

**THE DISCURSIVE CONSTRUCTION OF**

**PRESIDENTIABILITY**

**IN TELEVISED PRESIDENTIAL DEBATES**

Analysis of the Spanish political field during the campaign for the 2008 general election

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La Doyenne Bernadette Charlier

Je déclare sur mon honneur que ma thèse est une œuvre personnelle, composée sans concours extérieur non autorisé, et qu'elle n'a pas été présentée devant une autre Faculté.

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## Abstract

In this dissertation I analyze how presidentiability is discursively constructed in relation to the functioning of the Spanish contemporary political field. In particular I will analyze presidential debates as a privileged stage from which to observe the constitution, workings and representation of the political field, since they epitomize the fight between agents in changing the relations of force existing within it. Debates homologically represent the structure of the political field and its internal struggles. Since political struggle is mainly conducted with words, and debates are (or are framed as) the main communicative events of electioneering, they comprise the central space for the discursive construction of presidentiability. The analysis will show that the discourse produced by the candidates is determined by the political field structure and expresses its dynamics: in particular, it will be seen that candidates spend much of their time on the front-stage of debates to implement their electoral strategies using moves and devices designed to increase their presidentiability and decrease that of their opponent.

From my multidisciplinary theoretical standpoint, I link Bourdieu's reflections on *political field* and *capital(s)*, Rhetorical and Argumentative reflections on *ethos* and Goffman's reflections on *image* or *face* for the purpose of subsuming them under the label of *presidentiability*: i.e. the capability of being president in accordance with certain *attributes*. These attributes are rationally considered as necessarily inherent in the president by a large majority of people from both parties (*global attributes* such as ability, coherence, sincerity, selflessness, etc.) or by the large majority of people from each party (*local attributes* as supportiveness, dialogue, optimism, etc. in the case of the Left and toughness, strictness, etc. for the Right).

My discussion on the construction of presidentiability in debates can be conceived as a triangle whose surface is covered by *discourse* and whose sides are: 1) the *topics* of the debate in relation to which candidates are attacking each other; 2) the *attributes* of the presidentiable person that emerge as being relevant and 3) the *discursive devices* employed as well as the *moves* made by candidates in order to implement their electoral strategies. Within the debates, candidates manage presidentiability in relation to certain themes that are or have been constructed as contextually relevant for the Spanish electorate: the economy, immigration, terrorism and Catalan nationalism; their presidentiability rises or falls depending on their ability to present themselves with or without certain attributes constructed as relevant in relation to themes; they implement their strategies of presidentiability management by making discursive moves of dis/alignment and employing discursive devices such as metaphors, deixis, arguments, quotes, etc.

The analysis deployed in this dissertation will show how a discourse generated in a certain political field and that expresses its dynamics works: essentially, it will shed light on the rules of the political game and the way candidates play it against the backdrop of contemporary Spanish society.

## **0. INTRODUCTION. The political field and the discursive construction of presidentiality at the front-stage of televised debates**

### **0.1. Presidentiality**

This dissertation analyses the discursive construction of *presidentiality* in the two 2008 Spanish presidential debates, related to the functioning of Spanish political field. I decided to focus on the two televised presidential debates for many reasons: 1) they were the first debates between presidential candidates since 1993 (the year of the first of such debates); 2) they were created and presented as a media event and achieved a large audience share; 3) they reveal how politicians perform on the front-stage; 4) they epitomize the electoral struggle; 5) they were constructed as a competitive discussion around the main themes of the Spanish election campaign; at the same time they gave relevance to these issues and contributed to the construction and dissemination of a certain dominant discourse and ideology; 6) they are a small-scale representation of the dynamics of the Spanish (institutional) political field and at the same time they contribute to consolidating the status quo, for instance by sanctioning the bipolarism between PP and PSOE and their duopoly; 7) they reveal the growing similarities between the discourse of the two major parties.

In particular I will show that presidential debates have a crucial place in the construction, working and representation of political field. They are a privileged *front-stage* (Wodak 2009a) where (also in a theatrical sense) the struggles between the agents (or actors) of the political field emblematically take place and are represented in order to change the relations of force existing within the field. Presidential debates thus epitomize the political field, its structure and the struggles taking place within it. More particularly, since the political struggle is conducted with words (Edelman 1964) and debates are (or are framed as) the main communicative events of the electioneering, they become a central space for the discursive construction of presidentiality. From this perspective, analyzing the debates will allow me to pinpoint the role that discourse and communicative practices play in the construction and functioning of political field. This is the reason why debates are of such major interest for linguists concerned with the study of language and/in society. The aim is to show how discourse is at work within the political field, how it is determined by field structure and how it expresses

field dynamics. From this standpoint, I will analyze debates as communicative events, going beyond the communicative event itself, in order to investigate its articulations with the political field and the dynamics of those sectors of Spanish society that find a means of expression within the debates.

The analysis of the dynamics of the two debates carried out in this dissertation draws attention to the fact that, remarkably, their main feature is the candidates' use of strategies, moves and devices in order to boost their presidentiability, presenting themselves in a positive light, and decreasing that of their opponents by focusing on negative considerations. My work addresses two main questions related to these aspects of debate, namely **the reasons why** candidates interact in this way and **the ways** candidates manage their presidentiability. In particular I will try to answer the following questions: **the topics they use as terrain for managing their presidentiability; the attributes they mobilize and the values they invoke** (related to certain topics), **the moves they make and the discursive devices they deploy**.

My discussion on the *construction of presidentiability* in the debates can be conceived as a triangle whose surface is covered by *discourse* and whose sides are the *topics, attributes and discursive devices*.

1) I will focus on the *topics* of debate in relation to which candidate manages to increase his presidentiability (through positive self-presentation) and decrease the other's one (through negative presentation). The candidates manage presidentiability in terms of certain areas of political conflict that are or have been constructed as contextually relevant for the Spanish electorate: **the economy, immigration, terrorism and Catalan nationalism**.

2) I will analyze the *attributes* of the presidentiable person that emerge as relevant and whose presence/absence increases or decreases their presidentiability. Candidates manage presidentiability representing themselves as having or lacking certain attributes constructed as relevant in relation to certain topics. These attributes are rationally considered as necessary for the president by the vast majority of people from both parties (*global attributes* such as ability, coherence, sincerity, selflessness, etc.) or by the large majority of people belonging to one particular party (*local attributes* such as supportiveness, dialogue, optimism, etc. for the Left and toughness, strictness, etc. for the Right). Presidentiability can be easily conceived as *the capability of being president*, which is in turn *based on a set of qualities considered necessary in order to be (a good) president*. The analysis will determine the key attributes involved in the construction of

presidentiability. The reflection on the features that make a candidate presidential has a certain sociological and cultural value and can shed light on Spanish society in the age of Late Capitalism.

3) Since the construction of presidentiality in the debates is essentially discursive, I will focus on the *discursive devices* deployed by the two candidates in implementing their global or local electoral *strategies*. The candidates manage their presidentiality by making discursive moves and employing discursive devices as **metaphors; presuppositions; narratives; reported speech; deixis; arguments, fallacies, and loci**.

As one can see, the construct of presidentiality is quite complex: it articulates together the concepts of ethos, face, and political capital, and operationalizes these concepts within the frame of processes of de-legitimation (which is the way how presidentiality is constructed) in terms of themes, attributes, moves and discursive devices.

### **0.1.1. The rules of the political game**

Providing an answer to the question *why* politicians interact the way they do within the debates – basically positive self-presentation and the negative presentation of the other – implies revealing the **rules of the political game**.

This metaphor of Politics as a game is the underlying concept of the entire dissertation. In line with Lakoff & Johnson's (1980) definition of metaphor, rather than being just a (figurative) way of describing Politics, this metaphor is actually a way of conceptualizing it (spread equally among actors and analysts of the political field). According to this formulation, electioneering can be conceived as a social practice with its own field, agents (players), rules, stakes, and even its spectators.

Electioneering is a special kind of game, i.e., a non-cooperative game, or, rather, a zero-sum game (Carmichael 2005; Davis 1983; Morrow 1994; von Neumann & Morgenstern 1953[1944]), where players merely win or lose, and where one player's gain means a loss for the other player(s). Games are forms of sublimated struggles, where the fight is regulated, metaphorized and staged, with none of the violence of real fights (Salen & Zimmerman 2004: 80; Avedon & Sutton-Smith 1971: 7; Crawford 1984): this concept can easily be translated to the ritualized and fictional character of the political struggle, as highlighted by many scholars (Martin-Rojo 2000; Rey-Fuentes et al. 1999; Huici-Módenes 1996; Abélès 1989; Edelman 1964; 1971; 1988, etc.). From

this perspective, we can see that the candidates of the two parties that together account for practically the whole of Spanish institutional Politics, *act out* the opposition. This is especially significant considering, as the analysis will show, that the discourse of the two main Spanish parties is becoming increasingly similar.

Electioneering can be seen as ‘political behavior’ par excellence; since the most prominent and explicit feature of this socio-discursive practice is the struggle for power. Consequently the debate, which is the main place for discursively staging and enacting the fight for power, can be considered the epitome of the political game.

The rules of the political game are determined by the structure of the Spanish political field, whose aspect is in turn shaped by the dynamics of the actors obeying its rules: in other words it is the structure of the political field that obliges candidates to struggle for social capital (votes) through the management of presidentiability. Furthermore, the structure of political field (and the necessity of changing the relations of force within it) makes it necessary for candidates to present themselves in a positive light in order to enhance their presidentiability and present the opponents negatively to decrease their presidentiability.

**Presidentiability is the key construct of this dissertation**, mainly because it allows for the articulation of the *why-question* with the *how-question*: i.e. it makes it possible to consider the way the two candidates behave in the light of the conceptual framework used to conceive the structure of the political field. From my multidisciplinary theoretical standpoint, I link Bourdieu’s reflections on *political field* and *capital* (see below), crucial for understanding the structure of the field, with the Rhetorical and Argumentative reflections on *ethos* (Aristotle 1985; Amossy 1999; 2010a; 2010b; Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 1958: 490), aimed at highlighting the pre/discursive construction of credibility and Goffman’s reflections on *image* or *face* (Goffman 1959; 1972[1967]: 5). In turn, this enables me to insist on the interactivity of the process of presidentiability management in the debates. These three concepts are all subsumed under the label of *presidentiability*: i.e. the capability of being president in accordance with the interactive allocation of certain *attributes* in relation to particular *topics*.

Since one of the main ideas underlying this dissertation is that the way candidates interact is determined by the structure of the political field, the concepts of *fields* and *capital* are central to this work. My reflection on the structure of political field is based entirely on Bourdieu’s sociological theory of fields (1981; 2002a[1984]; 1995; 2000;

see also Bonnewitz 2002[1988]; Wacquant 2004; Fritsch 2000) and capitals (1980; 1982; 1986[1983]; 1987; 1989[1987]; 1991[1982]).

According to Bourdieu, one can think of the **political field** “à la fois comme champ de forces et comme champ des luttes visant à transformer le rapport de forces qui confère à ce champ sa structure à un moment donné” (1981: 3). In line with this definition the social space of (institutional) Politics can be seen as a place where certain kinds of struggle take place for specific ends, which naturally includes obtaining greater power. In Bourdieuan thinking, **power equates capital**: having power means at the same time having *some kinds of capital* (economic, cultural, social, and symbolic), and using it for specific purposes, normally for obtaining more capital. These two concepts of power and capital cannot be conceived as distinct, but rather as two faces of the same coin. Power and capital are at once material (salaries, emoluments, etc.) and symbolic resources (recognition, prestige, etc.). Capital is not only a means or a power for *make-do* something to someone (*faire-faire*), but also for *make-know* (*faire-savoir*) or *make-believe* (*faire-croire*) something to someone. Bourdieu is also clear on this issue, when he states that symbolic power is the power for imposing the legitimate principle of vision and division of the world<sup>1</sup>, or, in other words, the power for imposing one’s own *ideology*.

One of the main features of capital is its *convertibility*: capital has the intrinsic ability to change its nature. For instance, economic capital (material resources) can be converted into cultural capital (diploma), which in turn can give rise to social positions that guarantee more material resources (economic capital), etc. In particular, the political field is characterized by the struggle for **a special form of (symbolic) capital: political capital**. Bourdieu defines it as a capital based on recognizability and reputation. This conception is linked to those of *face* or *image* and *ethos*: candidates discursively manage their face and intervene in that of their opponents in order to increase their own credibility and decrease that of their opponents. As stated above, political capital, face, ethos, can all be subsumed under the construct of *presidentiability*.

Thanks to its convertibility, political capital can be transformed into social capital (votes) and economic capital (resources). Candidates fight to boost their political capital

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<sup>1</sup> Bourdieu says: “the categories of perception, the schemata of classification, that is, essentially, the *words*, the names which constructs social reality as much as they express it, are the stake par excellence of political struggle, which is a struggle to impose the legitimate principle of vision and division” (1989: 20-21, my italics).

and reduce that of their opponents in order to convert it into social capital. As Bourdieu shows, social capital and political capital are closely intertwined. Thanks to the logic of representation (Bourdieu 1981, 1984b), votes metaphorically represent the width of the social support of a party, or, in other words, the social representativity of a party, i.e., which *part* of the society a *party* represents and how big it is; or, again, how widely shared is the *partial principle of vision or division of the world*, which is a form of defining the *ideology*. Since in the so-called ‘representative democracies’ power is distributed on the basis of representativity, votes – which are a way for representing the social support – mean power. This is the moment when political capital becomes social capital, i.e. this is the moment when one form of power is transformed into another. For candidates, votes represent the legal and popular *legitimacy* of a president, yet they also represent the legitimacy of parties, the party system and representativity: they legitimate not only the president and the party that won the elections, but also the entire representative party system.

### **0.1.2. The management of presidentiality**

This dissertation also attempts to answer a second question: **how candidates manage their presidentiality**. The starting point is to acknowledge that Politics is an activity conducted through discourse and in particular through symbols (Edelman 1964). The way candidates obtain (more) votes is through discourse: candidates ask for votes, since every other means of obtaining them, such as buying them or physically forcing or intimidating the electorate, should in no sense whatsoever be considered political, since such practices cannot be considered ‘fair play’ according to the rules of the political game. But 1) candidates rarely ask the electorate directly for their vote; instead, they present themselves as the best option and the other as the worst; 2) candidates do not only ask their own voters for votes. If electors were stable in their choices there would be no game at all and the election results would always be the same. Hence the goal of the game is on the one hand to maintain one’s own voters, and on the other hand to deduct votes from the other(s) candidate(s): the aim is to prevent one’s own electors from giving their vote to other candidates, and to win votes from voters who (could) vote for other candidates.

Political communication has often been termed ‘persuasive’ and of course it is; in this dissertation I try to define what it is that receivers are persuaded about. Receivers, i.e. electors, are persuaded that the candidate to whom they should give their vote is the



best one, the most presidential, whilst the other candidates are the worst, the least presidential. In other words, candidates are constantly engaged in a struggle to increase their own presidentiality by presenting themselves positively, and to decrease that of others by presenting them in a negative light. This discourse is *ideological*, not only because it expresses political ideologies and stances, but especially since one of the main functions of ideology is *legitimizing* the group and the way it categorizes the world and actions within it and delegitimizing others (van Dijk 1998; Larraín 1979; Chilton & Schaffner 1997). In presenting themselves as the most presidential, candidates construct their legitimacy and deconstruct others' legitimacy through discourse, prior to obtaining electoral legitimacy.

In order to shed light on how the discursive management of presidentiality (construction, deconstruction, increasing, decreasing, attack, defense, etc.) works within the debates, I will analyze the main discursive strategies, moves and devices employed by the candidates within the two televised debates. The candidates use metaphors, presuppositions, narratives, reported speech and quotations, deixis, arguments, mainly *ad hominem*, and *loci* to strategically describe actors and actions, with the aim of presenting themselves in a positive manner whilst presenting their opponent in a negative light, basing their arguments on a series of key topics.

The description of the dynamics of the two debates (the answer to the *how-question*) together with the description of the political field (the answer to the *why-question*) will allow us to highlight the fact that this dynamic of reciprocal attacks is determined by the actual structure of the Spanish political field: if, according to the logic of representation and to the working of the field, the candidates achieve social capital (votes) by taking it away from their opponent, and if social capital is a function of political capital, it goes without saying that the candidates will attack each other in order to reduce their opponent's political capital. This dissertation shows how this dynamics worked in the 2008 Spanish elections.

This discussion on the structure of the political field and the dynamics of the candidates' interaction in the two debates will allow us to draw some conclusions regarding the main features of Spain's institutional political field. We will see, for instance, that as a consequence of the mediatization of politics (and for the need for simplification that it induces) and of people's need for symbols, electoral discourse is somewhat reduced to a staged fight between heroes and villains. Moreover, due to a structural feature of the field as the need for the two parties to win over voters from the

*center* of the political spectrum, i.e. from the most undecided electors, their discourses become increasingly similar. This symbolic, simplified, and ritual representation of politics allows the two main Spanish parties to maintain their monopoly in the political field. The critical implication of this point is that only a new structure of the Spanish political field could determine new socio-discursive dynamics.

## 0.2. Structure of the dissertation

This work is structured in two parts. Part one presents the main general theoretical issues, whilst part two includes the analysis of the debates.

