run fraction of human capital input in higher education, $h_h^{E^*}$ (Proposition 1). First, recall from (15) that an increase in subsidy rate ϑ or a decrease in tax rate τ_h raises the long run level of human capital per type- h individual, h^* . Under (A3), the level of human capital devoted to production, h^{X^*} , rises, implying that the output level of the human capital intensive composite income, X_H , increases. For given knowledge stocks, because of the complementarity of composite inputs in final goods production, this raises the price of the low-skilled labor intensive composite input, P_L^X . Moreover, as discussed after Lemma 2, for $\psi > 1$, the market size effect of an increase in H^X on profits for high-skilled intensive production, π_H , dominates the price effect. Thus, an increase in ϑ triggers off innovations directed to type- h human capital, i.e. A_H rises. As this also raises relative output X_H of the high-skilled intensive composite good, P_L^X increases through this effect as well. As a result, the value of the marginal product of low-skilled labor, w_l^* , increases — directly and by giving innovation incentives that raise knowledge stock A_L .

We next turn to the relative wage rate per unit of skill between the two types of workers. Although our focus is on the economic situation of low-ability dynasties, considering wage inequality is interesting to gain further confidence in the empirical relevance of our analysis.

Proposition 3. Under (A1)–(A3), the following holds for the relative wage per unit of human capital between type- h and type- l individuals in the long run, w_h^*/w_l^* .

- (i) If $\psi = \frac{2-\phi-\theta}{1-\theta}$ (i.e., ψ equals the upper bound in (A2)), w_h^*/w_l^* is independent of policy instruments;
- (ii) otherwise (if $\psi < \frac{2-\phi-\theta}{1-\theta}$), w_h^*/w_l^* is decreasing in ϑ , τ_r and τ_g and increasing in h_l^E and τ_h .

Consider an (endogenous) increase in the relative human capital level for the production of composite inputs, H^X/L^X , in the long run equilibrium, which depends on policy parameters, according to parts (vi) and (vii) of Proposition 1. For $\psi > 1$, an increase in H^X/L^X spurs innovation directed to type- h human capital relatively more, thus raising A_H/A_L . According to Lemma 1, for $\psi > 1$, an increase in the “relative knowledge stock”, A_H/A_L , raises the relative wage rate per unit of type- h

¹⁴ One can show (see the proof of Proposition 1) that in the case where the derived elasticity of substitution between the two types of workers, ψ , is high or the R&D technology parameters ϕ and θ lead to a high steady state growth rate, g , such that the second inequality in (A2) is violated, there may be two interior BGE. To understand why this can happen, suppose again $\psi > 1$, such that the market size effect discussed after Lemma 2 dominates the price effect, and h^X rises. According to (13), relative profits π_H/π_L thus rise, boosting the relative knowledge stock A_H/A_L , all other things being equal (“skill-biased technological change”). This effect is large when the knowledge spillover effect is high (i.e. ϕ is high), the duplication externality is low (i.e. θ is low) and/or ψ is high. If it is sufficiently large, the equilibrium amount of type- h human capital devoted to R&D targeted to type- l intensive production declines, implying that h^X rises further. In this case, there may be multiple equilibria. Perturbing, by increasing h^X , an interior BGE in which h^X is low to begin with, h^X rises by even more than initially. In other words, the BGE is “unstable”. If there are two interior BGE, then one is “stable”, characterized by a higher h^X than the “unstable” one (see the Remark in Appendix B and Fig. A.1 in the online-appendix). Property (vii) still holds in the stable BGE. In both types of equilibria, properties (i)–(vi) are satisfied. In the main text, we focus on the case with a unique BGE.

human capital, w_h/w_l , for a given H^X/L^X . However, an increase of H^X/L^X also has a negative impact on w_h/w_l for a given relative knowledge stock, A_H/A_L (see (12) in Lemma 1). If the substitution elasticity, ψ , equals the upper bound in (A2), both effects exactly cancel. If the two types of labor are stronger complements (i.e., if ψ is smaller than the upper bound in (A2)), then the effect for a given A_H/A_L dominates the one through a change in A_H/A_L .

4. Calibration

The baseline calibration is summarized in Table 1. The parameter values are mostly based on observables (including policy parameters) for the US economy in the 2000s before the financial crisis started in 2007, assuming that the US was in steady state initially (i.e. before the considered policy reforms). We calibrate variables related to type- h individuals by values for the representative individual with at least high school diploma and type- l individuals by values for the representative high-school drop-out. According to OECD (2014), the share of those among the 25–64 year-old with less than upper secondary education in the year 2005 is 12%, suggesting that the (by assumption time-invariant) relative population size reads as $N_l/N_h = 12/88 = 0.14$.

4.1. Policy parameters

Following the reasoning in Grossmann et al. (forthcoming) we set the capital gains tax rate to $\tau_g = 0.1$. Tax rates τ_l and τ_h are approximated by the marginal personal tax rate on gross labor income in the year 2005 at 67 and 133% of the average labor income, respectively, combining federal and subcentral government taxes and excluding social security contribution rates; this gives us $\tau_l = 0.21$ and $\tau_h = 0.31$ (OECD, 2015).¹⁵ Moreover, we assume $\tau_r = 0.17$, which coincides with the US net personal capital income tax (equal to the net top statutory rate to be paid at the shareholder level, taking account of all types of reliefs and gross-up provisions at the shareholder level) after the 2003 tax reform (Frank et al., 2012).

Let us denote the fraction of tax revenue devoted to redistributive transfers on behalf of type- l individuals by s^T , and that devoted to education of type- h and type- l individuals by s_h^E and s_l^E , respectively, $s^T + s_h^E + s_l^E \leq 1$. In the relevant case that the three spending fractions do not add up to one, suppose that there is an additional public spending category which may additively enter the utility function (like public expenditure for defense, the legal system, public order and safety). We approximate redistributive transfers by total “government social benefits” at the federal, state and local level between 2000–2007 as provided by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (2015),¹⁶ excluding those financed by social insurance contributions (social security, unemployment benefits, medicare), education and training measures and benefits to recipients outside the US. For instance, the measure includes the earned income tax credit and various kinds of public assistance (medical assistance, medicaid, energy assistance etc.). Dividing these expenditures by total public expenditure,¹⁷ we arrive at shares between 12 and 14%. We thus set $s^T = 0.13$ in our baseline scenario.

We now come to s_h^E and s_l^E . All US government bodies combined spent 13.6% of its total expenditure on education in the year 2011, including “public subsidies to households for living costs (scholarships and grants to students/households and students loans), which are not spent on educational institutions” (OECD, 2014, Table B4.1). We assume that public education expenditure per head is the same for workers of type- l (including public expenditure for specialized education programs

¹⁵ Data is retrieved from the OECD tax database on May 11, 2015 (http://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?DataSetCode=TABLE_14). The respective tax rate at 133 and 167% of average labor income is the same.

¹⁶ See www.bea.gov, National Data — National Income and Product Accounts Tables, Table 3.12 (Government Social Benefits), retrieved on May 12, 2015.

¹⁷ See www.bea.gov, National Data — National Income and Product Accounts Tables, Table 3.1 (Government Current Receipts and Expenditures), retrieved on May 12, 2015.

Table 1
Baseline calibration.

