

PARADOSIS

Contributions to the History of Early Christian Literature and Theology

XX

JOHN EDWARD CHISHOLM, C. S. SP.

THE PSEUDO-AUGUSTINIAN HYPOMNESTICON
AGAINST THE
PELAGIANS AND CELESTIANS

VOLUME 1
Introduction

1967

THE UNIVERSITY PRESS FRIBOURG SWITZERLAND

PARADOSIS is intended as a series of studies in ancient Christian literature and theology. The Greek term, already familiar to the earliest Christian writers, has been adopted as a title since it is convenient for quotation and reference, while at the same time serving to cover contributions in various languages. It implies, furthermore, both a principle and a programme. Christian theology is by its nature rooted in the past. Only in so far as it remains in living contact therewith is it capable of further growth. Hence any study, however unassuming, that throws light on tradition or its sources becomes by the very fact a contribution to the theology of the present.

OTHMAR PERLER.

Fribourg, Switzerland.

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TO
MY MOTHER
In Filial Gratitude

PREFACE

The present volume represents the first of two volumes treating of the Pseudo-Augustinian Hypomnesticon which were projected to appear in the PARADOSIS Series as Volumes XX and XXI. It treats of introductory questions concerning that book, particularly the much-debated problem of authorship, and the relation of the doctrinal content to the theology of St. Augustine. The second volume will be devoted to the first critical edition of the text of Hypomnesticon, and it is the text of that edition which is employed in the present volume.

I wish to express my gratitude to Dr. Othmar Perler, Professor of Patrology in the University of Fribourg, Switzerland, who suggested the subject of this work. To him I owe a debt of gratitude for his experienced guidance, constant encouragement, and unflinching courtesy.

My special thanks are due to Professor Bernhard Bischoff of Munich, Dr. E. A. Lowe of Princeton University, Mr. Neil R. Ker, Reader in Palaeography, Oxford, and Mr. R. W. Hunt, Keeper of Western Manuscripts, Bodleian Library, Oxford, for their invaluable information concerning manuscripts of Hypomnesticon. In particular, I wish to acknowledge my indebtedness to Georges de Plinval of Fribourg, Switzerland, for his many helpful suggestions, and to Father Bonifatius Fischer, O. S. B., for granting me free access to the catalogues of the *Vetus Latina* Institut at Beuron in Germany.

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ABBREVIATIONS

- ACO = Acta Conciliorum Oecumenicorum, edited by E. Schwartz, Berlin, 1914-1940.
- ACW = Ancient Christian Writers, Westminster (Maryland)-London, 1946 ff.
- CCL = Corpus Christianorum, Series Latina, Turnhout, 1953 ff.
- CLA = Codices Latini Antiquiores, Oxford, 1934 ff.
- CPL² = Clavis Patrum Latinorum, Sacris erudiri III, Steenbrugge, 2nd edition, 1961 (1st edition, 1951).
- CSEL = Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum, Vienna, 1866 ff.
- DTC = Dictionnaire de théologie catholique, Paris 1903 ff.
- LTK = Lexikon für Theologie und Kirche, Freiburg im Br., 2nd edition, 1957 ff.
- Mansi = Mansi, J. D., Sacrorum Conciliorum nova et amplissima collectio, Florence, 1759 ff.
- Misc. Agost. = Miscellanea Agostiniana, I-II, Rome, 1930-1931.
- NRT = Nouvelle revue théologique, Tournai, 1869 ff.
- PL = Patrologia latina, edit. J. P. Migne, Paris, 1844 ff.
- PLS = Patrologiae latinae supplementum, edid. A. Hamman and L. Guillaumin, Paris, 1958 ff.
- PWK = Real-Encyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft, Stuttgart, 1894 ff.
- RB = Revue Bénédictine, Maredsous, 1884 ff.
- RE = Real-Encyclopädie für protestantische Theologie und Kirche Leipzig, 1896 ff.
- REA = Revue des Etudes augustinienes, Paris, 1955 ff.
- RGG = Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart, Tübingen, 1927 ff. 3rd edition, 1957 ff.
- RHE = Revue d'histoire ecclésiastique, Louvain, 1900 ff.
- RSR = Recherches de science religieuse, Paris, 1910 ff.
- SC = Sources Chrétiennes, Paris, 1941 ff.
- ST = Studi e Testi, Città del Vaticano, 1900 ff.
- TR = Theologische Revue, Münster, 1902 ff.
- TU = Texte und Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der altchristlichen Literatur, Leipzig, 1882 ff.
- TLL = Thesaurus Linguae Latinae, Leipzig, 1900 ff.

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2. Patristic

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FOREWORD

The Pseudo-Augustinian work known as Hypomnesticon (PL 45, 1611-1664) is one of the most remarkable products of the Vth century Pelagian controversy that have come down to us. No other single work of the same period treats so comprehensively and at the same time so succinctly of the principal tenets of Pelagianism as moulded by Celestius and Julian of Eclanum; and no other work, with the exception of Augustine's masterpieces, deals so effectively with the heresy.

From the IXth century, when it was first used in theological debate, Hypomnesticon has been the subject of intermittent study, but to this day the enigma of its origin remains unsolved, its theological content remains largely unappraised, and its rôle in the history of theology has not yet been adequately defined.

In 1892 Hypomnesticon was given a short notice in the *Institutiones Patrologiae*¹ of J. Fessler and B. Jungmann, and as it is typical of notices subsequently given by such authors as Schanz and Bardenhewer, it is worth while reproducing it in full:

«*Hypomnesticon* (alias *Hypognosticon*²) *contra Pelagianos et Caelestianos libri VI* (ed. Paris, T. X. Append.; et Venet. tertiae, T. XVII, Append. IX), in quibus praecipui eorundem errores testimoniis potissimum s. Scripturae confutantur, non sunt s. Augustini, cui olim tributi sunt, sed vel Marii Mercatoris, vel alius cujuspian antiqui auctoris. Vid. Maur. Admonit. in hosce libros; Garnerius in Opp. Marii Mercatoris P. I., Diss. VI, c. 6 (p. 357-65); G. Cave, Vol. I, p. 298; J. L. Raab, Disquisitio histor. de libris Hypognosticon, Altorfii 1735, 4^o.»

In 1906 Friedrich Loofs alluded to the undeserved neglect with which Hypomnesticon had been treated in the history of dogma when he spoke of the «des in der Dogmengeschichte bisher ungebührlich vernachlässigten Hypomnesticon» (*Leitfaden zum Studium der Dogmen-*

¹ *Institutiones Patrologiae*, Tome II, pars prior (Innsbruck 1892) 314, n. 1.

² This form of the title, given as an alternative, will be discussed in Vol. II, § 4.

geschichte, 4th edition, Halle 1906, p. 440). But Tixeront does not seem to have shared his view for in 1912 he wrote: «Il [l'auteur de l'Hypomnesticon] reproduit la doctrine de saint Augustin, mais s'efforce d'en adoucir certaines affirmations plus dures: l'exposé n'y gagne pas en clarté» (*Histoire des dogmes dans l'antiquité chrétienne* III, Paris 1912, p. 292, n. 3). Schanz, however, in 1920 underlined the interest of Hypomnesticon for the history of dogma when he referred to it as «die dogmengeschichtlich interessante Schrift» (*Geschichte der Römischen Literatur*, IV, ii, Munich 1920, p. 438). Four years later Bardenhewer in his *Geschichte der altkirchlichen Literatur* (Freiburg im Breisgau 1924, IV, p. 479) gave a concise reference similar to that of Fessler-Jungmann, but developed slightly the allusions to authorship given by the latter. Harnack, surprisingly, dismissed the work with two brief references which he made when treating of the IXth century controversy on Predestination (*Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte*, 5th edition, III, Tübingen 1932, p. 294 and 295). On the other hand, Georges de Plinval showed more appreciation when he wrote in 1936: «Le grand traité en 6 livres de l'Hypomnesticon est, si l'on met à part les écrits d'Augustin, l'ouvrage le plus important et le plus complet qui ait été élaboré contre l'hérésie [du Pélagianisme].» (*Histoire de l'Eglise*. Fliche et Martin, Tome IV, 1936, p. 124). Later, in his *Pélage, ses écrits, sa vie et sa réforme* (Lausanne 1943, p. 372) he was even more explicit in his appreciation:

«L'auteur de l'*Hypomnesticon* en particulier a eu la vision de la tâche qui restait à accomplir après saint Augustin; il pouvait considérer l'hérésie pélagienne avec un recul suffisant pour en saisir l'ensemble; il se rend compte que les attaques de l'adversaire ont provoqué un progrès doctrinal et il possède assez de sûreté et de sens orthodoxe pour définir avec une fermeté étonnante la doctrine à laquelle se tiendra pour des siècles la dogmatique chrétienne.»

And in an article entitled, *Vue d'ensemble sur la littérature Pélagienne*, which appeared in *Revue des Études latines*, 29 (1951), p. 293, de Plinval referred once more to Hypomnesticon as a Catholic synthesis of anti-Pelagian doctrine; and in a more recent article in *Recherches augustiniennes*, I (1958), p. 339-355, entitled, *Prosper d'Aquitaine, interprète de Saint Augustin*, he made the comment: «l'Hypomnesticon, ce vaste et solide traité d'apologétique antipélagienne, contemporain des œuvres de Prosper.» (*Op. cit.*, p. 353).

In 1937 E. Pickmann drew attention to the doctrinal content of Hypomnesticon in a manner reminiscent of that of Loofs some thirty

years earlier (*The Mind of Latin Christendom*, Oxford 1937, p. 433-436). The treatment does not profess to be in any way comprehensive, and the discussion is limited to a small area in the doctrine of grace in which the author professes to find a divergence from Augustine's teaching.

Though treating of a subject with which Hypomnesticon is intimately bound, E. Amann in his article, *Semi-Pélagiens* [DTC 14, ii (1941) 1796-1850] made no mention of the work, but E. Portalié in his article *Augustin (Saint)* in the same *Dictionnaire*, Tome 1 (1903) 2307-2308, gave a brief account of it. On the other hand, neither Cayré in his *Précis de Patrologie*¹, nor Altaner in his *Patrologie*² makes any allusion to Hypomnesticon.

On the whole, then, the attention given to Hypomnesticon has been scant enough in modern times, and the neglect to which Loofs alluded in 1906 has been continued to our day. Passing references alone are to be found in the theological literature that appeared over the past fifty years, and no monograph has been published on the work since Johannes Raab's *Disquisitio historico-critica de libris Hypognosticon an ab Hincmaro in Augustana Confessione et alibi recte tribuantur divo Augustino episcopo Hipponensi* (Altdorf 1735).

Accordingly, a new treatment of Hypomnesticon seems to be a desideratum from the point of view of the history of theology in general, and that of Augustinian theology in particular, and it is precisely to supply this, at least in some measure, that the present work has been written.

As was intimated in the Preface, our work falls into two parts, and it is to the first of these that the present volume is devoted. It deals with introductory problems concerning the historical background of Hypomnesticon, the important questions of its unity of composition and date, the problems of its authorship, its doctrinal relationships, sources, and literary characteristics.

¹ F. CAYRÉ, *Précis de patrologie. Histoire et doctrine des Pères et doctrine de l'Eglise*, (Paris 1927 ff.).

² B. ALTANER, *Patrologie*, 6th edition (Freiburg im Br. 1960). Besides the allusions to Hypomnesticon found in the works mentioned above, some other references of a passing character are to be met with. The index of TLL lists Hypomnesticon as a Vth century work and adds a bracketed note making allusion to Marius Mercator as the possible author – (fortasse Marii Mercatoris). In his *Histoire ancienne de l'Eglise*, Tome III, 3rd edition (Paris 1910) p. 286, n. 2 and p. 664, n. 2, L. Duchesne makes brief references to Hypomnesticon. He refers to the work as anonymous and associates it vaguely with the *De vocatione omnium gentium* which he likewise refers to as anonymous. H. Rondet in his *Gratia Christi* speaks of Hypomnesticon as a work contemporaneous with the Semi-Pelagian quarrel: «un texte [l'Hypomnesticon] attribué à Augustin, en réalité contemporain de la querelle semipélagienne». (Paris 1948) 217, n. 2; cf. p. 266.

The Historical Setting

Erasmus, in an introductory note to his edition of *Hypomnesticon*, very aptly remarked that the author of that work seems to have endeavoured to condense into one volume all that Augustine had written on various occasions against the Pelagians¹. With due allowance for the independence and originality of *Hypomnesticon*, and also its concern with Semi-Pelagianism, this statement is true, as will appear later, and it gives at once the reason for and sets the limits to this historical survey. On the one hand, to appreciate *Hypomnesticon* it is necessary to trace, at least in broad outline, the emergence and growth of those Pelagian and Semi-Pelagian principles which survived the first decades of controversy, and presented themselves around 430² to the author of *Hypomnesticon* as the authentic expression of the heresy. On the other hand, Augustine's treatment of the various facets of the heretical teaching had such a profound influence on the author of *Hypomnesticon* that no study of this work would be comprehensible without a survey of Augustine's handling of the Pelagian problems.

Nevertheless, a full-scale historical account of Pelagianism and Augustine's reaction to it is unnecessary from our point of view, and it is not attempted here. Our attention is concentrated exclusively on the central lines of Pelagian and Semi-Pelagian development which immediately concern *Hypomnesticon*, and St. Augustine's reaction is dealt with only to the extent that is necessary for the *mise en scène* of that book.

¹ «Videtur fuisse quispiam qui quae sparsim ab Augustino disserta sunt contra Pelagianos studierit in unum contrahere». *Operum divi Aurelii Augustini*, Septimus tomus (Basle 1528) 925.

² The approximate date assumed here will be discussed in Chapter III.

For a fuller treatment of the historical background, reference is made in the Bibliography and in foot-notes to the many standard works available.

§ 1. The Controversy with Pelagius and Celestius ¹ (412-418)

When first introduced into Rome about 400 ², the Pelagian movement was distinguished by its insistence on two fundamental principles, one positive and the other negative, that were to prove the fountain-heads from which the entire heretical system derived. The positive principle was the affirmation of the absolute freedom of the human will and its innate power of achieving moral excellence by its own initiative and of

¹ Among the sources for the history and doctrine of Pelagianism are the anti-Pelagian writings of St. Augustine in general; and in particular: *De gestis Pelagii*, edition of C. Urba and J. Zycha, CSEL 42 (1902) 51-122: PL 44, 319-360; *De gratia Christi et de peccato originali*, *Ibid.* 125-206: PL 44, 359-410 – chapters 8 ff. of Book II are of special relevance; *Contra duas epistulas Pelagianorum* II, 1-4, CSEL 60 (1913) 460-468: PL 44, 571-577; *Epistulae* 186, 191, 194, edition of Al. Goldbacher, CSEL 57 (1911) 45-80; 162-165; 176-214; St. Jerome's *Dialogi contra Pelagianos libri* 3, PL 23 (1845) 495-590; Paulus Orosius, *Liber apologeticus contra Pelagianos*, edition of C. Zangemeister, CSEL 5 (1882) 601-664: PL 31 (1846) 1173-1212; St. Prosper of Aquitaine, *Carmen de ingratis*, PL 51 (1846) 91-148; *Epitoma chronicon*, edition of Th. Mommsen, *Monumenta Germaniae historica, Auctorum antiquissimorum tomus IX, Chronica minora saec IV. V. VI. VII*, Vol. I, (Berlin 1892) p. 467; 477: PL 51 (1846) 591 B; 598 B; Gennadius, *Liber de viris inlustribus*, edition of E. C. Richardson, TU 14 (1896) 77-78: PL 58 (1847) 1083-1084; MARIUS MERCATOR, *Commonitorium adversum haeresim Pelagii*, edition of E. Schwartz, ACO I, V, i, 5-23: PL 48 (1846) 109-172; *Commonitorium super nomine Caestii*, ACO *ibid.* 65-70: PL 48, 63-108. Some works: R. HEDDE and E. AMANN, *Pélagianisme* in DTC 12 (1933) 675-715; A. BRÜCKNER, *Quellen zur Geschichte des Pelagianischen Streites*, Tübingen, 1906; E. DINKLER, *Pelagius* in PWK 19 (1937) 226-242; J. FERGUSON, *Pelagius*, Cambridge, 1956; E. PICKMAN, *The Mind of Latin Christendom*, Oxford, 1937; G. DE PLINVAL, *Les luttes pélagiennes in Histoire de l'Eglise depuis les origines jusqu' à nos jours* (Fliche et Martin) IV (Paris 1937) 79-128; by the same author, *Pélage, ses écrits, sa vie et sa réforme*, Lausanne, 1943; H. ULBRICH, *Augustinus Briefe zur entscheidenden Phase des Pelagianischen Streites* (Von den Verhandlungen in Jerusalem und Diospolis im Jahre 415 bis zur Verdammung des Pelagius im Jahre 418) in REA 9 (1963) 51-75; 235-258. For the works of Pelagius and Celestius, cf. PLS I (1958) 1101-1570; 1679-1704.

² Speaking of the origins of the Pelagian system, Marius Mercator wrote: «Hanc ineptam et non minus inimicam rectae fidei quaestionem, sub sanctae recordationis Anastasio Romanae ecclesiae summo pontifice Rufinus quondam natione Syrus Romam primus innoxit et, ut erat argutus, se quidem ab eius invidia muniens, per se proferre non ausus, Pelagium gente Brittanum monachum tunc deceptum eumque ad praedictam adprime imbuit atque instituit impiam vanitatem». *Commonitorium adversum haeresim Pelagii*, Prologus, (ACO I, V, i, 5: PL 48, 111).

meriting grace¹; and the negative principle was the denial of the transmission of Original Sin².

By logical development, actuated in not a few cases by the stress of controversy, there followed from these basic principles a series of doctrines which were expressed in concise formulae wherein the distinctively Pelagian creed was summarized. A list of these formulae appeared for the first time towards the end of 411³, when the deacon, Paulinus of Milan, in his indictment of Celestius⁴ before Aurelius, Bishop of Carthage, thus formulated the chief Pelagian errors:

1. «Adam mortalem factum, qui sive peccaret sive non peccaret, moriturus esset.» (*De gestis Pelagii*, 11. CSEL 42, p. 76).
2. «Quoniam peccatum Adae ipsum solum laeserit et non genus humanum.» (*Ibid.*)
3. «Quoniam lex sic mittit ad regnum quemadmodum evangelium.» (*Ibid.*)
4. «Quoniam ante adventum Christi fuerunt homines sine peccato.» (*Ibid.*)
5. «Quoniam infantes nuper nati in illo statu sint, in quo Adam fuit ante praevaricationem.» (*Ibid.*)
6. «Quoniam neque per mortem vel praevaricationem Adae omne genus

¹ This principle, according primacy to the human will in relation to grace, is at the root of the entire Pelagian system. Pelagius believed that man, by his own innate power and independently of what we call today supernatural grace, was capable of avoiding all sin and of achieving moral excellence. Hence his dictum: «Deus me hominem fecit, justum ipse me facio». (*apud* St. Augustine, *Sermo* 115, 3: PL 38, 656), and Augustine's pertinent remark about the Pelagian heresy: «quae contra Dei gratiam, quae nobis est per Jesum Christum Dominum nostrum, tamquam defendendo liberum arbitrium deputeret et coneretur evertere christianae fidei firmamentum». *De gestis Pelagii*, 35, 61 (CSEL 42, 116: PL 44, 355). Nowhere, perhaps, is the absolute freedom of the human will more categorically expressed in Pelagian writings than in the words of Julian of Eclanum when he defines free will: «Libertas arbitrii qua a Deo emancipatus homo est, in admittendi peccati et abstinendi a peccato possibilitate consistit». — *apud* Augustine, *Opus imperfectum contra Julianum* I, 78 (PL 45, 1102).

² This principle is found in the earliest formulations of Pelagian teaching and is constantly repeated, cf. *De gestis Pelagii* 11 (CSEL 42, 76: PL 44, 333-334); MARIUS MERCATOR, *Commonitorium super nomine Caelestii* 1 (ACO I, V, i, 66: PL 48, 69-70); *Commonitorium adversum haeresim Pelagii*, Prologus (*Ibid.* 6: PL 48, 114-115).

³ For a discussion of the date cf. F. LOOFS, *Pelagius und der pelagianische Streit* in RE 15 (1904) 759; G. DE PLINVAL, *Pélage* (Lausanne 1943) 255.

⁴ Celestius, at first a disciple of Pelagius, soon became an active leader of the heretical movement. St. Jerome refers to him as the teacher and leader of the whole army of the heretics: «magister et totius ductor exercitus», *Epist.* 133, 5 (CSEL 56, 249: PL 22, 1154).

hominum moriatur, neque per resurrectionem Christi omne genus hominum resurgat.» (*Ibid.*)¹

To these six propositions recorded by St. Augustine, the contemporary writer, Marius Mercator, adds a seventh, viz.

«Posse esse hominem sine peccato et facile Dei mandata servare.» (*Commonitorium adversum haeresim Pelagii*. Prologus. ACO I, V, p. 6.)

However, due to the fact that Augustine makes no mention of this proposition in his list, and that it is missing also in the series Marius gives in his *Commonitorium super nomine Caelestii* (ACO I, V, p. 66), it is not altogether certain, though it seems likely, that it was actually among the propositions on which Celestius was questioned. In any case, the propositions on which Celestius was challenged, i. e. at least the first six quoted above, were pronounced heretical at the Council, and when Celestius refused to recant them, he was deprived of ecclesiastical communion. (*Ibid.*)²

Meanwhile, Augustine, though he had not been present at the Council which condemned Celestius, was informed of its proceedings and approved its decisions³. Shortly afterwards, in or about 412, Augustine composed his first major treatise against the Pelagian heresy, viz. *De peccatorum meritis et remissione et de baptismo parvulorum*⁴, and therein laid the foundation for all his subsequent writings against Pelagianism. Due to the fact that this first anti-Pelagian treatise was written in reply to difficulties posed for solution, it does not contain a systematic refutation of the entire Pelagian teaching. It deals, as Augustine himself remarked in his *Retractationes*⁵, with the questions of infant baptism and grace as

¹ These formulae are given by St. Augustine in *De gestis Pelagii* 11 (CSEL 42, 76: PL 44, 333-334), and also by MARIUS MERCATOR in *Commonitorium adversum haeresim Pelagii* (ACO I, V, i, 6: PL 48, 114-116) and in *Commonitorium super nomine Caelestii* (*Ibid.* 66: PL 48, 69-70). Cf. Orosius, *Liber apologeticus contra Pelagianos* (CSEL 5, 608 ff.: PL 31, 1177 ff.). F. Klagen discusses these formulae in *Die innere Entwicklung des Pelagianismus* (Freiburg im Br. 1882) 48, n. 4.

² «De quibus omnibus capitulis ... patres et episcopi regionis illius restiterunt Caelestio et iusserunt ut eadem condemnaret, quia essent haeretici sensus. Sed Caelestius nullo modo adquiescens, quin immo resistens, actis isdem quibus frequenter auditus est, ecclesiastica communione privatus est, a qua sententia ad Romani episcopi examen credidit appellandum». (ACO I, V, i, 66: PL 48, 70-71).

³ *De gestis Pelagii* 11 (CSEL 42, 77: PL 44, 334).

⁴ CSEL 60, 3-152: PL 44, 109-200.

⁵ *Retractationes*, II, 33: «Ubi maxime disputatur de baptismo parvulorum propter originale peccatum et de gratia Dei qua justificamur». (CSEL 36, 171: PL 32, 644).

its principal themes. Nevertheless, one is surprised to find in a work of this early date so many of the central themes of Pelagianism so thoroughly discussed and so completely refuted ¹. These themes are:

1. «Adam sic creatum, ut etiam sine peccati merito moreretur, non poena culpa, sed necessitate naturae.» ²
2. «Ipsam peccatum non propagatione in alios homines ex primo homine, sed imitatione transisse.» ³
3. In parvulis per baptismum non solvitur originale peccatum quod in nascentibus nullum esse omnino contendunt. ⁴
4. Baptismus parvulis datur solum ad regnum Dei, non vero ad salutem vitam aeternam adipiscendam. ⁵
5. «Si nolumus non peccamus, nec praeciperet Deus homini, quod esset humanae impossibile voluntati.» ⁶

Of these five doctrines, we note that the first corresponds to the first proposition condemned in the Council of Carthage. It is a basic Pelagian dogma which is tenaciously repeated in spite of the most overwhelming refutation, and its position in the lists of Pelagian propositions drawn up for discussion is consistently first ⁷. Significant in this connection is the fact that in Hypomnesticon it likewise heads the list of propositions to be refuted.

The second proposition, according to which Original Sin is transmitted, not by generation, but by imitation, does not figure in Paulinus's list. It was, nevertheless, considered an important Pelagian error, as is evident from the fact that in the statement wherein Marius Mercator claimed to synopsise the entire Pelagian system, we find this second proposition incorporated:

«... Adae videlicet et Evae transgressionem eos non fecisse mortales nec noxam eorum ad posteros originaria successione transisse, sola

¹ Perhaps St. Augustine throws some light on the reason when he writes in the *Retractiones* I, 9: «Ecce tam longe antequam Pelagiana haeresis exstisset, sic disputavimus, velut jam contra illos disputaremus». (CSEL 36, 45: PL 32, 598).

² *De peccatorum meritis et remissione et de baptismo parvulorum* I, 2 (CSEL 60, 3: PL 44, 109).

³ *Ibid.* Liber I, cap. 9 (CSEL 60, 10: PL 44, 114).

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ Liber II, cap. 1 (CSEL 60, 71: PL 44, 151); Liber I, cap. 18 (CSEL 60, 22: PL 44, 121-122).

⁶ *Ibid.* Liber II, cap. 3 (CSEL 60, 72: PL 44, 152).

⁷ Cf. *De gratia Christi et de peccato originali* II, 11 (CSEL 42, 174: PL 44, 390); *Commonitorium adversum haeresim Pelagii*, Prologus (ACO I, V, i, 6; 7: PL 48, 110-111; 114-116); *Commonitorium super nomine Caestii* 1 (*Ibid.* 66: PL 48, 69-70).

autem imitatione illorum qui divina mandata contempserit, effici reum ...»¹

In Hypomnesticon this second proposition also occurs, but there, instead of being associated with Proposition I, we find it subordinated to Proposition 2 of the Carthaginian list. Proposition 3, which is tantamount to the denial of Original Sin, differs only verbally from the corresponding third proposition in Paulinus's list, while Proposition 5, dealing with the capability of the human will of avoiding sin by its own power and unaided by grace, is closely related to Proposition 6 in the series of Paulinus.

At this stage, a comparative table showing the correspondence between the propositions dealt with in Hypomnesticon and those discussed both in the Council of Carthage and in the first anti-Pelagian treatise of St. Augustine will be of interest and utility. It will be seen from this table that already in 412 the main positions defended by the Pelagians were accurately located and were being subjected to attack².

Hypomnesticon	Council of Carthage	De peccatorum meritis et remissione
1. Adam sive peccasset sive non peccasset moriturus fuisset. (Responsio I)	Adam mortalis factus est, qui sive peccaret sive non peccaret moriturus esset. (<i>De gestis Pelagii</i> , cap. 11)	Adam sic creatus est ut moreretur ... non poena culpa, sed necessitate naturae. (Liber I, cap. 2)
2a Peccatum Adae neminem nisi solum nocuit ipsum (Resp. II)	Peccatum Adae ipsum solum laesit et non genus humanum. (<i>Ibid.</i>)	
2b Peccatum in mundum intravit non seminis propagatione, sed morum imitatione. (<i>Ibid.</i>)		Peccatum Adae, non propagatione in alios ex primo homine, sed imitatione transiit. (<i>Ibid.</i> cap. 9)

¹ «Tota summa inepti et magis impii Juliani laboris ad unam pravam redigi videtur sententiam, Adae videlicet et Evae transgressionem eos non fecisse mortales nec noxam eorum ad posteris originaria successione transisse, sola autem imitatione illorum qui divina mandata contempserit, effici reum». *Commonitorium adversum haeresim Pelagii*, Prologus (ACO I, V, i, 7: PL 48, 119-120).

² The CSEL and PL references regarding the propositions of the Council of Carthage and those found in the *De peccatorum meritis et remissione* that are given in the following table have already been given on pages 6-8 above. Hence it is unnecessary to give them again.

Hypomnesticon	Council of Carthage	De peccatorum meritis et remissione
3a Potest homo per libe- rum arbitrium tam- quam per se sibi suffi- ciens implere quod velit. (Resp. III)	Ante adventum Domini fuerunt homines sine peccato. (<i>Ibid.</i>)	Si nolumus non pecca- mus; nec praeciperet Deus homini quod esset humanae impossibile voluntati. (Liber 2, cap. 3)
3b vel etiam meritis ope- rum a Deo unicuique dari. (<i>Ibid.</i>)		
4. Libido naturale est bonum, nec in ea est quod pudeat. (Resp. IV)		
5a Parvuli non trahunt originale peccatum. (Resp. V)	Infantes nuper nati in illo statu sunt in quo Adam fuit ante prae- varicationem. (<i>Ibid.</i>)	In parvulis originale peccatum nullum esse omnino contendunt. (Liber I, cap. 9)
5b Parvuli non peribunt a vita aeterna si sine baptismo ex hac vita migraverint. (<i>Ibid.</i>)		Baptismus parvulis da- tur solum ad regnum Dei, non vero ad salu- tem vitamque aeternam adipiscendam. (Liber I, cap. 18)
	Lex sic mittit ad regnum quemadmodum evange- lium. (<i>Ibid.</i>) Neque per praevarica- tionem Adae omne ge- nus hominum moriatur, neque per resurrectio- nem Christi omne genus hominum resurgat. (<i>Ibid.</i>)	

During the four years following the appearance of *De peccatorum meritis et remissione*, i. e. 412-416, Augustine produced three other notable anti-Pelagian treatises together with a number of similarly inspired sermons and letters. The treatises are *De spiritu et littera*¹; *De natura et gratia*²,

¹ CSEL 60 (1913) 155-229; PL 44, 199-246.

² *Ibid.* 233-299; PL 44, 247-290.

written in reply to the *De natura*¹ of Pelagius; and *De perfectione iustitiae*², a refutation of the *Definitiones*³ of Celestius. In all three works, the central theme discussed is basically the same, namely, the necessity of grace for the observance of the commandments, against the Pelagian claim that the only thing required for the attainment of sinlessness and perfection is the gift made to us by God of a nature endowed with free will. Here the subject is identical with that of Proposition 2 of the Council of Carthage. A development is observable in Augustine's presentation of the Pelagian case – due no doubt to his acquaintance with new Pelagian sources, viz. Pelagius's *De natura*, and Celestius's *Definitiones* – and also in Augustine's refutation of the erroneous teaching. Very many new texts of Scripture are quoted that did not figure in *De peccatorum meritis et remissione*, and new arguments are adduced. Thus, for example, by combining the two texts I Cor. 1, 17, and Gal. 2, 21, Augustine shows that if, as Pelagius contends, man can become just by the resources of human nature alone an absurdity would follow, viz. the Cross of Christ would be made void and Christ would be made appear to have died in vain.

The writings of this period have a special importance from our point of view as it is in them that we find for the first time the sources for several of the arguments later used by the author of Hypomnesticon. It is unnecessary at this stage to do more than indicate the fact, as the matter will come up for fuller discussion when we come to deal specifically with the question of sources.

§ 2. The Controversy with Julian of Eclanum (418-430)

The entry of Julian, Bishop of Eclanum⁴, into the debate in 418 marks the beginning of a new phase in the development of Pelagianism. On refusing to subscribe in that year to the anti-Pelagian document of Pope

¹ Fragments *apud* Augustine in *De natura et gratia* (*Loc. cit.*).

² CSEL 42 (1902) 3-48: PL 44, 291-318.

³ This work is preserved in the *De perfectione iustitiae hominis* of St. Augustine. (CSEL 42, 4-48).

⁴ Among the sources for the rôle of Julian of Eclanum in the Pelagian movement are Augustine's *Contra duas epistulas Pelagianorum*; (CSEL 60, 423-570); *Contra Julianum* (PL 44, 641-874); *Opus imperfectum contra Julianum* (PL 45, 1049-1608); Marius Mercator's *Commonitorium adversum haeresim Pelagii*, ACO edition, p. 5-23: PL 48, 109-172; *Commonitorium super nomine Caelestii*, ACO edition, p. 65-70:

Zosimus known as the *Tractoria*¹, Julian was excommunicated and deposed², and thereafter became the most able defender of the heresy, and the most bitter antagonist of Augustine in the Pelagian camp. It is with a large measure of truth that Harnack in this connection wrote:

«Kein Anderer [Julian von Aeclanum] hat dem Augustin so zugesetzt wie er: er nötigte ihn, die Consequenzen seiner Denkweise auszuführen; er deckte unerbittlich die Widersprüche bei Augustin auf und zeigte, wie haltlos sich die Lehre des großen Mannes darstelle, wenn sie völlig entwickelt werde»³.

The doctrines professed by Julian were identical with those of Pelagius and Celestius, as can be proved both by a study of the extant fragments of Julian's works preserved by Augustine and also by the explicit testimony of Marius Mercator, the contemporary anti-Pelagian writer. In his *Commonitorium adversum haeresim Pelagii*, having listed the fundamental doctrines preached by Celestius, the colleague of Pelagius, Marius writes:

«Haec atque huiusmodi etiam Iuliano et ceteris eius commanipularibus placuere»⁴.

And elsewhere in this work, when giving the following resumé of Julian's teaching on Original Sin, Marius again reveals the identity of the heretic's teaching with that of the Pelagians:

«... Adae videlicet et Evae transgressionem eos non fecisse mortales nec noxam eorum ad posteros originaria successione transisse, sola

PL 48, 63-108; St. Prosper of Aquitaine's *Epitoma chronicon*, Mommsen's edition, p. 477: PL 51, 598B; Gennadius's *De viris illustribus*, Richardson's edition, p. 78: PL 58, 1084. Some works: A. BRUCKNER, *Julian von Eclanum, sein Leben und seine Lehre. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des Pelagianismus*, TU 15, Heft 3 (1897); J. FORGET, *Julian d'Eclane* in DTC 8, ii (1925) 1926-1931; PLS I (1958) 1571-1679. For the works of Julian, cf. PLS I (1958) 1571-1679.

¹ Fragments *apud* Augustine in *Epist.* 190, n. 23 (CSEL 57, 159: PL 33, 865); PL 20, 693-695; also *apud* Prosper of Aquitaine in *Praeteritorium Sedis Apostolicae episcoporum auctoritates de gratia Dei et libero voluntatis arbitrio*, cap. 5, *alias* 8 (PL 51, 207).

² «Quae omnia supra scripta capitula ... continet illa beatae memoriae episcopi Zosimi epistula, quae tractoria dicitur, qua Caelestius Pelagiusque damnati sunt ... cui Julianus et reliqui complices eius subscribere detrectantes consentaneosque se nolentes isdem patribus facere, non solum imperialibus legibus, sed et sacerdotalibus statutis depositi atque exactorati, ex omni Italia deturbati sunt». *Commonitorium super nomine Caelestii* (ACO I, V, i, 68: PL 48, 90-95).

³ A. HARNACK, *Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte*, Dritter Band, Fünfte, Photo-mechanisch gedruckte Auflage (Tübingen, 1932) 185.

⁴ ACO I, V, i, 6: PL 48, 116A.

autem imitatione illorum qui divina mandata contempserit, effici-
reum ...»¹.

What was distinctive in Julian's contribution to Pelagianism was the utter rationalism of its teaching, its incisive logic, vast scriptural and classical erudition, its disregard for the writings of the Fathers, its pertinacity and its flair for finding the weak points in the arguments of adversaries.

One doctrinal point especially emphasized by Julian was the question of concupiscence in the narrow sense of sexual lust. In opposition to Augustine, who saw in this inordinate passion an evil and shameful consequence of Original Sin, Julian maintained that it was a natural and laudable good. This issue was taken up by Julian with Augustine from the very beginning of his open revolt in 418, and it occupied an important place in the ensuing controversy between the two writers. On Augustine's side it loomed large in four works, viz. *De gratia Christi et de peccato originali*²; *De nuptiis et concupiscentia*³; *Contra Julianum libri VI*⁴, and *Opus imperfectum contra Julianum*⁵. On Julian's side, it occasioned the appearance of *Libri IV ad Turbantium*⁶; *Duae epistolae*⁷, and *Libri VIII ad Florum*⁸.

The fourth Responso of Hypomnesticon owes its origin to this controversy between Julian and Augustine, and we find in that Responso a clear statement of Julian's views together with a well-developed summary of Augustine's arguments. The accusation of Manichaeism so constantly

¹ *Ibid.* 7: PL 48, 119B-120A.

² CSEL 42, 123-206: PL 44, 359-410.

³ CSEL 42, 207-319: PL 44, 413-474.

⁴ PL 44, 641-874.

⁵ PL 45, 1049-1608.

⁶ Fragments *apud* Augustine in *Contra Julianum; De nuptiis et concupiscentia*, Book 2 and *Opus imperfectum contra Julianum*. The fragments were collected and published by A. Bruckner in *Die vier Bücher Julians von Aeclanum an Turbantius* (Berlin 1910) 24-76.

⁷ Fragments *apud* Augustine in *Contra duas epistulas Pelagianorum*, and *Opus imperfectum contra Julianum*, and also in Marius Mercator's *Commonitorium adversum haeresim Pelagii*. They were also collected by A. Bruckner in *Die vier Bücher Julians von Aeclanum an Turbantius*, 108-113. Cf. A. BRUCKNER, *Julian von Eclanum, sein Leben und seine Lehre*, TU 15, Heft 3 (1897) 36, adn. 2; H. VON SCHUBERT, *Der sogenannte Praedestinatus*, TU 9 (Neue Folge), Heft 4 (1903) 18; R. HEDDE and E. AMANN, *Pelagianisme* in DTC 12, i, 705 for a discussion of Julian's authorship of one of these letters, viz. that sent to the Italian clergy.

⁸ Books I and VI only are preserved by Augustine in the *Opus imperfectum contra Julianum*. For the sequence of these fragments and their content, cf. A. BRUCKNER, *Julian von Eclanum, sein Leben und seine Lehre* 49-51, adn. 2.

hurled by Julian at Augustine because of his teaching concerning concupiscence finds an echo in Hypomnesticon also, and the accusation is countered several times there.

Julian's disregard for the writings of the Fathers, and his insistence, almost exclusively, on rational and Scriptural arguments is characteristic, and it seems probable that his attitude in this regard had repercussions on the author of Hypomnesticon. It is true that theoretically Julian admitted three sources in theological debate, as is clear from his own statement:

«Cum igitur liquido clareat hanc sanam et veram esse sententiam, quam primo loco ratio, deinde Scripturarum munivit auctoritas, et quam sanctorum virorum semper celebravit eruditio, qui tamen veritati auctoritatem non suo tribuere consensu, sed testimonium et gloriam de eius susceperunt consortio, nullum prudentum conturbet conspiratio perditorum» (*Apud Augustine, Contra Julianum, I, 7*)¹

but in practice his recourse to the Fathers was very rare, and in all he quotes from them but three times in his controversy with Augustine, so far as can be discovered, viz. twice from a lost work of St. Basil, *Adversus Manichaeos* (Cf. *Contra Julianum* I, 5; PL 44, 649; 651) and once from a homily of St. John Chrysostom, *Ad neophytos*² (*Ibid.* I, 6; PL 44, 654). There is no doubt that Bruckner was correct in saying that for Julian reason took precedence of tradition:

«... Julian die Vernunft über der Tradition steht, und... die Aussprüche der Tradition für ihn nur deshalb wertvoll sind, weil sie mit der Vernunft übereinstimmen»³.

A curious feature of Hypomnesticon is its almost complete silence about the Fathers. They are referred to but once (Responsio III, 8) and even then the allusion is quite general. An explanation of this unexpected procedure may well be that the author, seeing the futility of the Patristic argument in dealing with Pelagian adversaries such as Julian of Eclanum, decided to waive that argument, and to attack his foes with the weapons of their own choosing, viz. Scripture and reason.

¹ PL 44, 661.

² The *Ad neophytos* has been found recently; cf. *Jean Chrysostome, Huit Catéchèses baptismales inédites*. Ed. A. Wenger. SC 50 (1957) 32 and 154.

³ A. BRUCKNER, *op. cit.* 108.

§ 3. The Controversy with the Semi-Pelagians ¹ (426-430)

A letter on the subject of grace and free will ² sent by Augustine in 418 to the Roman priest, Sixtus – later Pope Sixtus III (432-440) – found its way eight or nine years later to the monastery of Hadrumetum in north Africa, and produced consternation there. It was thought that Augustine, in maintaining that grace must precede every truly meritorious act ³, and that grace was a purely gratuitous gift of God, destroyed freedom of the will and undermined the traditional concept of the monastic and ascetical life, which insisted so much on personal effort in the pursuit of perfection. To answer these difficulties, Augustine composed his *De gratia et libero arbitrio* ⁴ and *De correptione et gratia* ⁵ (426/27), and in them firmly defined his views on the freedom of the human will ⁶ under the infallible operation of grace ⁷, on the powerlessness of the will to merit the first grace by its own initiative, and on its abiding need of further grace to persevere in the life of grace to the end. Augustine here sets the primacy of grace in the work of man's salvation in clear relief, admits that the grace of conversion is granted, independently of personal merit, to some while being denied to others, and then by logical development propounds the doctrine of predestination, which has not since ceased to be a subject of controversy.

¹ For a discussion of the origin of the term «Semi-Pélagien», cf. M. JACQUIN, *A quelle date apparaît le terme «Semipélagien»?* in *Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques* I (1907) 506-508.

² *Epist.* 194 (CSEL 57 iv, 176-214: PL 33, 874-891).

³ We would speak of this today as a supernatural act, but the terminology was unknown in Augustine's time, and he uses circumlocutions such as those that occur in such passages as: «Sed metuendum est ne ista omnia divina testimonia ... sic intelligentur, ut ad vitam piam et bonam conversationem, cui merces aeterna debetur, adjutorio et gratiae Dei locus non relinquatur». (*De gratia et libero arbitrio*, 4: PL 44, 885). Cf. H. DE LUBAC, *Remarques sur l'histoire du mot surnaturel* in *NRT* 61 (1934) 353; and by the same author, *Surnaturel* (Paris 1946) 327; 369.

⁴ PL 44, 881-912.

⁵ PL 44, 915-946.

⁶ Cf. *De gratia et libero arbitrio*, cap. 2 (PL 44, 882-884).

⁷ *Ibid.* cap. 4 (PL 44, 885-886); *De correptione et gratia*, cap. 2 (PL 44, 917-918); *ibid.* cap. 12, n. 38 (PL 44, 940): «Subventum est igitur infirmitati voluntatis humanae, ut divina gratia indeclinabiliter et insuperabiliter ageretur». We have taken the Maurist reading 'insuperabiliter' instead of Migne's questionable emendation 'inseparabiliter': cf. *Sancti Aurelii Augustini Hipponensis Episcopi Operum, Tomus Decimus* (Paris 1690) 771; and PL 44, 940. O. Rottmanner in his *Der Augustinismus* (Munich 1892) 21, n. 2 comments on the Migne emendation of this text and supports the Maurist reading.

Whatever pacific effect the *De correptione et gratia* may have had at Hadrumetum, it produced an unfavourable reaction in the monastic centres of southern and central Gaul, particularly in the region of Marseilles¹. There it changed what had been a veiled opposition to Augustine's teaching on grace and predestination into open hostility. Where Augustine had maintained the absolute gratuity of grace and its necessary priority to all supernatural merit², and also the restricted will of God whereby a specially chosen number were predestined to salvation and the remainder to perdition, these monks claimed that, at least in some cases, man could merit the first grace by naturally virtuous acts, and that God's will to save all men made no exception, that all who so willed could be saved, and that predestination was merely the divine foreknowledge of the response which each person would make to the invitation of grace.

When Augustine was apprised of these events by two faithful disciples in Gaul, Prosper of Aquitaine and Hilary, he wrote his last two complete works on the disputed doctrines, viz. *De praedestinatione sanctorum*³ and *De dono perseverantiae* (428/9)⁴, the one dealing principally with the initial act whereby faith is accepted (*initium fidei*) and the other with the question of perseverance in grace. Augustine shows that, in the case of faith, the initial act of acceptance, of belief, is produced as a result of a perfectly gratuitous gift of grace independent of all merit. Why this grace is accorded to some and denied to others is, says Augustine, an unfathomable mystery. In the case of perseverance in grace, Augustine sees also a gift of God which is likewise given to some and denied to others, not in virtue of any preceding merit, but uniquely by an inscrutable choice of the divine will – «*secundum ipsius [Dei] secretissimam eademque justissimam, sapientissimam, beneficentissimam voluntatem*» (*De dono perseverantiae*, 13 n. 33: PL 45, 1012).

To this controversy with the Semi-Pelagians and its continuation

¹ Cf. J. CHÉNÉ, *Que signifiaient 'initium fidei' et 'affectus credulitatis' pour les semipélagiens?* in RSR 35 (1948) 566-588; *Les origines de la controverse semi-pélagienne* in *L'année théologique augustiniennne* 13 (1953) 56-109; *Le semipélagianisme du midi de la Gaule d'après les lettres de Prosper d'Aquitaine et d'Hilaire à saint Augustin* in RSR 43 (1955) 321-341.

² «*Voluntas quippe humana non libertate consequitur gratiam, sed gratia potius libertatem, et ut perseveret delectabilem perpetuitatem, et insuperabilem fortitudinem*». *De correptione et gratia* 8, n. 17 (PL 44, 926).

³ PL 44, 959-992.

⁴ PL 45, 993-1034.

after Augustine's death in 430 is due the VIth Responsio, *De praedestinatione*, of Hypomnesticon. There, and also in Responsiones III and V are to be found echoes of the same conflict and the use of many of the same arguments. The acceptance of Augustine's teaching on grace is complete, and the same is true regarding the essentials of his teaching on predestination. Nevertheless, the more arresting terms used by the great Bishop in connection with the action of grace, e. g. 'indeclinabiliter' and 'insuperabiliter' are noticeably avoided; and in connection with predestination a nuance, absent in Augustine, is introduced, viz. that the reprobate are not predestined to glory because God foresees their future evil deeds. Considerable independence and originality are shown throughout; new imagery is evoked to illustrate the arguments; new Scripture texts are aligned to support the proofs, and from many widely-scattered elements in Augustine's writings a new synthesis is evolved. These matters will arise for fuller discussion later, and they are referred to here merely to indicate briefly their historical context.

CONCLUSIONS

1. Of the six problems dealt with in the six Responsiones of which Hypomnesticon is composed, the first five deal with specifically Pelagian errors, though the influence of the Semi-Pelagian controversy is evident in Responsiones III and V.

2. The problems dealt with in Responsiones I, II, III, and V owe their origin to the controversy that took place during the years 412-418 between Augustine, on the one hand, and Pelagius and Celestius on the other.

3. The problem of concupiscence treated in Responsio IV derives from the controversy between Augustine and Julian of Eclanum that began in 418 and continued till Augustine's death in 430.

4. The problem of predestination dealt with in Responsio VI took its rise from the controversy which began in 426 between Augustine and the Semi-Pelagians in Gaul and continued after Augustine's death.

Unity of Composition

The only doubt ever entertained about the unity of composition of Hypomnesticon concerns the final Responsio, i. e. VI, of the work, and the only person to express the doubt was the French Jesuit, Johannes Garnier (1612-1681), when he remarked:

«Sextus liber videri potest aut suppositivus aut saltem additivus, siquidem in eo mentio fit sexti articuli quamvis in praefatione quinque tantum propositi sint»¹.

The IXth century authors who used the final Responsio with such frequency invariably treated it as an authentic part of Hypomnesticon, and where they accepted Augustine's authorship of the latter, they quoted the VIth Responsio as belonging to him. This is particularly manifest in the writings of Gottschalk (c. 803-867/9), who quotes from the Praefatio, Responsio III, and Responsio VI, accepts all three parts as belonging to Hypomnesticon and ascribes the work in its entirety to one and the same author².

Nevertheless, the unity of composition of Hypomnesticon deserves examination, all the more so as there are some reasons, besides the one alluded to by Garnier, to cause hesitation. Differences of vocabulary can be noticed between the final Responsio and the other parts, and we find for example, that the term 'protoplastus', used so conspicuously as a

¹ *Marii Mercatoris sancti Augustini aequalis opera quaecumque extant*, Appendix 2a ad 1m partem, Dissertatio VI, pars 1a, caput 4; PL 48, 574 C.

² The relevant texts are found in the extant fragments of Gottschalk's works published by Dom C. Lambot, in his *Œuvres théologiques et grammaticales de Godescalc d'Orbais. Textes en majeure partie inédits*. (Spicilegium Sacrum Lovaniense XX) (Louvain 1945) 39; 151; 279; 495. Cf. *ibid.* 9 and 10.

synonym for Adam throughout the first five Responsiones¹ does not occur at all in the sixth, even though Adam is mentioned there several times². Then some texts of Scripture quoted in the first five Responsiones reappear in the sixth under a somewhat different form, e. g. Ephes. 2, 8-9 as quoted in Resp. III, 12 and 15 differs from the version in Resp. VI, 6, and the same may be said of Wisdom 1, 14 in Resp. I, 1 and Resp. VI, 7; Wisdom 2, 24 in Resp. I, 1 and Resp. VI, 7, etc.

Despite these and suchlike difficulties, the evidence in favour of unity of composition seems to be conclusive. First, we find in the extant MSS. of Hypomnesticon that Responsio VI, both when found in isolation, and in conjunction with the other parts, is referred to explicitly as part of Hypomnesticon in practically all cases, and where an attribution is made to an author, the sixth part is invariably ascribed to the same author as the first five parts³. Then the witness of the IXth century authors alluded to above in favour of unity of composition constitutes another argument of some weight.

Besides these external arguments, the internal evidence leads unmistakably to the same conclusion, and the objections are solved without much difficulty. To take these latter first, it can be shown that the presence of such words as 'protoplastus' in the first five Responsiones and their absence in Responsio VI can be easily explained. The latter Responsio is primarily concerned with the problem of Predestination and is directed against quite a different group of adversaries from that envisaged in the first five Responsiones. The terminology which an author employs will naturally tend to be influenced, not merely by the subjects treated, but also by the vocabulary current among his adversaries. If, as we shall find later to be the case, terms such as 'protoplastus' were used among the adversaries attacked in Responsiones I-V, and are never found in the writings of those attacked in Responsio VI, the absence of the word in the latter Responsio and its presence in the others will cause no difficulty. The same may be said, *mutatis mutandis*, about some other words, such as 'pandere' and 'liquido', which occur in Responsio VI alone.

Then the difficulty arising from discrepancies between the same texts

¹ Cf. Responsio I, 1; Responsio II, 4 (bis); Responsio III, 1 (bis); *Ibid.* 4; Responsio IV, 1; 2; 3; 4; 5; 9; Responsio V, 2; 3; 4.

² Adam is mentioned in chapters 2, 3 and 6 of Responsio VI.

³ This point will be made clear in Chapter IV, §3 dealing with the manuscript tradition of Hypomnesticon.

of Scripture as quoted in Responsiones I-V and in Responsio VI is not very formidable. Thus for example, Rom. 9, 20-21 is quoted with slight differences in Responsio III, 7 and Responsio VI, 3, and the same is true of Rom. 11, 35 as quoted in Responsio III, 12; 13, and Responsio VI, 3. From an examination of the contexts, it at once becomes apparent that in the third Responsio the texts are freely quoted from memory and adapted to the point under discussion, whereas in the sixth Responsio the citations are given with their contexts as part of a longer quotation – in the case of Rom. 11, 35 – transcribed it would seem, not from memory, but from a copy of the Vulgate. That the latter quotations should conform verbatim to the Vulgate and the former slightly diverge from it should cause no surprise, especially since minor differences of this kind occur between successive quotations of the same text in the same Responsio, e. g. Wisdom 2, 23 as quoted in Responsio I, 7 and Responsio V, 2; Rom. 11, 35 as quoted in Responsio III, 12 and also 13 of the same Responsio; and Ephes. 2, 8-9 as quoted in chapters 12 and 15 of the same third Responsio. Incidentally, and because of its connection with an important matter to be discussed later, it may be remarked here that similar fluctuations as regards quotations of the same Scripture text are found in the contemporaneous writer, Prosper of Aquitaine. Thus in the same work, the *De vocatione omnium gentium*, he quotes Acts 14, 15 according to the Vulgate when giving it with its full context in Book 2, chapter 4 (PL 51, 690 C) and yet shortly afterwards in chapter 9 of the same second Book (*Ibid.* 694 C) when giving a short extract from the text he changes it verbally, doubtless because quoting from memory; cf. *Ibid.* 71 B; 194 D; 651/2.

Then, the reason for doubt given by Garnier, viz. the fact that only five Responsiones are announced in the Preface, and that no provision is made for a sixth Responsio, is devoid of force. It is quite manifest from the introductory sentences of Responsio VI that a new situation, not envisaged when the Praefatio was being written, demanded attention after Responsiones I-V had been composed, and that the author appended the sixth Responsio as an addition. He writes:

«... addere etiam hoc quam maxime huic operi oportet ut et vestra calumnia ... revincatur.»

Any author may add appendices to his works, and there is nothing in the mere fact of an appendix added to a work to justify doubt about its unity of composition.

On the positive side, a number of features common to the first five Responsiones on the one hand, and to Responsio VI on the other can be noted. Thus the reference to God's foreknowledge of human evil arising from man's malice, and its consequent punishment by God's just judgement are conspicuously alike in both of these two divisions of Hypomnesicon. A few texts will suffice to make this clear:

- (i) «Igitur contra Pelagianos et Caelestianos haereticos, quos Dominus tales futuros suo vitio ante constitutionem mundi praescivit, et exortos in mundo iusto iudicio damnavit». (*Praefatio*)
- (ii) «Vos videbat praescientia sua futuros haereticos». (Responsio V, 7)
- (iii) «Ceteros autem poena punit ... quia quid essent futuri praescivit». (Responsio VI, 2)
- (iv) «Ceteros vero ... praescisse tantum vitio proprio perituros». (Responsio VI, 5)
- (v) «Hunc [Iudam] enim Deus cum praescisset in vitiis propriae voluntatis pessimum fore ... poenam ei praedestinavit». (Responsio VI, 5)

Then, the expression: «Paulus qui dixit, Christo in se loquente» – cf. 2 Cor. 13, 3 – with its equivalents, that is particularly dear to the author of the first five Responsiones, occurs also in the sixth:

- (i) «Paulus hoc dicit, non a se, sed in se Christo loquente». (Responsio III, 13)
- (ii) «... videte quia non tantum Paulum, sed et Christum in eo loquentem redarguitis». (Responsio III, 6)
- (iii) «Immo dicat Paulus ore suo, proferente Christo sententiam.» (Responsio III, 13)
- (iv) «Sed melius in vobis Pelagio et Caelestio loquentibus quam Christo in Paulo.» (Responsio IV, 8)
- (v) «... Paulum, in quo locutus est Christus, auscultamus.» (Responsio V, 8)
- (vi) «... argue Paulum, qui dixit, Christo in se loquente.» (Responsio VI, 3)

Further, the phrase from Matt. 6, 10: «Fiat voluntas tua» is used in very much the same immediate context in both Responsio III, 7 and Responsio VI, 8. In both, the general context, viz. the mystery of divine Predestination, is the same, and the association of the text of Matthew with the Christian attitude of humility before the mystery is identical in both places:

«... eris cum Catholicis humilis et mansuetus. Non ut dicas Deo, interrogando: Quae est voluntas tua? sed tremendo: Fiat voluntas tua.» (Responsio III, 7)

«... in conspectu Dei nos humiliemus, dicentes: Fiat voluntas tua.» (Responsio VI, 8)

More striking still are the combined quotations of Matt. 25, 41 and Matt. 25, 34 found alike in Responsio I, 3 and Responsio VI, 6. Not merely is the same Old Latin version of these two texts produced identically in both places, but the curious inversion of the order of the texts is also identical. This twofold identity offers very strong evidence in favour of the unity of composition of Responsio VI and the other five Responsiones. And the same may be said of the combined use of Wisdom 1, 14 and Wisdom 2, 23-25 that is found in Responsio I, 1 and Responsio VI, 7, even though the contexts are different and the texts show slight verbal divergencies. Yet more important is the fact that both Resp. III, 9 and Resp. VI, 7 have the unique reading 'a se facere' for the Vulgate 'accipere' in the quotation of Jn. 3, 27; and the reading «percipite regnum paratum vobis ab origine mundi» in the quotation of Matt. 25, 34 which occurs in Resp. I, 3 and Resp. VI, 6 is identical in both places in Hypomnesticon but is to be found nowhere else in Patristic literature ¹.

Besides the foregoing Scripture parallels, there are many significant literary similarities between Responsio VI and the other five. Thus the phrase, «peccatum Adae quod traxere nascentes» of Responsio I, 1 is repeated verbatim in Responsio VI, 6; the phrase, «iudicio aequitatis suae» of Responsio III, 9 is re-echoed identically in Responsio VI, 2; «per electionem gratiae assumpsit eum a consortio iniquorum» of Responsio III, 12 in «de damnabili massa ... quos electione gratiae praedestinavit ad vitam» of Responsio VI, 5; and the favourite expression, «illuminatio gratiae Salvatoris» which occurs so frequently in Responsio III, e. g. chapters 5; 7; 9 and 14, recurs also in Responsio VI, 1. Mannerisms too, such as the extraordinarily varied and frequent use of formulae of *renvoi*: «sicut supra dixi»; «sicut iam supra diximus»; «ut iam superius responsum est»; «quos superius memoravi», etc. are noticeable also in Responsio VI. Then the characteristic care with which accurate definitions are given in Responsiones I-V is evidenced also in Responsio VI, e. g. the definition of 'mors' in Responsio I, 4; that of 'liberum arbitrium' in Responsio III, 4; and that of 'libido' in Responsio IV, 2; and the definition of 'praedestinatio' given in Responsio VI, 2.

Doctrinally too, no disparity can be found between Responsio VI and the other five. On the contrary, wherever the doctrine in both places concerns the same subjects, perfect agreement is found, and this is

¹ This statement is based on personal research done in the Vetus Latina Institut at Beuron.

particularly true of the doctrine of God's foreknowledge of man's evil, and His preordaining consequent punishment for it by a just judgement: cf. the passage quoted above from the Praefatio; Responsio V, 7 (*bis*) and Responsio VI, 2; 5. Other significant doctrinal points dealt with in Responsiones I-V and receiving complementary treatment in Responsio VI are the views, firstly, that children must receive the Blessed Eucharist, as well as Baptism, to ensure their entry into everlasting life should they die before reaching the use of reason; and secondly, the Semi-Pelagian teaching – rejected by the author, of course, – that the same children are permitted by God to be baptized before dying dependently on the merit they would gain if they were allowed to live to maturer years: cf. Responsio V, 5 and Responsio VI, 6.

Again, when referring in the Praefatio to the effects produced by heresy, the author uses phrases remarkably similar to those employed in connection with a similar topic in Responsio VI:

«O dogma, quod sub nomine Christi evertere Christi et mutare nititur fundamenta.» (Praefatio)

«... scripturas sanctas... ad voluntatis vestrae intellectum mutare nitimini, fidem Christi, Apostolorum praedicatione fundatam, evertere, falsum dogma vestrum antepone veritati.» (Responsio VI, 1)

CONCLUSIONS

1. The unity of composition of Hypomnesticon is supported by the evidence of the extant MSS. of the work and also by the witness of some IXth century authors.

2. The internal evidence presents some superficial difficulties, but these can be solved.

3. The positive arguments deduced from the internal evidence are conclusively in favour of unity of composition.

4. Hence a combination of the external and internal evidence makes the unity of composition of Hypomnesticon assured, and it will be taken for granted in the chapter dealing with authorship.

Date of Composition

Among the problems presented by Hypomnesticon that of its date of composition is by no means the easiest to solve. Already in the IXth century, there were two divergent views on the matter, one assigning a date shortly before, and the other considerably after 430¹. Garnier in the XVIIth century was confident that the work was written between 418 and 420², Piccinardus in the same century was equally confident that it appeared almost immediately after St. Augustine's death in 430³; while Raab in the XVIIIth century considered a date prior to 422 quite acceptable⁴. In our day, the consensus of opinion favours a date after St. Augustine's death in 430 and before the middle of the same century. Thus, Georges de Plinval does not believe that the work was composed before 435⁵:

«Nous ne croyons pas que cette oeuvre ait pu être composée avant 435. En particulier, au Livre VI, la description et réfutation du prédestinarianisme correspond bien aux indications fournies vers le même temps par Vincent de Lérins.» [*Pélage* (Lausanne 1943) p. 372 n. 1]

¹ Cf. *Liber de tribus epistulis*, cap. 35 (PL 121, 1044-1045).

² *Marii Mercatoris ... opera*, Append. 2a, ad 1m partem. Dissert. VI, pars 1a, cap. 4 (PL 48, 575 A).