**Chapter 1** provides the theoretical framework. It begins with a clarification of the term *political discourse*. It then goes on to introduce the idea that Politics is conceivable as a struggle between parties: I will provide some definitions of party, highlighting the competitiveness as the main feature of party system. I will then introduce the two main theoretical concepts of this work: the Bourdieuan concepts of *field* and *capital*, focusing on social and political capital. I will then articulate the Bourdieuan theory of political field and of political capital with the Argumentation theory, crucial for understanding a persuasive discourse such as that deployed by the two candidates during the debates. The point of contact between these two theories will be the relationship between the Bourdieuan concept of *political capital*, the Aristotelian concept of *ethos*, and the Goffmanian concept of *face*. These three concepts can be subsumed under the label of *presidentiability*. The concept of capital refers to the structure and function of the field, whilst the concept of ethos refers to the discursive nature of the construction of the image of presidentiable. Finally, the concept of face insists on the existence of socially relevant attributes, the interactivity of stance taking and the construction of presidentiability.

**Chapter 2** addresses the main social, historical and ideological features of the Spanish political field. Section 1 deals with the Spanish political and administrative structure: I will sketch the main electoral processes at the four levels (state, region, province, and city) and provide charts and figures in order to easily visualize the relations of force between the main actors of Spanish political field. I will show the monopoly on politics exerted by PP and PSOE. Section two addresses Spanish party systems, introducing the main Spanish national and regional parties. Finally, I will focus on the three main Spanish parties: PP, PSOE and IU; I will provide historical data, point out the principal ideological features (with a specific focus on how the parties describe themselves), and present their figures (MPs and votes).

**Chapter 3** explains how the data was collected and organized. It also justifies the choice of using a simplified transcription for audiovisual data.

**Chapter 4** presents the analytical framework that articulates interactional approaches with discursive analytical approaches. After discussing the interactivity of stance taking and face-work, section two of this chapter presents the main discursive

devices that have emerged as vital in implementing the strategies and moves for constructing presidentiability: metaphors; presuppositions; narratives; reported speeches and quotations; deixis; arguments, and loci. This section provides a brief introduction for each, including examples of how these discursive devices are used as resources for a positive self-presentation and a negative presentation of the other with the aim of de/increasing presidentiability.

Part two of the dissertation, which focuses specifically on the analysis, starts with **chapter 5**, which presents the presidential debate as a stage for constructing presidentiability. It focuses on the debate as a communicative event: it begins by framing Spanish presidential debates within the history of presidential debates in the main Western democracies, referring to trends in debate analysis. It goes on to highlight the rituality of debates, insisting on the fact that they are mediatized communicative (pseudo)events. It also contains a description of the structure and the key features of the 2008 Spanish presidential debates. Finally, the section stresses the importance of the debates for candidates' construction of presidentiability.

Debating candidates take stances about something; therefore presidentiability is constructed in relation to certain topics. The topics presented roughly match the thematic division of debates and this division is related to the main cleavages existing in Spanish society. **Chapter 6** deals with the traditional and new cleavages that divide the three main parties and introduces the main topics and terrains of struggle in the 2008 electoral campaign: this section will help us understand the thematic organization of the debates and the way candidates construct their presidentiability around certain topics which are relevant or have been framed as such for contemporary Spanish society. The main terrains of struggle for managing presidentiability are: Economy, Immigration, Terrorism, and the Catalan question.

I will discuss each of these terrains and in this order in **chapters 7, 8, 9, and 10**. Each chapter includes a brief introduction of the topic and its relevance in the agenda, also in relation with the wider socio-historic and cultural context of Spanish society. Part two of each chapter presents an analysis of the main strategies, moves and devices employed in constructing presidentiability. They also include a more detailed sequential analysis of the interaction on a particular topic: the first question that Rajoy asked Zapatero in the *Congreso*; the xenophobia; the 11M attack; and the alleged persecution of Castilian speakers in Catalonia. Each chapter concludes with observations about the main moves and devices used and the main features of the discourse produced.

Finally, **Chapter 11** presents a summary of the work done, the main conclusions, some final remarks and some perspectives for further research and developments.

**The appendix** provides readers with the transcriptions of the two televised debates, a glossary with the names of the main Spanish parties and the transcriptions of other secondary data, such as videos, slogans, and other materials.

## **1. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK. From field structure to argumentative discourse**

### **1.1. Introducing the theoretical framework**

The basic idea upon which my theoretical framework is built is that institutional Politics is a struggle between parties to reach power through the imposition of an ideology – discursively constructed and spread– that must be shared by the majority. In articulating this framework, my first step will be to define *political discourse*, I will then go on to discuss the concept of multidisciplinary, since my approach is related to more than one discipline; I will then present a discussion on political parties as the main agents of institutional politics; providing some definitions of party, and highlighting the competitiveness of party system.

Following Bourdieu's sociology of fields, I will then describe Politics as a field, and will problematize the actions of politicians, their stakes, the logic of representation, and the relationships between the elected and electors, also at the light of Edelman's work on the symbolism of politics.

Since I postulate that politicians fight for some kind of capital, I will discuss the Bourdieuan concept of capital and in particular social and political capital; this will help shed some light on the structure of the field and the reasons why agents of this particular field act the way they do. I will then articulate the conception of political competition seen in the light of Bourdieuan theory of political field and of political capital with the argumentation theory, crucial for understanding persuasive discourses such as those produced by candidates during the debates. The point of contact will be the relationship existing between three concepts: Bourdieuan *political capital*, Aristotelian *ethos*, and Goffmanian *face*. These three concepts provide an explanation for the candidates' positive self-presentation (legitimation) and negative presentation of the other (delegitimation) in order to obtain votes in a process that I define as *the discursive construction of presidentiability*. The section on presidentiability will be preceded by some reflections on ideology and its relationship with de/legitimation.

## 1.2. Defining political discourse

Politics is essentially done through discourse (Edelman 1964: especially 114). Whilst discourse itself is a fuzzy term (Widdowson 2004: 1-16; Cameron 2001; for the definitions I will use here as a process of social interaction based on linguistic acts see Fairclough 1989: 24; Wodak & Meyer 2001b: 66; Calsamiglia-Blancafort & Tusón-Valls 1999: 15; Fairclough 1992: 64; see also van Dijk 1997a; 1997b), things are certainly no easier for the category of *political discourse* (van Dijk 2000: 46), mainly because it is difficult to establish categories as definite containers. This is particularly true if we consider hybridation as a central feature of our postmodern society (Bertens & Natoli 2002; Blommaert 2005: 31; Fairclough 2001: 133, in the specific case of political discourse).

According to Santulli (2005), any definition of political discourse –as a textual type with specific and distinctive features– is by nature complex and uncertain. It is difficult to distinguish a political discourse from a non-political one, firstly because politicalness intersects all spaces of social life; secondly, discourse is political – although perhaps a more correct term would be *ideological*<sup>2</sup>– because it constitutes an interaction that actualizes a relationship between speaker and hearer, who are always in a certain relation of power (see also Mazzoleni 1998: 140; Benveniste 1966). Santulli stresses that discourse is a form of power, and that every linguistic interaction is the exercise of this power, hence every form of discourse could be considered political manifestations. This vision is obviously in line with Foucault's vision of discourse (Foucault 1970)<sup>3</sup>.

Nevertheless, even if every discourse is political, from a narrower perspective some discourses are more political than others. As van Dijk says:

Political discourse is identified by its *actors* or *authors*, viz., *politicians* [...]. Politicians in this sense are the group of people who are being paid for their (political) activities, and who are being elected or appointed (or self-designated) as the central players in the polity (1997a: 12-13)<sup>4</sup>.

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<sup>2</sup> Roughly I use the term here as referring to every system of values shared by a social group, even if redefined by individuals, with social cognitive functions of orienting individuals' thought and behavior, and aimed at achieving group ends (see sub-section on Ideology).

<sup>3</sup> On the Foucaultian view of discourse and its relationship with power, see Jäger (2001; especially 33-38).

<sup>4</sup> On this see also Wilson (2001).

We can observe that for van Dijk, the definition of political discourse is a function between textual and contextual features.

I will use the term *political discourse* here as the discourse spoken by politicians (even if it is *multi-authored* or *polyphonic*, i.e. written by other and spoken by candidates) in more or less institutionalized political contexts and for institutional political aims. Moreover, according to the point of view adopted here of *politics as a spectacle and a competitive game*, I consider electoral discourse as the political discourse par excellence, as the epitome of institutional ‘doing politics’.



### 1.3. Multidisciplinarity

My approach is clearly *multidisciplinary* or *pluridisciplinary* as defined, among others, by van Dijk (2001a: 95-96), who says that “without being eclectic, good scholarship [...] should integrate the best work of many people, famous or not, from different disciplines, countries, cultures and directions of research”. I will not engage here in an overview of other terms used for referring to the mixing or crossing of disciplines, as *interdisciplinarity* and *transdisciplinarity*. It should simply be noted that some scholars consider multidisciplinarity and pluridisciplinarity as synonyms (Darbellay 2005: 46; Darbellay & Paulsen 2008: 3-5), as I do, while others distinguish between these two concepts (Charaudeau 2010). In the field of (Critical) Discourse Studies many authors have posited crossing disciplines (Blommaert 2005; Fairclough 2001; van Dijk 1995b; 1997b; 1997c; 2001a; Wodak & Fairclough 1997; Weiss & Wodak 2003; Fairclough 2005; van Leeuwen 2005). This way of proceeding, this lack of methodology, is probably the main feature of CDA (van Dijk 1993d; 2001b: 352; Wodak & Meyer 2001a; Blommaert & Bulcaen 2000; Wodak 1999: 186; 2006; Fairclough 2001), and the main argument for its critics, together with an overly textual approach (Cameron 2001; Widdowson 2004).

My approach might appear eclectic or “undisciplined”, as Morin (2005: 79) provocatively puts it, especially from a perspective of scientific discipline as regimenting category (Foucault 1970); however, I am convinced that the complexity of political discourse can only be addressed from multiple perspectives, using a wide range of analytical tools, approaches, and perspectives. In conceptualizing the political field, my inspiration stems from the Bourdieuan theory of field and concept of capital. Set against the background of this reflection is the work of Edelman and his idea of Politics as a spectacle, with its rites and myths. In order to theoretically sustain the idea of legitimation and delegitimation, I will link three concepts from different disciplines, such as that of political capital, developed by Bourdieu; that of face, developed by Goffman, and that of ethos, as developed in the rhetoric and argumentation. As we will see in chapter 4, in analyzing the discourse deployed by candidates during the debates, I will integrate two approaches: an interactional one, focused on stance-taking and facework in interaction, and a discourse analytical one, which will analyze more in particular textual features including metaphors, presuppositions, inferences, and implicatures, narratives, deixis, arguments, topoi, and the interdiscursivity (reported

speech). Since the starting point is the definition of the structure of the political field, I will begin my discussion with the main actors of the political fields.

#### 1.4. Parties as the main agents of institutional Politics

The role played by parties in contemporary democratic or totalitarian societies is widely recognized (LaPalombara & Weiner 1966: 3). Consensus regarding the central role played by parties is so large that some scholars define current democracies as *parties' democracies* (Mella-Márquez 2003[1997]: 5; Hernández-Bravo 2003[1997]: 27, who refers to Cotarelo 1981: 149). Nevertheless, there is no agreement on a single definition of political party. Without intending to provide an exhaustive vision, here I will provide a number of operational definitions.

For Spanish law (BOE 2002), a political party is “un ente privado de base asociativa [an associative private body]”. According to Giddens, a political party:

Is a group of individuals who work together because they have common backgrounds, aims or interests. Often a party works in an organized fashion, towards a specific goal, which is in the interest of the party membership (2009: 441).

Giddens goes on to define a party as “an organization established with the aim of achieving governmental power by electoral means and using that power to pursue a specific programme” (id.: 128).

Definitions given by political scientists are more specific. According to LaPalombara & Weiner, a political party is defined by:

(1) continuity in organization-that is, an organization whose expected lifespan is not dependent on the life span of current leaders; (2) manifest and presumably permanent organization at the local level, with regularized communications and other relationships between local and national units; (3) self-conscious determination of leaders at both national and local levels to capture and to hold decision-making power alone or in coalition with others, not simply to influence the exercise of power; and (4) a concern on the part of organization for seeking followers at the polls or in some manner striving for popular support (1966: 6).

The main elements of this definition (continuity, for the will to exert power, and participation in elections) are also present in the definition given by Cotarelo (1985: 14). Sartori (2005[1976]: 56) instead presents a minimalist definition of a political party as “any political group identified by an official label that presents at elections and is capable of placing through elections (free or non-free) candidates for public offices” (for an overview, see Alcántara-Sáez 2003[1997]).

Parties shape and mobilize public opinion, represent social interests, guarantee some level of stability and order even when changes take place, limiting changes and containing them within (legal or non-violent) channels; in particular, they circularly legitimize the political system since they build and articulate citizens' confidence in the party system and its own rules. In some sense they are the mediators between citizens and the State. Through parties, the political elites of a country are co-opted, who in turn constitute parliaments, institutions, governments, etc. Parties guarantee the functioning of politics and circularly the continuity of party systems (see Lapalombara & Weiner 1966: 3).

From a psychosocial point of view, a party is a group, membership of which is voluntary. Albeit not completely, members of party share a set of ideas whereby they categorize the world, i.e. phenomena, causality, social actors and social actions. This set of ideas is not only descriptive, in the sense that it describes the world, but also prescriptive, since it directs members' behavior. This set of ideas can be roughly defined as *ideology*. One of the main elements of the thought (cognition) of members of a group is social categorization, i.e. the way individuals define or represent self and others (Tajfel 1970, 1982; Tajfel & Turner 1979; 2004 [1986]). Social definition, representation and categorization are discursive and are based upon two crucial categories: in-group (us) vs. out-group (them).

Groups can cooperate or compete; during electioneering groups compete with other groups to control certain limited resources, so that categorization also is highly polarized. This polarization structures and reinforces the argumentation of speakers engaged in a competitive discursive practice such as electioneering; polarization is also perceived as constitutive of the situation by receivers (it is contextually relevant) and actually influences receivers' interpretation of discourse.

Summing up, political parties are organically structured and institutionalized groups whose goal is to achieve –through electioneering– manage and increase power; they need popular support and therefore need to convince people to embrace the ideology they propose.

It is clear to all that politicians contend for power, and that competition is one of the central features of democratic party-systems (Méndez de Hoyos 2003). This is especially evident in the case of electioneering. In ordinary language, electioneering is also defined as a 'competition', as a 'war' or as a 'game'. The use of these metaphors to describe Politics is neither new nor surprising (Lakoff & Johnson 1980; Lakoff 2004;

Fritsch 2000: 27-28). French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu, from whom I will draw extensively on the following pages, also considers Politics as a space for enacting struggles, and defines it – albeit in a broader sense than commonly understood– as a “*jeu* [game]” (1981: 6). As in every game, there is a field, the space(s) where participants compete delimited and separated from the rest; a number of *participants*, differentiated from those who are not taking part in the game, *spectators*; a set of *rules*, which are constitutive of the game itself; and above all a *reward* for which participants compete. The following section addresses these issues.

### 1.5. Politics as a zero-sum game

We have seen that electioneering, with parties competing for a reward, can be conceived through the well-known metaphor of the game. Indeed, electioneering is a particular kind of game: a zero-sum game. Roughly it is a sub-type of “constant sum games”, i.e. games where the total amount of what can be won or lost remains unchanged; since in this kind of game if one player wins, other(s) lose(s), it is a non-cooperative game, characterized by conflict. The concept of game and game theory is the result of research aimed at the application of mathematical methods to the analysis and prediction of human behavior<sup>5</sup>. This theory and its concepts have been applied firstly and most often to economic behavior, but also to political behavior<sup>6</sup>.

The definition of the zero-sum game provided above applies to electioneering; since in political elections only one party can win, i.e. run the government, while the other(s) lose(s). Nevertheless, even though running the government is the ultimate aim, it is reached by firstly obtaining a fundamental resource, namely *social capital*. Given a fixed amount of the winnable resources, of *social capital*, competitors act out strategies designed to achieve the maximum amount of social capital by taking it away from other(s). It is social capital that guarantees access to resources (a deeper analysis of social capital is given in section 1.6.4). This conception of electioneering is also extremely clear for political agents: note for instance the definition provided by Joan Campmany, the advertiser responsible for the 2004 electoral campaign for the PSOE, won by Zapatero<sup>7</sup>:

In Politics, if one wins, another loses. [...] In Politics, there is no doubt about the fact that votes sum or subtract in a perfect arithmetical way; peaceful coexistence between parties is simply impossible (2005: 86, my translation).

This situation of the zero-sum game is especially evident in two-party-systems, as in Spain, where only one of the two main parties (PP and PSOE) can obtain a majority.

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<sup>5</sup> See for instance the seminal book written by von Neumann & Morgenstern (1953[1944]: especially p. 46-49) or Davis (1983: chs. 2 and 3). For an easy introduction see Carmichael (2005: i-xx and on zero-sum games p. 12).

<sup>6</sup> See, for instance, Colomer (1995) or Morrow (1994).