Parameter	Value	Parameter	Value	Parameter	Value	Variable	Value
n	0.01	α	0.4	τ_g	0.1	N_l/N_h	0.14
g	0.02	ε	1.83	τ_l	0.21	R_h^*/R_l^*	4
κ	1.3	δ_K	0.04	τ_h	0.31	$R \& D^*$	0.031
θ	0.5	δ_H	0.03	τ_r	0.17	Ω^*	2.09
ϕ	0.75	β	0.33	s_h^E	0.12	inv^*	0.196
ρ	0.02	γ	0.1	s_l^E	0.016	K^*/Y^*	2.8
σ	1.91	η	0.2	s^T	0.13	r^*	0.07
ψ	1.5	ξ	0.3	\bar{v}	0.2	a_h^*/a_l^*	5

Use $\phi = 1 - \frac{n(1-\theta)}{g}$, $\sigma = \frac{(1-\tau_r)r-\rho}{g}$, $\varepsilon = \frac{\psi-\alpha}{1-\alpha}$ and $inv^* = (n + g + \delta_K)K^*/Y^*$.

for young adults which are typically more costly than other types of education) and type- h (including public expenditure for tertiary education, which is about 25% of total public education expenditure in the year 2011, according to OECD, 2014). We thus set the government budget share of education for type- l individuals, s_l^E , to $0.12 \times 0.136 \approx 0.016$ and for type- h individuals accordingly to $s_h^E = 0.88 \times 0.136 \approx 0.12$.

With a balanced government budget, the level of transfers on behalf of type- l individuals adjusted for steady state growth, $\tilde{T} \equiv Te^{-gt}$, the amount of type- h human capital devoted to educating type- l individuals, h_l^E , and the subsidy rate on education costs of type- h individuals, ϑ , can be endogenously derived given the government expenditure shares s^T , s_l^E and s_h^E , respectively (see online-appendix). Our calibrated parameters imply an education subsidy rate for type- h workers of $\vartheta = 0.29$, which seems reasonable.¹⁸ In the US, the fraction of educational spending financed by public sources is 34.8% for tertiary education and 67.9% for all levels combined in the year 2011 (OECD, 2014). These figures do not account, however, for private opportunity costs of education which are inherently difficult to estimate.

4.2. Directly observed parameters

The per capita income growth rate (g), the population growth rate (n), the mark-up factor (κ), the elasticity of substitution between high-skilled and low-skilled labor (ψ) and the human capital depreciation rate (δ_H) are observed directly.

Recalling $g = \frac{n(1-\theta)}{1-\phi}$, we have $\phi = 1 - \frac{n(1-\theta)}{g}$. Consistent with average values for the period 1998–2006 (thereby averaging out business cycle phenomena) from the Penn World Tables (PWT) 8.1 (Feenstra et al., 2015), we let the long-run average per capita income growth rate of the US economy, g , be equal to two percent. The average annual population growth was about one percent. With $g = 0.02$ and $n = 0.01$, we have $\phi = 0.5(1 + \theta)$. Assuming an intermediate value $\theta = 0.5$, we arrive at $\phi = 0.75$. Our main conclusions are robust to variations in θ and ϕ which fulfill $\phi = 0.5(1 + \theta)$.

In his survey about skill-biased technological change, Johnson (1997) argues that the elasticity of substitution between high-skilled and low-skilled labor is about 1.5. We thus take value $\psi = 1.5$ for our baseline calibration.¹⁹

For the mark-up factor on marginal costs of durable goods producers, κ , we take a typical value from the empirical literature, $\kappa = 1.3$ (Norrbín, 1993). The human capital depreciation rates are set within the range of the estimated value in Heckmann (1976), who finds that human capital depreciates at a rate in the range between 0.7 and 4.7%. We assume $\delta_H = 0.03$.

¹⁸ According to (14), the education subsidy which offsets the long run distortion of labor income taxation of type- h workers reads as $\vartheta = \tau_h$. Our calibrated levels of ϑ and τ_h thus suggest little distortion of educational choices in the US. For the long run fraction of human capital of the representative high-ability worker devoted to education, our calibration in Table 1 implies $h_h^E/h = 0.18$. Moreover, the fraction of type- h human capital devoted to educating type- l individuals reads as $h_l^E/h = 0.05$.

¹⁹ $\theta = 2\phi - 1$ and $\psi = 1.5$ jointly imply that (A2) holds with equality.

4.3. Endogenous observables

We need to calibrate either the long run value of one of the individual asset holdings, a_h^* , a_l^* , or their ratio, a_h^*/a_l^* . As shown in the online-appendix, the long run values of individual asset holdings and consumption levels are indeterminate, i.e. depend on initial values for the number of machines, $A_{H,0}$, $A_{L,0}$, and asset holdings $a_{h,0}$, $a_{l,0}$. Since the equity issued by machine producers to finance blueprints is included in asset holdings (see Appendix A), $A_{H,0}$, $A_{L,0}$, $a_{h,0}$, $a_{l,0}$ are not independent from each other. Thus, for instance, $A_{H,0}$, $A_{L,0}$ and the ratio $a_{h,0}/a_{l,0}$ give us $a_{h,0}$ and $a_{l,0}$. We thus choose a_h^*/a_l^* according to empirical evidence. Survey data for the year 2007 suggests that households headed by someone without a high school diploma (type- l individuals) have, on average, a net worth of US\$ 150,000 (in 2010 dollars). Moreover, the average asset holding of educated households (type- h individuals) is approximately US\$ 750,000.²⁰ We thus set $a_h^*/a_l^* = 5$.

Also the other parameters are matched to long run values of endogenous observables: the capital-output ratio, K/Y , the investment rate, $inv \equiv \frac{K+\delta_K K}{Y}$, the interest rate (r), the full-time equivalent of relative wage income of the different types of workers (“skill premium”), Ω , the R&D intensity, $R \& D$, and the rates of return to education for type- h and type- l individuals, R_h and R_l , respectively.

We assume that the long run interest rate is $r^* = 0.07$ (Mehra and Prescott, 1985). The Keynes–Ramsey rule for consumption growth implies $\sigma = \frac{(1-\tau_r)r-\rho}{g}$. Given a typical value for the time preference rate, $\rho = 0.02$, recalling $\tau_r = 0.17$ and $g = 0.02$, we find $\sigma = 1.91$.

Similarly to Grossmann et al. (2013), we determine the output elasticity of capital goods, a , and the depreciation rate of physical capital, δ_K , to simultaneously match the investment rate (inv) and the capital-output ratio (K/Y). Using $\dot{K}/K = n + g$ implies that the long run investment rate reads as $inv^* = (n + g + \delta_K)K^*/Y^*$. We use typical values $\alpha = 0.4$ and $\delta_K = 0.04$, which gives us a theoretical long term capital-output ratio, K^*/Y^* , of about 280% and a long run investment rate, inv^* , of about 19.6%. According to the online database provided by Piketty and Zucman (2014), the value of US net financial assets, excluding housing wealth, as percent of GDP was 280% in the years 2002 and 2003, which is also the average figure over the period 1988–2006.²¹ Moreover, according to PWT 8.1, the average investment rate over the period 1998–2006 is about 19.5%. With $\alpha = 0.4$ and $\psi = 1.5$, we obtain an elasticity of substitution between the inputs in final production of $\varepsilon = \frac{\psi-\alpha}{1-\alpha} = 1.83$.

Our calibration of the parameters characterizing the educational production processes, $\xi = 0.3$, $\beta = 1/3$, $\gamma = 0.1$, $\eta = 0.2$, are in line with empirical evidence on observables with theoretically derived long run values of the (pre-tax) skill premium,

$$\Omega \equiv \frac{w_h h}{w_l l}, \tag{17}$$

the R&D intensity (total wage costs for researchers per unit of final output),

$$R \& D \equiv \frac{w_h (H_H^A + H_L^A)}{Y}, \tag{18}$$

and the relative returns to education for type- h and type- l individuals. We define R_h and R_l as the internal rates of return for type- h and type- l individuals from permanently raising teaching inputs h_h^E and h_l^E

²⁰ Those headed by a college graduate possess about US\$ 1,15 million, whereas those households headed by high-school graduates and educated by some college possess about US\$ 264,000 and US\$ 384,000, respectively. See http://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/scf/scf_2010.htm. In the 2000s, about 40% of the 25–64 year-olds in the US are tertiary-educated (OECD, 2014).