³ *De novitio opere quod inscribitur Praedestinatus auctoris anonymi Semipelagiani consarcinato anno 434 tempore Prosperi ...* (Padua 1686) 64.

⁴ *Disquisitio historico-critica de libris Hypognoticon an ab Hincmaro in Augustana Confessione et alibi recte tribuantur Divo Augustino episcopo Hipponensi* (Altdorf 1735) 23.

⁵ Since writing the above, I had the pleasure of meeting M. Georges de Plinval and of discussing with him the date of Hypomnesticon. I am happy to be able to say that now (1965) M. de Plinval agrees with me in saying that Hypomnesticon was written prior to 435.

And Dom Cappuyns does not think that its date is after 440:

«La date de ce dernier [Hypomnesticon] nous est inconnue ... Il ne semble pas cependant qu'il soit postérieur à 440.» [RB 39 (1927) 226, n. 3]

Nevertheless, no detailed examination of the problem has been hitherto attempted, and one searches in vain, in the authors referred to, for adequate proofs to establish the dates they sometimes assign ¹.

The evidence available for discovering when Hypomnesticon was written is far from being abundant. The external evidence is particularly meagre, and by itself alone is insufficient to warrant anything more than a probable conclusion, but the internal evidence is somewhat more helpful. By means of this latter and the indications offered by external witnesses, the date may be calculated with a fair degree of precision and certitude.

§ 1. The External Evidence

The extant MSS. of Hypomnesticon reveal that at least as early as the VIIIth century, the work bore St. Augustine's name in the title and that, therefore, its origin before 430 was to that extent then accepted. Besides, one of the VIIIth century MSS. ² has palaeographical symptoms to indicate that it was probably copied from a VIth century MS. now lost, which also bore an attribution to St. Augustine in the title. This would bring the MS. witness to within a century of Augustine's time, and would give some plausibility to the view that Hypomnesticon was written about the time of Augustine, since the VIth century MS. would seem to have had Augustine's name in the title.

The opinions of the IXth century writers in the Predestinationist controversy were, as we noted, divided on the date of composition of Hypomnesticon. Thus Hincmar, Archbishop of Reims (806-882), quotes what has all the appearance of being a tradition when he asserts that the work was composed by St. Augustine at the urgent request of friends

¹ Cf. F. LOOFS, *Semipelagianismus* in RE 18 (1906) 198-199; M. CAPPUYNS, *L'auteur du «De vocatione omnium gentium»* in RB 39 (1927) 226, n. 3; GEORGES DE PLINVAL, *Pélage, ses écrits, sa vie et sa réforme* (Lausanne 1943) 372, n. 1.

² This manuscript is *Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, Latin 2034*. It will be discussed in vol. II, § I of the present work.

after the publication of the *De praedestinatione sanctorum* (428/9). On this view, Hypomnesticon was composed very shortly before 430:

«... postquam *De libero arbitrio et De correptione et gratia et De perfectione justitiae hominis et De praedestinatione sanctorum ad Prosperum et Hilarium* ... multis postulantibus scripserat, librum Hypomnesticon adversus Coelestium et Pelagium scripsit de quinque quaestionibus, et hanc sextam, loco retractationis superaddidit *De praedestinatione*: ubi se excusat non eo sensu dixisse nec intelligi velle praedestinos ad interitum, sed in iniquitate vel impietate perseverantium poenam esse praedestinatam. Quarum quaestionum et absolutio- num mentionem in libro quem scripsit contra Manichaeos ex Genesi facit»¹.

Unfortunately, a contemporaneous writer in Lyons, the author of the *Liber de tribus epistulis*, entirely rejects Hincmar's allegations and knows nothing, either from his reading or from any reliable tradition, that could justify Hincmar's statements. So he thinks it more reasonable to assume that Hypomnesticon was written by someone else a considerable time after Augustine's death:

«Adjungit [Hincmar] etiam rem novam et neque ex lectione, neque ex veraci aliqua traditione nobis hactenus compertam. Quo scilicet, beatus Augustinus, post omnes libros suos, scripserit quemdam libellum quem Graeco vocabulo Hypomnesticon nominant, quod Latine 'memoratorium' interpretatur ...»²
«Unde magis credibile est quod non parvo spatio post ejus [Augustini] obitum a quodam alio scriptus sit.»³

Of these two diametrically opposed views, the second is unquestionably the more reliable. Hincmar, though a man of great erudition, was devoid of critical sense and when bent on proving a point was capable of using in his arguments 'evidence' that originated very largely in his own imagination⁴. In the debate with the author of the *Liber de tribus epistulis* he is several times convicted of citing as facts what are in reality gross misrepresentations⁵. In fact, we have a blatant example of Hincmar's method in the passage quoted above where he endeavours to explain how Augustine came to add Responsio VI to the other five:

«Scripsit [Augustinus] de quinque quaestionibus et hanc sextam loco retractationis superaddidit de praedestinatione, ubi se excusat non

¹ Cf. *Liber de tribus epistulis*, cap. 34 (PL 121, 1043 A).

² *Op. cit.* cap. 35 (*Ibid.* 1044 A).

³ *Loc. cit.* (*Ibid.* 1045 C).

⁴ Examples of this trait of Hincmar will be given in the following chapter.

⁵ Cf. *Liber de tribus epistulis*, cap. 35 (PL 121, 1044-1045).

eo sensu dixisse nec intelligi velle praedestinos ad interitum, sed in iniquitate vel impietate perseverantibus poenam esse praedestinatum»¹.

This is utterly misleading and one will search in vain in Responsio VI for any evidence to corroborate Hincmar's statement. Hence, in the present instance it would be unwise to attach any significance to Hincmar's information, and it would be safer to conclude that in the IXth century nothing certain was known about the origin of Hypomnesticon that could not be deduced from the work itself or from the title in the MSS. of the work.

Two rather slender pieces of external evidence remain to be examined. The first is an apparent quotation from Responsio V, chapter 8 found in the *De vocatione omnium gentium* (c. 450) of Prosper of Aquitaine². In Book 2, chapter 24 of the latter work³, Prosper, speaking of infant baptism, quotes the phrase: «Habet gratia quod adoptet, non habet unda quod diluat» that had been used by some Pelagian. In Hypomnesticon the same Pelagian aphorism occurs together with its full context:

«Ergo est peccatum in parvulis quod eis in sacro baptisate remittatur. Respondetis: 'Nullum: tantum in adoptionem filiorum baptizantur. Habet enim in eis gratia quod adoptet, non habet unda quod diluat; propter solam vero Symboli formulam, ut tradita consuetudo servetur, tinguuntur in remissionem peccatorum. Maiores autem propter quod usu liberi arbitrii peccata contrahere potuerunt in remissionem peccatorum baptizantur.' ... Verba namque Dei sunt Symboli verba. Non se fefellit Deus tradens per Apostolos suos Ecclesiae suae sanctae catholicae credentes in remissionem peccatorum baptizari»⁴.

The author of Hypomnesticon introduces this discussion with the words: «sicut aliquotiens a vobis audimus», and is therefore quoting, it seems, from memory events actually experienced and not from a written document. The actual wording of the dialogue is therefore very likely his own. The author of the *De vocatione omnium gentium*, on the other hand, is more vague and introduces the citation with the words: «nec impie a quodam de parvulorum baptismo dictum fuisset», and gives no details of the context in which the citation was originally made. It is probable,

¹ *Op. cit.* cap. 34 (*Ibid.* 1043 B).

² Cf. M. CAPPUYNS, *De vocatione omnium gentium* in RB 39 (1927) 226, n. 3.

³ PL 51, 710C.

⁴ Responsio V, 8.

therefore, that the author of the *De vocatione omnium gentium* is here quoting from Hypomnesticon. It may, of course, be objected that the quotation because of its aphoristic nature could have been easily passed from mouth to mouth and could have found its way into the *De vocatione* independently of Hypomnesticon. Still the word 'aliquotiens' used in Hypomnesticon in connection with the Pelagian dictum does not favour the wide-spread use of the latter, and neither does its absence from all extant Pelagian and anti-Pelagian literature. For two reasons, therefore, arising from the use of this Pelagian dictum it would seem that Hypomnesticon antedates the *De vocatione omnium gentium*. First, the author explicitly professes to have heard the saying used, and secondly, he cites it in its full context, whereas the author of the *De vocatione* neither does the one nor the other. Hence, even if the author of the *De vocatione* is not quoting directly from Hypomnesticon, the anteriority of the latter is still probable, and its date of composition is, in consequence, probably before 450.

Of a somewhat similar circumstantial nature is the second piece of external evidence for the dating of Hypomnesticon. In Responsio V, 4, having quoted Job 14, 4 according to the Old Latin version made from the Septuagint, the author of Hypomnesticon adds:

«Haec secundum Septuaginta interpretum editionem, quae ex Graeco in Latinum sermonem versa est posuimus. Audite apertius ad sugillationem vestram idipsum qualiter ex Hebraeo verbo sit in Latinum translatum».

And then he gives St. Jerome's Vulgate translation of the verse to show that its doctrine is identical with that of the Septuagint text. Formerly, the text of Job 14, 4 had been quoted both on the Catholic and also, it would seem, on the Pelagian side according to the Old Latin version. Here for the first time we find two Latin versions, i. e. the Latin version from the Septuagint, and Jerome's Vulgate, of the same text, Job 14, 4, explicitly compared.

In the Commentary on Job (A. Amelli, *Spicilegium Casinense*, III, 1, 1897, p. 333-417; PLS I, 1573) that has been ascribed to Julian of Eclanum, a similar twofold citation of Job 14, 4 occurs, but the order there is inverted as compared with that in Hypomnesticon; instead of giving the Old Latin version in the first place, the author, following his general plan throughout the work, cites the Vulgate first and adds the Latinized Septuagint only in an incidental manner. Were it not known that the

Pelagians were the first to use and comment on the Vulgate text and that they played a prominent part in its diffusion¹, one would, perhaps, have little hesitation in concluding on the basis of Job 14, 4 that Hypomnesticon was probably written prior to Julian's Commentary. At any rate, the author of Hypomnesticon gives the impression that he is doing something never done before when he brings together the two versions of Job 14, 4 and formally contrasts them from the doctrinal point of view.

Quodvultdeus in his *Liber promissionum et praedictorum Dei*², Part 1, chapter 4 (445/451 A. D.) also juxtaposes the Old Latin and the Vulgate of the same Job 14, 4, but he makes no allusion to the fact that the quotations derive from two distinct versions of the same Biblical text. In fact, the quotations are presented in such wise as to appear like two different Scriptural texts. Nevertheless, the order is the same as that of Hypomnesticon with the Old Latin text preceding the Vulgate version. In the *Epistula ad Demetriadem* that has been ascribed to Prosper of Aquitaine³; and also in the *Epistula ad omnes episcopos per Picenum*⁴ of Pope Gelasius I (492-496), we find a somewhat similar juxtaposition of the two different Latin versions of the same Job 14, 4, and they are found in the same order as in Hypomnesticon.

Judging by the context, with its explicit comparison and formal development, Hypomnesticon's use of the two Latin versions of Job 14, 4 seems to be primitive as compared with that of the other four works mentioned. It is also possible that the other works depend, at least indirectly, on Hypomnesticon for their juxtaposed use of the versions of the same text. This being so, the anteriority of Hypomnesticon is here probable, and since the date of composition of the *Liber promissionum*

¹ Cf. HERMANN JOSEF FREDE, *Vetus Latina 24/1. Epistula ad Ephesios* (Freiburg im Br. 1962-1964) 36*.

² Quodvultdeus's authorship of this work is assumed here. It will be discussed in the next chapter. For the dating of the work, cf. R. BRAUN, *Quodvultdeus. Livre des promesses et des prédictions de Dieu* SC 101, Tome 1 (Paris 1964) 88-113. The text is also in Migne, PL 51, 733-858 and the twofold quotation of Job 14, 4 is found on page 737 A.

³ Cf. *Epistula ad Demetriadem*, cap. 11 (PL 55, 171). L. Valentin in his *Saint Prosper d'Aquitaine* (Toulouse 1900) 714-725 gives an impressive array of arguments to prove that the *Epistula ad Demetriadem* was written by Prosper of Aquitaine, but the authorship is still doubtful. Cf. M. GONSETTE, *Les directeurs spirituels de Démétriaide* in NRT 60 (1933) 799. PL 55, 161-180 (text); Ib. 171 A (citations of Job 14, 4).

⁴ PL 59, 36D: CSEL 35, 361.

lies between 445 and 451, that of Hypomnesticon is probably well within the first half of the fifth century.

§ 2. The Internal Evidence

By means of the internal evidence, it can be established that Hypomnesticon was not written prior to 428/9, and that it was probably written before 435. In dealing with the former date, it suffices to refer to two matters discussed in Hypomnesticon, one of which was treated by St. Augustine – on whom Hypomnesticon depends – in 428/9, and the other shortly afterwards by Prosper of Aquitaine. In dealing with the later date, it is necessary to examine some points of doctrine common to Hypomnesticon and Prosper of Aquitaine, and endeavour by means of the established dates of Prosper's works to approximate to the date of Hypomnesticon.

THE TERMINUS POST QUEM

In a letter which he wrote to Augustine in 428/9, Prosper of Aquitaine reported that certain monks of Marseilles¹ taught an error according to which children who die before reaching adulthood are admitted to or denied Baptism dependently on God's prevision of their merits if they were allowed to live to maturity – «tales aiunt perdi, talesque salvari, quales futuros illos in annis maioribus, si ad activam servarentur aetatem, scientia divina praeviderit.»² Shortly afterwards Augustine wrote the *De praedestinatione sanctorum* in reply to Prosper and dealt with the above-mentioned error in Book I, chapters 12 and 13³. There, having shown the absurdity of the teaching, Augustine added the significant remark:

«... nec Pelagiani hoc dicere potuerunt, et multo magis nec isti dicere debuerunt. Dicit enim non potest ... quod viderunt Pelagiani esse

¹ Cf. Prosper's *Epistula ad Augustinum apud* Epistles of St. Augustine where it is numbered *Epistula 225*: CSEL 57, ii, 455; 461: PL 51, 67 B, 71 A.

² CSEL 57, ii, 461: PL 51, 71 A.

³ PL 44, 977-979. Augustine had already dealt with the same problem in *Epist.* 217, 6, n. 22 (CSEL 57, 418-419) written about the same time. For the dating of this *Epistula*, cf. AL. GOLDBACHER's account in CSEL 58, 57-58. Augustine also deals with the same problem in the *De dono perseverantiae*, 9; but the treatment is more developed in the *De praedestinatione sanctorum*.

falsissimum et absurdissimum, hoc non vidisse istos qui nobiscum errorem illorum haereticorum catholica auctoritate condemnant»¹.

The error of the monks of Marseilles is not, therefore, a specifically Pelagian one. It is something new, and Augustine finds it hard to believe that men of no mean ability could entertain it:

«... unde opinari potuerint homines, quorum ingenia non esse contemptibilia vestrae indicant litterae, mirans et stupens reperire non possum: nec credere auderem, nisi vobis non credere non auderem»².

This same error is discussed in *Responsio V*, chapter 5 of *Hypomnesticon*, and its context there, though slightly different from that of the *De praedestinatione*, is very like it, and the handling of the problem shows dependence on Augustine. In fact, a certain development of Augustine's treatment is observable in *Hypomnesticon*, for there the absurdity of the Marseilles error is shown both in relation to circumcision in the Old Law and to Baptism in the New. It can, therefore, be concluded that *Hypomnesticon* was written some time after the appearance of this new error concerning infant Baptism and its discussion by St. Augustine, i.e. after 428/9.

The second argument to establish the *terminus post quem* of *Hypomnesticon* is drawn from the author's teaching on the relation between grace and faith. Among the errors taught by the Semi-Pelagian monks of Marseilles and opposed by Augustine in the *De praedestinatione sanctorum* and the *De dono perseverantiae* was the view that the initial acceptance of faith depended on the human will, though the increase of faith was dependent on grace: «putant ex nobis esse fidei coeptum, et ex Deo esse fidei supplementum»³; «ex nobis quidem nos habere ipsam fidem, sed incrementum ejus ex Deo»⁴. The anxiety of the author of *Hypomnesticon*

¹ *Op. cit.* cap. 13 (PL 44, 979). In *Epistula 194*, cap. 9 Augustine had anticipated this objection. He had shown the absurdity of maintaining, as the Pelagians had done, that God's choice of Jacob in preference to Esau was determined by the divine prevision of their merits and demerits respectively, and went on to show that if the Pelagian hypothesis were accepted on this point, it could equally well be maintained that God allowed children who died before reaching the use of reason to be admitted to or denied Baptism dependently on His prevision of their works if they were allowed to live longer. Actually there is an important difference between the two cases. In the first there is question of works that will really take place in the future; in the second the works will never materialize. The pertinent passages in *Epist.* 194, 9 are to be found in CSEL 57, ii, 208-210: PL 33, 888-889.

² *Op. cit.* cap. 12 (PL 48, 978).

³ *Op. cit.* cap. 2 (PL 48, 962).

⁴ *Loc. cit.* (PL 48, 961).

to preclude any error of this kind and his insistence on the need of grace for the acceptance of faith is a sufficiently clear indication that his work is posterior to the above-mentioned ones of Augustine that were written around 428/9. A few texts will illustrate the point:

«... liberum arbitrium ... non ... sit idoneum quae ad Deum pertinent, sine Deo aut inchoare aut certe peragere». (Resp. III, 4)

«... Christus ... idoneam in eisdem ad credendum praeparans voluntatem». (*Ibid.*)

«... homo ... absque adiutorio gratiae Deo quod placeat, nec valet incipere nec proficere». (Resp. III, 5)

«... praevenit voluntatem eius sua gratia, quo in eum credere possit». (Resp. III, 7)

«*Et duxit in stabulum*, scilicet donans ei fidem ad credendum in se». (Resp. III, 8)

«Quae fides donum est sicut et gratia, non merces». (Resp. III, 14)

«Nemo penitus gloriatur fidem se ex proprio sensu genuisse in se, per quam credere possit Deo». (*Ibid.*)

«... secundum donum gratiae unumquemque fidelem esse non secundum meritum propriae voluntatis». (*Ibid.*)

The above arguments were purposely chosen from the first five Responsiones, as internal arguments taken from the sixth Responsio would have been invalid in proving the *terminus post quem* of the work as a whole. This sixth Responsio, being an addition to an already completed work, could naturally have a chronological context proper to itself alone. Other arguments similar to those already given could be adduced from the internal evidence of the first five Responsiones, but they would not greatly strengthen the conclusion already reached, viz. that Hypomnesticon was not written before 428/9.

It is possible, on the basis of the arguments given above, to go further and say that the evidence so far examined strongly suggests that Hypomnesticon was written a short while after 428/9, and, therefore, very probably after the death of St. Augustine. A development was already noticed in Hypomnesticon as compared with the *De praedestinatione sanctorum*, not so much in the doctrine as in its application. Thus the application of Augustine's teaching regarding God's prevision and infant baptism to the doctrine of circumcision is very significant, and is indicative of a general trait observable in Hypomnesticon, namely, its originality and independence. It shows besides that a certain time must

have elapsed between the composition of the *De praedestinatione sanctorum* and the appearance of Hypomnesticon. Nevertheless, this does not mean that the date of composition of Hypomnesticon must necessarily be postponed beyond 435, as Georges de Plinval would have it. Any of the more capable disciples of St. Augustine, particularly a Prosper of Aquitaine, would have been long in possession of Augustine's anti-Pelagian theology before 428/9, and the application of basic Augustinian principles to Semi-Pelagian problems had been virtually effected by St. Augustine before his death. Certainly the five fundamental Pelagian errors discussed in the first five Responsiones of Hypomnesticon had been thoroughly exposed and refuted at least during the last twelve years of Augustine's life, and the principles concerning Augustine's final doctrine on Predestination had been expounded from 417/18 A. D. onwards – cf. O. Rottmanner, *Der Augustinismus* (Munich 1892) p. 5. In other words, there was ample time for the assimilation and synthesis of Augustinian doctrine, of which Hypomnesticon gives evidence, during the long years of controversy between Augustine and his disciples on the one hand, and the Pelagians and Semi-Pelagians on the other. One has only to recall Prosper of Aquitaine's *Epistula ad Rufinum*, written before 428/9 – cf. DTC 13, 846 – to realize how thoroughly an intelligent disciple could absorb and synthesize Augustinian teaching even before Augustine's death. Hence, there seems no cogent reason for postulating a date of composition for Hypomnesticon after 435 when a date nearer to 430 is quite possible. Finally, Georges de Plinval's statement:

«En particulier, au Livre VI, la description et réfutation du prédestinacionisme correspond bien aux indications fournies vers le même temps par Vincent de Lérins.» (*op. cit.* p. 372, n. 1)

is not compelling. In fact, as will be seen later in this essay, the problems raised in that final *Responsio* are remarkably similar to those mooted by Prosper of Aquitaine in his *Epistula ad Rufinum* and *Epistula ad Augustinum*, both written before 430.

THE TERMINUS ANTE QUEM

Here the terrain is much less certain and the landmarks are not so clear. The absence of all references to persons other than Pelagius, Celestius, and their disciples in general, and the complete silence about datable contemporaneous events make it impossible to determine with certitude

the *terminus ante quem* of our work. Moreover, the question is made still more difficult by the fact that a certain time could have elapsed between the publication of Responsiones I – V and the addition of Responsio VI. Had the author decided to add the sixth Responsio before publishing his work, it seems likely that he would have included a reference to it in the Praefatio where he announced the other five. Besides, the conclusion of Responsio V gives the impression of terminating not merely that Responsio, but also the work as a whole:

«Nos vero anathematizantes vos, Paulum in quo locutus est Christus, auscultamus praedicantem et sequimur, qui unum corpus et unum Spiritum esse dixit Ecclesiae catholicae in Christo, unam fidem, unum baptisma, unum Deum et Patrem omnium, qui super omnes, et per omnia, et in omnibus nobis.» (Responsio V, 8)

And the opening of Responsio VI suggests that some urgent preoccupation, either unforeseen or overlooked, when the work as originally composed was being published, possessed the author and made the writing of that additional Responsio a matter of prime importance:

«Licet latius de gratia et libero arbitrio iam superius disputatum sit, addere etiam hoc quam maxime huic operi oportet, ut et vestra calumnia ... revincatur, immo confutetur, et nostrae fidei integritas comprobetur.» (Responsio VI, 1)

If, therefore, a lapse of time intervened between the composition of Responsiones I – V and Responsio VI, the *terminus ante quem* of the latter could be quite inaccurate in relation to the work as originally planned and written, i. e. without Responsio VI. On the other hand, it is *a priori* possible that the latter Responsio was produced either immediately, or within a short interval, after the appearance of the others and that its *terminus ante quem* is a sufficiently accurate later limit for the date of the work as a whole. Consequently, it is best to start with the dating of Responsio VI and thereafter, if necessary, investigate the later date limit of the other five Responsiones.

Between Responsio VI of Hypomnesticon and several works of Prosper of Aquitaine a certain relationship, arising from direct dependence, or derivation from a common source, or from common authorship, can be detected. This relationship will be examined more fully in the following chapter, but it is mentioned here as it provides a possible means of approximating towards the *terminus ante quem* of Responsio VI. Thus, to take but one out of many possible examples, if Prosper's *Pro Augustino res-*

pensiones ad capitula objectionum Gallorum, chapter 8 (PL 51, 162-164) is compared with chapter 3 of Responsio VI of Hypomnesticon, a correspondence between the passages can be noted. The doctrine in both places is the same, namely, that God's choice of one nation among many in which to realize His plan of salvation, just as His predestination of one individual to glory and His abandonment of another to perdition – in virtue of His mercy in the one case and of His justice in the other – is an inscrutable mystery:

«... impossibile est comprehendere et periculosae curiositatis est quaerere.» (Prosper, *Ibid.* 162 C)

«... si scrutari voluerimus secretum Dei, quod iustitiae ipsius solius notum est, comprehendere non valemus.» (Resp. VI, 3)

Further, both in the treatment of Prosper and in that of Hypomnesticon the key texts are Acts 14, 15: «[Deus] qui in praeteritis generationibus dimisit omnes gentes ingredi vias suas» and Ps. 134, 4: «unam tantum gentem, id est, Jacob elegit sibi Dominus et Israel in possessionem sibi». This combination of texts is certainly not accidental. It is found in Prosper and Hypomnesticon alone, never in any of Augustine's writings on which the two so intimately depend, and indeed never in any other extant Latin patristic writing ¹. The correspondence, therefore, between Hypomnesticon, Responsio VI, and Prosper's *Pro Augustino responsiones ad capitula objectionum Gallorum*, chapter 8, is significant, and strongly suggests a close relationship between the two works; and since the date of the latter is about 434 ², it is pertinent to ask if there is any means of finding whether Hypomnesticon, Responsio VI, is chronologically anterior or posterior to Prosper's work.

To begin with the two passages referred to above, there seems to be some slight indication that Hypomnesticon VI is earlier than *Pro Aug. resp. Gall.* It is difficult to be sure as both passages reveal a similar competence and maturity of judgement, and a like skill in the choice of Scripture texts, but the addition to Ps. 134, 4 in Prosper's work of the well-chosen Os. 2, 23; Rom. 9, 26 and Rom. 11, 7, seems to suggest a de-

¹ This statement is based on extensive personal research done at the Vetus Latina Institut, Beuron, on the Card Index of Patristic Scripture quotations and allusions.

² For the date of this work, cf. G. BARDY, *Prosper d'Aquitaine (Saint)* in DTC 13, i, 847; B. ALTANER, *Patrologie*, 6th edition (Freiburg im Br. 1960) 414; BONIFATIUS FISCHER, *Vetus Latina. Die Reste der altlateinischen Bibel 1/1 Verzeichnis der Sigel für Kirchenschriftsteller* (Freiburg im Br. 1963) 437.

velopment not present in Hypomnesticon VI. This is a minor point and must not be stressed. Of perhaps more importance is the comparison between the two authors on the basis of a doctrinal issue that involved them both.

It has long been established that Prosper's teaching on the question of God's will to save men underwent a change between the time of Augustine's death in 430 and the publication of the *De vocatione omnium gentium* about 450¹. Starting with an uncompromising adherence to Augustine's definitive teaching, according to which God willed the salvation, not of all men universally, but of all men of a certain class only, Prosper progressively modified his ideas and tended more and more to admit that God's salvific will embraced all men without restriction². In the evolution of his thought, Prosper made use of I Tim. 4, 10: «Qui est Salvator omnium hominum maxime fidelium» in conjunction with I Tim. 2, 4: «Qui omnes homines vult salvos fieri, et ad agnitionem veritatis venire» and arrived at the conclusion that God genuinely willed the salvation of all men without exception, but that He did so in a special manner in the case of a specially chosen number – «maxime fidelium». Already in the *Pro Aug. resp. Gall.* chapter 8, the combination of I Tim. 2, 4 and I Tim. 4, 10 has taken place and the universalist tendency regarding God's will to save, though far from being as explicit and developed as in the later *De vocatione omnium gentium*, is nevertheless intimated in the series of texts favouring the universalist interpretation that is added, viz. Matt. 28, 19; Gen. 12, 3; Ps. 21, 28; Ps. 71, 17; Ps. 85, 9.

In Hypomnesticon, on the other hand, there is no suggestion of any such modification of Augustine's doctrine regarding God's salvific will. There the conformity with Augustine's final thought on the point is com-

¹ For details concerning the development of Prosper's teaching, see M. CAPPUYNS, *L'auteur du 'De vocatione omnium gentium'* in RB 39 (1927) 198-226; *Le premier représentant de l'augustinisme médiéval: Prosper d'Aquitaine in Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale* I (1929) 309-337; G. BARDY, *Prosper d'Aquitaine (Saint)* in DTC 13, 847-848. Rudolf Lorenz disagrees with Cappuyens but his arguments do not appear to be conclusive; cf. R. LORENZ, *Der Augustinismus Prosper's von Aquitanien in Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte* 73 (1962) 217-252, and the *compte rendu* of this work by Roger Aubert in RHE 60 (1965) 211.

² Prosper's initial conformity with Augustine's thought concerning the scope of God's salvific will is particularly evident in the *Epistula ad Augustinum*. There he lists among the Semi-Pelagian errors one advocating God's universal salvific will, and describes it in the following terms: «... bonitas [Dei] in eo apparet, si neminem repellat a vita, sed indifferenter universos velit salvos fieri, et in agnitionem veritatis venire». (CSEL 57, 460: PL 51, 70C).

plete. Though I Tim. 2, 4 is cited three times in chapter 8 of Responsio VI, I Tim. 4, 10 is neither mentioned in that chapter nor anywhere else in the book, and the series of texts used by Prosper to confirm the universal scope of God's will to save men is entirely missing. On the contrary, a series of texts is quoted that seems to limit the scope of God's saving will, viz. Is. 6, 10; Jn. 12, 39; Mk. 4, 11, and no universalist tendency whatever can be discovered. Quite bluntly the author states the fact that not all are saved: «Ecce iam omnes gentes salvi non sunt cum aliis datur viam nosse salutis, aliis non datur», and in terms almost identical with those used by St. Augustine and certainly in the same sense concludes: «Quapropter omnes qui salvantur Deo volente salvantur» (Resp. VI, 8) ¹. For both St. Augustine and the author of Hypomnesticon the restrictive interpretation of 'omnes' in I Tim. 2, 4 is necessitated by the fact that not all are saved, a fact that is proved by the death of so many children without the possibility of receiving Baptism, and the abandonment of so many nations to idolatry. It is precisely in his avoidance of this conclusion and in his endeavour to retain a universal sense for 'omnes' in the Scripture text that Prosper in the *Pro Augustino responsiones ad cap. Gall. 8* show an incipient divergence from the integral teaching of Augustine and, at the same time, a stage of development beyond that of Hypomnesticon. Prosper wrote:

«Remoto ergo obscurarum turbine quaestionum, ad revelatae nos gratiae latitudinem conferamus; dicamusque cum Apostolo: Quoniam Deus vult omnes homines salvos fieri, et in agnitionem veritatis venire. Et iterum dicamus cum Apostolo: Qui est Salvator omnium, maxime fidelium.» (*Ibid.* 163 A)

«Haec ergo est illa totius humani generis assumptio, haec filiorum Dei adoptio, haec gentium plenitudo.» (*Ibid.* 163 C)

«Omnium ergo hominum cura est Deo; et nemo est quem non aut Evangelica praedicatio, aut Legis testificatio, aut ipsa etiam natura conveniat.» (*Ibid.* 164 A)

But the mere fact of doctrinal development in Prosper's thought vis-à-vis Augustine's and Hypomnesticon's teaching on predestination does not of itself impose the conclusion that Hypomnesticon antedates Prosper's

¹ Cf. *Epist.* 217, 6, n. 19: «... omnes, qui salvi fiunt, nisi ipso volente non fiunt». (CSEL 57, 417: PL 33, 986); «Omnes ergo qui salvi fiunt, et in agnitionem veniunt veritatis, eo volente salvi fiunt». (*Contra Julianum* IV, 8, n. 44: PL 44, 760).

Pro Augustino responsiones ad cap. Gall. : it merely gives it a fair measure of plausibility. For if the author of Hypomnesticon were writing subsequently to the *Pro Augustino responsiones ad cap. Gall.*, he was most likely acquainted with it, otherwise the combination of Acts 14, 15 and Ps. 134, 4 would be scarcely explicable. And if he disagreed with the doctrine of the *Pro Augustino responsiones ad cap. Gall.*, it is very likely that the fact would have emerged when he came to deal *ex professo* with predestination in Responsio VI. The argument again is far from being conclusive, but it makes it more probable that Hypomnesticon chronologically preceded the *Pro Augustino responsiones ad cap. Gall.* than the converse and that, therefore, Hypomnesticon was probably written before 434.

Another comparison between Hypomnesticon and Prosper's *Epistula ad Rufinum* seems to point in the same direction. In the *Epistula*, which was written about 426/8, Prosper mentions an objection made by the Semi-Pelagian monks at Marseilles that seems remarkably similar to that dealt with in Responsio VI of Hypomnesticon. Prosper reported that the monks in question had argued that if, as Augustine taught, God from the beginning had predestined some to everlasting life, and had decided to abandon others to everlasting doom, an absurdity would follow, viz. all striving and labour would be superfluous as much for the one class as for the other, since no negligence on the part of the elect could prevent their salvation, and no effort on the part of the reprobate could avert their destruction:

«Hoc autem propositum vocationis Dei, quo vel ante mundi initium, vel in ipsa conditione generis humani, eligendorum et rejiciendorum dicitur facta discretio ... et lapsis curam resurgendi adimere, et sanctis occasionem teporis afferre: eo quod in utraque parte superfluous labor sit, si neque rejectus ulla industria possit intrare, neque electus ulla negligentia possit excidere ... Removeri itaque omnem industriam, tollique virtutes, si Dei constitutio humanas praeveniat voluntates.»
(PL 51, 69 B)

In Responsio VI, chapter 1, of Hypomnesticon, we encounter what is essentially the same objection, though couched in more concrete terms:

«...Deus quosdam hominum sic praedestinet ad vitam regni caelorum, ut si nolint orare aut ieiunare, aut in omni opere divino vigiles esse, eos omnino perire non posse, nec prorsus debere sui esse sollicitos, quos Deus quia voluit, semel iam eligendo praedestinavit ad vitam:

quosdam vero sic praedestinet in gehennae poenam, ut etiam si credere velint, si ieiuniis, orationibus, omnique se voluntati divinae subiecerint ... vitam illis aeternam in toto dari non posse.»

Likewise, the rejoinder of the Semi-Pelagians to the difficulty that God's choice among the nations to be evangelized depends uniquely on His good pleasure and not on human merit is very similar both in the *Epistula ad Augustinum* of Prosper (*Ibid.* 71B) and Hypomnesticon (Responsio VI, 4). In the first case, it is argued that where God permits the preaching of the Gospel, it is because He foresees that the divine message will be accepted by the people to whom it is preached: «praevisos, inquit, a Domino credituros» (*Ibid.* 71C), and in the second case, that where He prevents the Gospel being preached, He foresees that it would be rejected: «Sciebat Deus quia credituri non essent.» (Responsio VI, 4)

It seems evident, therefore, that the situation envisaged in the sixth Responsio of Hypomnesticon corresponds closely to that revealed in Prosper of Aquitaine's *Epistula ad Rufinum* and his *Epistula ad Augustinum*, both written before 430. The Semi-Pelagian problems dealt with in these two epistles are re-echoed in the sixth Responsio, and the urgency and actuality with which they are treated give a strong impression that the author of Hypomnesticon was close to the events in question and that his work was written not long after they had first become notorious. On the other hand, the synthesis of doctrine found in Hypomnesticon and the development it contains relative to St. Augustine's *De praedestinatione sanctorum* (428/9 A. D.) already referred to would seem to postulate an interval of time more or less long. To postulate that this interval should be longer than a few years is unnecessary, and there is accordingly reason to believe that Hypomnesticon appeared shortly after 430 and probably before 435.

CONCLUSIONS

1. The external evidence for the date of composition of Hypomnesticon is neither abundant nor cogent, but it suffices to show that the work was written very probably before 445.
2. From the internal evidence, it can be established that the work was not written before 428/9.
3. The same internal evidence suggests 435 as a likely *terminus ante quem* for the date of composition.

4. From the combined evidence, both internal and external, it seems likely that Hypomnesticon was published between 430 and 435.

5. These dates hold alike for Hypomnesticon as originally planned, i. e. Responsiones I-V, and also for Responsio VI. The interval between the composition of the first five Responsiones and the sixth seems to have been very short.

CHAPTER FOUR

The Author

Historically, the discussion of the authorship of Hypomnesticon falls into two clearly distinct phases. The first occurred in the IXth century as an incidental feature of the Predestinationist controversy instigated by Gottschalk, the wayward monk of Orbais¹; the second began in the XVIIth century with the researches of J. Garnier, S. J., and continued intermittently since. During the first phase, the debate was limited to the question whether Augustine was or was not the author of the work, and it ended with a margin of victory for the negative conclusion, viz. the denial of Augustinian authorship; during the second phase, positive attempts were made to discover the real author, but though several solutions were proposed, none has hitherto prevailed.

§ 1. The IXth Century Discussion

Gottschalk of Orbais (c. 803-867/9 A. D.) is the first known writer to make an explicit quotation² from Hypomnesticon, and the author to whom he ascribes the text is St. Augustine. On the occasion of the Synod of Mainz³ (848 A. D.) which examined his theology and condemned his teaching, Gottschalk quoted an extract from *Responsio VI*, chapter 5,

¹ Cf. K. VIELHABER, *Gottschalk v. Orbais* in LTK 4, 1144-1145.

² By an explicit quotation we shall understand one given together with the name of Augustine as author.

³ «In Moguntina civitate habitae synodo et Rabano archiepiscopo libellum sui [Gotteschalci] erroris porrigens, damnatus... ad Remorum metropolim est remissus». Thus wrote Hincmar, Archbishop of Reims, in his *Liber de praedestinatione Dei et libero arbitrio* (859 A. D.) The fragment is published in DOM LAMBOT's *Œuvres théologiques et grammaticales de Godescalp d'Orbais*, p. 37 (Cf. above, page 18, footnote 2).

with the words «inquit beatus Augustinus»¹. Shortly before this he had made the following declaration, which shows at once his conviction that Augustine was the author of the work and his belief in its importance in relation to the church's teaching on free will:

«De quo videlicet libero arbitrio, quid ecclesiae Christi tenendum sit atque credendum, cum a ceteris catholicis patribus evidenter sit deo gratias disputatum, tum praecipue contra Pelagianos et Caelestianos a beato Augustino plenius et uberius diversis in opusculis et maxime in *Hypomnesticon* esse cognoscitur inculcatum». ²

While Gottschalk takes Augustine's authorship of *Hypomnesticon* for granted and never attempts to prove it, his great opponent, Hincmar, Archbishop of Reims, (806-882) first accepts the authorship unquestioningly, but later, when challenged on the point, makes elaborate attempts to justify his acceptance. In the very first work he launched against Gottschalk's teaching on Predestination, *Ad reclusos et simplices*³ (849 A. D.), Hincmar quotes several times from the VIth *Responsio* of *Hypomnesticon* and invariably ascribes the work to Augustine with some such formula as «beatus Augustinus dicit»⁴.

In the year following the appearance of Hincmar's *Ad reclusos et simplices*, viz. 850 A. D., Ratramnus, a monk of Corbie, in his *De praedestinatione Dei libri duo* (PL 121, 13-80), and John Scotus in *De divina praedestinatione* (851 A. D.) (PL 122, 355-440) both make explicit quotations from *Hypomnesticon*.⁵

¹ *Si talis, inquit beatus Augustinus, factus esset, inculpabilis esset et dei opificio reputaretur, non Iudae. Iniuste etiam in eo praelata damnatio esset. Item Petrus: Quibus iudicium iam olim non cessat et perditio eorum non dormitat. Et Iudas: Subintroierunt quidam homines qui olim praescripti sunt in hoc iudicium impii.* (*Op. cit.* p. 39.)

² *Op. cit.* p. 39; also PL 121, 365C-366B. Similarly in other works Gottschalk uses quotations from *Hypomnesticon* and attributes them to Augustine, e. g. «Unde si plura vis nosse, *Enchyridion* et *Ypomnisticon* sancti Augustini lege et tres libros *De libero arbitrio* et duas eius *Epistolas ad Valentinum* et librum *De gratia et libero arbitrio*». (*Responsio Gotteschalci de diversis, VI. De libero arbitrio in op. cit.* p. 151.) Another example is found in his *Quibus modis dicatur Redemptio*: «Sicut dicit sanctus Augustinus in libro *Ypomnisticon*: 'Confidamus et nos resistentes eis in gratia domini quae est gloria nostra redimens nos a circumdantibus nos'». (*Op. cit.* p. 279.) And finally, in the *Opusculum II* we read: «'Omnes in Moysen'. Hoc est, ut in *Ypomnisticon* exponitur, 'per Moysen baptizati sunt in nube et in mari', sub typo scilicet spiritali». (*Op. cit.* p. 495.)

³ The text was published by Wilhelm Gundlach in *Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte*, 10 (1889) 258-309.

⁴ *Op. cit.* p. 270-273; 299-302; 307-308.

⁵ At the beginning of the second book of his *De praedestinatione Dei libri duo*,

A change occurred, however, in 852 when Augustine's authorship was challenged for the first time. Prudentius, Bishop of Troyes, attacking Scotus's teaching on Predestination¹, severely criticized him for quoting the apocryphal Hypomnesticon as a work of St. Augustine:

«Dein sententia qua id roborare nisus es non est Augustini, neque ex ullo librorum, epistolarum, sermonumve ipsius excerpta; de qua cum anceps diutius haesitarem, ubinam dictorum ejus reperiri posset, repente subiit in mentem recensendum quemdam pseudographum libellum qui falso Hypomnesticon Augustini inscribitur, quem non esse beatissimi Augustini plurima documenta sunt»².

Thereupon he gave the following reasons for rejecting the work as spurious:

External arguments :

1. «... nec cum caeteris libris suis ab ipso [Augustino] retractatus est»³.
2. «... neque in indice sermonum, librorum, epistularumque illius a S. Possidio episcopo, discipulo eius enumeratus invenitur». (Cf. *Operum S. Augustini elenchus*, edited by A. Wilmart, in Misc. Agost., ii, p. 149-233: PL 46, 5-22)

Internal arguments :

1. «... neque quibuscumque ejus dictis concors facillime comprobatur».
2. «Ipsa quoque loquendi facie quisquis tanti Patris litteris jugi meditatione percipitur ... perfacile alterius esse perpendit»⁴.

Ratramnus makes an explicit quotation from Responsio VI of Hypomnesticon. He calls the Responsio *Liber de praedestinatione* – a title found in some MSS. of this Responsio, as will be shown in Part II, sections 1 and 4 of the present work. Ratramnus writes: «Ait enim Augustinus *Libro* ['in' is omitted in the text] *de praedestinatione*: 'Praedestinatio quippe a praemittendo et praeveniando vel praeordinando futurum aliquid dicitur'». (PL 121, 43). Scotus quotes from chapters 2, 5, and 6 of Responsio VI of Hypomnesticon in his *De divina praedestinatione*, chapter 14 (PL 122, 411B-412A). He ascribes the quotations to Augustine with the words: «His et hujusmodi sanctissimi patris Augustini dictionibus ...» (*Ibid.* 412A.)

¹ Prudentius's work is entitled *De praedestinatione contra Joannem Scotum*. It is published in PL 115, 1009-1366; cf. B. LAVAUD, *La controverse sur la Prédestination au IX^e siècle* in DTC 12, ii, 2912; M. CAPPUYNS, *Jean Scot Erigène, sa vie, son œuvre, sa pensée* (Louvain 1933) 111-127.

² *Ibid.* 1199D-1200A.

³ Prudentius circumspcctly observes that since Augustine had revised most of his works, «... librorum suorum partem maximam retractaret», he would never have omitted to correct one that by its disagreement with so many others of his works would necessarily cause confusion: «[Libellus] qui tot ... librorum sermonumque illius magnitudinem sua contrarietate fuscaret». (*Ibid.* 1200A and B.)

⁴ *Ibid.* 1200.

About this time, i. e. 852¹, Hincmar and his suffragan, Pardulus, Bishop of Laon, each sent a letter² to the Archbishop of Lyons in the hope of winning his support in their doctrinal struggle against Gottschalk and his sympathizers. The reply, written in the name of the Church of Lyons, is known as the *Liber de tribus epistulis* (PL 121, 985-1068) and seems to have come from the pen of Florus the Deacon³. Both Hincmar and Pardulus in their letters had defended the Augustinian authorship of Hypomnesticon and this, together with their teaching on Predestination, was vigorously refuted by the author of the *Liber de tribus epistulis*. In the process, he reveals an exceptional theological competence and, for one of his period, a surprisingly keen critical sense. In fact, the arguments he advances to disprove Augustine's authorship of Hypomnesticon are so sound that several of them can be accepted without alteration today.

In chapter 35 of the *Liber de tribus epistulis*, the author refers to Hincmar and one of his arguments with the words – which we already quoted in the preceding chapter in regard to another problem:

«Adjungit etiam rem novam, et neque ex lectione, neque ex veraci aliqua traditione nobis hactenus compertam. Quo scilicet, beatus Augustinus, post omnes libros suos, scripserit quemdam libellum quem Graeco vocabulo Hypomnesticon nominant, quod Latine 'memoria-torium' interpretatur, in quo de quinque quaestionibus contra Pelagium et Coelestium disputaverit»⁴.

Next, two other external and seven internal arguments⁵ are directed against Hincmar's view regarding the authorship of the work:

¹ Cf. E. AMANN, *L'époque carolingienne in Histoire de l'Eglise depuis les origines jusqu'à nos jours* (Fliche et Martin) Tome VI (Paris 1937) 329.

² These letters have been lost and our knowledge of their contents depends on the *Liber de tribus epistulis*; cf. the preface of the *Liber* in PL 121 985 B-987 A.

³ DOM WILMART, in an article entitled *Une lettre sans adresse écrite vers le milieu du IX^e siècle* RB 42 (1930) 149-162, shows that works hitherto attributed to Remigius, Archbishop of Lyons († 875) should be restored to Florus the Deacon of Lyons; cf. DOM CAPPUYNS, *Jean Scot Erigène* (Louvain 1933) 117, and also n. 2 and n. 3. In his excellent article, *Florus de Lyon in Dictionnaire de Spiritualité* 5 (1964) 514-526, DOM C. CHARLIER confidently ascribes the *Liber de tribus epistulis* to Florus, and maintains that its date is prior to the spring of 853. (*Ibid.* 518).

⁴ PL 121, 1044. In view of the general unreliability of Hincmar's arguments where they can be checked, the unverifiable tradition here alluded to becomes suspect. Curiously enough, however, the claim that Hypomnesticon was written after all the other known works of Augustine is quite sound, as the investigation in our preceding chapter sufficiently indicates.

⁵ These two external arguments are similar to those put forward by Prudentius of Troyes and referred to above.

External arguments :

1. «Nos enim manifeste novimus, quia quando libros Retractationum jam senex et morti vicinus scripsit ... nequaquam adhuc istum libellum scripserat»¹.
2. «... post ejus obitum, quando vitam ipsius et catalogum ... librorum ejus ... quidam sanctus episcopus et alumnus ejus ... recensuit ... necdum istum libellum scripserat beatus Augustinus.»

Internal arguments² :

1. «...nec praefationem aliquam in initio sui gerit ubi se ab aliquibus rogatum vel sibi necessario visum ut de tali re ... aliquid novum opus scriberet.»
2. «Nec ulla talis necessitas exstitisse cognoscitur, ut de illis quinque quaestionibus de quibus tam multa, et tam multipliciter in libris praecedentibus disputaverat, iterum novo opere disputare cogereetur.»
3. «... ipse sermo ab eloquio sancti Augustini multum discrepat,»
4. «... sensus ab illius sensu non parum inferior habetur.»
5. «... testimoniis ex Hebraica translatione, quam beatus Hieronymus edidit, praeter ejus consuetudinem contra illos haereticos utitur.»
6. «... modestia atque humilitas morum et sermonum ejus non ibi servatur.»
7. «... prorsus de tanto viro sentire indignum est, verbum et sensum praedestinationis quem omni tempore in suis scriptis et praedicationibus tenuit et commendavit et quem ... in hoc libello evacuare et destruere inveniatur»³.

Next, the writer suggests that it would be more reasonable to suppose the work to have been written by someone else against the five more dangerous tenets of the Pelagians and Celestians some years («non parvo spatio») after Augustine's death, and in general conformity with his teaching and manner of presentation⁴.

Because the work contained a digest of what Augustine had written variously on the subject of Pelagianism, the inclusion of his name in

¹ This quotation and the following one are both taken from chapter 35 of the *Liber de tribus epistulis* (PL 121, 1044). The use of the word 'adhuc' is significant and reflects favourably on the writer's caution.

² The author introduces the internal arguments with the words: «ipse supra memoratus libellus manifestissimis indiciis non se sancti Augustini esse aperte ostendit». (PL 121, 1045 A.) The arguments which follow are taken from the same chapter of the *Liber de tribus epistulis*, but the order has been changed.

³ PL 121, 1045.

⁴ «Unde magis credibile est, quod non parvo spatio post ejus obitum a quodam alio scriptus sit, et magna ex parte juxta modum et formam sensuum ejus, contra Pelagianos et Coelestianos haereticos de illis quinque periculosioribus eorum quaestionibus breviter collectus atque digestus.» (*Ibid.* 1045 C).

the title is readily explained¹. Thus if the author chose to call his opusculum «Memoratorium Sancti Augustini», nothing more should be deduced than that it was meant to serve as a tidy and easily remembered resumé of Augustine's teaching².

In dealing with the letter of Pardulus, the author of the *De tribus epistulis* once more rejects Hypomnesticon from Augustine's writing as spurious. Pardulus had maintained its authenticity, but the only argument he seems to have advanced was unfounded, viz. that Augustine mentioned the five Pelagian questions treated in Hypomnesticon towards the end of the second book of the *De Genesi contra Manichaeos* (written 388-390).³

The third letter, viz. that sent by Rabanus Maurus, Archbishop of Mainz, to Noting, Bishop-elect of Verona, shortly after 840 is also attacked for quoting Hypomnesticon⁴: «tacito nomine libelli, Hypomnesticon subjungit [Rabanus] et adjungit ejus verba... Haec igitur omnia quia, ut diximus, non sunt verba ejus [Augustini] sed manifeste ex jam dicto libello sumpta agnoscuntur, do quo quid nobis videatur jam supra satis ostensum est.» (PL 121, 1061 D; *ibid.* 1063 A)

Finally, the same author of the *De tribus epistulis* made a last recorded attempt to discredit Hypomnesticon and to disprove its authenticity in the *Libellus de tenenda immobiliter scripturae veritate*⁵. Here, while repeating arguments he had formerly made, he brought forward a new and important one, viz. that scarcely a single ecclesiastical writer could be found who made mention of the work and that therefore the attribution in the title was certainly false⁶.

Hincmar for his part was unmoved by the arguments directed against

¹ «... quia auctor ejus [Hypomnesticon] ipsius beati Augustini sensus brevi isto opusculo velut in unum collegisse et explicuisse videtur, ideo ipsi opusculo nomen sancti Augustini in titulo praeferre voluerit» (*Ibid.*).

² «[Si libellum] latine 'Memoratorium sancti Augustini' appellare voluisset, nihil utique aliud intelligeretur, nisi quia illud quod ab eo sparsim, et multipliciter fuerat disputatum, breviter et velut sub uno aspectu positum memoriae commendaret» (*Ibid.*).

³ *Ibid.* 1052-1053. Hincmar in his letter had also used this ill-advised anachronistic argument; cf. *Liber de tribus epistulis*, cap. 35 (PL 121, 1046-1047).

⁴ The author of the *Liber de tribus epistulis* suppresses Rabanus's name, but the letter is easily recognized as his. It is found in PL 112, 1530-1553; cf. E. AMANN, *op. cit.* p. 326, n. 3.

⁵ Written after the Council of Quierzy (853 A. D.) according to B. LAVAUD, *art. cit.* in DTC 12, ii, 2920.

⁶ «Neque ullus fere ecclesiasticus scriptor ejus mentionem facere invenitur, et ideo falsa superscriptione titulum minime dubium est» (PL 121, 1108).

the authenticity of Hypomnesticon, and as late as 860 A. D. we find him still claiming Augustine as its author. In his *De praedestinatione Dissertatio posterior*¹, he successfully rebuts the two external arguments employed by the author of the *Liber de tribus epistulis*. In reply to the objection that Hypomnesticon is not mentioned in the *Retractationes*, Hincmar refers to other undoubtedly genuine works of Augustine likewise left without mention in this book². Then to the argument that Possidius does not mention Hypomnesticon in the list, i. e. the *Operum S. Augustini elenchus*, which he compiled of Augustine's works, Hincmar replies by invoking Possidius's own admission of the incompleteness of his list³, and points to two undoubtedly authentic works that are there missing, viz. the *De praedestinatione sanctorum* and the *De bono perseverantiae*. Next, alluding to the synodal letter issued by the Bishops of the African Province in 523 A. D., he claims – wrongly in fact – that a quotation from Hypomnesticon is found there that is directed against heretics⁴. For his final argument, Hincmar seems to draw entirely on his imagination, for he maintains that Augustine, having written the *Liber ad Dulcitium de octo quaestionibus* when returning from Carthage and recalling the books he had formerly written on the same subject, added a passage from Hypomnesticon with the words: «addere etiam hoc quam maxime huic operi oportet», etc. (Responsio VI)⁵.

¹ PL 125, 65-474. The full title reads: *De praedestinatione Dei et libero arbitrio posterior dissertatio adversus Gothescalum et caeteros praedestinatianos*. With reference to its date, B. LAVAUD remarks: «L'ouvrage fut sans doute achevé dans la première moitié de 860, avant le concile de Thuzey auquel il ne fait aucune allusion». B. LAVAUD, *art. cit.* 2927.

² «... plures illius libros habemus, qui in eodem indiculo non habentur» (*De praedestinatione Diss. post.* PL 125, 73 B).

³ «'Fiunt', inquit, 'simul quos memoratus sanctus Augustinus ... fecit libros, tractatus, epistolas, mille et triginta, excepto qui numerari non possunt, quia nec numerum designavit ipsorum'» (*Ibid.* 73 C); «possint et ipsi videre in eodem indiculo si conscripti sunt libri isti de Praedestinatione sanctorum, ac Bono perseverantiae, quos sancti Augustini esse nemo denegare aut volet aut valet» (*Ibid.* 73 D). Cf. Possidius's *Operum S. Augustini elenchus*, edited by A. Wilmart in *Misc. Agost.*, II (Rome 1931) 208.

⁴ «Et in eadem epistola praefati sancti episcopi [Provinciae Africanae] ipsa beati Augustini verba de supradicto Hypomnesticon libro ex responsione tertiae quaestionis ad revincendos ponunt haereticos» (PL 125, 74 B). No such quotation from Hypomnesticon is found in the letter in question; cf. PL 45, 1779-1785.

⁵ The only reality corresponding to this argument seems to be the fact that in some French manuscripts the VIth Responsio occurs immediately after the *Ad Dulcitium de 8 quaestionibus*. These manuscripts will be alluded to in vol. II, § 1.

Finally, in the *De una et non trina Deitate* ¹, written probably between 864 and 868 ², Hincmar once more numbered Hypomnesticon among the genuine works of Augustine: «Et de gratia et libero arbitrio sicut sanctus Augustinus docet in his libris suis, id est, *De correptione et gratia*, *De praedestinatione sanctorum*, *De dono vel bono perseverantiae*, et in libro *De spiritu et littera* et in libro *Hypomnesticon* ... quia sedes apostolica et sancta catholica ecclesia, et nos sic credimus et tenemus» ³. With this remark, the recorded account of the IXth century debate on the authenticity of Hypomnesticon closes.

CONCLUSIONS

1. Before the Predestinationist controversy broke out in the IXth century, the authenticity of Hypomnesticon never seems to have been questioned.

2. The attribution of the work to Augustine in the manuscripts of the period was so constant that no argument against the authenticity of the work was made by an appeal to the omission of Augustine's name from the title in the manuscripts of the book.

3. The two external arguments used by Prudentius of Troyes and the author of the *Liber de tribus epistulis* against the attribution of the work to Augustine, viz. its omission in the *Retractationes* and the *Operum S. Augustini Elenchus*, or *Indiculus* of Possidius were successfully countered.

4. The external arguments advanced by Hincmar *in favour* of authenticity were refuted.

5. The internal arguments against authenticity used by Prudentius of Troyes and the author of the *Liber de tribus epistulis* were left unanswered.

6. Unequivocal quotations from Hypomnesticon made by earlier ecclesiastical writers seem to have been unknown.

Briefly, therefore, the discussion of the external arguments left the possibility of authenticity, in relation to Augustine, open, but the consideration of the internal arguments made it *highly improbable*, if not *impossible*.

¹ PL 125, 473-618.

² For the date of this work, cf. H. NETZET, *Hincmar* in DTC 6, ii, 2484.

³ PL 125, 615 D-616 A.

§ 2. The XVIIIth Century Investigation

Little need be said about the centuries between the IXth and XVIIth so far as the authorship of Hypomnesticon is concerned. No appreciable improvement was made on the critique written by the author of the *Liber de tribus epistulis*. Augustine's name continued to hold its place in the title of the manuscripts copied up to the time printed editions appeared, i. e. from 1506 onwards. Quotations occur but rarely, and not at all before the advent of St. Thomas Aquinas. The reason for this is very probably that the theologians of the XIIth and XIIIth centuries – with the exception of St. Thomas – were unacquainted with historical Semi-Pelagianism¹, and certainly Peter Lombard shows no knowledge of it in his *Quatuor libri sententiarum*. St. Thomas himself divides his choice when naming the author of citations he makes from Hypomnesticon between St. Augustine and St. Ambrose. Thus, of the six citations from the book that occur in the *Summa Theologiae*, four are ascribed to St. Augustine and two to St. Ambrose: Ia IIae Q. 109, a. 5 corp.; *Ibid.* ad 1m; *Ibid.* a. 8 ad 3m; *Ibid.* Q. 110, a. 4, object. I; IIIa Q. 89, a. 2, object. 2; Suppl. Q. 28, a. 1, object. 3; cf. II sent. D. 26, a. 3; III Sent. D. 31, Q. 1, a. 4, q. 3, object. 2².

A somewhat similar fluctuation regarding the authorship of Hypomnesticon is found in the earlier printed editions of the work. Thus, in the *editio princeps* (published by Johannes Amerbach – or Amorbach – at Basle in 1506) and in the third (edited by Claude Chevallon, Paris 1531) of the *Opera omnia* of St. Augustine, Hypomnesticon is included among the authentic works of the saint, whereas in the second edition, i. e. that of Erasmus, published by Froben in Basle in 1529, Hypomnesticon is relegated to the *spuria*. The reasons given, however, add nothing to those already formulated during the IXth century Predestinationist controversy:

«Hoc opus non esse Augustini primum illud arguit, quod quum sit iusti voluminis non commemoratur in retractationibus, deinde titulus insolens ὑπογνωσκῶν [*sic*] quasi dicas subnotationum: neque enim solet ille titulos Graecos indere suis libris, multo minus eos qui non

¹ Cf. H. BOUILLARD, *Conversion et grâce chez S. Thomas d'Aquin* (Paris 1944) 92-102.

² Cf. G. VON HERTLING, *Augustinus-Citate bei Thomas von Aquin* in *Sitzungsberichte der phil.-philol. und der hist. Klasse der bayrischen Akademie der Wissenschaften*, Jahrgang 1904, p. 540.

indicant argumentum, postremo nec stilus per omnia congruit, licet hominis eruditi facundique videatur. Clamoris plus habet, solidae argumentationis minus quam Augustinus. Videtur fuisse quispiam qui quae sparsim ab Augustino disserta sunt contra Pelagianos, studuerit in unum contrahere»¹.

At the famous Disputation of Leipzig (1519, 27th June - 15th July) which took place between Johann Eck (1486-1543), the first great champion of the Catholic cause against Lutheranism, and Carlstadt, the Lutheran representative, Hypomnesticon was frequently quoted by both parties, and both alike ascribed the work to Augustine. Thus, in one of the opening sessions, Eck stated:

«Ab initio erat [liberum arbitrium] integrum et illaesum, in processu vero peccati macula est vulneratum, juxta divi Ambrosii *De vocatione gentium* sententiam, et claudicans factum, juxta Augustinum, libro 3, *Hypognosticon contra Pelagianos*.» [*Der authentische Text der Leipziger Disputation* (1519). Edited by Otto Seitz (Berlin 1903) 16]

In his reply, Carlstadt quoted from Responsio III, 2 of Hypomnesticon with the words:

«Verba Augustini sunt inducentis hanc auctoritatem: ‘Deus ab initio etc. Ipsa est prima gratia, qua primus homo stare potuisset si servare mandata Domini voluisset ...’» (*Ibid.* p. 17; cf. p. 24; 28; 31-32)

Then the author of the Confession of Augsburg (1530) incorporates an extract from Responsio III, 4 of Hypomnesticon into Article XVIII with the words:

«De libero arbitrio docent quod humana voluntas habeat aliquam libertatem ad efficiendam civilem justitiam et deligendas res rationi subiectas. Sed non habet vim sine Spiritu Sancto efficiendae justitiae Dei seu justitiae spiritualis, quia animalis homo non percipit ea quae sunt spiritus Dei; sed haec fit in cordibus, quum per Verbum Spiritus Sanctus concipitur. Haec totidem verbis dicit Augustinus lib. iii *Hypognosticon*:

‘Esse fatemur liberum arbitrium omnibus hominibus habens quidem iudicium rationis, non per quod sit idoneum in iis quae ad Deum pertinent, sine Deo aut inchoare aut certe peragere sed tantum in operibus vitae praesentis tam bonis quam malis...’» (B. J. Kidd,

¹ The above quotation from Erasmus is found in a note ‘Ad lectorem’ with which he prefaces his edition of Hypomnesticon, *Septimus tomus operum divi Aurelii Augustini Hipponensis episcopi* ... (Basle 1528) 925. Adequate comment is made on this assessment of Erasmus in J. GARNIER’s *Dissertatio* which will be discussed presently. Cf. PL 48, 577-579.