<sup>7</sup> Joan Campmany (agency DDB) organized the PSOE 2004 electoral campaign, while PSOE 2008 campaign was run by the agency Sra Rushmore. These statements obviously do not exclude the fact that the competition could be fictitious.

In order for candidates to obtain more social capital to access power they must remove it from their competitors. We will see below that social capital, i.e. the social support measurable by votes, is a function of *political capital*, i.e. recognizability and reputation; so that more recognizability and reputation = more votes. To achieve more social capital (votes) candidates need to convince their own electors to continue voting for them, whilst at the same time persuading those voting for other candidates to change and vote for them. They do so by increasing their own political capital. Candidates increase their political capital by enhancing their recognizability and reputation and that of the party they belong to. Obviously this is linked to image management. Candidates must be known: electors must know them and recognize them from amongst other candidates; but electors must also have a favorable opinion of candidates in order to vote for them. This issue is related to the marketization of politics (branding the leader, making him recognizable to the audience) and the efforts to generate associations of the leader with positive values (presenting him as desirable). One can easily see that this exercise could be labeled as *face-work* (in Goffmanian terms) and is related to the question of *ethos* as used in classical and modern Rhetoric (see below). Since, according to Bourdieu, the political field is relational, the increase in one's own social capital implies the decrease of that of others (voters that once voted for X now vote for Y); homologically, the increase in one's own political capital (reputation) is accompanied by a decrease in others' reputation: for this reason candidates are constantly engaged in positively presenting themselves and negatively presenting others.

A way of measuring social capital is to measure consensus. One of the most accepted and popular ways of doing this is computing votes (see Sartori 2005[1976]). Votes are a way of *representing* social capital. The way votes are represented as a totality, as a "fromage [cheese]" in TV graphics (Bourdieu 1988: 3), shows that votes can be considered as a whole, as *the* reward of the political game. Political parties attempt to obtain a majority share in this "fromage". This is so because institutional politics works according to the *logic of representation*; within this logic, the *number* – the number of persons represented by a successful candidate – is of considerable significance, since the representative's power (and legitimacy) grows in relation to the number of people he represents (Bourdieu 2000: 84). This issue is addressed in greater depth in the next section.

### 1.6. The logic of representation and the functioning of the field

The way parties strive to obtain power could not be adequately understood without taking into account the logic of *representation* as explained by Bourdieu and Politics as characterized by professionalization, delegation, and concentration of social capital.

Together with journalists, Bourdieu considers politician to be the main agents of the political field, which they constitute and perpetuate. Politicians are the players; they are inside the political field, while voters are outside it, since they do not partake of politicians' stakes. Nevertheless, even though they are external to the game, voters are necessary for its perpetuation, which prevents the political field from being completely autonomous: politicians must regularly submit to voters' judgment (Bourdieu 2000: 63).

Politics is not for everybody (Bourdieu 2002b[1984]), since in order to acquire political competence a vast amount of capital is needed: economic capital, time and education are needed to acquire political *habitus*, i.e. to know *how to behave as a politician*<sup>8</sup>. Politicians are competent in politics; they are professionals of Politics ("initiated", "clergy" or "ministries"), while voters are laymen ("profanes"). Politicians *represent* laymen; but this concept of representation is far from simple. Politicians express and defend the interests of persons as if they were a group. But to act as a group and wield greater force, individuals have to lose their individual forces, conceding them to an individual who concentrates their voices into one voice (Bourdieu 1984b: 49). Consequently, representative groups exist when isolated individuals with the same *principle of vision and division of the world* (the same ideology) delegate their power to permanent organs with the *plena potestas dicendi et agendi*, the party. In further degrees of delegation, the party delegates a group within the party (permanent committee) to represent the Party, and in turn this permanent organ delegates one person to represent itself, the entire Party and its voters (id.: 50). This concentration of voices, actually a concentration of capital, and by extension of power, is the way *representation* works (Bourdieu 1981; 1984a; 1984b; 1988).

It should be noted that since the representative acts/speaks in the name of and in the place of others, the greater the number of others, the more powerful the representative will be. This is the reason why candidates and parties fight for votes, to increase the amount of social capital (votes are a form of measuring this) and political

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<sup>8</sup> *Habitus* can be roughly defined as the system of long-lasting dispositions or schemata determined by social structure and that determine the way individuals perceive the world and behave in it (see Bourdieu 1980: chs. 3 and 4; 2000[1972a]; 2000[1972b]).



capital (increasing the number of persons that can identify with the politician/party). Yet votes as social capital, and recognizability and reputation as political capital, are at the same time a means and an aim (which is a quality of all the forms of capital, see below). The way Bourdieu puts it is especially clear:

Dans les démocraties parlementaires, la lutte pour conquérir l'adhésion des citoyens (leur vote, leur cotisations, etc.) est aussi une lutte pour maintenir ou subvertir *la distribution du pouvoir sur les pouvoirs publics* (ou si l'on préfère, pour le monopole de l'usage légitime des ressources politiques objectivées, droit, armée, police, finances publiques, etc.). Les agents par excellence de cette lutte sont les partis, organisations de combat spécialement aménagées en vue de mener cette *forme sublimée de guerre civile en mobilisant durablement* par des prévisions prescriptives le plus grand nombre possible d'agents dotée de la même vision du monde social et de son avenir. Afin d'assurer cette mobilisation durable, les partis doivent d'une part élaborer et imposer une représentation du monde social capable d'obtenir l'adhésion du plus grand nombre possible de citoyens et d'autre part conquérir des postes (de pouvoir ou non) capables d'assurer un pouvoir sur leurs attributaires politiques (Bourdieu 1981: 8).

The passage highlights that political field is the social space where struggles for power take place. But what is this *power* parties are constantly seeking for? Concrete resources (money, cars, apartments, etc.) as well as symbolic resources (influence on others, their thinking and behavior). As is evident from the previous point, and as Bourdieu claims, power *is* capital and vice versa (1986[1983]: 243). Therefore, since capital equates power, we can see the way one form of capital can circularly transform itself into another form of capital: social capital is necessary for acquiring and maintaining *power*, which is the real aim of politicians. However, social capital is in itself a power. For this reason capital or power is also an aim and a resource, a means.

The fact that political field is the place in which the struggle for power is enacted is evident in Campmany's statements about the nature of electioneering: "an electoral campaign has the virtue of clearly representing the fight for power" (2005: 9, my translation). Analyzing electoral discourse as a (special) form of *discourse of power*, we can *unveil* the ideologies that underlie signs and discourses of opposed addressers, uncovering the language that speakers employ when in power, or when striving to achieve it (Blommaert 2005: 25; Wodak & Meyer 2001a: 65; Mey 1985; Voloshinov 1929; van Dijk 1997a). This is my intention, here, through the analysis of the way candidates manage presidentiability with processes of de/legitimation. In this

perspective, an electoral campaign is a privileged point for witnessing the (semiotic) fight for symbolic supremacy: competitors struggle to impose their own words, interpretations, symbols and (preferred) meanings over those of others, in order to construct and transmit an image of reality that favors the achievement of their own social ends, i.e. to increase their social capital in order to control other resources, and thereby control power. This vision of the political space as an arena could explain why the discourse produced by candidates is aimed at telling voters that one option (themselves) is legitimate, whilst another (the other) is not. The struggle to achieve greater power, thus, passing through the struggle for political and social capital, is, as Bourdieu himself as well as Edelman noted, a symbolic struggle: a battle of words, of meanings. As Bourdieu puts it, it is a way of imposing the group's *principle of vision and of division of the society* (a principle which is functional to the achievement of group's interest), i.e. for achieving and maintaining symbolic power, or, semiotic *hegemony*. Hegemony is reached when the *partial* (etymologically intended as 'belonging to the party') principle of vision and division is *naturalized* as objective and inevitable, so that it is impossible to imagine something different, it becomes *common sense* thanks to *consensus*. In other words, as symbolic power, hegemony is power acknowledged but not recognized as power or domination: it is domination interiorized as natural, and consequently does not need coercion to be exerted. In this sense, hegemonic discourse is discourse perceived not as dominating, but rather as natural<sup>9</sup>.

In his works, Bourdieu states that every political field is bipolar, i.e. organized around two opposite poles: for instance, right/left, liberal/conservative, etc. (1981: 10), both fighting to impose their *principle of vision and of division of the world*, i.e. their *ideologies*. Therefore, since in order to achieve more power (power, for instance, to decide about state-owned resources and the way of managing them) candidates need to obtain the maximum amount of social capital (support = votes) and political capital (visibility and reputation), candidates have to present themselves in a positive light and present their opponents negatively. In short, during electioneering candidates' discourses are aimed at accrediting (legitimizing) themselves and discrediting (delegitimizing) their opponents.

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<sup>9</sup> Power, Bourdieu says, is always arbitrary and powerful people always try to naturalize the arbitrariness of their power in order to make it more acceptable (1977: 164; cf. also Briggs 1992). Naturalization is related to the Gramscian concept of *common sense* (Gramsci 1971: 322, 323-326, 422, 424; see also Raiter 2001; 2003).

## 1.7. Conceptual frame

### 1.7.1. Fields

The Bourdieuan concept of field (Bourdieu 1981; 1995; 2000; 2002a[1984]; for an introduction see Bonnewitz 2002: 41-75; see also Wacquant 2004) will be the main starting point for the analysis deployed here of the Spanish political field and the way presidentiability is constructed. According to Bourdieu, social space is constituted by delimited sub-spaces of social practice and *habitus*, called fields. These fields are more or less autonomous and interrelated in different degrees: artistic, intellectual, scientific, economic, political field, etc. Fields are fields of forces (“champs de force”), where agents with specific *habitus* and knowledge compete for limited specific capitals, for different forms of capital (see below), and to dominate the field, thereby changing the relations of power existing at each moment in a given field. The most prominent agents of each field are those who have the most pertinent capital within the corresponding field. Positions within the field are relative and temporarily limited; hence the situation is dynamic.

Even though fields differ from each other in relation to “enjeux [stakes]”, composition, etc., they do have some laws in common. (a) A field has a specific stake, which could be considered useless or go unnoticed outside it or in other fields. For the perpetuation of field, agents must believe in the game, play it, and share the same illusions about the importance of the game and of its stakes, which can be material or symbolic. (b) Within the field agents are secretly in collusion with each other. Even though they compete, they share common interests, such as the survival of the field itself. (c) The stake for each field is the monopoly or exclusive control of the specific authority. Agents compete to maintain or improve their position. The best way to do this is by dominating the principle of hierarchization<sup>10</sup>. Dominating a field means setting the game rules, the pertinent capitals, etc. For every field there are orthodox/heterodox, legitimate/illegitimate positions, as well as gate keeping for agents and capital.

We will now specifically address the question of political field.

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<sup>10</sup> Bourdieu says “imposer la vision légitime du monde social” (1995: 16) or the legitimate principle of vision and division (1981: 4, 8 et seq.).

### 1.7.2. Political field

In general terms, the political field comprises the political structure of a given country (a given political system) at a given moment, as well as the set of the agents acting within the field: their aims, the game rules, and the forces that regulate their actions. Bourdieu defines it as follows:

le champ [politique] est un microcosme, c'est une sorte de monde séparé, de monde à part, fermé sur lui même, en grand partie, pas complètement, sinon la vie politique serait impossible, mais assez ferme sur lui même et assez indépendant de ce qui se passe à l'extérieur. Et c'est dans ce petit monde, ce microcosme, que se joue un jeu tout à fait particulier dans lequel s'engendrent des intérêts particuliers. Je crois que c'est la chose la plus importante: dans ce jeu auquel participent évidemment les hommes politiques, les députés, etc., mais aussi des journalistes, des commentateurs politiques, des sondeurs, etc. se définissent des intérêts qui sont indépendants des intérêts des simples votants, de la clientèle (2000: 35).

In this definition three things need to be highlighted: a) the separation and the relative *autonomy* of the field from the rest of society, something on which Bourdieu insists on various occasions (2000: 52); b) the fact that politicians' interests are different from citizens' interests, something that matches with Edelman's observations (1964); c) the role of journalists (and more generally of the media system) as agents of the political field rather than simple observers, as journalists try to portray themselves (2000: 76; Champagne 1988). This leads Bourdieu to talk about a real "connivance" between politicians and journalists; on this particular point Bourdieu also clarifies the *circular circulation of doxa* (received ideas, dominant thought and discourse) among politicians and journalists:

Je pense qu'il y a une [...] connivence entre les très grands journalistes politiques, ceux qui sont connus par la télévision, etc. et les hommes politiques; connivence qui repose sur une familiarité réelle: ce sont des gens qui se voient constamment. [...] Il s'ensuit que les uns et les autres s'imprègnent mutuellement d'idées qui circulent circulairement –et que j'appelle la *doxa* politique, c'est-à-dire un ensemble d'idées reçues qui sont en deçà même de la croyance, par exemple, actuellement la vision néolibérale. [...] Et ces connivences reposant sur la familiarité [...] sont, je pense, un des facteurs de la fermeture du monde politique. Et les journalistes qui se pensent comme des observateurs du champ politique sont en fait des agents du champ politique [...] par les questions qu'ils posent et par les questions qu'ils ne posent pas (2000: 37).

This last point, as we will see more in detail in the analytical chapters, will be visible in the dominant discourse or *doxa*, created and spread by politicians during the debate on certain topics. Like other fields, the political field is “un champ de forces et un champ de lutte pour transformer ces rapports de force” (2000: 41), but it works as a game whose stake is to impose the legitimate principles of vision and division, i.e. the right principles of categorization of the social world (2000: 67). This latter point shows that the main stake for politicians is to impose their ideology:

Dans le champ politique, si je dis que la division majeure est celle des riches et des pauvres, j’obtiens une certaine structure sociale. Si je dis que c’est la division entre les Français et les étrangers, j’obtiens toute une autre structure. [...] Si le principe de division que je propose est reconnu de tous, [...] si tout le monde voit le monde comme je le vois, j’aurais alors derrière moi toute la force des gens qui partagent ma vision (2000: 63).

It is clear that social capital, the social support underpinning an idea, equates to the number of persons behind it, i.e. the number of people that believe they are represented by that idea.

As we have seen, the political field is partially but not totally closed, since politicians are obliged to periodically submit themselves to the electorate’s judgment; even though politicians may be more concerned with relations between themselves, and with the action aimed at perpetuating the field and its apparatuses which assure their existence within the field<sup>11</sup>, they have to interact with those who give them their ‘power’, those who delegate their voice to them, i.e. electors. Moreover, electors give politicians legitimacy through their vote. For these reasons, a considerable number of politicians’ actions target their electors, including propaganda. Bourdieu refers several times to this issue of the elections as a periodical, ritual contact between the agents of the field (politicians) and those who are excluded from it (electors) (2000: 39), between players and spectators. His observations remind us that electioneering is crucial for the continuity of the field itself.

The partial *autonomy* and the *closedness* of the political field also determine the increasing distance between electors’ and politicians’ interests (2000: 58). This point explains the “political deficit” many scholars have referred to (for instance, Wodak

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<sup>11</sup> Bourdieu states that a great amount of the actions performed by politicians are inspired by the desire of and are aimed at reproducing the apparatus and politicians by the reproduction of the apparatus that guarantees the reproduction, i.e. its members’ political existence (2000: 66, 67).

2009a) and echoes Edelman's reflections on the Politics as a spectacle whose actors defend their own interests (1964). Bourdieu's observations also explain on the one hand politicians' necessity of being "plebiscited" (and therefore legitimized) by citizens through their vote, and on the other hand the fact that the battle taking place in the political field is fictive, since politicians' first aim is to perpetuate the game (2000: 60; Martin-Rojo 2000a; 2000b: 173, 180-183). The fact that electioneering is a ritualized and performed competition means that instead of being, as political mythology presents them, the highest moment of political participation, it is instead a form of demobilization and depoliticization (Bourdieu 1986: 241, footnote 1). Interestingly enough, together with this latter issue, Bourdieu often also draws a very common parallelism whereby electors are buyers, clients, consumers and parties are producers of political products (Bourdieu 2000).

As we have seen, in his definition of political field, Bourdieu openly refers to competitiveness: in fact, he defines it as an "arena", a term which metaphorically recalls *spectacular* battle and fights, as a space where struggles take place:

Le champ politique est une 'arène' qui se donne comme telle et dans laquelle il y a des combats, des affrontements déclarés. Comme dans tous les champs, il y a accumulation de force, de capital politique, c'est-à-dire de réputation (c'est ce qui fait que les hommes politiques sont particulièrement vulnérables aux scandales). C'est de la réputation, de la renommée, si possible de la bonne renommée [...]. Ce capital politique, qui s'accumule selon une logique tout à fait particulière, s'accumule à la fois vis-à-vis des profanes mais aussi à l'intérieur du champ politique (2000: 39-40).

The previous passage also refers to the main point, i.e. that one of the main forces of the political field is *political capital*. It is at the same time a goal and a means, which thanks to its *convertibility*, inherent to every form of capital, can be used to achieve further aims.

In the next section I will consider capital, its forms and its convertibility from a deeper perspective.

### **1.7.3. Capital**

Capital is one of the main concepts in Bourdieu's sociology. Capital, Bourdieu says, can be summed up in the amount of accumulated labor. It has the "potential capacity to produce profits and to reproduce itself in identical or expanded form" (1986: 241).