²¹ Available on <http://gabriel-zucman.eu/capitalisback/>. Country-specific data: U.S.A. (1770–2010), Table US.6c, retrieved on August 23, 2015.




Fig. 1. Time paths of normalized wage income of type- l individuals, W_l/W_l^* , in response to three policy reforms under endogenous adjustment of τ_h : Government budget shares s_h^E, s_l^E and s^T are raised by one percentage point to expand higher education (increase in ϑ), skills of low-ability workers (increase in h_l^E) and transfers towards low-skilled workers (increase in \tilde{T}), respectively. Set of parameters as in Table 1.

by one unit, respectively, holding the wage rates w_l and w_h constant and starting in a BGE.

The theoretical long run values of (17), (18) and the internal education returns, Ω^* , $R\&D^*$, R_h^* , R_l^* , are derived in the online-appendix and used to set the remaining parameters. To calibrate Ω^* , we looked at the earnings distribution for those aged 25+ with at least high school diploma and without high school diploma. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics (2015), the median earnings ratio between the two groups is 1.9 and the earnings ratio at the 90th percentile about 2.1. We would like to measure relative average earnings to proxy Ω^* which are not available, however. As the earnings dispersion is less pronounced within the group of high school dropouts, it is safe to choose a calibration in line with the notion that the value for relative average earnings is higher than relative median earnings. Our calibration suggests $\Omega^* = 2.09$, which appears reasonable. Moreover, for the R&D intensity, it implies $R\&D^*$ equal to 3.1%, which is the value suggested by OECD (2009) for the business R&D intensity (BERD as a percentage of value added in industry) in the US for the year 2007. Finally, we use the theoretically derived relative returns to education, R_h^*/R_l^* . The Mincerian rate of return to education (percentage change of wage income per additional year of schooling) is found to be higher for individuals with at least high-school education than for high-school drop-outs attending special education programs for adolescents and young adults (see e.g. the survey by Kautz et al., 2014). Our baseline calibration suggests $R_h^*/R_l^* = 4$, roughly in line with this literature.

It turns out that values of variables in BGE can be written as functions of $\bar{v} \equiv \nu(N_{h,0})^{1-\theta}$, where ν is the R&D productivity parameter. The endogenous observables are basically insensitive to changes in \bar{v} ; we choose $\bar{v} = 0.2$.

5. Numerical analysis and trickle-down dynamics

This section examines the dynamic implications of policy reforms on gross wage income of type- l individuals, $W_l \equiv w_l l$, their consumption level, c_l , and their net total income level, y_l . Starting from a BGE for our baseline calibration, we consider changes in the rate at which education costs of type- h individuals are subsidized, ϑ , in the amount of type- h human capital devoted to improve skills of type- l individuals, h_l^E , and in (steady state growth-adjusted) transfers, \tilde{T} , triggered by comparable (one percentage point) increases in the government budget shares s_h^E, s_l^E and s^T , respectively. We first focus our discussion on financing rising public expenditure by an increase in the marginal labor income tax rate of high-skilled workers, τ_h , and discuss alternative financing schemes in the aftermath.

To be more precise, for instance, consider a certain percentage point increase in s_h^E which is financed by an increase in τ_h . We let the education subsidy rate ϑ adjust endogenously along with τ_h , such that (i) the government's budget remains balanced, (ii) the other tax rates as well as the other policy instruments which govern the dynamical system (in the example, h_l^E and \tilde{T}) are held constant, and importantly, (iii) the steady state growth-adjusted level of public spending per capita of the fourth public spending category is held constant at the initial level (it thus continuous to grow at rate g also after a policy reform). The government budget shares (s_h^E, s_l^E, s^T) have been introduced to calibrate the policy instruments ($\vartheta, h_l^E, \tilde{T}$) as outlined in Section 4 and also allow us to consider three different policy reforms which are comparable to each other. Without the fourth spending category, requirement (iii) would be superfluous (it would trivially hold because the residual expenditure would be zero). However, any reasonable calibration dictates $s^T + s_l^E + s_h^E < 1$.

We apply the relaxation algorithm (Trimborn et al., 2008) which is designed to deal with highly-dimensional and non-linear differential-algebraic equation systems. A favorable feature of the relaxation algorithm is that it does not rely on linearization of the underlying dynamic system. Our differential-algebraic system turns out to be saddle-point stable for our calibration and is summarized in the online-appendix.

5.1. Endogenous adjustment of income tax rate for high-earners

We first evaluate the dynamic effects of policy reforms under endogenous adjustment of the (marginal) tax rate on labor income of high-skilled workers, τ_h , to keep the government's budget balanced.

As displayed by the solid lines of Figs. 1–3, an increase in the subsidy rate for higher education, ϑ , leads to a drop on impact and further reduction of W_l/W_l^* , c_l/c_l^* and y_l/y_l^* early in the transition to the new BGE. This primarily reflects a reallocation of high-skilled labor away from manufacturing (decrease in h^X) on impact. In turn, the price of the low-skilled intensive composite input, P_l^X declines²² due to the complementarity of both types of labor (which is higher, the lower the elasticity of substitution, ψ). Consequently, the wage rate w_l declines relative to the one in the initial steady state. In the longer run, however, human capital of high-ability workers expands despite the distortionary effect of an increase in τ_h . After the initial drop, h^X increases over time, eventually beyond the initial level, in turn raising P_l^X and w_l . An increase in P_l^X also has an additional effect on w_l by raising the R&D incentives of

²² The online-appendix (Fig. A.2–A.4) displays the transitional dynamics of all variables in response to policy reforms.




Fig. 2. Time paths of normalized consumption of type- l individuals, c_l/c_l^* , in response to same policy reforms as in Fig. 1. Set of parameters as in Table 1.




Fig. 3. Time paths of normalized income of type- l individuals, y_l/y_l^* , in response to same policy reforms as in Fig. 1. Set of parameters as in Table 1.

machine producers used in the low-skilled intensive composite goods sector. In sum, W_l increases in the longer run beyond the initial level, consistent with Proposition 2. In turn, also consumption and net income is boosted unambiguously in the longer run.

Now consider the dashed lines of Figs. 1–3. Expanding skills of type- l individuals (via increasing h_l^E) leads to a slight drop in $W_l = w_l$ very early in the transition, followed by an increase over time soon above the initial steady state wage income level (Fig. 1). The wage rate w_l decreases compared to the initial level in association with a decreasing composite input price P_l^X that occurs for two reasons. First, an increase in type- l human capital raises the output level of the low-skilled intensive composite good. Second, higher teaching input reallocates high-skilled labor away from manufacturing (decrease in h^X). The amount of human capital in manufacturing decreases further over time. The reason is that increased education costs are financed by an increase in distortionary tax rate τ_n , implying that human capital of type- h workers declines over time. These adverse general equilibrium effects are dampened by unskilled-biased technological change triggered off by the increase in skill level l . The increase in the present discounted value of after-tax wage income allows type- l workers to raise their consumption level c_l . They decide to do so particularly in the shorter run, whereas c_l declines over time below the initial level in the longer run (Fig. 2). The impact on wage income displayed in Fig. 1 is – except in the longer run – not substantial, reflecting the adverse general equilibrium effects of the policy intervention under the low relative return to education of low-ability types to which the education technology is calibrated. Thus, the present discounted value of the future stream of wage income increases rather moderately, with moderate effects on c_l . Total net

income y_l is decreasing on impact and over time (Fig. 3), reflecting decumulation of asset holding over time.