Documents illustrative of the Continental Reformation, Oxford 1911, p. 226-227. Cf. J. Müller, *Die Symbolischen Bücher der evangelischen lutherischen Kirche*, 12th edition, 1928, p. 43) ¹.

We learn from Thomas de Lemos, O. P., that Hypomnesticon was used as a source by some of the disputants in the famous «De auxiliis» controversies. Referring particularly to the sessions held before Clement VIII from March 1602 to February 1605, Lemos writes:

«In congregationibus ... ab istis libris [liber responsionum ad articulos sibi falso impositos et liber Hypomnesticon] argumenta ab aliquibus contra divinam praedestinationem proponebantur.» [*Panoplia gratiae.. in IV tomos distributae*, Tomus II (Leodii – actually Béziers – 1676) Tract. iii, cap. 29, p. 217, n. 454]

And we know from the same theologian that opinions were still divided at this time about the authorship of the work:

«Sunt et alii circa istam materiam duo libri sub nomine sancti Augustini, qui sancti Augustini non sunt sed incerti auctoris: huiusmodi sunt liber responsionum ad articulos sibi falso impositos, et liber Hypognoticon, qui optimam continent doctrinam et communiter recipiuntur.» (*Op. cit.* n. 454)

The *Liber responsionum ad articulos sibi falso impositos* referred to in these two places by Lemos is the *Pro Augustino responsiones ad capitula objectionum Vincentianarum* (PL 51, 177-186) of Prosper of Aquitaine. In view of what we shall have to say later about Prosper of Aquitaine, this association of Hypomnesticon with Prosper in the above passages is of particular interest. The fact that the two works should be linked together doctrinally by the great theologian is significant, and it is noteworthy too that at this time the authorship of Prosper's *Pro Augustino responsiones ad capitula objectionum Vincentianarum* was as unknown as that of Hypomnesticon.

Shortly after Lemos's testimony appeared, Cardinal Bellarmine commented:

«Libri qui inscribuntur Hypognoticon eruditi sunt, et utiles, et vetusti auctoris, sed phrasim non habent Augustini, neque a Possidio, vel Beda, vel alio vetere citantur sub nomine Augustini.» [*De scriptoribus ecclesiasticis*, liber unus, (Rome 1613) 110]

¹ J. T. MÜLLER's book was first published in Gütersloh, 1848.

Up to this point, no systematic effort seems to have been made to identify the author of Hypomnesticon, but with the publication in 1673 of J. Garnier's *Marii Mercatoris Sancti Augustini aequalis opera quaecumque extant* (Paris),¹ the quest for the author seriously begins. In Appendix 2 ad Im partem Dissertatio VI, pars Ia, cap. 4², a comprehensive review of the problem of authorship, both in its negative and positive aspects, is to be found for the first time.

At the beginning of his study, Garnier outlined the method of inquiry he proposed to adopt and showed it to consist in collecting from the work itself all possible evidence that could serve to determine the author, the time in which he wrote, and the circumstances³. Next he listed twelve distinctive characteristics of Hypomnesticon and by means of these reached the conclusion that the adversary envisaged in the book was Julian of Eclanum, that the time of composition was 418-420, and that the author was very probably – even certainly – Sixtus of Rome, later Pope Sixtus III.

Speaking of the distinctive characteristics⁴ of the work, Garnier notes that the fourth error combated, viz. «Libido naturale est bonum, nec in ea est quod pudeat», was formally introduced into the debate only when Julian undertook the defence of Pelagianism. He notes also that Julian's name never occurs in the book, and that some unnamed individual was the object of the attack, a disciple rather of Celestius than of Pelagius, judging by his *penchant* for arguing against Original Sin (the speciality of Celestius) and the less marked tendency to concern himself with limiting the rôle of grace (the aim of Pelagius). Garnier further notes that the only courts of appeal used were Sacred Scripture, in the Vulgate text of Jerome, and reason, and that no allusion was made to the Fathers of the Church, to Synods or to the Roman Pontiffs. Garnier commented also on what he called the unevenness of style in the book, its peculiarity of being at times noble and sublime, at others vehement and impassioned or pedestrian and banal, and its use of strange and even barbarous words,

¹ The work was incorporated in Migne's PL in 1846 as Tome 48.

² PL 48, 572-586.

³ It should be remarked that Garnier calls our pseudo-Augustinian work Hypognosticon. The title was used for the work by Hincmar in the IXth century, and was commonly used in the XVIth and XVIIth centuries in the same connection. It is quite certain from the extant MSS. that this form of the title was not original. The point will come up for discussion in vol. II § 4.

⁴ PL 48, 572-574.

such as 'protoplastus', 'desolatus', 'exsulatus', etc.¹. Finally, attention was drawn to the anomaly of the VIth Responsio. Because this part was not catered for in the Preface, and because the ending of Responsio V has all the signs of being the definitive conclusion of the book, Responsio VI seems to be either supposititious or an addition made by the author – a conclusion that seems to be confirmed, thought Garnier, by the existence of codices and printed editions in which the VIth Responsio is found apart from the other five.

To prove that Julian was the adversary attacked in Hypomnesticon, Garnier shows that the errors opposed in the book are precisely the ones Julian supported with such tenacity, viz. the doctrine that lust, 'libido', was a natural good, and the denial of the transmission of Original Sin².

To show that the time of composition of Hypomnesticon was between 418-420, Garnier assumes that Julian, though condemned by Pope Zosimus in 418, was not deposed from his office until 420: a time prior to Julian's removal from office is postulated by the silence about his name, and a time subsequent to his condemnation in 418 by the words: «contra Pelagianos et Caelestianos ... quos Dominus ... exortos in mundo iudicio justo damnavit» (Hypomnesticon, Praefatio). It was hoped that during this period before 420 Julian would retract his errors and his name was suppressed in Hypomnesticon in order to avoid antagonizing him³.

Next, Garnier seeks to discover among Augustine's contemporaries the author of the book, and the case for St. Jerome, Paulinus of Nola, Aurelius of Carthage, Alypius of Africa, the author of the *De vocatione gentium* and *Epistula ad Demetriadem*, Pope Zosimus, St. Augustine, Marius Mercator, and Paulinus the Deacon is considered in turn and each rejected.

In dealing with the case for Augustine, Garnier examines the reasons for and against, particularly those of Hincmar and the author of the *De tribus epistulis*, in considerable detail, and he concludes by formulating seven arguments – he calls them decisive – against Augustine's authorship⁴:

¹ *Ibid.* 574 C. This criticism is not justified. Most of the words objected to are classical, and 'protoplastus' though not classical, had had a very respectable ecclesiastical tradition behind it before it was used by the author of Hypomnesticon. It is to be found in writings of Tertullian, Cyprian, Ambrose, Jerome and Marius Mercator. The point will be discussed in more detail in Chapter VII and references will be given to the writings of the authors alluded to here.

² PL 48, 574 D.

³ *Ibid.* 575 A.

⁴ *Ibid.* 578 B.

1. Inter capitalia quinque Pelagianorum dogmata, recenset Hypognostes, quod *libido sit naturale bonum*; numquam recensuit Augustinus, etiam cum de haeresibus sub finem vitae scriberet.
2. Aliter Hypognostes, aliter Augustinus praedestinationem explicat.
3. Multum Augustinus modestia orationis, plurimum Latinitate Hypognostem vincit.
4. Augustinus ex antiqua communi translatione Scripturae testimonia profert; Hypognostes ex Hebraica Hieronymi.
5. Numquam siluisset Augustinus de Patrum traditione, et Ecclesiae iudicio ad stabiliendam fidem, silet omnino Hypognostes.
6. Augustinus Juliani nomen, quod alias tam frequenter appellat, hoc utique in loco non reticuisset; reticet Hypognostes quantumcumque vehementer hominem impugnet.
7. Augustinus, si modo operis auctor esset, hoc certe edidisset in lucem eo tempore quo editum reipsa ostendimus: recensisset ergo cum aliis ejusdem aetatis ¹.

The possibility of Marius Mercator's being the author is also carefully examined ². On the balance side, Garnier remarks that Mercator used a title for one of his books similar to that of Hypomnesticon, viz. Hypognostica ³. The work was also contemporaneous with those of Marius, and showed the same detestation of Julian's errors and the same devotion towards Augustine that is manifested in Marius's works. Besides, both Marius and the author of Hypomnesticon reveal a similar Latin style involving the use of rare words, exclamations, and the more vehement figures of speech. On the debit side, Garnier notes the difference in the version of Scripture used by both authors adding the discerning remark: «quod omnino capitale est ubi de ecclesiasticis scriptoribus agitur». Then the word 'protoplastus', so often used in Hypomnesticon, never occurs in Marius's extant works. Again, whereas Marius has scarcely anything to say about the grace of Christ, or about the question of lust or free will, even though occasions for doing so present themselves, Hypomnesticon treats of these topics at length.

Finally, Garnier suggests as a solution the authorship of Sixtus of Rome and proposes it – perhaps with more courage than circumspection – as very probable, even certain – «veluti admodum probabilem,

¹ Of these arguments, numbers 2, 3, 4 and 7, with minor modifications, are found among those enumerated by the author of the *Liber de tribus epistulis*. They were discussed above, p. 45.

² PL 48, 578 C-579.

³ GARNIER is referring to the *Commonitorium adversum haeresim Pelagii*.

immo pene certam». Unfortunately, the arguments he uses to establish his view are disappointingly weak ¹.

On the basis of Augustine's two letters to Sixtus, Epistles 191 and 194, Garnier assumes that Sixtus had at first succumbed to Pelagianism ², but soon freed himself from the error and became its active opponent. Thereupon, admonished by Augustine in Epistles 191 and 194, he set to work and produced his Hypomnesticon, taking up in the Preface where Augustine had left off in Epistle 194 ³. Garnier finds the time and place of composition of Hypomnesticon and also the contents of the book all favourable to his hypothesis. Augustine's two letters had reached Sixtus by the end of 418, or the beginning of 419, whereas, in Garnier's view, Hypomnesticon was written about 419. Further, the book was produced in Rome at a time when Jerome's version of Sacred Scripture was being used nowhere else but there, and it deals with questions which preoccupied the Church at Rome at the time, questions that are reheated in the *Tractoria* of Pope Zosimus.

Among the objections to his solution which he anticipates, Garnier deals with the omission of any reference to the book under the name of Sixtus in Gennadius's *Liber de scriptoribus ecclesiasticis* ⁴, and he incidentally refers to the enigmatic *Liber unus adversus quaestiones Pelagianistarum* included by Possidius among Augustine's anti-Pelagian writings. Garnier conjectures that this work is Hypomnesticon, and that it was sent without the author's name to Augustine. It remained among the latter's writings until his death, and when subsequently found by

¹ The quotation is from *Ibid.* 579 D; the arguments are found *Ibid.* 579-586.

² This is far from being certain, and it seems that the reports about Sixtus's patronizing attitude towards Pelagianism to which Augustine refers in Epistles 191 and 194 are as likely to be slanderous as true. Cf. E. AMANN, *Sixte ou Xyste (Saint)* in DTC 14, ii (1941) 2196.

³ GARNIER finds a consonance between the ending of Epistle 194 and the opening of Hypomnesticon to which he gives a very tendentious interpretation. Actually, there are points of contact between Augustine's Epistle 194 and Hypomnesticon, but these in no way demand that Sixtus be the author of the latter work. Epistle 194, though addressed to Sixtus, was read by many, and we know that it caused a sharp reaction in a monastery at Hadrumetum, north Africa, in 426. The letter could, therefore, have been used as a source by authors other than Sixtus. Cf. PL 48, 582 C and ff.

⁴ Gennadius's reference to Sixtus is so summary that no argument can be gathered from the absence of allusion to Hypomnesticon under his name: Gennadius writes: «Similiter etiam Sixtus, successor Caelestini, pro eadem re [Nestorianismo] et ad ipsum Nestorem et ad Orientis episcopos adversum errorem ejus Occidentalium sententias direxit». (*Liber de viris inlustribus*, edition of E. C. Richardson, p. 80: PL 58, 1090). Cf. PL 48, 584 C.

Possidius was assumed to be a genuine work of Augustine, and was included as such in the list of Augustine's writings which Possidius drew up after the great bishop's death.

Natalis Alexander, O. P. (1639-1724), the celebrated French historian and theologian, seems to have been unaware of the existence of Garnier's hypothesis when, in 1679, he published his *Selecta historiae ecclesiasticae capita saeculi V*, Pars prima (Paris 1679), for he discusses the authorship of Hypomnesticon without making the slightest allusion to Garnier's views:

«Libri sex Hypognosticon non sunt S. Augustini. Id demonstrant stili dissimilitudo; Scriptura secundum S. Hieronymi translationem laudata; S. Augustini in Retractationibus, Possidii in Indiculo, S. Prosperi, S. Fulgentii, Bedae silentium. Nonnulla denique a S. Augustini doctrina prorsus aliena ... Praedestinationem ex praevisione operum esse docet: quod Augustinianae doctrinae repugnat, Bellarmino etiam favente.» (*Op. cit.* p. 491-493)

Seven years later, in 1686, the Dominican theologian, Seraphinus Piccinardus takes up the question of the authenticity of Hypomnesticon once more, though in a very different context and for widely different motives. In his *De novitio opere quod inscribitur Praedestinatus auctoris anonymi Semipelagiani*¹, he states the current view very concisely:

«Falso non minus hoc opusculum adscribi Augustino certoque esse alicuius alterius utique Augustini discipuli et interpretis post ejus mortem fere immediate scribentis, omnes fere Doctores conveniunt.» (*Op. cit.* p. 64)

The names of the 'Doctores' are then added – Remigius of Lyons, Erasmus, Cardinal Bellarmine, Johannes Garnier, Natalis Alexander, «et quotquot legerim recentiores», and a long series of arguments to support their views follows. These arguments are similar to those already encountered, but they are given with more specific detail². The primary concern of the author, however, is to show that the sixth Responsio was written by the same author as that of the first five³, and that it was

¹ Published at Padua in 1686.

² Instead of contenting himself with the mere affirmation of the difference in doctrine between Hypomnesticon and Augustine's works, Piccinardus quotes pertinent extracts from the former and compares them with passages in the *De perfectione justitiae hominis*, cap. 12; *Tractatus 48 in Joannem*, etc. *Op. cit.* p. 65.

³ Speaking of Responsio VI, Piccinardus says: «En velut appendicus operis, seu additum operi, ut ipse loquitur, jam antea completo, nova aliqua superveniens causa, ut id oporteret, extorsit». *Op. cit.* p. 67.

directed against the anonymous *Praedestinatus* that appeared, in Piccinardus's view, in 434.

In considering the question of authorship in the case of Hypomnesticon, Piccinardus limits his choice to two alternatives, namely, Sixtus of Rome and Marius Mercator. He supports the arguments in favour of Sixtus given by Garnier, but advances the date of composition from 418-420 to a time shortly after the death of Augustine in 430. Leaving Garnier's conjecture as plausible¹, Piccinardus considers the claims that could be made for Marius Mercator. He argues from *Ad Dulcitium de 8 quaestionibus*, Q. 3, to show that Marius was a close disciple of Augustine. Again, he shows that Marius located the primary error «praecipuum eorundem errorem» of the Pelagians in the proposition: «Quod mors non esset retributa peccato» and this is precisely the error that is dealt with first in Hypomnesticon². Then in both Hypomnesticon and Marius's *Liber Subnotationum* a like violence is everywhere found; no occasion for vituperating error is missed and frequently not even sound teaching escapes unscathed³. The same unpolished style is found in both works, a fact already observed by Rigberius⁴ in connection with the *Liber Subnotationum* and sufficiently obvious in Hypomnesticon from the use of such words as 'protoplastus', 'exulatus', 'desolatus gratia', 'refellitus' and 'repedare'⁵. The titles are also similar: the *Liber Subnotationum* has the title *Commonitorium adversus haeresim Pelagii et Caelestii* while the second work is entitled *Hypomnesticon adversus Pelagianos et Caelestianos*. The similarity is even made more plain by substituting for Hypomnesticon its Latin equivalent, viz. 'Commonitorium'. Finally, having answered possible objections, Piccinardus concludes:

«Stet ergo operis Hypomnesticon auctorem fuisse alterutrum ex praedictis Augustini discipulis, scil. aut Sixtum etiam ante Ponti-

¹ «Nec inverisimilis haec Garnerii conjectura videtur cum propter rationes... probabiles saltem... tum propter praecedentia Sixti ejusdem gesta adversus Pelagianos eosdem». *Ibid.* p. 73.

² *Ibid.* p. 77-78.

³ «In utroque libro, Hypognosticon et Subnotationum in Julianum... ubique ferocia inspicitur, nullibi censuras omittens, et saepe etiam nec probis parcens». *Ibid.* p. 80.

⁴ The reference is to the *Acta Marii Mercatoris ... cum notis Rigberii* (Brussels 1673) of the Maurist scholar, Dom Gabriel Gerberon (1628-1711). The name Rigberius was one of the pseudonyms used by Dom Gerberon.

⁵ «In utroque eadem styli asperitas, minus redolens linguam nativam Latini sermonis, ut de subnotationibus jam observavit Rigerberius [sic] scholastes in easdem, et in libro Hypognosticon, non minus illae voces ostendunt: protoplastus, exulatus, desolatus gratia, refellitus, repedare, et huiusmodi». *Ibid.* p. 80.

ficium Augustino addictissimum aut Marium Mercatorem autd emum (si neuter adhuc placet) certum esse ab aliquo saltem Augustini discipulo post ejus mortem hoc opus conscriptum esse.» (*Ibid.* p. 81)

The Maurist editors of the *Opera Omnia* of St. Augustine seem to have been unaware of Seraphinus Piccinardus's view when they speculated about the author of Hypomnesticon, for they tended towards the same conclusion without making any allusion to it. Shortly before the publication of the tenth tome (the one containing Hypomnesticon) of the *Opera Omnia* in 1690, the editor-in-chief wrote to Louis-Ellies du Pin and tentatively suggested Marius Mercator as the author of the work. The reaction of du Pin as published in his *Nouvelle Bibliothèque des Auteurs Ecclesiastiques*, Tome 3 (Paris 1689), p. 816-817, is of interest and significance. Referring to Hypomnesticon he writes:

«... quoique cet Ouvrage soit conforme à la doctrine de Saint Augustin, il n'est pas de son stile. Celui des PP. Bénédictins qui a le principal soin de la nouvelle édition de Saint Augustin [presumably the reference is to Dom T. Blampin], m'ayant averti qu'il avoit quelque soupçon qu'il pouvait être de Marius Mercator, après l'avoir examiné, j'ai trouvé la conjecture bien fondée.

1. Car premièrement cet Ouvrage est d'un Auteur ancien qui vivoit et qui écrivoit du temps même de Pélage et de Celestius, et qui étoit dans les sentiments de Saint Augustin; cela convient à Marius Mercator.
2. Marius Mercator donne ordinairement à ses Traitez le titre que porte celui-ci: car c'est ainsi qu'il a intitulé son écrit contre Julien.
3. La forme de ce Traité est entièrement semblable à celle des autres Traitez de Marius Mercator. Il y rapporte les termes de ceux qu'il veut combattre, & les réfute ensuite par des Notes ou Réflexions.
4. Après avoir comparé ce Traité avec des autres Traitez de Marius Mercator, & particulièrement avec son Livre contre Julien, j'ai trouvé que le stile étoit tout semblable: l'on y rencontre le même tour, les mêmes expressions.
5. Enfin Saint Augustin dans la lettre 193, écrite à Marius Mercator en 418, nous témoigne que cet homme lui avoit écrit contre les nouveaux Hérétiques un Livre plein des Témoignes de l'écriture sainte. C'est ce qui ne peut convenir à pas un autre des Traitez de Marius Mercator, & c'est ce qui convient parfaitement à celui-ci.»

Notwithstanding du Pin's enthusiasm, the Maurist presentation of the case in the following year, when they wrote the *Admonitio in Hypomnesticon*, was very moderate and reserved:

«Ipsi Mercatori facilius adjudicabit, quisquis non modo cum Garnerio animadverterit, suis Mercatorem opusculis insignioribus contra Pelagianos titulum eumdem fecisse, alteri scilicet «Subnotationum libro», alteri autem «Commonitorio» nuncupato; sed illud etiam observavit, quod in epistola 193 ... rescribit Augustinus ad Mercatorem, cap. 1, se nimirum cum ejus litteris accepisse «et alium» ipsius «adversus novos haereticos» Pelagianos «librum refertum, sanctarum testimoniis Scripturarum». Istum tamen Mercatoris librum ab Augustino laudatum, quo minus continuo pronuntiemus asseveranter ipsum esse Hypomnesticon, moram injicit stilus, et dicendi ratio, quam in Hypomnestico non eandem plane atque in aliis Mercatoris indubitatis opusculisprehendimus»¹.

In spite of the overwhelming weight of criticism that had already accumulated against Augustine's authorship of Hypomnesticon, Cardinal Sfondrati was not convinced, and as late as 1697 we find him quoting from Responsio VI as from Augustine:

«Rursus idem Augustinus lib. 6 Hypognosticon haec habet» and a little further on he adds: «Scio quidem ab eruditis dubitari, an hic liber Augustini sit, sed tamen Doctores qui notas editioni Lugdunensi addiderunt ad finem huius libri haec habent: Hujus operis non meminit Augustinus in catalogo suarum lucubrationum, sed omnia sic referunt ingenium illius, ut de auctore nihil sit dubitandum»².

Just before the close of the 17th century, Natalis Alexander, O. P., subjected J. Garnier's hypothesis concerning Marius Mercator's authorship to a severe though just criticism in *Historia Ecclesiastica Veteris Novique Testamenti* (Paris 1699), Tomus quintus. He points out that Garnier's date for the composition of Hypomnesticon, i. e. 418-420 is based on pure conjecture devoid of proof; the conclusion that Rome was the place of composition, because the Vulgate text quoted in Hypomnesticon was used at the time in Rome and nowhere else, he shows to be quite groundless. He remarks, on the one hand, that it was improbable that Jerome's translation was used at the time 418-420 in Rome, and even if it were, the fact would not prove that Hypomnesticon was not written in the sixth or seventh century outside Rome rather than in the fifth at Rome. With these and suchlike arguments Alexander invalidates most of Gar-

¹ *Sancti Aurelii Augustini Hipponensis episcopi operum tomus decimus. Appendix ad tomum decimum operum sancti Augustini. Admonitio in Hypomnesticon* (Paris 1690) 3: PL 45, 1611.

² COELESTINUS SFONDRATI, *Nodus praedestinationis ex Sacris Litteris doctrinae SS. Augustini et Thomae ... dissolutus* (Rome 1697) 35.

nier's proofs, but this does not mean that some of Garnier's conclusions cannot be established by other means.

Finally, at the turn of the century, Tillemont in his *Mémoires*¹ re-examined Garnier's views on the authorship of Hypomnesticon and rejected his conclusions. Tillemont writes:

«Le P. Garnier ajoute, que Sixte pour réparer la faute qu'il avoit faite en soutenant l'erreur des Pélagiens, (car il n'en doute pas,) écrivit contre eux *l'Hypognosticon*, ... Il allegue à son ordinaire un grand nombre de conjectures, qui toutes ensemble sont moins fortes, que la difference de style qu'il avoue estre entre cet ouvrage, & les trois livres Pelagiens qu'il veut aussi estre de Sixte»².

Then having commented briefly on the fact that the Maurists preferred to ascribe the work to Marius Mercator, in spite of difficulties of style, and that the conjectures formed by M. du Pin in support of the same conclusion were without force, Tillemont concludes:

«Ainsi il vaut mieux arrester nostre curiosité sur l'auteur de cet ouvrage, pour nous contenter de profiter de ce que la verité nous y apprend, par quelque main qu'elle l'ait fait écrire, & pour rejeter ce que l'ignorance & la foiblesse humaine peuvent y avoir ajouté. Car les Saints qui ont défendu la grace dans le IX siècle, y ont remarqué des choses qui ne s'accordoient pas avec la doctrine de S. Augustin, sous le nom duquel quelque uns pretendoient alors le faire passer»³.

Between the close of the seventeenth century and our day, no notable advance has been made in the quest for the author of Hypomnesticon. It is true that Johannes Raab produced a scholarly dissertation on the subject in 1735⁴, but the author's desire to justify the attribution of Hypomnesticon to Augustine in Article XVIII of the Confession of Augsburg was perhaps the reason why he did not fare better. Having dealt at considerable length with the historical evolution of the problem, Raab surmises that the author sought is not Augustine of Hippo, but Augustine of Aquileia, Primate of Venice (414-422), and referred to by Johannes

¹ SÉBASTIEN LE NAIN DE TILLEMONT, *Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire ecclésiastique des six premiers siècles. Editio princeps* 1693-1712, Paris, in 16 volumes. There was a second edition, 'revue et corrigée' by the author which appeared from 1701 onwards and went as far as the fifth volume.

² *Op. cit.* Tome XIV (1709) p. 266.

³ *Ibid.* p. 267.

⁴ *Disquisitio historico-critica de libris Hypognosticon an ab Hincmaro in Augustana Confessione et alibi recte tribuantur divo Augustino episcopo Hipponensi.* See above, p. 3.

Albertus Fabricius in his *Bibliotheca Latina Mediae et Infimae Aetatis*, Tome 1¹. Raab thought that the author of the *Liber de tribus epistulis* attributed Hypomnesticon to another Augustine in the passage:

«Ex falso titulo plerosque putare libellum Hypognosticon esse Augustini ... quem libellum non esse ejusdem sancti Augustini et stilus ipse demonstrat et sensus»².

But apart from this unjustifiable deduction from the phrase «non esse ejusdem sancti Augustini» of the *Liber de tribus epistulis*, Raab offers no evidence whatever in support of his hypothesis.

More recent authors refer incidentally to the authorship of Hypomnesticon, but though occasional efforts are made to determine the date and place of composition of the work, no serious effort is made to continue the search for the author³.

CONCLUSIONS

1. By the close of the XVIIth century, Augustine's authorship of Hypomnesticon was decisively disproved, and almost universally abandoned⁴.

2. The quest for the author of Hypomnesticon was unsuccessful. It gave rise to two hypotheses, one advocating the authorship of Sixtus of Rome, the other of Marius Mercator. The case for Sixtus was badly presented and the arguments in its favour were promptly and easily refuted, but the possibility of Sixtus's being the author was not thereby disproved. The case for Marius Mercator offered some plausibility, but was greatly weakened by an examination of some stylistic differences between Hypomnesticon and Mercator's genuine works.

3. A cursory review of other possibilities among contemporaries of Augustine, such as St. Jerome, Paulinus of Nola, Aurelius and Alypius

¹ This work was published in Hamburg in 1734. The reference made by Raab is found on p. 141 of Tome 1 (Florence edition 1858) and reads: «Augustinus post Chromatium Episcopus Aquilejensis, Primas Venetiarum, Histriae, Norici utriusque et Rhaetiae ab A. 414 ad 422.»

² Raab quotes the above passage on p. 23 of his work, and he adds: «Videtur [auctor *Libri de tribus epistulis*] innuere alium forte virum doctum Augustino homonymon huius libelli auctorem esse ... Hunc igitur Augustinum Aquilejensem esse auctorem librorum Hypognosticon mea est conjectura» (*Ibid.*).

³ These more recent authors were referred to earlier; cf. pp. 1-3.

⁴ Cardinal Sfondrati is an exception; cf. p. 59 above.

of Africa, Pope Zosimus, and the then unknown author of the *De vocatione gentium* and the *Epistula ad Demetriadem* led to negative conclusions.

4. A number of distinctive features of Hypomnesticon were thrown into relief, notably the suppression of Augustine's name in the work, the omission of reference to Roman Pontiffs, Councils of the Church or to the Fathers, and the refutation of Julian's teaching without a single mention of his name.

5. No external evidence bearing on the question of authorship was discovered in early ecclesiastical literature and it is highly improbable that any such evidence exists.

§ 3. A Re-assessment

From the foregoing historical survey, the difficulties inherent in the problem of identifying the author of Hypomnesticon will be apparent. Though discussed as early as the IXth century, and that by some of the ablest men of the age, and though debated at intervals since by scholars of exceptional erudition, the problem is still unsolved except in the negative sense that Augustine's authorship has been categorically excluded. The likelihood of a facile solution being found is remote, and it is only by laborious and painstaking research that any advance towards the discovery of the author is likely to be made.

The research hitherto pursued consisted in tacitly assuming that the author was a contemporary of St. Augustine. Then by means of internal criteria provided by the work itself and by correlative indications in Augustine's writings it was hoped to solve the problem. In this way, Sixtus of Rome came up for discussion and also Marius Mercator. However, several lacunae in the methods of inquiry employed in these investigations can be noticed, e. g. the omission of a systematic study of the MS. tradition of the work to see if it could throw any light on the question of authorship; the absence of any careful attempt to find the date of composition of the work; and the neglect of a sufficiently detailed examination of the doctrinal, scriptural and literary peculiarities of the work as a preliminary to searching, by a comparative method, in the period corresponding to the date of composition, for the long-sought author. In the present study an attempt is made, at least in some measure, to supply these lacunae.

a) *The Manuscript Tradition*

In investigating the MS. tradition of Hypomnesticon, a total of 95 MSS. of the work was discovered, ranging from the VIIIth to the XVth century and located in such countries as Italy, France, Germany, England, Spain, Switzerland, Belgium, Holland and Czechoslovakia. All these MSS., with the exception of three or four late and fragmentary ones, were studied in view of the present work and the results as regards the question of the authorship of Hypomnesticon may be summarized as follows:

1. St. Augustine is the only author to whom the work is ever ascribed in the MSS.¹, and in the case of the vast majority of the MSS. the attribution is explicitly made. This is so true that if the authorship of Hypomnesticon depended on the extant MSS. alone the case for Augustine would admit of no doubt.

2. There exists a small number of MSS. in which Hypomnesticon is left anonymous, e. g. St. Gall 29; Lyons 611; Boulogne-sur-Mer 48; Troyes 1532; Vat. Lat. 555; London, British Museum, Royal 5 C. V; Oxford, Merton 36; Bodley 150. However, as practically all these MSS. contain only the VIth Responsio, *De Praedestinatione*, the omission of Augustine's name is easily explained. The scribe, in extracting the VIth Responsio from an exemplar which originally contained all six, would not normally find Augustine's name repeated in the *Incipit* of the Responsio, and so could easily omit Augustine's name in his copy, e. g. Vat. Lat. 491 ends Resp. V and begins Resp. VI with the formula: *Expl. res. V incipit resp VI de P' destinatione (sic)*, and a scribe copying Resp. VI alone

¹ Since writing the above, and indeed since terminating the entire first part of this work, I found two XVth century manuscripts in the Vatican Library which ascribe Responsio VI of Hypomnesticon to Prosper of Aquitaine. The manuscripts in question are, Vat. Lat. 500 and Vat. Lat. 501. In the case of the former, the *Incipit* (f. 374) includes the name of Augustine as the author of the work, but a marginal note in another XVth century hand reads: «Credo etiam hoc quod sequitur esse Prosperi, non Augustini». Judging by the other marginal notes entered by the same hand, the author is well-informed, and his addition of variants derived from other MSS. of Hypomnesticon shows some acquaintance with the MS. tradition of that work. His attribution of Hypomnesticon to Prosper gains in importance and interest from these facts. In the case of Vat. Lat. 501, which is dated 1452, the scribe seems at first to have written Augustine's name in the *Incipit* (f. 301), but subsequently to have erased it and inscribed Prosper's name instead. When he reached the *Explicit* (f. 305) he showed no hesitation, and directly inscribed the name of Prosper of Aquitaine as author. Thereupon, the scribe added his own name, Bartholomeus de Medemblic.

could easily entitle the work *De Praedestinatione* without any reference to the author. Besides, when Hypomnesticon is found in a collection of Augustine's works, as frequently happens, the name of Augustine is given at the beginning of the collection and is occasionally omitted in the *Incipits* of the subsequent individual works.

3. Hypomnesticon is found frequently enough among works of St. Prosper of Aquitaine, e. g. Boulogne-sur-Mer 48; St. Gall 29; Helmingham L. J. VI; Merton 19; Cambridge Ii. i. 29; London, Lambeth 50; Cambridge, Trinity B. 3. 18; Cambridge, Gonville and Caius 69, and when this occurs both Hypomnesticon and one or other of Prosper's works are alike attributed to St. Augustine in practically all cases. This is particularly true of the *Pro Augustino Responsiones ad cap. obj. Vincentianarum* (PL 51, 177-186) of Prosper. Indeed the attribution of this latter to Augustine is so frequent that the work is ascribed to the saint in all the earlier printed editions of his *Opera Omnia*, e. g. Amerbach (1506), Froben (1529), Chevallon (1531) and Lyons (1561).

4. Hypomnesticon is never found in association with the works of Marius Mercator and very rarely with those of any other close disciple of St. Augustine, save Prosper of Aquitaine.

5. The earliest MSS. of Hypomnesticon term the divisions of the work *Responsiones* – not «libri» or «articuli» – and this term was undoubtedly original. Prosper of Aquitaine used the term frequently in his works for their divisions, e. g. *Pro Augustino responsiones ad capitula objectionum Gallorum*; *Pro Augustino responsiones ad capitula objectionum Vincentianarum*; *Pro Augustino responsiones ad excerpta Genuensium*.

Granted, therefore, that Augustine's authorship of Hypomnesticon is excluded on the grounds of the internal arguments – cf. § 1 and § 2 above – the manuscripts suggest some possible association between the work and Prosper of Aquitaine which ought to be examined.

b) *Likely Authors*

Here it is accepted on the basis of the investigation in Chapter III that the date of composition of Hypomnesticon lies between 430 and 435. It is also accepted on the basis of the many arguments put forward from the IXth to the XVIIIth century and discussed in § 1 and § 2 above that Augustine is not the author. On the other hand, whoever the actual author was, he was such a faithful disciple of St. Augustine that the

search must be restricted to the circle of the close followers of St. Augustine's theology: it is obvious, for example, that a Cassian or a Vincent of Lerins ¹, whose principles were uncompromisingly rejected by the author of Hypomnesticon, may be safely excluded from the investigation. It is proposed, therefore, to begin by passing in review a number of writers belonging to the period 430/435 for whom some *prima facie* case can be made, and thereafter, if necessary, to extend the field of inquiry.

Sixtus, presbyter of Rome and later Pope Sixtus III (432-440)

When discussing Garnier's hypothesis regarding the authorship of Hypomnesticon, it was remarked that the case he made for Sixtus was badly presented and that the arguments used to support it were easily refuted. Nevertheless, it was also remarked that the possibility of Sixtus's authorship was not excluded by the untenability of Garnier's assumptions. Thus, for example, it was part of Garnier's hypothesis that Hypomnesticon was written between 418 and 420. This dating must be rejected in favour of that determined in Chapter III above, but there is no evident reason why Sixtus could not have written a work such as Hypomnesticon in or about 430.

It is certain that Sixtus before he became Pope was an active opponent of Pelagianism at Rome at least as early as 418, a fact that is known from two letters, viz. 191 and 194 ², which Augustine addressed to him in that year. It is true, as can be gathered from Augustine's remarks, that rumours had reached Africa some time earlier that Sixtus was a distinguished patron of the Pelagians:

«... qui eorundem inimicorum [Pelagianorum] magni momenti patronus antea iactabatur (*Epist.* 191, n. 1); ³

«... cum fama iactaret inimicis Christianae gratiae te favere» (*Epist.* 194, n. 1) ⁴.

¹ It is unnecessary here to take sides in the debate concerning St. Vincent of Lerins's doctrinal relationship to St. Augustine which may emerge from the dissertation of Dr. W. O'Connor, C.S.Sp., *Saint Vincent of Lerins and St. Augustine. Was the Commonitorium of Saint Vincent of Lerins intended as a Polemic Treatise against Saint Augustine and his Doctrine on Predestination?* (Rome 1964). Even if the conclusions of that dissertation are accepted, there are numerous proofs which could be drawn from it to show that, whatever the nature of the doctrinal relation between St. Vincent and St. Augustine, St. Vincent could not have been the author of Hypomnesticon.

² CSEL 57 (1911) 162-165; 176-214: PL 33, 867-868; 874-891.

³ *Ibid.* 163-164: PL 33, 867.

⁴ *Ibid.* 176: PL 33, 874.

But the stand taken by him at an ecclesiastical gathering in Rome during the course of the year 418 left no doubt about his opposition to the heresy:

«... primo te priorem anathema eis [Pelagianis] in populo frequentissimo pronuntiasset eadem fama non tacuit» (*Epist.* 194, n. 1) ¹.

Then in *Epist.* 191 Augustine speaks in terms of unreserved praise of two anti-Pelagian letters written by Sixtus making clear his position in face of the slanderous reports circulated about him. Of the first of these, a brief letter addressed to Aurelius, Bishop of Carthage, Augustine wrote:

«... brevissimam epistolam tuam, quam de hac ipsa re ad beatissimum senem Aurelium per Leonem acolithum direxisti, exsultanti alacritate descripsimus, et quibus poteramus magno studio legebamus, ubi nobis exposuisti, quid de illo perniciosissimo dogmate vel quid contra de gratia Dei, quam pusillis magnisque largitur, cui est illud inimicissimum, sentias» (*Epist.* 191, n. 1. CSEL 57, 163: PL 33, 867).

And of the second letter, which was addressed to himself, Augustine could say:

«... quanta nos putas ista tua prolixiora scripta vel exultatione legisse vel cura, ut legantur, quibus valuimus, aliis obtulisse atque adhuc, quibus valemus, offerre! Quid enim gratius legi vel audiri potest, quam gratiae Dei tam pura defensio adversus inimicos ejus?» (*Ibid.*) ²

About the zeal and competence of Sixtus, so far as the suppression of Pelagianism was concerned, these letters of Augustine offer every assurance, and there is in consequence an initial presumption in favour of his being capable of producing a work as competent as *Hypomnesticon*. Further, *Epistle* 194, which Augustine wrote by way of reply to Sixtus's second letter, contained an admirably comprehensive account of the problem of grace and free will which was central in the Pelagian debate and it also contained an anticipated treatment of several errors that were to come to a head about eight years later in the Semi-Pelagian movement, e. g. God's prevision of man's merit as the cause of His bestowal of grace (*Ibid.* chapter 8) ³ and the teaching that the 'initium fidei' was dependent on man's free will (*Ibid.* chapters 2, 3 and 5) ⁴.

¹ *Loc. cit.*

² CSEL 57, 163: PL 33, 867.

³ CSEL 57, 203-208: PL 33, 886-888.

⁴ *Ibid.* chapter 2 (CSEL 57, 178-180: PL 33, 875-876); chapter 3 (CSEL 57, 180-188: PL 33, 876-879); chapter 5 (CSEL 57, 190-193: PL 33, 880-882).

Being in possession of such a compendium of doctrine as early as 418, Sixtus would have been prepared long beforehand and in considerable measure for the production of *Hypomnesticon* in or about 430. Indeed the number of parallels that can be remarked between *Epistle 194* and *Hypomnesticon* could be used as a contributory argument in favour of Sixtus's authorship of the work were more probative arguments forthcoming ¹.

The fact that Sixtus became Pope in 432 seems to cause some difficulty, because if Sixtus wrote *Hypomnesticon* he very probably did so before his elevation to the Chair of Peter. The reason is that the Preface contains statements that lack altogether the tone of authority that is rightly distinctive of the Bishops of Rome:

«Si qua vero sunt in quibus nolentes erravimus, si tamen sunt aliqua corrigenda, intuitu caritatis, Deo iudice corrigat; sed is cui sensus est catholicus corrigendi.» (Praefatio)

This is scarcely the language of a Bishop when writing for the benefit of the faithful. Still less is it the language expected of the Bishop of Rome. It would seem therefore that if Sixtus wrote *Hypomnesticon* he most likely did so before 432. However, since the author of *Hypomnesticon* possibly did not disclose his identity when publishing the work, and since Popes may write anonymously, Sixtus's authorship need not necessarily be excluded, even if its likelihood is diminished, were *Hypomnesticon* written after 432.

A greater difficulty is caused by the loss of Sixtus's two letters on Pelagianism of which Augustine made so much and which would doubtless have been invaluable in the present investigation. Worse still, of Sixtus's other writings nothing remains but some letters which he wrote as Pope in connection with the Church in the East. Three of these letters are addressed to Cyril of Alexandria and a fourth to John, Bishop of Antioch, and all four are concerned with the establishment of peaceful relations between these two bishops ². Four other letters deal with the

¹ The fact that *Epistle 194* circulated after its reception by Sixtus and found its way as far as Hadrumetum in north Africa by 426/7 (cf. Augustine's *Epistle 214* n. 3 and 215, n. 3) means that it could have been used as a source by many authors other than Sixtus. Cf. p. 15.

² The three letters addressed to Cyril of Alexandria are in ACO I, i, 7, p. 143-144, n. 100 and n. 101, and ACO I, ii, p. 107-108, n. 30; also in Coustant's collection of Sixtus's correspondence reprinted in Migne, PL 50, 587-590; 583-588; 602-606; cf. Mansi V, 371-380. The letter to John of Antioch is in ACO I, ii, 2, p. 108-110

prerogatives of the Bishop of Thessalonica ¹ and another letter to Flavian of Philippi is concerned with the Council of Ephesus ². The evidence provided by correspondence of this kind is neutral so far as our investigation is concerned. The problems of Pelagianism are never discussed in these letters and their language and style, being adapted to official and administrative affairs, betray no reliable clues that could link the author with any theological work, not to speak of Hypomnesticon. It is true that the imagery of 'naufragium', 'portus', 'gubernacula', and 'caligo propriarum doctrinarum' used by Sixtus in one of the epistles he sent to Cyril of Alexandria is indeed reminiscent of Hypomnesticon, Resp. III, 4; Resp. IV, 6; 8; 9 and Resp. VI, 4, but imagery of this kind is so common in the literature of the period that nothing can be proved from it. Finally, Gennadius, the Vth century French ecclesiastical writer, in his *De viris inlustribus*, omitted all mention of Sixtus's works, other than some letters he wrote in connection with Nestorianism, and so deprived us of a possible source for solving our problem ³.

To sum up: from the evidence available it is impossible to make a plausible case for Sixtus's authorship of Hypomnesticon. Both internal and external evidence are entirely lacking and all that can be concluded from Augustine's comments is that Sixtus was perhaps capable of writing a work of the kind.

Marius Mercator

From the XVIIth century when the matter was mooted for the first time, the suggestion that Marius Mercator was the author of Hypomnesticon received more attention than that made in favour of any other author. Since the arguments for and against the case were given earlier (§ 2 above) it is unnecessary here to do more than discuss a few matters, either omitted or not sufficiently developed by the above-mentioned authors, and then draw some conclusions from the total evidence collected.

Already in 418 Marius Mercator had written two works (lost) against the Pelagians, both of which he sent to St. Augustine and received in

and Mansi V, 379-380 and PL 50, 607-610. Cf. *Regesta Pontificum Romanorum* edited by Ph. Jaffé, 2nd edition (Leipzig 1885-1888) n. 389 ff.

¹ *Epistula ad Perigenen*, Bishop of Corinth (PL 50, 610-611); Epistle to the Synod of Thessalonica (*Ibid.* 611-612); *Epistula ad Proclum*, Bishop of Constantinople (*Ibid.* 612-613); Epistle to the Bishops of Illyricum (*Ibid.* 616-618).

² ACO I, i, 7, p. 143.

³ Cf. chapter 55 of the *De viris inlustribus* of Gennadius, edition of E. C. Richardson, TU 14 (1896) 80: PL 58, 1090A. The text was quoted on page 55, foot-note 4.

return a letter of warm approval (Epist. 193) ¹. In connection with the second of Marius's anti-Pelagian works, Augustine remarked:

«... inveni et alium adversus novos haereticos [Pelagianos] librum refertum sacrarum testimoniis paginarum». (*Ibid.* n. 1) ²; and a little further on he adds: «fateor enim, tantum te profecisse nesciebam». (*Ibid.*) ³

It was precisely with this second anti-Pelagian work of Marius that du Pin sought to identify Hypomnesticon and in doing so he ran into exactly the same difficulty as Garnier did, viz. the anachronism arising from error about the date of composition of the latter work: Marius's work pre-dated Hypomnesticon by at least ten years. Hence du Pin's conjecture as it stands must be abandoned, but it remains to be seen whether Marius could have written the work later.

Among the extant writings of Marius Mercator ⁴ are the two well-known anti-Pelagian works, the *Commonitorium super nomine Caelestii* and the *Commonitorium adversum haeresim Pelagii*. These, together with three epistles and two works against Theodore of Mopsuestia, form a sufficiently wide basis for comparison to evaluate the likelihood of Marius's authorship of Hypomnesticon. The *Comm. super nom. Cael.* appeared in 429 and the *Comm. adv. haer. Pel.* shortly after 430, and both were therefore written about the same time as Hypomnesticon, a fact that makes the comparison between these works particularly informative. From such a comparison, the following conclusions emerge:

Doctrinally, the works manifest considerable divergence, even though the subject treated is basically the same. Thus, for example, Marius finds the whole Pelagian system as represented by Julian of Eclanum summed up in the proposition that the transgression of Adam and Eve did not make them mortal and that their sin was not transmitted to their posterity:

«... tota summa inepti et magis impii Juliani laboris ad unam pravam redigi videtur sententiam: Adae videlicet et Evae transgressionem eos non fecisse mortales, nec noxam eorum ad posteros originaria successione transisse; sola autem imitatione illorum, qui divina mandata contempserit effici reum.» (*Comm. adv. haer. Pel.*, Preface) ⁵

¹ CSEL 57, 167-175: PL 33, 869-874.

² *Ibid.* 168: PL 33, 870.

³ *Loc. cit.*

⁴ MARIUS MERCATOR'S works were published by E. Schwartz in ACO I, V, i (Berlin 1924-1925) nos. 3-36; and also in part by Migne in PL 48.

⁵ *Commonitorium adversum haeresim Pelagii*, Prologus (ACO I, V, i, p. 7: PL 48, 119-120).

For the author of Hypomnesticon, on the other hand, what was central in Pelagianism was the primacy accorded by it to the human will in relation to grace and summed up in the proposition:

«Posse hominem per liberum arbitrium tamquam per se sibi sufficientem implere quod velit, vel etiam meritis operum a Deo gratiam unicuique dari.» (Resp. III, 1 and *passim*)

Preoccupation with the problem of grace and free will is dominant in Hypomnesticon: in Marius Mercator's works it is scarcely developed at all.

Again, the Pelagian propositions enumerated by Marius are different, both in their formulation and number, from those of Hypomnesticon. Thus the propositions:

«Quoniam lex sic mittit ad regnum caelorum quomodo et evangelium» (*Comm. sup. nom. Cael.*, Chapter 1)

«... parvuli qui nascuntur, in eo statu sunt, in quo Adam fuit ante praevaricationem» (*Ibid.*)

«... quoniam et ante adventum domini fuerunt homines inpeccabiles, id est sine peccato» (*Ibid.*)¹

that are encountered in both of Marius's works are not mentioned in Hypomnesticon at all.

Further, the question of 'libido' that is examined so thoroughly in Hypomnesticon is almost entirely ignored by Mercator in his works, and what is more important, when he does mention the topic he shows quite a different understanding of it from that of Hypomnesticon or indeed of Augustine. Marius understood 'libido' to be the innate appetite for procreation that *per se* was morally indifferent and was judged good or evil only according to whether rightly or wrongly used:

«Constat in illis prosatoribus generis humani fuisse libidinem insitam eorum naturae, quam quidem divinae scripturae non, ut tu vis, libidinem solent sed carnis concupiscentiam nominare, de qua illud inplerent *Crescite et multiplicamini et replete terram*» (*Comm. adv. haer. Pel.*, Chapter 5)².

For the author of Hypomnesticon, on the other hand, as well as for Augustine, 'libido' as existing in the actual order of things was an evil whose author was the devil:

¹ *Commonitorium super nomine Caelestii* (ACO *Ibid.* p. 66: PL 48, 69-70). Cf. *Commonitorium adversum haeresim Pelagii*, Prologus (ACO *Ibid.* p. 6: PL 48, 114-116).

² *Commonitorium adversum haeresim Pelagii* (ACO *Ibid.* p. 10: PL 48, 133-134).

«Libido non est naturale bonum in hominibus, sed per peccatum primorum hominum accidens malum atque pudendum, cuius non Deus auctor est sed diabolus.» (Resp. IV, 1) ¹

The problem of Predestination is a subject that is insinuated at the very beginning of *Hypomnesticon*; it arises again in Resp. III, 5 and Resp. V, 5; and it is dealt with explicitly in Resp. VI. In Marius's works the subject is not mentioned at all. These and similar differences weigh heavily against Mercator's authorship of *Hypomnesticon* and so also do the literary and Scriptural differences. Thus the violence and language of Marius's diatribes against Julian of Eclanum in the *Comm. adv. haer. Pel.* are quite unlike anything of which the author of *Hypomnesticon* gives evidence, even though that author is capable of great vehemence. One example taken from chapter 4 of Marius's work will suffice to make this clear:

«Erubescite, infelicissime, in tanta linguae scurrilis vel potius mimicae obscenitate; vulgares tu dignus audire adclamationes: unus tu; unus Filistion, unus Latinorum Lentulus, unus tibi Maryllus comparandus. Namque Martialis et Petronii solus ingenia superas. Te verissime Amsanctinae scaturiginis conregionalis tuae taeterrimus foetor, te Averni lacus nocentissimus halitus, te postremo Atabulus provinciae tuae pestifer flatus inflavit, quibus tot morbis turgidus et male sanus, immo insanus effectus, haec eructuares, haec evomeres, haec exhalares; atque utinam, quia hoc tibi fuisset utilius, vitalem spiritum exhalasses, antequam tam obscena tamque plena dedecoris in puro ore proferres» ².

If this piece of declamation is compared with what is perhaps the strongest passage in *Hypomnesticon*, the difference between the two will be apparent. While Marius recalls Jerome by his violence and classical allusions, *Hypomnesticon*, though certainly vigorous, is never quite so abusive and never makes use of classical comparisons:

«Pergite adhuc per campos loquacitatis vestrae, qua tantae turpitudinis squalorem laudare non erubescitis, et clamate secundum consuetudinem vestram, dicentes, 'Libido calor bonus est genitilis, nec est quod pudeat in ea: quia si malum dicatur, nuptiae jam damnabuntur; sine illa enim non poterit proles existere ...' Fallimini prorsus et fallitis, immo decepti estis et decipitis.» (Resp. IV, 7)

¹ Cf. AUGUSTINE, *Liber de mendacio*, chapter 7 (CSEL 41, 427-429); *De civitate Dei*, 14, 15 (CCL 48, 436-438); *Retractiones* I, 22 (CSEL 36, 104-110).

² *Commonitorium adversum haeresim Pelagii* (ACO I, V, i, p. 9: PL 48, 126-129).

Again mannerisms such as Marius's frequent use of the formula 'Ad haec'¹ when introducing replies to objections which he quotes from Julian are never found in Hypomnesticon however frequently the author of that work quotes objections from his adversaries. Then the term 'prosatores' is quite frequently used by Marius for Adam and Eve², but it is never employed in Hypomnesticon, nor is the term 'protoplastus', so often used for our First Parents in Hypomnesticon, ever found in Marius's writings. Also Marius's occasional parentheses in which he gives the Greek equivalents for some Latin terms find no parallels whatever in Hypomnesticon, e. g. «Ecclesia universalis (quam Graeco sermone catholicam dicimus)»³; «concionatorem (quem Graeci Ecclesiasten nuncupant)»⁴. Marius quotes classical authors rather frequently, e. g. Juvenal⁵, Persius⁶ and Sallust⁷, whereas Hypomnesticon quotes Virgil alone and that but once, viz.

«... nomina mille
... mille nocendi artes.» (*Aeneid* VII, 337-8)

and even then the brief extract he quotes seems to have been frequently used about the time of the author⁸.

A comparison of Scripture quotations reveals a similar disparity between the two authors. For example, Jn. 3, 5 as quoted in *Comm. adv. haer. Pel.* I (ACO I, V, 7: PL 48, 122 C) and 8 (*Ibid.* 15; 152 A) differs from the reading in Resp. V, 5; and the same is true of Jn. 6, 54 as quoted by Marius in chapter 8 of the same work (*Ibid.* 15; 152 B) and by Hypomnesticon in Resp. V, 5. Cf. also Ephes. 2, 4 in the same chapter 8 of Marius's work (*Ibid.* 15; 154 A) and Resp. III, 6; Tit. 3, 4-6 in chapter 1 of Marius's work (*Ibid.* 8; 123 B) and Resp. III, 6.

It would be a simple matter to add considerably to these differences between Marius Mercator's works and Hypomnesticon as regards doc-

¹ Cf. chapter I and *passim*, *Commonitorium adversum haeresim Pelagii* (ACO *Ibid.* p. 7 ff.: PL 48, 121 ff.).

² *Commonitorium adversum haeresim Pelagii* (ACO *Ibid.* p. 10: PL 48, 133; *Ibid.* p. 20: PL 48, 165A; *Ibid.* p. 22: PL 48, 167A).

³ *Op. cit.* (ACO *Ibid.* p. 20: PL 48, 164 A).

⁴ *Op. cit.* (ACO *Ibid.* p. 19: PL 48, 158 D).

⁵ *Op. cit.* (ACO *Ibid.* p. 7: PL 48, 121 A).

⁶ *Op. cit.* (ACO *Ibid.* p. 11: PL 48, 140 A).

⁷ *Op. cit.* (ACO *Ibid.* p. 19: PL 48, 162 A).

⁸ I find the same citation in the contemporaneous Pelagian work, *Epistula magnum cumulatam* (PLS I, 1695), and also in *Epistula 25* (Paulinus and Theresia) *apud* Augustine's Epistles (CSEL 34, i, 79).

trinal, literary and scriptural characteristics, but the points sketched above will suffice to show that Marius's authorship must be definitively rejected.

Quodvultdeus, Bishop of Carthage, 437

As a close disciple of Augustine, Quodvultdeus may be considered worthy of some consideration in connection with the search for the author of Hypomnesticon. However, the difficulties in ascribing the work to this author are insuperable and there seem to be conclusive reasons for denying his authorship. Leaving aside the works of doubtful authenticity¹ and accepting, on the basis of the researches of Dom G. Morin², P. Schepens³, P. D. Franses⁴, and more recently René Braun⁵, against A. D. Nock⁶ and M. Simonetti⁷, that the *Liber promissionum et praedictorum Dei* is authentic, there is ample evidence available from which to draw a reliable conclusion⁸.

First of all, it is to be noted that Quodvultdeus's work presents a theological and religious setting very far removed from that found in Hypomnesticon. The accent in his work is on the Donatists and Maximianists, and there is comparatively little attention given to the Pelagians⁹, and scarcely any at all to the Semi-Pelagians with whom the author of Hypomnesticon is preoccupied. It is true that he speaks of 'indebita gratia' once (Part 1, Chapter 28, PL 51, 755 C), and the phrases: «gratia ... non esset ex operibus: alioquin gratia non esset gratia» (Part 1, Chapter 31, PL 51, 757 B), and «salus nullis praecedentibus meritis» (*Ibid.* Chapter 36, 762 C) are encountered, but these are passing references, without the

¹ M. SIMONETTI denies the authenticity of the twelve sermons attributed to Quodvultdeus and listed in CPL² p. 99-100. Cf. *Rendiconti dell'Istituto Lombardo. Classe di Lettere* 83 (1950) 413-424.

² Cf. RB 31 (1914) 156-162.

³ Cf. RSR 10 (1919) 230-243; *ibid.* 13 (1923) 77.

⁴ *Die Werke des hl. Quodvultdeus* (Munich 1920) 36.

⁵ *Quodvultdeus. Livre des promesses et des prédictions de Dieu*, SC 101, Tome 1 (Paris 1964) 88-113.

⁶ Cf. *Vigiliae Christianae. A review of Early Christian Life and Language*, Amsterdam, 3 (1949) 48 ff.

⁷ *Rendiconti dell'Istituto Lombardo, loc. cit.*

⁸ The work is also found in PL 51, 733-858, and for the sake of convenience the references are given to this source. For the correct title of the work, cf. RENÉ BRAUN, *op. cit.* p. 13-15. We are indebted to him for his dating of the work as well as for his indications relative to Quodvultdeus's style.

⁹ Cf. L. VALENTIN, *Saint Prosper d'Aquitaine* (Toulouse 1900) 657; RENÉ BRAUN, *op. cit.*, p. 20.

emphasis and development that one would expect from the author of Hypomnesticon. The style too is very different. That of Hypomnesticon reveals the language of a militant polemist, vigorous, vehement and trenchant, while that of the *Liber promissionum* manifests a writer of markedly less power and resource, given to exegetical speculations and refinements that are on the whole very different from the usual handling of Sacred Scripture found in Hypomnesticon. Then the expression: «non tantum ... quantum et» with the sense of «non tantum ... sed etiam» that recurs so frequently in Quodvultdeus's work as to be quite distinctive, is never found in Hypomnesticon. The Scripture quotations used by Quodvultdeus have this in common with those of Hypomnesticon that both were taken from more than one version of the Bible, and both authors are acquainted with, and quote from, St. Jerome's translation. Nevertheless, the difference between the two from the point of view of their Scripture quotations is very great, as can be seen from a few illustrations. Thus, as was remarked in Chapter III both authors juxtapose the text of Job 14, 4 in both the Old Latin and Vulgate versions, but several differences can be noticed:

<i>Quodvultdeus</i> (Old Latin)	<i>Hypomnesticon</i> (Old Latin)
Nullus est immunis a sorde nec infans cujus est unius diei super terram. (Part. 1, Chap. 4, PL 51, 737 A)	Quis enim erit mundus a sorde? Ne unus quidem etiam si unius diei fuerit vita eius super terram. (Resp. V, 4)
(Vulgate)	(Vulgate)
Nemo potest facere mundum de immundo conceptum semine, nisi tu qui solus mundus es. (<i>Ibid.</i> 737 A)	Quis potest facere mundum de immundo conceptum semine. Nonne tu qui solus es? (Resp. V, 4)

Similar differences can be noted by comparing the text Gen. 3, 16 as quoted in the Liber, Part 1, Chap. 4 (736 C) and in Hypom. Resp. II, 4; Gen. 3, 17 in the Liber, Part 1, Chap. 5 (737 B) and in Hypom. Resp. II, 1, etc.

Again it would be possible to multiply examples, but to pursue the inquiry further is, from our point of view, superfluous. The evidence already noted seems quite sufficient to establish the conclusion that Quodvultdeus was not the author of Hypomnesticon.

Paulinus of Milan, Deacon (c. 422)

Because of the rôle played by him in the Council of Carthage (415) and referred to in Chapter I, § 1, Paulinus may seem to claim a place among the likely authors of Hypomnesticon. However, the two extant works of Paulinus, viz. the *Vita S. Ambrosii*¹ and the *Libellus adversus Caelestium Zosimo episcopo datus*² lead quite definitely to a negative conclusion. The style and vocabulary as manifested in the two works do not resemble those of Hypomnesticon, and the few expressions that are common are of no significance as they were widely used at the period, e. g. 'fides ecclesiae', 'sensus catholicus'. The *Vita* is a modest production and shows nothing of the force and personality of Hypomnesticon, and the short *Libellus* offers no ground whatever for suspecting that its author also composed Hypomnesticon.

Leo the Great, Pope (440-461)

The hypothesis that Leo the Great was the author of Hypomnesticon has, at first sight, considerable attraction. There are passages in the work – the Preface is an obvious example – whose objective solemnity and power are so redolent of the Roman genius that one would be readily inclined to believe that a Roman writer such as Leo was their author. However, it requires but a brief comparison with Leo's extant sermons (PL 54, 137-468) and his letters (*Ibid.* 593-1218 and E. Schwartz ACO 2) to dispel the illusion. It is true that Leo was a stern opponent of Pelagianism, and we know from Prosper of Aquitaine³ that it was he who alerted Sixtus III in 439 when Julian of Eclanum endeavoured by feigned repentance to enter into communion with the Church:

«Hac tempestate Iulianus Aeclanensis iactantissimus Pelagiani erroris adsertor, quem dudum amissi episcopatus intemperans cupido exagitantabat, multimoda arte fallendi, correctionis speciem praeferens, molitus est in communionem ecclesiae inreperere. Sed his insidiis Xystus papa (diaconi Leonis hortatu) vigilanter occurrens nullum aditum

¹ According to Dom E. DEKKERS (CPL², p. 36) the edition of J. G. Krabinger (Tübingen 1857) is preferable to that of S. Kaniecka (Washington 1928) *Patristic Studies XVI*.