Bourdieu also distinguished the guises that capital can take: it can be economic, social, cultural or symbolic (1982; 1986; 1987). Economic capital is the amount of material resources: money, property, cars, etc. Cultural capital is the accumulation of culture/knowledge: embodied in individuals, i.e. their knowledge; objectivized in the material form of books, paintings, statues, etc.; or institutionalized in form of degrees and other academic qualifications. Social capital is the total amount of potential/actual resources derived from one's own network of relationships, the resources based on belonging to a group. Symbolic capital is the amount of capital that does not seem to be capital at all, i.e. prestige, charisma, status, etc. is "the form that the various species of capital assume when they are perceived and recognized as legitimate" (Bourdieu 1989[1987]: 17). In another sense of 'symbolic', we can say that it is capital that is constructed and transmitted mainly semiotically, i.e. created and interchanged by signs, and more particularly by symbols.

The four types of capital are strictly and problematically intertwined and can be converted from one another. For instance, a specific knowledge and specific *habitus* of behaving *as* a politician as well as specific degrees or qualifications are needed to acquire political capital. Obtaining these *habitus* and specific knowledge/degrees individuals takes time, which must be stolen from the work for subsistence (people can only study if they are not obliged to work for their living), so a certain amount of economic capital is needed; also a solid network of social relations (family, acquaintances and friends) is necessary in order to enter political groups, hence of the need for some social capital (and in turn some economic capital is needed to maintain social capital); some charisma or at least a certain amount of recognizability is needed for achieving political posts, etc.

Obviously the above example does not show all the possible interrelations between the different forms of capital or the different kinds of possible *conversions*. In the following sub-section I will consider the issue of social capital and political capital in greater depth.

#### **1.7.4. Social capital and political capital**

The notion of social capital (Bourdieu 1980; 1986) is of particular interest for the purpose of this work. I argue that it can be measured *by computing the number of votes obtained in the elections*. I interpret social capital according to Bourdieu's vision of

(political) representation<sup>12</sup>. In order to provide a clear definition of this kind of capital which, together with the political capital is the most useful tool for understanding how political field works and the process of construction of presidentiability, it is worth quoting Bourdieu:

Social capital is the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition –or in other words, to membership in a group– which provides each of its members with the backing of the collectivity-owned capital, a ‘credential’ which entitles them to credit, in the various senses of the word. These relationships may exist only in the practical state, in material and/or symbolic exchanges which help to maintain them. They may also be socially instituted and guaranteed by the application of a common name (the name of a family, a class, or a tribe or of a school, a party, etc.) and by a whole set of instituting acts designed simultaneously to form and inform those who undergo them; in this case, they are more or less really enacted and so maintained and reinforced, in exchanges [...]. The volume of the social capital possessed by a given agent thus depends on the size of the network of connections he can effectively mobilize and on the volume of the capital (economic, cultural or symbolic) possessed in his own right by each of those to whom he is connected [...] (1986: 248-249).

As we can see, Bourdieu explicitly refers to parties as socially instituted groups that embody a social network. Bourdieu also takes into account the fact that producing social capital requires an effort, ongoing work which entails a loss of time and energy, hence directly or indirectly, a loss of economic capital, and states that: “this is one of the factors which explain why the profitability of this labor of accumulating and maintaining social capital rises in proportion to the size of the capital” (1986: 250); this latter point explains politicians’ efforts to keep their electors, given the importance of the rewards of the political game. Bourdieu goes on to analyze the institutionalization of social capital and establish the main feature of the *logic of representation*, and therefore the main feature of the functioning of political parties, i.e. the concentration of social capital:

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<sup>12</sup> Even if Bourdieu’s concept of social capital is more related to *physical* practices, it is possible to expand it beyond its original definition by acknowledging that social relationships, especially in contemporary societies, are increasingly mediated (Thompson 1995).



Every group has its more or less institutionalized forms of delegation which enable it to concentrate the totality of the social capital, which is the basis of the existence of the group (a family or a nation, of course, but also an association or a party), in the hands of a single agent or a small group of agents and to mandate this plenipotentiary, charged with *plena potestas agendi et loquendi*, to represent the group, to speak and act in its name and so, with the aid of this collectively owned capital, to exercise a power incommensurate with the agent's personal contribution [...]. The mechanisms of delegation and representation (in both the theatrical and the legal senses) which fall into place –that much more strongly, no doubt, when the group is large and its members weak– as one of the conditions for the concentration of social capital (among other reasons, because it enables numerous, varied, scattered agents to act as one man and to overcome the limitations of space and time) also contain the seeds of an embezzlement or misappropriation of the capital which they assemble (1986: 251).

This is a crucial point, which refers to the fact that some members of a group, receiving and managing the power from other members of the same groups, dispossess them of the power they receive. Yet this feature is a constant in political representation. As Bourdieu continues:

This embezzlement is latent in the fact that a group as a whole can be represented, in the various meanings of the word, by a subgroup, clearly delimited and perfectly visible to all, known to all, and recognized by all, that of the *nobiles*, the 'people who are known,' the paradigm of whom is the nobility, and who may speak on behalf of the whole group, represent the whole group, and exercise authority in the name of the whole group [...]. Similarly, phenomena such as the 'personality cult' or the identification of parties, trade unions, or movements with their leader are latent in the very logic of representation. Everything combines to cause the signifier to take the place of the signified, the spokesmen that of the group he is supposed to express, not least because his distinction, his 'outstandingness,' his visibility constitute the essential part, if not the essence, of this power, which, being entirely set within the logic of knowledge and acknowledgment, is fundamentally a symbolic power; but also because the representative, the sign, the emblem, may be, and create, the whole reality of groups which receive effective social existence only in and through representation (1986: 251-252).

In this passage we can see the reasons why Politics becomes increasingly *personalized*, as well as the leaders' need for visibility. It is worth focusing on what Bourdieu adds (id.: footnote 17), since it allows us to relate social and symbolic capital: "social capital is so totally governed by the logic of knowledge and acknowledgment that it always functions as symbolic capital". This means that social and symbolic capital, as well as political capital (which is a particular case of symbolic capital) are strictly intertwined,

since they all work following the logic of *connaissance*, *reconnaissance* and *méconnaissance*: politicians' political capital (visibility and reputation) is inseparable from the social relationships created and maintained within the group that recognizes politicians as the mandated; at the same time political capital is a form of symbolic capital, due merely to the recognizability of politicians<sup>13</sup>.

#### **1.7.4.1. Social capital and votes**

Bourdieu says that votes are the symbolic and material force offered by laymen to politicians (1981: 14). Before reaching this conclusion, Bourdieu explains the relationship between capital and votes: he claims, for instance, that the force of political discourse depends on social and symbolic capital; on the number of persons that recognize themselves in it (1981: 12-13).

La force d'un discours dépende moins de ses propriétés intrinsèques que de la force mobilisatrice qu'il exerce, c'est-à-dire, au moins pour une part, du degré auquel il est reconnu par un groupe nombreux et puissant qui se reconnaît en lui et dont il exprime les intérêts (sous une forme plus ou moins transfigure et méconnaissable) (1981: 12-13).

Bourdieu also states that politicians fight to increase the number of people they represent, for the monopoly of the right to speak and act on behalf of and instead of laymen, who in turn confer a voice and force on politicians through their votes.

Le champ politique est donc le lieu d'une concurrence pour le pouvoir qui s'accomplit par l'intermédiaire d'une concurrence pour les profanes, ou mieux, pour le monopole du droit de parler et d'agir au nom d'une partie ou de la totalité des profanes. Le porte-parole s'approprie non seulement la parole du groupe, c'est à dire, la plupart du temps son silence, mais aussi la force même de ce groupe, qu'il contribue à produire en lui prêtant une parole reconnue comme légitime dans le champ politique. La force des idées qu'il propose se mesure [...] à la force de mobilisation qu'elles enferment, c'est à dire à la force du groupe qui les reconnaît [...] et qu'il peut manifester en recueillant ses voix (1981: 13).

Therefore, in politicians' fight for the monopoly of representation, the importance of a party is measured by the number of voices/votes (these two terms are interestingly

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<sup>13</sup> Remember that, according to Bourdieu, symbolic capital is "the recognition, institutionalized or not, that [agents] receive from a group" (1991[1982]: 72) and that "political capital is a form of symbolic capital, credit, founded on credence or belief and recognition" (id.: 192).

synonymous in French) that the party represents (id.). Also in Sartori (2005[1976]) votes are the measure of the power of a party.

#### 1.7.4.2. Political capital as symbolic capital

We will now take a closer look at political capital, as it is crucial in order to understand the reasons why politicians accredit themselves and discredit others. As Bourdieu says:

Le capital politique est une forme de capital symbolique, crédit fondé sur la croyance et la reconnaissance [...] l'homme politique tient sa force politique de la confiance qu'un groupe place en lui (1981: 14).

The specific nature of political capital must be stressed here: namely the fact that it is based 1) on recognizability and 2) credibility. On the one hand, it depends on the visibility of the candidate, and on the other hand, on the faith of the persons that recognize him. So in order to be recognized and to secure the attention they constantly require (Atkinson 1984; Wodak 2009a), candidates must exhibit themselves. This is particularly true in the case of their television appearances<sup>14</sup>. On the other hand candidates must appear to be credible and associated with positive values (even if these values are disputed, so that what is positive for some electors is negative for others). This leads us to consider the fact that political capital is *personalized*, embodied into an individual, in the candidate. This explains not only the increasing *personalization* of politics (Mazzoleni 1998; Livolsi 2000), its *peopleization* (Charaudeau 2008) and mediatization<sup>15</sup>; but also the fact that politicians are constantly engaged in maintaining their much-cherished and *delicate* reputation against all forms of scandal (Bourdieu 1981: 18), as well as the fact that political discourse is based on personal attacks, or *argumentum ad hominem*. As Bourdieu states<sup>16</sup>:

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<sup>14</sup> Bourdieu himself draws attention on the role of TV. Also an 'inside man' as Campmany stressed that elections are won with TV (2005: 141); on the importance of TV for politicians for mediating interaction see Thompson (1995); on the role of TV and the transformation of politicians in celebrities see Champagne (1988: 81-83).

<sup>15</sup> See, for instance, Grandi (1998b). As I posited (Screti 2013a), these terms indicate the interdependency between politics and the media, as well as the fact that politicians act like media celebrities (Bourdieu 2000; Wodak 2009), but especially what has been alternatively defined as the 'eventization', 'theatrization' or 'spectacularization' of politics (Rieffel 1989; as for Spain, see for instance, Del Rey-Moratò 1989; Muñoz-Alonso 1989; Rey-Fuentes et al. 1999).

<sup>16</sup> As many other authors, Bourdieu confuses *argumentum ad hominem* and *ad personam*, the latter (personal attack and disqualification) being a particular case of the former (Amossy 2010: 131-133). Even though it is now common to use the two terms interchangeably, the term *ad personam* would have had the merit of highlighting the *embodied* feature of political capital.

La violence de la polémique politique, et le recours constant à la mise en question éthique, qui s'arme le plus souvent d'arguments *ad hominem*, s'explique aussi par le fait que les idées-force doivent une partie de leur crédit au crédit de la personne que les professe et qu'il ne s'agit pas seulement de les refuser, par une argumentation purement logique et scientifique, mais de les discréditer en discréditant leur auteur. Par la licence qu'elle donne de combattre les adversaires dans leurs idées mais aussi dans leur personne, la logique du champ politique fournit un terrain hautement favorable aux stratégies du ressentiment (Bourdieu 1981: 14, footnote 26)<sup>17</sup>.

This quote shows how *personalized* political discourse is and the way it works: by increasing and defending one's own political capital, as well as attacking that of others. In other words, it works through the positive self-presentation or self-legitimation and the negative presentation or delegitimation of the other(s).

As we have seen, political capital is a special form of symbolic capital, based on recognizability, fame, and reputation (1991[1982]: 192). The following definition is particularly clear:

Il s'agit d'un capital réputationnel qui est lié à la notoriété, au fait d'être connu et reconnu, *notable*, d'où le rôle très important de la télévision, qui a introduit quelque chose d'extraordinaire car les gens qui n'étaient connue que par les réunions électorales sous les préaux d'école n'ont plus rien à voir avec ces sous-ministres dont tout le monde connaît la tête pourvu qu'ils soient assez puissants dans leur parti pour passer à la télé. Le capital symbolique est une espèce de capital réputationnel, un capital symbolique lié à la manière d'être perçu (2000: 64-65).

So political capital means visibility and especially a (good) reputation; for this reason politicians fight to be visible, recognizable, and to construct and promote a positive self-image. This quote points out the importance of television in the construction and management of self-image. I will return to this in chapter 5 in order to consider politicians' performance and the mediatization of politics.

The following section provides a summary of a number of observations, before going on to articulate the concept of *political capital* with the notions of *face* and *ethos*.

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<sup>17</sup> As many other, Bourdieu confuses *argumentum ad hominem* and *ad personam*, this latter (personal attack and disqualification) being a particular case of the former (Amossy 2010: 131-133). Even if it is now common to interchangeably use the two terms, the term *ad personam* would have had the merit of highlighting the *embodied* feature of political capital.

### 1.7.5. Observations

As we have seen, Bourdieu points out the competitive nature of the political game, but also the fact that politicians fight to change the relations of force existing within the field; the fact that field is (partially) separated from rest of society, and that politicians fight for stakes that differ from the laymen's interests. Bourdieu also points out the politicians' need for citizens' legitimation (vote); the fact that politicians' behavior is competitive but its main stake is the perpetuation of the field (connivance among initiated); the fact that politicians need to be visible and recognized, and the importance of political capital, as a particular form of symbolic capital, based on (good) reputation, crucial for obtaining popular support, i.e., social capital (votes). Bourdieu also states the paradox of representation: giving people voice silences people. All these points are crucial for the present work. For instance, the competitive feature of the political game led me to refer to politics as a zero-sum game. The politicians' need for citizens' legitimation, while they are fighting for particular ends (different from those concerning citizens) led me to consider Politics as spectacle. The idea that Politics is a spectacle and that politicians are in connivance to perpetuate the game despite the fight (reciprocal attacks and defense), led me to draw attention to the fact that conflict between politicians is only partial and often performed or overrepresented. In this way politicians, with the support of media system, legitimate the political system as plural, even if its plurality is limited. Finally, conceiving political capital as a symbolic capital made up of *embodied* and *personal* recognizability and reputation, led me to discuss the importance of ethos and facework in the way political field functions.

In short, the political field works in the following way: politicians fight for social capital (popular support measurable through votes), which allows them to manage power (other forms of capital). Politicians try to achieve social capital by increasing their political capital (which is a particular form of symbolic capital), i.e. increasing their recognizability (which explains the importance of being visible, of showing off) and their reputation (which explains the importance of positive self-presentation). In order to obtain voters' support, politicians must present themselves as credible, reputable, honest, etc. Yet at the same time they have reduce the popular support of other politicians, which is achieved by presenting them in a negative light. This positive self-presentation (self-legitimation) and negative presentation of the other (delegitimation) is essentially a discursive process which I have defined as the *discursive construction of presidentiability*. In order to construct the concept of

presidentiability, the following section articulates the Bourdieuan notion of *political capital* with the Aristotelian notion of *ethos* and the Goffmanian notion of *face*<sup>18</sup>.

#### **1.7.6. Self-presentation: Political capital, ethos, face**

If we agree in considering the two presidential debates as the epitome of the electoral campaign due to their features (maximum degree of polarization, personalization, eventization, concentration of all the strategies for being re-elected, performance of electoral discourse, etc.), the notions of political capital, ethos and face turn out to be fundamental for understanding the (discursive) behavior of the two candidates during the debate, their efforts to positively present themselves and negatively present the opponent.

As we have seen above, in Bourdieu's perspective, the political capital is a particular kind of highly feeble symbolic capital embodied in the person who possesses it, making it totally personal. Political capital is the reputation, credit, and credibility a politician enjoys, together with the confidence a group has deposited on him. Political capital is in sum, the quality of being credible, of inspiring belief. The importance of credibility for persuasive discourses and political discourse in particular is generally well-known (Pratkanis & Aronson 1992; Holly 1989). For inspiring credibility in the receivers the speakers must act and speak (the relationship between these two activities should be more deeply problematized) *as if they were credible*; i.e. they must perform as credible.

This conception of political behavior as a *performance*, aimed at constructing and giving an impression of the self leads us to consider not only the classical theatrical metaphor of human behavior as occurring on a life stage (Goffman 1959, although he was not the first to use this metaphor!), or the notion of the spectacle applied to politics (Edelman 1964; 1988), but in particular the notion of *face* and *face work* or *impression management* (on this see also Brown & Levinson 1978). The notion of *face* allows us to insist on the issue of *approved attributes*:

Every person lives in a world of social encounters, involving him either in face-to-face or mediated contact with other participants. In each of this contact he tends to act out what is

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<sup>18</sup> Note that even if he agreed with the explicative potential of the theatrical metaphors for understanding Politics, Bourdieu warns against possible abuses of Goffmanian symbolic-interactionism theories (2000: 41). Also note that other scholars have already shown the relationship existing between these three concepts (Amossy 1999; 2001; 2010; Maingueneau 1999).

sometimes called a *line* –that is a pattern of verbal and nonverbal acts by which he expresses his view of the situation and through this his evaluation of the participants [...]. The term *face* may be defined as the positive social value a person effectively claims for himself by the line others assume he has taken during a particular contact. Face is an image of self delineated in terms of approved social attributes (Goffman 1972 [1967]: 5)

In reality both the idea of performance and that of face are related to that of strategy, in the sense that (social) actors act (perform) in ways useful to the achievement of their particular ends. What is remarkable about Goffman's definition of face is the fact that actors employ verbal and nonverbal acts in an attempt to present themselves as having approved (positive) social attributes. As we will see below, this issue of *attributes* is crucial for the construction of presidentiability.