From the set of policy reforms under consideration, expanding redistribution through labor income taxation is most effective for boosting consumption of low-skilled workers for a long time after the policy reform (see the dotted line of Fig. 2). Because of the distortionary way transfers are financed,²³ the human capital stock of high-ability workers and thus the amount of human capital in manufacturing declines over time. Only on impact the reduced teaching input goes along with an increase in h^X . From the viewpoint of low-skilled workers, the redistribution policy dominates the policy to improve their skills and, at least for a relevant time horizon, also the policy of expanding higher education. Our comparative policy conclusions are robust to alternative, reasonable parameter sets that are consistent with the observable data.

5.2. Trickle-down growth from higher education: discussion

Our analysis suggests that expanding higher education has a dismal consumption and income effect for low-ability workers early in the

²³ In the online-appendix, to isolate the role of tax distortions, we display the implications of the three policy shocks for consumption of low-ability individuals, under the assumption that additional public spending is financed in a non-distortionary way at the expense of the fourth spending category (Fig. A.5). That is, all tax rates are kept constant. The dynamic effects of higher education expansion look rather similar to Fig. 2, whereas the other two policies become more beneficial: c_l is now raised through the entire transition also when expanding skills of low-ability individuals (increase in h_l^E); raising transfers boosts c_l the most also in the long run.




Fig. 4. Time paths of normalized consumption of type-I individuals, $c_{I,t}/c_I^*$, under the policy reform “expanding higher education” (s_h^* is raised by one percentage point), assuming alternative tax rate adjustments. Set of parameters as in Table 1.




Fig. 5. Time paths of normalized consumption of type-I individuals, $c_{I,t}/c_I^*$, under policy reform “expanding higher education” (s_h^* is raised by one percentage point), assuming endogenous adjustment of τ_h and alternative relative rates of return to education. Set of parameters as in Table 1.

transition and an eventual trickle-down growth effect. It takes about five decades until consumption, c_t , becomes higher compared to the initial steady state level, c_t^* .

5.2.1. Robustness

How robust is this result? First, we consider alternative ways how the increase in the subsidy rate for higher education, ϑ , is financed. Rather than solely adjusting labor income tax rate τ_h , consider an adjustment of τ_h along with an adjustment of the tax rate on capital income, τ_r , and the capital gains tax rate, τ_g , such that ratios τ_h/τ_r and τ_h/τ_g remain constant, respectively. Also consider an adjustment of τ_h along with both τ_r and the capital gains tax, τ_g , such that ratios of tax rates remain constant. In our model, taxation of both capital income and capital gains slows down the accumulation process of physical capital and knowledge capital, by giving disincentives for households to save and for firms to invest in R&D. Labor income taxation, however, has adverse growth effects by distorting human capital accumulation. As shown in Fig. 4, the considered alternatives to finance an increase in ϑ changes the evolution of consumption in a minor way.

Second, there is an intensive discussion on the returns to education particularly regarding programs aiming to improve skills of high-school drop-outs. It turns out that the curvature parameters β and γ , capturing the effectiveness of teaching high-ability and low-ability workers, according to (7) and (8), critically determine the relative education return, R_h/R_l , while playing little role for other endogenous observables. Fig. 5 displays that varying R_h^*/R_l^* by changing β (increase to 0.35 to match $R_h^*/R_l^* = 5.4$) and γ (increase to 0.15 to match $R_h^*/R_l^* = 1.5$) has little effect on the time elapsing until an increase in ϑ becomes beneficial for low-skilled workers.

5.2.2. Wage inequality

Is the preceding dynamic policy evaluation consistent with rising skill premia along with expansion of higher education, as observed in many advanced countries? Fig. 6(A) and (B) display the impact of an increase in ϑ on the skill premium, Ω , and the relative skill level, h/l , under the alternative ways of tax rate adjustments as for Fig. 4. Acemoglu (2002) has analyzed the impact of an exogenous increase in the supply ratio of high-skilled to low-skilled labor on the long run skill premium. His analysis requires that the (derived) elasticity of skilled labor and unskilled labor must be larger than two to explain a rising skill premium, which is higher than most empirical studies indicate. Our model, in contrast, suggests a gradual increase in Ω during the transition towards the steady state along with an endogenous increase in the relative skill level triggered off by higher education expansion for the empirically plausible calibration $\psi = 1.5$.²⁴

6. Conclusion

The first goal of this paper was to understand whether and, if so, when economic growth caused by an increase in public education expenditure on behalf of high-ability individuals trickles down to low-ability workers who do not acquire higher education. We contrasted the dynamic effects of higher education expansion with those of an equally sized increase in redistributive transfers and of skill formation targeted to low-ability workers. In our dynamic general equilibrium

²⁴ As in our baseline calibration part (i) of Proposition 3 applies, the change in the long run skill premium, Ω^* , is entirely driven by the change in h^*/l^* .




Fig. 6. (A): Time paths of the skill premium $\Omega = w_h/w_l$, under the policy reform “expanding higher education” (s_h^E is raised by one percentage point), assuming alternative tax rate adjustments. Set of parameters as in Table 1. (B): Time paths of the skill ratio, h/l , under the policy reform “expanding higher education” (s_h^E is raised by one percentage point), assuming alternative tax rate adjustments. Set of parameters as in Table 1.

framework, (changes in) public expenditures are financed by (changes in) various distortionary income taxes, human capital accumulation is endogenous, and R&D-based technical change could be directed to complement high-skilled or low-skilled labor (or both).

In the shorter run, if anything, low-skilled workers lose from expanding higher education for an extended period relative to the status quo. Consistent with empirical evidence for the US from the 1970s onwards, our analysis suggests that human capital accumulation is accompanied by falling or stagnating earnings of low-skilled individuals early in the transition phase and rising skill premia. In the longer run, however, low-ability workers benefit from promoting education of high-ability workers. The trickle-down effect is driven by the (static) complementarity of different types of human capital in goods production and an eventual increase in the level of human capital devoted towards R&D for producing low-skilled labor intensive goods.

Skill promotion targeted to low-ability workers is more effective than expansion of higher education to raise their wage income also in the longer run and triggers off unskilled-biased technological change. However, the policy is only moderately effective for two reasons. First, when the internal rate of education return is relatively low for low-ability workers, as suggested by empirical evidence and captured in our calibration of model parameters, there are high opportunity costs of allocating high-skilled workers to teach low-ability ones. Second, the necessary increase in tax rates for financing such education is distortionary. As a result, although the policy reform allows low-skilled workers to raise consumption, it raises their well-being less than expanding redistribution through the entire transition.

As a caveat, although our analysis suggests that moderately increasing redistribution through labor income taxation works best to raise

well-being of low-ability workers, there are obvious limits to redistribution resulting from growth-reducing tax distortions to finance them. Moreover, while demonstrating that the evaluation of skill formation programs on behalf of the socially disadvantaged should account for general equilibrium effects, its limited role to raise living standards critically hinges on exclusion of social mobility in the model. The modeling choice served to highlight the comparative role of policy options if potentially high-ability children from disadvantaged households do not benefit from interventions preventing them to end up as high-school drop-outs or similar. This is, unfortunately, not unrealistic for the time-being. It would be interesting, however, to direct future research on education programs (possibly early in the childhood) which promotes social mobility and comparatively dynamically evaluate them vis-à-vis other policy interventions from a general equilibrium perspective.