² This is found in the *Collectio Avellana* 47, edited by O. Günther in CSEL 35, i (1895) 108-111 and also in PL 45, 1724 ff.

³ *Chronicon*, edition of Th. Mommsen in *Monumenta Germaniae historica, Auctorum antiquissimorum tomus IX. Chronica minora* (Berlin 1892) Vol. 1, p. 477; PL 51, 598.

pestiferis conatibus patere permisit ...» (*Chronicon*, Mommsen's edition, p. 477: PL 51, 598 B)

We know also that shortly after his election as Pope in 440, Leo gave further evidence of his opposition to Pelagianism. Thus speaking of events that occurred in 443/4, Quodvultdeus in his *Liber promissionum et praedictorum Dei*, Part 4, Chapter 6 wrote:

«In Italia quoque, nobis apud Campaniam constitutis, dum venerabilis et apostolico honore nominandus papa Leo Manichaeos subverteret et conteret Pelagianos et maxime Iulianum ...»¹

And the first two letters of Leo's extant collection likewise reveal his anti-Pelagian zeal. Nevertheless, Hypomnesticon and Leo's extant writings are poles apart. Augustine, who is such a conspicuous source in Hypomnesticon, is detected only with difficulty in Leo's works². Besides, Pelagianism figures but very rarely in the sermons and epistles, and Manichaeism and Nestorianism are concentrated on instead, e. g. Sermons 22, 6; 34, 4-5; 47, 2; 76, 6, etc. Even when dealing with identical themes, the treatment in Hypomnesticon and that in Leo's writing can be extraordinarily different, and perhaps one of the most striking instances of this is the account of Judas's betrayal given in Resp. V, 5 and that found in Leo's Sermon 58³. Granted the difference in the point of view, it is scarcely conceivable that both accounts should stem from the same author.

From the literary point of view the difference is also very marked. The antithetic endings that are of such regular occurrence in Leo's writing are more seldom used in Hypomnesticon. Occasional phrases in Leo find a parallel in Hypomnesticon, e. g. «catholicae fidei integritate servata» (PL 54, 856) and «nostrae fidei integritas comprobetur» (Resp. VI, 1), but these are offset by greater dissimilarities; for example, the enticing imagery of the wolves in sheep's clothing that is used in both his anti-Pelagian letters by Leo is never found in Hypomnesticon. Significant differences are also detectable in the Scripture texts used by the two

¹ RENÉ BRAUN, *op. cit.*, Vol. 2, p. 610: PL 51, 843A. Cf. *op. cit.*, Vol. 1, p. 17.

² Cf. P. BATIFFOL, *Léon I^{er}* (Saint) in DTC 9 (1926) 279: «... on ne voit pas à quels auteurs ecclésiastiques il puise, saint Augustin peut-être excepté»; Y.-M. DUVAL, *Quelques emprunts de S. Léon à S. Augustin*, in *Mélanges de science religieuse* 15 (1958) 85-94; and by the same author, *S. Léon et S. Gaudence de Brescia*, in *Journal of Theological Studies*, New series 11 (1960) 83-84.

³ PL 54, 333-335.

authors. Thus, if the Leonine authorship of the anti-Pelagian Summaries of St. Paul's Epistles is accepted on Dom D. de Bruyne's authority [RB 39 (1927) 45-55], it is found that there is practically no resemblance between the choice of anti-Pelagian texts made by Leo and those of Hypomnesticon. Of twenty-three texts taken from the Epistle to the Romans used in the Summary only five are found in Hypomnesticon. Besides, so far as the Summaries are concerned, there is no correspondence in vocabulary or in doctrine. Briefly, therefore, the question whether Leo was the author of Hypomnesticon must be answered in the negative.

Augustine of Aquileia

The theory of Raab sponsoring the authorship of Augustine of Aquileia and dealt with in Chapter IV, § 2 may be dismissed immediately. Of this Augustine practically nothing is known other than the fact he was Primate of Venice from 414 ¹ and that he died in 422. He could not possibly have been the author of a work composed after 429.

Paulus Orosius

This great admirer of Augustine, active opponent of Pelagianism and author of the *Liber apologeticus contra Pelagianos* (415) ², may likewise be dismissed without delay. His style is not even remotely similar to that of Hypomnesticon. Besides, he disappeared from the scene in 418 and nothing further is heard of him, very likely because he died shortly after that date.

c) The Case for St. Prosper of Aquitaine

In retrospect, it is a cause of considerable surprise that Prosper of Aquitaine was never considered as a possibility in connection with the authorship of Hypomnesticon. Why this was so is not easily explained for whatever superficial differences seemed to dissociate Hypomnesticon from Prosper's works, there were a number of points of contact between the two that should have been noted and should have prompted an in-

¹ Cf. JOHANNES ALBERTUS FABRICIUS, *Bibliotheca Latina mediae et infimae aetatis*, Tome 1 (Reprinted from the *Editio Patavina* of 1754, Florence 1858), p. 141. It was from this author that Raab derived his knowledge about Augustine of Aquileia; cf. *Disquisitio historico-critica de libris Hypognosticon ...* (Altdorf 1735), p. 23.

² C. ZANGEMEISTER, CSEL 5 (1882) 601-664.

quiry. For one thing, both writings were concerned in a special way with Semi-Pelagianism, and both showed a similar militant aggressiveness in their attacks on this heresy; both were intimately penetrated by Augustine's thought even though both showed a certain independence in relation to it. The basic method employed by both was the same, and the style and vocabulary, though showing differences that could well have arisen from their different orientation, were sufficiently alike to call for investigation. For these and similar reasons it is proposed to examine in somewhat greater detail the possibility of Prosper's authorship of *Hypomnesticon*.

α) *The Title*

As a point of departure, there are reasons for taking the title of *Hypomnesticon*. In the extant MSS., the title most often found reads: *Hypomnesticon sancti Augustini episcopi contra Pelagianos et Caelestianos* and, with the possible exception of the word 'sancti', there is no compelling reason to believe that it is not authentic. As the author of the IXth century *Liber de tribus epistulis* remarked, the inclusion of Augustine's name in the title need not necessarily mean that the writer wished it to be thought that his book was actually written by St. Augustine, but simply that it contained a memorandum of Augustine's teaching against the Pelagians and Celestians (Cf. Chapter IV, § 1). This is all the more likely as the work seems to have appeared shortly after Augustine's death, when the publication of such a work would have been of particular significance. In this way, *Hypomnesticon Augustini episcopi* would readily find its place among a number of works of St. Prosper of Aquitaine which likewise have Augustine's name in their titles and were in consequence for a time considered, just as was *Hypomnesticon*, as products of St. Augustine's pen, e.g. *Epigrammata in obtrectatorem Augustini* (PL 51, 149-152); *Pro Augustino responsiones ad capitula objectionum Gallorum calumniantium* (PL 51, 155-174); *Pro Augustino responsiones ad capitula objectionum Vincentianarum* (*Ibid.* 177-186); *Pro Augustino responsiones ad excerpta Genuensium* (*Ibid.* 187-202); *Sententiae ex operibus sancti Augustini* (*Ibid.* 427-496); *Epigrammata ex sententiis sancti Augustini* (*Ibid.* 497-532). And the fact that Greek or Greek-sounding titles head several of Prosper's works, e.g. *Περὶ ἀχαρίστων* (*Carmen de ingratis*), the two *Epigrammata* and the *Chronicon*¹ is an added reason why *Hypomnesticon* would not

¹ Cf. CPL² p. 119-121.

seem out of place among them. The titles, then, of these works of Prosper and that of Hypomnesticon already show a possible link between the two and they also show a similar preoccupation with the teaching of St. Augustine that may well be indicative of a deeper relationship. Even the word 'Responsiones' which finds its place in several titles of Prosper's works is the term used by the author of Hypomnesticon for the six divisions of his work. This is not without significance because the more usual title for divisions such as those in Hypomnesticon would have been 'libri' or 'partes' ¹. So much is this the case that in all the editions and even in some MSS. dating from the XIth century, e. g. Montecassino 162, the parts of Hypomnesticon are incorrectly called 'libri' and 'articuli'. So much for the titles of the whole and of the parts. It is now time to discuss the doctrinal content.

β) *A Doctrinal Comparison*

Before examining the doctrinal relationship between Hypomnesticon and Prosper's writings, it is necessary to throw into relief the limits that circumscribe the debate. First of all, the works of Prosper which are generally acknowledged as authentic ², and whose authenticity is accepted here, are concerned almost exclusively, not with Pelagianism as such, but either directly with Semi-Pelagianism or with problems in some way associated with that heresy. Specifically Pelagian problems are dealt with only incidentally, except in the *Carmen de ingratiss*, whereas in Hypomnesticon five out of the six Responsiones are devoted, at least ostensibly, to purely Pelagian errors, with the additional sixth Responsio alone catering directly for Semi-Pelagian problems. This means that the area of doctrinal comparison between Hypomnesticon and Prosper's works seems to be limited on Hypomnesticon's side very largely to the rather short sixth Responsio ³.

On the side of Prosper's works, there is also a limitation, this time

¹ Cf. RENÉ BRAUN, *op. cit.*, p. 25, n. 2.

² These works are listed in CPL² p. 119-121. Prosper's works are also published in PL 51. For the *Praeetitorium sedis apostolicae episcoporum auctoritates de gratia Dei et libero voluntatis arbitrio*, the edition of P. and H. Ballerini in *S. Leonis opera* II (Venice 1756) 251-257 is to be preferred. The *De vocatione omnium gentium* is also in the *S. Leonis opera*, viz. Tome II, 167-249, but as Ballerini is not readily available, the Migne references will be given for convenience. The authenticity of the *Auctoritates* and of the *De vocatione* is accepted as established by Dom M. CAPPUYNS; cf. RB 39 (1927) 198-226; *ibid.* 41 (1929) 156-170.

³ It will be shown presently that there are means of overcoming this difficulty.

arising from the fact that his theology underwent an evolution after Augustine's death ¹, and though it remained faithful to the great bishop's teaching on most points, it tended to diverge from his views on the problem of God's salvific will and also on the problem of predestination. Hence, those works of Prosper that were written several years after Hypomnesticon will naturally tend to be less reliable as a basis for doctrinal comparison than those written in or about the same time as the latter work. In practice, this means that the works of Prosper written before the *De gratia et libero arbitrio contra Collatorem* (PL 51, 213-276) will be of greater service for purposes of doctrinal comparison. Such works are the *Epistula ad Rufinum de gratia et libero arbitrio* (*Ibid.* 77-90); *Epistula ad Augustinum* (*Ibid.* 67-71; CSEL 57, 454-468); and the three *Pro Augustino responsiones*, together, of course, with the *Carmen de ingratis*. ²

A final limitation arises from the basic identity which is found in both Hypomnesticon and the earlier works of Prosper vis-à-vis the doctrine of St. Augustine. As a result of this, coincidences of doctrine between Hypomnesticon and Prosper tend to constitute, where Augustine is obviously a common source, a negative criterion only: it is clear that a book showing notable divergencies from Augustine's thought and originating about 430 would scarcely have been written by Prosper of Aquitaine, while a book containing pure Augustinian doctrine could be doctrinally indistinguishable from Prosper's works and yet not belong to him. However, it is possible to circumvent this difficulty in consider-

¹ Cf. L. VALENTIN, *S. Prosper d'Aquitaine* (Toulouse 1900) 386-394; E. PORTALIÉ, *Augustinisme (Développement historique de l')* in DTC I (1903) 2525-2526; M. CAPPUYNS, *art. cit.* in RB 39 (1927) 202; L. CAPÉLAN, *Le problème du salut des infidèles* (Toulouse 1934) 135-144; J. R. O'DONNELL, *Prosper of Aquitaine, Grace and Free Will* (The Fathers of the Church, Vol. 7) (New-York 1949) 335 ff. Capéran seems to deny the evolution in Prosper's thought that is in question.

² I accept the following approximate dates of composition for the works of Prosper with which we are primarily concerned: *Epistula ad Rufinum de gratia et libero arbitrio* (426/428); *Epistula ad Augustinum* (428/429); *Carmen de ingratis* (428/430); the three *Pro Augustino responsiones* (431/434); *De gratia et libero arbitrio contra Collatorem* (433/434); *Praetervitorum Sedis Apostolicae episcoporum auctoritates de gratia* (435/442); *Expositio Psalmorum a 100^o usque ad 150^m* (c. 440); *De vocatione omnium gentium* (c. 450). Cf. L. VALENTIN, *Saint Prosper d'Aquitaine* (Toulouse 1900) 156-204; M. SCHANZ, *Geschichte der römischen Literatur* IV, ii (Munich 1920) 496-498; G. BARDY, *Prosper d'Aquitaine* (Saint) in DTC 13, i (1936) 846-850; B. ALTANER, *Patrologie*, 6th edition (Freiburg im Br. 1960) 414-415; B. FISCHER, *Vetus Latina. Die Reste der altlateinischen Bibel 1/1 Verzeichnis der Sigel für Kirchenschriftsteller*, 2nd edition (Freiburg im Br. 1963) 436-438.

able measure by concentrating particularly on those aspects of doctrine that are given a distinctively Prosperian turn even though they remain in close conformity with Augustine's thought.

1. *The Organic Bond between Pelagianism and Semi-Pelagianism*

One conspicuous feature of Prosper's teaching is his preoccupation with the danger of the resurgence of the Pelagian heresy even though it had been defeated by conciliar decrees and the writings of St. Augustine, and his conviction that where even a small germ of that heresy is allowed to survive – as happened, according to Prosper, in the case of Semi-Pelagianism – the entire Pelagian organism must necessarily reappear. This preoccupation is particularly evident in the *Carmen de ingratis*, and it is there given expression in the lines:

«... tota nefandae
Haereseos summa exigua sub parte tegatur
De qua plena mali labes renovetur et omne
Commenti corpus per singula membra resurgat». (PL 51, 106)

and the same thought is repeated in the *Contra Collatorem*, chapter 21:

«Quia notum est, ita falsitatis istius haberi versutias, ut si ei liceat praetenta correctionis imagine aliquod sibi faventem radicis suae germen excipere totam se possit in exigua sui parte reparare». (*Ibid.* 273; cf. n. 1)

and with particular reference to Cassian the idea is found in the same book, chapter 11:

«Ecce jam in ista paucorum brevitate verborum, non duarum tantum, sed multarum impietatum numerosa connexio est: quae si scrupulosioris diligentiae discretionem tractetur, in nullo a damnati erroris catena absoluta monstrabitur». (*Ibid.* 243 B)

and again in chapter 16:

«Et exigua conclusione pene totum Pelagianum dogma confirmas». (*Ibid.* 259 B)

That this conception was peculiar to Prosper seems to be evident from a statement which he made in what is one of his earliest extant writings, viz. his *Epistula ad Augustinum*:

«Unde si in istis Pelagianae reliquiis pravitatis non mediocris virulentiae fibra nutritur, si principium salutis male in homine conlocatur, si divinae voluntati impie voluntas humana praefertur ... receptionem boni non a summo bono, sed a semetipso inchoare male creditur». (CSEL 57, 465; PL 51, 72 C)

This danger, thought Prosper, called particularly for attention at a time when victory over Pelagianism had been achieved. Lulled into a false sense of security by this very victory, the faithful could be all the more easily deceived:

«Ne post confectum celebris victoria bellum
Securos animos incauta pace resolvat». (PL 51, 93)

And later, referring to that same victory and its sequel he adds:

«Jamque procellosae disjecto turbine noctis
Heu! nova bella, novi partus oriuntur in ipso
Securae matris gremio». (*Ibid.* 103)

In Hypomnesticon the same preoccupation is sensed, and the need of being roused from the sleep of complacency in face of Pelagianism is forcibly suggested in the words:

«Nos quodammodo excitant dormientes ut ... vigilemus Evangelica tuba nostris auribus insonante: *Vigilate ...*» (Preface)

– an idea that is strikingly repeated in a broader context in Prosper's *De vocatione omnium gentium*, Book 2, chapter 28:

«... numquam debet in auribus fidelium vox illa Domini non sonare qua Apostolis dicitur: *Vigilate*». (*Ibid.* 713 B)

The plan devised by Prosper in the *Carmen de ingratis* was to show the origin of the Semi-Pelagian errors in pure Pelagianism and in this way forewarn his readers of the danger they incurred by any tolerance whatever in regard to the apparently innocuous Semi-Pelagian principles:

«Unde igitur commenta mali sopita resurgant,
Quemve ipso de fine dolum nova promat origo,
Da fari, Pater omnipotens, artemque malignam
Pandere, prostratus qua rursus nititur error». (*Ibid.* 93)

And that the Semi-Pelagians are primarily envisaged is made sufficiently clear from the opening lines:

«Unde voluntatis sanctae subsistat origo,
Unde animis pietas insit, et unde fides:
Adversum ingratos falsa et virtute superbos
Centenis decies versibus excolui». (*Ibid.* 91)

In Hypomnesticon, on the other hand, the enemies to be fought are referred to as Pelagians and Celestians, but the author soon shows that these names are to be taken in a sufficiently wide sense to include the Semi-Pelagians. Indeed, by the very terms he uses to designate the heretics to be refuted he already, in some measure, shows the orientation of his thought towards the Semi-Pelagians:

«Igitur contra Pelagianos et Caelestianos haereticos quos Deus tales futuros suo vitio ante constitutionem mundi praescivit et exortos in mundo iudicio iusto damnavit, sermo nobis est respondendi». (Praefatio)

The allusion here to God's foreknowledge 'ante constitutionem mundi' of the heretics' conduct, and His predetermining, by a just judgement, of corresponding punishment for their crime, is typical of the Semi-Pelagian debate. An allusion to the point occurs again in Responsio V, 7:

«Vos videbat praescientia sua futuros haereticos, vosque increpat in Apostolis suis ...» (*Loc. cit.*)

and the question arises for detailed examination in Responsio VI, 2 and *passim*.

Just as Prosper in the *Carmen* outlines the central Pelagian errors, refutes them and shows their intimate relation with Semi-Pelagianism, the author of Hypomnesticon expounds and refutes the principal Pelagian doctrines, but at the same time, whenever the occasion presents itself, he pursues the discussion beyond the confines of pure Pelagianism into the realm of Semi-Pelagianism and thereby shows implicitly the same organic relationship between the two systems that is explicitly indicated in the *Carmen de ingratis*. Indeed the synthetic development is so complete in Hypomnesticon that the work contains as much an exposition and refutation of Semi-Pelagianism as of Pelagianism, as will be made abundantly clear in the course of this essay.

The differences between the poem and the prose work are necessarily very great, and there is a full-scale development in the latter that could not be expected in a poetic medium, but there is in the basic plan of the *Carmen* and Hypomnesticon an extensive and synthetic confrontation

of Pelagianism and Semi-Pelagianism that is unique in the anti-Pelagian literature of the period. It seems to derive from a common inspiration, and may perhaps be explained by common authorship.

2. The proposition: Gratia secundum merita hominum dari

Another characteristic of Prosper's teaching is his emphasis on the proposition: «Gratia Dei secundum merita hominum dari» as being central in the entire Pelagian system:

«Ex his [venenis Pelagianis] una est blasphemia, nequissimum et subtilissimum germen aliarum qua dicunt *Gratiam Dei secundum merita hominum dari.*» (*Epist. ad Ruf. Ibid. 77 B*)

«Si enim consideremus Pelagianae argumenta perfidiae, quid magis nititur obtinere quam ut videatur gratia Dei secundum merita nostra dari?» (*Pro Augustino resp. ad excerpta Genuensium. Ibid. 190 B*)

The author of Hypomnesticon shows perfect agreement with this point of view. For him also this proposition is by far the most important. Among the five Pelagian propositions chosen by him for discussion, this one literally occupies the central place, and it is given there a development that is twice as long as that given to any of the others. Not merely that, but the recurring phrases 'gratuita gratia'; 'indebita gratia'; 'gratia praeveniens'; 'gratia praecedens' together with the pervading references to grace throughout the entire work are a conclusive proof that as regards the proposition, «Gratia Dei secundum merita dari», both Prosper and the author of Hypomnesticon held identical views. And it should be remarked that this fact gains perhaps in significance when it is recalled that another contemporaneous anti-Pelagian writer, Marius Mercator, considered the proposition denying the transmission of Original Sin and its being the cause of man's mortality as the most important one in Pelagianism; cf. *Commonitorium adversum haeresim Pelagii*, Prologus (ACO I, V, i, 7: PL 48, 119-120).

3. Predestination as applied to the nations

A recurring feature in Prosper's works is his concern with the question of Predestination as applied to the nations. It was a problem raised by the Semi-Pelagians of southern France, as Prosper indicates in his *Epistula ad Augustinum*:

«Hanc sane de humanis meritis praescientiam Dei, secundum quam gratia vocantis operetur, multo sibi rationabilius videntur adstruere, cum ad earum nationum contemplationem venit, quae vel in praeteritis saeculis dimissae sunt ingredi vias suas.» (CSEL 57, 462; PL 51, 71 B)

In the *Epistula ad Rufinum*, Prosper brings the point up again and there uses it to rebut the Semi-Pelagian objection that his teaching runs counter to I Tim. 2, 4:

«Numquid non sunt de omnibus hominibus qui a praeteritis generationibus usque in hoc tempus sine Dei cognitione perierunt?» (PL 51 85 A)

Likewise, it is encountered in the *Carmen de ingratis* (*Ibid.* 111); *Pro Augustino responsiones ad capitula object. Gallorum*, 8 (*Ibid.* 162 B); *Pro Augustino responsiones ad excerpta Genuensium*, 6 (*Ibid.* 194 D); and with interesting developments in the *De vocatione omnium gentium*, Book I, chapters 5; 11; 13; 21; Book II, chapters 4 and 9 (*Ibid.* 652 A; 663 B; 666 A; 674 B; 689 C; 694 C).

Here we have a distinctive and persistent feature that is all the more significant in that it does not occur in the context of the Pelagian controversy in St. Augustine. Yet, it does occur in Hypomnesticon (Responsio VI, 3) in connection with exactly the same problem of predestination, and there, as was remarked earlier, it is associated immediately with Acts 14, 15 and Ps 134, 4, just as happens in Prosper's *Pro Augustino responsiones ad cap. obj. Gallorum*, 8 (*Ibid.* 162 B), a combination of texts found in no other patristic Latin writing, and used in connection with the same distinctive problem. Not merely that, but there is another text peculiar to Prosper when dealing with this problem, viz. Acts 16, 6; cf. *Epistula ad Rufinum*, 14 (*Ibid.* 85 D); *Contra Collatorem*, 12 (245 B); *De vocatione omnium gentium*, Book 2, chapter 3 (*Ibid.* 689 A). Again the text does not occur in this context in St. Augustine, but it does occur in connection with precisely the same problem in Hypomnesticon.

The correspondence extends even further. In connection with the question of God's mysterious choice of one nation among many in which to realize His salvific plan, Prosper raises the wider question of the variation observable in the divine plan of salvation, not merely in regard to different peoples, but also in regard to different times. It would even appear, thinks Prosper, that this variation arose from God's inability to bestow His mercy simultaneously on all nations, and that it was only because of the infidelity of Israel that He was able to provide for the

Gentiles (666 A). Once more Hypomnesticon reproduces exactly the same thought (Responsio VI, 3). In fact, the converging elements in both Prosper and Hypomnesticon are so similar in this entire question, and at the same time, in their conjunction, so entirely absent from contemporary writers, that they leave no room for doubt about the intimate relationship between Prosper and Hypomnesticon. To set this correspondence forth in clearer relief, we subjoin in parallel columns the views of Hypomnesticon (Responsio VI, 3) and Prosper (*De vocatione omnium gentium*, Book I, chapter 13. *Ibid.* 666)¹:

Hypomnesticon

1. Pandite itaque quo iudicio ... in praeteritis generationibus dimisit omnes gentes ingredi vias suas (Acts 14,15), ut in idolatria simulacrorum perirent; et unam tantum gentem, id est, Iacob elegit sibi Dominus et Israel in possessionem sibi (Ps. 134, 4); cui soli utique legem ad cognoscendum se, postpositis, ut dixi, ceteris generationibus dedit:
2. vel cur iterum amissio facta est Iudaeorum, ut mundi fieret reconciliatio, id est, omnium gentium, sicut dicit Apostolus: Si enim amissio eorum reconciliatio est mundi, quae assumptio eorum nisi vita ex mortuis? (Rom. 11,15)
3. Quasi impossibile erat Deo omnipotenti uno tempore universo mundo legem dare, salutem gratiae Christi conferre;
4. [quasi impossibile erat] ab initio lapsus Adae id agere, quod diversitate temporum fieri ejus arbitrio sedit.

Prosper

1. Cur scilicet anterioribus saeculis dimissae essent omnes gentes ingredi vias suas (Acts 14,15), uno tantum Israele, qui divinis eloquiis erudiretur (cf. Ps. 134, 4), excepto, et ad cognitionem veritatis electo;
2. cujus infidelitas locum tandem salvandis gentibus fecerit: ... Cur denique ipsi quorum diminutio salus gentium est (Rom. 11,12), ab obcaecatione sua non liberentur priusquam ingrediatur gentium plenitudo? (Rom. 11,25)
3. tamquam si unus populus in fide sui generis permaneret, misericordia Dei caeteris se nationibus praestare non posset ...
4. quasi illuminari cum omnibus nequeant qui omnes, facta omnium gentium adoptione, salvandi sunt; ... locum dabat multimodae quaestioni, ut variatae per tot populos ac tempora gratiae Dei causa quaeretur.

¹ The sequence of the ideas in Prosper's text is not identical with that of Hypomnesticon. I have rearranged Prosper's passages, as found in PL 51, 666A and B, to facilitate the comparison.

The tendency of Prosper to contract in the *De vocatione omnium gentium* what is found expanded in the earlier work can be clearly observed in Number 1 of the columns. If the comparison were prolonged and the columns extended, it would become evident that the *De vocatione* adds developments after Number 4 that are missing in Hypomnesticon – a fact that argues in favour of the later date of the *De vocatione*.

4. A Semi-Pelagian objection against Augustine's doctrine on Predestination

Another doctrinal preoccupation peculiar to Prosper of Aquitaine emerges also in Hypomnesticon in substantially the same manner. Since the matter was discussed earlier (Chapter III) in connection with the date of composition, it is unnecessary to do more here than recall its salient features. The Semi-Pelagians of southern France had argued that all effort on the part of both the predestined and the reprobate was absurd on Augustine's principles, for if predestined to glory, the former need do nothing to be saved, and if abandoned by God to everlasting doom, the latter can do nothing to avert their fate. The same problem, couched in even more concrete terms, is a cause of considerable concern also to the author of Hypomnesticon. He discusses it at length in the sixth *Responsio* in a manner that re-echoes that of Prosper, and in doing so shows once more a relationship between the two.

5. Grace does not destroy Freedom of the Will

Again, Prosper concentrated particular attention on the objection that Augustinian teaching on grace virtually meant the denial of freedom of the will. In the *Epistula ad Rufinum*, 3, he formulates the calumny in the following terms:

«... scripta ejus [Augustini] quibus error Pelagianorum impugnatur, infamant [Semi-Pelagiani], dicentes eum liberum arbitrium penitus submovere, et sub gratiae nomine necessitatem praedicare fatalem.» (*Ibid.* 79 A)

And in the *Epistula ad Augustinum*, listing the problems which he wished Augustine to handle, Prosper mentioned the present one in the second place:

«Ac primum, quia plerique non putant Christianam fidem hac dissensione violari, quantum periculi sit in eorum persuasione patefacias; deinde, quo modo per istam praeoperantem et cooperantem gratiam liberum non impediatur arbitrium.» (CSEL 57, 466; PL 51 73 A)

In the *Contra Collatorem*, 6, the same preoccupation is expressed:

«Non est periculum liberi arbitrii ex gratia Dei, nec voluntas aufertur, cum in ipsa bene velle generatur.» (PL 51, 229 B)

And also in chapter 8 of the same work:

«Hac regula [fidei et gratiae] nulli hominum aufertur voluntas; quia virtus gratiae non hoc in voluntatibus operatur ut non sint, sed ut ex malis bonae, et ex infidelibus sint fideles.» (*Ibid.* 234-235)

Hypomnesticon voices exactly the same problem, and deals with it in exactly the same way. Indeed the correspondence is so close here as to point very decisively at least to common inspiration. Right from the commencement of his treatment of grace and free will in *Responsio III* the author insists on the freedom of the human will in relation to grace, and throughout gives repeated expression to the same theme:

«Igitur liberum arbitrium hominibus esse, certa fide credimus, et praedicamus indubitanter.» (*Resp.* III, 3)

«Est fatemur liberum arbitrium omnibus hominibus habens iudicium rationis.» (*Ibid.* 4)

«Est igitur liberum arbitrium, quod quisque esse negaverit catholicus non est.» (*Ibid.* 10)

«Quomodo autem unicuique secundum sua opera redderetur in die iudicii, nisi liberum esset arbitrium?» (*Ibid.*)

«Nolite itaque putare quod haec et huiusmodi dicentes, liberum voluntatis amputemus arbitrium, cum tamen constet ea quae loquimur, ex auctoritate divina pendere.» (*Resp.* VI, 7)

This does not mean that the primacy of grace is in any way impaired either in *Hypomnesticon* or in *Prosper*. On the contrary, it is equally affirmed and admirably maintained in both, but what is common is the anxiety lest freedom of the will should appear to be destroyed by grace. For Augustine, on the other hand, what was dominant was rather the fear lest grace should appear to be destroyed by freedom of the will.

6. Faith a gift of God

Characteristic also of *Prosper* is his insistence on the entirely gratuitous character of faith. This is scarcely surprising because the Semi-Pelagians had been claiming that the initial acceptance of faith, the 'initium fidei', was within the power of man's free will, and in so doing they undermined

the theology of grace and opened up the way for the return of Pelagianism. Augustine, on being informed of this error by Hilary, the friend of Prosper, devoted chapters 2 to 8 of the *De praedestinatione sanctorum* to the problem.

Prosper, in his turn, reverted to the question time and time again, e. g. *Pro Augustino responsiones ad cap. Gallorum*, 14 (*Ibid.* 169-170); *Ibid. sententia super xiv* (*Ibid.* 174 A); *Pro Augustino responsiones ad excerpta Genuensium III - V* (*Ibid.* 189 C - 194 A); *Contra Collatorem*, 16 and 17 (*Ibid.* 260-262) and in the *De vocatione omnium gentium*, Book I, chapters 23 and 24 (*Ibid.* 676-685). Granted the importance of this question in the Semi-Pelagian controversy, there is nothing particularly significant about the frequency of Prosper's allusions to it, and granted Augustine's developed treatment of the problem in the *De praedestinatione sanctorum*, it is to be expected that Prosper would use him as a source, but what is significant is an association of texts found in Prosper's treatment of the problem which is absent from that of St. Augustine. It is the association of Matt. 16, 13-17 with Ephes. 2, 8. Cf. *De vocatione omnium gentium*, Book I, chapter 23 (*Ibid.* 678 A-C); *Ibid.* Book 2, chapter 27 (*Ibid.* 712 C).

In Hypomnesticon, the same problem of faith as a gift of God is analysed and is given a developed treatment in Resp. III, 14-15. The doctrine is identical with that of Prosper, which in its turn is identical with that of Augustine; but what is most significant is the fact that in Hypomnesticon, Matt. 16, 13-17 is also associated with Ephes. 2, 8 as in Prosper's account. Hence we encounter here once more an agreement between Prosper and Hypomnesticon on a point that is independent of St. Augustine, and to be found in no other known source.

7. *Naturally good acts*

L. Valentin in his monumental work on St. Prosper of Aquitaine has satisfactorily shown that the saint tended progressively to avoid the harsh terminology of Augustine when dealing with the naturally good acts of unbelievers¹. While emphasizing the valuelessness of these acts in relation to the supernatural life, and while occasionally using in their regard derogatory terms similar to those of Augustine, in order to insist on the surpassing excellence of grace, Prosper tends, perhaps, in his

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 383-385.

development of this theme to make a contribution to Augustine's teaching. Thus in the *Contra Collatorem* 10, speaking of the naturally good effects produced in pagan society by its laws and customs, he writes:

«... quis ambigat, hanc sapientiam humano generi ad temporalis vitae utilitatem, ex naturae a Deo conditae superesse reliquii? Si enim nec ad ista terrena ordinanda rationalis animi vigeret ingenium, non vitiata esset, sed extincta natura. Quae tamen etiamsi excellentissimis artibus, et cunctis mortalium eruditionum polleat disciplinis, justificari ex se non potest.» (*Ibid.* 241 A)

Prosper returns to the same theme in chapter 12 of the same work:

«Naturae quippe humanae, cujus creator est Deus, etiam post praevariationem manet substantia, manet forma, manet vita, et sensus, et ratio, caeteraque corporis atque animi bona, quae etiam malis vitiiosisque non desunt: sed non in his habet veri boni perceptionem, quae mortalem vitam honestare possunt, aeternam autem conferre non possunt.» (*Ibid.* 246 A)

And in chapter 13:

«Nec ideo aestimare debemus in naturalibus thesauris principia esse virtutum, quia multa laudabilia reperiuntur etiam in ingeniis impiorum. Quae ex natura quidem prodeunt; sed quoniam ab eo qui naturam condidit recesserunt, virtutes esse non possunt.» (*Ibid.* 250 A)

Finally, in the *De vocatione omnium gentium*, Book I, chapter 4, we read:

«... humana ingenia etiam si corporeae voluptati non turpiter serviant, et cupiditates suas justitiae atque honestatis legibus temperent, nihil supra mercedem gloriae temporalis acquirunt; et cum praesentem vitam decenter exornent, aeternae tamen beatitudinis praemium non habent.» (*Ibid.* 650C-651A)

The author of *Hypomnesticon* shows in this matter views identical with those of Prosper, but his concrete elaboration of the theme, and the omission of the wider perspective found in the *Contra Collatorem* and *De vocatione omnium gentium* may be another indication of *Hypomnesticon*'s anteriority in relation to these two works:

«Est, fatemur, liberum arbitrium omnibus hominibus ... non per quod sit idoneum quae ad Deum pertinent, sine Deo aut inchoare aut certe peragere: sed tantum in operibus vitae praesentis, tam bonis quam etiam malis. Bonis dico, quae de bono naturae oriuntur, id est, velle laborare in agro, velle manducare et bibere, velle habere amicum, velle habere indumenta, velle fabricare domum ...» (Resp. III, 4)

As it stands in its fully expanded form, Hypomnesticon's exposition of this doctrine is remarkable, and the fact that St. Thomas chose an extract from the above passage when dealing with the Question: «Utrum homo possit mereri vitam aeternam sine gratia» (*Summ. Theol.* Ia IIae, Q. 109, a. 5) is a sufficient indication of its value:

«Et ideo sine gratia homo non potest mereri vitam aeternam. Potest tamen facere opera perducentia ad aliquod bonum homini connaturale, sicut *laborare in agro, bibere, manducare, et habere amicum*, et alia huiusmodi, ut Augustinus dicit in tertia responsione contra Pelagianos». (*Loc. cit.*)

Here the author of Hypomnesticon shows in relation to St. Augustine a certain degree of independence and originality which, in greater or lesser measure according to the subjects treated, pervades his entire work, and thereby reveals in it a trait that is also characteristic of Prosper of Aquitaine. Quite definitely, the author of Hypomnesticon gives no signs of being a mere disciple of Prosper: he seems very like his equal, and one is led perhaps to suspect that he is the same person.

8. God's salvific will

It was remarked earlier in this chapter that Prosper of Aquitaine's teaching concerning God's salvific will underwent an evolution after St. Augustine's death, and in Chapter III, the curve of the change was outlined. Because of such an evolution, comparison between Prosper and Hypomnesticon on this doctrinal issue must be limited on Prosper's side to those works which he wrote in or about the same time as the date of composition of Hypomnesticon, i. e. around 430. Agreement or disagreement within these limits will be of importance for the investigation in hand.

Already in his *Epistula ad Augustinum* (428/429), Prosper brings up the problem of God's salvific will for discussion, and there shows the identity between his thought and that of Hypomnesticon. In drawing up a list of Semi-Pelagian errors, he includes one proposition advocating God's universal salvific will:

«... bonitas [Dei] in eo appareat, si neminem repellat a vita, sed indifferenter *universos velit salvos fieri et in agnitionem veritatis venire.*» (CSEL 57, 460: PL 51, 70 C)

Also in the early work, *Pro Augustino responsiones ad cap. Gallorum, Sententia super* 8, Prosper uses a formula which is almost identical with that of Hypomnesticon used in connection with the same question:

«... ut et qui salvantur, ideo salvi sint, quia illos voluit Deus salvos fieri.» (Prosper: PL 51, 172 B)

«... quapropter omnes homines qui salvantur, Deo volente salvantur.» (Resp. VI, 8)

That Augustine is a common source here is obvious, and the formulae quoted derive from him, but the important point is that Prosper and Hypomnesticon agree on an issue which is later to undergo modification in Prosper's thought and expression. Then the use of the word 'salvantur' in both Prosper's and Hypomnesticon's formulae for the 'salvi fiunt' which alone occurs, to my knowledge, in Augustine's formulations of the same idea, may indicate a close relationship between Prosper's earlier works and Hypomnesticon. Cf. Augustine's *Epist.* 186, 1 and *Epist.* 217, 6; *De praedestinatione sanctorum* 8, 14; *De correptione et gratia* 14, 44; *Contra Julianum*, IV, 8. Besides, a comparison between Prosper's formula as used in the *Pro Augustino resp. ad cap. Gallorum* and one which he produced later in the *De vocatione omnium gentium* will underline the significance of the similarity between Prosper's and Hypomnesticon's formulae compared above. This later formula reads:

«Qui ad Deum per Deum veniunt, et salvari volentes omnino salvantur.» (Book 1, chap. 9. *Ibid.* 658 B)

The shift of emphasis from 'Deo volente' and 'quia voluit Deus' of the earlier formulae to 'qui volentes' of the later one indicates the direction in which Prosper's thought regarding God's salvific will tended.

9. *The rôle of heresy in relation to the Church*

In their handling of this problem, there is found between Prosper and Hypomnesticon a triple agreement. First, both are agreed on the destructive effect which heresy, and particularly the Pelagian heresy, exerts within the Church. Thus Prosper, in the *Epistula ad Rufinum* I, writes:

«Pelagiana... haeresis, quo dogmate catholicam fidem destruere adorta sit.» (*Ibid.* 77 B)

and Hypomnesticon:

[Pelagiana haeresis]: «dogma per quod scinditur matris unitas ecclesiae.» (Praefatio)

[Pelagiani]: «evacuare thesauros fidei concertant.» (*Ibid.*)

Secondly, both are also agreed that heresy indirectly redounds, under

God's providence, to the benefit of the Church. To this effect Prosper writes:

«... quaeritur an de istis quos a vera religione impius error avertit aliquid boni profectibus sanctorum et incrementis Ecclesiae providentia divina contulerit.» (*Ibid.* 168 B)

and in the reply, among other things, he says:

«De illis quoque erroribus consulens nobis Dei bonitas sentiat, quos Deus in Ecclesia contra Ecclesiam permisit exurgere ... per ipsos diligentiam filiorum suorum ad inquisitionem et custodiam veritatis exercens.» (*Ibid.* 168 C)

The author of *Hypomnesticon*, in his turn, reveals very much the same mind when he writes:

«... faciunt [haeretici] plenitudine fidei ecclesiam, opitulante gratia gloriari.» (Praefatio)

«Nos quodammodo excitant dormientes ut, arrepto clipeo veritatis, falsitatibus eorum corde resistere vigilemus.» (*Ibid.*)

Thirdly, they are both agreed that heresy is an evil to be fought and overcome by means of the power or weapon of truth. In this sense, Prosper, writing to Augustine, uses the phrase:

«... adversus haereticarum doctrinarum insidias veritatis virtute pugnante.» (CSEL 57, 455; PL 51, 67 A)

And *Hypomnesticon* faithfully reflects the same idea both in regard to the struggle which heresy necessitates and the weapon of truth that must be used in resisting it:

«... nos sollicitudine repugnandi faciunt cautiore.» (Praefatio)

«... ut arrepto clipeo veritatis, falsitatibus eorum corde resistere vigilemus.» (*Ibid.*)

Further, in their practical reaction to heresy, both Prosper and the author of *Hypomnesticon* show the same horror of the evil, the same fiery zeal in its suppression, the same vehement language in its denunciation, the same impassioned intolerance regarding its persistence and the same violent indignation towards its perpetrators. All this is particularly true of the Pelagians, and the terms used to castigate them are very alike in both writings; expressions such as 'inimici gratiae Dei', 'inimici fidei veritatis', 'insani haeretici', 'calumniatores', 'corrupti', 'abominabiles', pour forth with equal profusion in both. Thus Prosper writes in the opening passages of the *Contra Collatorem* against those whom he calls 'inimici gratiae Dei':

«... immoderatis calumniis impetere non quiescunt. Quorum intus interstrepens domestica malignitas non minus spernenda esset, quam foris latrans haeretica loquacitas ... sed studendum est, in quantum Dominus adjuvat, ut fallacium calumniatorum hypocrisis detegatur.» (*Ibid.* 215 A and B)

And if Prosper can use language as vigorous as that against Cassian whom he considers, not a heretic, but a danger to the integral teaching on grace, his vehemence in the case of the heretical Pelagians as expressed, for example, in the *Carmen de ingratis* will come as no surprise. The author of Hypomnesticon is not less forthright when attacking the enemies of grace:

«Quid ad haec adhuc haeretice respondebis? Quid inimice gratiae adhuc contra gratiam ... excogitabis opponere?» (Resp. III, 6)

«Audi, haeretice stulte, et inimice fidei veritatis ...» (Resp. III, 13)

«Pergite adhuc per campos loquacitatis vestrae, qua tantae turpitudinis squalorem laudare non erubescitis, et clamate secundum consuetudinem vestram ...» (Resp. IV, 7)

We conclude this treatment with a brief enumeration of some characteristics of doctrinal import common to both Prosper and Hypomnesticon. Thus, as was noted earlier, the disinctive phrase deriving from 2 Cor. 13, 3: «Paulus in quo locutus est Christus» recurs in slightly modulated forms throughout Hypomnesticon, e. g. Resp. III, 6; III, 13 (*bis*); IV, 8; V, 8; VI, 3. It occurs also in Prosper: «Praecepit itaque Apostolus, immo per Apostolum Dominus, qui loquebatur in Apostolo.» (*Ibid.* 664 B)

Again the idea of illumination associated with grace is characteristic of Hypomnesticon, e. g. «illuminante gratia Salvatoris» (Resp. III, 5); «per illuminationem gratiae quae ex Deo Patre est» (Resp. III, 14); «gratia fidei illuminante» (Resp. III, 9). It is encountered also in Prosper: «illuminante Dei gratia» (*Ibid.* 651 B).

The teaching that the faith and grace of the Old Testament times was identical with those of the New is expressed in very much the same manner:

«Omnes igitur qui fuere, vel sumus, et futuri sunt, per unicam unitatem fidei et gratiam quae est in Christo Iesu, in Deum crediderunt, credimus, et credituri sunt, salutem receperunt, recipimus, et recepturi sunt.» (Resp. III, 15)

«... nec alia gratia aut alia fide quemquam hominum, sive ante legem, sive legis tempore justificatum esse credendum sit, quam hac eadem per quam Dominus noster Jesus Christus ... venit quaerere et salvare quod perierat.» (Prosper: *Ibid.* 162 C)

Speaking of the powerlessness of the human will to avoid the evil consequences of Original Sin, without the aid of grace, both Prosper and Hypomnesticon use almost identical phrases; and we find that the phrases are employed in both cases to terminate a *Responsio*;

«... nisi gratia per Jesum Christum Dominum nostrum subvenerit salutaris.» (Resp. IV, 9)

«... nisi ei per Dominum nostrum Jesum Christum Dei gratia subvenerit.» (Prosper: *Ibid.* 169 A)

The motive for the Incarnation is associated with the triumph over death and sin in a rather similar way in Prosper and Hypomnesticon. Besides, the phrase «Deus, Dei Filius» used to designate Our Saviour is noteworthy in that it occurs in both passages:

«... ut inimicam mortem vinceret, vel eius peccatum, ideo Deum, Dei Filium hominem suscepisse.» (Resp. I, 2)

«Deus ergo Dei Filius, mortalitatis humanae particeps factus absque peccato ... ut qui nativitatis ejus consortes fuissent, vinculum peccati et mortis evaderent.» (Prosper: *Ibid.* 165 A)

Then, the idea that sin, in a sense, is also its own punishment is equivalently expressed in both Prosper and Hypomnesticon:

«... ut haec eidem esset poena in non faciendo quod velit, qui semper, si Deo fuisset obediens, sufficere potuisset ad omne bonum quod voluisset.» (Resp. III, 4)

«Sed haec sibi sunt poena, quae inordinate proferens putat esse victoriam.» (Praefatio)

«... quia relinquere a Deo, ac sibi ac deceptoribus suis tradi, propter praecedentia peccata, meruerunt, ut eis peccatum sit ipsa etiam poena peccati.» (Prosper: *Ibid.* 173 A)

Likewise, the verb 'impellere' used in phrases denying God's causality in the evil of sin is common to both Prosper and Hypomnesticon:

«... quos in operibus impietatis et mortis praescivit, non praedordinavit, nec impulit.» (Resp. VI, 5)

«... ipse non fecit, neque fieri suasit, aut impulit.» (Prosper: *Ibid.* 167 B)

«Si Deus hominem ... cadere facit, ergo ... injuste punit, quod ut fiat impellit.» (*Ibid.*)

Again, in the matter of God's prevision of man's sin and His punishment of it, Prosper and the author of Hypomnesticon express cognate thoughts in rather similar language:

«... quos ideo punit, quia quid essent futuri praescivit.» (Resp. VI, 2)
«... sed ideo praedestinati non sunt, quia tales futuri ex voluntaria
praevaricatione praesciti sunt.» (Prosper: *Ibid.* 158 C)

Finally, the anxiety to prevent despair in connection with the doctrine of predestination, is also alike in Prosper and Hypomnesticon:

«Hinc nemo gloriatur, nemo desperet ... omnes homines ad bonum opus exhortemur, nulli desperationem demus.» (Resp. VI, 8)
«... quemadmodum per hanc praedicationem propositi Dei, quo fideles fiunt qui praeordinati sunt ad vitam aeternam, nemo eorum qui cohortandi sunt impediatur, nec occasionem negligentiae habeant, si se praedestinos esse desperent.» (Prosper: *Ibid.* 73 B)

It would be an easy matter to extend this series of comparisons between Prosper and Hypomnesticon, as the areas of doctrinal agreement between them are far more extensive than would be suspected at first sight. Indeed, the difficulty is to find doctrinal disagreements, for apart from those few points on which Prosper's thought underwent a later modification, the doctrinal identity seems to be complete. However, for our purpose, the points of doctrine already compared suffice to show that the doctrinal similarity between Prosper of Aquitaine and Hypomnesticon is such as to suggest a relationship of special intimacy which may indicate common authorship.

γ) *The Scripture Quotations*

In the case of the Scripture quotations common to Hypomnesticon and Prosper of Aquitaine's accepted works there are two lines of investigation to be pursued. The first consists in searching for identical groupings of Scripture texts used in both writings in dealing with identical theological problems; the second consists in a comparison of the readings of the common texts themselves. If, on the one hand, it can be shown that the identical groupings of texts are unique, i. e. found in Hypomnesticon and Prosper alone and associated in both with the same theological problems, the relation, either of common origin or of close dependence, between these writings will be made evident. If, on the other hand, the readings of the texts which are common are found to be unique, a similar conclusion will be made probable, and the probability will be increased proportionately to the number of identical readings so found. Of these two lines of inquiry it will be seen that the first is by far the more conclusive so far as the discovery of the relationship between Prosper

and Hypomnesticon is concerned; and it will appear in the course of our investigation that the reason for this is purely factual. We begin, therefore, with the common groupings.

Common grouping of biblical texts

Reference has already been made in Chapter III, b) to the grouping of Acts 14, 15 and Ps. 134, 4, which occurs in connection with the problem of predestination as applied to nations – as distinct from individuals – in both Hypomnesticon (Resp. VI, 3) and Prosper (*Ibid.* 162 B; cf. 194 D; 652 A; 663 B; 674 B; 689 C; 694 C). This grouping is unique, as was pointed out, in that it is never encountered in any other extant Latin patristic writing.

Another distinctive Scriptural association common to Hypomnesticon and Prosper is that of Acts 16, 6 as linked with the same problem of predestination as applied to nations. This association occurs in Hypomnesticon (Resp. VI, 3) and Prosper (*Ibid.* 85 D; 245 B; 689 A), but is found in no other Latin writing. What adds very considerably to the significance of this fact is that the reading ‘vetiti’ for the Old Latin ‘prohibiti’ occurs in the text given both by Prosper and Hypomnesticon, but not in that of any other known writer of the Vth century or earlier¹.

Again, the three texts, Matt. 13, 11, Matt. 11, 27, and Jn. 5, 21, quoted in immediate succession by Prosper in his *Pro Augustino responsiones ad excerpta Genuensium* 8 (*Ibid.* 198B) to show God’s power of changing the minds and hearts of men at His good pleasure, are quoted in exactly the same order, in immediate succession, and in connection with the same problem in Hypomnesticon (Resp. III, 7). On the other hand, these texts are not found together at all, not to speak of their being in the same order, in any earlier or contemporaneous writing, and we have to wait for the *Opusculum de gratia* of Caesarius of Arles (470-543) to encounter them in association with each other again². That Caesarius depends either on the *Pro Augustino responsiones ad excerpta Genuensium* or on Hypom-

¹ This statement is based on personal research done in the Vetus Latina Institut at Beuron. A possible exception is to be found in Book XI, chapter 9 of the *De Trinitate* of the Pseudo-Vigilius of Thapsus, but as both author and date of composition of this book are unknown, our statement may stand. The text of the *De Trinitate* is to be found in CCL 9 (1957) 1-205. For a detailed bibliography of the work, cf. CPL², p. 24.

² Cf. G. Morin, *S. Caesarii episcopi Arelatensis opera omnia* II (Maredsous 1942) p. 161.

nesticon for his grouping of the three texts in question seems to be certain.

Another threefold grouping of texts, viz. Jn. 8, 34; 2 Pet. 2, 19, and Rom. 6,20, found in Prosper's *Contra Collatorem* 9 (*Ibid.* 239B) occurs in relation to an identical problem in Hypomnesticon (Resp. III, 2). Apart from Prosper and Hypomnesticon, no other writer before Pope Gelasius I (492-496) is found to combine these texts in the same way, and in the case of Pope Gelasius there is every reason to believe that he is dependent either on Hypomnesticon or on the *Contra Collatorem* for his combined use of the texts ¹.

Then, the four texts, Jn. 6, 44, Jn. 6, 66, Matt. 19, 11, and Matt. 13, 11, quoted together by the author of Hypomnesticon in a context dealing with predestination (Resp. VI, 8; cf. Resp. III, 7) are all quoted in an identical context by Prosper in his *De vocatione omnium gentium* I, 24 (*Ibid.* 680-683A), but are not grouped together by any other known Latin author ².

Further, the association of Matt. 16, 15-17 with Ephes. 2, 8 in Prosper's treatment of Faith as a gift of God (*Ibid.* 678A) is found also in Hypomnesticon when the same problem is being discussed (Resp. III, 14-15). Once more this association of texts is peculiar to Prosper and Hypomnesticon and does not occur in any other extant Latin writing.

Yet another significant grouping of texts is that of Eccles. 15, 21 with Ps. 5, which is found in Prosper's *Pro Augustino responsiones ad cap. Gallorum* 1 (*Ibid.* 157B) and in Hypomnesticon (Resp. VI, 7). This grouping of texts is never encountered in any other Latin writing.

Ps. 144, 14 is a popular text with Prosper (*Ibid.* 166-167; 182A; 661A; 722A; cf. 414A). In the *Pro Augustino responsiones ad capitula obiectio-num Vincentianarum* 7 (*Ibid.* 182A), Prosper uses the text in connection with man's inability to rise by his own power from the helplessness of sin, and we find that Hypomnesticon employs the text to exactly the same effect in Resp. III, 2. No other Patristic author, not even Augustine (Cf. *De correptione et gratia* 36; *Contra Julianum opus imperfectum* II, 71), used the text in the same way.

¹ Cf. *Epistula* 94, 25 in *Collectio Avellana*: CSEL 35 (1895) 365.

² It is interesting to note that in his *De dono perseverantiae* 14, 37, Augustine quotes three of the above four texts, viz. Jn. 6, 66; Matt. 13, 11; and Matt. 19, 11, to show that only those who receive the gift of obedience from God will listen with effect to exhortations to obedience. Caesarius of Arles in his *Opusculum de gratia* also combines three of the four texts, viz. Matt. 19, 11; Jn. 6, 44; and Matt. 13, 11.

Finally, Matt. 11,27 is never used by Augustine in his anti-Pelagian and Semi-Pelagian writings, but it is quoted by Prosper in connection with God's power over the human will (*Ibid.* 198 B; 234 B; 673 A), and it is also encountered in a similar context in Hypomnesticon (Resp. III, 7).

Very many similar groupings of texts in connection with similar doctrinal questions are common to Prosper and Hypomnesticon, but since they occur also in St. Augustine, their significance in showing the special relationship between Prosper and Hypomnesticon with which we are concerned is considerably reduced. In listing the above groupings, our aim was to deal only with those which were common to Prosper and Hypomnesticon, and not found in Augustine or any other known source. Hence, their value in showing the intimate relation which exists between Prosper and Hypomnesticon is all the greater. The conclusion can scarcely be avoided that this relation is either one of common origin or of very close dependence. We pass now to the second line of inquiry indicated at the beginning of this section, namely, the comparison between Prosper and Hypomnesticon on the basis of the actual readings of the Scripture texts used in both.

A comparison of the readings of the biblical texts

At this point we meet a problem of extreme complexity and delicacy, and we do not profess to be in a position to deal exhaustively with it here. In fact, a definitive treatment is at present impossible for several reasons, the chief of which is the absence of a critical edition of Prosper of Aquitaine's writings. Without such an edition¹ it is, in general, impossible to be sufficiently sure of the exact readings of the individual biblical quotations found in Prosper's works to base conclusive arguments on them. Nevertheless, this difficulty can, to some extent, be overcome due to the habit observable in Prosper – and conspicuous also in Hypomnesticon – of quoting certain key texts over and over again; and so in the case of Prosper we frequently meet a text repeated, not merely in the same work, but also in several others of his works as well. When these repeated quotations of Prosper show the same reading of a given text in all, or practically all, cases, it may be reasonably assumed that

¹ Despite Dom Dekkers' announcement in CPL², p. 119, of a new edition of Prosper of Aquitaine's works by Professor F. Sciuto, there seems now to be little likelihood that this desideratum will be supplied in the near future. Professor Sciuto informed me in March, 1965, that he had abandoned the project of editing Prosper's works.

that reading is authentic. Nevertheless, were we to limit ourselves solely to texts of this kind the area of comparison between Prosper and Hypomnesticon would naturally be very much reduced, because the number of *repeated* texts among the texts common to Prosper and Hypomnesticon is understandably not very great. Besides, even where individual readings can be established in detail, we have no guarantee that Prosper will necessarily reproduce them exactly when writing any given book. It is notorious, that at the period with which we are concerned, individual Scripture texts appear in different forms in writings of the same author. This fact can be easily verified in the case of Augustine or Jerome, for example, and there is every reason to expect the phenomenon to occur in Prosper also. The probable reasons for this phenomenon are multiple, e. g. the use of different versions of Scripture, particularly at the time when the Vulgate text commenced to be known and used, the habit of quoting from memory, and the desire to adapt texts to particular needs. These and suchlike difficulties complicate the problem of comparing the readings of the Scripture texts used in common by Prosper and Hypomnesticon, and it is with the reservations arising from them that we make the following observations:

In view of the present study, a total of 120 Scripture quotations – either literal or free – was found to be common to Hypomnesticon and Prosper's works; and while not claiming this number to be quite exhaustive, we may take the group of texts as providing a sufficiently extensive basis for fruitful comparison. The overall picture which emerges from such comparative study is the very considerable similarity that exists between Hypomnesticon and Prosper's works so far as the readings of the biblical texts common to both are concerned. Whether this similarity can be called significant in the sense of establishing a relationship of dependence or of common authorship between the works in question is debatable, and depends on the point of view adopted. Thus, if we take the common readings individually, and accept as significant only those which are unique, i. e. not found outside Prosper's works and Hypomnesticon, we shall be disappointed. Such readings, though some exist, are extremely rare, and this is a fact which will surprise no one who is in any way acquainted with the Scripture usage of Vth century Latin authors. These latter normally used readings derived from current versions of Scripture, whether Old Latin or Vulgate. Hence, the likelihood of finding in two distinct works, whether they derive from the same author or not, identical readings which are at the same time unique, will be very remote.

Another method suggests itself, which appears to be more helpful in spite of its difficulty, namely, to trace the curves of similarity or dissimilarity regarding biblical texts common to Hypomnesticon and Prosper through all the books of the Bible which they use, and then to assess the significance of the general picture which presents itself. Here what will be considered significant regarding the relation between Prosper and Hypomnesticon will be the fact that both, throughout the long series of texts in question, make normally the same or a different choice from the more or less wide range of possible readings available in their day. If the texts chosen are found, for example, to be normally the same, we shall have an argument of some value in determining the relationship existing between Prosper and Hypomnesticon.

As regards the Old Testament quotations common to Prosper and Hypomnesticon, a practical identity of readings was found to exist between the two. Only a small number of slight differences could be detected: for example, 'investigabiles' added to 'Domini' in an adapted quotation from Ps. 24, 10 in Resp. III, 7; and the possible reading of 'voluntas' for 'misericordia' in a quotation from Ps. 58, 11 found in the *De vocatione omnium gentium*, Book I, chap. 24 (*Ibid.* 679 B). The first of these differences clearly shows an association in the mind of the author of Hypomnesticon between Ps. 24, 10 and Rom. 11, 33, an association which is also found in the mind of Prosper as appears from chapter 4 of the *Pro Augustino resp. ad excerpta Genuensium* (*Ibid.* 192 B). Besides, Augustine, in the *Opus Imperfectum contra Julianum* II 117, has a similar fusion of the same two texts. Then, the possible reading of 'voluntas' for 'misericordia' used by Prosper in quoting Ps. 58, 11 seems to be doubtful on the evidence of the manuscript tradition; and besides, in his earlier work, *Contra Collatorem* 19 (*Ibid.* 266 B), Prosper shows acquaintance with the more usual reading, 'misericordia'.

Among the individual readings common to Prosper and Hypomnesticon which perhaps merit special attention is that of Job 14, 4. This appears to be noteworthy inasmuch as the author of Hypomnesticon in Resp. V, 4 had quoted the text first according to the Old Latin version of the LXX, then commented: «Audite apertius ... qualiter ex Hebraeo verbo sit in Latinum translatum», and thereupon added the Vulgate text of the same verse. Prosper varied in his choice of versions when quoting from the book of Job, e. g. Job 12, 6 (*Ibid.* 667 C); Job 12, 16-25 (*Ibid.* 667-668); Job 23, 13 (*Ibid.* 668 A); and the fact that he chose the Vulgate reading when he decided to quote Job 14, 4, a version which the author

of Hypomnesticon had earlier stated expressly to give a clearer rendering than the Old Latin, is probably indicative of a special bond between Prosper and Hypomnesticon.

Being roughly four times more numerous than the Old Testament quotations common to Hypomnesticon and Prosper, the New Testament quotations are obviously likely to show a greater number of differences than the Old Testament ones. Yet, what is surprising is that the differences are so rare and generally so insignificant, while the agreements are so numerous. The discrepancies in several cases arise from confusing similar texts when quoting from memory. Thus the minor confusions in the quotations of Matt. 13, 11 as found in Hypomnesticon (Resp. III, 7) and Prosper (*Ibid.* 198 B; 682 D) are surely caused by the remarkable resemblance the text bears to Lk. 8, 10. Also, the substitution of 'ab origine mundi' for 'a constitutione mundi' in Matt. 25, 34 as quoted in Hypomnesticon (Resp. VI, 6) can be as easily explained as due to a confusion with Heb. 9, 26 or Apoc. 13, 8 as by its being an Old Latin variant. Besides, Prosper varies in his quotations of this text; cf. *Ibid.* 186 C; 323 D; 327 B; 417 A. Further, the close resemblance between Lk. 19, 10 and Matt. 18, 11 explains why both Prosper and Hypomnesticon confound 'salvum facere' and 'salvare' in their quotations of these texts; cf. Hypomnesticon, Resp. V, 7 and Prosper, *Ibid.* 284 D; 686 A; 656 A; 675 C. Then Hypomnesticon's reading of 'de caelo' for the Vulgate 'desuper' in his triple quotation of Jn. 3, 27 (Resp. III, 7; III, 9; VI, 7) is easily understood since the variant was very common. The significance of the difference between Hypomnesticon and Prosper concerning this text is very much reduced when it is observed that the two quotations of the text in Prosper are found to differ considerably among themselves; cf. *Ibid.* 259 C; 683 A. And the addition to Rom. 11, 34 of the phrase 'qui instruat eum' from I Cor. 2, 16 in Hypomnesticon's quotations seems to be due to a confusion when quoting from memory; cf. Resp. III, 7; VI, 3 and Prosper, *Ibid.* 665/6; 694 A; 192 B. In fine, allowing for minor differences arising from confusions of memory, and the adaptation of texts to the needs of the argument, the discrepancies between Prosper and Hypomnesticon from the point of view of their New Testament quotations are so reduced as to appear relatively insignificant, and the agreements between them seem to become correspondingly suggestive ¹.