Since politicians' behavior is eminently discursive (Edelman 1964: ch. 5), and this is especially true in the case of televised debates, for politicians face work is essentially discursive. Politicians act and speak as if they had positive social attributes, as if they were good and therefore credible. This latter observation brings us to the issue of discursive ethos.

*Ethos* is one of the most complex concepts of rhetoric (Gill & Whedbee 1997: 158, 165; Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 1958: 426-432; Pratkanis & Aronson 1992; D'Hondt & Vanacker 2013; for a survey see Amossy 1999c; 2010a[2000]: 61-72; 2010). One of the main areas of discussion concerns the relation between ethos and discourse: whether ethos is discursive, i.e. built throughout discourse, or extra-discursive, and especially pre-discursive, i.e. whether it exists before discourse. Ethos would appear to be both, so we have an extra/pre-discursive ethos, which corresponds to the Ciceronian and Quintilian perspective, and a discursive ethos, which corresponds more strictly to the Aristotelian one (Amossy 1999a: 19; 1999b; 2010[2000]: 61-64; Maingueneau 1999: 78). Both are intertwined and influence each other (Amossy 1999b: especially 147-154; Haddad 1999). Even though I here I will focus mainly on discursive ethos, i.e. the self-image built and projected by the speaker through discourse<sup>19</sup>, I am not claiming that the construction of ethos is only discursive (see Amossy 1999b), and that it is independent from extra-textual (for instance socio-structural) or pre-discursive elements.

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<sup>19</sup> For a relationship between ethos and the Bourdieuan *habitus* see Amossy (1999a: 29; 2010a[2000]: 68-69); see also Maingueneau (1999: 79).

I will define ethos as the image (or face) built up by speakers in order to persuade their audience. As Barthes puts it:

*Ethé* sont les attributs de l'orateur [...]: ce sont les traits de caractère que l'orateur doit montrer à l'auditoire (peu importe sa sincérité) pour faire bonne impression: ce sont ses airs. [...]: je dois signifier ce que je veux être *pour l'autre*. [...] l'orateur énonce une information et en même temps il dit: je suis ceci, je ne suis pas cela (1970: 212).

In this definition, there are some important elements: 1) the impression of management as a work that is not necessarily related to sincerity (Amossy 2010a[2000]: 64), but rather 2) to strategies for achieving particular ends; 3) the discursive character of ethos, which is built *by* and *within* discourse (Eggs 1999: 33; Dascal 1999: 69; Perelman 1977: 111 apud Adam 1999: 101; Amossy 2010a[2000]; Maingueneau 2002); 4) the differential construction of ethos or self-image as opposed to the other one's, which is related to the dialectic of interaction and its extreme polarization.

Indeed, during the debates that constitute my corpus the two politicians manage their face or ethos or political capital by positively presenting themselves and negatively presenting the other independently from “reality”, with the sole end of obtaining more votes. They do so discursively, asking, answering, describing situations, telling stories, presenting arguments (most of them *ad hominem*), etc. and through their speech and particularly the way they speak, each trying to present himself as a good debater, person and president. Moreover, given the polarization of the communicative event and the structure of the political field, every time a candidate presents himself positively, he casts a negative light on his opponent.

Even if in their seminal book the treatment of ethos is marginal and somewhat problematic (Leff 2009), it is interesting to see how Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca deal with this issue. First of all, they highlight the importance of discourse as “la manifestation par excellence de la personne” and that receivers judge speakers by their discourse; they also state that in demonstrative discourses or in formal deduction the role of speaker is less important than in argumentative discourses (1958: 426). Then they insist on the importance of discourse in the receivers' evaluation of the speaker:

Tenant compte des rapports qui existent entre l'opinion que l'on a de l'orateur et la manière dont on juge son discours, les maîtres anciens de rhétorique en ont, depuis longtemps, tiré des conseils pratiques, recommandant aux orateurs de donner une impression favorable de leur personne, de



s'attirer l'estime, la bienveillance, la sympathie de leur auditoire; leurs adversaires devaient, par contre, s'efforcer de les dévaluer, en attaquant leur personne et leurs intentions. L'orateur doit, en effet, inspirer confiance: sans elle, son discours ne mérite pas créance. Pour réfuter une accusation, Aristote conseille "accuser à notre tour, quiconque nous accuse, car ce serait l'absurdité même que l'accusateur fût jugé indigne de confiance et que ses paroles méritassent confiance" (id.: 428).

In these lines we can see the importance the authors place on positive self-presentation (inspiring confidence) and the negative presentation of the other (attacking the other for presenting him as untrustworthy) through discourse. They go further than this, stating that discourse determines the opinion receivers have of the speaker, and providing a discursive definition of ethos: "Ce que les Anciens appelaient l'éthos oratoire se résume à l'impression que l'orateur, par ses propos, donne de lui-même" (id.: 429). Since ethos is incorporated in the person, it is evident that the negative presentation of the other will extensively use *argumentum ad personam* (Amossy 2001). Interestingly, Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca suggest that open *ad personam* attacks are sometimes counterproductive for the attacker; but the same applies to self-praising (id.: 428-429), which leads us to consider that *indirectness* either in attacks or in self-praise is more effective. So it is not through explicit utterances about his own goodness that the speaker convinces receivers of his presidentiability, but rather through utterances aimed at making them infer it. Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca also refer to the role played by the media (press and television) in constructing and representing the life of a public speaker as a pre-discursive ethos (id.: 430). On the one hand, this reference to pre-discursive ethos reminds us of the role of context, or more precisely the *pre-textual* conditions of the text (Widdowson 2004), and highlights the importance of the media in constructing politicians' public image. In connection with this idea of *publicity*, Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca are very clear in defining the role of discourse in building the speaker's image, especially in situations where discussants debate in front of a public, as is the case here for presidential debates that become a duel as a consequence of the *solidarity between speaker and speech*:

A cause de l'interaction constante entre le jugement que l'on porte sur l'orateur et celui que l'on porte sur son discours, celui qui argumente expose constamment quelque peu son prestige, qui s'accroît ou décroît selon les effets de l'argumentation. Une argumentation honteuse, faible ou incohérente, ne peut que nuire à l'orateur; la vigueur du raisonnement, la clarté et la noblesse du style, disposeront, par contre, en sa faveur. A cause de la solidarité entre le discours et l'orateur, la

plupart des discussions, spécialement devant témoins, ressemblent quelque peu à un duel, où l'on cherche moins l'accord que la victoire: on connaît les abus auxquels a conduit l'éristique. Mais rechercher des victoires, ce n'est pas seulement aspiration puérile ou manifestation d'orgueil, c'est aussi un moyen pour l'orateur de s'assurer de meilleures conditions pour persuader (id.: 430).

This observation explains why candidates try to present themselves as good debaters; since a good debater is supposed to be a good person and/or a good president (see also Kerbrat-Orecchioni 2013e).

Interestingly, this connection between the speech and the candidate's character has been treated also by Silverstein (2011) under the label of "message", which through its semiotic resonances, has the advantage of insisting on the inter-actional and communicational aspect of *ethos* or *face*. Silverstein traces a parallel between the term *message* and that of *brand* (2011: 204), but at the same time he enhances its scope, saying that:

'message' is the characterological aura of a persona, much like a character in realist literature, who has not only said and done things, but who has the potential, in the fictive universe of a plot, to be imaginable as acting in certain ways in situations still unrealized in plot space-time (ibid.).

Silverstein's reflections also emphasize the agonistic feature of electoral campaigns, the competitive nature of the political game (he also uses this metaphor) and the two-fold nature of the political message which is always positive (candidate) and negative (opponent): he also insists on the mediatization of politics, giving account of the connivance between politicians and journalists, and in particular the fictionality and spectacularity of politics: as a narrative concerning *heros vs. villains*. As far as I understand it, the term *message* roughly matches with the *political capital*, and what Silverstein calls *messaging* is what I have defined as the "management of presidentiability", i.e. the process of legitimation through positive self-presentation and delegitimation through negative presentation of the other.

In short, the Bourdieuan notion of political capital as embodied in the candidate can be related to the Goffmanian notion of face and the rhetorical notion of ethos (discursive or extra-discursive): Goffman's concept is more general and metaphorically refers to embodiment (face is a part of the body), and highlights the role of social interaction as well as the importance of some social attributes; Bourdieu's concept is far more narrowly linked to political discourse, referring clearly to the structure of political

field and the relational feature of capital management; in contrast, ethos is more comprehensive, as it is at the same time product and process and firmly places discourse as the central space for negotiation. In this work the term *presidentiability* is used to subsume the three concepts of political capital, face and ethos (see section 1.6.9.).

Before analyzing in further detail the discursive construction of *presidentiability*, i.e. how the two candidates discursively protect their ethos, and attack the other's ethos or face, in order to reduce his political capital, i.e. his credibility, I will make a brief reference to the concept of ideology, a term which is used extensively in this work.

### 1.7.7. Ideology

In democratic systems, in order to obtain power, parties must win elections. As mentioned earlier, this is achieved by increasing their social capital, their social support, or, in other words, increasing the number of persons *they represent*. Parties achieve this objective by increasing the number of persons that embrace their principle of vision and division, their *ideology*. This is the reason why party discourse, which is the means by which parties build and transmit their ideology, is persuasive and rhetorical (see De Santiago-Guervós 1996: 3)<sup>20</sup>.

The vast amount of literature on ideology has as yet failed to provide a clear definition for this concept: indeed, scholars' only area of consensus would appear to be that they are unable to agree on a definition for it (Blommaert 2005: 161; Eagleton 1991: 1; de Beaugrande 1999: 259; Wodak 2009a: 214, footnote 6; Larrain 1979: 13). One of the most problematic issues is whether ideology has a negative or a positive meaning:

On one hand, ideology may be conceived in eminently negative terms as a critical concept which means a form of false consciousness or necessary deception which somehow distorts men's understanding of social reality [...]. On the other hand, the concept of ideology may be conceived in positive terms<sup>21</sup> as the expression of the world-view of a class. To this extent one can talk of 'ideologies', in plural, as the opinions, theories and attitudes formed within a class in order to promote its interests (Larrain 1979: 14).

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<sup>20</sup> It is evident that Rhetoric is inherent to political discourse (Santulli 2005; Pujante 1998), but it seems to be related even to the very activity of thinking (Billig 1991).

<sup>21</sup> Rather in 'neutral' terms (see Eagleton 1991: 6), as *vox media*.

I am unable to resolve the insidious issues concerning the concept of ideology, and furthermore, this is not my aim. Instead, I am going to use it in an operative way, which, of course arises from the Marxist approach to ideology as “false consciousness” (Larrain 1979: chapter 2, especially pages 47-51; Eagleton 1994: 23-49; 1991: 1-31), for overcoming it without denying it. It should be noted that the negative approach to ideology (Fairclough 1996a[1989]: 33; 1995: 17-19; 2003a: 9; Thompson 1990: 6-7) differs radically from van Dijk’s definition. Whilst Fairclough accepts traditional (Neo)Marxist ideas about ideology, i.e. that it pertains to dominant groups and is essentially negative, since it veils reality in order to serve the interests of dominant groups, van Dijk (1998), who developed a socio-cognitive theory of ideology, considers that ideologies can also be positive, such as feminism, socialism or ecologism, which are progressive. Attaching a negative or a positive value to ideology also affects the relationship between legitimation and ideology (see, for instance, van Dijk 1998: ch. 26; but also Eagleton 1994: 6-10; 1991: 5; Larrain 1979: 47). In the negative approach to ideology, the ruling class proposes its own way of thinking as natural and neutral, as *common sense* (Gramsci 1971), legitimating itself and its ideology as natural. This process of naturalization is related to the Gramscian concept of *hegemony* (id.) as well as the Bourdieuan notion of *symbolic power*<sup>22</sup>.

For van Dijk an ideology is “a shared framework of social beliefs that organize and coordinate the social interpretations and practices of groups and their members, and in particular also power and other relations between groups” (1998: 8)<sup>23</sup>. Van Dijk also highlighted that ideologies emerge when two or more groups have conflicting interests and compete for some limited (material or symbolic) resources (2003: 49). This dialectic feature of ideologies already featured in Marx’s thought (Larrain 1979: 50, 62) and also appears, together with the categorizing function, in Bourdieu’s definitions of what he calls the “principle of vision and division of the world”:

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<sup>22</sup> Hegemony is achieved when the ruling class’ self-legitimizing discourse (see Marx & Engels’ statement (1845) that “the ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas”) is assumed as natural, as common sense, by subaltern classes, with no (more) need for coercion (Gramsci 1971: 322, 323-6, 422, 424). This perspective is coherent with Bourdieu’s reflection on symbolic power, i.e. the power recognized as such through the misrecognition of its coercion (1977a; 1977b: ch. 4). On naturalization see also Raiter (2001; 2003).

<sup>23</sup> As for other conceptions of ideology, it is worth referring to Lakoff (2004), where ideology seems to be a mental framework, something like the *Weltanschauung* of social actors. On the other hand, Blommaert stresses ideologies’ hybridation and complexity; he considers them ideal phenomena materialized and implemented in social practices, and represents them as systemic, polycentric, and stratified constructions of different layers collapsed into one (2005: 164-174; on the complexity of ideologies and their contradictions see Hodge & Kress 1988 and Billig et al. 1988).

The categories of perception, the schemata of classification, that is, essentially, the *words*, the names which constructs social reality as much as they express it, are the stake par excellence of political struggle, which is a struggle to impose the legitimate principle of vision and division (Bourdieu 1989: 20-21, my italics).

This quote clearly shows that ideology is mainly *discursive* or semiotic. And even though discourse is not the only societal ideological practice carried out by the members of a group, ideologies are essentially built and spread throughout discourse<sup>24</sup>. Moreover, discourse has long been recognized as a special form of action (Austin 1962; 1979) that has become increasingly important in our contemporary logocratic societies. Therefore, if we wish to determine the appearance, workings and reproduction of ideologies it is necessary to analyze their discursive manifestation (van Dijk 1998: 6).

### **1.7.8. Ideology and de/legitimation**

One of the main social functions of ideologies is self-legitimation through discourse (van Dijk 1998: 255 *et seq.*; see also van Dijk 1995a; 2005a; 2006a): the self-legitimation of the principles of vision and division of the world, of the principles of categorization, as well as of the fight for certain stakes and of the persons involved in this fight. Furthermore, every move for self-legitimizing in-group members, their ideology and their behaviors, are sided by moves for delegitimizing the ideology of others, their person, expressions, etc. (Chilton & Schäffner 1997: 213; Chilton 2004: 45-47)<sup>25</sup>. Self-legitimation is achieved through the use of expressions with a positive evaluative dimension, and delegitimation through negative evaluative expressions (van Leeuwen & Wodak 1999). This de/legitimizing function seems to be typical of political discourse (van Dijk 1998: 256; 2003; 2005a; 2006c). In situations of the highest polarization, the intrinsic ideological-evaluative feature of any discourse (Voloshinov 1973[1929]) reaches its greatest degree of explicitness. In this sense, it is interesting to recall Campmany's statements on electioneering as a competitive zero-sum game (2005: 86) or the following statements of the prominent Spanish politician Leopoldo Calvo

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<sup>24</sup> Voloshinov has stressed the intrinsic ideological-evaluative value of the word (1973[1929]: 33). Voloshinov's conception of ideology is clearly Marxist.

<sup>25</sup> Legitimization and dialectic constitute two points of contact between Marxist and van Dijk vision of ideology: actually, according to Marxist, one of the main features of ideology (which is always ruling class' ideology) is legitimizing ruling class' power.

Sotelo, a former Spanish Minister and Prime Minister, supporting the idea that political discourse is belligerent:

Todo el mundo sabe que en los parlamentos antes que la verdad se busca la eficacia del ataque político [...]. El ámbito de la política es primariamente, para la oposición, el acoso y derribo del gobierno (*apud* De Santiago-Guervós 1996: 3-4).