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Appendix A. Definition of equilibrium

Denote sizes of “type-*h*” and “type-*l*” households by $N_h > 0$ and $N_l > 0$, respectively. Let P_H^X and P_L^X denote the price of the high-skilled intensive and low-skilled intensive composite intermediate good used in the final goods sector, respectively, and $p_H(i)$, $p_L(i)$ the prices of machine *i* in the respective composite input sector. Moreover, let P_H^A and P_L^A denote the present discounted value of the profit stream generated by an innovation in the low-skilled and high-skilled intensive sector, respectively. These are equal to equity prices. There are no arbitrage possibilities in the financial market; thus, the after-tax returns from equity (capital gains and dividends) in both sectors and bonds must be equal:

$$(1 - \tau_g) \frac{\dot{P}_H^A}{P_H^A} + (1 - \tau_r) \frac{\pi_H}{P_H^A} = (1 - \tau_g) \frac{\dot{P}_L^A}{P_L^A} + (1 - \tau_r) \frac{\pi_L}{P_L^A} = (1 - \tau_r)r. \quad (19)$$

For given policy parameters $(\tau_g, \tau_r, \tau_h, \tau_b, T, h_t^E, \vartheta)$, an equilibrium consists of time paths for quantities $\{H_t^X, L_t^X, H_{Ht}^A, H_{Lt}^A, h_t, h_{ht}^E, X_{Ht}, X_{Lt}, \{x_{Ht}(i)\}_{i \in [0, A_{Ht}]}, \{x_{Lt}(i)\}_{i \in [0, A_{Lt}]}, A_{Ht}, A_{Lt}, c_{ht}, c_{lt}, a_{ht}, a_{lt}\}$ and prices $\{P_{Ht}^X, P_{Lt}^X, \{p_{Ht}(i)\}_{i \in [0, A_{Ht}]}, \{p_{Lt}(i)\}_{i \in [0, A_{Lt}]}, P_{Ht}^A, P_{Lt}^A, w_{ht}, w_{lt}, r_t\}$ such that

1. R&D firms and producers of the final good, the composite intermediate goods, and machines maximize profits²⁵;
2. taking factor prices as given, type-*h* households choose the consumption path $\{c_{ht}\}_{t=0}^\infty$ and teaching inputs $\{h_{ht}^E\}_{t=0}^\infty$ to maximize utility U_h s.t. (7) and (7); type-*l* households choose the consumption path $\{c_{lt}\}_{t=0}^\infty$ to maximize U_l s.t. (11);²⁶
3. the no-arbitrage conditions (19) in the financial market hold;
4. the total value of assets (owned by households) fulfills

$$N_h a_h + N_l a_l = K + P_H^A A_H + P_L^A A_L, \quad (20)$$

where K is given by (4).

5. the labor markets for type-*h* and type-*l* workers clear:

$$H^X + H_H^A + H_L^A + N_h h_h^E + N_l h_l^E = N_h h, \quad (21)$$

$$L^X = N_l l. \quad (22)$$

Appendix B. Proofs

Proof of Lemma 1. According to (1), inverse demand functions in the composite input sectors are given by

$$P_H^X = \frac{\partial Y}{\partial X_H} = \left(\frac{Y}{X_H}\right)^{\frac{1}{\alpha}}, \quad P_L^X = \frac{\partial Y}{\partial X_L} = \left(\frac{Y}{X_L}\right)^{\frac{1}{\alpha}}. \quad (23)$$

Thus, relative intermediate goods demand is given by

$$\frac{X_H}{X_L} = \left(\frac{P_H^X}{P_L^X}\right)^{-\alpha} \quad (24)$$

According to (3), the inverse demand for machine *i* in the human capital intensive sector is $p_H(i) = \alpha P_H^X (H^X / x_H(i))^{\alpha - 1}$. Machine producers, being able to transform one unit of the final good to one unit of output, have marginal production costs equal to the sum of the interest rate and the capital depreciation rate, $r + \delta_K$. In absence of a competitive fringe, the incumbent's profit-maximizing price would be $(r + \delta_K) / \alpha$. A price equal to $\kappa(r + \delta_K)$ (the marginal cost of the competitive

²⁵ This implies that the composite intermediate goods markets and the market for machines clear.

²⁶ Households also observe standard non-negativity constraints which lead to transversality conditions (see the proof of Proposition 1).

fringe) is the maximal price, however, a producer can set without losing the entire demand. Since $\kappa \leq 1/\alpha$, it is also the optimal price. Thus, with $p_H(i) = p_L(i) = \kappa(r + \delta_K)$ for all *i*,

$$x_H(i) = x_H = \left(\frac{\alpha P_H^X}{\kappa(r + \delta_K)}\right)^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}} H^X \stackrel{(2)}{\Rightarrow} X_H = A_H H^X \left(\frac{\alpha P_H^X}{\kappa(r + \delta_K)}\right)^{\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}}, \quad (25)$$

$$x_L(i) = x_L = \left(\frac{\alpha P_L^X}{\kappa(r + \delta_K)}\right)^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}} L^X \stackrel{(3)}{\Rightarrow} X_L = A_L L^X \left(\frac{\alpha P_L^X}{\kappa(r + \delta_K)}\right)^{\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}}, \quad (26)$$

Hence, relative supply of composite inputs is

$$\frac{X_H}{X_L} = \frac{A_H H^X}{A_L L^X} \left(\frac{P_H^X}{P_L^X}\right)^{\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}}. \quad (27)$$

Equating the right-hand sides of (24) and (27) and using $\psi = \alpha + \varepsilon(1 - \alpha)$ leads to an expression for the relative price of the composite inputs,

$$P \equiv \frac{P_H^X}{P_L^X} = \left(\frac{A_H H^X}{A_L L^X}\right)^{-\frac{1-\alpha}{\psi}}, \quad (28)$$

which is inversely related to the relative “efficiency units” of high-skilled to low-skilled labor in production activities, $\frac{A_H H^X}{A_L L^X}$.

According to (2) and (3), wage rates per unit of high-skilled and low-skilled labor are given by $w_h = P_H^X(1 - \alpha)X_H/H^X$ and $w_l = P_L^X(1 - \alpha)X_L/L^X$, respectively. Dividing both equations and using both (27) and (28) confirms (12). ■

Proof of Lemma 2. According to (25) and (26), the instantaneous profits of machine producers, $\pi_H = (\kappa - 1)(r + \delta_K)x_H$ and $\pi_L = (\kappa - 1)(r + \delta_K)x_L$, read as

$$\pi_H = (\kappa - 1) \left(\frac{\alpha}{\kappa} P_H^X\right)^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}} (r + \delta_K)^{-\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}} H^X, \quad (29)$$

$$\pi_L = (\kappa - 1) \left(\frac{\alpha}{\kappa} P_L^X\right)^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}} (r + \delta_K)^{-\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}} L^X. \quad (30)$$

Dividing both expressions, substituting (28) and noting from the definition of ψ that $\frac{1}{1-\alpha} = \frac{\varepsilon - \psi}{\psi - 1}$ confirms (13). ■

Proof of Proposition 1. First, we define $l^X \equiv L^X / N_h$, $h^X \equiv H^X / N_h$, and the relative population size $\chi \equiv N_l / N_h$. We also define $h_k^A \equiv H_k^A / N_h$, $p_k^A \equiv P_k^A / N_h$, $k \in \{H, L\}$. With these definitions we can rewrite labor market clearing conditions (21) and (22) as

$$h^X + h_H^A + h_L^A + h_h^E + \chi h_l^E = h, \quad (31)$$

$$l^X = \chi l. \quad (32)$$

Moreover, let $\tilde{z}_t \equiv z_t e^{-gt}$ for $z \in \{T, c_h, c_l, a_h, a_l, w_h, w_l, A_H, A_L\}$. That is, if a variable *z* grows with rate *g* in the long run, then \tilde{z} is stationary. Combining (4) and (20) and substituting both (25) and (26), we then have

$$\begin{aligned} \tilde{a}_h + \chi \tilde{a}_l &= \tilde{A}_H \left(\frac{\alpha}{\kappa(r + \delta_K)} P_H^X\right)^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}} h^X + \\ &\tilde{A}_L \left(\frac{\alpha}{\kappa(r + \delta_K)} P_L^X\right)^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}} l^X + p_H^A \tilde{A}_H + p_L^A \tilde{A}_L. \end{aligned} \quad (33)$$