¹ The texts of Matt. 25, 34 and 41 dealing with the General Judgement, which are found in Hypomnesticon, Responsio I, 3 and VI, 6, differ from those of Prosper in his *Pro Augustino responsiones ad excerpta Genuensium*, 16 (PL 51, 186C), but,

The agreements between Prosper and Hypomnesticon in their quotations from the New Testament are very frequent, and in some cases they are particularly significant. Reference has already been made to the reading 'vetiti' for the Old Latin 'prohibiti' in Acts 16, 6 which occurs in both Hypomnesticon (Resp. VI, 3) and Prosper (*Ibid.* 85 D; 245 B; 689 A), but which is found in no other known author of the Vth century or earlier. This fact seems to link Prosper and Hypomnesticon very closely together, and that all the more certainly since in each of his three quotations of the text Prosper uses the word 'vetiti'.

The reading of Rom. 9, 14 with 'iniquitas non est' occurring at the end after 'Deum' or 'quem' is extremely rare. Thus, though Augustine quotes the text 45 times, he uses the form ending with the phrase 'iniquitas non est' but once, i. e. in the *Enarrationes in psalmos*, 144, 21 [CCL 40 (1956) 2103]. With the exception of Prosper and Hypomnesticon, no other Patristic writer appears to do so; cf. Prosper, *Ibid.* 321 C; 434 C; 512 C; 687 A and Hypomnesticon VI, 2.

By way of general conclusion to this study of the biblical texts quoted in common by Prosper and Hypomnesticon, it may be remarked that the relationship between the two which was already observed when making the doctrinal comparison, seems to be strongly confirmed by a comparative study of their Scripture usage. The evidence appears to point unmistakably either to a relationship of intimate dependence between Hypomnesticon and Prosper or to Prosper's authorship of the work ¹.

δ) *A Literary Comparison*

A detailed analysis of the literary characteristics of either Prosper's works or Hypomnesticon is not intended here. Our primary concern at the moment is to see whether a broad literary comparison between the two can clarify the relation which we have already seen from the doctrinal and Scriptural comparison to exist between them. For our purpose statistical compilations of vocabulary, clausulae, etc. are unnecessary. Indeed, judging by the results obtained by J. Young in his *Studies on the Style of the 'De vocatione omnium gentium' ascribed to Prosper of Aqu-*

given Hypomnesticon's loose application of the texts and Prosper's more formal treatment in the latter work, very little can be deduced from the difference.

¹ This is necessarily a very summary account, but it is hoped to supplement it in our second volume by appending tables containing complete lists of the biblical texts used in Hypomnesticon, and also found in Prosper's work.

*taine*¹, based on statistical methods, a separate work would be required for such a study, and it is very doubtful if the conclusions reached by such methods would either differ from, or offer any greater certitude than, those based on a less minute and specialized study². Besides, it is intended to deal more particularly with the literary characteristics of Hypomnesticon in a later chapter, and in order to avoid repetition as much as possible, only those literary aspects that are of value for comparison with Prosper's works will be treated.

Style

Hypomnesticon and the works of Prosper have, from the literary point of view, at least this much in common that they both belong to the classical Christian literature of the Vth century. The style of both is studied and polished and reveals marked oratorical tendencies, but in neither case does it bear the strongly personal stamp that characterizes the works, say, of the contemporaneous Julian of Eclanum: it is less complicated and precious than his³, and approximates rather to that of St. Leo, while being less perfect⁴. Both Prosper and the author of Hypomnesticon are even more clearly distinguishable, so far as their manner of writing is concerned, from St. Augustine, even though he is equally the common source of their doctrine and inspiration. They lack, among

¹ This work is Volume 87 (1952) of *Patristic Studies* (Washington).

² Young's conclusions are to be found on p. 178-179 of his work. They will be quoted later.

³ Good examples of the preciousness of Julian's style are afforded by the passages cited by St. Augustine in the *Opus imperfectum contra Julianum*, I, 49; 50; 53.

⁴ An examination of the 96 Sermons of St. Leo (PL 54, 141-468), and a comparison with the prose works of Prosper or with Hypomnesticon will show the superiority of the former from the point of view of purity of style and the use of antithesis for the ending of the periods. For a detailed comparison made between the style of Leo the Great and that of Prosper of Aquitaine as illustrated in the *De vocatione omnium gentium*, cf. QUESNEL, *Dissertatio de auctore librorum de vocatione omnium gentium* in *S. Leonis ... operum omnium*, Tome 2 (Paris, 1675), reprinted in PL 55, 339-372; J. ANTELMUS, *De veris operibus ss. patrum Leonis Magni et Prosperi Aquitani dissertationes criticae* (Paris, 1689) Dissertatio 3; L. VALENTIN, *op. cit.* 697-698; M. CAPPUYNS, *art. cit.* in RB (1927) 221-225. A study of Pope Leo's vocabulary was made by M. MUELLER in *The Vocabulary of Pope St. Leo the Great*, *Patristic Studies*, 67 (Washington 1943). J. YOUNG compiled a list of words common to Pope Leo and the *De vocatione*, *op. cit.* p. 171-173. Young remarks that «the vocabulary of the *De vocatione* is for the most part common to all the Christian writers of the age» (*Ibid.* 164).

other things, his intimate and personal approach ¹, and their style shows little of the extraordinary patience and forbearance when dealing with even such bitter and tantalizing opponents as Julian of Eclanum ². In contrast with the polemical style of St. Jerome, that of Prosper and also of Hypomnesticon is sober and measured, even though it can be vehement at times: it is almost entirely devoid of allusions to, or quotations from, the pagan classical authors, and it never degenerates into the violent and protracted vituperation and obloquy which continually menaced Jerome's pen when he engaged in controversy ³. It is superior to the style of Marius Mercator which tends in its violence and classical allusions to approach from afar that of Jerome ⁴; more eloquent and resourceful than that of Paulinus, the Deacon of Milan, which tended to be rather pedestrian ⁵, more vigorous and militant than that of Quodvultdeus ⁶.

There is an impersonality and objectivity about the manner of writing of Prosper that was already noted and commented upon by L. Valentin in his classical work entitled *Saint Prosper d'Aquitaine*. Referring to Prosper, he wrote:

«Un des caractères les plus frappants de ses écrits, c'est, comme disent les Allemands, leur objectivité. La personne de saint Prosper est étrangère à son œuvre» ⁷.

¹ Worthy of note in this connection is the opening of the *De peccatorum meritis et remissione* I, 1; the personal references in the *Proemium* and chapter I of the *De gestis pelagii* are also worthy of note, or the closing lines of the *Contra Julianum* VI, 26.

² This is admirably demonstrated in the *Opus imperfectum contra Julianum*. Augustine never descends to the uncharitable harshness of Prosper in the *Contra Collatorem* in chapter I, or of Hypomnesticon in Responsio IV, 4; 9.

³ The scathing sarcasm of Jerome's *Altercatio Luciferiani et Orthodoxi* (PL 23, 155-182) offers a contrast in this respect to Hypomnesticon. As regards allusions to pagan classical authors, Jerome's *Dialogi contra Pelagianos libri 3* differs notably from Hypomnesticon and Prosper's work. In the prologue he refers to the Stoics and Peripatetics (PL 23, 495 A) and thereafter alludes to Cicero and Virgil (*Ibid.* 506 D; 515 A; 517 C); cf. *Epistula ad Ctesiphontem* (*Epist.* 133) n. 1 (CSEL 56, iii, p. 242); n. 3 (*Ibid.* 245-246).

⁴ Cf. *Commonitorium adversum haeresim Pelagii*. An excellent example of Marius's violence is to be seen in n. 7 (ACO I, V, i, p. 9). In its vehemence and length it is quite unlike anything to be found in Prosper's writings or in Hypomnesticon. It was quoted above on p. 71. We already referred to the classical allusions in Marius Mercator's writing; cf. p. 72.

⁵ Cf. above p. 75.

⁶ Cf. above p. 74.

⁷ *Op. cit.* p. 448. It should be remarked that not all of the following arguments based on similarity of style have equal force. Indeed, taken separately, their de-

Here we have a succinct description that can be applied to the letter to Hypomnesticon. So far as impersonality and objectivity are concerned, the work would be difficult to surpass, and if these qualities are a criterion, then there is little doubt about the close affinity between Hypomnesticon and Prosper's works. In neither case is the author interested in speaking about himself; in both cases what is of absorbing interest is doctrine, and primarily the doctrine of grace as expounded by Augustine; and again in both cases, the object in view is the defence of that doctrine against all erroneous and deviationist teaching, and thereby the defence of the Catholic faith – 'fides qua ecclesia vivit', as Prosper expresses it (CSEL 57, 455; PL 51, 67 A) 'fides catholica' ... 'unitas matris ecclesiae', as the author of Hypomnesticon would have it (Praefatio).

Both writings give evidence of a high degree of culture, but nowhere in either writing is learning paraded for its own sake. Prosper's cultural background is proved in the highest degree by the extraordinary success with which he could produce his *Carmen de ingratis*, a *tour de force* in verse dealing with the Pelagian and Semi-Pelagian errors. With an astonishing ease and facility, Prosper can modulate from the five opening elegiac couplets to continue in Virgilian hexameters, and within the compass of 1002 lines can expound and refute Pelagianism and its offspring, Semi-Pelagianism, as though the expression of abstract theological ideas in classical Latin verse, and even the poetic interlacing of the lines with Scripture texts, were the most natural thing in the world¹. Such facility can be explained only by extensive study of the Latin classics, together with native talent of a very high order. Again, the

monstrative force in proving Prosper's authorship of Hypomnesticon is sometimes slender, as they concern traits that were to some degree rather common at the epoch. Taken collectively, however, their probative force is greatly increased, and it is only in this collective sense that they are offered as an argument in what follows.

¹ Speaking of Prosper's ability to weave the sacred text into his *Carmen*, Valentin writes:

«Cette méthode [citation du texte sacré] s'affirme dans le *De ingratis*, où il est d'autant plus intéressant de l'étudier qu'elle semblait incompatible avec le rythme. Il en appelle à la Bible; il la cite sans l'altérer, sans en subordonner l'interprétation aux besoins de la cause ... Les textes remplissent, autorisent, consacrent les hexamètres prospériens». *Op. cit.* p. 321.

The use of poetry as a medium for the treatment of theological subjects had a pronounced vogue in the Vth century, and it was for this reason that the Christian poets of the period, e. g. Sedulius, Claudius Marius Victor, Avitus Poeta, as well as Prosper of Aquitaine chose as subjects for their art the revealed truths of religion.

range of Prosper's learning can be divined from his historical work, viz. the *Chronicon*, from the versatility with which he could turn from poetry to prose, from the dogmatic discussion of the *Contra Collatorem* to the exegetical work based on Augustine's *Enarrationes in psalmos* and known as the *Expositio psalms a 100^o usque ad 150^m*. But if Prosper makes use of such culture and learning, and if his style by its versatility gives evidence of it, the reason is uniquely his anxiety to defend, and incidentally to expound, orthodox teaching. Learning for its own sake receives no encouragement from Prosper, and his views, as expressed in chapter 12 of the *Contra Collatorem*, clearly explain why this is so:

«Neque enim ignotum est, quantum Graecae scholae, Romana eloquentia, et totius mundi inquisitio, circa inveniendum summum bonum, acerrimis studiis, et excellentissimis ingeniis laborando nihil egerint, nisi ut evanescerent in cogitationibus suis, et obscuraretur cor insipiens eorum, qui ad cognoscendam veritatem semetipsis ducibus utebantur. Si ergo quis de aerumnosis vanitatibus et insaniis fallacibus erubescens, tenebras esse et mortem quidquid pro lumine et vita amplectebatur intelligit, et ab his se conatur abstrahere, non est ab ipso, quamvis non sine ipso sit, ista conversio ... sed agit haec occulta et potens gratia Dei.» (PL 51, 246 A)

In Hypomnesticon also there is evidence of a high degree of learning and culture. The author is acquainted with Virgil as the unacknowledged quotation from the Aeneid, Lib. 7, vers. 337-8 in the Praefatio indicates, and as the allusion to the Marsi and their curative power in Responsio IV, 1 probably insinuates¹. He has at his command a full repertoire of literary figures together with an extensive and varied vocabulary that shows wide acquaintance with classical literature, while the rich resource of his imagery, always so expressive and discreet, and the rhythm of his prose reveal a cultured and fertile mind of exceptional ability. As in the case of Prosper, to flaunt his knowledge is not his purpose, and he shares too deeply Prosper's regard for humility to let the pride of knowledge lure him to a vain display of learning. All his intellectual resource is put at the service of the Church, and the defence of its teaching. If he is eloquent, it is his love of grace and his hatred of the errors attacking it

¹ St. Augustine refers to the Marsi in his *Enarrationes in psalmos* 57, 7 (CCL 39 [1956] 714: PL 36, 679-680); *De civitate Dei* V, 22 (CCL 47 [1955] 158: PL 41, 168); but the details in Hypomnesticon's reference are such as to make the author's dependence on Augustine for his information about the Marsi improbable. It is more likely that he derived his knowledge on the subject from Virgil directly or from some other source. Cf. PWK 14, 1977-1979.

that alone inspire him; and if he is oratorical, it is again his impassioned zeal on behalf of Catholic truth that moves him.

Prosper's writings, in contrast with those, say, of St. Jerome, who associated ideas with events and linked doctrines with those who sponsored them, reveal as little information about others as about himself¹. Thus, in the *Contra Collatorem* which is directed against Cassian, Prosper never once mentioned his opponent's name and refers to him vaguely as 'vir quidam sacerdotalis'². The same is perfectly true of the author of *Hypomnesticon*. Though his work, by its title, is directed against the Pelagians and Celestians, he mentions Pelagius himself but three times³, and even then no details are given beyond reference to the man's errors or those professed by his followers in general. In two of the allusions to Pelagius, Celestius is also mentioned by name⁴, but otherwise not at all. Again, Julian of Eclanum, though his teaching and its refutation occupy the entire IVth Responsio, and though it is perfectly obvious that he is in view throughout⁵, is never mentioned by name. The attitude adopted here is remarkably similar to that of Prosper in the *Contra Collatorem*.

A characteristic of Prosper's style is the violence of which it is capable when the errors of the Semi-Pelagians are being attacked, and in this regard Prosper's writings are noticeably different from the *Contra Julianum* or the *Opus imperfectum contra Julianum* of Augustine, wherein the saint maintains an admirable patience throughout. Nevertheless, the severity of Prosper's onslaughts is to some extent softened by the fact that individual names are not mentioned. At any rate, it is certain that Prosper did not mince his words when castigating his enemies, as a few passages from the *Contra Collatorem* will suffice to show. Speaking with reference to Cassian and his followers, he writes:

¹ Examples of this characteristic are found in Jerome's *Contra Vigilantium* (PL 23, 339-352); *Apologia adversus libros Rufini* (*Ibid.* 397-492).

² PL 51, 218 A.

³ Cf. Responsio II, 1; III, 13; IV, 8.

⁴ Cf. Responsio II, 1; IV, 8.

⁵ That Julian is envisaged in Responsio IV is certain. It is seen in the fact that the doctrine attacked, viz. the teaching on 'libido', is precisely that defended so persistently by Julian in his controversy with Augustine and reflected in the *Contra duas epistulas Pelagianorum*, *De nuptiis et concupiscentia*, *Contra Julianum*, and *Opus imperfectum contra Julianum*. Then the derogatory terms 'loquacitas', 'procax lingua' and similar terms, so often used with reference to Julian as to be almost synonymous with his name, occur in Responsio IV alone and that in relation to the adversary attacked; cf. chapters 4 and 7.

«Quorum intus interstrepens domestica malignitas non minus spernenda esset, quam foris latrans haeretica loquacitas.» (PL 51, 215 A)

and lacerating their hypocrisy, he adds:

«... studendum est, in quantum Dominus adjuvat, ut fallacium calumniatorum hypocrisis detegatur, qui ex ipsa injuriae magnitudine, quam ... intulerunt, ab indoctis et parum cautis excellentioris scientiae judicantur, et misero perversoque successu facilem mendacio consensum eliciunt.» (*Ibid.* 215 B)

and later:

«Itane in omnibus hominibus intelligentiae caligat obtutus, et a cunctis ecclesiae filiis spiritus scientiae et pietatis abscessit, ut non erubescant ingerere se iudiciis legentium tam inhonesta mendacia? Vir gravis, doctor sapiens, verax magister, redde nobis catholicam definitionem.» (*Ibid.* 253 C)

He can even go so far as to attack uncharitably the private life of his opponents by implying that they are wolves in sheep's clothing, and that their appearance of piety is but sham:

«... sub nomine ovium sunt ... Siquidem habentes speciem pietatis in studio, cuius virtutem diffitentur in sensu, trahunt ad se multos ineruditos.» (*Ibid.* 215 A)

The author of *Hypomnesticon* shows an identical violence in face of his adversaries, and in his more impassioned moments he can become particularly eloquent:

«Audis, haeretice Pelagiane, pelago perditionis demerse, sive Caesariane, caelesti iudicio periture, vas electionis veritatis tubam canentem?» (Resp. III, 3)

«O caeca vestrorum sensuum corda! O magisterium quod obvolutum mortali nebula vobis diabolus propinavit? ... Quis vos non horreat potius nominare, quam cernere, ut verbum Dei fidele in parte veri et in parte mendacii esse praedicetis.» (Resp. V, 8)

Again, just as in the case of Prosper, the author of *Hypomnesticon* is capable of attacking uncharitably the private life of those whom he combats. Thus on two occasions he casts aspersions on the private morals of his adversaries:

«... impudenti fronte lascivientes ... [libidinis] motum sic procaci lingua laudatis in publico, ut cunctis pateat quid a vobis geritur in secreto; si tamen quos laudare publice non pudet, eligant vel secretum.» (Resp. IV, 4)

«Ecce cuius obscaenitatis et turpitudinis estis acerrimi laudatores, impudentissimi defensores, et si non fallor ... forsitan et factores.» (Resp. IV, 9)

And in passing, the close parallelism in the construction of two of the derogatory passages quoted above is worth noting, viz. Prosper's phrase

«Siquidem habentes speciem pietatis in studio, cuius virtutem diffidentur in sensu ... (*Ibid.* 215 A)

and that of Hypomnesticon:

«[Libidinis] motum sic procaci lingua laudatis in publico, ut cunctis pateat quid a vobis geritur in secreto.» (Resp. IV, 4)

But again, as in the case of Prosper, the venom of these assaults, though scarcely to be condoned, is rendered less virulent by the fact that individual names are never mentioned, and that the persons addressed are referred to in a vague plural number. What is primarily attacked in both Prosper's works and in Hypomnesticon is not the individual person so much as error.

Another distinctive literary characteristic of Prosper is his *penchant* for repetition. Thus we find him not merely repeating himself from one work to another, but also from one part of the same work to another. For example, in the *Contra Collatorem* he repeats several times his conviction that Semi-Pelagianism is an organic development of Pelagianism, viz. Chapter 11 (PL 51, 243 B); chapter 16 (*Ibid.* 259 B); chapter 21 (*Ibid.* 273 B). It is also repeated in the *Carmen de ingratis* (*Ibid.* 106 B). Likewise the teaching that freedom of the will is not destroyed by the action of grace is repeated in chapters 6 and 18 of the *Contra Collatorem* (*Ibid.* 229 B; 264 C-265 A).

In fact, there is reason to believe that repetition was a deliberate part of Prosper's method, for we find him in his *Epistula ad Augustinum* urging the Bishop to repeat what he had already written lest the faithful should conclude that the questions at issue were unimportant because they were not frequently propounded:

«... necessarium et utile est etiam, quae scripta sunt, scribere, ne leve existimetur quod non frequenter arguitur.» (CSEL 57, 468; PL 51, 74 B)

That repetition is a striking characteristic of Hypomnesticon becomes evident from even a casual reading of the work. A singular example is

provided by the recurring statement of the author in Responsio III affirming the freedom of the will, and though it was quoted earlier, it is so indicative of the repetitious character of the writing that it is worth while reproducing it once more here:

«Igitur liberium arbitrium hominibus esse, certa fide credimus.» (Resp. III, 3)

«Est fatemur liberium arbitrium omnibus hominibus habens iudicium rationis.» (*Ibid.* 4)

«Est igitur liberum arbitrium, quod quisque esse negaverit catholicus non est.» (*Ibid.* 10)

«Quomodo autem unicuique secundum sua opera redderetur ... nisi liberum esset arbitrium?» (*Ibid.*)

Again, the repetitious tendency of the author is conspicuously shown by his frequent use of formulae of renvoi: 'ut superius disputavi' (Resp. III, 1), 'ut superius iam dictum est' (III, 3), 'ut ante iam dixi' (III, 4), 'quae ante iam dixi' (III, 7), 'ut dixi' (*Ibid.*), 'ut ad propositum superioris disputationis revertamur' (III, 8), etc. There is not the slightest shadow of doubt but that the author of Hypomnesticon was at one with Prosper of Aquitaine in his belief in and use of repetition in inculcating sound doctrine. Here once more we find a characteristic common to Prosper's works and to Hypomnesticon. And it may be remarked that being at one with Prosper in this and in so many other points may perhaps mean that the author of Hypomnesticon is in fact none other than Prosper himself.

Two notable characteristics of Prosper's style are precision and conciseness¹. That Prosper was concise is shown in manifold ways, but is particularly evident in the three *Responsiones pro Augustino*. In fact, in the *Pro Augustino responsiones ad cap. obj. Gallorum*, Prosper is explicit about his efforts to be concise. Thus, at the conclusion of his treatment of the final objection in that work, he adds:

«Quamvis ergo ad omnes objectiones seu querulae imperitiae, seu fallacis invidiae, planissime ac plenissime ... existimem esse responsum, professionem tamen sensus nostri etiam in brevia coarctamus, ut sub paucorum verborum simplicitate magis magisque appareat nos quod de supra scriptis capitulis intelligimus.» (PL 51, 169 C)

Besides, Prosper puts his decision into practice, as is evident from such concise passages as the following:

¹ Valentin observed these qualities in Prosper's style; cf. *op. cit.* p. 525 ff.

«Quamvis enim fides non sit nisi ex Dei dono et hominis voluntate, infidelitas tamen non est nisi ex sola hominis voluntate.» (*Ibid.* 171 B)

«... quia hoc ipsos voluntaria facturos defectione praevidit, ideo in praedestinationis electione illos non habuit.» (*Ibid.* 171 D)

«... relinqui a Deo, ac sibi ac deceptoribus suis tradi, propter praecedentia peccata, meruerunt, ut eis peccatum sit ipsa etiam poena peccati.» (*Ibid.* 173 A)

That precision and accuracy of expression were also characteristic of Prosper's style is evident in all his writings. Thus, the care to avoid ambiguity and to express his thought clearly is manifest in such passages as:

«Justificatus itaque homo, id est, ex impio pius factus, nullo praecedente bono merito, accipit donum, quo dono acquirat et meritum: ut quod in illo inchoatum est per gratiam Christi, etiam per industriam liberi augeatur arbitrii.» (*Ibid.* 161 A)

«... confitendum est et misericorditer eum dedisse quod dedit, et juste non dedisse quod non dedit: ne quemadmodum ex libero arbitrio oritur causa labendi, ita ex ipso oriri videatur et standi, cum illud humano fiat opere, hoc divino impleatur ex munere.» (*Ibid.* 162 A)

«... dubium non est, sine ulla temporali differentia Deum et praescisse simul, et praedestinasse, quae ipso erant auctore facienda, vel quae malis meritis justo erant iudicio retribuenda; praescisse autem tantummodo, non etiam praedestinasse, quae non ex ipso erant causam operationis habitura. Potest itaque sine praedestinatione esse praescientia: praedestinatio autem sine praescientia esse non potest.» (*Ibid.* 170 B)

Of the author of *Hypomnesticon* it can with equal truth be affirmed that precision and conciseness were characteristic of his style. He is constantly in search of the most accurate terms with which to express theological and even philosophical truths. He is obviously anxious to avoid all ambiguity and to express his thought with absolute clarity, as the following illustration clearly shows:

«Mors itaque privatio vitae est, nomen tantum habens, non essentiam; et ideo Deus eius auctor esse dici non potest. Quidquid enim Deum fecisse dicimus, habet essentiam, id est, speciem. Essentia enim dicitur ab eo quod est, quae tantum de solo Deo dici debet ... Tamen et de ceteris creaturis dici potest quod habeant essentiam; sed non sicut de Deo, qui initium non habet quod est, sed ex quo accipientes a Deo initium, quod sunt esse coeperunt.» (*Resp.* I, 4)

The trait is also evident in the explanation of free will:

«Arbitrium scilicet ab arbitrando rationali consideratione, vel discernendo quid eligat, quidve recusat, puto quod nomen accepit; vel ideo liberum dictum, quod in sua sit positum potestate, habens agendi quod velit possibilitatem, quod est vitalis et rationalis animae motus.» (Resp. III, 4)

Again, his precision is illustrated in the careful distinction he makes in Responsio II, 1 between sinful nature and sin:

«Adam igitur factus est absque peccato natura; cum vero peccavit homo, natura peccavit, et facta est natura iam peccatrix, id est vitium habens peccati, non ipsa effecta vitium vel peccatum.» (Resp. II, 1)

As for conciseness, the author of Hypomnesticon gives many examples of the quality throughout his work. A few examples will suffice to illustrate the point:

«Per velle ergo malum, recte perdidit posse bonum, qui per posse bonum potuit vincere velle malum.» (Resp. III, 4)

«Itaque nec gratia sine libero arbitrio facit hominem habere beatam vitam, nec liberum arbitrium sine gratia.» (Resp. III, 11)

«Eva ergo peccatum a diabolo mutuavit, Adam consensu cautionem fecit, usura posteritati crevit.» (Resp. V, 1)

Summing up the effect of Sacred Scripture on the style of Prosper of Aquitaine, it may be said that his style is wholly dominated by the Bible. The language of Sacred Scripture flows through all parts of his works and contributes to it very much of its vigour and originality ¹. It is true that for Christian writers of the Vth century the Bible was the source *par excellence* for theological treatises, but what distinguishes Prosper is the extent of the Scriptural penetration into his work, the all-pervasiveness of the sacred text. Other contemporary writers could abound in classical allusions, e. g. Jerome, Julian of Eclanum ², Marius Mercator ³,

¹ Valentin refers briefly to the influence of Sacred Scripture on Prosper's style in his book; cf. *op. cit.* p. 531.

² Some examples of Jerome's allusions to classical authors are to be found in foot-note p. 105, n. 3. A. Bruckner gives many illustrations of Julian of Eclanum's usage in this matter in *Julian von Eclanum, sein Leben und seine Lehre* TU 15,3 (Leipzig 1897) 87-90. Bruckner remarks: «Wie der Kirchengeschichte, so hat Julian auch der römischen Litteratur ein reges Interesse entgegengebracht und besonders Virgil und Cicero mit großem Fleiße studiert» (*Op. cit.* p. 87).

³ In his *Commonitorium adversum haeresim Pelagii*, Marius Mercator refers to Juvenal at the end of the prologue (ACO I, V, i, p. 7: PL 48, 121 A); to Persius (ACO *Ibid.* p. 11: PL 48, 140 A and B); to Sallust (ACO *Ibid.* p. 19: PL 48, 162 A); Sallust and Horace (ACO *Ibid.* p. 23: PL 48, 172 A).

but Prosper distinguishes himself from them by ignoring the classical authors. On the other hand, every page of his theological writing is liberally interspersed with biblical texts, very particularly from St. Paul. Thus, of approximately 49 Scripture quotations in the *Pro Augustino responsiones ad cap. obj. Gallorum* 20 are taken from St. Paul's Epistles, and of approximately 54 texts in the *Pro Augustino responsiones ad excerpta Genuensium* 26 derive from St. Paul, and likewise of 191 Scriptural quotations in the *Contra Collatorem* 77 were noted to have been taken from the Pauline Epistles.

Hypomnesticon's style, so far as the influence of Sacred Scripture and Scriptural quotations are concerned, is strikingly similar to that of Prosper. Just as in Prosper, explicit citations from the pagan classics are ignored, and instead, just as in the case of Prosper, Sacred Scripture is so woven into the texture of the author's style as to be at times indistinguishable from the writer's own words. He cites the sacred text with an extraordinary frequency and appositeness. Indeed, a comparative study made between Hypomnesticon and Prosper's *Contra Collatorem* revealed the fact that the frequency of Scripture quotations relatively to the length of the text showed a remarkably similar proportion in both works. Besides, the preference for St. Paul which is so marked in Prosper's works was found to be equally marked in the author of Hypomnesticon; so much so, in fact, that almost half the number of Scripture quotations in his work were noted to have been borrowed from St. Paul. Similarly, just as in Prosper's works the sacred text is introduced with considerable skill, either without an introductory phrase or by means of constantly varying formulae, so also in Hypomnesticon a certain art is observable in the method employed for citing the divine word. And just as certain chapters of Prosper's works are composed of a veritable tissue of texts, intertwined or juxtaposed, e. g. *Pro Augustino responsiones ad cap. Gallorum*, 8; *Pro Augustino responsiones ad excerpta Genuensium*, 4; *Contra Collatorem*, 8; so also certain chapters of Hypomnesticon are likewise woven almost throughout with texts of Scripture, e. g. Responsio III, 5; 7; 12; Responsio V, 7.

The oratorical character of Prosper's style is so pronounced that it has been claimed that his language was perhaps more that of an orator than of a theologian¹. Though there may be something of exaggeration in such a view, it is not without some foundation. At any rate, it is certain

¹ Cf. VALENTIN, *op. cit.* p. 531.

that Prosper's style reveals an oratorical quality of high merit, as will appear from a few out of many possible examples:

«Itane libera est ista libertas, ut quantum ex se habeat fastidii ut negligat gratiam Dei, tantum ex se habeat delectationis ut diligat? Itane illum vetustae infidelitatis glaciale rigorem nullus meridiani caloris spiritus relaxavit, et torpor mentis obstrictae de suo algore concaluit; et dicente Domino: 'Ignem veni mittere in terram', nulla ad cor frigidum scintilla pervenit, et cinis mortuus a semetipso in flammam charitatis exarsit? ... Et tanta est secundum istum liberi arbitrii incolumitas et facultas, ut charitatem, quae in omnium arce virtutum est, non ex Dei munere, sed ex sola habeant voluntate.» (PL 51, 251 A)

«Cur bellum confectum retractant, et munitiones securae dudum pacis infirmant? An victores displicent, et victi placent; tantaque insolentia damnati foventur errores, ut pravitatis invidia, et auctores nostri pulsantur et iudices? An vero ita se novorum censorum norma exactior temperavit, ut et nulla eorum quae excisa sunt, asserat, et quaedam ex his quae defensa sunt, respuat? Ecce salva catholicae pace victoriae, salva indissolubili reverentia decretorum, parati sumus patronos doctrinae emendationis audire, et circumcisas ab omni errore lineas subtilissimae discretionis agnoscere.» (*Ibid.* 217 A)

In Hypomnesticon the oratorical turn is no less marked than in Prosper's works, and just as can be observed in Prosper, it is precisely in the measure that the author's indignation is roused by error that his oratory excels. The errors of Julian of Eclanum were particularly hateful to Prosper, as is manifest from the reference he makes to the heretic in the *Chronicon* under the title of Theodosius XVII and Festus, Consuls (PL 51, 598 B); and Hypomnesticon shows the author to share the same hatred. It is very indicative, therefore, to find that it is precisely in the IVth Responsio, directed, as we saw, against Julian, that the fiery oratory of the author reaches its climax. Indeed, throughout that entire Responsio the exalted tone and the oratorical flow are particularly sustained and powerful. In the VIth Responsio, on the other hand, where the Semi-Pelagians are in question, the oratorical strain is perceptibly less pronounced, though it is far from being absent. The following extract from Responsio IV will serve as an example ¹:

«Pergite adhuc per campos loquacitatis vestrae, qua tantae turpitudinis squalorem laudare non erubescitis, et clamate secundum con-

¹ These passages are not quoted in the order in which they appear in the text: the third extract precedes the second in the Responsio from which they are taken.

suetudinem vestram, dicentes: 'Libido calor bonus est genialis, nec est quod pudeat in ea...' Quid praestigiosissimis assertionibus vestris diem in noctem mutare nitimini? Quid nebulis serena convolvitis? Quid intuentibus lucem, ferventes in calore turpi, quem optimum praedicatis, ut cordis eorum oculus perturbetis, fumi amaritudinem erucatis? (Resp. IV, 7) «Isto calore si vigor mentis vestrae ad illicita non dissolveretur, non a vobis tam licite laudaretur, quin potius sicut a catholicis damnaretur.» (*Ibid.*)

It is curious to note the similarity amid diversity in the above oratorical passages. Both Prosper and the author of *Hypomnesticon* draw their similes from nature, and both heighten the effect by a contrast of opposites: in the one case by the opposition between the glacial cold of the human heart in sin and the noonday warmth of the Spirit; in the other by the opposition between the dark clouds of Pelagian error concerning 'libido' and the bright light of Catholic truth. It is further curious that the association in *Hypomnesticon*'s example of 'amaritudo' with 'fumus' is remarkably similar to that between 'amaritudo' and 'fumosa' in the *Epistula ad Rufinum*, 4: «amaritudinem istam volet fumosae recipere vanitatis.» (*Ibid.* 80 A)

Among the qualities observable in Prosper's style is its military character. The violent terms of battle and warfare are often used in similes to describe the struggle against heresy and doctrinal error in which the author was engaged. It is true that St. Paul had set a standard in this matter and that the language of war was particularly apt in connection with heresy. Nevertheless, Prosper distinguished himself by his choice of military expressions, as can be seen from a reading, say, of his *Contra Collatorem*. There the language of the battle-field is often used:

«... contra inimicos gratiae Dei catholica acies, huius viri [Augustini] ductu pugnat et vincit. Et vincit, dico, quia non patitur respirare quos vicit ... Cur bellum confectum retractant, et munitiones securae dudum pacis infirmant? An victores displicent, et victi placent?» (PL 51, 216-217)

«... inter nostros et Pelagianos quaestio versaretur, non ancipiti victoria, nec dubio diremptum est fine certamen; ut adhuc nobis de iniquissima hujus foederis tui pace tractandum sit. Prostrata est inimica acies, bellum confectum est, victores sumus.» (*Ibid.* 229 A)

«... demonstratum est, reprehensores sancti Augustini et vana objicere, et recta impugnare, et prava defendere; peremptorumque armis intestinum bellum moventes, dictis divinis, atque humanis constitutionibus rebellare.» (*Ibid.* 274 B)

The militant character of Hypomnesticon's language is no less pronounced. From the very opening lines of the Praefatio the terms of battle used by Prosper resound:

«Adversarii catholicae fidei, dum contra regulam veritatis diabolicis armis pugnare nituntur, nos sollicitudine repugnandi faciunt cautiore; se vero decipiunt antequam nostrorum valeant aliquem vulnerare. Cum enim caeci evacuare thesauros fidei concertant ... nos quodammodo excitant dormientes, ut arrepto clipeo veritatis, falsitatibus eorum corde resistere vigilemus, evangelica tuba nostris auribus insonante: *Vigilate* ...» (Praefatio)

«Arma contra legem sumit ex lege; impugnat evangelium ex evangelio pugnans ... Sed haec sibi sunt poena, quae inordinate proferens putat esse victoriam.» (*Ibid.*)

«Sed quantalibet latitudine mendaciorum vestrorum verbis muros haeresi vestrae circumquaque construatis, veritas vincit, cuius aries impulsus gratiae manibus, totum quassat et destruit, unde repugnatis et confiditis.» (Responsio V, 4)

«Omnem vero amputavit imperitorum suspicionem ancipitem, et nostram definitionem nullo haereticorum ariete quassandam muro vallavit.» (Responsio III, 15)

Here we notice very much the same belligerent language of Prosper: 'pugnare', 'impugnare', 'repugnare', 'resistere', 'bellum', 'arma', 'victoria', 'vincere', etc. which taken together show clearly a martial tone in the writing very similar to that of Prosper of Aquitaine.

Besides the foregoing points of resemblance, we find a number of expressions in Hypomnesticon that bear a resemblance to corresponding expressions in Prosper's works. The following will serve as examples.

Hypomnesticon

Prosper

«Deus, iudex iustus, comprehendi non potest, non potest reprehendi.» (Hypom. VI, 4)

«[Judicium Dei] quod nefas est ideo reprehendi, quia non potest comprehendi.» (Prosper: PL 51, 166 C)

«Venit in similitudinem carnis peccati, non ut ille qui iacebat in carne peccati.» (Resp. III, 8)

«... quamvis ille natus sit in similitudine carnis peccati, omnis autem homo nascatur in carne peccati.» (*Ibid.* 165 A)

«Et gratiae eius ingratus existens, sanum te naturaliter putas liberum arbitrium possidere?» (Resp. III, 4)

«... neque simul et libero arbitrio infensus, et gratiae Dei esset ingratus.» (*Ibid.* 235 B)

«... quos ideo punit, quia quid essent futuri ... praescivit.» (Resp. VI, 2)

«... quapropter omnes homines qui salvantur, Deo volente salvantur.» (Resp. VI, 8)

«Nos quodammodo excitant dormientes ut ... vigilemus evangelica tuba nostris auribus insonante: Vigilate ...» (Praefatio)

«... nisi gratia per Iesum Christum Dominum nostrum subvenerit salutaris.» (Resp. IV, 9)

«Per se ergo homo lapsum facere potuit quia voluit; sed non sicut per se lapsus est continuo a lapsu per se ... consurgere valuit.» (Resp. III, 3)

«Et nostram definitionem nullo haereticorum ariete quassandam muro vallavit.» (Resp. III, 15)

«... quos in operibus impietatis et mortis praescivit, non praeordinavit, nec impulit.» (Resp. VI, 5)

«... tunc a nobis limes fidei sanae defenditur, quando termini quos posuerunt sancti patres, non transferuntur.» (Resp. III, 8)

«Distende te in longitudinem et latitudinem ...» (Resp. VI, 4)

«... ideo praedestinati non sunt, quia tales futuri ... praesciti sunt.» (Ibid. 158 C)

«... qui salvantur, ideo salvi sint, quia illos voluit Deus salvos fieri.» (Ibid. 172 B)

«... numquam debet in auribus fidelium vox illa Domini non sonare qua Apostolis dicitur: Vigilate ...» (Ibid. 713 B)

«... nisi ei per Dominum nostrum Iesum Christum Dei gratia subvenerit.» (Ibid. 169 A)

«... homo qui in libero arbitrio fuit malus, in ipso libero arbitrio factus est bonus, sed per se malus, per Deum bonus.» (Ibid. 87 C)

«... si hanc pastoralis speculae validissimam turrim crebra Pelagiani arietis illusione pulsaverint.» (Ibid. 270 C)

«... omnino ipse non fecit, neque fieri suasit, aut impulit.» (Ibid. 167 B)

«... non solum nobis, sed et aliis utile sit, ad aliquem nos limitem pervenisse, quem non debeamus excedere.» (Ibid. 649 B)

«[Malum] ab ortu suo latius longiusque distenditur.» (Ibid. 215 B)

The formulae of 'renvoi' which we already observed to be so marked a feature of Hypomnesticon by reason of their frequency are very similar to those employed by Prosper:

«... ut ad propositum superioris disputationis revertamur.» (Resp. III, 8)

«... ut ad ea quae superius disputare coepimus revertamur.» (Resp. VI, 4)

«... quos superius memoravi.» (Resp. III, 14)

«... ad id unde digressa est disputatio revertamur.» (Ibid. 694 A)

«... de quibus dictum supra memoravimus.» (Ibid. 166 A)

Likewise, similar formulae are used in connection with the effort already observed both in Hypomnesticon and Prosper to attain clarity and precision:

«Ut evidentius ergo cognoscas donum esse gratiam et fidem ...» (Resp. III, 15)	«Quod ut evidentius appareat ...» (<i>Ibid.</i> 653 B)
	«Deinde, ut evidentius definias ...» (<i>Ibid.</i> 223 C)

The habit of using participles in sequence is particularly conspicuous in Hypomnesticon; it is also noticeable in Prosper's works:

«... ipsa [gratia] faciente, gubernante et perficiente ...» (Resp. III, 13)	«... ipso [Deo] vocante, docente, salvante ...» (<i>Ibid.</i> 85 B)
«... obviantem et resistentem et praevalentem ...» (Resp. IV, 5)	«... corrigens et mundans atque emendans ...» (<i>Ibid.</i> 199 C)
«David loquentem ... prophetantem ... dicentem ...» (Resp. V, 3)	

The frequent use of superlatives is characteristic of Hypomnesticon, and is no less marked in Prosper's style. Examples are so numerous in both cases that an attempt to give comparative lists would be impracticable, but it may be stated that an examination of the superlatives in the *Contra Collatorem* of Prosper and those of Hypomnesticon revealed that the incidence of the form was proportionately similar. It was also found that in both cases the frequency of superlatives tended to be greater in the measure that the author's indignation was roused by error. Thus, in the IVth Responsio of Hypomnesticon, in chapters 7, 8, and 9, where the author reaches the climax of his indignation against Julian's teaching on the question of 'libido', superlatives are used more frequently than in any other parts of the work. Similarly, when Prosper's feelings are more particularly roused by Cassian's errors, superlatives are more likely to flow in greater abundance, and we notice in the same work that on the sole occasion that Julian of Eclanum is mentioned a superlative adjective is used to describe him. viz. 'procacissimus Iulianus' (*Contra Collatorem*, 21; PL 51, 270 C).

Very many other stylistic features common to Prosper of Aquitaine and the author of Hypomnesticon can be noted. Thus, the use of antithesis, hyperbaton, irony, metaphor, anaphora, parenthesis, paronomasia, and similar figures is equally present in the style of both, but as such

literary devices were part of the stock-in-trade of the writers of the period, particularly of writers with oratorical leanings such as Prosper and the author of Hypomnesticon undoubtedly had, they are merely negative criteria so far as our present aim is concerned: their absence in one of the authors in question and their presence in the other would indeed be of importance, but their presence in both has very restricted significance in identifying the authors. Again, the prose rhythm of Hypomnesticon and that of Prosper's works show marked similarity, as can be observed from many of the passages already quoted, but here also the rhythmic features are, in the main, common to much of the prose writing of the period, and accordingly their value for our immediate purpose is greatly reduced. We pass, therefore, to a brief survey of the question of vocabulary.

Vocabulary

J. Young, in a work referred to earlier ¹, after a systematic and careful examination of Prosper's vocabulary with a view to identifying the author of the *De vocatione omnium gentium*, came to the following conclusion:

«The very close resemblance between the genuine Prosper and Leo and the fairly close resemblance between Augustine and Leo reflect the fact that Christian theological vocabulary and the higher Christian prose style in general in the first half of the fifth century had become relatively stereotyped» ².

Later the same writer adds:

«In general, the results of my studies on the vocabulary and clausulae of the *De vocatione* may be summarized as follows: The vocabulary is not conclusive for or against Prosperian authorship, but indicates that the *De vocatione* is one of the more carefully composed works of the fifth century» ³.

Accordingly, there is nothing particularly significant in the fact that the vocabulary of Hypomnesticon should bear a marked resemblance to that of Prosper of Aquitaine, and that the number of words common to both should be very great. This is the very least that could be ex-

¹ *Studies on the Style of the 'De vocatione omnium gentium' ascribed to Prosper of Aquitaine*, chapters 1 to 3 (*Op. cit.* p. 11-71).

² *Op. cit.* p. 174.

³ *Op. cit.* p. 179.

pected of works intimately dependent on Augustine for their inspiration and sharing so extensively his rich theological vocabulary, while dealing contemporaneously with closely related subjects which had given rise to more or less stereotyped terminology. It is true that there are words in Hypomnesticon that do not form part of the vocabulary of Prosper's acknowledged works, and the converse is, of course, also true. This should cause no surprise since Hypomnesticon, to the extent that it is a systematic refutation of Pelagianism, has no counterpart in Prosper's works, with the exception of the *Carmen de ingratis*. Naturally, this latter does not deal at all as extensively with the Pelagian errors as Hypomnesticon – for example, the entire controversy on the 'libido' question which fills the IVth Responsio is entirely ignored – and as a result it is to be expected that much of the vocabulary special to the Pelagian controversy, as distinct from the Semi-Pelagian debate, will be absent from Prosper's undoubtedly genuine works.

Conspicuous among the words found in Hypomnesticon and absent from Prosper's accepted works is the term 'protoplastus' used as a synonym for Adam. It occurs very frequently in the first five Responsiones of Hypomnesticon, but, as was pointed out earlier, it does not occur in the VIth Responsio, even though Adam is mentioned several times there. Bearing in mind the fact that the first five Responsiones are concerned directly with Pelagianism and that the sixth is concerned with Semi-Pelagian problems exclusively, and also the fact that the term 'protoplastus' does occur in at least one Pelagian writing¹ while never occurring in Semi-Pelagian ones, the use of the word in the first five Responsiones and its absence in the sixth will be understandable to some degree. And by this very fact, the absence of the word in Prosper's accepted works will also be understandable: none of these latter – with the exception of the *Carmen de ingratis* – deals directly with Pelagianism, but are occupied rather with Semi-Pelagian problems. In brief, the absence of the word 'protoplastus' in the known works of Prosper and its presence in Hypomnesticon is no more an argument against his authorship of the latter than its presence in the first five Responsiones of Hypomnesticon and its absence in the sixth is an argument against the unity of composition of the work. There are reasons to explain its

¹ This work is the *De induratione cordis Pharaonis* of Pelagius. The word 'protoplastus' occurs in chapter 35 of the text as published by G. DE PLINVAL in his *Essai sur le style et la langue de Pélage* (Fribourg in Switzerland 1947) 177; and also in PLS I (1958) 1525.

presence in the one case and its absence in the other. Besides, it must be remembered that in the Pelagian debate the name Adam naturally occurred with great frequency, because of the central position in the controversy occupied by Original Sin, whereas there was scarcely any reason for its use in the Semi-Pelagian controversy at all. In such circumstances, an author with the feeling for style that the author of *Hypomnesticon* evinces is likely to search for effective synonyms to avoid the endless repetition of the same word. So we find him using a variety of terms to designate Adam, viz. 'primus homo' (Resp. I, 3; II, 1 etc.); 'protoplastus' (Resp. I, 1 and passim); 'primoplastus' (Resp. V, 4); 'parens' (II, 1). Finally, it may be remarked that the word 'protoplastus' had a respectable ecclesiastical tradition behind it. Apart from the fact that it occurred in the LXX translation of Wisdom 7, 1 and 10, 1¹, it is found in the writings of Tertullian², Cyprian³, Ambrose⁴, Jerome⁵ and Marius Mercator⁶. Hence there is nothing extraordinary about its use in *Hypomnesticon*.

Again, the term 'libido' which was a pivotal term in the debate with Julian of Eclanum occurs very frequently in *Responsio IV* of *Hypomnesticon* where Julian's teaching is explicitly refuted⁷. In Prosper's accepted works, on the other hand, Julian's teaching is never given detailed treatment, and as a result one is not surprised to find terms such as 'libido' and 'concupiscentia' either not being mentioned at all in Prosper's works, or occurring only very rarely.

To enter into greater detail regarding the vocabulary of Prosper and of *Hypomnesticon* would be quite futile from our point of view. For if the difference in vocabulary can be explained by reference to the orientation and subject-matter involved, and if the extensive agreements can be accounted for by reference to the stereotyped Vth century theological language common to the Christian writers of the period, vocabulary, as

¹ Cf. A. RAHLFS, *Septuaginta* Vol. 2, 6th edition (Stuttgart 1959) 854.

² Cf. *Adversus Iudaeos* 13 [CCL 2 (1954) 1387: PL 2, 635 A]; *De exhortatione castitatis* 2, n. 6 (CCL 2, 1017: PL 2, 916 B).

³ Cf. *De habitu virginum* 4 [CSEL 3, i (1868) 190: PL 4, 444].

⁴ Cf. *Sermo* 27, 5 (PL 17, 661 C).

⁵ Cf. *Commentarium in Evangelium Matthaei*, Book 3, chapter 20, 13 (PL 26, 141 D).

⁶ Marius uses the word only in his translation of Nestorius's *Contra haeresim Pelagii* (ACO I, V, i p. 61: PL 48, 192 A). He does not use it in his own works. See above, p. 72.

⁷ The term 'libido' occurs in all nine chapters of *Responsio IV* and is of particularly frequent occurrence in chapters 2 and 7.

a criterion of authorship, becomes largely neutral, or at least a negative criterion. Besides, in the absence of a critical edition of Prosper's works any results obtained by a comparative study of Prosper's vocabulary with that of Hypomnesticon would necessarily be provisional: without a critical text, conclusions based on vocabulary could well be built on sand. However, to the extent that the available text of Prosper's works enables one to judge there seem to be no solid reasons for denying Prosper's authorship of Hypomnesticon so far as vocabulary is concerned. But to go further and claim that the vocabulary gives evidence for Prosper's authorship cannot reasonably be done.

e) *Objections considered*

1. A possible objection to Prosper's authorship of Hypomnesticon is the absence of reference to the book in Gennadius's account of Prosper and his works in the *De viris inlustribus*, 85.

Answer: It is true that in chapter 85 of the *De viris inlustribus* Gennadius gives a brief account of Prosper and makes reference to some of his works¹. However, this writer mentions explicitly but two of these latter, the *Chronicon* and the *Contra Collatorem* together with some epistles against Eutyches which Prosper was said to have written for Pope Leo². Thus, Gennadius makes no allusion to the *Carmen de ingratis*, the *Epistula ad Augustinum*, the *Epistula ad Rufinum*, the three *Responsiones pro Augustino*, the *Expositio psalmorum*, etc., about whose Prosperian authorship there is no doubt. Indeed, it is obvious that Gennadius did not claim to give a full list of Prosper's works, and that he was not acquainted with them all. This appears from his statement: «Prosper ... multa composuisse dicitur»³, followed by his remark that

¹ Gennadius's account reads: «Prosper, homo Aquitanicae regionis, sermone scholasticus et adsertionibus nervosus, multa composuisse dicitur, ex quibus ego *Chronica* nomine illius praetitulata legi, continentia a primi hominis condicione, iuxta Divinarum Scripturarum fidem, usque ad obitum Valentiniani Augusti et captivitatem Romanae urbis a Genserico, Vandalorum rege factam. Legi et librum adversus opuscula (suppresso nomine) Cassiani, quae ecclesia Dei salutaria probat, ille infamat nociva. Re enim vera Cassiani et Prosperi de gratia Dei et libero arbitrio sententiae in aliquibus sibi inveniuntur contrariae. Epistulae quoque Papae Leonis adversus Eutychen de vera Christi incarnatione ad diversos datae ab isto dictatae creduntur.» *Liber de viris inlustribus*, chapter 85, edition of E. C. RICHARDSON, TU 14 (1896) 90. The text is also to be found in chapter 84 of the Migne edition: PL 58, 1107-1108.

² *Loc. cit.*

³ *Ibid.*

of these works he had read the *Chronicon* and the *Contra Collatorem*. The absence of reference to Hypomnesticon in Gennadius's account of Prosper does not, therefore, constitute an argument against Prosper's authorship of the work.

2. It may be objected that the absence of all reference to Prosper in the extant MSS. of Hypomnesticon constitutes a grave difficulty against Prosper's authorship of the work.

Answer: This difficulty must necessarily arise in all attempts to find the author of Hypomnesticon and it has no more significance in connection with Prosper's authorship of the work than in that of any other possible author. Besides, there exists another work ascribed by modern scholarship to Prosper, viz. the *Praeteritorum Sedis Apostolicae episcoporum auctoritates de gratia Dei et libero voluntatis arbitrio*, known also as the *Capitula*¹, whose authenticity is entirely devoid of the support of the manuscripts, and therefore dependent uniquely on internal evidence². As a consequence, this work was ascribed without reservation to Pope Celestine up to the XVIth century³. It seems, therefore, that Prosper sometimes left his works anonymous. Further, it appears that of the works generally attributed to Prosper, the *De vocatione omnium gentium* was also left anonymous by its author, for we find that within fifty years of its composition, Pope Gelasius, in his *Dicta adversus Pelagianam haeresim* refers to a passage in the *De vocatione* with the words: «Quidam magister ecclesiae sapienter edocuit dicens ...»⁴. And the question of its authenticity was a matter of considerable doubt until Cappuyns vindicated the work for Prosper in 1927⁵. On the hypothesis,

¹ The best edition is that of P. and H. BALLERINI, *apud S. Leonis opera II* (Venice 1756) 251-257. It is also available in PL 45, 1756-1760; 50, 531-537; 51, 205-212; 84, 682-686; 130, 750-754.

² Dom M. CAPPUYNS probed the Prosperian authorship of this work in RB 41 (1929) 156-170. B. ALTANER in his *Patrologie. Leben, Schriften und Lehre der Kirchenväter*, 6th edition (Freiburg im Br. 1960) 415, accepts the attribution and so also does Dom E. DEKKERS in CPL² p. 120, n. 527. Having referred to the absence of all manuscript witnesses to support the authenticity of the work, CAPPUYNS adds: «C'est dire que la critique externe est impuissante à résoudre le problème de leur origine [des *capitula*], et que nous n'avons à notre disposition que les seuls critères d'ordre interne.» (*Art. cit.* p. 156-157.)

³ *Art. cit.* p. 156.

⁴ Pope Gelasius reigned from 492 till his death in 496. The passage quoted by Gelasius is in his *Dicta adversus Pelagianam haeresim* (PL 59, 127 B and C).

⁵ RB 39 (1927) 198-226.

therefore, that Prosper was the author of Hypomnesticon, there would be nothing specially significant about the book being left anonymous; and if it was published anonymously, there was every chance that the MS. copies would later appear without the author's name ¹.

3. The absence of Augustine's name in the text of Hypomnesticon could be taken as a major objection against the Prosperian authorship of the work. Prosper was such a devoted disciple of Augustine that the omission of his name in one of his genuine works is not to be expected.

Answer: This objection is not as formidable as it may appear at first sight. For one thing, we find that the *Pro Augustino responsiones ad capitula obiectionum Vincentianarum* which is universally accepted as a genuine work of Prosper contains no reference to Augustine in its text, and the same is true of the *De vocatione omnium gentium*. In the case of the *Pro Augustino responsiones ad cap. Vinc.* the mention of the Bishop of Hippo's name in the title was sufficient to indicate the orientation of the author's thought in relation to St. Augustine. Similarly, in the case of Hypomnesticon, the inclusion of Augustine's name in the title: «Hypomnesticon Augustini episcopi ...» bears eloquent testimony to the fact that the work in its entirety was dependent on Augustine for its contents ². Since the work professed to be a resumé of Augustine's teaching against the Pelagians and Celestians, further explicit reference to Augustine in the body of the text became unnecessary, and the same is true, in its own way, of the *Pro Augustino responsiones ad cap. Vinc.* In fact, the omission of Augustine's name is considerably more difficult to explain in the case of the *De vocatione omnium gentium*, for there the name of Augustine is not merely absent from the body of the text, but the title contains no allusion to him either.

4. It may also be objected that the silence of the author of Hypomnesticon about the Fathers of the Church and the Councils is a serious difficulty against Prosper's authorship of the work.

¹ The anonymous publication of works was certainly not unknown in Prosper's time. St. Jerome attests the existence of the practice and condemned it; cf. *Epistula ad Evangelium presbyterum* [*Epist.* 73, n. 1. CSEL 55 (1912) 13: PL 22, 676]. It should be remarked, as was noted in connection with Chapter IV, § 3, a), that I recently found two MSS. in the Vatican Library, viz. Vat. Lat. 500 and 501 which refer to Prosper as the author of Hypomnesticon.

² This point was alluded to earlier; cf. p. 45 and p. 46.

Answer: So far as reference to the Fathers of the Church is concerned, Hypomnesticon fares better than the undoubtedly genuine *Pro Augustino responsiones ad cap. Vinc.* For this latter work contains no allusion whatever to the Fathers, whereas Hypomnesticon contains one general reference to them:

«Ista interim iam a maioribus ecclesiae catholicae tractatoribus dicta vel exposita sunt, sed tunc a nobis limes fidei sanae defenditur, quando termini quos posuerunt sancti patres non transferuntur, immo observantur et defensantur a nobis.» (Resp. III, 8)

Besides, though the *Carmen de ingratis* makes mention of some Fathers ¹, it was not Prosper's practice to make frequent explicit allusion to them.

So far as reference to Councils of the Church is concerned, Hypomnesticon is identical with the *Pro Augustino responsiones ad cap. Gallorum* and the *Pro Augustino responsiones ad excerpta Genuensium*, and the only difference it shows in relation to the *Pro Augustino responsiones ad cap. Vinc.* is that this latter makes a general reference to the authority of the Apostolic See in the Praefatio:

«Propositis igitur singillatim sedecim capitulis, sub unoquoque eorum, sensus nostri, et fidei quam contra Pelagianos ex apostolicae sedis auctoritate defendimus ...» (PL 51, 178 A)

but no mention is made of the Councils of the Church in that work. Hence, in the case of Hypomnesticon, the omission of more detailed reference to the Fathers, and the silence in regard to the Councils of the Church do not seem to constitute an insuperable obstacle to Prosper's authorship of the work.

It may also be added that the author of Hypomnesticon very probably realized the futility of using Patristic arguments and the authority of Councils against such opponents as Julian of Eclanum ² and his followers. As we saw earlier ³, the argument from the Fathers held very little weight for Julian and by openly acting in defiance of the Councils which had condemned Pelagius and Celestius by his support of their doctrines, he showed how useless arguments based on these sources would be against

¹ Cf. lines 55 ff. (PL 51, 98 A); lines 91 ff. (*Ibid.* 102 A). Cf. also *Contra Collatorem* 13, (*Ibid.* 250 C); *Pro Augustino responsiones ad excerpta Genuensium* 3 (*Ibid.* 189 C).

² Cf. p. 14.

³ *Ibid.*

him. On the other hand, his attitude towards Sacred Scripture¹ would have made of it a more hopeful weapon in controversy with him. Therefore, it is possible that the author of Hypomnesticon decided to waive arguments based on the authority of the Fathers and Councils of the Church and to concentrate on Sacred Scripture as a common court of appeal.

5. The similarities of doctrine, Scripture usage, and style, which were found to exist between Prosper and Hypomnesticon may be explained by the dependence of one of them on the other.

Answer: The likelihood of the dependence of Prosper on Hypomnesticon is countered by the fact that Prosper, in his *Epistula ad Augustinum* and *Epistula ad Rufinum* which ante-date Hypomnesticon, raised problems, together with their discussion, which recur similarly in Hypomnesticon, e. g. the problem of predestination as applied to nations, that was dealt with earlier in this Chapter², and also the Semi-Pelagian objection against Augustine's doctrine on predestination that was likewise treated earlier³. Therefore, whatever possibility there may be that Hypomnesticon depended on Prosper, the converse seems to be excluded.

On the hypothesis that Hypomnesticon was composed by an author other than Prosper of Aquitaine, the theoretical possibility of the dependence of the former on the latter cannot be denied, but practically it is made very improbable. An investigation among the contemporaries of Prosper to find the author of Hypomnesticon proved fruitless. On the other hand, the author of Hypomnesticon shows himself to be a personality of outstanding ability and power, with an exceptional mastery of Augustine's teaching on the relation between grace and free will, on Original Sin, and on predestination, who is concerned to defend and expound that teaching, and who shows in his writing an assurance and conviction which are quite remarkable. He speaks with a characteristic tone of authority and maintains a measure of independence and of originality vis-à-vis St. Augustine. In no other author of the period besides Prosper of Aquitaine are these and the other characteristics of the author

¹ Julian seems to have subordinated Sacred Scripture to reason, as appears in his statement: «Cum igitur liquido clareat hanc sanam et veram esse sententiam, quam primo loco ratio, deinde Scripturarum munivit auctoritas», *apud* AUGUSTINE, *Contra Julianum* I, 7, n. 29 (PL 44, 661).

² Cf. p. 84-87.