So in order to get a majority of social capital (measurable through the votes obtained), i.e. to *defeat* the opponent in the electoral *battle/game*<sup>26</sup>, candidates need to secure their support and win votes from their opponent. This implies convincing their own (former) electors to vote again for them, and convince the opponent's (current or potential) electors to vote for them. To do this, candidates need to present themselves as credible (Grandi 1998a) and their opponents as untrustworthy; the fact of reducing the opponent's credibility to some extent increases their own trustworthiness (De Santiago-Guervós 1996: 5). Candidates do so by *strategic* discursive representations of the social actors and of the reality (van Leeuwen 2003[1996]) that highlight one's positive qualities and the negative qualities of opponent. I use the term *strategy* as "a more or less intentional plan of practices (including discursive practices) adopted to achieve a particular social, political, psychological or linguistic aim" (Wodak & Meyer 2001b: 73; Wodak 2009a: 40; Wodak et al. 1999: 31-32; for some typologies of strategies see Chilton & Schäffner 1997; Chilton 2004; Reisigl & Wodak 2001: 44-56, in particular for strategies on racist discourse). They can be more or less unconscious, but they can be inferred by the speakers' discursive behaviors. De Santiago-Guervós bluntly describes the dynamic of the political discourse in general:

Defensa y ataque, estereotipo positivo y estereotipo negativo; embellecimiento y envilecimiento; neologismo, adjetivación dudosa, palabrería, eufemismo. [...] se parte de la realidad para preparar la estrategia política y crear los estereotipos que marcarán, por una parte, el ennoblecimiento de la propuesta política propia y, por otra, el envilecimiento de la propuesta contraria, envilecimiento que se plasma en un ataque político [...] cuyo fin último es la lucha por el electorado. Tal es el fin del discurso político y así hay que entenderlo (1996:24).

All the discursive devices employed by candidates, namely metaphors, narratives, presuppositions and implicatures, deixis, topoi, quotes, reported speech, *argumenta ad*

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<sup>26</sup> De Santiago-Guervós states that electoral lexis is a "belligerent" lexis (1996: 9).

*hominem, ad verecundiam*, etc., which will be analyzed in chapter 4, are used to implement all the strategies and moves that constitute what I have defined the *management of the presidentiability*, a notion under which I include Bourdieu's concept of *political capital*, Goffman's concept of *face* and Aristotle's notion of *ethos*. The following section provides a more detailed discussion of presidentiability.

#### **1.7.9. Presidentiability and attributes of the presidentiable candidate**

Presidentiability is the candidate's capacity to be a potentially (good) president, i.e. to be *presidentiable*: it is based on the assumption that a (good) president should have certain **general attributes**, on which there is a general agreement even among members of different groups (parties), and some **particular attributes**, on which members of the same group (party) generally agree, but that are not shared by members of different groups<sup>27</sup>. As for the first set of attributes, it could be claimed that all electors, even those belonging to different electoral groups and having different ideologies, could reasonably vote for a candidate who deals with their problems (regardless of their nature); in fact, it would be as unreasonable and irrational for a voter to choose a candidate who is not going to deal with electors' interests, as a candidate to present himself as someone who fails to address electors' interests. Candidates thus play with voters' interests and construct them, i.e. they discursively present and build *what are to be considered as* citizens' interests.

As for the second set of attributes, I refer to those that receive a different evaluation/appraisal depending on the electoral group or ideology. For instance, we can consider that left-wing electors will be more inclined to consider solidarity and dialogue as pertinent attributes, whilst right-wing electors will be more inclined to consider strength and authority as pertinent attributes of the president.

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<sup>27</sup> On agreement (*accord*) see Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca (1958: ch. 1). According to these authors, some issues seem to be universally accepted (*accord universelle*), but others are more contingent (*accord selon l'auditoire*). Obviously things are not that straightforward and probably what can also be taken as universally agreed is actually negotiated according to situation. For a study on accord in French presidential debates, see Doury & Kerbrat-Orecchioni (2011).

Therefore, presidentiability depends on candidates' ability to present themselves as possessing the set of attributes that a candidate should have to be a (good) president in relation both to the in-group and out-group (since each candidate has to convince electors of both groups).

After analyzing the discourse produced by the two candidates to present themselves as presidentiable, we can list the set of general and particular attributes that they assume as necessary for a president. Among the **general attributes**, emerging from the candidates' discourse, we can cite the following<sup>28</sup>:

- Unity (a good president unifies, a bad president divides)
- Centerness (a good president is moderate, a bad president is not)
- Sincerity<sup>29</sup> (a good president is sincere, a bad president is not)
- Strength (a good president is strong, a bad president is not)
- Realism (a good president is realistic, a bad president is not)
- Loyalty (a good president respects the rules of democracy, a bad president does not)
- Coherence [doing the same of what one says; saying the same of what one does]  
(a good president is coherent, a bad president is not)
- Consistency [saying the same of what one said; doing the same of what one did]  
(a good president is consistent, a bad president is not)
- Defending Spaniards' interests (a good president defends Spaniards' interests, a bad president does not)
- Supportiveness (a good president is supportive, a bad president is not)
- Activity, capacity, efficacy (a good president is active, capable and effective, a bad president is not)

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<sup>28</sup> In such a highly polarized and competitive discursive practice as the face-to-face presidential debate and in the competitive context of an electioneering, the construction of self-image and the destruction of the image of the other are two faces of the same coin: the construction of the self-image is based on an affirmation (I am X) and on a negation (I am not Y); at the same time the self-attribution of a positive feature (I am P+ or I have P+) occurs together with the implicit or explicit subtraction of the same attribute to the other (you are not P+ or you do not have P+); but this attribution process can also have a negative form (I do not have Q-; you have Q-).

<sup>29</sup> This also includes keeping the promises (a good president keeps his promises, a bad president does not).



According to these attributes, each candidate tries to present himself positively and to present the opponent negatively: for example, in relation to the attribute of unity, each candidate presents himself as the person who has favored or is going to favor unity, and presents the other as the candidate that has favored or is going to favor division.

Beside general attributes, there are the **particular attributes**, about which there is no agreement because they are based on the ideology of each party or elector group. They include the following, sorted into two general sets roughly corresponding to Lakoff's *frames* (2004).

- Being a nurturing father  
(includes: being dialoguing, optimistic; not being authoritarian, pessimistic)
- Being a strict father  
(includes: exerting authority, being realistic; not being feeble, utopist)

Those latter attributes are disputable and disputed, in the sense that in these attributes, as I stated above, there is no agreement: RJ prefers to (re)present himself as a leader that takes decisions rather than dialoguing, ZP prefers to (re)present himself as an optimistic rather than a realistic leader, etc. Presumably, both candidates make their choice also according to the image that they have of the electors they address with their persuasive discourse.

In the management of presidentiality, then, each candidate attributes to himself certain general presidential attributes and presents the opponent as lacking them. At the same time, he contests the values of the frame employed by the opponent, denying, underestimating, dismissing, disputing, minimizing, erasing, twisting, re-framing them, etc.

Since presidentiality management is a dialogic and dialectic process, involving two candidates fighting to impose their own *principle of vision and division of the world*, the candidates' interaction is almost never aimed at reaching agreement: candidates contradict, deny and attack each other, try to defend themselves, retake the (part of) other's discourse to deny them or argue against them; they refer to other previous deeds or words in order to frame them negatively or contest words, data or figures; they interrupt, violating the turn-taking<sup>30</sup>; they accuse each other of lying,

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<sup>30</sup> This is not very common in these two debates, due to their regimented structure.

especially in order to construct or demonstrate dealignment with the candidate and alignment with targeted electors.

As I have already pointed out in the introduction, the management of presidentiability can be conceived as a triangle whose surface is covered by discourse and whose sides are constituted by: a) the attributes; b) the campaign themes; and c) the discursive devices for implementing the strategies, as shown in the following diagram.




Figure 1. Diagram showing the discursive construction of presidentiability

The attributes have already been discussed above; the following lines provide a brief insight into the themes and devices (a deeper analysis is included in chapters 6 and 4 respectively).

Candidates construct their presidentiability in relation to some **themes**, i.e. some particular events and situations of the present Spanish society. As I will show more in detail in chapter 6, different issues were dealt with during the campaign and the debates, but according to the debate division in blocks, my personal observations, the declarations of Gabriel Elorriaga (apud Crawford 2008) and triangulations with other

sociological and statistical studies (Pujol 2008; Ruiz-Jiménez 2010), the main issues were the economy, immigration, terrorism and the Catalan question.

Candidates also manage their presidentiality according to general, global, or overarching strategies and local moves that they implement through several discursive devices. For instance, the main PP strategy is to separate ZP from laymen and his electors; the local moves range from presenting him as inactive or passive, to framing him as unpatriotic, unrealistic, etc. These moves are implemented through argument *ad hominem*, reporting the speeches, metaphors, etc. The devices will be analyzed in greater depth in chapter 4.

## 1.8. Summary

This chapter has addressed the theoretical framework. The basic assumption is that the field of institutional Politics works as a battlefield where the main actors, i.e. candidates (with the active contribution of journalists) fight to achieve power by imposing their ideology, their principles of vision and division of the world, on the majority. Since politics is mainly done by discourse, I have started the discussion by defining *political discourse*. I then went on to describe the structure of political field by its main agents: parties. I have provided some definitions of party, and highlighted the competitiveness of party system.

The starting point of my theoretical framework is the concept of political field as posited in Bourdieu's sociology. Drawing extensively to Bourdieu and referring to Edelman, I have thus conceived Politics as a field where a symbolic struggle takes place for different forms of capital. Again drawing on Bourdieu, I have discussed the concept of capital and in particular social capital (support) and political capital (visibility and reputation). The structure of political field and its workings as a competitive zero-sum game, where candidates fight for capital, can help to explain why politicians are constantly engaged in positive self-presentation and negative presentation of the other: essentially because candidates build up capital by taking it away from their opponents.

In a clear example of multidisciplinary, and in order to move from structure to discourse, I have articulated the Bourdieuan theory of political field and of political capital with the argumentation theory. The point where these two theories meet is the relationship that can be traced to link these three concepts: the Bourdieuan concept of *political capital*, the Aristotelian concept of *ethos*, and the Goffmanian concept of *face*. In particular, the last point allows for the insistence on the interactive feature of discursive practices such as presidential debates in relation with social structure (field). The concepts of political capital, ethos and face can thus provide explanations for presidentiability management, a process whereby candidates' present themselves positively (legitimation) and present the other (delegitimation) in a negative light in order to obtain votes.

## **2. THE POLITICAL FIELD AS TERRAIN. Social, historical and ideological components of the Spanish political field**

### **2.1. Introducing the Spanish political field**

This chapter is composed of two main subsections. The first deals with the Spanish political and administrative structure and the second with the Spanish party systems and synthetically introduces the main Spanish national and regional parties, focusing in particular on the three main Spanish parties: PP, PSOE and IU.

Section one introduces some central features of Spanish democracy, such as the division of power and the administrative division (regions, province, and city councils). I will then outline the main electoral processes at the four levels (state, region, province, and city). I will provide charts and figures in order to easily visualize the relations of force between the mains actors of the Spanish political field.

Section two outlines the main features of the Spanish political party system. I will introduce the issue of cleavages, which will be discussed more extensively later on. I will then briefly present each of the main Spanish parties, starting with the national ones (from left to center to right), then the regional ones (in order of relative importance). I will conclude the section with some general observations on the Spanish political party system.

The final part of section two focuses specifically on the three main national parties (PP, PSOE and IU). I will firstly recall recent Spanish history, and then I will provide historical data, pointing out the main ideological features (centering my attention on how the parties describe themselves), and present the figures (MPs and votes) of these three parties (PP, POSE and IU, in this order). I will conclude the section with some general remarks on the three parties and their relative situation within the Spanish political field.

## 2.2. Spain's political and administrative structure

This section briefly presents the structure of the Spanish State<sup>31</sup>. This is not the place for an in-depth analysis, and I will therefore merely outline a number of points necessary in order to understand how Spanish democracy works, as well as to comprehend the power relationships between parties. This will enable me to highlight the *monopoly of the political field* exerted by the two major parties (PP and PSOE), as well as the relative importance of regionalist parties (CiU, PNV, ERC, PAR, CHA, etc.) in detriment of IU, which despite being the third most voted party, is underrepresented.

### 2.2.1. Division of powers

Spain has been a parliamentary monarchy since 1978, the year of the positive response in the referendum for the new democratic Spanish constitution. Like many other democratic states, and according to the 1978 Spanish Constitution (CE 1978), power is distributed between legislative, executive and judiciary powers.

**Legislative power** is constituted by the two branches of the Parliament. On the one hand there is the *Congreso de Diputados*, whose MPs are elected by universal suffrage<sup>32</sup> normally every 4 years; their number is established by law<sup>33</sup> and currently stands at 350 MPs, elected by a proportional system with blocked lists and distributed according to D'Hondt law<sup>34</sup>. On the other hand, there is the *Senado de España*, formed by representatives of the Spanish regions; their number is variable and is established by law. It currently consists of 266 members, elected in a mixed way: some of them (208) are elected directly by universal suffrage normally every 4 years (together with *Congreso* members), and with a majoritarian plurinominal system (electors express preferences), whilst others are elected by the Regional Parliaments (according to the local coalitions) of each *Comunidad Autónoma* or Region (hereafter CA or CCAA). Both the *Congreso* and *Senado* have legislative competencies and initiatives but the *Senado* is subordinated to the *Congreso*, in that the Government only responds for its

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<sup>31</sup> For this chapter the main reference is Solsten & Meditz (1990).

<sup>32</sup> All the Spanish citizens over 18 years old can vote.

<sup>33</sup> Like many other aspects of electoral process (call of elections, electioneering, polling day, results, etc.) this issue is also regulated by the LOGRE (Ley Orgánica del Régimen Electoral General de 1985), approved by PSOE Government, essentially similar to the previous electoral law (Real Decreto-Ley de marzo de 1977), approved by UCD Government during the Transition.

<sup>34</sup> D'Hondt Law, named after the Belgian mathematician Victor D'Hondt, is the most commonly-used method within the Spanish electoral system for converting votes into seats (it is used in the elections of *Congreso*, *Parlamentos Autonómicos*, and *Ayuntamientos*). It is a formula of proportional representation.

actions to the latter, so that the real legislative power is in the *Congreso*, which is the cornerstone of the Spanish political system.

According to the Constitution, the **executive power**, the Government, is constituted by the President of the Government (hereafter PoG) and its vice-president(s), Ministries and Sub-secretaries (vice-ministers). The members of the Government form the Council of Ministers, which in turn represents the Government, the executive power. The Government administers the State, directing internal and foreign policies, civil and military administration and implementing laws (promulgated by Parliament). According to Spanish law, the PoG has the faculty to name and dismiss ministries, he<sup>35</sup> responds for his own or the Government's acts only before Parliament, who can dismiss him with a motion of no confidence. If the PoG is dismissed, the government ceases to be effective: it means that the confidence (or a censure motion) is voted by the Parliament directly with regard to the PoG and/or his Government, so that the PoG has absolute authority within the executive power. For these reasons, the PoG is the highest political office in Spain. The candidate firstly presents his program before Parliament and he becomes the PoG if Parliament gives him a vote of confidence with an absolute majority, or alternatively, a simple majority (once 48 hours has elapsed). Members of both the *Congreso* and the *Senado* are entitled to ask the Government questions.

The **judiciary power** is constituted by the set of all judges and magistrates, tribunals and courts at the various levels that administer justice and interpret, enforce, sanction or invalidate laws. Tribunals and courts decide all the civil, penal, administrative, social and military trials. According to the Constitution and other fundamental laws, and based on the principle of justice and equality, Judiciary power is impartial and independent; judges are immovable except in those cases established by law, they are responsible for their acts and infractions, and are subject to the Constitution and other existing laws like all other citizens. There are many different levels and competencies for different courts (civil, administrative, penal, military, ordinary, Supreme, etc.), but here is not the place the place for an in-depth discussion of these complex questions.

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<sup>35</sup> I use the masculine form for referring to the President, since so far only men have run the government.

### 2.2.2. Territorial and administrative organization

Like many other European countries, Spain is organized at various subsidiary levels. The central administration is entitled to the State, and is established by some fundamental laws. According to article 137 of the Spanish Constitution, “el estado se organiza territorialmente (y administrativamente) en municipios, provincias y Comunidades Autónomas” (CE 1978).

Regions are thus the second major level of administrative division. Regions are called *Comunidades Autónomas* (CCAA). The kingdom of Spain has 17 regions: Galicia, Asturias, Cantabria, Basque Country, Navarra, Aragón, Catalonina, Castile & Leon, La Rioja, Madrid, Castile La Mancha, Comunidad Valenciana, Extremadura, Andalusia, Murcia, Balearic Island, Canary Island, plus 2 *Ciudades Autónomas*, namely autonomous cities situated in Morocco: Ceuta and Melilla. All these territorial and administrative entities have a certain degree of autonomy. They have their own parliament, called *Parlamentos Autonómicos*, with their own MPs, their own regional government, called *Juntas Autonómicas*, and their own President, called *Presidente de la Comunidad Autónoma* or *Presidente Autonómico*.



Figure 1. Administrative map of Spanish regions and provinces (source: IGN).



According to the various *Estatutos de Autonomía*, which are the laws defining the rights of each region within the frame of the Spanish Constitution (especially art. 143 et seq. CE), each region has a considerable degree of political and administrative autonomy and a number of specific competencies. These competencies must be aligned with the Spanish Constitution, often a cause of struggle and friction among peripheral and central governments due to conflicting interests. Unlike the extremely centralized Francoist administrative structure, the new Spanish Constitution recognizes and guarantees devolution to regions throughout the so-called *Estado de las Autonomías*, the legal politico-administrative frame for decentralization.