The representative R&D firm which directs R&D effort to the human capital intensive sector maximizes

$$P_H^A \dot{A}_H - w_h H_H^A = P_H^A \tilde{\nu}_H (A_H)^\phi H_H^A - w_h H_H^A, \quad (34)$$

taking A_H and $\tilde{\nu}_H$ as given. Analogously for the R&D sector targeted to machines which are complementary to low-skilled labor. Thus, using (7) and (11), we have

$$P_H^A \nu(A_H)^\phi (H_H^A)^{-\theta} = P_L^A \nu(A_L)^\phi (H_L^A)^{-\theta} = w_h. \tag{35}$$

Define $\bar{\nu} \equiv \nu(N_{h,0})^{1-\theta}$ and recall $g = \frac{(1-\theta)n}{1-\phi}$. According to (35), we can then write

$$P_H^A \bar{\nu} (\tilde{A}_H)^{\phi-1} (h_H^A)^{-\theta} = \frac{\tilde{w}_h}{\tilde{A}_H}, \tag{36}$$

$$P_L^A \bar{\nu} (\tilde{A}_L)^{\phi-1} (h_L^A)^{-\theta} = \frac{\tilde{w}_h}{\tilde{A}_L}. \tag{37}$$

We turn next to composite input prices. Combining (23) with (1) implies

$$P_H^X = \left[1 + \left(\frac{X_H}{X_L} \right)^{\frac{\varepsilon-1}{\varepsilon}} \right]^{\frac{1}{\varepsilon-1}}, \tag{38}$$

$$P_L^X = \left[1 + \left(\frac{X_H}{X_L} \right)^{\frac{\varepsilon-1}{\varepsilon}} \right]^{\frac{1}{\varepsilon-1}}. \tag{39}$$

Substituting (28) into (24) we find

$$\frac{X_H}{X_L} = \left(\frac{A_H H^X}{A_L L^X} \right)^{\frac{\varepsilon(1-\alpha)}{\varepsilon(1-\alpha)+\alpha}}. \tag{40}$$

Substituting (40) into (38) and (39), and using $A_H/A_L = \tilde{A}_H/\tilde{A}_L$, $H^X/L^X = h^X/l^X$ and $\psi = \varepsilon(1-\alpha) + \alpha$, we obtain

$$P_H^X = \left[1 + \left(\frac{\tilde{A}_H h^X}{\tilde{A}_L l^X} \right)^{\frac{\psi-1}{\psi}} \right]^{\frac{1}{\varepsilon-1}}, \tag{41}$$

$$P_L^X = \left[1 + \left(\frac{\tilde{A}_H h^X}{\tilde{A}_L l^X} \right)^{\frac{\psi-1}{\psi}} \right]^{\frac{1}{\varepsilon-1}}. \tag{42}$$

The current-value Hamiltonian which corresponds to the optimization problem of a type- h household (see Definition 1) is given by

$$\mathcal{H}_h = \frac{(c_h)^{1-\sigma} - 1}{1-\sigma} + \mu \left(\xi (h_h^E)^\beta h^\eta - \delta_H h \right) + \lambda \left([(1-\tau_r)r-n]a_h + (1-\tau_h)w_h h - (1-\vartheta)w_h h_h^E - c_h \right), \tag{43}$$

where μ and λ are multipliers (co-state variables) associated with constraints (7) and (7), respectively. Necessary optimality conditions are $\partial \mathcal{H}_h / \partial c_h = \partial \mathcal{H}_h / \partial h_h^E = 0$ (control variables), $\dot{\mu} = (\rho-n)\mu - \partial \mathcal{H}_h / \partial h$, $\dot{\lambda} = (\rho-n)\lambda - \partial \mathcal{H}_h / \partial a_h$ (state variables), and the corresponding transversality conditions. Thus,

$$\lambda = (c_h)^{-\sigma}, \tag{44}$$

$$\mu \beta \xi (h_h^E)^{\beta-1} h^\eta = \lambda (1-\vartheta) w_h, \tag{45}$$

$$\frac{\dot{\mu}}{\mu} = \rho - n - \eta \xi_h (h_h^E)^\beta h^{\eta-1} + \delta_H - \frac{\lambda}{\mu} (1-\tau_h) w_h, \tag{46}$$

$$\frac{\dot{\lambda}}{\lambda} = \rho - (1-\tau_r)r, \tag{47}$$

$$\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} \mu_t e^{-(\rho-n)t} h_t = 0, \tag{48}$$

$$\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} \lambda_t e^{-(\rho-n)t} a_{ht} = 0. \tag{49}$$

Differentiating (44) with respect to time and using (47) as well as $\tilde{c}_h = c_h e^{-\sigma t}$, we obtain Euler equation

$$\frac{\dot{\tilde{c}}_h}{\tilde{c}_h} = \frac{(1-\tau_r)r - \rho}{\sigma} - g. \tag{50}$$

Define $m_t \equiv \mu_t e^{(\sigma-1)gt}$ and recall definition $h_h^E = h_h^E/h$. Combining (44) and (45) we can then write

$$m \xi \beta (h_h^E)^{\beta-1} h^{\eta+\beta-1} = (\tilde{c}_h)^{-\sigma} (1-\vartheta) \tilde{w}_h \tag{51}$$

(recall $\tilde{w}_h = w_h e^{-\sigma t}$). Moreover, combining (45) and (46) and making use of (44) and (51),

$$\frac{\dot{m}}{m} = \delta_H + \rho - n + (\sigma-1)g - \left(\eta h_h^E + \beta \frac{1-\tau_h}{1-\vartheta} \right) \xi (h_h^E)^{\beta-1} h^{\beta+\eta-1}. \tag{52}$$

Moreover, (7) can be written as

$$\frac{\dot{\tilde{a}}_h}{\tilde{a}_h} = (1-\tau_r)r - n + (1-\tau_h) \frac{\tilde{w}_h h}{\tilde{a}_h} - (1-\vartheta) \frac{\tilde{w}_h h_h^E}{\tilde{a}_h} - \frac{\tilde{c}_h}{\tilde{a}_h} - g. \tag{53}$$

For low-skilled individuals (who decide about their consumption profile only), we find analogously to (50) that

$$\frac{\dot{\tilde{c}}_l}{\tilde{c}_l} = \frac{(1-\tau_r)r - \rho}{\sigma} - g. \tag{54}$$

By using (11) we also obtain

$$\frac{\dot{\tilde{a}}_l}{\tilde{a}_l} = (1-\tau_r)r - n + (1-\tau_l) \frac{\tilde{w}_l l}{\tilde{a}_l} - \frac{\tilde{c}_l}{\tilde{a}_l} + \frac{\tilde{T}}{\tilde{a}_l} - g. \tag{55}$$

Using $A_k = \tilde{A}_k e^{gt}$, $H_k^A = N_h h_k^A$, $k \in \{H, L\}$, as well as $N_{h,t} = N_{h,0} e^{nt}$, $\bar{\nu} = \nu(N_{h,0})^{1-\theta}$ and $g = \frac{(1-\theta)n}{1-\phi}$ we can rewrite (7) and (11) as

$$\frac{\dot{\tilde{A}}_H}{\tilde{A}_H} = \bar{\nu} (\tilde{A}_H)^{\phi-1} (h_H^A)^{1-\theta} - g, \tag{56}$$

$$\frac{\dot{\tilde{A}}_L}{\tilde{A}_L} = \bar{\nu} (\tilde{A}_L)^{\phi-1} (h_L^A)^{1-\theta} - g. \tag{57}$$