³ Cf. p. 87-88.

of Hypomnesticon to be found in the same degree. Besides, Prosper was the recognized authority on Augustine's teaching in his day, and if anyone was likely to give an authoritative resumé of the great Bishop's teaching on Pelagianism such as Hypomnesticon contains, that person is, before all others, Prosper of Aquitaine.

Incidentally, it may be added that the foregoing considerations serve to dispose of another theoretical possibility, viz. the dependence of Hypomnesticon and Prosper on a second source – Augustine being the first – to account for the multiple agreements and similarities which exist between Hypomnesticon and Prosper among themselves but not vis-à-vis St. Augustine. A source of this kind must have been important and even if it were subsequently lost, it should have left traces in other literature besides Hypomnesticon and Prosper's writings.

6. Finally, the objection may be raised that in Prosper's known works the 'libido' question, which occupies the entire IVth Responsio of Hypomnesticon, is never discussed.

Answer: With the exception of the *Carmen de ingratis*, the known polemical works of Prosper of Aquitaine are concerned primarily with Semi-Pelagian problems. In these latter, the debate about 'libido' had no place, so it is natural that the issue should not arise in the works. The *Carmen de ingratis*, in its turn, is principally concerned to show the crucial danger of Semi-Pelagianism in its teaching on grace and free will because of its organic bond with Pelagianism. As the title implies, the central theme in the poem is grace. The discussion of the 'libido' question in the context of the *Carmen* would, therefore, have been irrelevant, and its omission could be expected. Hypomnesticon, on the other hand, is a formal and comprehensive refutation of Pelagianism as such¹ and, therefore, to be complete would have to include a discussion of the question to which Julian had given such importance in the Pelagian debate². Accordingly, it may be concluded that the absence of discussion of the 'libido' topic in the known works of Prosper is no argument against his possible authorship of Hypomnesticon.

¹ This does not mean that Semi-Pelagian problems are not also a preoccupation of the author of Hypomnesticon; cf. above, pp. 15-17; 81-84; 87-89; 91-92.

² AUGUSTINE'S *Contra duas epistulas Pelagianorum*; *De nuptiis et concupiscentia*; *Contra Julianum*; *Opus imperfectum contra Julianum* bear ample witness to the fact.

CONCLUSIONS

1. With regard to the authorship of *Hypomnesticon*, a study of the manuscripts of the work suggested a possible association between the the work and Prosper of Aquitaine.

2. An investigation among a number of disciples of St. Augustine, including Sixtus, presbyter of Rome and later Pope Sixtus III, Marius Mercator, *Quodvultdeus*, Paulinus of Milan, Leo the Great, Augustine of Aquileia and Paulus Orosius, led to negative conclusions.

3. The title and the name of the divisions of *Hypomnesticon* showed possible links with Prosper of Aquitaine's known works.

4. A doctrinal comparison between *Hypomnesticon* and Prosper showed such a degree of resemblance as to suggest a relation of special intimacy between them and indeed to make Prosper's authorship of the work probable.

5. A study of the Scripture quotations common to *Hypomnesticon* and Prosper confirmed in a marked degree the conclusion reached by the doctrinal comparison.

6. A literary comparison based on characteristics of style, taken collectively, confirmed the likelihood of Prosper's authorship of *Hypomnesticon*; a comparative study of vocabulary, to the extent that its investigation was judged practicable, proved to be neutral so far as the question of Prosper's authorship was concerned.

7. The objections against Prosper's authorship that were examined did not prove formidable and were answered without undue difficulty.

8. In the absence of external arguments, caution and reserve are always advisable where the question of identifying the authors of anonymous writings is concerned. However, in the present instance there seem to be adequate grounds for concluding that *Hypomnesticon* was written by St. Prosper of Aquitaine and published shortly after St. Augustine's death, i. e. between 430 and 435¹. The work was directed, as the title indicates, against the Pelagians and Celestians, with particular reference to Julian of Eclanum's teaching in *Responsio IV*, and also with extensive reference to the Semi-Pelagians of southern and central Gaul, particularly in *Responsio III* and *VI*.

¹ As was indicated earlier, i. e. in Chapter III, p. 24, Georges de Plinval held that *Hypomnesticon* was written after 435. Since I wrote the above section, he has intimated privately that he now considers a date of composition prior to 435 more likely. To this extent, therefore, he now agrees with our conclusion.

Hypomnesticon and St. Augustine

A Doctrinal Comparison

An exhaustive analysis of the doctrinal content of Hypomnesticon is beyond the scope of this study. Indeed, the range of subjects treated, either directly or indirectly, in the book is so wide as to make of it, in some sort, a compendium of theology, whose exposition would require an entire volume. Hence, it is proposed to limit the discussion to certain specially chosen themes that were central in the Pelagian controversy and that serve to determine the position of Hypomnesticon in the theological development which took place in the first half of the Vth century.

As was remarked in passing several times already, Hypomnesticon is intimately dependent on St. Augustine. True, his name is never mentioned in the body of the work; but mention was unnecessary, as the name was included once for all in the title: «Hypomnesticon Augustini episcopi ...», and by this inclusion, the author, from the outset, acknowledged that his work as a whole depended for its inspiration on the saint. It is certain that Augustine's influence is everywhere present, and that it is his theology which forms the woof and warp of almost the entire theological fabric of the book. Nevertheless, as was also pointed out earlier, Hypomnesticon's conformity with Augustine's thought is not complete and a certain independence, characteristic of Prosper of Aquitaine, becomes apparent after even a brief comparative study. This being so, it seems best, as a method of procedure, to treat the main doctrinal themes of Hypomnesticon against the background of Augustine's teaching, in order to show, at one and the same time, the areas of agreement and disagreement between the two authors involved, and the doctrinal development vis-à-vis Augustine which can be detected in Hypomnesticon.

Basically, Hypomnesticon deals with three main theological problems, viz. Original Sin, Grace and Predestination. Of these, the first two were directed against the two great nerve centres of the Pelagian system, viz. the negative principle denying the transmission of Original Sin, and the positive principle affirming the innate power possessed by the human will of achieving moral excellence and of meriting grace by its own efforts. The third problem, viz. Predestination, more particularly concerned the Semi-Pelagians. To the problem of Original Sin, the author devoted four Responsiones, corresponding to the four major Pelagian propositions which summarized the Pelagian teaching on the matter. The problem of grace was treated in the extensive third Responsio, and that both in relation to the Pelagians and the Semi-Pelagians, as it was a problem about which both parties erred, though in different degrees. The third problem particularly concerned the Semi-Pelagians, and it is the subject of the additional sixth Responsio of Hypomnesticon. Hence, taking the theological problems in conjunction with the corresponding Responsiones of Hypomnesticon, we find that the work can be structurally analysed as follows:

1. *Original Sin*

- a) Death a consequence of Original Sin and a proof of its existence. (Responsio I)
- b) The transmission of Original Sin in general. (Responsio II)
- c) The transmission of Original Sin to children, and the necessity of Baptism. (Responsio V)
- d) Libido (lust) as a consequence of Original Sin. (Responsio IV)

2. *Grace*

- a) The necessity of Grace for merit. (Responsio III)
- b) The gratuity of Grace. (*Ibid.*)
- c) The compatibility of Grace with freedom of the will. (*Ibid.*)

3. *Predestination*

- a) Definition and nature of Predestination. (Responsio VI)
- b) Personal effort and Predestination. (*Ibid.*)
- c) Predestination and Prevision. (*Ibid.*)
- d) Predestination and God's salvific will. (*Ibid.*)

It is proposed to treat of these three main problems of Hypomnesticon,

viz. Original Sin, Grace and Predestination, but in order to avoid repetition, it is not intended to deal with all the sub-headings given above. Thus in the case of the first problem, viz. Original Sin, four aspects have been chosen, namely, the existence of Original Sin; its nature in Adam's descendants; its transmission; and finally, 'libido' as a consequence of Original Sin.

§ 1. Original Sin

a) *The Existence of Original Sin*

It was during the long years of controversy with the Pelagians from 411/412 onwards, that Augustine's teaching on Original Sin reached its maturity and was given its final form. It is true that the problem of evil in general, and that of Original Sin in particular, occupied his thoughts long before the Pelagian heresy made its influence felt, as is evident especially in the anti-Manichaean writings¹. But the Pelagian challenge demanded a more specialized and prolonged study of the problem and this gave rise to new developments, and issued in a comprehensive treatment not found in the earlier writings.

As was shown in Chapter I, § 1, the Pelagian denial of Original Sin constituted a cardinal issue in the heretical system and was given expression in the formula: «Quoniam peccatum Adae ipsum solum laeserit, et non genus humanum» (*De gestis Pelagii*, cap. 11)². Applied to mankind in general, this formula led to the proposition: «Adam mortalis factus est, qui sive peccaret, sive non peccaret moriturus esset»³, and applied to children, it produced the propositions: «Quoniam infantes nuper nati in illo statu sunt in quo Adam fuit ante praevaricationem»⁴, and «Baptismus parvulis datur solum ad regnum Dei, non vero ad salutem vitamque aeternam adipiscendam»⁵.

¹ Cf. *Confessiones* V, 14, 24-25, edition of M. Skutella (Leipzig 1934) 96-98: PL 32 717-719; *De moribus ecclesiae catholicae et de moribus Manichaeorum* (PL 32, 1309-1378); *De libero arbitrio libri tres* (CSEL 74 [1956]: PL 32, 1221-1310); *De diversis quaestionibus ad Simplicianum* (PL 40, 101-148); *De Genesi contra Manichaeos* (PL 34, 173-220). Cf. A. GAUDEL, *Péché originel*, III. *Saint Augustin avant la controverse pélagienne*, in DTC 12, i (1933) 371-382.

² CSEL 42 (1902) 76: PL 44, 333.

³ Cf. *ibid.* The proposition has been altered from the form of an indirect to that of a direct statement.

⁴ *Ibid.*: PL 44, 334.

⁵ Cf. *De peccatorum meritis et remissione* I, 18 (CSEL 60, 22-23: PL 44, 121-122). The proposition is found in substance in the passage referred to; not verbatim.

In opposing these errors, and with a view to proving the existence of Original Sin, Augustine had recourse to four principal arguments, viz. Sacred Scripture, Tradition, the Rite of Baptism, and the experimental fact of human misery. Of these sources, the one most frequently invoked is Sacred Scripture and the texts most conspicuously used are the seven texts: Gen. 3,6-7; 16-19; Ps. 50,7; Job 14,4; Jn. 3,5; Rom. 5,12; Ephes. 2,3. Indeed in the very first of his anti-Pelagian works, the *De peccatorum meritis et remissione*, Augustine quotes all of these seven key texts; not merely that, but they are all quoted in the very first of the three books which constitute that work¹ – yet another indication of the initial mastery of his subject which Augustine possessed from the beginning of the Pelagian controversy².

The argument from tradition is not very developed in the early anti-Pelagian works, though it is present from the beginning and appeared already in the *De peccatorum meritis et remissione*, III, 5; 6; 7³. Nevertheless, when once challenged by Julian on the point, Augustine gives special attention to this argument, and we find it well-developed in the first book of the *Contra Julianum* (421)⁴. There the western tradition is presented in the persons of St. Irenaeus, Saint Cyprian, Reticus of Autun, Olympius, the IV/Vth century Spanish bishop, Hilary of Poitiers and St. Ambrose (cap. 3)⁵, and Saint Jerome (cap. 7)⁶; and for the eastern tradition St. Gregory of Nazianzus and Saint Basil (cap. 5)⁷ and St. John Chrysostom (cap. 6)⁸ are chosen as spokesmen.

The argument from the rite of Baptism to establish the existence of Original Sin also appears at the very beginning of Augustine's controversy with the Pelagians and recurs frequently afterwards. Thus in the first book of the *De peccatorum meritis et remissione I*, 34⁹, it is pointed out that the exorcisms which form part of the baptismal rite would be

¹ Gen 3, 19 is quoted in the *De peccatorum meritis et remissione I*, 2 and 4; Ps 50, 7 in I, 24; Job 14, 4 in I, 24; Rom 5, 12 in I, 10; Jn 3, 5 in I, 30. Both in the two subsequent books of the *De peccatorum meritis et remissione* and in the other anti-Pelagian works these texts recur with astonishing frequency.

² We had occasion to refer to this mastery of Augustine earlier in this essay, cf. p. 8-9.

³ St. Cyprian is quoted in Book 3 of the *De peccatorum meritis et remissione* chapter 5 and St. Jerome is quoted in chapters 6 and 7 of the same Book.

⁴ Chapters 3-7 (PL 44, 644-666).

⁵ PL 44, 643-646. Cf. *De nuptiis et concupiscentia II*, 29.

⁶ PL 44, 665.

⁷ *Ibid.* 649-654.

⁸ *Ibid.* 654-660.

⁹ CSEL 60, 63-65: PL 44, 146-147.

PARADOSIS

Contributions to the History of Early Christian Literature and Theology

XX

JOHN EDWARD CHISHOLM C.S.Sp.

THE PSEUDO-AUGUSTINIAN HYPOMNESTICON
AGAINST THE
PELAGIANS AND CELESTIANS

VOLUME I

Introduction

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meaningless in the case of infants unless these were already at birth subject to the power of Satan as a result of the contamination of sin, not indeed of personal sin, which would be absurd in the case of infants, but of Original Sin.

The argument from experience to prove the existence of Original Sin is drawn from the infirmities of children, and the miseries and sufferings of the human race generally. The observable facts of human misery point to the existence of a state of culpability, and since infants incapable of personal sin, and made to God's image, are as liable to these sufferings and to death as adults, the explanation must be sought in the culpable state of Original Sin in which they are born. Once more, this argument appears, though embryonically, in the *De peccatorum meritis et remissione I*, 36-38¹, and is developed in later works, e. g. *De nuptiis et concupiscentia II*, 29²; *Contra Julianum V*, 13³; *Opus imperfectum contra Julianum II*, 202⁴, etc.

Turning now to Hypomnesticon and comparing its teaching on Original Sin with that of St. Augustine, we soon become aware of the vast extent to which the author of that book depends on the Bishop of Hippo, and the consequent close conformity between the two authors. Thus, of the four arguments used by Augustine to establish the existence of Original Sin, three, viz. Sacred Scripture, the Rite of Baptism and the factual argument from experience, are reproduced and fully exploited in Hypomnesticon.

Further, the seven key Scripture texts used by Augustine to prove the fact of Original Sin are all used for the same purpose in Hypomnesticon, and so we find Gen. 3, 6-7 quoted in Responsio IV, 2; Gen. 3, 16-19 in Responsio II, 1; IV, 2; Ps. 50, 7 in Responsio II, 4; V, 1; 3; Job 14, 4 in Responsio V, 4; Jn. 3, 5 in Responsio V, 5; 6; VI, 6; Rom. 5, 12 in Responsio I, 2; II, 2; 3; 4; IV, 5; V, 1; and Ephes. 2, 3 in Responsio II, 4. And it is noteworthy in this connection that just as in Augustine the decisive text, Rom 5, 12, is the one most frequently used in proof of the existence of Original Sin, so also it is the most frequently quoted of all the texts in Hypomnesticon⁵. Besides, as an indication of development in Hypomnesticon it should be remarked that the argument from the text of Job 14, 4 to prove the transmission of Original Sin to children,

¹ *Ibid.* 67-70: PL 44, 148-150.

² CSEL 42, 304-308: PL 44, 464-467.

³ PL 44, 811-812.

⁴ PL 45, 1227-1228.

⁵ This text is quoted in Responsio I; II; IV; V.

(Responsio V, 4) as used by the author of Hypomnesticon, is more developed than in Augustine¹. The combined use of both the Old Latin and Vulgate translations of the text that is found in Hypomnesticon is absent from Augustine's treatment. Certainly, the proof drawn from the two versions in Hypomnesticon is very effective, and however questionable the exegesis may appear to the modern scholar², the argument produced from the text must have appeared unanswerable to orthodox contemporaries.

The silence of Hypomnesticon regarding the Patristic argument constitutes a difference in relation to Augustine. On the other hand, this silence is not peculiar to the treatment of Original Sin, for with the exception of one general allusion, that silence is complete throughout the entire work. As was remarked earlier³, the argument seems to have been deliberately suppressed, and so its absence in connection with the existence of Original Sin has scarcely more significance than its absence elsewhere.

The argument from the rite of Baptism, viz. the exorcisms, which is used so effectively by Augustine also occurs to the same effect in Hypomnesticon. A comparison between two texts of the authors concerned will illustrate the point:

Hypomnesticon

«[Parvuli] propterea catechizantur et exsufflantur ac baptizantur, ut princeps huius mundi diabolus ex eis foras mittatur. Aut si non in illis diabolus exsufflatur, cuius opere, i. e. vitio peccati per Adam tenentur obnoxii; dicite cur imagini Dei sit iniuria? ...

Exsufflatur ergo et increpatur in eis in catholica ecclesia opus diaboli ... peccatum, opus diaboli est.»

(Resp. V, 8)

Contra Julianum

«[Ecclesia] quae filios fidelium nec exorcizaret, nec exsufflaret, si non eos de potestate tenebrarum et a principe mortis erueret ... exsufflationi qua princeps mundi et a parvulis eiicitur foras.» (Lib. VI, 5, n. 11⁴)

¹ Cf. *De peccatorum meritis et remissione* I, 24, n. 34; *De nuptiis et concupiscentia* II, 29, n. 50; *Contra Julianum* V, 13, n. 49; *Opus imperfectum contra Julianum* II, 77; III, 7; 110; IV, 8; 78; V, 2; VI, 11.

² Cf. P. DHORME, *Le livre de Job* (Etudes bibliques), 2nd edition (Paris 1926) 178; R. P. LARCHER, *Le livre de Job* (Bible de Jérusalem) (Paris 1950) 79; FR. HORST, *Biblischer Kommentar, Altes Testament. Hiob* (Neukirchen-Vluyn 1960) 207; M. POPE, *Job. Introduction, Translation, and Notes* (New York 1965) 101.

³ Cf. p. 14.

⁴ PL 44, 829.

The correlative argument based on the rite of Circumcision, as stipulated in Gen. 17, 14, to prove the existence of Original Sin is found in chapter four of the same *Responsio V*. Like the preceding argument, it is also borrowed from Augustine, who makes use of it for the first time in his anti-Pelagian works in 418, and thereafter refers to it frequently in his battle with Julian of Eclanum. The work in which it first appears is the *De gratia Christi et de peccato originali II*, 30, n. 35, and again a confrontation of texts will show the close dependence of *Hypomnesticon* on Augustine's thought:

Hypomnesticon

«Scriptum est enim, infans qui octavo die circumcisis non fuerit disperiet anima illa de populo suo.»
(Gen. 17, 14)

«Dicigitur mihi a quo facinore circumcisio parvulum liberabat? ... Actua-
lia certe nulla sunt eius delicta. Quae enim esse potuerunt octo dierum?»

«Parvulo autem incircumciso solum pro delicto quod est opus diaboli, quod ex Adam seminatus contraxit, et circumcissione fraudatus non caruit hoc in parvulo Deus odit et punit.»

«Circumcisio enim illa octavi diei, figuram resurrectionis et gratiam baptismi gestabat.»
(Resp. V, 4 and 5)

De gratia Christi et de peccato originali

«[Signum circumcisionis] ... quod sub terrore tanto est imperatum, ut diceret Deus, animam illam de suo populo perituram, cujus octavo die praeputii circumcisio facta non fuisset.» (Cf. Gen. 17, 14)

«Quid enim mali, quaeso, parvulus propria voluntate commisit, ut alio negligente et eum non circumcidente, ipse damnetur?»

«Unde ergo recte infans illa perditione punitur, nisi quia pertinet ad massam perditionis et juste intelligitur ex Adam natus antiqui debiti obligatione damnatus?»

«[Christum] inter cetera veterum sacramenta etiam ipsa praeputii circumcisio prophetavit. Dies enim octavus est ... dies Dominicus, quo resurrexit Dominus.»
(Lib. II, 30 and 31) ¹

Similarly, the argument derived by St. Augustine from the observable fact of human misery to prove the existence of Original Sin is also developed in *Hypomnesticon*. Thus, in *Responsio II*, 1, having quoted the sentence of condemnation pronounced by God against Adam and Eve in Gen 3, 16-19, the author of *Hypomnesticon* continues:

«Hac nos poenae sententia conligatos, ipsa sibi humana natura totum per orbem terrarum diffusa testimonium perhibet, dum se paternis

¹ CSEL 42, 194-195: PL 44, 402-403.

cruciatibus sanctae legis testimonio pervidet laborare. Quod qua iustitia, si heredes peccati parentum non sumus, patiamur?» (Resp. II, 1)

Here the author shows in a general way that the miseries to which mankind is subject are an indication of the transmission to all men of Original Sin. Later, however, he shows in particular that death in the case of children proves the same conclusion. To this effect, he asks his Pelagian adversary:

«Dic ergo quaerenti mihi: Si peccatum parvulus nullum carnaliter natus adtraxit, cur brevis dierum sorte mortis adstringitur? Quia ubi peccatum non est, utique mors esse non debet; non me fingente, sed Apostolo praedicante dictum est: 'Per peccatum mors'.» (Resp. V, 1)

Further in the same Responsio, referring once more to children, he asks:

«...quare ut flos decidit [parvulus], fugitque ut umbra, et in vita multorum dierum sive annorum non permanet, sicut novimus multis contingere parvulis ...? Haec utique secundum vos, ut dixi, iniuste parvuli patiuntur a iusto iudice, si nulla peccati contagione tenentur obnoxii». (Resp. V, 4)

With similar, though not identical arguments, Augustine had likewise argued from the fact that children are subject to misery and death to their contamination by Original Sin. For example, referring to the grave evils that oppress children he demands:

«Dic ergo qua iustitia parvuli tanta mala patiantur; quae saepe commemorare nos piget ... qua igitur iustitia premuntur gravi jugo a die exitus de ventre matris eorum?»

And a little further on in the same passage, he draws the firm conclusion.

«Nemo igitur potest in tot tantisque poenis parvulorum praedicare Deum justum, negans originale peccatum.» (*Opus imperfectum contra Julianum* V, 64) ¹

In the sixth book of the same *Opus imperfectum contra Julianum*, he continues the argument:

«Nec ego dico: Ideo miseri sunt [parvuli] nascentes, ut convincantur rei; sed dico potius: Ideo convincuntur rei esse, quoniam sunt miseri ...

¹ PL 45, 1505-1506.

justus est, inquam, Deus et ideo nascentes nec facere nec fieri sineret miseros, nisi nosset reos.» (*Ibid.* VI, 27) ¹

And with direct allusion to the mortality of children he says:

«... cum ille [Paulus] dicat: *Regnavit mors ab Adam usque ad Moysen, et in eos qui non peccaverunt*, volens intelligi parvulos, qui nulla propria peccata fecerunt: et addat, *in similitudine praevaricationis Adae*, ostendens cur in eos regnaverit mors ... Quomodo enim *per unum hominem peccatum intravit in mundum et per peccatum mors*, si in aliquos ad hoc unius hominis peccatum non pertinentes regnavit tamen mors?» (*Ibid.* II, 202) ²

From the foregoing, it should be clear that so far as the existence of Original Sin was concerned both Augustine and the author of Hypomnesticon held identical views. Not merely that, but their general method of defending the dogma against the Pelagian onslaughts was very similar, and a marked dependence of Hypomnesticon on Augustine's theology was found throughout. There was, however, no question of a slavish imitation ³. Rather was it a matter of intelligent assimilation, enriched by personal study, the addition of new illustrations and occasionally the use of new Scripture quotations, all leading to a new synthesis, which, in spite of its accidental changes is Augustinian to the core.

b) The Nature of Original Sin in Adam's Descendants

From the moment in 418 when Julian of Eclanum first engaged in the struggle on the Pelagian side against Augustine, he did not cease to harass his great antagonist with the accusation of Manichaeism. With an unrelenting insistence that was proof against all argument, Julian claimed that to admit the transmission of Original Sin was equivalent to the admission that human nature was intrinsically evil. As Augustine put it:

«... saepe incutis legentium sensibus Manichaeae pestis horrorem: quasi malum naturale cum Manichaeis sapiat, qui dicit infantes

¹ *Ibid.* 1573-1574.

² PL 45, 1228. Cf. *De peccatorum meritis et remissione* III, 10, n. 18.

³ The absence of the Patristic argument and the development of the argument based on Job 14,4 are examples to illustrate this point. Many other examples will be given in Chapter V where a doctrinal comparison will be made between Hypomnesticon and St. Augustine on several other issues.

secundum Adam carnaliter natos, contagium mortis antiquae prima nativitate contrahere, et ob hoc secunda indigere, ut per lavacrum regenerationis prius peccati originalis remissione purgentur, et in Dei filios adoptati in regnum Unigeniti transferantur».

(*Contra Julianum* I,2) ¹

And prefacing an appeal to the witness of the Fathers in defence of his teaching, he adds:

«Sed tu qui tam crebro nobis Manichaeorum nomen opponis, quos et quales viros et quantos fidei catholicae defensores tam execrabili criminatione appetere audeas, si evigilas intueri.» (*Ibid.* cap. 3) ²

In face of these persistent calumnies, Augustine untiringly insisted that the doctrine of Original Sin was diametrically opposed to Manichaean principles, that human nature was essentially good, though tainted by the Primeval Sin, and that marriage was good, though the inordinate passions associated with it as a result of the Fall were evil:

«Quid ergo mirum est, si renasci debet homo ex illo malo [concupiscentiae] natus, contra quod pugnat homo renatus, quo reus et ipse teneretur, nisi renascendo liberaretur? Non est hoc malum materies Dei creantis, sed vulnus diaboli eadem materiem vitiantis. Non est hoc malum nuptiarum, sed primorum hominum peccatum, in posteros propagatione trajectum.» (*Contra Julianum*, II, 10) ³

As he issued from God's creative hands, Adam was endowed with perfect rectitude and sanctity, free to avoid all sin and possessed of a divine help whereby he could persevere in righteousness if he chose:

«Primo itaque homini, qui in eo bono quo factus fuerat rectus acceperat posse non peccare, posse non mori, posse ipsum bonum non deserere, datum est adjutorium perseverantiae, non quo fieret ut perseveraret, sed sine quo per liberum arbitrium perseverare non posset.» (*De correptione et gratia*, 12) ⁴

Nevertheless, the crime perpetrated by Adam in paradise changed human nature for the worse, and was of such enormity as to extend from Adam to all his posterity. It plunged human nature into a state of culpability, rendering that nature sinful (peccatrix) and making all those who shared

¹ PL 44, 643.

² *Loc. cit.*

³ PL 44, 697.

⁴ *Ibid.* 937.

that nature guilty. Hence the need of corporate redemption in Christ corresponding to the corporate Fall in Adam:

«Hoc autem peccatum, quod ipsum hominem in paradiso mutavit in peius, quia multo est grandius quam iudicare nos possumus, ab omni nascente trahitur nec nisi in renascente remittitur; ita ut etiam de parentibus iam renatis, in quibus remissum atque tectum est, trahatur in reatum nascentium filiorum, nisi et ipsos, quos prima carnalis nativitas obligavit, secunda spiritalis absolvat.» (*De nuptiis et concupiscentia* II, 34, n. 58) ¹

The author of Hypomnesticon in his turn is also seen to smart under the accusation of Manichaeism in his defence of orthodox teaching on the nature of Original Sin and its consequences. In dealing with the calumny, he adopts very much the same tactics as Augustine, turns the accusation against his enemies and shows that in reality they themselves, rather than those whom they accuse, are the veritable Manichaeans:

«Nisi enim credideritis mortem et peccatum utraque esse mala, et nullius horum auctorem esse Deum, sed diabolum, delinquentibus protoplastis, prorsus Manichaeos adiuvatis, immo estis perfectissimi Manichaei.» (Responsio V, 2)

And elsewhere he writes:

«Malum itaque velle non ex naturae suae conditione bona habuit, tamquam ex congenito malo, ut Manichaeus credit, sed ex accidenti desiderio pravo concepit, videlicet cum ... ad manducandum vetitum lignum ... assensum serpenti, id est, diabolo praebuit.» (Responsio III, 4)

Similarly, with St. Augustine he insists on the state of innocence in which the first man had been created, on the power he originally had of resisting the serpent's seductions in virtue of an untrammelled freedom of will, and his capability of persevering in his state of innocence unendingly:

«Nulli itaque fidelium dubium esse potest, primos homines factos sic fuisse vitales, ut si in libertate animae, qua immaculati creati sunt, serpentis contempsissent seductionem mortiferam, vita fruerentur aeterna.» (Responsio I, 3)

«Neminem posse per se sibi, id est, per liberum arbitrium sufficere implere quod velit, recte dicimus, nisi protoplastum solum potuisse, cum voluntas liberi arbitrii fuisset sana eidem ante culpam.» (Responsio III, 1)

¹ CSEL 42, 316: PL 44, 471.

«[Liberum arbitrium] fuit in homine protoplasto, cum ante peccatum maneret illaesus. Non enim per aliud contraxit offensam, nisi per id quod potuit ne delinqueret resistere suadenti.» (Responsio III, 4)

Time and time again he repeats that, if human nature has been reduced to a state of culpability by Original Sin and thereby made a sinful nature, this disaster is to be ascribed, not to God who can be the author only of what is good, but uniquely to Adam's sin. And in describing human nature as affected by the Fall, he repeatedly uses the term 'peccatrix' that we already encountered in the same context in St. Augustine. Likewise, with St. Augustine and in order to avoid the suggestion of Manichaeism, he carefully underlines the fact that though made sinful, 'peccatrix', by the primeval sin, our nature did not itself become intrinsically evil, 'vitium' or 'peccatum':

«Et de peccato, inquit [Paulus], damnavit peccatum in carne; de humana videlicet peccatrice natura: peccatricem dico, non Deo auctore, sed homine delinquente.» (Responsio I, 2)

«Cum vero peccavit homo, natura peccavit, et facta est natura iam peccatrix, id est, vitium habens peccati, non ipsa effecta vitium vel peccatum.» (Responsio II, 1)

«Et ideo peccatum eius non solum ipsum, sed omne nocuit genus humanum, cum eius damnatione simul et culpam suscepimus.» (Responsio II, 4)

«Massae itaque humani generis, quae in Adam et Eva praevaricatione damnabilis mortalisque facta est, non conditione divina generaliter, sed ex debito poena cruciatusque gehennae debetur.» (Responsio VI, 2)

The faculty in man immediately affected by Original Sin is the will, and since it is by means of this faculty that man in his whole being is made either morally good or evil, so it is that by Original Sin the whole man is plunged into a condition of sinfulness which contaminates his entire nature:

«Igitur cum de libero arbitrio agimus, non de parte hominis agimus, sed de toto; quia cum peccavit homo primus, non in parte aliqua, sed tota, qua conditus est, natura deliquit ... Vitiato ergo libero arbitrio, totus homo est vitiatus.» (Responsio III, 5)

And in showing that the human will itself is wounded by Original Sin, the author of Hypomnesticon shows complete conformity with St. Augustine's thought:

«Hoc ergo vulnere [peccati originalis] cuncti libero claudicamus arbitrio, nec implere nobis naturaliter sufficit posse bonum; quia iam ... de

natura vitiata peccato, id est, de protoplastis hominibus, quorum sumus et ipsi natura, in quibus est vitiata libertas, homo voluntatis sanae, perfecto videlicet libertatis arbitrio quo sibi sufficiat, non potest exoriri.» (Responsio III, 1)

And perhaps nowhere is the nature of Original Sin and its evil consequences in fallen man more clearly described than in chapter 8 of Responsio III. There the author allegorically expounds the parable of the Good Samaritan (Lk 10, 30-35), just as Augustine, following St. Ambrose, had so frequently done before and for the same reason; cf. *Quaestiones Evangeliorum* II, 21; *De natura et gratia* 43; 52; *Sermo* 131, 6; 154, 9; 171, 2 etc. At considerable length, and with even greater effect than St. Augustine, the author of Hypomnesticon shows the ravages incurred by Original Sin and the incapacity of the human will wounded by that sin of regaining what it had lost:

«... homo vulneratus libero arbitrio per Adae peccatum, sine gratia Dei, id est, per se solum sanare se non potest, nec sponte ad paradysum reverti, sanctorum numero sociandus ...

«Homo iste quidam ipse est humanum genus ... Incidit in latrones, in diabolum et angelos eius; per inobedientiam enim ... primi hominis, diabolus humanum genus despoliavit et vulneravit, morum scilicet ornamentis et bono possibilitatis liberi arbitrii perditio ... Recte dictus est semivivus; habebat enim vitalem motum, id est, liberum arbitrium vulneratum, quod ei solum ad aeternam vitam quam perdidit, redire non sufficiebat.» (Responsio III, 8)

Yet, while insisting that the will of man has been wounded and weakened by Original Sin, he is careful to emphasize that it has not been destroyed, and that, when he chooses evil, man is not necessitated by a defect inherent in his nature as that was created by God:

«Est igitur liberum arbitrium, quod quisque esse negaverit, catholicus non est ... Quibus enim dicitur in Psalmis nisi liberum arbitrium habentibus; 'Venite filii, audite me, timorem Domini docebo vos?' ... Quomodo autem unicuique secundum sua opera redderetur in die iudicii, nisi liberum esset arbitrium?» (Responsio III, 10)

«Malum itaque velle non ex naturae suae conditione bona habuit, tamquam ex congenito malo, ut Manichaeus credit.» (Responsio III, 4)

Agreement with Augustine is constant throughout the entire discussion, and the closeness with which the author identifies himself with Augustine's cause is perhaps particularly conspicuous in the identical attitude

assumed vis-à-vis the accusation of Manichaeism that appeared so prominently in Julian of Eclanum's invectives against the great Bishop. At the same time, the independence of the author of Hypomnesticon is given free play, as is especially evident in his splendid development of the parable of the Good Samaritan. Indeed, his handling of that parable is unique, and scarcely finds its equal, not merely in the writings of his predecessors, including Saint Augustine, but in subsequent writings¹.

c) *The Transmission of Original Sin*

According to the Pelagians, the transmission of sin from Adam to his posterity, of which St. Paul spoke in Rom. 5, 12, was a purely moral transmission based on imitation alone. Against this erroneous view, Augustine argued that, if such had been the mind of St. Paul, he would have referred the transmission of sin, not to Adam, but to the devil whose sin preceded that of our First Parents. Referring to Rom. 5, 12, he writes:

«... si peccatum apostolus illud commemorare voluisset, quod in hunc mundum non propagatione, sed imitatione intraverit, eius principem, non Adam, sed diabolum diceret, de quo scriptum est: 'ab initio diabolus peccat'.» (*De pecc. meritis et remiss.* I, 9, n. 9)²

The author of Hypomnesticon deals with the same problem, but in his criticism of the Pelagian view, he introduces a nuance not found in Augustine's account. Thus he writes:

«'Peccatum', inquis, 'per unum hominem in mundum intrasse, Apostolus non seminis propagatione, sed morum imitatione dixit'. Respondeo: Si peccatum morum imitatione constat, quem imitatus est diabolus ut delinqueret, dicite, qui primus invenitur peccator esse? Quia si de Adam interrogavero, respondebitis forsitan, quod sit diabolus imitatum». (Responsio II, 4)

¹ Cf. J.-M. VOSTÉ, *Parabola selectae Domini Nostri Jesu Christi* Vol. 2 (Rome 1933) 616-635, and especially 632-633; J. DANIELOU, *Le bon Samaritain* in *Mélanges bibliques rédigés en l'honneur d'André Robert* (Paris 1957) 457 ff.; B. GERHERDSSON, *The Good Samaritan - The Good Shepherd*, (*Conjectanea neotestamentica*, XV). (Copenhagen 1958) 1-31; D. SANCHIS, *Samaritanus ille - L'exégèse augustinienne de la Parole du bon Samaritain* in RSR 49 (1961) 406-425.

² CSEL 60, 10: PL 44, 114.

The new element here is the replacement of Augustine's objection, viz. if sin were propagated by imitation, then Paul should have referred to the devil rather than Adam as the one from whom sin derived, by the question: if all sin derives from imitation, whom did the devil imitate? The difference is indeed slight enough, and attention is drawn to it simply to show that, however close the author of *Hypomnesticon* is in his teaching to St. Augustine, he nevertheless maintains a certain independence even in apparently trivial details.

In their treatment of the positive side of the problem concerning the transmission of Original Sin, full agreement is again found between the author of *Hypomnesticon* and Augustine. For both authors, the basic fact to account for the communication of Original Sin from Adam to his descendants is the solidarity existing between Adam and these latter in virtue of generation. In opposition to the Pelagian teaching, Augustine insisted that the phrase: 'in quo omnes peccaverunt' of St. Paul (Rom. 5, 12) admitted of but one satisfactory explanation, viz. that mankind as a whole was unified in Adam at the moment of his sin, that his sin was a sin attaching to human nature as such, and that it was, therefore, propagated to all who received human nature from Adam by generation.

«... in Adam omnes tunc peccaverunt, quando in eius natura illa insita vi, qua eos gignere poterat, adhuc omnes ille unus fuerunt». (*De pecc. mer. et remiss.* III, 7, n. 14) ¹

«Merito etiam dicit (Ambrosius) ... 'Fuit Adam, et in illo fuimus omnes; periiit Adam, et in illo omnes perierunt.'» (*Opus imperfectum contra Jul.* I, 48) ²

«Hoc autem peccatum, quod ipsum hominem in paradiso mutavit in peius, quia multo est grandius quam iudicare nos possumus, ab omni nascente trahitur.» (*De nuptiis et concupiscentia* II, 34, n. 58) ³

«Hoc autem valde tunc maius atque altius diabolus infixit, quam sunt ista hominibus nota peccata. Unde illo magno primi hominis peccato natura ibi nostra in deterius commutata, non solum est facta peccatrix, verum etiam genuit peccatores.» (*Ibid.* n. 57) ⁴

Substantially, the teaching in *Hypomnesticon* on the solidarity of all men in Adam and the consequent propagation of the First Sin to all those born of him coincides with that of Augustine: and though the

¹ CSEL 60, 141: PL 44, 194.

² PL 45, 1070.

³ CSEL 42, 316: PL 44, 471.

⁴ CSEL 42, 315: PL 44, 471.

actual words of St. Ambrose¹ so often used by Augustine to indicate the virtual presence of all men in Adam, and cited above, are not quoted by the author, he reproduces in slightly modified terms the same idea:

«... audes dicere haeretice: 'Adae peccatum nulli nisi soli nocuit ipsi'.
Et vere tunc soli nocuit, cum solus esset ipse et Eva mulier eius. Sed in illis omnes eramus, quia natura humani generis erant, sicut nunc in nobis omnibus illi uni sunt, quia natura eorum sumus».
(Responsio II, 2)

«Et ideo peccator homo genuit hominem, sine dubio peccatorem, quia de natura, ut dixi, peccato vitiata, non nisi natura nascitur vitiosa, id est, peccatrix.» (Responsio II, 1)

Absent from Hypomnesticon is all mention of the magnitude of Adam's sin as having a bearing on its transmission. This view, which emerges in the two passages from the *De nuptiis et concupiscentia* quoted above, is made even more explicit in the *Opus imperfectum contra Julianum*:

«Absit ut dicamus, aliorum patrum in filios Deum peccata non reddere: cum Scriptura divina toties nominatimque testetur, pro quibus patrum peccatis in quos eorum filios vindicta processerit ... Sed apostasia primi hominis, in quo summa erat, et nullo impediatur vitio libertas propriae voluntatis, tam magnum peccatum fuit, ut ruina ejus natura humana esset tota collapsa.» (*Ibid.* III, 57)²

The absence of all allusion to this thorny question of the magnitude of Original Sin in relation to its propagation seems to indicate a prudent reserve on the part of the author of Hypomnesticon, which is all the more commendable in that the omission, far from weakening the argument, makes it more clear.

For St. Augustine, carnal generation, and not imitation, was the means whereby Adam's sin was propagated throughout the human race. This he made abundantly clear in the first major work directed against the Pelagians, the *De peccatorum meritis et remissione*, and we find him maintaining it with the same vigour, though in a more developed form, in the final anti-Pelagian work, viz. *Opus imperfectum contra Julianum*. Thus in the third book of the *De peccatorum meritis et remissione*, drawing an illuminating parallel between generation in Adam and regeneration in Christ, he writes:

¹ *Expositio Evangelii secundum Lucam*, Liber 7, n. 234 [CCL 14 (1957) 295: PL 15, 1762].

² PL 45, 1275.

«... sicut eos vitae spiritus in Christo regenerat fideles, sic eos corpus mortis in Adam generaverat peccatores; illa enim carnalis generatio est, haec spiritualis; illa facit filios carnis, haec spiritus; illa filios mortis, haec filios resurrectionis ... ac per hoc illa peccato originali obligatos, ista omnis peccati vinculo liberatos». (*Op. cit.* III, 2, n. 2) ¹

«Restat igitur ut peccatum, quod per unum hominem intravit in mundum, non imitationi, sed generationi recte possit attribui.» (*Opus imperfectum contra Julianum* II, 52) ²

The author of *Hypomnesticon* likewise finds the cause of the transmission of Original Sin in carnal generation:

«Vere non morum imitatione, sed seminis sparsione constat per unum hominem peccatum intrasse in mundum, et per peccatum mortem, et ita in omnes homines pertransisse in quo omnes peccaverunt.» (*Responsio* II, 4)

Then in answering the Pelagian objection that St. Paul, if he wished it to be understood that sin entered into the world by generation, would not have said 'per unum hominem' but 'per duos homines', the author of *Hypomnesticon* adheres closely to the thought of Augustine:

Hypomnesticon
«... 'non per unum hominem dixisset, sed per duos homines, quia sine femina de solo masculino homo nasci non potest'. Si cordis oculos non admisistis attendite dictum esse: 'Iam non sunt duo, sed una caro'. Et iterum, erunt duo in carne una. Nam ideo, per unum hominem, dixit Apostolus, quia cum in viro suo mulier una sit caro, in semine progenies imputatur. Audite adhuc et alium sapientissimum dicentem ad vestram confusionem: 'Ex muliere initium factum est peccati, et per illam omnes morimur'.» (*Resp.* II, 3)

De peccatorum meritis et remissione
«'A muliere initium factum est peccati et per illam omnes morimur'. Sive autem a muliere sive ab Adam dicatur, utrumque ad primum hominem pertinet, quoniam, sicut novimus, mulier ex viro est et utriusque una caro est. Unde et illud quod scriptum est: 'Et erunt duo in carne una'».
(*Liber* I, 16, n. 21) ³

When explaining in more detail the mode whereby Original Sin is transmitted, Augustine referred it to the 'pudenda libido' or concupiscence

¹ CSEL 60, 130: PL 44, 187.

² PL 45, 1164.

³ CSEL 60, 21: PL 44, 121.

that is an inseparable accompaniment of carnal generation ever since the Fall. Thus speaking of concupiscence he says:

«... sine illo malo [concupiscentiae] fieri non potest nuptiarum bonum, hoc est, propagatio filiorum ... Hinc est, quod infantes etiam qui peccare non possunt, non tamen sine peccati contagione nascuntur, non ex hoc quod licet, sed ex eo [malo concupiscentiae] quod dedecet. Nam ex hoc quod licet natura nascitur, ex illo quod dedecet vitium.» (*De gratia Christi et de peccato originali* II, 37, n. 42) ¹

«Ecce de qua [pudenda libidine] trahitur originale peccatum: ecce per quam nasci noluit, qui venit, non suum ferre, sed nostrum auferre peccatum.» (*Opus imperfectum contra Julianum* II, 42) ²

«Ex hac concupiscentia ... generatione trahitur originalis peccati vinculum.» (*Ibid.* II, 218) ³

For St. Augustine, therefore, it is not carnal generation as such that directly causes Original Sin in Adam's offspring, but rather the evil libido or concupiscence that inseparably accompanies carnal generation as a result of the Fall.

The author of Hypomnesticon holds exactly the same view. Thus in the context of his explanation of Job 14, 4, he writes:

«'Quis potest facere mundum de immundo conceptum semine? Nonne tu qui solus es?' Ob hanc igitur solam sordem peccati, quam trahit, non de coniugii bono, sed de libidinis malo, parvulus brevis vitae et plenus iracundiae est.» (Responsio V, 4)

d) Libido a Consequence of Original Sin

A question of cardinal importance in the controversy between Augustine and Julian of Eclanum was that concerning 'libido' (lust) or carnal concupiscence. According to Julian, this accompaniment of procreation was a natural good, and far from being in any way shameful, was praiseworthy and honourable. Julian's view was formulated in the proposition: 'Libido in homine naturale est bonum, nec in ea est quod pudeat' ⁴, and it is as thus condensed that it is introduced into Hypomnesticon. There the entire IVth Responsio is devoted to the problem.

That Julian of Eclanum is specially in view in this IVth Responsio, even though his name is never explicitly mentioned, is evident from a multi-

¹ CSEL 42, 200: PL 44, 406.

² PL 45, 1160.

³ PL 45, 1237.

⁴ Cf. Praefatio and Responsio IV, 1.

plicity of indications, and that Augustine is the inspirer of the author's attack is apparent throughout. For one thing, the errors attacked are precisely those of Julian as reflected in the *De nuptiis et concupiscentia*, the *Contra duas epistulas Pelagianorum*, the *Contra Julianum* and the *Opus imperfectum contra Julianum* of St. Augustine. Besides, the reference to 'loquacitas' in chapter 7 of the IVth Responsio is particularly significant as implying reference to Julian of Eclanum, for of all the epithets applied to the heretic that of loquacity was perhaps the most common. Not merely is it of frequent occurrence in Augustine's attacks on Julian ¹, but it is found also in Marius Mercator ² with reference to the same person. Indeed, because of the diffuseness of the heretical bishop, the term almost became a synonym for his name, and the fact that in Hypomnesticon the only place in which the word occurs is in connection with the errors defended by him is a clear indication that Julian is the person particularly in view:

«Pergite adhuc per campos loquacitatis vestrae, qua tantae turpitudinis squalorem laudare non erubescitis, et clamate secundum consuetudinem vestram, dicentes: 'Libido calor bonus est genitalis, nec est quod pudeat in ea, quia si malum esse dicatur, nuptiae iam damnabuntur'». (Resp. IV, 7)

Besides, the very terms used in the passage just quoted seem to show a link with those of Augustine in connection with the same Julian, and the phrase 'campos loquacitatis vestrae' of Hypomnesticon is remarkably similar to the 'campos quaesisse verborum' in Augustine's phrase:

«Quod autem putasti congerenda esse sacrarum testimonia Litterarum ... quo pertinuit, nisi ut te appareret campos quaesisse verborum, ubi ventose atque inaniter curreres?» (*Contra Julianum* V, 13, n. 49) ³

In his exposition of the problem, the author of Hypomnesticon shows a certain degree of originality in relation to Augustine, though basically

¹ The following phrase of Augustine with reference to Julian is characteristic: «Ut enim tanta ibi loquacitate laborares, contra sensus veniebas omnium, et eos multiloquii strepitu perstringere cupiebas». *Contra Julianum* II, 6, n. 16 (PL 44, 685). Cf. *Contra Julianum* V, 13, n. 49; *Opus imperfectum contra Julianum* III, 57; 110; V, 63; VI, 10; 40.

² *Commonitorium adversum haeresim Pelagii*, Prologus (ACO I, V, i, p. 6; cf. p. 7: PL 48, 119 A; cf. 120 B). Marius also uses the term 'loquacitas' in connection with Celestius. Cf. *loc. cit.* (ACO I, V, i, p. 6: PL 48, 113A).

³ PL 44, 811.

his teaching is identical with that of the great Bishop. Thus, whereas Augustine's treatment, as found in the four works against Julian mentioned above, does not present a systematic account of the problem of 'libido' inasmuch as it follows too closely the meanderings of Julian's writings with a view to refuting their errors in detail, the treatment in Hypomnesticon does present some attempt at an ordered exposition of the subject.

At the very beginning of the discussion, immediately after enunciating the Pelagian view, the author of Hypomnesticon briefly formulates his teaching on 'libido':

«Libido non est naturale bonum in hominibus, sed per peccatum primorum hominum accidens malum, atque pudendum, cuius non Deus auctor est, sed diabolus.» (Resp. IV, 1)

Here at the outset, the author shows the influence of Augustine on his thought, for the saint had expressed something of the same idea in the *De nuptiis et concupiscentia* more than ten years earlier:

«Non enim est [carnis concupiscentia] ex naturali conubio veniens bonum, sed ex antiquo peccato accidens malum.» (*Op. cit.* I, 17, n. 19) ¹

Thereafter, in chapter 2, the author of Hypomnesticon analyses the concept of 'libido' starting with the etymology of the word and defines the term in the statement: «omne quod male libet, libido est». There is lacking in this definition a distinction found in St. Augustine. For whereas the saint conceived 'libido' to be evil as it is found in the present order of things, he did not define it as something necessarily evil, and he even envisaged the possibility of its existence in Paradise before the Fall. Speaking of this subject in his controversy with Julian, Augustine writes:

«... illa carnalis concupiscentia, cuius motus ad postremam, quae vos multum delectat, pervenit voluptatem, numquam in paradiso, nisi cum ad gignendum esset necessaria, ad nutum voluntatis exsurget. Hanc si placet vobis in paradiso collocare et per talem concupiscentiam carnis, quae nec praeveniret, nec tardaret nec excederet imperium voluntatis, vobis videtur in illa felicitate filios potuisse generari non repugnamus.» (*Contra duas epistulas Pelagianorum* I, 17, n. 35) ²

¹ CSEL 42, 232: PL 44, 425.

² CSEL 60, 451: PL 44, 566. Cf. *Opus imperfectum contra Julianum* I, 70; II, 42; III, 177; V, 17. That 'concupiscentia carnis' and 'libido' were identified by Augustine is evident from his words: «Quolibet pruritu libidinem, id est, concupiscentiam carnis laudes ...» *Opus imperfectum contra Julianum* II, 31 (PL 45, 1155).

But 'libido' as it actually exists in fallen man is disordered and in consequence is evil:

«... quoniam nunc talis non est [libido qualis forte potuerit esse in paradiso], sed ipsa licita inhianter, non obtemperanter appetit, in illicitis autem aut spiritum dejicit, aut contra spiritum concupiscit; agnoscite malum vitiata naturae integritate contractum». (*Opus imperfectum contra Julianum* I, 70) ¹

The author of *Hypomnesticon*, on the other hand, does not enter into a discussion of this distinction, and never considers the possibility of the existence of 'libido' in Paradise. For him 'libido' is so defined as to be evil, and indeed precisely as defined by him it could have no place in that happy abode:

«Non omne quod libet, libido est, sed omne quod *male* libet, libido est». (Resp. IV, 2)

In proving that 'libido' as actually affecting man in his fallen state is evil, he resorts to the text of Gen. 3, 7 to contrast it with Gen. 2, 25 as St. Augustine so often did to establish the same conclusion ². He also uses St. Paul's teaching as found in chapter 7 of the Epistle to the Romans to prove the magnitude of the evil of concupiscence very much as Augustine had done, particularly in the *Contra duas epistulas Pelagianorum* ³. Thus in chapter 5 of the same IVth Responsio he introduces a long commentary on Rom 7 with the words:

«Audite ergo quanta sit iniquitas huius mali, [libidinis] quidve hinc homo patiatur infirmus, Apostolo dicente et disputante inter cetera: 'Nam concupiscentiam', inquit 'nesciebam, nisi lex diceret, non concupisces'.»

and having unfolded the noxious effects of concupiscence as he sees them described in St. Paul's epistle he heavily underlines the conclusion to be drawn for the sake of his Pelagian opponents:

«Ecce quanta mortifera bella, ecce quae pericula, quantaque naufragia, de malo laudabilis et dilectae vestrae concupiscentiae, diabolo seminante exorta sunt.» (Resp. IV, 6)

¹ PL 45, 1094. Cf. *Contra Julianum* IV, 13, n. 63; V, 7, n. 27; *Opus imperfectum contra Julianum* II, 31.

² *De nuptiis et concupiscentia* I, 5, n. 6; *Ibid.* 6, n. 7; *Ibid.* 21, n. 23 – 22, n. 24; *Ibid.* II, 5, n. 14; *Ibid.* 14, n. 28; 30, n. 52; *Contra duas epistulas Pelagianorum* I, 15, n. 31.

³ Cf. *Contra duas epistulas Pelagianorum* I, 8, n. 13; n. 14; *Ibid.* 10, n. 17; n. 18; n. 19.

«Stulti, aliquando iam sapite, et nolite de tanto malo gloriari, neque mendaces esse adversus veritatem, quae per os sanctorum suorum laudabilem dilectamque vestram concupiscentiam malam, et libidinem punit immundam.» (*Ibid.* 8)

Even in the case of those joined in wedlock, the author of *Hypomnesticon* sees in 'libido' an evil, and when this same 'libido' is legitimately used in marriage for the procreation of children, he finds it still to give rise to evil in the form of venial sin:

«Et in coniugatis igitur et in omni homine libido mala est: nonnunquam enim ad illicita trahit, quia voluntati peccatrici, qua factum est ut esset in membris, contraria est in tantum, ut ipsorum coniugatorum ad licitum usum ardore sui sic anhelantes praecipitet mentes ... Fit enim voluntas incontines, dum inlecta vincitur voluptate; sed venialis est in coniugatis malo bene utentibus.» (*Resp.* IV, 7)

Here the author of *Hypomnesticon* is at one with Augustine when he writes:

«Non autem dicimus, morbum esse negotium nuptiarum, quod est liberorum procreandorum causa concumbere, non satiandae libidinis; quam tu negas morbum, cum fatearis adversus eam provisum fuisse conjugale remedium ... Hoc itaque malo sola bene utitur intentione propagandae prolis pudicitia conjugalis: huic malo venialiter in conjugate ceditur, non causa prolis, sed carnalis tantummodo voluptatis.» (*Opus imperfectum contra Julianum* I, 68) ¹

Finally, in his endeavour to safeguard the good of marriage in spite of the evil concomitance of carnal concupiscence in procreation, the author of *Hypomnesticon* has recourse to similes rather like the one normally employed by Augustine in his handling of the same problem. Yet, here again the author of *Hypomnesticon* shows his independence by choosing images of his own instead of using the 'oliva-oleaster' image that was so dear to the Bishop of Hippo ². Thus, taking as an example a vine abandoned by the vine-dresser and choked as a result by briars, he asks whether the grapes produced from such a plant will be ascribed to the thorns which oppress the fruit. On the contrary, he explains, it is rather from the native goodness of the vine, though the plant is encumbered by thorns, that the good fruit is produced. Similarly, in the case of

¹ PL 45, 1090-1091.

² *De nuptiis et concupiscentia* II, 34, n. 58; *Contra Julianum* VI, 6, n. 15; *Ibid.* 7, n. 20; n. 21.

wheat overgrown with cockle, the good grain is ascribed to the native goodness of the wheat and not to the evil cockle. So also, he argues, children are the good fruit of a nature that in itself is good, and not of the evil and corrupting 'libido' wherewith all men are born. And just as every living thing, though good in itself, requires the diligent care and attention of a cultivator in order to avoid being destroyed by the evils that attack it, so also our sinful nature has constant need of the help of God, its Creator, its Cultivator and Preserver, that the thorns and cockle of 'libido' and every evil concupiscence which were contracted by sin may be purged by the hand of grace, through Jesus Christ our Lord. Then concluding his indictment of Julian's slanderous charge that by condemning 'libido' as evil one necessarily condemned marriage also, our author adds:

«Ideoque nuptiarum licentiam bonam valde fatemur, et malam concupiscentiam in coniugatis damnabilem et voluptuosam esse catholico ore clamamus, vestrumque dogma in eius turpitudine horrendum, sanctorum scripturarum auctoritate damnamus.» (Resp. IV, 7)

In conclusion, it may be remarked that throughout his entire treatment of the problem of Original Sin the author of *Hypomnesticon* followed the main lines traced out by Augustine in his teaching on the subject as found in the anti-Pelagian writings. In substance, the doctrine of *Hypomnesticon* is identical with that of the great Doctor of the Church. Nevertheless, in his presentation of the problems involved, the author followed a method of his own. He waived the patristic argument entirely and made no allusion to the councils of the Church or to the teaching of the Roman Pontiffs. Instead he concentrated exclusively on arguments based on Sacred Scripture and reason; but in his choice of scriptural texts he adhered closely to Augustine's example, and very frequently used identical texts to establish the same points of doctrine. The illustrations used differed occasionally from those employed by Augustine, but they were sufficiently alike in their application to point to the ultimate source of their inspiration. An effort at a systematic treatment was made, and pains were taken to define accurately the main terms used. As an exposition of St. Augustine's teaching on the complex problem of Original Sin, the treatment of *Hypomnesticon* is remarkably sound and competent.

§ 2. The Doctrine of Grace

The doctrine that predominates in Hypomnesticon is beyond all question the doctrine of Grace. From the opening sentences of the Praefatio to the final sentence of Responsio VI, the theme recurs with a frequency which is remarkable, and which is characteristic of perhaps St. Prosper of Aquitaine alone among the immediate disciples of St. Augustine¹. Apart from the deep personal commitment to grace which the author unconsciously reveals in his book, the reason for the emphasis on this subject is the acute awareness the author possessed of the utterly destructive effect on the doctrine of grace which the Pelagian heresy produced. The author clearly saw in Pelagianism a devastating onslaught, not merely on the doctrine of Original Sin, but also on the entire supernatural order of grace. Hence the urgency of his appeal in the Praefatio:

«Confidamus et nos resistentes eis in gratia Domini, quae est gloria nostra, redimens nos a circumdantibus nos, et intellectum dans nobis, et instruens nos in via hac qua ingredimur ...» (Praefatio)

Hence the vigour and vehemence of his attack on those whom with Augustine he dubbed 'inimici gratiae'². Hence the particularly extended Responsio III to deal specifically with the problem.

The principle affirming the innate power of the human will of achieving moral excellence by its own efforts and of meriting grace was basic in the Pelagian system, and it was summed up in the formula:

«Posse hominem per liberum arbitrium, tamquam per se sibi sufficientem, implere quod velit, vel etiam meritis operum a Deo gratiam unicuique dari». (Responsio III, 1)

It was against this baneful principle that the author of Hypomnesticon directed his best efforts, and in doing so firmly established two doctrines which at first sight seem to be mutually exclusive, viz. the necessity of grace and its gratuity.

¹ It is true that only one of the six Responsiones, viz. Responsio III, is devoted specifically to the question, and that four Responsiones are concerned with different aspects of the problem of Original Sin; but it should be recalled that Responsio III on grace is so extended as to dwarf all the others. Besides, what the author has to say on the matter is far from being confined to the third Responsio. On the contrary, the teaching on grace is woven in manifold ways into the entire texture of the work.

² Cf. *Contra Julianum* IV, 3, n. 23; *Contra duas epistulas Pelagianorum* I, 21, n. 39, etc. Hypomnesticon, Responsio III, 6.

a) *The Necessity of Grace*

In the *De gratia Christi et de peccato originali*¹, when examining the Pelagian concept of grace, St. Augustine finds it to consist primarily in external factors, such as the Law, divine revelation generally, the example of Christ; the only internal element admitted to the notion was an illumination of the mind enabling men to learn the divine message. On no account did the Pelagians conceive grace as an internal aid moving man's will effectively and thereby helping him to act worthily in relation to God:

«Hinc itaque apparet hanc eum gratiam confiteri, qua demonstrat et revelat Deus quid agere debeamus; non qua donat atque adjuvat, ut agamus, cum ad hoc potius valeat legis agnitio, si gratiae desit opitulatio, ut fiat mandati praevaricatio.» (*Op. cit.* I, 8, n. 9)²

«Denique Dei adiutorium multipliciter insinuandum putavit commemorando doctrinam et revelationem, et oculorum cordis adaperitionem ... Hoc est ergo gratiam Dei ponere in lege atque doctrina.» (*Ibid.* I, 7, n. 8)³

And then shortly afterwards, contrasting this defective view with what he believed to be the true nature of grace⁴, viz. that divine aid whereby man's will is effectively moved to believe what is revealed and to live according to the norms and example which it enjoins, Augustine adds:

«Sed nos eam gratiam volumus isti [Pelagiani] aliquando fateantur, qua futurae gloriae magnitudo non solum promittitur, verum etiam creditur et speratur; nec solum revelatur sapientia, verum et amatur; nec solum suadetur omne quod bonum est, verum et persuadetur.» (*Ibid.* I, 10, n. 11)⁵

«Qua gratia agitur, non solum ut facienda noverimus, verum etiam ut cognita faciamus; nec solum ut diligenda credamus, verum etiam ut credita diligamus.» (*Ibid.* cap. 12, n. 13)⁶

Later, he shows the reason for this insistence and indicates why grace in the sense he outlined was necessary:

¹ CSEL 42, 123-206: PL 44, 359-410.

² CSEL 42, 132: PL 44, 364.

³ CSEL 42, 131-132: PL 44, 364.

⁴ St. Augustine did not deny that revelation was a grace; cf. *De gratia Christi et de peccato originali* I, 8, n. 9; 12, n. 13.