The 1978 Spanish Constitution establishes the different competencies for the CCAA and for the State (art. 148, 149). In Spain there are two different kinds of CCAA, those that quickly became autonomous according to art. 151 or 152 CE (Basque Country and Catalonia in 1979, followed by Galicia and Andalusia in 1981) and the other that became autonomous through art. 143 CE, by means of a slower process and with a lesser degree of autonomy. At present, and following long and far from straightforward negotiations between the central government(s) and the CCAA, now all CCAA share practically the same degree of autonomy, as well as the same basic political administrative bodies: a parliament, elected by universal suffrage, a government with executive power, and a president, elected by the parliaments, the highest political authority in the CCAA. Nevertheless, the Basque Country, Catalonia, Galicia and Andalusia have a slighter greater degree of autonomy.

At a third level of administration there are the *provincias*, a territorial division recognized in the 1978 Spanish Constitution (art. 141). In Spain there are 50 provinces, plus the two autonomous cities of Ceuta and Melilla. The CCAA are organized according to historic-cultural affinities between provinces: hence there are CCAA made up of a single province (Asturias, Cantabria, La Rioja, Madrid, Murcia, and Navarra) or of multiple provinces. The province is considered a circumscription for the general election of MPs of the *Congreso* and *Senado*. Normally the administration of each province falls to its *Diputación Provincial* [Provincial Council]. Provincial Council is the governing body of the province and is made up of a provincial assembly (a sort of parliament, which administers legislative power), a government (executive power), and a president. Their main aim is to manage local administrative and economic or territorial questions. The Provincial Council is present in all provinces, except in those CCAA made up of a single province and in those in the Basque Country, where they are called

*Juntas Forales*. Apart from the 38 *Diputaciones*, there are also the 3 assemblies of the *Juntas Forales*, the 7 *Cabildos Insulares* of the Canary Islands and the 4 *Consells Insulars* of the Balearic Islands. Members of the *Diputaciones Provinciales* are elected indirectly through a complex calculation based on the results of municipal elections. In contrast, representatives of the *Juntas*, *Cabildos* and *Consells* are elected directly.

Finally, a fourth level of administration comprises the *ayuntamientos* [local authorities or councils] (art. 140 CE). This is the smallest administrative organ, and it is formed by a *pleno* [assembly or council], whose members are elected directly by universal suffrage, an *alcalde* [mayor], elected by the majority according to coalitions and agreements, and a council, which exerts executive power, and which is made up of the majority of the local councillors. Spain currently has 8,117 *ayuntamientos*.<sup>36</sup>

Let's see now the elective process at the different levels of the Spanish political and administrative structure.

### **2.2.3. Elections at the different levels of the Spanish administrative structure<sup>37</sup>**

Elective offices exist for all 4 levels of the legislative and executive power: 1) at State level: *Congreso* and *Senado*; 2) at a regional level: *Parlamentos Autonómicos*; 3) at a Province level: *Diputaciones Provinciales*; 4) at a municipal level: *Ayuntamientos*.

Not always the representatives, that I will hereafter call MPs<sup>38</sup>, are elected directly by citizens, and sometimes they are elected indirectly by representatives who in turn are elected by citizens. The following sections provide a brief insight into the electoral system in Spain, from the highest to the lowest level. It starts with the State Parliament, then with the Regional Parliaments, then with Provincial Parliaments and ends with the Municipal Parliaments.

#### **2.2.3.1. State Parliament**

According to the Spanish Organic Law on the General Electoral Regime (hereafter LOREG), the 350 members of the State Parliament, the *Congreso*, are elected by universal suffrage with a proportional system of representation, called the D'Hondt

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<sup>36</sup> [http://www.seap.minhap.gob.es/es/areas/politica\\_local.html](http://www.seap.minhap.gob.es/es/areas/politica_local.html)

<sup>37</sup> Except for Regional elections, all results of all elections throughout Spain's democratic history are available on the official website of the Ministry of Interior, from where I took the data for drawing up the charts and tables: <http://www.infoelectoral.mir.es/min/>. For the regional elections, the data come from the official website of the Spanish Parliament: <http://www.congreso.es/consti/elecciones/autonomicas/1997-.htm>.

<sup>38</sup> I will use MPs or Senators, as well as regional MPs, provincial MPs, or city MPs.

system; the province is the electoral circumscription; parties with less than 3% of votes in the district have no representation and candidates are included in a blocked and closed list. The following two charts show the distribution of MPs after the 2000 and 2004 elections. Detailed data are provided under each chart.




Figure 2. MPs in Congreso after the 2000 general elections

Partido Popular (PP)	183
Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE)	125
Izquierda Unida (IU)	8
Convergència i Unió (CiU)	15
Euzko Alderdi Jeltzalea-Partido Nacionalista Vasco (EAJ-PNV)	7
Bloque Nacionalista Galego (BNG)	3
Coalición Canaria (CC)	4
Partido Andalucista (PA)	1
Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC)	1
Iniciativa per Catalunya-Verds (IC-V)	1
Eusko Alkartasuna (EA)	1
Chunta Aragonesista (CHA)	1

Table 1. Breakdown of MPs for each party after the 2000 general elections




Figure 3. MPs in Congreso after the 2004 general elections

Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE)	164
Partido Popular (PP)	146
Convergencia i Unió (CiU)	10
Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC)	8
Euzko Alderdi Jeltzalea-Partido Nacionalista Vasco (EAJ-PNV)	7
Coalición Canaria (CC)	3
Izquierda Unida (IU)	2
Iniciativa Per Catalunya Verds- Esquerra Unida I Alternativa (ICV-EUIA)	2
Bloque Nacionalista Galego (BNG)	2
Unión del Pueblo Navarro-Partido Popular (UPN-PP)	2
Coalición Esquerra Unida Pais Valencia-Izquierda Republicana (ENTESA)	1
Chunta Aragonesista (CHA)	1
Eusko Alcartasuna (EA)	1
Coalición Nafarroa Bai (NA-BAI)	1

Table 2. Breakdown of MPs for each party after 2004 general elections

As for the *Senado*, the LOREG establishes that 208 members are elected directly by universal suffrage with a majoritarian system of representation; the province is the electoral circumscription; citizens can vote for several candidates; the LOREG also establishes the number of senators eligible in each province. The other senators (58 at present, but their number can change according to the number of inhabitants) are elected by the *Parlamentos Autonómicos* of the respective *Comunidades Autónomas*. The following two charts show the distribution of Senators after the 2000 and 2004 elections.




Figure 4. Senators after the 2000 general elections




Figure 5. Senators after the 2004 general elections

The charts show that on a national level, Spanish institutions are monopolized by PP and PSOE. The next section addressed the various levels of regional and local administration: regional and provincial parliaments and city councils.

#### 2.2.3.2. Regional Parliaments

Elections for regional parliaments are very similar in nature to the general elections and do not differ too much amongst regions. The main difference amongst the CCAA is the call for elections and the length of the legislature. Legislature length for all CCAA is fixed (4 years) and elections take place together with municipal elections, except for Galicia, the Basque Country and Catalonia, which have a different parliamentary

calendar. Provinces normally constitute the electoral circumscription and parties with less than 3% (or 5% in the case of some CCAA) have no representation.

Each regional parliament is composed by a different number of MPs, based on the number of inhabitants of the region and range at the present from 129 in the case of Madrid (with 6.5 million inhabitants), to the 33 MPs of the region of La Rioja (320,000 inhabitants). Members of regional parliaments are elected directly through universal suffrage every 4 years. Regional elections are normally held every 4 years on the third Sunday in May, together with municipal elections (city). In 2008 Spain had a total of 1,216 Regional MPs.

As an autonomous legislative body, regional parliaments pass autonomous laws (whose scope is limited to regions, and if they affect the state or other regions, they have to pass through the two Spanish State parliaments). Their competencies include setting the budget and appointing, together with other offices, senators for the Spanish State Senate, and they can also recur to the Constitutional Court laws of the State affecting a region's competencies. The respective *estatutos de autonomia* [statutes of autonomy] establish which competencies a region is entitled to (devolution): budget, finance, health, education, urbanism, ecology, etc. In all cases the competencies of regions must be compatible with the Spanish constitutional framework.

In order to give an idea of the figures and the general situation of Spanish politics at a regional level, below are four charts, two for 2003 and two for 2007. These charts illustrate the distribution of MPs and the parties they belong to. It is clear that PP and PSOE are the majority parties (between them they account for 77% of all MPs in 2003 and 79% in 2007). The first two charts for each year present the data concerning the percentage of PP and PSOE MPs from the total (which is why the parties of the other MPs are not specified). The two remaining charts for each year show the total number of MPs for each party. The final section of this chapter provides a more detailed explanation (the name of each party, their political stance, etc.) and data<sup>39</sup>.

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<sup>39</sup> As throughout this work, the data concerning PP, PSOE and IU include all the various local denominations and coalitions, for instance, IU includes Ezker Batua, Esquerra Unida, Los Verdes, etc.; PSOE includes its main local groups such as PSdG (from Galicia) or PSC (from Catalonia) and PSE (from the Basque Country), etc.; PP includes UPN, etc.

### regional MPs 2003




Figure 6. Regional MPs after the 2003 regional elections

### regional MPs 2003




Figure 7. Breakdown of regional MPs after the 2003 regional elections

regional MPs 2007




Figure 8. Regional MPs after the 2007 regional elections

regional MPs 2007




Figure 9. Breakdown of regional MPs after the 2007 regional elections

In order to show the extreme bipolarization of the Spanish political field, the following charts show the distribution of the presidents of the regional parliaments. Together, PP and PSOE account for 82% of the total for both 2003 and 2007, albeit in varying percentages.



### Presidents of regional parliaments 2003




Figure 10. Presidents of regional Parliaments after the 2003 regional elections

### Presidents of regional parliaments 2007




Figure 11. Presidents of regional Parliaments after the 2007 regional elections

The breakdown of the regional governments, as shown in the charts below, presents a similar picture.

### Regional Governments (coalitions) 2003




Figure 12. Regional Governments, including coalitions, after the 2003 regional elections

### Regional Governments (coalitions) 2007




Figure 13. Regional Governments, including coalitions, after the 2007 regional elections

Even though the situation is somewhat more fragmented, PP and PSOE still have the most prominent roles in the regional politics, except in the Basque Country, Catalonia and the Canary Islands (further details are provided in the final section of this chapter).

### 2.2.3.3. Provincial Parliament

*Diputaciones Provinciales* (hereafter DP) are not present in all Spanish regions. Properly speaking, a DP is an institution which only exists in 38 out of 50 provinces, since it does not exist in Basque Country, Balearic and Canary Islands. These three regions have similar institutions, called respectively *Juntas Forales*, *Consells Insulars*, and *Cabildos Insulares*, but whose MPs are elected directly by universal suffrage usually every 4 years and normally during municipal elections. DP do not exist either in those regions constituted by just one province (Asturias, Cantabria, La Rioja, Madrid, Murcia, Navarra); in these regions competencies otherwise held by DP are divided among municipalities or belong to Regional Parliaments. DP Representatives are elected indirectly according to a very complex system based on the representation in the municipal parliament of each party, and according to the D'Hondt system. Depending on the number of inhabitants of each province, the number of eligible candidates is 25, 27, 31 or 51<sup>40</sup>.

In order to make the data clearer and more significant, the following charts include data for DP as well as *Juntas Forales*, *Consells Insulars* and *Cabildos Insulares*. These charts provide an insight into those parties with political representation at a provincial level, and especially of the major role played by PP and PSOE in monopolizing politics. I will present only the MPs of PP, PSOE, IU and I will aggregate all those of other parties (in brackets the number of parties), in order to make the monopoly exerted by PP and PSOE in terms of representation and power visually clearer. In the table below I present the data for the elections of provincial MPs.

Year	DP	Juntas forales	Consells insulars	Cabildos insulares	Total
1999	1.034	134	59	139	1.385
2003	1.036	153	59	149	1.397
2007	1.038	153	72	153	1.416

Table 3. Provincial MPs elected in *Diputaciones Provinciales*, *Juntas*, *Consells* and *Cabildos* after the 1999, 2003 and 2007 municipal elections

As we can see from the graphs below, PP and PSOE hold the highest representation, with 76-78% of provincial MPs.

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<sup>40</sup> Up to 500,000 inhabitants: 25 representatives; 500,000-1,000,000 inhabitants: 27 representatives; 1,000,000-3,500,000 inhabitants: 31 representatives; more than 3,500,001 inhabitants: 51 representatives.

### Provincial MPs 1999




Figure 14. Provincial MPs after the 1999 municipal elections

### Provincial MPs 2003




Figure 15. Provincial MPs after the 2003 municipal elections

## Provincial MPs 2007




Figure 16. Provincial MPs after the 2007 municipal elections

Generally speaking, and despite some very few exceptions, the respective presidents of the DP were elected in the most voted party. The chart below shows the proportional representation of the parties with at least one DP president.

## Presidents of provincial parliaments 1999




Figure 17. Presidents of provincial parliaments after the 1999 municipal elections

## Presidents of provincial parliaments 2003




Figure 18. Presidents of provincial parliaments after the 2003 municipal elections

## Presidents of provincial parliaments 2007




Figure 19. Presidents of provincial parliaments after the 2007 municipal elections

### 2.2.3.4. Municipal Parliaments

As for the elections of the *ayuntamientos*, each municipality constitutes the electoral circumscription; the principle of representation is proportional; the electoral method is the D'Hondt system; candidatures are within blocked and closed lists; parties with less than 5% of votes have no representation. Municipalities with fewer than 100 inhabitants have a different administrative structure. Elections for *ayuntamientos* (city councils) are normally held every 4 years on the third Sunday in May, together with the regional elections. Citizens elect the members of the city councils directly by universal suffrage and the town and city councils then elect *alcaldes* (mayors). Municipal elections are

also fundamental in that, as we have seen, they contribute to the constitution of the DP. At present, Spain has more than 8,100 *ayuntamientos* and more than 56,000 councillors. Parties compete with their list of *concejales*. The elected *concejales* elect the leading candidate of each list as *mayor*. If there is no absolute majority, the election of the mayor is subject to agreements. The city council has competencies in security in public places; traffic; urbanism; environmental protection and historic heritage; cemeteries, markets; public water, lighting and cleaning; public transport, cultural and sporting activities and social services. The city government is run together with a collegial body (*Junta de gobierno local*) with a varying number of members.

The following chart shows the number of city MPs in the period 1999-2003-2007. An initial analysis reveals the monopoly of PP and PSOE: as in other levels of administration, the figures are ten times higher than all other political parties.




Figure 20. MPs in city councils for the main parties after the 1999, 2003 and 2007 municipal elections

The previous charts clearly show the dominant position of PP and PSOE, who together account for 84% and 85% of the total number of MPs in the city councils.

#### 2.2.4. Observations

This section has provided a brief outline of the structure of Spanish politics and administration at its various levels (national, regional, provincial, and municipal) and shown the composition of the different assemblies of the different elective bodies of the political and administrative structure. I focused on the period 1999-2007 in order to create a proper frame for understanding the Spanish political field at the time of the

communicative event I will deal with in detail here: the two presidential debates of 2008. The data presented here shows that PP and PSOE monopolize Spanish politics and obviously from this condition they not only monopolize power, but also political discourse, topics, forms, etc. They monopolize the political public sphere, the (mainstream) public space where political struggles are conducted. From this perspective, television has sanctioned PP-PSOE duopoly. Indeed, they are the two only parties present in the presidential debates. It is true that they are the only ones capable of providing a real presidential candidate, but it is also true that television nurtures this duopoly. This duopoly emerged clearly in 1993 from a situation of greater fragmentation (more parties with more votes), which is exactly the year of the first two televised presidential debates. On that occasion, only PP and PSOE candidates were invited to participate in the debate.



## 2.3. The Spanish political party system

Although the three main parties will be discussed in greater detail in a later chapter (2.3.2), I will here provide a brief overview of the Spanish political parties, giving some succinct indications on the main cleavages that distinguish them. The chapter ends with a number of observations on the Spanish party system.

### 2.3.1. A brief overview of the system of Spanish political parties

While during Franco's dictatorship there was only one party, at present the many political parties are the main agents of Spanish democracy: they construct and manage public life and power (Fernández-Sarasola 2009a; 2009b). The Spanish Constitution (art. 6) recognizes their role in expressing political pluralism, and establishes the freedom for creating political parties within the framework of the Constitution<sup>41</sup>.

Spanish institutional politics is characterized by the presence of two main parties in terms of votes and MPs: Partido Popular (PP) and Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE). PP is a conservative party, founded by several of Franco's principal ministers. It then absorbed Christian-Democrats and Liberals and moved toward the center of the political spectrum. PSOE is the most ancient Spanish party, founded in the 19th century on a Marxist basis, and is now a moderate social democratic party. Amongst other significant parties (in terms of votes) we must firstly mention Izquierda Unida (IU), a coalition of left-wing parties, such as Partido Comunista de España (PCE) and some ecologist groups. Then we have regionalist parties with representation at a national level (MPs in the *Congreso* and *Senado*) and strong support in their respective regions: for Catalonia: Convergència i Unió (CiU), a center-right, neoliberal and Catalanist party; Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC), a left-wing, republican Catalanist party. for the Basque Country: Partido Nacionalista Vasco (PNV), a center-right, neoliberal, Basqueist party; for Galicia: Bloque Nacionalista Gallego (BNG), a left wing, Galicianist party; for the Canary Islands: Coalición Canaria (CC), a center-right, neoliberal regionalist party.