Recall that competitive wage rates read as $w_h = P_H^X (1-\alpha) X_H / H^X$ and $w_l = P_L^X (1-\alpha) X_L / L^X$. Combining these expressions with (25) and (26), respectively, we find for adjusted wage rates:

$$\tilde{w}_h = (1-\alpha) \left(\frac{\alpha}{\kappa(r + \delta_K)} \right)^{\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}} \tilde{A}_H (P_H^X)^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}}, \tag{58}$$

$$\tilde{w}_l = (1-\alpha) \left(\frac{\alpha}{\kappa(r + \delta_K)} \right)^{\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}} \tilde{A}_L (P_L^X)^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}}. \tag{59}$$

Substituting (29) and (30) into (19) implies

$$\dot{p}_H^A + n p_H^A = \frac{1-\tau_r}{1-\tau_g} \left(r p_H^A - \frac{(\kappa-1) \left(\frac{\alpha}{\kappa} P_H^X \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}} h^X}{(r + \delta_K)^{\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}}} \right), \tag{60}$$

$$\dot{p}_L^A + n p_L^A = \frac{1-\tau_r}{1-\tau_g} \left(r p_L^A - \frac{(\kappa-1) \left(\frac{\alpha}{\kappa} P_L^X \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}} l^X}{(r + \delta_K)^{\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}}} \right). \tag{61}$$

In sum, the dynamical system is given by (7), (31)–(33), (36), (37), (41), (42) and (50)–(61).

To prove that a steady state with the properties stated in Proposition 1 exists, we need to show that $h_k^A, p_k^A, P_k^X, \tilde{A}_k$ ($k \in \{H, L\}$), $l^X, h^X, h_h^E, h, \tilde{\tau}, \tilde{c}_j, \tilde{a}_j, \tilde{w}_j$ ($j \in \{l, h\}$), r and m are stationary in the long run. To see this, we next derive steady state values of the just derived dynamical system.

First, set $\dot{h} = 0$ and use $h_h^E = h_h^E h$ in (7) to find $\xi(h_h^E)^\beta h^{\beta+\eta-1} = \delta_H$, which confirms (15). Using $\xi h^{\beta+\eta-1} = \delta_H (h_h^E)^{-\beta}$ in (52) and setting $\dot{m} = 0$ gives us (14). This confirms part (v). Note that h^* and h_h^{E*} are indeed time-invariant (i.e., $\dot{h} = 0$ for $t \rightarrow \infty$), as claimed in part (iv). Setting $\dot{l} = 0$ in (8) confirms (16) in part (vi).

Next, set $\dot{c}_h = 0$ in (50) to find that the long run interest rate, r^* , is given by

$$r^* = \frac{\rho + \sigma g}{1 - \tau_r}. \tag{62}$$

Thus, also $\dot{c}_l = 0$ holds, according to (54). Next, set $\dot{A}_H = \dot{A}_L = 0$ in (56) and (57) to obtain

$$\tilde{A}_H = \left(\frac{\bar{v}(h_H^A)^{1-\theta}}{g} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\phi}}, \tag{63}$$

$$\tilde{A}_L = \left(\frac{\bar{v}(h_L^A)^{1-\theta}}{g} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\phi}}, \tag{64}$$

respectively, or $\bar{v}(\tilde{A}_k)^{\phi-1} = (h_k^A)^{\theta-1} g, k \in \{H, L\}$. Using the latter together with (58) in (36) and (37) yields

$$p_H^A = (1-\alpha) \left(\frac{\alpha}{\kappa(r + \delta_K)} \right)^{\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}} (P_H^X)^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}} \frac{h_H^A}{g}, \tag{65}$$

$$p_L^A = (1-\alpha) \left(\frac{\alpha}{\kappa(r + \delta_K)} \right)^{\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}} (P_H^X)^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}} \frac{h_L^A \tilde{A}_H}{g \tilde{A}_L}, \tag{66}$$

respectively. Now substitute (62) and (65) into (60) and set $\dot{p}_H^A = 0$ to find

$$h_H^A = \Gamma(\tau_r, \tau_g) h^X, \tag{67}$$

where

$$\Gamma(\tau_r, \tau_g) \equiv \frac{1 - \frac{1}{\kappa}}{\alpha} \frac{(1 - \tau_r)g}{\rho + \sigma g - (1 - \tau_g)n}. \tag{68}$$

Note that $\Gamma > 0$ under (A1). Similarly, substituting (62) and (66) into (61) and setting $\dot{p}_L^A = 0$ we obtain

$$h_L^A = \frac{\Gamma(\tau_r, \tau_g) l^X}{P^{1-\alpha} \frac{\tilde{A}_H}{\tilde{A}_L}}. \tag{69}$$

From (67) and (69) we get

$$\frac{h_H^A}{h_L^A} = \frac{\tilde{A}_H}{\tilde{A}_L} \frac{h^X}{l^X} P^{1-\alpha}. \tag{70}$$

Moreover, (63) and (64) imply that

$$\frac{\tilde{A}_H}{\tilde{A}_L} = \left(\frac{h_H^A}{h_L^A} \right)^{\frac{1-\phi}{1-\theta}} = \left(\frac{h^X}{l^X} P^{1-\alpha} \right)^{\frac{-1-\phi}{1-\theta}}, \tag{71}$$

where the latter equation follows after substituting (70).

Next, substitute $A_H/A_L = \tilde{A}_H/\tilde{A}_L$ as given by (71) into (28), and use $h^X/l^X = h^X/l^X$ to obtain

$$P^{1-\alpha} = \left(\frac{h^X}{l^X} \right)^{\frac{-1-\phi}{1-\theta-\psi(\phi-\theta)}}. \tag{72}$$

According to assumption (A2), $\psi > 1$ and $2 - \phi - \psi + \theta(\psi - 1) = 1 - \theta - \psi(\phi - \theta) - (\psi - 1)(1 - \phi) > 0$, implying $1 - \theta - \psi(\phi - \theta) > 0$. Hence, the relative composite input price, P , and relative employment in input production, h^X/l^X , are negatively related under (A2).

Substituting (71) and into (69) and using (72) then leads to

$$h_L^A = \Gamma(\tau_r, \tau_g) (h^X)^\varrho (l^X)^{1-\varrho}, \text{ where} \tag{73}$$

$$\varrho \equiv \frac{2-\phi-\psi+\theta(\psi-1)}{1-\theta-\psi(\phi-\theta)} \tag{74}$$

(thus, $1 - \varrho = \frac{(\psi-1)(1-\phi)}{1-\theta-\psi(\phi-\theta)}$). According to assumption (A2), $0 \leq \varrho < 1$.