⁵ CSEL 42, 134: PL 44, 366.

⁶ CSEL 42, 136: PL 44, 367. Cf. *ibid.* I, 33, n. 36.

«Non solum enim Deus posse nostrum donavit atque adiuvat, sed etiam *velle et operari operatur in nobis*, non quia nos non volumus, aut nos non agimus, sed quia sine ipsius adiutorio nec volumus aliquid boni nec agimus.» (*Ibid.* cap. 25, n. 26) ¹

The procedure adopted by the author of Hypomnesticon is quite different. Instead of unfolding at length the Pelagian view on the matter as Augustine customarily did ², he ignores altogether the details of Pelagius's notion of grace, and never mentions the Law or revelation as identified with grace in the Pelagian system. He simply enunciates the Pelagian doctrine as condensed in the one proposition:

«Posse hominem per liberum arbitrium, tamquam per se sibi sufficientem, implere quod velit, vel etiam meritis operum a Deo gratiam unicuique dari.» (Responsio III, 1)

and immediately tackles the problems summarized therein.

Further, in handling these problems, the method he employs is proper to himself, and though dependent on Augustine for its general inspiration, is independent of him in the details of its proofs. Thus, having formulated the Pelagian proposition given above, our author immediately proceeds to make a distinction between the state of Adam before the Fall and that of mankind since that disaster:

«Respondemus: Neminem posse per se sibi, id est, per liberum arbitrium sufficere implere quod velit recte dicimus, nisi protoplastum solum potuisse, cum voluntas liberi arbitrii fuisset sana eidem ante culpam.» (Responsio III, 1)

Next he takes considerable pains to demonstrate that Adam was in fact free to choose either good or evil before the Primal Sin, and that the command not to eat the fruit of the forbidden tree would not have been made were Adam not free to obey it. Then by a brilliant stratagem, he uses the very Scripture passage which had been customarily used by the Pelagians to vindicate the absolute freedom of will for all men independently of grace ³, to establish the freedom wherein Adam had

¹ CSEL 42, 146: PL 44, 373.

² Cf. *Liber de spiritu et littera* 2, n. 4; 3, n. 5; *De gestis Pelagii* passim; *De gratia Christi et de peccato originali* I, 3, n. 3 ff.

³ The text is Ecclesiasticus 15, 14-18; cf. *De perfectione iustitiae hominis* 19, n. 40; *De gestis Pelagii* 3, n. 7; *De gratia et libero arbitrio* 2, n. 3; *Opus imperfectum contra Julianum* I, 45.

been created by God. By this ingenious tactic, the author at once showed the necessity of grace to arise, not from an inherent defect in the will as created by God, but from man's sin in Adam; and at the same time, by showing the application of the favourite Pelagian text to man as originally created, he deprived the Pelagian enemy of one of its most dangerous weapons, viz. Eccl. 15, 14:

«Nam ut calcatus liberum arbitrium cum possibilitatis bono, quo valeret implere quod voluisset, Adam factum intelligas, audi quid dicat scriptura sancta in libro Ecclesiastico: 'Deus' inquit 'ab initio fecit hominem et reliquit illum in manu consilii sui ...' Hac per inobedientiam desolatus homo, iudicio iusto factus est serpenti, id est, diabolo, cui maluit obedire quam Deo, captivus.» (Responsio III, 2)

If this entire passage is compared with a corresponding one in the *De perfectione iustitiae hominis*, where St. Augustine is confronted with the same text as used by Celestius, the progress made by the author of Hypomnesticon will be manifest. Augustine's reply is far from being effective and the conclusion to the few remarks he makes is specially weak:

«Nolo plura dicere de re tanta, quia melius eam committo fidelium gemitibus, quam sermonibus meis.» (*Op. cit.* 19, n. 40) ¹

And he is not much more successful when the text recurs again for discussion in the *De gestis Pelagii* 3; the *De gratia et libero arbitrio* 2, or the *Opus imperfectum contra Julianum* I, 45. Once more the author of Hypomnesticon shows his independence in relation to Augustine and at the same time reveals his exceptional ability to absorb the saint's teaching, and to mould it into a new and sometimes more effective form.

A strong argument used repeatedly by St. Augustine to establish the necessity of grace is one drawn from Gal. 2, 21, viz. that if man can rise by his own efforts to the state of justice lost by Adam's sin, then Christ died in vain ². In Hypomnesticon a very similar argument is constructed from the same text:

¹ CSEL 42, 43: PL 44, 314.

² Cf. *De spiritu et littera* 29; *De natura et gratia* I; 2; 9; *De perfectione iustitiae hominis* 7; *Contra Julianum* IV, 3, n. 17; V, 4, n. 18; VI, 24, n. 81; *Opus imperfectum contra Julianum* II, 70; 198.

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«Quod si homo propria voluntatis virtute, et non per Dominum, sufficit elisus assurgere quo in paradiso, de quo inobediens pulsus est, Deo reconciliandus redeat, ergo 'Christus gratis mortuus est'.» (Responsio III, 2)

De natura et gratia

«Si enim possibilitas naturalis per liberum arbitrium, et ad cognoscendum quomodo vivere debeat, et ad bene vivendum sufficit sibi, ergo 'Christus gratis mortuus est'.» (cap. 40, n. 47) ¹

And just as Augustine frequently returned to the same argument, so we find that the author of *Hypomnesticon* repeats it also:

«Nihil videlicet aliud adstruitis ista dicendo ['Si volo sanctus sum ...'], nisi, ut superius iam dictum est, Christus veniens nihil nobis praestitit, nihil salutis, nihil adiutorii contulit, mors eius nihil profuit nobis, salus nostra naturalis est nobis.» (Responsio III, 3)

Similarly, a number of other texts, viz. Matt. 9, 21; Lk. 19,10; I Tim. 1, 15; I Pet. 2, 24, and Jn. 2, 2, all used frequently by St. Augustine to prove the necessity of grace, are exploited for the same purpose by the author of *Hypomnesticon*. In fact, several of these texts are found together in chapter 27 of the first book of the *De peccatorum meritis et remissione* ². This chapter is a veritable arsenal of Scripture texts in support of the doctrine of the necessity of grace, and it may well have been a source used for the composition of *Hypomnesticon*. It is not, however, easy to establish this, as the texts in question are repeated so often in other works of Augustine that it is impossible to determine with certitude the precise work which served as an inspiration for the use of any of them. However, taking them as a block, and remembering that they are directed to prove an issue similarly established by Augustine, the relation of general dependence of the author of *Hypomnesticon* on Augustine in this whole question of the necessity of grace is beyond all doubt.

One argument used with particular effect by Augustine to prove the necessity of grace is derived from the obligation incumbent on all Christians of prayer. Referring to the petitions contained in the Lord's Prayer, he writes:

«Ut quid enim ista orando tanto gemitu petimus, si volentis hominis et currentis, non miserentis est Dei? Non quia hoc sine voluntate

¹ CSEL 60, 268: PL 44, 270.

² Three such texts are, Lk. 19, 10; I Tim. 1, 15; I Pet. 2, 24.

nostra agitur, sed quia voluntas non implet quod agit, nisi divinitus adiuvetur.» (*De perfectione iustitiae hominis* 19, n. 40) ¹

This argument is entirely absent from Hypomnesticon, though references to prayer do occur in connection with the doctrine of predestination.

The fundamental reason given alike by Augustine and the author of Hypomnesticon for the necessity of grace is that the human will wounded by Original Sin is no longer capable by itself of doing anything efficacious for supernatural life:

«Hoc ergo vulnere cuncti libero claudicamus arbitrio, nec implere nobis naturaliter sufficit posse bonum.» (Responsio III, 1) ²

Yet, however much both authors insisted on man's ineptitude without grace – and it is true that Augustine's insistence on the point is so overwhelming as to give the impression, at times, that he considered fallen man incapable of any good whatever without it ³ – they both admitted the possibility of naturally good acts ⁴. Indeed, the author of Hypomnesticon was specially explicit in this matter, and while diminishing in no wise the emphasis on the need of grace found in Augustine's works, he developed the theme at considerable length in the third Responsio. He carefully drew a distinction between those activities 'quae ad Deum pertinent' and those others 'quae ad praesentem pertinent vitam'; 'quae ex bono naturae oriuntur', maintained that the first were impossible without grace, but that it was otherwise in the case of the second. As was remarked in another connection ⁵, his treatment of this problem is remarkably good and this is very likely the reason why it attracted the attention of St. Thomas Aquinas and merited mention in the *Summa Theologiae*; and it is perhaps not fanciful to think that Q. 109, a. 2 of the Ia IIae was in part inspired by Hypomnesticon's treatment ⁶.

¹ CSEL 42, 43: PL 44, 314; cf. *De gratia et libero arbitrio* 4, 9.

² Cf. *De natura et gratia* 52, n. 60.

³ This is particularly true of the early works: *De beata vita* (386); *De ordine* (386); *Soliloquia* (386/7) but it holds also for the anti-Pelagian works which are more especially in view here. Cf. J. CHÉNÉ, *Les origines de la controverse semi-pélagienne* in *L'année théologique augustinienne* 13 (1953) 57-60.

⁴ Cf. Responsio III, 4, and St. Augustine's *De spiritu et littera* 27, n. 48. For a discussion of the problem of naturally good acts in St. Augustine's writings, see L. CAPÉLAN, *Le problème du salut des infidèles* (Toulouse 1934) 121-126.

⁵ See above, p. 91.

⁶ St. Thomas's examples of naturally good acts as given in the *Summa Theologiae* Ia IIae Q. 109, a. 2, corp., viz. 'aedificare domos' and 'plantare vineas' are similar to those given in Hypomnesticon, viz. 'fabricare domum' and 'laborare in agro' (Resp. III, 4).

An argument of great appeal to the Pelagians to show that man was capable of sinlessness and of sanctity by his own efforts was built on the many examples of holiness which flourished under the Old Law. Pelagius himself, and Julian of Eclanum after him, had maintained that those who lived before the Law was given were saved by the natural law, that those who lived after the revelation of the Law were saved by the Law of Moses, and that only those who lived in New Testament times were saved through Christ. Hence, the Pelagians concluded, those who achieved sanctity in Old Testament times did so by their own efforts under the guidance of the law of nature or of the Law of Moses, and independently of grace in Augustine's sense ¹. In replying to this argument, St. Augustine laboured to show that the Old Testament personages invoked by the Pelagians had not been free from sin. His task in certain cases was not easy owing to the silence of the Scriptures about the failings of several of the personages in question, e. g. Abel, Elizabeth, the wife of Zachary, etc. ².

The author of *Hypomnesticon* in his handling of this question had recourse to an ingenious tactic reminiscent of the one he used in dealing with the objection framed on the basis of Eccl. 15, 14. He simply admitted the sanctity of the Old Testament personages referred to, ignored altogether the vexed question of their sinlessness, and by drawing attention to the references to grace which the sacred text made in connection with them, showed that any sanctity they possessed was, on the evidence of Scripture, to be attributed to grace. In this way, he both vindicated the principle for which St. Augustine stood, and at the same time, avoided the difficulties inherent in the method of defence he employed. Thus referring to Noah, he writes:

«In libro Geneseos: Noë autem, ait, invenit gratiam ante Dominum Deum. Statimque sequitur: Noë homo iustus et consummatus erat in genere suo, et placuit Deo. Nota, igitur, post inventam gratiam, Deo donante, iustum et consummatum dictum esse et placuisse Deo, non ante gratiam.» (Responsio III, 12)

Nevertheless, though the method he employs to counter the Pelagian objection that the Old Testament gives evidence of holiness dependent uniquely on personal effort and the Law is new, the conclusion at which

¹ Cf. *Contra duas epistulas Pelagianorum* I, 21, n. 39; *De gestis Pelagii* 35, n. 63.

² Cf. *De peccatorum meritis et remissione* II, 10-13; *Ibid.* 29, n. 47; *De natura et gratia* 38, n. 45.

the author aims is identical with that of Augustine, namely, that grace is necessary for all holiness. Besides, the assumption made at the outset, and developed later, viz. that it was the grace of Christ which operated in Old Testament times, both before and under the Law, to produce whatever sanctity is found there, derives also from St. Augustine ¹:

«Dono autem gratiae Dei Patris, et Christi eius, sanctique Spiritus, iustos qui fuerunt ante legem, vel sub lege, tam electos quam gubernatos fuisse, ex multis testimoniis accipe pauca.» (Responsio III, 12)

Finally, a problem intimately connected with the foregoing was that of the identity between the faith and grace of the Old Testament with those of the New. By appealing to the holiness of those who lived before the time of the coming of Christ, the Pelagians hoped to demonstrate that the grace and faith of Christ, as understood by Augustine, were not a *sine qua non* of sanctity. Hence, referring to Julian, Augustine declares:

«Quantaelibet fuisse virtutis antiquos praedicet iustos, non eos salvos fecit nisi fides Mediatoris, qui in remissionem peccatorum sanguinem fudit ... Vos non vultis, inimici huic gratiae, ut eadem gratia Jesu Christi salvi facti credantur antiqui, sed distribuitis tempora secundum Pelagium, in cuius libris hoc legitur; et ante legem dicitis salvos factos esse natura, deinde per legem, postremo per Christum, quasi hominibus duorum superiorum temporum, ante legem scilicet et in lege, sanguis Christi non fuerit necessarius.» (*Contra duas epistulas Pelagianorum*, I, 21, n. 39) ²

The author of *Hypomnesticon* maintains exactly the same doctrine as Augustine in this matter, and supports it with a series of well-chosen texts wherein he shows the vast extent of his own resource, and his capability of making a positive contribution to Augustine's theology. He writes:

«Omnes igitur sancti Dei ... qui ante adventum fuere incarnationis Domini nostri Jesu Christi, fide non alia nisi quae nunc est, salvi facti sunt.» (Responsio III, 14)

«Sed non sola fide, immo et gratia, quae nunc per Christum donata est; quia nec fides sine gratia, nec gratia sine fide: dicente Apostolo ad Timotheum: Superabundavit autem gratia Domini nostri cum fide et dilectione quae est in Christo Jesu.» (*Ibid.*)

¹ Cf. *De spiritu et littera* 15, n. 27; *De perfectione iustitiae hominis* 19, n. 42.

² CSEL 60, 456-457: PL 44, 569.

«Nam eandem ... esse fidem quae salutem contulit in cognoscendum Deum, et illis et nobis, apertissime demonstrat Apostolus scribens ad Galatas ... Tempora itaque mutata sunt, non fides.» (*Ibid.*)¹

He continues the argument with a wealth of Scripture texts skilfully manipulated, and produces a splendid example of concentrated reasoning to confound the Pelagian errors; so much so that what he says in conclusion with reference to St. Paul could well be applied to his masterful refutation:

«Omnem vero amputavit imperitorum suspicionem ancipitem, et nostram definitionem nullo haereticorum ariete quassandam muro vallavit.» (Responsio III, 15)

b) *The Gratuity of Grace*

The author of *Hypomnesticon* introduces the discussion of the gratuity of grace very much as St. Augustine introduced it many years before in the *De natura et gratia*, and that in conjunction with precisely the same text, Ephes. 2, 4, used by St. Augustine. Having quoted this text, the saint continued:

«Haec igitur Christi gratia, sine qua nec infantes, nec aetate grandes salvi fieri possunt, non meritis redditur, sed gratis datur, propter quod gratia nominatur.» (*Op. cit.* 4, n. 4)²

The author of *Hypomnesticon*, in his turn, reproduces the same teaching:

«Nullum autem hominis esse meritum in accipienda gratia ad salutem, Paulus apostolus docet scribens ad Ephesios: 'Deus ... convificavit nos Christo, cuius gratia estis salvati'. Propter nimiam, ait, caritatem suam qua dilexit nos, non propter nostram, quasi priores dilexerimus eum, cum essemus mortui peccatis.» (Responsio III, 6)

He then marshals a phalanx of texts from St. Paul, Ephes. 2, 8; 2 Tim. 1, 8; Rom. 10, 3; Tit. 3, 4, etc. which shows with incontrovertible force the flagrant contradiction between the Pelagian view and the sacred text.

¹ The idea expressed in the above passage to the effect that the faith which saved in Old Testament times was identical with that of the New, and epitomized in the formula «tempora mutata sunt, non fides» derives directly from Augustine. Cf. *Tractatus in Evangelium Joannis* 45, 9: «Tempora variata sunt, non fides» (CCL 36, 392: PL 35, 1722); *Enarrationes in psalmos* 50, n. 17 (CCL 38, 612: PL 36, 596); *De natura et gratia* 44, n. 51 (CSEL 60, 271: PL 44, 272).

² CSEL 60, 235: PL 44, 249.

Next, to the Pelagian question: If divine grace must precede all human merit, why does God not bestow this prevenient grace alike on all men?, our author replies by citing a text of St. Paul, viz. Rom. 9, 20, so often used by Augustine when confronted with the same objection:

«Sed respondes mihi inquis: 'Si non unusquisque pro sua voluntate, qua nos dicimus eum inquisisse Deum, accipit gratiam, sed praevenit voluntatem eius sua gratia, quo in eum credere possit, cur non hoc ergo in omnibus operatur?' ... Cur hoc illi operetur, illi non operetur, metuentem me et trementem iudicia eius inscrutabilia et inreprehensibilia, nolo interrogas ... 'Quis est enim homo qui respondeat Deo? Numquid dicit figmentum ei qui se finxit, quare me sic fecisti?'.» (Responsio III, 7)

Then, showing in unmistakable terms the full extent of his adherence to St. Augustin's theology of Original Sin and Grace, he defends God's justice against the background of the famous teaching of Augustine on the 'massa damnata'¹:

«Si tamen adtendas peccatum primorum hominum, quo massa humani generis damnari meruit, quia secundum testimonium Pauli apostoli: 'Ex uno omnes in condemnationem', poteris agnoscere iudicia Dei esse iustissima.» (*Ibid.*)

The parable of the Good Samaritan is next invoked, not merely to show the wounded state of mankind resulting from the Fall and the consequent necessity of grace, but also to show that grace is prior to all human merit:

«Audi tamen adhuc calcatus ... quia homo vulneratus libero arbitrio per Aadae peccatum ... per se solum sanare se non potest ... nec eum gratiam meritis ullis accipere, sed totum sua misericordia Deum peragere.» (Responsio III, 8)

And in the course of his exposition, reverting to the same idea that grace precedes all merit, he adds:

«Et videns eum misericordia motus est ... Et ideo misericordia motus est, quia in eo, quo curari dignatus esset, meritum nullum invenit.» (*Ibid.*)

Afterwards, explaining the significance of the act whereby the Good Samaritan committed the wounded man to the care of the inn-keeper, he remarks:

¹ Cf. *De diversis quaestionibus ad Simplicianum* I, Quaestio 2, n. 19; *De diversis quaestionibus lxxxiii*, Quaestio 68, n. 3.

«... stabulario curam habere iubet sibi traditi sauciati, significans quod a die qua datur homini a Deo per motum misericordiae eius, non per meritum quod in vulnerato non invenitur, ut sanetur, usque ad diem assumptionis eius, nisi sub cura gratiae fuerit, ad perfectum pervenire non posse.» (*Ibid.*)

And in conclusion, he clinches the argument with another favourite text of Augustine ¹:

«Quod si dicas, ut dicere consuesti: 'Quia ego prior volui, Deus voluit', iam meritum facis, ut gratia ex operibus iam non sit gratia sed merces. Hoc loco redarguit te Apostolus dicens: 'Si autem gratia, iam non ex operibus...' Gratia igitur donatur, non redditur, quia si redderetur quasi ex debito, non ab Apostolo, non ex operibus, sed ex operibus diceretur.» (Responsio III, 10)

Thus, in opposition to the Pelagians – and he has the Semi-Pelagians in view also ² – the author defended the absolute gratuity of grace with a weight of argument that was overwhelming, and left no room for any human merit that preceded grace. Certainly, throughout, the discussion is particularly close to the master ideas dominating Augustine's theology of grace. Apart from differences in the order of presentation of the arguments, and other matters of minor detail, no divergence can be observed. Finally, by the general character of the proofs and the choice of Scripture texts, the treatment is specially reminiscent of the *De natura et gratia* (415) and the *De gratia et libero arbitrio* (425) ³.

c) *Grace and Freedom of the Will*

From the very beginning of the anti-Pelagian controversy, Augustine drew attention to a twofold danger inherent in all disputes about grace and free will, viz. the danger of seeming to annihilate freedom when defending grace, and the corresponding danger of appearing to destroy grace when defending freedom of the will. Thus, in the second book of

¹ The text in question is Rom. 11,6. Cf. *De gestis Pelagii* 14, n. 33 (CSEL 42, 89: PL 44, 340); *Contra Julianum* V, 4, n. 14 (PL 44, 792).

² See above, pp. 16-17; 83-84.

³ The use of Ephes. 2,4 in the *De natura et gratia* 3, n. 3 at the opening of the discussion (cf. Hypomnesticon, Resp. III, 6) and also the example taken from the parable of the Good Samaritan in chapter 43 n. 50 of the same work (cf. Hypomnesticon, Resp. III, 8) are significant. In the *De gratia et libero arbitrio* the two texts 2 Tim. 1, 8 and Tit. 3, 4 are found together (chapter 5, n. 12) just as in Hypomnesticon, Resp. III, 6.

the *De peccatorum meritis et remissione*, he gives expression to the extreme embarrassment this problem causes when he wrote:

«Ipsa etiam ratio, quae de his rebus a talibus quales sumus iniri potest, quemlibet nostrum quaerentem vehementer angustat, ne sic defendamus gratiam, ut liberum arbitrium auferre videamur, rursus, ne liberum sic asseramus arbitrium, ut superba impietate ingrati Dei gratiae iudicemur.» (*De peccatorum meritis et remissione*, II, 18, n. 28) ¹

That this was an abiding concern of the saint is apparent from the fact that he makes allusion to the point in several later works, e. g. *De natura et gratia* 32, n. 36; *De gratia Christi et peccato originali* I, 17, n. 52; *De gratia et libero arbitrio* I, 1, n. 1.

On the other hand, Augustine was acutely aware that of the two principles, grace and free will, the one which men tended naturally to extol at the expense of the other was freedom of the will:

«Sed laborant homines invenire in nostra voluntate quid boni sit nostrum, quod nobis non sit ex Deo, et quomodo inveniri possit ignoro.» (*De peccatorum meritis et remissione*, II, 18, n. 28) ²

And while being given ample evidence of this wayward tendency in the teaching of Pelagius and Celestius ³, he encountered it in its most extreme and forthright form in the declaration of Julian of Eclanum:

«Libertas arbitrii, qua a Deo emancipatus homo est, in admittendi peccati et abstinendi a peccato possibilitate consistit.» (*Apud Augustine in Opus imperfectum contra Julianum* I, 78) ⁴

And as he could well have anticipated, his defence of grace against the Pelagian error was met by an accusation that he had destroyed free will:

«Dicunt ... illi Manichei ... quia primi hominis peccato, id est Aadae, liberum arbitrium perierit.» (*Apud Augustine in Contra duas epistulas Pelagianorum* I, 2, n. 4) ⁵

In his defence, Augustine strove to show the compatibility between grace and free will. Starting with the wounded condition of the human will

¹ CSEL 60, 100: PL 44, 168.

² CSEL 60, 100: PL 44, 168.

³ Pelagius's emphasis on free will is particularly evident in the *Epistula ad Demetriadem* 4 (PL 30, 19); that of Celestius in quotations preserved in Augustine's *De gestis Pelagii* 18, n. 42.

⁴ PL 45, 1102.

⁵ CSEL 60, 425: PL 44, 552.

resulting from the Fall, and showing its incapability of doing anything of value in the sight of God without grace, he strove to demonstrate that grace for fallen man, far from annihilating his will, really enabled him to use his free will properly:

«... cum bene illo [libero arbitrio] uti nemo possit nisi per gratiam, quae non secundum debitum redditur, sed Deo gratis miserante donatur.»
(*Contra 2 epistulas Pelagianorum* I, 24, n. 42) ¹

«Liberum ergo arbitrium evacuamus per gratiam? Absit: sed magis liberum arbitrium statuimus ... per gratiam sanatio animae a vitio peccati, per animae sanitatem libertas arbitrii ... ita liberum arbitrium non evacuatur per gratiam, sed statuitur.» (*De spiritu et littera* 30, n.52)²

In the *De natura et gratia*, using the formula 'operari-cooperari' which became characteristic in the discussion of the action of grace and the reaction of the human will, he epitomizes his teaching in the luminous passage:

«... operamur et nos [in nostra iustificatione], sed illo operante cooperamur, quia misericordia eius praevenit nos. Praeuenit autem, ut sanemur ... praevenit ut pie vivamus, subsequetur ut cum illo semper vivamus, quia sine illo nihil facere possumus.» (*Op. cit.* 31, n. 35) ³

Turning to *Hypomnesticon*, we find in the treatment of grace and free will a somewhat more pronounced emphasis on the freedom of the will than in Augustine's anti-Pelagian works, and the reason probably is that the author had the Semi-Pelagians very much in mind in the discussion. Because the Pelagians so exaggerated the rôle of free will as to leave no room for grace in the proper sense, it was necessary in their case to insist on grace as against free will; in the case of the Semi-Pelagians, on the other hand, it was particularly important to show that the freedom of the will was not impaired by a grace that was necessary even for the 'initium fidei'. At any rate, the preoccupation of the author of *Hypomnesticon* with the question of freedom in relation to grace is very marked and can be seen especially in the recurring assertions he makes about the matter in *Responsio III*:

«Igitur liberum arbitrium hominibus esse, certa fide credimus, et praedicamus indubitanter.» (*Responsio III*, 3)

¹ CSEL 60, 459: PL 44, 571.

² CSEL 60, 208: PL 44, 233.

³ CSEL 60, 259: PL 44, 264.

«Est, fatemur, liberum arbitrium omnibus hominibus, habens quidem iudicium rationis.» (*Ibid.* 4)

«Est igitur liberum arbitrium, quod quisque esse negaverit, catholicus non est.» (*Ibid.* 10)

Together with Augustine, the author of *Hypomnesticon* shows that grace, far from being incompatible with free will or impairing it in any way, really restores freedom by curing the wound inflicted on the will by sin:

«Vitiato ergo libero arbitrio, totus homo est vitiatus, per quod absque adiutorio gratiae, Deo quod placeat, nec valet incipere, nec perficere sufficit. Praevenitur autem medicina, id est, Christi gratia, ut sanetur, et reparetur in eodem vitiata atque praeparetur voluntas.»

(*Responsio* III, 5)

«Credit enim [fides catholica] quod salus hominis ex Deo sit Christo, cuius vulnere liberum nostrum curatur et reformatur arbitrium vulneratum, qui aversos a se gratuita gratia sua convertit ad se, et ut Deo placeant operibus bonis, operatur in eis et velle et posse.» (*Ibid.* 3)

The formula 'operari-cooperari' that was characteristic of Augustine's description of the respective rôles of grace and free will in all meritorious acts occurs also in *Hypomnesticon* with overtones deriving from the teaching of the Bishop of Hippo:

«In omni itaque opere sancto prior est voluntas Dei, posterior liberi arbitrii: id est, operatur Deus, cooperatur homo.» (*Responsio* III, 10)

«Itaque nec gratia sine libero arbitrio facit hominem habere beatam vitam, nec liberum arbitrium sine gratia.» (*Ibid.* 11)

But what is most noteworthy in the author's treatment of the harmonious functioning of grace and free will is the clever simile he develops on the basis of Ps. 72, 23. St. Augustine¹, and St. Ambrose² before him, had occasion to comment on the Psalm text in question, but neither of them drew from it the splendid comparison in which the human will is compared to a beast of burden (*iumentum*) and grace to its rider (*sensor*). Certainly, the simile is particularly effective as an illustration of the compatibility between grace and free will, and it is scarcely surprising that it attracted the notice of Johann Eck who made use of it in his controversy with Carlstadt at the famous Leipzig Disputation³.

¹ Cf. *De civitate Dei* 10, 25; *Enarrationes in psalmos* 72, n. 28 and 29; *Ibid.* 73, n. 21; *Ibid.* 81, n. 1; *Quaestiones Evangeliorum* II, 33.

² Cf. *De interpellatione Job et David* I, 9, n. 29; *Epistula* 43, 13.

³ The question under debate between Johann Eck and Carlstadt, when the simile from *Responsio* III, 11 of *Hypomnesticon* was invoked, was precisely the

The author begins by describing the initial state in which the animal is found, wandering wild among a troop of its kind. Before being fit for service, it must be broken in by a trainer who gradually subjects it to his will. So also the human will, wounded by sin, is taken possession of by grace, removed from the wild state of the world's evils and concupiscences in which it had hitherto strayed, divested of the savagery of its former evil ways and rendered obedient and apt for the work required by God. And just as the beast when performing a journey is guided by the hand of its rider, so that it follows the course indicated, and travels either fast or slow according to the desires of its master until the destination is reached, so also the human will, when on its Christian journey, is directed by the rule of grace along the paths of the Lord, either with the slow patience of charity or the rapid fervour of the Spirit, until it arrives at the promised kingdom of heaven. This is the reason why the Psalmist says: 'Thy good spirit shall lead me into the right land' (Psalm 142, 10). Again, just as the beast, by reason of too great an abundance of food, can become restive and unruly at times, so that the rider is obliged to use the whip in order to reduce his mount to submission, similarly man can become forgetful of God's grace as a result of his prosperity, and begin to glory in his self-sufficiency. At such times, man needs to be chastened by the whip of tribulations and afflictions until he is gradually made aware of his infirmity and is obliged to have recourse to the help of grace. Finally, just as the rider who has reached his destination after a journey on horseback can say: 'I think I have travelled thirty miles today', so also it can be said that the animal made the same journey. However, the latter would not have accomplished the journey had it not been guided in the way by its rider. Hence it is that the journey is attributed to both rider and beast, though in different ways. Likewise, man's will is said to travel the journey of faith when it observes the divine precepts, but it does not do so without the aid of a grace that guides and directs it. In this way, it becomes apparent that neither grace without free will nor free will without grace is sufficient for salvation in the case of all endowed with the use of reason ¹.

problem of the relation between grace and free will. Eck introduced the simile with the words: «Et quod Augustinus, lib. 3 Hypognosticon, gratiam ad liberum arbitrium velut sessorem ad equum comparat...», and later he made several other allusions to the same topic. Cf. OTTO SEITZ, *Der authentische Text der Leipziger Disputation*, p. 24; 28; 31-32.

¹ This is a free adaptation of the simile as found in *Responsio III*, 11.

The primacy accorded to grace by the author of *Hypomnesticon* is manifest in the foregoing simile, and is summed up in the statement already quoted:

«In omni itaque opere sancto prior est voluntas Dei, posterior liberi arbitrii: id est, operatur Deus, cooperatur homo.» (Responsio III, 10)

Indeed the sovereignty of the divine will and the infallibility of grace in achieving its purpose is affirmed by the author in terms very similar to those employed by Augustine ¹:

«... omne quod vult Deus facere potest, nec prorsus humana voluntate praepeditur quod vult.» (Responsio VI, 8)

«... bene et iuste semper omnia quaecumque vult operatur, et voluntati eius nemo resistit.» (Responsio III, 7)

«... praecedit ... gratia sua Deus hominis ... voluntatem liberi arbitrii ut eum se scire et quaerere faciat.» (*Ibid.* 5)

«... qui aversos a se gratuita gratia sua convertit ad se, et ut Deo placeant operibus bonis, operatur in eis et velle et posse.» (*Ibid.* 3)

Nevertheless, both F. Loofs ² and E. Pickman ³ were convinced that the author of *Hypomnesticon* betrayed Augustine by admitting the possibility of resistance on the part of the human will in face of grace – as though St. Augustine stood for the irresistibility of grace while the author

¹ Numerous parallel passages are to be found throughout the anti-Pelagian writings, especially in the *De natura et gratia*, e. g. chapter 31, n. 35; *De gratia Christi et de peccato originali*, e. g. chapter 10, n. 11; chapter 11, n. 12; chapter 14, n. 15; *De correptione et gratia*, e. g. chapter 14, n. 45.

² F. Loofs wrote: «Und ein wirklich einlenkender Augustinismus, wie der des später Augustin zugeschriebenen *hypomnesticon*, verleugnete Augustin». In a footnote Loofs adds: «Dies m. E. aus dieser Zeit und vielleicht auch aus Gallien stammende *Hypomnesticon* contra Pelagianos et Celestianos (Aug. X, 1611-1664) unbekannter Herkunft (vgl. RE XII, 344, 16 ff.) verwirft zwar die Begründung der Prädestination auf die *praevisa fides* (6, 4, 5 p. 1659), rechnet aber mit der Möglichkeit eines *resistere* (3, 13, 30 p. 1636), hält allein die *electi* für *praedestinati* und sagt von den in *malis propriis praesciti*: *his poenam praedestinatam esse fatemur* (6, 5, 7, p. 1660; vgl. 6, 8, 8 p. 1662). Augustin ist nicht zitiert». And having ended his footnote, Loofs concludes in the body of his text: «So behauptete denn in Südgallien der 'Semipelagianismus' das Feld». [*Leitfaden zum Studium der Dogmengeschichte*, 4th edition (Halle 1906) 439-440]. That we disagree with Loofs' views is indicated in what follows, and our reasons are given.

³ E. PICKMAN's views are found in his *The Mind of Latin Christendom* (Oxford 1937), p. 433-436. They are clearly dependent on Loofs and are not reliable so far as the critique of *Hypomnesticon* is concerned.

of Hypomnesticon denied it. And both writers refer to a passage in Responso III, 13 in support of their erroneous view:

«Habet nihilo minus et bonum meritum, cum in omnibus gratiae Dei bona in se operanti non resistit, sed cooperator existit.» (*Ibid.* 13)

Had both writers carefully read what the author of Hypomnesticon had written in the passages quoted above, particularly the one which runs:

«... bene et iuste semper omnia quaecumque vult operatur, et voluntati eius nemo resistit.» (*Ibid.* 7)

and had they compared this with St. Augustine's statement in the *De dono perseverantiae*:

«At enim, 'voluntate sua quisque deserit Deum, ut merito deseratur a Deo'. Quis hoc negaverit? Sed ideo petimus ne inferamur in tentationem, ut hoc non fiat.» (*Op. cit.* 6, n. 12) ¹

they would neither have claimed that St. Augustine asserted the irresistibility of grace nor that the author of Hypomnesticon differed from him in his teaching on the subject in question. In fact, the author of our work remains entirely faithful to his master in this realm of his teaching, and though he refrains from the use of such terms as 'indeclinabiliter' and 'insuperabiliter' ² to describe with Augustine the movement imparted by grace, he in no way mitigates the saint's teaching on the all-powerful action of God, by grace, to move men's wills freely to choose what He willed.

To sum up: our comparison between Hypomnesticon and Augustine on the subject of grace reveals full consonance between the two authors on all the doctrinal issues involved. The former is deeply indebted to the Doctor of Grace for all the key ideas of its teaching together with much of its vocabulary and many of its Scripture quotations. Thus the combined allusion to Ps. 58, 11 and Ps. 22, 6 which occurs in Hypomnesticon III, 3 seems to have been derived from the *De natura et gratia* 30, n. 35, together with the doctrine associated with the texts. Yet, the contribution made by the author of Hypomnesticon is very real. He gave an excellent *mise au point* to the question of naturally good acts that marked

¹ PL 45, 1000.

² Cf. *De correptione et gratia* 12, n. 38, Maurist edition (Paris 1690) p. 771. The Migne text, viz. PL 44, 940, is unsatisfactory inasmuch as it substitutes 'inseparabiliter' for 'insuperabiliter'. Cf. O. ROTTMANNER, *Der Augustinismus*, p. 21, n. 2.

a definite advance on Augustine's teaching, and won the honour of mention in the *Summa* of St. Thomas in consequence. Then the clever comparison of the rider and his mount to illustrate the mutual operations of grace and free will in the supernatural order was a welcome addition to a discussion which otherwise left the mind of the average man confused.

§ 3. Predestination

The historical context that gave rise to the discussion of predestination in Hypomnesticon has already been discussed ¹. Here we are concerned merely with the doctrinal content of the treatment and that particularly in relation to St. Augustine's teaching. We propose, therefore, to expound briefly the author's views in the order in which he develops them and to add comment where necessary to show their bearing on Augustine's doctrine. Further, we shall limit the discussion to two aspects of the problem, viz. the definition and nature of predestination, and predestination and the divine salvific will.

a) The Definition and Nature of Predestination

Of the eight chapters into which the Louvain theologians divided their edition of Responsio VI of Hypomnesticon (Antwerp, 1576/7), the first is purely introductory and recounts the Semi-Pelagian objection that induced the author to include a treatment of the problem of predestination in his work, viz. that if God predestined some men to glory and abandoned the others to perdition, all prayer, fasting and good works become meaningless, because those predestined for life everlasting will infallibly achieve their end without such practices, and those abandoned to perdition are powerless to change their fate by means of them.

In chapter 2 the author begins his treatment, and he characteristically prefaces it by giving a verbal definition of the term predestination:

«Praedestinatio quippe a praemittendo et praeveniendo vel praeordinando futurum aliquid dicitur.» (Resp. VI, 2)

He next explains that foreknowledge or prescience in God is not an accident but that it is identical with the divine essence, and that every-

¹ See above, p. 15-17.

thing, other than evil, that is foreknown by God is predestined precisely because God foresees what its condition will be in the future. In the case of evil, there is on God's part simply prevision, not predestination, whereas in the case of what is good, there is both prevision and predestination. Hence what is good is predestined by the divine foreknowledge, i. e. before it actually exists God preordains that it will be:

«Mala enim tantum praescit, bona vero et praescit et praedestinat. Quod ergo bonum est, praescientia praedestinat, id est, prius quam sit in re praeordinat.» (*Ibid.*)

Applying these notions of predestination to mankind, the author explains in terms that vividly recall Augustine's phraseology that the entire human race, which had become damnable and mortal by reason of the sin of Adam and Eve, was deserving of the punishment and torments of hell:

«Massae itaque humani generis, quae in Adam et Eva praevaricatione damnabilis mortalisque facta est ... ex debito poena cruciatusque gehennae debetur.» (*Ibid.*)

Nevertheless, because God is just and merciful, He chose from the sinful 'mass' of mankind, not by favouritism but by an inscrutable judgement, those whom He foreknew, prepared and predestined by gratuitous mercy for eternal life. The rest, 'ceteri', God punished by a just judgement. Nevertheless, God did not predestine these latter to be culpable: He simply foresaw them in the mass of perdition:

«Quia vero iustus et misericors Deus praesciusque est futurorum, ex hac damnabili massa non personarum acceptione, sed iudicio aequitatis suae inreprehensibili, immo incomprehensibili, quos praescit, misericordia gratuita praeparat, id est, praedestinat ad aeternam vitam; ceteros autem poena ut praedixi debita punit.» (*Ibid.*)

That we have here a condensed account of the basic ideas of St. Augustine on predestination is so evident to a reader of the great Doctor of the Church as scarcely to need any further comment. For the idea of the 'massa damnata' and God's choice from the guilty mass of mankind of a certain number, by virtue of his mercy, whom He predestined for glory and His abandonment of the rest by a just judgement to perdition, is a constantly recurring theme throughout Augustine's later theological writings¹.

¹ The term 'massa damnata' and similar terms occur with great frequency in Augustine's works in connection with the doctrines of grace and predestination; cf. *De civitate Dei* 14, 26; 15, 1; 21, 12; *Epistula* 194, 6, n. 23; *Enchiridion* 27.

To the question why God makes this distinction between men who are all equally guilty, why He chooses some for everlasting life and abandons the rest to damnation, the author gives exactly the same response as Augustine so often gave in reply to the same and related questions, viz. he refers to St. Paul's words in the Epistle to the Romans 9, 20: «O man, who art thou that repliest against God ...?»¹; and the words: «How incomprehensible are His judgements and unsearchable His ways ...» – Rom. 11, 33²:

«Quod si a me quaeris scire cur duo ista differenter Deus fecit, si personarum acceptor non est ... contende cum Paulo ... loquente: O homo tu quis es qui respondeas Deo?» (Resp. VI, 3)

Thus far the author of Hypomnesticon follows in the footsteps of Augustine, but there is one element proper to Augustine's account which our author does not formally mention. Augustine had explained that if all mankind remained in its culpable state arising from Adam's sin, God's merciful grace would not be manifested among men, and on the other hand, if all were transposed from the darkness of sin to the light of grace, the divine justice would not be manifested:

«Nec beneficium, quod quibusdam gratis tribuitur, appareret, nisi Deus aliis ex eadem massa pariter reis iusto supplicio condemnatis, quid utrisque deberetur, ostenderet.» (*Contra duas epistulas Pelagianorum* II, 7, n. 15)³

«... non utrumque in honorem, ne hoc meruisse se existimet tanquam inculcata natura: ideo non utrumque in contumeliam, ut iudicio superexsultet misericordia.» (*Contra Julianum* IV, 8, n. 46)⁴

Here it would almost appear that it was necessary that a large section of mankind – indeed for Augustine by far the greater section⁵ – be doomed to destruction precisely in order that God's justice might be shown forth among men. The author of Hypomnesticon avoids all mention of this painful topic and does not pronounce on the relative numbers to be lost or saved. In this he again shows that prudent reserve which

¹ Cf. *De nuptiis et concupiscentia* II, 16, n. 31; *Contra duas epistulas Pelagianorum* II, 7, n. 15; *Contra Julianum* IV, 8, n. 46; *De correptione et gratia* 8, n. 17; *De praedestinatione sanctorum* 8, n. 16; 15, n. 30.

² *De peccatorum meritis et remissione* I, 21, n. 29; *De praedestinatione sanctorum* 6, n. 11; 8, n. 16; 15, n. 30; *De dono perseverantiae* 11, n. 25.

³ CSEL 60, 476; PL 44, 582. Cf. *Epistula* 194, 5, n. 21.

⁴ PL 44, 761.

⁵ Cf. *De correptione et gratia* 10, n. 28.

we had occasion to note in connection with another problem dealt with by Augustine ¹.

Answering an objection to the effect that God's denial of the graces leading to salvation was determined by His prevision of man's refusal of those graces, the author of *Hypomnesticon* writes:

«Stulte, Deus est qui iustificat impium, non praeventus humana voluntate, sed ipse praeveniens hominis voluntatem misericordia sua.» (Resp. VI, 4)

Shortly afterwards, with direct reference to predestination, he emphasizes the fact that God's choice is in no way dependent on His prevision of man's future merits, but that it is due uniquely to God's mercy:

«Diximus namque de damnabili humani generis massa Deum praecisisse misericordia, non meritis, quos electione gratiae praedestinavit ad vitam.» (Resp. VI, 5)

By this insistence on the fact that it is God's mercy and not man's merits that explains the predestination of the elect to glory, the author of *Hypomnesticon* identifies himself with Augustine's teaching, for the absolutely gratuitous character of predestination was unequivocally taught by the saint in his later writings:

«... regenerati a damnatione liberantur debita, sed gratuita miseratione, non debita, quos elegit ante constitutionem mundi per electionem gratiae, non ex operibus vel praeteritis, vel praesentibus, vel futuris? ... Quod maxime apparet in parvulis, quorum nec praeterita dici possunt opera, quia non fuerunt; nec praesentia, quia nihil operantur; nec futura, quando in illa aetate moriuntur.» (*Contra Julianum* VI, 19, n. 59) ²

On the other hand, while Augustine in considering the fate of those not predestined to eternal life normally stopped short at the inscrutable judgement of God whereby a certain number were abandoned to perdition that the justice of God might be manifested in them ³, the author of *Hypomnesticon* underlined God's prevision of man's future sin as the cause of the punishment predestined for him:

«Ceteros autem poena, ut praedixi, debita punit; quos ideo punit quia quid essent futuri praescivit, non tamen puniendos ipse fecit vel praedestinavit.» (Resp. VI, 2)

¹ The question was that of the magnitude of Original Sin as a factor in its transmission. The problem was alluded to above, p. 145.

² PL 44, 858. Cf. *Enchiridion* 99.

³ Cf. *Contra duas epistulas Pelagianorum* II, 7, n. 15; *Contra Julianum* IV, 8, n. 45.

«Ceteros vero iudicio iustitiae eius ... praescisse tantum vitio proprio perituros, non ut perirent praedestinasse ... his poenam praedestinatum esse rite fatemur.» (Resp. VI, 5)

Then taking Judas as an example he adds:

«Hunc enim Deus cum praescisset in vitiis propriae voluntatis pessimum fore ... poenam ei praedestinavit ex merito.» (*Ibid.*)

An evolution may be noted here in relation to Augustine's teaching. It consists in a shift of emphasis from the inscrutable divine judgement, of which Augustine spoke, whereby God, independently of all prevision of man's merit or demerit, chooses a certain number of men to be vessels of election and abandons the rest to be vessels of wrath, to the predestination of punishment on the basis of God's prevision of future sin. By his emphasis on the divine prevision of man's future sin as the reason why God predestines punishment corresponding to the sin, the author of *Hypomnesticon* prepares the way for the conclusion reached shortly afterwards in the *Pro Augustino responsiones ad capitula objectionum Gallorum*, viz. that those not predestined for glory are rejected because God foresees their future evil deeds:

«... ideo praedestinati non sunt, quia tales futuri ex voluntaria praevaricatione praesciti sunt.» (Prosper: PL 51, 158 C)

«... ideo eum non praedestinavit, quia recessurum ab ipsa obedientia esse praevидit.» (*Ibid.* 167 C)

«... quia hoc ipsos voluntaria facturos defectione praevидit, ideo in praedestinationis electione illos non habuit.» (*Ibid.* 171 D)

«Et quia praesciti sunt casuri, non sunt praedestinati.» (*Ibid.* 184 A)

Here we have reason to see a modification of Augustine's thought as expressed, say, in the *De dono perseverantiae*. There, as so often in other passages, the saint explains that the reprobate, in virtue of an impenetrable judgement of God and independently of all prevision of their future sins are abandoned to perdition:

«Ceteri autem ubi nisi in massa perditionis justo divino iudicio relinquuntur? ... a perditionis massa non sunt gratiae praedestinatione discreti.» (*Op. cit.* 14, n. 35) ¹

¹ PL 45, 1014. Cf. *De perfectione iustitiae hominis* 13, n. 31: «Hoc ergo bonum, quod est requirere Deum, non erat qui faceret, non erat usque ad unum, sed in eo genere hominum, quod praedestinatum est ad interitum» (CSEL 42, 32: PL 44, 308).

On the other hand, it is a very short step indeed from the 'ideo punit [Deus] quia quid essent futuri praescivit' of Hypomnesticon to the 'ideo praedestinati non sunt quia tales futuri ex voluntaria praevaricatione praesciti sunt' of the *Pro Augustino responsiones ad capitula objectionum Gallorum*, for not to be predestined for glory necessarily involves being punished and if prevision of sin is the cause of the latter, why is it not also the cause of the former? We see here a close doctrinal connection between Hypomnesticon and Prosper's *Pro Augustino responsiones ad cap. Gall.* and in both the emphasis on the prevision of future sin as an explanation of predestined punishment seems to indicate an effort to moderate the harsh teaching of Augustine on the predestination of the reprobate for destruction:

«... quos praedestinavit ad aeternam mortem iustissimus supplicii retributor.» (*De natura et origine animae* IV, 11, n.16) ¹

«Sed quoniam Deus occulta satis dispositione sed tamen iusta non-nullos eorum poenis praedestinavit extremis.» (*Epistula* 204, n. 2) ²

«Quia videbat eos ad sempiternum interitum praedestinos.» (*Tractatus in evangelium Joannis* 48, 4) ³

Certainly none of the above startling phrases finds a place in Hypomnesticon, and their very absence in the writing of one who is otherwise such a close follower of Augustine's thought is significant.

On one point, however, the author of Hypomnesticon, shows no trace of hesitation, and that is the all-important principle in Augustine's definitive teaching that predestination to glory is independent of human merit, and dependent entirely on God's gratuitous grace. But while uncompromisingly maintaining this principle, the author shows anxiety lest his teaching should be considered to destroy freedom of the will, or that it should seem to involve a denial of the need of prayer, fasting and good works generally:

«Nolite itaque putare quod haec et huiusmodi dicentes liberum voluntatis amputemus arbitrium ... operari bona et oportere esse in Dei proposito sollicitos prohibeamus.» (Resp. VI, 7)

In defence of prayer and good works he rallies a number of texts of Sacred Scripture that exhort the faithful to personal effort and exercises of piety, viz. Matt. 26, 41; Lk. 21, 36; Lk. 13, 24; Jn. 15, 14. Then

¹ CSEL 60, 396: PL 44, 533.

² CSEL 57, 318: PL 33, 939.

³ CCL 36, 415: PL 35, 1742. Cf. *Enchiridion* 103; *Contra Julianum* IV, 8, n. 42.

returning once more to consider the fate of the reprobate, he is at pains to point out that God does not compel these unfortunates to sin and that He does not precipitate them unwillingly into the works of death. The problem seems to cause the author some embarrassment, and having listed a series of examples to show the mysterious workings of God's choice among men, he concludes with some texts high-lighting the holiness, justice and mystery of God's ways, viz. Ps. 144, 13; Ps. 91, 6 and the oft-repeated words: «O altitudo divitiarum sapientiae et scientiae Dei, quam incomprehensibilia sunt iudicia eius et investigabiles viae eius.» (Rom. 11, 33)

b) Predestination and the Divine Salvific Will

The brief final chapter of Responsio VI of Hypomnesticon is devoted to the very much debated and complex problem concerning God's salvific will in relation to predestination. As an objection to the teaching that had been given on predestination the classical text, I Tim. 2, 4, is cited to show that God's will is to save all men, and not to make an irrevocable choice whereby some are predestined to glory and the remainder abandoned to perdition independently of all merit.

The author of Hypomnesticon shows no intention of entering into a detailed discussion of this vexed question, and instead of undertaking a direct vindication of the restrictive interpretation of the 'omnes' in the text of St. Paul that had been the abiding preoccupation of Augustine¹, he cleverly rebuts the objection of his adversary with the text of Is. 6, 10:

«Ommino non est falsum [i. e. I Tim. 2, 4] quia omne quod vult Deus facere potest ... Sed quaero a vobis ut dicatis quare Deus qui vult omnes homines salvos fieri, quorundam, ut dicit Isaias propheta, excaecat oculos ne videant, et obdurat cor ne intelligant, ne convertantur et sanentur.» (Resp. VI, 8)

He follows this text with Jn. 12, 39 and for good measure adds Mk. 4, 11, both of which texts refer to Is. 6, 10. Thereupon he poses the question:

¹ In the *De correptione et gratia* 14, n. 44, Augustine said of I Tim 2, 4: «... multis quidem modis intelligi potest, ex quibus in aliis opusculis nostris aliquos commemoravimus» (PL 44, 943). Cf. *Enchiridion* 103; *Contra Julianum* 4, 8, n. 42 and n. 44. For a discussion of Augustine's interpretations of the text, see L. CAPÉLAN, *Le problème du salut des infidèles* p. 126-132; H. RONDET, *Gratia Christi* (Paris 1948) 119 and 146.

«Dicite, quaeso, qualiter haec loca evangelica accipitis? Docete, quid hic de Deo, qui vult omnes homines salvos fieri sentitis? Ecce iam omnes generaliter salvi non sunt, cum aliis datur viam nosse salutis, aliis non datur.» (*Ibid.*)

and he concludes:

«Haec itaque cum facit Deus non personarum acceptione facit, non iniustitia, sed iustitia inenarrabili et misericordia indebita. Quoniam vero hinc liquido utraque pars dicere nihil valemus, credamus tantum reum mortis ex iudicis voluntate pendere.» (*Ibid.*)

Then returning to I Tim. 2, 4, the author explains the text according to one of the several interpretations given by Augustine – and the one most frequently used by the saint¹, viz. that the word ‘omnes’ in the text signifies the predestined:

«... dixit Apostolus: Qui vult omnes homines salvos fieri. Quapropter omnes homines qui salvantur, Deo volente salvantur.» (*Ibid.*)

Finally, in concluding his work the author exhorts his readers to humility in face of the mystery of predestination. He would remove all despair, encourage all men to perform good works, to pray for each other, and in the presence of God to repeat the words: «Thy will be done», and he ends on the hopeful note:

«Ipsius [Dei] erit potestatis iudicium in nobis debitum mutare damnationis, et gratiam praedestinationis indebitam praerogare.» (*Ibid.*)

CONCLUSIONS

1. On all the doctrinal issues examined it was found that the author of Hypomnesticon adhered closely to the teaching of Augustine, and nowhere did he change that teaching substantially.

2. The conformity of the teaching on Original Sin with that of Augustine was remarkably close, and the similarity of the arguments used in connection with the existence, nature and transmission of Original Sin was particularly striking.

3. In his teaching on the necessity of grace the author of Hypomnesticon was seen to be dependent on Augustine for the substance of the

¹ Cf. *Epistula* 217, 6, n. 19; *Contra Julianum* IV, 8, n. 44. See, p. 37, n. 1.

doctrine, but he showed considerable independence in the details of his proofs.

4. When treating of the relation between grace and free will the author showed complete agreement with Augustine's views, but he gave evidence of considerable originality by the way in which he illustrated the teaching. The admirable simile of the rider and his mount deserves special mention in this connection.

5. The problem of predestination was given a brief but solid treatment in the final Responsio. Here general agreement with Augustine's thought was preserved, but a tendency to moderate the more fearful aspects of Augustine's expression of the doctrine was observable. The awesome terms in which the saint spoke of the 'predestination' of the reprobate to perdition were studiously avoided by the author and an effort was made to focus attention where possible on man's personal guilt as the reason for the punishment predestined for him.

6. In dealing with the problem of God's salvific will, the author again showed a moderating tendency in relation to Augustine's teaching. He insinuated his view concerning the restrictive salvific will by reference to biblical texts rather than by presenting it as the rigid conclusion of theory.

7. In contrast with St. Augustine, the author, apart from one general allusion, ignores the argument from the Fathers of the Church. This constitutes a marked departure from Augustine's method. On the other hand, the Scriptural argument is given an astonishing development and it is used throughout with exceptional mastery, power and effect.

8. Augustine's influence is everywhere present and his theology forms the staple of the theological content of the book. Yet in the details of his method, of his explanations and illustrations the author of Hypomnesticon shows great ingenuity and considerable originality. In fine, as a memorandum (hypomnesticon) of Augustine's teaching – which it purports to be – the book is beyond all doubt of outstanding merit.

The Sources

Owing to the fact that the author of *Hypomnesticon* makes no explicit use of the patristic argument, with the exception of one general allusion that occurs in *Responsio* III, 8¹, and that he quotes a pagan classical author but once², the literary sources he employs are far from being diversified. In fact, they reduce to two, namely, Sacred Scripture and the writings of St. Augustine; of other sources the author gives absolutely no indication. We propose, therefore, to consider briefly the author's use of Sacred Scripture and the writings of St. Augustine.

§ 1. Sacred Scripture

a) The Books quoted

That Sacred Scripture is quoted in *Hypomnesticon* with extraordinary frequency has already been made abundantly clear³. If both quotations and recognizable allusions are counted, it is found that the sacred text is invoked slightly more than 660 times. Many texts, of course, are repeated, but there are nevertheless approximately 400 different texts cited in all. Further, it is found that the New Testament quotations and allusions

¹ This general allusion to the Fathers occurs in *Responsio* III, 8 immediately after the exposition of the parable of the Good Samaritan: «Ista interim iam a maioribus ecclesiae catholicae tractatoribus dicta vel exposita sunt: sed tunc a nobis limes fidei sanae defenditur, quando termini quos posuerunt sancti Patres, non transferuntur, immo observantur et defensantur a nobis».

² The classical author quoted is Virgil *Aeneid* VII, 337-8. Cf. above, p. 72.

³ See above, p. 114.

are almost exactly twice as numerous as the Old Testament ones. The following lists will serve to show the books of both the Old and New Testament from which the biblical quotations and allusions in Hypomnesticon derive and also the number of citations and allusions taken from each of the individual books.

Old Testament

Genesis	20	Wisdom	9
Exodus	6	Ecclesiasticus	5
Deuteronomy	1	Isaias	3
Josue	2	Jeremias	3
Judges	2	Baruch	2
2 Kings	1	Ezechiel	4
Tobias	1	Osee	2
Job	2	Amos	2
Psalms	60	Zacharias	1
Proverbs	6		
		<i>Total:</i>	<hr/> 132
<i>Total</i> (including repeated citations and allusions):			201

New Testament

St. Matthew	32	Colossians	3
St. Mark	3	I Timothy	5
St. Luke	11	2 Timothy	8
St. John	30	Titus	2
Acts	10	Hebrews	10
Romans	72	James	7
I Corinthians	27	I Peter	6
2 Corinthians	19	2 Peter	5
Galatians	7	I John	6
Ephesians	13	Jude	1
Philippians	6	Apocalypse	1
		<i>Total:</i>	<hr/> 284
<i>Total</i> (including repeated citations and allusions):			468

b) *The Versions used* ¹

A special study would be required to examine in detail the versions of Sacred Scripture used by the author of Hypomnesticon. We must content ourselves here with some general indications, leaving a more specialized treatment to the student of tomorrow.

By way of general remark, it may be stated that the author of Hypomnesticon wrote at a time and in a setting in which the Vulgate translation of the Bible began to be used for the first time. As is well known, Pelagius himself was the first to use and comment on the Vulgate text, and Pelagius's followers had no small part to play in its propagation. Then Cassian (died c. 435), the leader of the Semi-Pelagian movement ² that centred round Marseilles used the Vulgate translation of St. Paul's epistles, as did also Eucharius, Bishop of Lyons (died c. 450), and Faustus of Riez (died c. 490). And we find that Prosper of Aquitaine also was acquainted with and used the Vulgate frequently in his writings. It is to this setting that Hypomnesticon belongs, and it is not surprising, therefore, that it also should reveal the influence of the contemporary movement towards the use of the new translation.

What is noticeable in Hypomnesticon is that the author fluctuates in his use of versions of Sacred Scripture. This is a common feature in the writing of the time and is to be expected in a period in which no standard and universally accepted text prevailed. It is also to be expected of writers – and the author of Hypomnesticon is one of them – who sometimes quote the sacred text from memory and at other times, particularly when making longer quotations, use a copy of the Bible. Variations can be observed in quotations of the same text as used by the author of Hypomnesticon in different parts of his work ³. Further, the author on occasions makes such a free use of the biblical text, and so weaves

¹ The Vetus Latina Institut at Beuron provides excellent facilities for the comparative study of the versions of Sacred Scripture used in Hypomnesticon. The Vetus Latina editions of Genesis, the Epistle to the Ephesians, the Catholic Epistles and the Apocalypse referred to in the Bibliography are invaluable, and also Sabatier's *Bibliorum Sacrorum latinae versiones antiquae seu Vetus Italica*. For the four Gospels, A. JÜLICHER's *Itala. Das neue Testament in allateinischer Überlieferung* (Berlin 1938-1963) is very useful.

² Cf. J. CHÉNÉ, *Que signifiaient 'initium fidei' et 'affectus credulitatis' pour les semipélagiens?* in RSR 35 (1948) 571-578; E. PICHÉRY, *Conférences I-VII. Introduction, texte latin, traduction et notes* SC 42 (Paris 1955) 19-22.

³ See above, p. 19-20.

it into the texture of his own writing that it is impossible to be sure whether the variants are created by the author in his free adaptation or are derived from some version recognizable in his day.

Old Testament. The quotations from the Book of Genesis used by the author of Hypomnesticon are given in detail in *Vetus Latina II*, edited by B. Fischer (Beuron, 1951-1954) and the version used is there described simply as a European Old Latin version.

An examination of the Psalm texts used by the author of Hypomnesticon failed to show conformity to any one version of the Psalter, and the only conclusion which could be reached was that the Psalter employed was an Old Latin one that showed no African elements and whose symptoms were entirely European. The readings frequently resembled those of the Roman Psalter but the fluctuations are too great to enable it to be said that any one version of the Psalter served as the source for the author.

The Major Prophets are quoted according to the Old Latin in every case, but the Vulgate version of the Minor Prophets prevails.

The sole text from the Book of Job that is quoted in Hypomnesticon is taken from chapter 14, verses 1-4 (Responsio V, 4). The text is first quoted from an Old Latin version and immediately afterwards, for the sake of comparison, the Vulgate translation of verse 4 is given. This, as we remarked before ¹, seems to be the earliest known explicit comparison of the two Latin versions, viz. the Old Latin and the Vulgate, of the same text of Job 14, 4.

The quotation of Tobias I, 12-14 as cited in Responsio III, 12 is the sole Patristic witness to the Old Latin version of the text, and the same holds for 2 Kings 15, 25 as quoted in the same Responsio III, 12 ².

New Testament. Of the 76 Gospel quotations that occur in Hypomnesticon, 62 are taken from St. Matthew and St. John and these are borrowed from an Old Latin version. The remaining 14 Gospel quotations belong to St. Luke and St. Mark, and these are identical with the Vulgate readings in almost every case.

¹ See above, p. 28.

² Neither P. SABATIER in his *Bibliorum Sacrorum latinae versiones antiquae seu Vetus Italica* nor the Card Index of Patristic quotations in the *Vetus Latina Institut* mentions any other quotation of these texts besides that of Hypomnesticon.

The quotations from the Acts of the Apostles conform very closely to the Vulgate text, and the same is true for the most part of the quotations from St. Paul's Epistles. These latter had been used in the Vulgate translation early in France, and their use in this version could be expected in Hypomnesticon.

In the case of the two Epistles of St. Peter, a certain fluctuation can be noted in the versions; but the texts taken from the Epistle of St. James are identical with those of the Vulgate.

By way of general conclusion, it may be stated that Hypomnesticon is among the early witnesses of the Vulgate translation of the Bible, i. e. for the Book of Job and the Minor Prophets in the case of the Old Testament; and for the Acts of the Apostles, the Epistles of St. Paul and the Catholic Epistles in the New.

§ 2. St. Augustine

In Chapter V, when dealing with the doctrinal comparison between St. Augustine and Hypomnesticon, copious references were incidentally made to the works of the Bishop that contained the same doctrine as that of Hypomnesticon. Hence, it is unnecessary here to do more than draw up a list of the works of Augustine that served as sources for the teaching found in our work. It must, of course, be remembered that no explicit acknowledgement of dependence on Augustine is ever made in the body of the text of Hypomnesticon, and no mention is ever made of the titles of Augustine's books that were used as sources. Accordingly, in compiling the list of titles used a certain degree of conjecture is necessary. This becomes all the more imperative in that Augustine's teaching on all the main doctrinal issues involved in the Pelagian controversy was repeated many times in the Anti-Pelagian writings, and as a result it is very often impossible to indicate the precise work used in the case of individual arguments or particular points of doctrine. Besides, the fact that the author of Hypomnesticon exercised – within limits, to be sure – originality and independence in the arrangements of his proofs, choice of biblical texts and general method of procedure, makes it difficult to pin-point the sources with complete certitude in each case. Nevertheless, the following works can be indicated with considerable plausibility as having been used by the author of Hypomnesticon in the composition of his work.

1. *De peccatorum meritis et remissione et de baptismo parvulorum*

That the author of Hypomnesticon was acquainted with this work and made use of it admits of no reasonable doubt, and it becomes particularly evident by comparing the proofs for the existence of Original Sin given in Responsio I with those given in the first book of the *De peccatorum mer. et remiss.* Reference was made to this matter in Chapter V¹.

2. *De natura et gratia*

There are multiple points of contact between this book and Hypomnesticon that indicate its use as a source for the latter. The general character of the proofs and the choice of Scripture texts used in connection with the treatment of the gratuity of grace are very similar to those found in Responsio III of Hypomnesticon. Also the reference to the identity of faith in the Old Law with that of the New in chapter 44, n. 51² that corresponds to Responsio III, 14 is perhaps another indication of a link between the two works. Then the references to the parable of the Good Samaritan that occur in chapters 43³ and 52⁴ recall Responsio III, 8 where the same parable is used in connection with the same problem.

3. *De perfectione iustitiae hominis*

Chapter 19 of this work and Responsio VI, 8 seem to be related, and the combined use of Jn. 6, 44 and Jn. 6, 66 that is found in both places is perhaps of special significance in this respect; as is also the use of Ecclus. 15, 14 found in the same chapter 19 of the work and used likewise in Responsio III, 2 of Hypomnesticon.

4. *De gestis Pelagii*

Chapters 33 and 35 of this work seem to be the source for the propositions and much of the teaching of the Pelagians that are refuted in Responsio I, II, III and V of our work.

¹ See above, p. 133-134.

² See above, p. 161, n. 1.

³ CSEL 60, 270: PL 44, 271.

⁴ CSEL 60, 277: PL 44, 276.

5. *De gratia Christi et de peccato originali*

Chapters 30 and 31 of Book II show parallels with Responsio V, 4 and 5 in the treatment of the fate of children who died without circumcision in the Old Law and without Baptism in the New; and chapter 40, with its example of the 'oleaster', may well have inspired the example of the vine used in Responsio IV, 7.

6. *Epistula ad Sixtum* (194)

There are numerous points of contact between this letter and Hypomnesticon. Of particular significance is the reference to prayer in connection with Rom. 8, 26 of chapter 4, n. 17 of the letter that recurs also in Responsio III, 9.

7. *De nuptiis et concupiscentia*

The object of this work is, as St. Augustine himself explains in the very first chapter of Book I, to explain the distinction between the evil of carnal concupiscence and the goodness of marriage. The IVth Responsio of Hypomnesticon in dealing with the same problem uses the *De nuptiis* as a source.

8. *Contra Julianum*

This work also was used as a source for the IVth Responsio. Besides, the references to Manichaeism that occur in Book I, chapter 2 seem to show a link with Responsio V, 2 of Hypomnesticon.

9. *De gratia et libero arbitrio*

This work is re-echoed in many places in Hypomnesticon, as can be seen by comparing chapter I of the work with Responsio III, 13 of Hypomnesticon; chapter 2 with Responsio III, 2; chapter 5 with Responsio III, 6. The combined use of 2 Tim. 1, 8 and Tit. 3, 4 in chapter 5 of the *De gratia* to prove that grace is given independently of merit is reproduced in Hypomnesticon III, 6.

10. *De praedestinatione sanctorum*

One of the principal concerns of this book is to show that the commencement of Faith, 'initium fidei' is a gift of God. The work is directed against the Semi-Pelagians who maintained that the initial acceptance of faith was within the power of man's free will. The author of Hypomnesticon deals with the same problem in Responsio III, 14-15 and uses Augustine's work as a source. The joint use of Rom. 9, 20 and Rom. 11, 33 that occurs in chapter 8, n. 16 of the *De praedestinatione sanctorum* may explain the combined use of Rom. 9, 20 and Rom. 11, 34 that is found in Responsio VI, 3.

11. *De dono perseverantiae*

Chapter 9 of this work seems to have been used as a source for Responsio V, 5 of Hypomnesticon. In the former chapter, the teaching that God's mode of acting in the case of children who die before reaching the use of reason is determined by His prevision of what their conduct would be if they were allowed to live longer is refuted by Augustine, and it is dealt with in a manner that suggests dependence on Augustine in Responsio V, 5.

That the author of Hypomnesticon was acquainted with other books and epistles of Augustine, particularly the anti-Pelagian ones is most probable. His general mastery of Augustine's theology is such as to indicate, not merely protracted study of the anti-Pelagian writings, but also very extensive reading in other works of the saint. However, as no clear indications of the use in Hypomnesticon of works, other than those mentioned above appear, it is impossible to include them in the likely sources. Finally, it may be remarked that the *Opus imperfectum contra Julianum* does not appear to have been used by the author of Hypomnesticon. This is not very surprising when it is remembered that the work was still being written by Augustine up to the time of his death in 430, a time very close to that at which Hypomnesticon was written.

Literary and Methodological Characteristics

When making a literary comparison between the writings of Prosper of Aquitaine and Hypomnesticon in Chapter IV, § 3, c) ¹, we had occasion to speak of a number of the literary characteristics observable in the latter work. We purposely confined the discussion to those literary aspects of Hypomnesticon that were of significance in establishing the possibility of Prosper's being the author of our work, leaving a more detailed investigation to the present chapter.

One of the most striking literary characteristics of Hypomnesticon is the use of Sacred Scripture of which it gives evidence. Not merely are texts of Scripture quoted with astonishing frequency, but the inspired word is so closely woven into the fabric of the writing as to be at times scarcely distinguishable from the writer's own words. Indeed the language of Holy Writ constitutes the author's medium of speech to such a degree that biblical phrases and expressions of all kinds both from the Old and New Testaments flow unconsciously from his pen and impregnate his entire work. Thus, from the opening paragraph, apart from the numerous explicit citations, phrases redolent of the sacred text abound, e. g. 'arrepto clipeo veritatis' (Praefatio) re-echoes Ezech. 38, 4; 'tuba nostris auribus insonante' (*Ibid.*) re-echoes Josue 6, 5; 'mecum stabit ante tribunal Christi' (*Ibid.*) re-echoes Rom. 14, 10; 'requirentium Deum' (Resp. I, 1) echoes Ps. 13, 2; 52, 3; 'caligine mortis' (Resp. I, 2) echoes Job 10, 21; 'in deserto, eius non obedivit concupiscentiis' (Resp. I, 4) echoes Ps. 105, 14; 'Si cordis oculos non admisistis' (Resp. II, 3) echoes Ephes. I, 18; 'Paulus, in quo locutus est Christus' (Resp. III, 6; 13; IV, 8; V, 8; VI, 3) echoes 2 Cor. 13, 3. It is true that for Christian writers

¹ See above, p. 103 ff.

of the Vth century the Bible was, beyond all compare, the source of vocabulary and of literary expression. Nevertheless, the author of Hypomnesticon distinguishes himself by his mastery of the inspired text, by the extent of his use of it to the exclusion of all other sources – with the sole exception of Augustine’s writings. And in this regard a comparison with the contemporary Marius Mercator is particularly illuminating, since this writer not merely wrote at the same time as the author of Hypomnesticon, but also on the same subject of Pelagianism ¹. The influence of the sacred text is without any doubt very much less marked in Marius than in our author.

§ 1. Method of Argumentation

Sacred Scripture

Not merely does Sacred Scripture constitute very largely the medium of expression of our author, but in his arguments and proofs, it is the sole extrinsic court of appeal ², to the exclusion of all reference to Councils of the Church, to the authority of the Roman Pontiffs, or to the Fathers ³. Hence it can be said that both from the point of view of expression and dialectic, Hypomnesticon is scriptural in a unique sense.

As an example of the method of argumentation based on Sacred Scripture that is employed by our author, we may take the opening of the debate as it is found in the very first Responsio. There, having enunciated the first heretical proposition to be refuted, viz. that Adam was doomed to die whether he sinned or not, the author challenged his opponents to combat on the sole basis of Sacred Scripture:

«Falleris haeretice, falleris, non ita est; aut si ita est, et non falleris. divinis adstrue documentis.» (Resp. I, 1)

¹ If we compare Marius Mercator’s *Commonitorium adversum haeresim Pelagii* with Hypomnesticon from the point of view of length, it will be found that the latter is slightly less than three times as long as the former; but it has more than six times as many scriptural quotations and allusions. Therefore, proportionately Hypomnesticon has *more than twice* as many scriptural citations and allusions as Marius Mercator’s work.

² The reference to the ‘maiores ecclesiae catholicae tractatores’ of Responsio III, 8 is scarcely an exception as the allusion is very general, and no explicit argument is drawn from the writings of the ‘tractatores’ in question.

³ This statement is also true in the case of Augustine to the extent that no mention is ever made of his name in the text of Hypomnesticon, however much his doctrine may be reproduced in the work.

Thereupon he continues: «Scriptum est enim ...», and proceeds to invoke in succession no fewer than 33 remarkably apposite Scripture quotations to annihilate the error of his adversaries. Having quoted the sacred text, the author normally comments on its application to the point at issue, and so in the case under discussion, immediately after citing the texts of Wis. I, 12-13 and Wis. 2, 23-24, he remarks:

«Si vides, vide mortem non a Deo auctore, sed per errorem vitae venisse hominibus in paradiso deliciarum positis.» (*Ibid.*)

Next, he quotes Gen. 2, 16-17 and adds the comment:

«Haec audis, et auctorem mortis dicere Deum audes?» (*Ibid.*)

Then Wis. 2, 24 is repeated and an explanation is added:

«Recte enim perdidit vitam, qui mortem noluit, ne vitam perderet, cavere praedictam. Tamen verax et misericors Dominus non laetatur in perditione vivorum.» (*Ibid.*)

Another argument based on the text of St. Paul from Rom. 8, 3 follows, and as frequently happens in the case of St. Paul's texts the commentary is more detailed and extended. Because of his desire to comment on St. Paul's text, a certain amount of digression ensues and the course of the argument becomes less clear in consequence. Here we have a weakness in the method employed by the author, namely, the tendency to expound certain Scripture texts more than is necessary for the argument in hand with consequent lack of clarity in the presentation¹. Yet the main direction of the argument is not lost sight of, and in the present case, after his exposition of Rom. 8, 3, the author recalls the point at issue with the phrase:

«Haec dicendo quid aliud nos intelligere voluit quam Deum mortem non fecisse, nec laetari in perditione vivorum.» (Resp. I, 2)

Nor is the author of *Hypomnesticon* content with quoting a given text of Scripture once in an argument: he very often repeats texts with great effect. Thus in the first two chapters of *Responsio I* he recalls the text of Wis. I, 13 three times and Wis. 2, 24 twice, and generally throughout the work certain key-texts, such as Ps. 50, 7; Jn. 6, 44; Jn. 15, 5; Rom.

¹ Other examples of this tendency are to be found in the commentary on Ps. 114, 7-9 in *Responsio I*, 3; that on Amos 9, 3 in *Responsio I*, 4; and that on Rom. 7, 7 ff. which occupies chapters 5 and 6 of *Responsio IV*.

5, 12; Rom. 9, 16; Ephes. 2, 8-9 are repeatedly quoted. This constant recurrence of pivotal texts both in the same argument and throughout the work as a whole serves to focus attention on the central themes and to give cohesion and unity to the entire work.

Rational argument – Reductio ad absurdum

Besides the scriptural argument, which is paramount in Hypomnesticon, the rational argument is by no means neglected. Indeed this argument was so much used by his adversaries that our author had no choice in his debate with them but to make frequent use of it ¹. The form the argument took was very often the *reductio ad absurdum*, and we find it introduced early in the first Responsio. There it is argued that if God were the author of death, as the Pelagians maintained, an absurdity would follow, viz. God, the Son of God, Who became man to conquer death would be at cross-purposes with Himself for having been responsible for death in the first instance. (Resp. I, 2)

Again in Responsio II, having first introduced the Pelagian proposition which was to be refuted, viz. that the sin of Adam wounded no one but himself alone, our author again introduces the *reductio ad absurdum* when he asks: If the sin of our First Parents wounded them alone and not their posterity, how does it happen that the sentence of punishment pronounced against them affects us? Unless their guilt were communicated to us, their posterity, God would be found unjust in punishing with Adam those who in no way shared his sin. The author then quotes the words of condemnation pronounced by God against Adam and Eve in Gen. 3, 16-19, shows from experience that the same condemnation afflicts all Adam's posterity and demands:

«Quod qua iustitia, si heredes peccati parentum non sumus, patiamur?» (Resp. II, 1)

and then by a rational argument based on our oneness with Adam in virtue of our sharing the same nature with him, shows that when human nature became sinful in Adam it became sinful in all his posterity, so

¹ For an account of Pelagius's use of rational arguments before Scripture ones, see G. DE PLINVAL, *Essai sur le style et la langue de Pélage* (Fribourg en Suisse 1947) p. 15 f. For Julian of Eclanum's views in the matter, see above p. 14, where we discussed them briefly.

that the sentence of condemnation pronounced against Adam necessarily affects all those born of him.

Definitions

The use of definitions and rational arguments derived from them is to be expected of the author of Hypomnesticon. Not merely were definitions part of the dialectic of the period in which he wrote, but we find that his adversaries had frequent recourse to them in expounding their heretical views. Thus we find that Pelagius almost always had recourse, at the beginning of his treatment of a problem, to some form or other of definition as a point of departure for the discussion ¹. The same tendency is observable in Julian of Eclanum ², and also in Prosper of Aquitaine ³. These definitions were not necessarily strict philosophical definitions, and often they could be more accurately termed descriptions or descriptive definitions, but they served to delimit the subject that was to be treated, and they also provided principles from which conclusions could be rigorously deduced.

In Responsio I the author of Hypomnesticon introduces his first definition, and it is very significant that unlike the Pelagians who tended to place definitions at the beginning of their discussion of a problem ⁴, he resorts to the definition and the philosophical considerations accompanying it only when he has exhaustively dealt with the problem by means of scriptural arguments:

«Mors itaque privatio vitae est, nomen tantum habens, non essentiam; et ideo Deus eius auctor esse dici non potest. Quidquid enim Deum

¹ Examples of definitions are found in Pelagius's *Epistula de castitate* [edited by C. P. CASPARI in *Briefe, Abhandlungen und Predigten* (Christiana 1890) p. 123] and in his *De natura*, apud Augustine, *De natura et gratia* 7, n. 8. Cf. G. DE PLINVAL, *op. cit.* p. 16 f.

² The importance of definitions in Julian of Eclanum's method is particularly clear from his words: «Omnis quippe, ut ait ille [Cicero], quae ratione suscipitur de aliqua re disputatio, debet a definitione proficisci ut intelligatur quid sit id de quo disputatur». Thereupon he gives his notorious definition of free will: «Libertas arbitrii, qua a Deo emancipatus homo est, in admittendi peccati et abstinendi a peccato possibilitate consistit». Apud AUGUSTINE, *Opus imperfectum contra Julianum* I, 78 (PL 45, 1102). Augustine's reply is worth noting: «Emancipatum hominem dicis a Deo: nec attendis hoc cum emancipato agi, ut in familia patris non sit.» (*Ibid.*)

³ Prosper of Aquitaine's definition of free will in the *Contra Collatorem* 9 is worth noting in this connection: «Liberum ergo arbitrium, id est, rei sibi placitae spontaneus appetitus» (PL 51, 238A).

⁴ Cf. G. de PLINVAL, *op. cit.* p. 16 f.

fecisse dicimus, habet essentiam, id est, speciem. Essentia enim dicitur ab eo quod est, quae tantum de solo Deo dici debet ... Tamen et de ceteris creaturis dici potest, quod habeant essentiam; sed non sicut de Deo, qui initium non habet quod est, sed ex quo accipientes a Deo initium, quod sunt esse coeperunt.» (Resp. I, 4) ¹

Besides the definition of 'mors' just noted, we find our author attempting a definition of free will in Responsio III, 4. Once more it should be noted that the definition and the philosophical considerations that follow from it occur only when the scriptural argument to establish freedom of the will has already been given. This sufficiently indicates that for the author of Hypomnesticon the scriptural argument has primacy over all other arguments, and it also shows how far his method differs from that of Julian of Eclanum who explicitly gave primacy to reason as against Sacred Scripture ². The author of Hypomnesticon writes:

«Sed cur liberum dicatur arbitrium est paululum disserendum. Arbitrium scilicet ab arbitrando rationali consideratione, vel discernendo quid eligat, quidve recuset, puto quod nomen accepit; vel ideo liberum dictum, quod in sua sit positum potestate, habens agendi quod velit possibilitatem, quod est vitalis et rationalis animae motus.»
(Resp. III, 4)

The etymological approach which can be seen in the foregoing definition, appears also in the one which follows, viz. that of 'libido':

«Quaerendum est igitur, cur hoc malum de quo agitur libido dicatur. Sine dubio a libendo, id est, a libitu per derivationem libido est nuncupata ... Non omne quod libet libido est, sed omne quod male libet libido est. In bono enim libitu libido dici non potest, sed voluntas, de ratione scilicet mentis naturalis exoriens. In malo vero libitu non voluntas est, sed voluptas.» (Resp. IV, 2)

In the same Responsio IV we notice also a definition of 'malum' followed by the deduction that God cannot be the author of evil:

«Omne enim malum natura non est, sed actus accidens defectu boni. Quamobrem quod natura non est, Deus non fecit, quia natura est omne quod fecit.» (Resp. IV, 1)

Finally, in Responsio VI when treating of the subject of predestination, the author of Hypomnesticon begins with a nominal definition of the term:

¹ That St. Augustine is the source for the terminology is most likely; cf. *Contra Julianum* I, 8, n. 37; 9, n. 45.

² See above, p. 14.

«Praedestinatio quippe a praemittendo et praeveniando vel praedordinando futurum aliquid dicitur.» (Resp. VI, 2)

Rhetorical questions

A characteristic device employed with great frequency by the author of Hypomnesticon in his arguments is the rhetorical question. It abounds throughout the entire work, and we shall give but a few examples as representative of the many others that occur:

«Haec audis, et auctorem mortis dicere Deum audes?» (Resp. I, 1)

«Audis itaque per unum hominem ... et audes dicere, haeretice ...?» (Resp. II, 2)

«Audis ante tempora saecularia ... et praeponis dono eius opera voluntaria, caecus veritati resistens?» (Resp. III, 6)

«Interrogo de quo Dei Filius apparens opera dissolvit diaboli?» (Resp. III, 4)

«Quomodo autem unicuique secundum sua opera redderetur in die iudicii, nisi liberum esset arbitrium?» (Resp. III, 10)

Our author not merely poses rhetorical questions in his own name, but it is also part of his method to put such questions and statements in the mouth of his adversaries in the form of objections. These questions and statements are introduced by means of varying formulae:

«Sed ais mihi e diverso veniens: 'Ergo semen peccatum est?'" (Resp. II, 2)

«Sed respondententes dicitis, ut dicere consuestis ...» (Resp. II, 3)

«Sed quid adhuc dicturus sis, sicut soletis dicere novi ...» (Resp. II, 4)

«'Ergo', inquires, 'damnas opera liberi arbitrii ...'» (Resp. III, 13)

«Sed clamas iterum et dicis ...» (Resp. III, 13)

«Sed forsitan quaeris a me dicens ...» (Resp. IV, 1)

«Sed respondes forsitan ...» (Resp. IV, 3)

«Sed iterum respondetis ...» (Resp. IV, 7)

«Sed more illo vestro ... inquitis:» (Resp. V, 5)

«Responde more illo solito ...» (Resp. V, 6)

«'Et nos', inquires, sicut aliquotiens a vobis audimus ...» (Resp. V, 8)

That some of these questions and statements correspond to actual objections raised by the Pelagians appears to be vouched for by some of the phrases used, e. g.

«Sed respondentes dicitis, *ut dicere consuestis ...*» (Resp. II, 3)

«Sed quid adhuc dicturus sis, *sicut soletis dicere novi ...*» (Resp. II, 4)

«Responde *more illo solito ...*» (Resp. V, 6)

That some of them were actually heard by the author appears from his statement:

«'Et nos', inquires, *sicut aliquotiens a vobis audimus ...*» (Resp. V, 8)

That yet others were composed by our author himself to anticipate possible objections appears to be evident from the formulae:

«Sed *forsitan* quaeris a me dicens ...» (Resp. IV, 1)

«Sed respondes *forsitan ...*» (Resp. IV, 3)

Nowhere does our author give the slightest hint that the objections and statements in question were derived from any Pelagian writing and efforts made to identify them in extant Pelagian works and fragments proved fruitless. They correspond in some measure to the objections posed in Prosper of Aquitaine's *Pro Augustino responsiones*, with this difference that the objections in the latter were formulated by the Semi-Pelagians and published in brief summaries, as Prosper intimates¹, whereas those in Hypomnesticon were freely chosen by the author, or composed by him, to serve as devices for introducing his own replies.

§ 2. Stylistic Features

In general it may be said of the style of Hypomnesticon that it is sober, precise, eloquent and well-rhythmed. It certainly shows care on the part of the author to achieve a certain degree of literary excellence, though this is far from being his primary concern. What lies nearest to the author's heart is not perfection of style for its own sake, such as the pagan classical authors aspired to, but above all the adequate expression of the truths of Faith which he defended. This he makes clear in the Praefatio of his work, and though it was conventional for authors to speak in modest terms of the mediocrity of their style, despite their aware-

¹ In the *Pro Augustino responsiones ad capitula obiectionum Gallorum* Prosper refers to these 'capitula': «*quae in libris ... praedicti viri [Augustini] damnabilia se reperisse jactabant, brevium capitulorum indiculis publicarent*». (PL 51, 155A and 156A).

ness of its perfection, the author of *Hypomnesticon* very probably meant what he said when he wrote:

«Igitur de magisterio gratiae confidens ... *Hypomnesticon*, abbreviatum hunc facere curavi libellum; quem si quis legere voluerit, non verborum mediocritatem contempletur sed fidei rationem.» (Praefatio)

There is no doubt that this 'ratio fidei' was all-important for the author of *Hypomnesticon*, and where its accurate exposition required plain and even ungainly turns of phrase, our author never hesitated to forgo elegance of style for the sake of accuracy of expression. Thus in his demonstrations, in his commentaries on texts of Scripture, in his analyses of words and ideas, he leaves aside all attempt to produce graceful turns of phrase and concentrates entirely on the choice of accurate terms to express his thought. In this our author is remarkably similar to Pelagius, who though capable of very distinguished writing when he wished, thought more of the choice of correct and apt terms for his arguments than of elegant and finely polished language. At any rate, it is this anxiety, and not any absence of literary ability on the part of the author that explains what Garnier described as the unevenness of style observable in *Hypomnesticon*¹. To illustrate this feature a passage in the Praefatio may be compared with the opening lines of chapter 4 of *Responso I*. It is obvious that the explanatory nature of the latter passage calls for quite a different form of language from that used in the Praefatio:

«Adversarii catholicae fidei, dum contra regulam veritatis diabolicis armis pugnare nituntur, nos sollicitudine repugnandi faciunt cautiores; se vero decipiunt antequam nostrorum valeant aliquem vulnerare. Cum enim caeci evacuare thesauros fidei concertant, spe fidei vacuati, faciunt plenitudine fidei ecclesiam, opitulante gratia glorari.» (Praefatio)

«Mors itaque privatio vitae est, nomen tantum habens, non essentiam; et ideo Deus eius auctor esse dici non potest. Quidquid enim Deum fecisse dicimus, habet essentiam, id est, speciem. Essentia enim dicitur ab eo quod est, quae tantum de solo Deo dici debet ... Tamen et de ceteris creaturis dici potest, quod habeant essentiam; sed non sicut de Deo, qui initium non habet quod est, sed ex quo accipientes a Deo initium, quod sunt esse coeperunt.» (*Resp. I*, 4)

Nevertheless, it would be erroneous to conclude that our author's style lacks elegance because its didactic passages are occasionally devoid of

¹ See above p. 52-53.

literary distinction. Taken as a whole the writing maintains a high stylistic standard throughout so that the work is to be classed among the more polished and classical works of the Vth century. This will appear to some extent from a consideration of the many effective literary figures of speech used by our author.

a) *Figures of Speech*

Worthy of note in the style of Hypomnesticon is the skilled and expressive use of a wide variety of figures of speech. Thus in the Praefatio we encounter an effective use of anaphora:

«O malum dogma, quod pacis inimicus invenit!
O dogma, per quod scinditur matris unitas ecclesiae renatorum!
O dogma, quod sub nomine Christi evertere Christi et mutare nititur
fundamenta!
O dogma, cui nefanda sunt nomina mille, mille nocendi artes!»
(Praefatio)

Likewise it occurs in Responsio IV:

«Quid praestigiosissimis assertionibus vestris diem in noctem mutare
nitimini?
Quid nebulis serena convolvitis?
Quid intuentibus lucem, ferventes in calore turpi ... fumi amaritudi-
nem eructatis?» (Resp. IV, 7)
«Ecce calor ille amantissimus vester ...
Ecce quam illuviem ...
Ecce cuius obscenitatis ...» (Resp. IV, 9)

The author's use of hyperbole is very marked and recalls Prosper of Aquitaine's use of the figure: 'manu Domini misericordissima' (Resp. III, 2) 'misericordissima gratia' (Resp. III, 5); 'praestigiosissimis assertionibus' (Resp. IV, 7); 'imperio honestissimae voluntatis' (*Ibid.*); 'malum ... pulcherrimum' (*Ibid.* 8); 'caloris vestri amantissimi opera' (*Ibid.* 9); 'calor ille amantissimus vester' (*Ibid.*); 'acerrimi laudatores' (*Ibid.*); 'impudentissimi defensores' (*Ibid.*); 'clarissima auctoritate' (Resp. V, 4); 'athletam fortissimum' (*Ibid.*); 'iudicia iustissima' (*Ibid.*) 'clarissima lumina' (Resp. III, 4).

Paronomasia also occurs:

«Audis, haeretice *Pelagiane*, *pelago* perditionis demerse, sive *Caeles-
tiane*, *caelesti* iudicio periture ...?» (Resp. III, 3)

«De *deserto* errantem ... divini praecepti *desertor* exsulatus est.»
(Resp. III, 9)

«... nascitur *immundus* in *mundo*.» (Resp. V, 4)

«Et *gratiae* eius *ingratus* existens ...»¹ (Resp. III, 4)

Exclamation is used with discretion and always with effect:

«Ecce quanta mortifera bella, ecce quae pericula quantaque naufragia, de malo laudabilis et dilectae vestrae concupiscentiae, diabolo seminante exorta sunt! Ecce cuius pestis onus leve esse praedicatis, et iugum suave!» (Resp. IV, 6)

«O caeca vestrorum sensuum corda! O magisterium quod obvolutum mortali nebula vobis diabolus propinavit.» (Resp. V, 8)

A favourite figure employed by the author of *Hypomnesticon* is that of antithesis. In his use of this form he is at one with his contemporaries for we find it used constantly and with great perfection in Pope Leo's sermons; it is also widely used in St. Augustine's writings and in those of Prosper of Aquitaine, particularly in his *Pro Augustino responsiones*. Several passages in our author recall Augustine's and Prosper's use of the figure:

«... cum in omnibus gratiae Dei bona in se *operanti non resistit*, sed *cooperator existit*.» (Resp. III, 13)

«... non a vobis tam licite *laudaretur*, quin potius sicut a catholicis *damnaretur*.» (Resp. IV, 7)

«Dimittitur enim eis *regeneratione spiritali*, quod traxerunt ... ex Adam *generatione carnali*.» (Resp. V, 8)

«... credite *malum ex diabolo*, non *bonum ex Deo* esse libidinem.»
(Resp. IV, 4)

«... *diabolum excusantes*, *Deum accusantes* ...» (Resp. IV, 3)

«... in *maioribus verax* ... in *parvulis autem mendax*.» (Resp. V, 8)

«... *ut moriantur homines*, poena peccati est; *ut revertantur ad vitam*, Domini miserantis est.» (Resp. I, 3)

Closely associated with the antithetic figures above are the effective contrasting clauses in the following passage:

«Ille in veritate docendo prohibet his immunditiis obedire; tu in errore Pelagiano suades. Ille concupiscentiam menti contrariam peccatum vocat; tu eam laudando, vel in ea delectando, bonum asseris naturale.» (Resp. IV, 8)

¹ The figure, 'gratiae ... ingratus', originated with Augustine and is of frequent occurrence in his anti-Pelagian writings, e. g. *Contra Julianum* IV, 3, n. 15.

Irony is also part of the literary resource of our author, and we find it used several times in the IVth Responsio which is directed against Julian of Eclanum's teaching on 'libido':

«Ista est vestra laudabilis atque dilecta libido ...» (Resp. IV, 3)

«... praedicatis cum laudabili plausu, dicentes: 'Vivificate membra vestra quae sunt super terram, fornicationem mundam, libidinem bonam, concupiscentiam optimam'.» (Resp. IV, 8)

«... caloris vestri amantissimi opera.» (Resp. IV, 9)

«Ecce calor ille amantissimus vester ...» (*Ibid.*)

«Auditis quale officium habet nimium dilecta vestra concupiscentia ...» (Resp. IV, 8)

Epexegetic figures such as 'id est'; 'hoc est' occur with great frequency in Hypomnesticon and these, together with the formulae of *renvoi* that were treated in Chapter IV, § 3, c) ¹, are a striking index of the didactic character of the style in the work. They convincingly show the author's all-absorbing anxiety to explain for the ordinary reader even apparently obvious matters. Thus, for example, in one short chapter in the first Responsio we encounter no fewer than eleven of these figures. A few extracts from this chapter will suffice as illustrations, and they will incidentally show the repetitious character of the writing, which was commented on earlier ²:

«Quidquid enim Deum fecisse dicimus, habet essentiam, *id est*, speciem.» (Resp. I, 4)

«... morsu quodam modo venenosi serpentis, *id est*, diaboli.» (*Ibid.*)

«Ibi mandabo serpenti ... *hoc est*, diabolo qui ab initio serpens est nominatus.» (*Ibid.*)

«... homini accidit mors, *id est*, privatio vitae.» (*Ibid.*)

«... morsu insanabili mortem, *id est*, privationem faciunt vitae.» (*Ibid.*)

When it is noted that already in the opening sentence of the chapter from which the above were taken, the author had defined death with the words: «Mors itaque privatio vitae est» the repetition in the last two citations will appear all the more striking. Likewise the twofold explanation that 'serpens' is identified with 'diabolus' indicates the author's repetitious trait, and it becomes increasingly evident that he is catering

¹ See above, p. 111.

² *Loc. cit.*

for ordinary folk in his work and that his style is adapted to their limitations¹.

The metaphors and similes to be found in Hypomnesticon are, for the most part, those commonly used at the time in which the author wrote. Besides the military images already referred to², nautical metaphors also occur, e. g.

«... dum per mundi pelagus currit [homo] ... ancoram gratiae cervicibus revinctam fiducia liberi arbitrii non solvat. Quia sive in prospero cursu ne extollatur, sive in tempestate temptationum ne mergatur, eius gubernaculo quoadusque ad portum paradisi perveniat poterit permanere securus.» (Resp. III, 11)

«Si pacem fidei catholicae sequeris, a turbine bellorum horum et litium quo in cordis tui pelago circumquaque iactaris ne ad portum pervenias veritatis, facile gratiae gubernaculo poteris liberari.» (Resp. IV, 8)

«Si ... iactatus curru inanium quaestionum cadis in fluctus vanae contentionis, et veluti navis deserta gubernaculo per diversa et incognita littora voveris, nec prorsus ibi prospere navigare potes, revertere et sede in portu fidei catholicae, ubi te nulla possit infructuosae curiositatis tempestas turbare vel mergere.» (Resp. VI, 4)

Images borrowed from medical science are used also, and the expression 'medicus Christus' that was so popular with Tertullian, Cyprian, Ambrose and Augustine³, is found in Responsio V, 6:

«... catholica ratio sine medico Christo in mansiones Patris [parvulos] ... non sinit introire.» (Resp. V, 6)

Likewise, 'medicamentum' occurs in Resp. III, 3; 'medicina' in Responsio III, 4; 5; V, 7; 'antidotum' in Responsio IV, 1; 4, and in each case the terms are used for grace.

¹ That repetition is a deliberate part of our author's method is evident from his repeated statements:

«Iterum ergo, iterumque percontor ...» (Resp. IV, 3).

«Iterum ergo, iterumque repeto ...» (Resp. IV, 7).

«Iterum iterumque est repetendum ...» (Resp. V, 2).

As was recalled earlier, this insistence on repetition corresponds closely to Prosper of Aquitaine's method as appears from his statement:

«Necessarium et utile est etiam quae scripta sunt, scribere, ne leve existimetur, quod non frequenter arguitur.»

(*Epistula ad Augustinum* n. 9; CSEL 57, 468: PL 51, 74B).

² See above p. 117.

³ Cf. R. ARBESMANN, *art. The Concept of Christus Medicus in St. Augustine in Traditio* 10 (1954) p. 1-28; REA 3 (1957) p. 302.

Metaphors derived from agricultural life and from nature generally are to be expected in writings of the period, and they are not lacking in our work:

«Huic iugo, id est, originali peccato revincti maiores atque minores vitia ex ipso orta tamquam aratrum trahimus, quamdiu sumus in mortis corpore cuius cupiditatum vomere proscinditur, hoc est, corrumpitur terra nostra.» (Resp. V, 3)

«Numquid enim cum vitis undique deserente agricola fuerit sentibus occupata, et tempore suo iacens in dumis produxerit botros de contrariis sibi spinis, quibus premitur, uvam produxit? ... Similiter et triticum, si natum circumquaque zizaniis operiatur, in quantum spicam produxerit, de naturae suae bono, non de zizaniorum malo quibus impeditur, bonum intulit germen: sic filii de naturae bono boni sunt fructus, non de malo libidinis corrumpentis et vitiantis, cum quo nascitur omnis homo.» (Resp. IV, 7)

Then the original use of the images of the 'sessor' and 'iumentum' in Responsio III, 11 to illustrate the respective rôles of grace and free will in the Christian life is a particularly fine specimen of the author's skill in the manipulation of effective imagery. As this comparison has already been commented on at length, it is unnecessary to deal with it further here ¹.

Among the literary devices used occasionally by the author of Hypomnesticon is that of a succession of nouns in apposition whose nominative singular ends in -or, e. g.

«... aliquis ... qui non sit rationum certarum *quaesitor*, sed quaestionum perplexarum ... *inventor* atque *propositor*.» (Resp. I, 5)

«... semper indiget *auctore* et *cultore* suo atque *conservatore* Deo». (Resp. IV, 7)

«... estis acerrimi *laudatores*, impudentissimi *defensores*, et si non fallor ... forsitan et *factores*.» (Resp. IV, 9)

«Nullum enim hominem tam *amatorem* vel *defensorem* sui erroris ad Dei iudicia reprehendenda vel etiam refellenda diabolus potuit invenire.» (Resp. II, 1)

Corresponding series of participles are also a feature of our author's style:

«... concupiscentiam ... *obviantem* et *resistentem* et *praevalentem* legi mentis meae.» (Resp. IV, 5)

«Videte dilectam vestram ... *concupientem* dolorem, *parturientem* peccatum, *generantem* mortem.» (Resp. IV, 8)

¹ See above, p. 166-167.

«... de gratiae antidoto *confidentes* ... *castigantes* corpus suum, et in servitutem *redigentes*.» (Resp. IV, 4)

«... ipsa [gratia] *faciente*, *gubernante* et *perficiente*.» (Resp. III, 13)

«Audi et alterum Dei sapientiam *inquirentem* et per illam veritatem mortalibus *praedicantem*; audi aliter quam David *loquentem*, sed non aliter *prophetantem*.» (Resp. V, 3)

Similar series of gerundives are also encountered:

«... Dei quoque Filium ad hoc *salvandum*, *reparandum* atque *vivificandum* venisse ...» (Resp. III, 4)

«Nullum enim hominem ... ad Dei iudicia *reprehendenda* vel etiam *refellenda* diabolus potuit invenire.» (Resp. II, 1)

And the series of nouns beginning in *re-* that is found in Resp. III is noteworthy:

«... Christum Dominum ad nostram *reparationem*, *reformationem*, *redemptionem*, *reconciliationem*, formam servi suspicere voluisse.» (Resp. III, 3)

Indeed throughout his writing, whenever the subject treated gives him scope for the free use of his extensive literary resource, our author shows his *penchant* for rolling participles, gerundives and superlatives that lend his style great solemnity and power. On the other hand, by constantly varying the literary techniques et his disposal, he imparts to his writing a remarkable impression of energy, irresistible force of argument and incessant movement.

b) Vocabulary

As was already noted, the defence of the Catholic Faith against the insidious menace of the Pelagian heresy in its manifold manifestations was of supreme importance for the author of Hypomnesticon, and refinements of style were entirely subordinated to this dominant preoccupation. Likewise the choice of vocabulary to be used in his work was dictated by the same practical purpose our author had in view. He wished to make himself intelligible to the average reader, and in order to do so he used a vocabulary that would be apt to instruct and convince, not to confound or bewilder. The search for learned, unusual or difficult language would have defeated his purpose, and for this reason it could be anticipated that the vocabulary he chose would remain within the limits of the language current at his time and in his setting. In point of fact this is found to be the case, and by way of general description it may

be said that the vocabulary of Hypomnesticon is typical of the ordinary Christian vocabulary of the Vth century as exemplified in the works of St. Prosper of Aquitaine and St. Leo the Great.

There are no neologisms in Hypomnesticon and the vocabulary, for the most part, is classical. Nevertheless, as is to be expected, there is a percentage of words of Late Latin coinage, corresponding rather closely to that found in the theological writers of the Vth century, and particularly in St. Prosper.

The Christian vocabulary

The vocabulary of Christian theology and liturgy naturally finds an extensive use in Hypomnesticon, and as a consequence we encounter many words in the book of Greek and also a few of Hebrew origin. A number of these terms before being assumed into the Christian vocabulary had purely secular meanings, but in Christian usage they were given a new significance and gradually became technical terms of theology. The following list is representative of this class:

Anathema (Resp. III, 3; 13)

Anathemizare (Resp. V, 8)

Angelus (Resp. I, 5)

Apostata (Resp. V, 5)

Apostolus (Resp. III, 4, and *passim*)

Baptisma (Resp. III, 15; V, 8 bis; VI, 7)

Baptismus (Praef.; Resp. I, 3; III, 9; 12; V, 2 and *passim*)

Our author shows some fluctuation between these two forms of the term for baptism. It is worth noting that the usage of Prosper of Aquitaine is identical in its fluctuation¹. The form which is more usual in Hypomnesticon is *Baptismus* with genitive in *-i*.

Baptizare (Resp. V, 5, and *passim*)

Blasphemare (Praef.; Resp. III, 4)

Blasphemium (Praef.; Resp. VI, 8)

Catechizare (Resp. V, 8)

Catholicus (Praef.; Resp. III, 4 and *passim*)

Charisma (Resp. III, 7)

¹ Prosper uses the form 'Baptisma' in the *De vocatione omnium gentium* I, 17 (PL 51, 669B); II, 33 (*Ibid.* 717C); and we find the form 'Baptismus' in I, 18 (671C); and it occurs twice in II, 24 (*Ibid.* 710B and C), and once in the *Expositio psalmodum* 105, 10 (*Ibid.* 303C).

Chrisma (Resp. III, 8)
Christianus (Resp. III, 11 and *passim*)
Circumcisio (Resp. V, 5): *Circumcidere* (Resp. V, 4): *Circumcisus* (*Ibid.*)
Daemon (Resp. V, 3)
Diabolus (Resp. I, 1: 2; 4, and *passim*): *Diabolicus* (Praef.)
Discipulatus (Resp. VI, 5)
Ecclesia (Praef. and *passim*)

The term *Catholica* is used in the Praefatio to signify the Church also.

Episcopatus (Resp. VI, 5)
Evangelium (Praefatio and *passim*): *Evangelista* (Resp. V, 8)
Evangelicus (Praefatio)

Exsufflare (Resp. V, 8)

The term is used to signify 'to exorcize'.

Gehenna (Resp. III, 9; V, 5 and *passim*)
Haeresis (Resp. V, 4; 6): *Haereticus* (Praef. and *passim*)
Hypocrisis (Praef.)
Idolatria (Resp. VI, 3)

The manuscript witness is unanimous in giving the above form. *Idololatria* never occurs. On the other hand, a citation from Hypomnesticon made by Rabanus Maurus in his *De praedestinatione* gives the reading *idololatria*, (PL 112, 1547 A) ¹:

Idolum (Resp. III, 4)
Incarnatio (Resp. III, 8)
Martyr (Resp. VI, 8)

This term is used in a series that has the appearance of a fragment of a litany: «in *Patriarchis* et *Prophetis*, in *Martyribus* et *Confessoribus*, in omnibus *Sanctis* et digne servientibus Deo». That these terms have here their distinctive Christian signification is evident.

Orthodoxus (Resp. V, 4)
Paradisus (Resp. I, 1; 4 and *passim*)
Patriarcha (Resp. VI, 8)
Paenitentia (Resp. III, 9)

Our author gives a definition of the term: «*Paenitentia ergo res est optima et perfecta quae defectos revocat ad perfectum*». That the author is speaking of Christian penance which depends on supernatural grace is manifest from the context. (*Ibid.*)

¹ This citation of Rabanus Maurus will be dealt with in vol. II.

Propheta (Praef. and *passim*): *prophetare* (Resp. V, 3)

Protoplastus (Resp. I, 1 and *passim*)

This word occurs in the first five Responsiones but not in the VIth. It is used as a synonym for Adam, and the Latinized form doubtless derives from Wis. 7, 1 (LXX). Its Patristic usage has already been noted ¹.

Sacramentum (Praef.; Resp. III, 15)

In the Praefatio the term is applied to Baptism: «sine sacramento baptismi»; in the third Responso it is applied to the rites of both the Old and New Law: «Paulus scribens Corinthiis, id est, ostendens eadem fide, iisdem sacramentis, quibus et nos, patres nostros omnes fuisse redemptos.»

Scriptura sancta (Resp. I, 1 and *passim*)

The synonym *Pagina sancta* occurs in Responso VI, 4.

Statio baptismi (Resp. V, 5)

The term designates the place of Baptism.

Symbolum (Resp. V, 8)

That the term refers to the Nicene Creed is sufficiently evident from the context. The Pelagians maintained that they baptized children unto the remission of sins merely because it was customary, according to the Creed, to do so. The author of Hypomnesticon says, among other things, in reply: «Verba namque Dei sunt Symboli verba. Non se fefellit Deus tradens per Apostolos suos ecclesiae suae sanctae catholicae credentes in remissionem peccatorum baptizari.» (*Ibid.*)

Tinguere (Resp. V, 7; 8)

The word signifies to baptize. The term is very frequently used by Tertullian in connection with Baptism in his *De Baptismo* (CCL, I, 277-295); cf. Lactantius, *Divinae Institutiones* IV, 15, 2.

Trinitas (Resp. V, 7)

Our author refers to the Blessed Trinity as the 'plenitudo divinitatis' (*Ibid.*), and he also remarks: «Baptismus enim Christi opus est Trinitatis.» (*Ibid.*)

Unda (Resp. V, 8)

This is a synonym for Baptism.

¹ See above, p. 122.

The philosophical vocabulary

That our author was accustomed to philosophical language is evident from his accurate use of terms such as 'essentia' (Resp. I, 4); 'species' (*Ibid.*); 'privatio' (*Ibid.*); from his care to distinguish between essence and existence (*Ibid.*); 'nomen' and 'essentia' (*Ibid.*) and from his competent discussion of 'natura', 'malum' and 'bonum', in Resp. IV, 1. Nevertheless, the philosophical terms used are not sufficiently numerous to suggest any particular specialization in philosophy on the part of the author. Besides, the terms correspond to the philosophical vocabulary to be found in St. Augustine's writings, and most of them recur frequently in the anti-Pelagian works with which our author was familiar. The following is a list of the most significant words of this category that occur in Hypomnesticon:

Accidens (Resp. IV, 1; 2; VI, 2)

This word is often used adjectively to denote what is accidental as opposed to substantial or essential, cf. Resp. IV, 1; 2. But it also occurs as a substantive, e. g. Resp. VI, 2. There it is opposed to 'essentia': «Deus cui praesentia non accidens est, sed essentia». (*Ibid.*)

Actus (Resp. IV, 1)

The term is opposed to 'natura' in Responsio IV: «Malum natura non est, sed actus accidens defectu boni». (*Ibid.*)

Anima (Resp. I, 3 and *passim*)

The word designates the principle of life or the soul.

Animus (Resp. IV, 5)

That the word signifies the mind and is synonymous for 'mens' is clear from the passage: «praevalentem legi mentis meae, intentioni videlicet animi mei naturali». (*Ibid.*)

Arbitrium (Resp. III, 4 and *passim*)

The author defines the term: «Arbitrium scilicet ab arbitrando rationali consideratione, vel discernendo quid eligat, quidve recuset, puto quod nomen accepit». (Resp. III, 4)

Bonum (Resp. III, 8 and *passim*): *Bonitas* (Resp. IV, 5)

Essentia (Resp. I, 4; VI, 2)

The term is defined: «Essentia enim dicitur ab eo quod est». (Resp. I, 4. It is identified with 'species': «Quidquid enim Deum fecisse dicimus

habet essentiam, id est, speciem». (*Ibid.*) It is distinguished from 'accidens' in Responsio VI, 2.

Insubstantialis (Resp. I, 5)

Our author's usage is seen from the phrase: «Cum ergo dicimus 'nihil', nomen insubstantiale nominamus». And in the same context he describes 'nihil' as 'nomen insubstantiale'.

Motus (Resp. III, 4; 8 and *passim*)

The term 'vitalis motus' is used to mean the active power of the will to choose: «[Possibilitas agendi quod velit] est vitalis et rationalis animae motus». (Resp. III, 4); «habebat enim [homo lapsus] vitalem motum, id est liberum arbitrium vulneratum». (Resp. III, 8)

Natura (Resp. I, 5 and *passim*)

The word is used in the philosophical sense: «Diabolus enim natura est angelus: sed quod natura est, opus Dei est: quod vero diabolus, vitio suo est». (Resp. I, 5): *Naturalis* (Resp. IV, 1 and *passim*): *Naturaliter* (Resp. III, 3; 4)

Possibilitas (Resp. III, 4; 8 and *passim*)

Privatio (Resp. I, 4 and *passim*)

The term is used by our author in his definition of death: «Mors itaque privatio vitae est» (Resp. I, 4), which definition is inspired by Augustine's definition of evil as found, say, in the *Confessiones*, Book III, 7; *Enchiridion*, 11.

Rationalis (Resp. III, 4; IV, 9)

The adjective is used to describe human nature in Responsio IV and to distinguish it from that of lower animals: «Homo immemor suae naturae rationalis, irrationali naturae et alienae a sua pecudi coire compellitur». (Resp. IV, 9)

Species (Resp. I, 4)

This term is understood as synonymous with 'essentia'.

Substantia (Resp. I, 5; III, 4)

Legal and medical vocabulary

Legal terminology occurs sporadically throughout Hypomnesticon, but there is nothing specially significant about its presence in our work, as similar legal terms, or words with legal associations, were in common use in the writings of the period, and were freely employed by Christian writers in their theological works. The following are the most conspicuous examples of such terms in Hypomnesticon: 'ferre sententiam'

(Resp. II, 1; III, 7); 'ius hereditarium' (Resp. IV, 7; V, 1); 'reus mortis' (Resp. III, 7); 'debitum', 'cautio', 'usura' (Resp. V, 1); 'delictum' (Resp. II, 1 and *passim*); 'idonei testes' (Resp. III, 3); and perhaps 'in solio iudicare' (Resp. II, 1); 'iudex'; 'iudicium' (Praef. and *passim*).

Similarly, medical terms are encountered occasionally in Hypomnesticon, but they have no particular significance inasmuch as they formed part of the ordinary literary vocabulary of the period and were widely used for similes and metaphors in contemporaneous Christian writings. Examples are: 'medicamentum' (Resp. III, 3); 'medicina' (Resp. III, 5 and *passim*); 'medicus' (Resp. III, 8 and *passim*); 'infirmas' (Resp. III, 3); 'remedium' (Resp. IV, 1; 8); 'antidotum' (Resp. IV, 1; 4); 'morbus' (Resp. IV, 2); 'insanabilis' (Resp. I, 4). As was conventional at the time, such medical terms were used to describe the sanctifying action of Christ (medicus) by means of grace (medicina, remedium, medicamentum) in the human soul (vulneratus, aegrotans). The inspiration for the use of all such imagery is the parable of the Good Samaritan, (Lk. 10, 30-35; cf. Resp. III, 8) and Matt. 9, 12 (cf. Resp. V, 3; 8) and similar scriptural passages.

c) Some Syntactical Characteristics

Syntactically, Hypomnesticon manifests certain divergencies from the rules of classical Latin, but certainly not more so than contemporary writings. Unclassical constructions are encountered, such as: «Rogo erubescite» (Resp. IV, 4; 7); «Rogo quid conamini resistere vera praedicanti, tam excellenti doctori.» (Resp. III, 6); «Videte, quia non tantum Paulum, sed et Christum ... redarguitis.» (*Ibid.*); «Audi ... quia homo vulneratus ... sanare se non potest.» (Resp. III, 8); «Sed cur jacebat, dicite...» (*Ibid.*). We witness in these and many similar examples that occur in our work, not merely a departure from the rules of strictly classical construction, but also the introduction of a certain colloquial freedom which characterizes the Latin usage of St. Augustine, St. Jerome and the Vth century Latin writers generally.

The tendency to use present participles substantively, which is also symptomatic of the period in which our author wrote, is pronounced in Hypomnesticon. The substantival use of 'credens' in the phrase: «de credentium libero arbitrio gratuita sua gratia amputat», is an example in point (Resp. III, 4; cf. Resp. III, 9). Another example occurs in the phrase: «numquid enim, cum delinquentibus mortem futuram praedixis-

set ...» (Resp. I, 3); and also in the expression: «liberum arbitrium habentibus» (Resp. III, 10).

A certain inconsistency can be observed in the use of the verb, 'nocere', inasmuch as its object is sometimes in the accusative case, e. g. Resp. II, 1; 4; and at other times in the dative, e. g. Resp. II, 2. However, the 'faulty' usage here can perhaps be explained by the fact that the Pelagian proposition with which the author of Hypomnesticon was concerned in Responsio II contains the accusative as object of 'nocere', viz. «Pecatum Adae neminem nocuit nisi solum ipsum» (Resp. II, 1).

Normally the noun governed by 'utor' is in the ablative case, but an exception is encountered in Responsio VI:

«Hunc [Iudam] enim Deus cum praescisset in vitiis propriae voluntatis pessimum fore, id est, electionem discipulatus sui bene a Christo conferendam male usurum ...» (Resp. VI, 5)

We find an example of 'potior' governing the accusative in Responsio III, 1. This usage was rare in the strictly classical authors, though it is to be found in Cornelius Nepos¹. The phrase in Hypomnesticon containing the verb runs:

«arbitrium ad velle potitus est vulneratum».

In the case of other verbs such as 'fruor', 'obedio', 'suadeo', etc., the syntax is normal.

Ellipsis occurs but rarely. An example is found in Responsio IV: «Homo ... irrationali naturae, et alienae a sua [...] pecudi coire compellitur» (Resp. IV, 9); another example occurs in Responsio I: «illam [carnem Christi] absque peccato, nostram vero peccatricem [...] ostendit» (Resp. I, 2).

The word 'calcatius', meaning 'with greater precision', which occurs twice in Responsio III is very rare. Only two uses of the comparative of the adverb are recorded in TLL² and both of them are found in works that are later than Hypomnesticon. Hence it would appear that Hypomnesticon is the earliest extant writing which contains the word in this

¹ See *Eumenes* 3, 4.

² TLL III, 139. The editors of TLL did not mention the occurrence of the word 'calcatius' in Hypomnesticon. They noted Boethius' use of the term as found in his *De syllogismo categorico* (PL 64, 830D), and that found in *Lactantii Placidi qui ferunter commentarii in Statium Thebaidem* I, 35. To the latter the editors add the note, 'sero compilata'.

form: «Nam ut *calcatius* liberum arbitrium ... intelligas» (Resp. III, 2); «Audi tamen adhuc *calcatius*» (Resp. III, 8).

An unfamiliar use of the word 'falsatus' is met in Responsio VI, 1:

«Non miramur vos de nobis, id est, homines de hominibus falsa posse confingere, cum videamus vos sic a diabolo esse *falsatos*, ut scripturas sanctas et veridicas ... mutare nitamini.» (Resp. VI, 1)

The Maurist editors, following Erasmus and subsequent editors¹, substituted 'fascinosus' for 'falsatos' in the above text. However, the MS. witness unanimously supports the reading, 'falsatos', and the context seems to support it also, since the word 'falsa' that is found shortly before provided a possibility for paronomasia which our author would most likely have exploited. Besides, we find a somewhat similar association of 'falsare' with 'diabolus' occurring in Prosper of Aquitaine's *De vocatione omnium gentium* I, 8 (PL 51, 656 B); «quidquid in animae paginis diabolus invidendo *falsavit*». Hence the word 'falsatos' ought to be restored in the text of Hypomnesticon even though the use of the word in the context is rare.

CONCLUSIONS

1. From the point of view of its literary characteristics, Hypomnesticon is to be ranked among the classical Christian writings of the Vth century.

2. The style of the writing is grave, moderate, elegant and precise. It bears marked oratorical tendencies, but is predominantly didactic. The practical aim of the writer, viz. to instruct and convince the reader of average intelligence, induces him to be repetitive, while his desire to comment on texts of Sacred Scripture occasionally leads him into digressions that obscure the course of the argument.

3. The language is typical of the writings of the Vth century Christian authors, particularly those of St. Prosper of Aquitaine. The vocabulary is rich and varied, but unusual words are on the whole avoided.

4. The grammatical forms show a certain degree of emancipation from the rules of strictly classical Latin composition, but by Vth century standards the writing, in spite of sporadic blemishes, is remarkably correct.

¹ These other editors are Chevallon, whose edition appeared in 1531, and the Theologi Lovanienses who published the work in 1577.

Conclusion

As a comprehensive and systematic refutation of Pelagianism and Semi-Pelagianism, *Hypomnesticon* is without parallel among the prose works of the Vth century. Though ostensibly directed against the Pelagians and Celestians alone, inasmuch as the title and preface mention only these, the work is concerned also with the teaching of Julian of Eclanum and with that of the Semi-Pelagians of southern and central Gaul. One of the six parts, or *Responsiones*, into which the work falls is devoted to the refutation of Julian of Eclanum's teaching on lust (*libido*). The Semi-Pelagian problems concerning Predestination are treated in the final *Responsio* which is an appendix. The remaining four *Responsiones* deal with specifically Pelagian problems though the Semi-Pelagian errors regarding the question of free will and grace are incidentally treated in one of these four *Responsiones*, viz. *Responsio III*.

To establish the date of composition of *Hypomnesticon*, it was necessary to depend very largely on internal evidence as the external witness was both meagre and inconclusive. By means of the combined evidence, both internal and external, it was possible to prove that *Hypomnesticon* was certainly not written before 428/29 and that it was very probably written before 435. A date very close to 430 and after the death of St. Augustine seemed most likely.

The authorship of *Hypomnesticon* presented special difficulties and called for a protracted investigation. The extant MSS. were first examined and it was found that no attribution other than to St. Augustine ever occurred in the MS. titles of the work. On the other hand, the association of *Hypomnesticon* with writings of St. Prosper of Aquitaine in the MSS. suggested a relation between them of some significance. An examination of the work itself indicated that the author was certainly

one of the great personalities of the Vth century, and that he must be ranked with St. Augustine and St. Jerome as an outstanding champion of the Faith, as a defender of what he terms the 'limes fidei sanae' (Resp. III, 8), against the Pelagian heresy. Further, the vindication of St. Augustine's theology which the work contains naturally suggested that the author was a close disciple of the great Bishop of Hippo. An investigation was made of the possible claims to the authorship of Hypomnesticon that could be put forward on behalf of Sixtus of Rome, Presbyter and later Pope Sixtus III, Marius Mercator, Quodvultdeus, Paulinus of Milan, Leo the Great, Augustine of Aquileia, and Paulus Orosius, but the results proved negative. The case for St. Prosper was next examined on the basis of a doctrinal, scriptural and literary comparison. Doctrinally, the resemblance between Hypomnesticon and Prosper's generally accepted works was found to be so close as to suggest a relation of at least dependence between them, and even to make Prosper's authorship probable. The study of the Scripture quotations in both, together with the literary comparison, strongly confirmed the conclusion reached by means of the doctrinal comparison. Hence, despite the absence of external arguments, there seem to be sufficient solid reasons to warrant the conclusion that Hypomnesticon was written by St. Prosper of Aquitaine.

In treating the doctrinal content of Hypomnesticon, it was decided to select three cardinal themes in the work, viz. Original Sin, Grace and Free Will, and Predestination, and to examine them in connection with the teaching of St. Augustine. It was found that the author of Hypomnesticon adhered closely to the teaching of Augustine and that nowhere did he change that teaching substantially. The conformity of the teaching on Original Sin with that of St. Augustine was found to be remarkably close, but a certain independence was observed in the treatment of Grace. This did not affect the substance of the doctrine taught, but rather the details of the proofs and the selection of illustrations. General agreement with Augustine's thought on the problem of predestination was found to be preserved in Hypomnesticon, but a certain 'Roman' moderation was remarked in the tendency to avoid the more fearful aspects of Augustine's expression of the doctrine. The awesome terms in which the Bishop spoke of the 'predestination' of the reprobate to damnation were studiously avoided, and a shift of emphasis to man's personal guilt as the reason for the punishment predestined for him was observable. Here we witnessed a development that was readily integrated into the curve of doctrinal evolution observable in St. Prosper's teaching on

Predestination. Due very probably to methodological reasons dictated by the general disregard for authorities other than reason and Scripture characteristic of such Pelagians as Julian of Eclanum, the author of *Hypomnesticon* confines himself solely to Sacred Scripture and to reason as the explicit sources for his proofs. In this the work is strikingly distinguished from the anti-Pelagian writings of St. Augustine where the argument from Councils of the Church and the witness of the Fathers are frequently invoked. Still, St. Augustine's influence is everywhere present in *Hypomnesticon*, and it is his theology that forms the substance of the book. Considered as a theological work and as a synopsis of St. Augustine's teaching on the problems debated between him and the Pelagians and Semi-Pelagians, *Hypomnesticon* is certainly of outstanding merit. Further, because of its contribution to Augustine's teaching on Grace and Predestination, viz. by its new proofs, its original illustrations and explanations, occasional changes of emphasis and moderating tendency, it is in its own right a work of importance in the history of theology generally, of Augustine's theology in particular, and perhaps more particularly still of the theology of St. Prosper of Aquitaine.

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