Using (67) and (73) in (31), and substituting $h_h^E = h_h^{E*} h^*$ and $l^X = \chi l^*$, the long run value of h^X is implicitly defined as

$$\begin{aligned} & [1 + \Gamma(\tau_r, \tau_g)] h^X \\ & = \left(1 - \bar{h}_h^E(\vartheta, \tau_h) \right) \bar{h}(\vartheta, \tau_h) - \chi h_l^E - \Gamma(\tau_r, \tau_g) (h^X)^\varrho \left(\chi \bar{l}(h_l^E) \right)^{1-\varrho}. \end{aligned} \tag{75}$$

We write $h^{X*} = \bar{h}^X(\tau_r, \tau_g, \vartheta, \tau_h, h_l^E)$. The left-hand side of (75) as a function of h^X is an increasing line through the origin. For $h^X=0$, the right-hand side of (75) is positive (since $h > h_h^E + \chi h_l^E$ in any meaningful equilibrium). If $\varrho > 0$, it is monotonically decreasing in h^X and eventually becomes negative. If $\varrho = 0$, it is a (positive) constant. Thus, whenever $\varrho \geq 0$, h^{X*} is unique.²⁷ To prove part (vii), first note that $\Gamma(\tau_r, \tau_g)$ is decreasing in both τ_r and τ_g , according to (68). Moreover, the right-hand side of (75) is decreasing in h_l^E (as \bar{l} is increasing in h_l^E). Finally, note from (15) that the term $(1 - h_h^{E*})h^*$ is proportional to $(1 - h_h^{E*})(h_h^{E*})^{\frac{\beta}{1-\beta-\eta}}$, which is increasing in h_h^{E*} if and only if assumption (A3) holds. The remainder of part (vii) then follows from the properties of h_h^{E*} .

Remark. If $\varrho < 0$, meaning that assumption (A2) is violated, the right-hand side of (75) is strictly increasing and concave in h^X , goes to $-\infty$ for $h^X \rightarrow 0$ and approaches a strictly positive value for $h^X \rightarrow \infty$. Thus, in this case, either two solutions or no interior solution for h^X as given by (75) exist. Two solutions means that two interior BGE exist, one stable and one unstable (see online-appendix for a numerical example). If no solution to (75) exists, then $h^X = 0$ would hold in BGE.

It is easy to check that (25), (26), (31), (41), (42), (50), (52), (53), (54), (55), (58), (59), (62)–(67), (73) and (75) are consistent with parts (i)–(iv) of Proposition 1.

Finally, it remains to be shown that the transversality conditions (48) and (49) hold under assumption (A1). Differentiating (45) with respect to time and using that $\dot{h} = 0$ as well as $\dot{w}_h/w_h = g$ for $t \rightarrow \infty$ implies that, along a balanced growth path, $\dot{\mu}/\mu = \dot{\lambda}/\lambda + g$. From (44) and $\dot{c}_h/c_h = g$ for $t \rightarrow \infty$ we find $\dot{\lambda}/\lambda = -\sigma g$ and thus $\dot{\mu}/\mu = (1 - \sigma)g$. As h becomes

²⁷ If $\varrho < 0$, meaning that assumption (A2) is violated, the right-hand side of (75) is strictly increasing and concave in h^X , goes to $-\infty$ for $h^X \rightarrow 0$ and approaches a strictly positive value for $h^X \rightarrow \infty$. Thus, in this case, either two solutions or no solution for h^X as given by (75) exist. Two solutions means that two interior BGE exist, one stable and one unstable (see online-appendix for a numerical example). If no solution to (75) exists, then $h^X = 0$ would hold in BGE.

stationary, (48) holds iff $\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} e^{((1-\sigma)g+n-\rho)t} = 0$, i.e., iff (A1) holds. Similarly, using $\dot{\lambda}/\lambda = -\sigma g$ and the fact that a_h grows with rate g in the long run, we find that also (49) holds under (A1). The same is analogously true for the transversality condition associated with a_l . This concludes the proof. ■

Proof of Proposition 2. Using (67) and (73) we have

$$\frac{H_H^A}{H_L^A} = \frac{h_H^A}{h_L^A} = \left(\frac{h^X}{l^X}\right)^{1-\varrho} \quad (76)$$

Substituting (76) into $\tilde{A}_H/\tilde{A}_L = (h_H^A/h_L^A)^{\frac{1-\varrho}{1-\psi}}$ (recall (71)) and using $1-\varrho = \frac{(\psi-1)(1-\phi)}{1-\theta-\psi(\phi-\theta)}$, according to (74), we obtain

$$\frac{\tilde{A}_H}{\tilde{A}_L} = \frac{\tilde{A}_H}{\tilde{A}_L} = \left(\frac{h^X}{l^X}\right)^{\frac{(\psi-1)(1-\theta)}{1-\theta-\psi(\phi-\theta)}} \quad (77)$$

Substituting (42) and (64) into (59) and using $\frac{1}{1-\alpha} = \frac{\varepsilon-1}{\psi-1}$, we find

$$\tilde{w}_l = (1-\alpha) \left(\frac{\alpha}{\kappa(r+\delta_K)}\right)^{\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}} \left(\frac{\bar{V}}{g}\right)^{\frac{1}{1-\psi}} \left(h_L^A\right)^{\frac{1-\varrho}{1-\psi}} \left(1 + \left(\frac{\tilde{A}_H h^X}{\tilde{A}_L l^X}\right)^{\frac{\psi-1}{\psi}}\right)^{\frac{1}{\psi-1}} \quad (78)$$

Substituting (73), (77) and $l^X = \chi l^*$ into (78) implies that the long run level of \tilde{w}_l , denoted by \tilde{w}_l^* , is given by

$$\tilde{w}_l^* = (1-\alpha) \left(\frac{\alpha}{\kappa(r^*+\delta_K)}\right)^{\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}} \left(\frac{\bar{V}}{g}\right)^{\frac{1}{1-\psi}} \Gamma(\tau_r, \tau_g)^{\frac{1-\theta}{1-\psi}} \times \left(h^X\right)^{\frac{(1-\theta)\varrho}{1-\psi}} \left(\chi l^*\right)^{\frac{(1-\theta)(1-\varrho)}{1-\psi}} \left(1 + \left(\frac{h^X}{\chi l^*}\right)^{1-\varrho}\right)^{\frac{1}{\psi-1}}, \quad (79)$$

where we used $1-\varrho = \frac{(\psi-1)(1-\phi)}{1-\theta-\psi(\phi-\theta)}$. Defining $\tilde{W}_l^* \equiv \tilde{w}_l^* l^*$ and recalling the definition of ϱ in (74), we find

$$\tilde{W}_l^* = \tilde{w}_l^* l^* = (1-\alpha) \left(\frac{\alpha}{\kappa(r^*+\delta_K)}\right)^{\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}} \left(\frac{\bar{V}}{g}\right)^{\frac{1}{1-\psi}} \Gamma(\tau_r, \tau_g)^{\frac{1-\theta}{1-\psi}} \left(h^X\right)^{\frac{(1-\theta)\varrho}{1-\psi}} \times \chi^{-\varrho} (l^*)^{1-\varrho} \left[\left(\chi l^*\right)^{1-\varrho} + \left(h^X\right)^{1-\varrho}\right]^{\frac{1}{\psi-1}} \quad (80)$$

Recalling both $0 \leq \varrho < 1$ and $\psi > 1$, according to assumption (A2), we see that the right-hand side of (80) is increasing in $h^X = \bar{h}^X(\tau_r, \tau_g, \vartheta, \tau_h, h_l^E)$. The result thus follows from part (vii) of Proposition 1. ■

Proof of Proposition 3. Substituting $h^X/l^X = h^X/l^X$ and (77) into (12) we obtain $w_h/w_l = (h^X/l^X)^{-\varrho}$. Thus, the long run relative wage rate, w_h^*/w_l^* , can be written as

$$\frac{w_h^*}{w_l^*} = \left(\frac{\chi \bar{l}(h_l^E)}{\bar{h}^X(\tau_r, \tau_g, \vartheta, \tau_h, h_l^E)}\right)^{\varrho} \quad (81)$$

Note that $\varrho = 0$ and $\varrho > 0$ are equivalent to the presumption in part (i) and (ii), respectively. The results thus follow from part (vii) of Proposition 1. ■

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