As we will see more in detail in chapter 6, parties construct, express and represent social interests, they channel the lines of conflict (*cleavages*) existing within a society, trying to manage them in institutional and pacific ways. According to Lipset & Rokkan

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<sup>41</sup> Apart from the Constitution, Spanish political parties are also subject to the Spanish Law on Political Parties of 4<sup>th</sup> December 1978, modified by the Organic Law on Political Parties 6/2002 of 27<sup>th</sup> June 2002, also called the Party Law.

(1967) there are 4 main cleavages in Western societies: a) center-periphery; b) state-church; c) land-industry; d) owner-worker (id: 47). Chapter 6 will deal more extensively with the issue of cleavages amongst the main Spanish parties, but a number of points will be briefly outlined here. After different phases in Spanish political history, the most significant cleavages of the Spanish party system are: a) socioeconomic (workers vs. owners, public-private<sup>42</sup>, Socialism-Neoliberalism, progressivism-conservatism, etc.), which distinguishes parties on a continuum from neoliberals to socialist; and b) the center vs. periphery cleavage, which distinguishes parties on a continuum from centralist to peripheralist (centralism-federalism, Unitarianism-separatism). Other classical cleavages in Spanish society, such as that concerning the nature of the State (monarchy vs. republic) or the role of religion within the State (laity vs. Catholic confessionality), are much more on the background and less prominent, even though they had and continue to have a certain importance in distinguishing Spanish parties. The two main cleavages referred to above outline a situation where parties can be distinguished according to their relative position on the left-right continuum and according to their position in the centralism-peripheralism continuum. This latter distinction operated on ideological basis is homologous to the structural constitution of the Spanish political field, which allows a distinction to be drawn between parties of a national and regional scope.

The following section provides an overview of the main parties (Solsten & Meditz 1990; Magone 2005; UCM 1999), starting with the national ones and then moving on to the regional ones. In all cases I will indicate the main ideological features about the main cleavages (left-right, center-periphery, etc.). Section 2.3.2., offers a more detailed discussion of the three main Spanish parties.

### **2.3.1.1. National parties**

Among the parties with a national scope, we can distinguish between left, center and right parties.

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<sup>42</sup> According to Belloc et al. (2014) privatization is a typical feature of right-wing parties in government in Europe.

## Left

**Partido Comunista Español (PCE)-Izquierda Unida (IU):** founded in 1921 from a scission of the PSOE, after PSOE (founded in 1879) and PNV (founded in 1895) it is the oldest political party in Spain. From the late 1950s onwards, it was also the strongest anti-Francoist party. It was the last party to be legalized during the Transition, due to the opposition of the Spanish Army, convinced that Communists were the greatest threat to Spain. In order to achieve legal status, the leader Santiago Carrillo accepted the Monarchy and the Monarchic flag (Cercas 2009: 114). Progressively the PCE assumed moderate positions: from euro-communism to social democracy. Due to the constant loss of votes, in 1986 PCE integrated other left wing parties, such as Partido de Acción Socialista, Partido Comunista de los Pueblos de España, Partido Humanistas, Federación Progresista, Partido de Izquierda Republicana and other independents under the name of Izquierda Unida. Due to a *rightization* of electors and to a prejudicial electoral system based on the D'Hont system, IU lost progressively votes and MPs. As for the center-periphery cleavage, it is open to a degree of federalism.

**Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE):** Founded in 1879 it is the oldest political party in Spain. The current PSOE is an internal current of the historic PSOE that became predominant. Since the early years of democracy it became the most voted Spanish party. During the 28<sup>th</sup> Congress (1979) the leader Felipe González convinced members to abandon Marxism and adopt social-democracy. PSOE ruled Spain with an absolute majority from 1982 to 1989. In 1993, it was returned with a relative majority and governed in coalition with a number of regionalist parties. In 1996, after the victory of PP, PSOE became the first party of the opposition. As for the center-periphery cleavage, it accepts more devolution (autonomy) for regions.

**Other far left parties** (Partido del Trabajo de España; Organización Revolucionaria de Trabajadores, Liga Comunista Revolucionaria) since the beginning of the democracy they have obtained few votes and no MPs.

## Center

**Unión de Centro Democrático (UCD):** This is a coalition of parties of moderate ideology founded in 1977 under the charismatic figure of Adolfo Suárez (then President of the Government) just at the end of the dictatorship. It became the first party in the country, but due to its heterogeneity (Francoists, liberals, social-democrats, Christian-democrats and regionalists), the coalition quickly broke up, especially after Suarez

resigned in 1981. Suárez went on to found the Centro Democrático y Social (CDS), which had a good representation until 1989, when Adolfo Suárez resigned as General Secretary, and in 1993 the party eventually disappeared.

## **Right**

**Partido Popular (PP):** Founded in 1977 as Alianza Popular (AP) to bring together the right wing forces during the transition. Its members included 7 early ministers of the Francoist regime. AP's leader, Manuel Fraga, was one of them. After a frustrating beginning, AP began to receive more votes following the disappearance of UCD, obtaining a 26% share in the 1982 elections, making it the second most voted party in Spain. After an internal crisis, and with the progressive moderation of its characteristics associated with Francoism, in 1989 the party was refounded as Partido Popular. PP quickly obtained a higher share of votes: in 1993 it was just 4 points behind PSOE; in 1996 it obtained a relative majority and in 2000 an absolute majority. As for the center-periphery cleavage, it leans towards centralism.

**Other far right parties:** after the Transition all the most reactionary Francoist groups joined Fuerza Nueva and its leader Blas Piñar; but they have no MPs and play only a marginal role in political life.

### **2.3.1.2. Regional parties**

In this section, the parties are classified according to the region they represent, briefly indicating their ideological stance in terms of left-center-right. As for the center-periphery cleavage, all these parties lean towards peripheralism in varying degrees, ranging from devolution to secession. Moreover, both PP and PSOE have their regional representation for each region, and for the most peripheral regions the difference also lies in the actual names: PSdG is the Galician federation of PSOE; PSC is the Catalan one, etc.

## **The Basque Country**

**Partido Nacionalista Vasco (PNV):** Founded in 1895 by the racist and Catholic writer Sabino Arana, today it is a moderate right wing Basqueist party. It has governed in the Basque Country since the first regional elections (1980), albeit on occasions in coalition with other parties.

**Eusko Alkartasuna (EA)** emerged in 1986 following a scission with PNV and adopts a social democratic stance. PNV and EA often run in coalition in elections. It plays a major role in all the regional, provincial and municipal parliaments.

**Esuskadiko Ezquerria (EE):** founded in 1977 following a scission with Partido Comunista de Euskadi, this Basqueist party merged in 1993 with the Basque PSOE group known as Partido Socialista de Euskadi (PSE).

**Herri Batasuna (HB):** founded in the late 1970s, it is the coalition of the Marxist Basqueist parties. Considered as the political wing of ETA, and illegalized, in 1998 it changed its name to Euskal Herritarrok (EH), then again in 2001 when it became known as Batasuna, although a number of its members entered the Partido Comunista de las Tierras Vascas. In 2007 it stood with the party Acción Nacionalista Vasca (ANV), a traditional radical Basqueist party. Despite accusations of supporting terrorism, it plays a certain role in provincial and particularly municipal parliaments.

## **Catalonia**

**Convergència i Unió (CiU):** founded in 1977, this coalition of moderate Catalanist right-wing neoliberal Catholic parties, whose leader was Jordi Pujol, has been in office in the Catalan government since the first regional elections (1980). On a national level, it played an increasingly important role from 1993 onwards, since, in the case of a relative majority, the two main parties (PP and PSOE) both need CiU's support. In this sense CiU has become a key party for governance in Spain. At the same time, this position of strength and influence enables CiU to defend the interests of Catalonia on a national level. CiU also plays a major role in regional, provincial and municipal government.

**Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC):** founded in 1931, this republican left-wing Catalanist party played a major role during the II Republic. Apart from a short parenthesis (1986 and 1989 elections) without MPs in the *Congreso*, since 1977 it has been represented in Spain's State Parliament. ERC plays a relevant role in all regional, provincial and municipal parliaments.

## **Galicia**

**Bloque Nacionalista Gallego (BNG):** founded in 1982, this left-wing Galicianist party, which questions the current territorial articulation of Spain, has MPs in the Galician

parliament, the *Congreso* and *Senado*. It also plays a relevant role in provincial and municipal parliaments.

### **Andalusia**

**Partido Socialista Andaluz (PSA):** founded in 1965, it has a left-wing ideology with a certain leaning toward Andalusianism. In 1984 changed its name to Partido Andalucista (PA).

### **Canary Islands**

**Coalición Canaria (CC):** Founded in 1993 after the disappearance of UCD, it is formed by Canarianist parties, ex-communists, and Canarianist conservatives (Agrupaciones Independientes de Canarias (AIC), Partido Nacionalista Canario (PNC), Centro Canario Independiente (CCI), etc.). It has held a majority in the Canary Island Parliament uninterruptedly since 1993. Its aims are greater devolution and autonomy for the Canary Islands whilst remaining within the Spanish State. It is the governing party in many *cabildos* and *ayuntamientos* in the Canary Islands, and has MPs in the *Congreso* and *Senado*.

### **Aragon**

**Partido Aragonés Regionalista (PAR):** founded in 1978, this center and regionalist party changed its name in 1993 to Partido Aragonés (PAR). Since 1993 it has had no representation in the Congreso or Senado, but it continues to play a major role in all the regional, provincial and municipal parliaments.

**Chunta Aragonesista (CHA):** founded in 1986, this social-democrat, republican Aragonese party has held a relevant representation in all the regional, provincial and municipal parliaments, and since 2000 has had MPs in the *Congreso*.

### **Navarre**

**Unión del Pueblo Navarro (UPN):** founded in 1979 following a scission with UCD, between 1991 and 2008 this center-right, regionalist and Christian-democrat party stood in all the elections in coalition with PP at all administrative levels.

## Valencia

**Unión Valenciana (UV):** founded in 1982, this right-wing regionalist party has often stood in coalition with PP. It had MPs in the *Congreso*, *Senado* and Valencian Parliament, but now only has representatives at a provincial and municipal level.

### 2.3.2. The three main Spanish parties: PP, PSOE, IU

In order to better understand the debate as a communicative event within the socio-historical context within which it occurs, I will briefly recall the recent history of Spain and the three main Spanish parties, in terms of votes, discussing their ideology and their electoral results: PP (*Partido Popular* [Popular Party]), PSOE (*Partido Socialista Obrero Español* [Spanish Socialist Workers Party]), and IU (*Izquierda Unida* [United Left]).

#### 2.3.2.1. The recent history of Spain

Although it is one of the most ancient European nation-states, dating back to the 15th century<sup>43</sup>, Spain is one of the youngest Western European democracies. In November 1975, the Spanish dictator General Francisco Franco died peacefully. He had ruled Spain for 39 years, after having won the Civil War (1<sup>st</sup> April 1939) that followed his military coup d'état, also known as *Alzamiento* or *Levantamiento* [uprising] (18<sup>th</sup> July 1936) against the democratically elected Second Spanish Republic<sup>44</sup>. The new Head of State, King Juan Carlos I, was named by the dictator himself to succeed him<sup>45</sup>.

In 1976, King Juan Carlos I and the new Prime Minister Adolfo Suárez, a young moderate conservative, led a peaceful but complex transition towards democracy, approving the democratic constitution in December 1978, after it was ratified in a

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<sup>43</sup> The birth of the Spanish kingdom is conventionally situated between 1479, the year of the marriage of the so-called Catholic Monarch, Isabelle I of Castile and Ferdinand II of Aragon, which meant the union of the two major kingdoms of the Iberian peninsula, and 1492, the year of the completion of the *Reconquista*, i.e. the conquest of the kingdom of Granada until then ruled by Muslims.

<sup>44</sup> For an overview of recent Spanish history see Gunther et al. 1986: ch. 2. On the Spanish Second Republic see Payne (1993).

<sup>45</sup> According to one of the 8 fundamental laws of Francoist regime, the Ley de Sucesión en la Jefatura del Estado (BOE 1947), the dictator himself should designate the successor; and he will be subsequently ratified by Spanish Francoist courts (art. 6). Interestingly, the Law stated that: (Art. 1) Spain was a Catholic kingdom; (Art. 2) the Head of State was the “the Commander of Spain and of the Crusade, Overlord of Armed Forces, Mr. Francisco Franco Bahamonde (my translation)”. Franco wanted his successor to be committed to Francoist principles: Spanishism, Catholicism, anticommunism and anti-liberalism. On 23 July 1969, named by Franco as his successor with the title of “Prince of Spain”, Juan Carlos I swore “allegiance to the principles of the National Movement and other Fundamental Laws of the Kingdom” (Bernecker 1996: 118); he was then ratified by the Francoist courts..

referendum<sup>46</sup>. The monarchy is questioned by some Left groups<sup>47</sup> for its relationship with the Francoist regime and for not having submitted to a democratic ratification by referendum<sup>48</sup>. Furthermore, the King's role in the military attempt of coup d'état led by Lieutenant Colonel Antonio Tejero with the support of some of the King's personal friends on 23<sup>rd</sup> February 1981<sup>49</sup> remains unclear

After Franco's death, Adolfo Suárez, founder and President of UCD, held the office of President for two terms (1977-1979; 1979-1981)<sup>50</sup>, after winning the first general elections held without Francisco Franco (1977), as well as the first democratic elections (1979).

The second democratic elections (1982) were won by PSOE. Felipe González, leader of the PSOE since 1974, was Prime Minister for four terms (1982-1986; 1986-1989; 1989-1993; 1993-1996).

In 1996 José María Aznar, president of PP since April 1990, won the elections held office as President for two terms (1996-2000; 2000-2004).

Finally, José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, elected the new leader of the PSOE in July 2000, was President for a further two terms (2004-2008; 2008-2011).

At the time of writing, Mariano Rajoy, leader of the PP since August 2003, is the country's President with an absolute parliamentary majority, after winning the 2011 general elections, which were brought forward 4 months, due to the economic and financial crisis.

In the following sections I am going to deal with the history of these three parties, outlining their ideology, and giving some figures about the votes obtained and the MPs in the *Congreso*.

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<sup>46</sup> On the Spanish transition and the recent years of Spanish democracy, see Morodo (1984), Colomer (1995; 1998), Balfour (2005a), Hopkins (2005).

<sup>47</sup> Interestingly some far-right groups also question it, due to its alleged "betrayal" of Francoism and of its main principles of anticommunism and Spanishism: King Juan Carlos legalized PCE and approved decentralizing laws.

<sup>48</sup> Note that on the official website for Juan Carlos I official (Casareal 2010) there is no reference to Francoism nor to the well-known fact that he was enthroned by Franco, who is euphemistically defined "Head of State". On Juan Carlos see Preston (2005).

<sup>49</sup> Again, see Colomer (1998: ch. 7).

<sup>50</sup> Adolfo Suárez resigned on 29 January 1981; Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo (UCD) acted as President for the remainder of the term. The 1981 attempt of coup d'état occurred exactly while MPs were voting Calvo Sotelo as President.



### 2.3.2.2. History, ideology and figures of PP, PSOE, and IU

#### 2.3.2.2.1. PP

##### How party describes itself

PP emerged directly from the ashes of the Francoist regime: its founder, Manuel Fraga Iribarne<sup>51</sup>, honorary president of the PP until his death (15<sup>th</sup> January 2012), was Minister of Information and Tourism (1962-1969), and Minister of Government (1975-1976). In 1976 Fraga founded Alianza Popular (AP), an agglomerate of right-wing groups and parties led by personalities directly proceeding from the Francoist regime. This heterogeneous group, led by Fraga, participated in general elections under different names. In 1977 it stood as AP and in 1979 as *Coalición Democrática* (CD), including parties as *Acción Ciudadana Liberal*, *Partido Democrático Progresista*, *Renovación Española* and *Partido Popular de Cataluña*.

AP absorbed groups and movements previously integrated in UCD, such as *Partido Demócrata Popular* (PDP) and *Partido Liberal* (PL). In 1982 AP stood for the general elections under the name of *Coalición Popular*, including PDP, PL and various regionalist right-wing parties such as *Unión Valenciana* (UV), *Unión del Pueblo Navarro* (UPN) and *Partido Aragonés Regionalista* (PAR). Finally, in 1989 Fraga founded the PP that absorbed and merged all the previous existing right-wing groups.

PP in Spain mainly represents continuity with the country's conservative past; its main ideological axes are **centralism**, with the consequent opposition to peripheralist movements (Catalanism, Basqueism, and Galicianism); a rigid stance against the claims of the armed separatist and independentist organization ETA; **patriarchalism** and **paternalism**<sup>52</sup> vis-à-vis of women rights and gender issues or in the field of individual freedoms and rights, mostly due to the influence of the Catholic establishment (refusal to accept homosexual marriage, legally regulated abortion and euthanasia, repressive policies for drug consumers, etc.); **economic liberalism** (deregulation, tax reduction, privatization, reduction of public services, etc.); and a nationalist (discriminating) position against immigrants.

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<sup>51</sup> Colomer (1998: 62) defines him as “reformista y aperturista”.

<sup>52</sup> On paternalism and patriarchalism see Kleinig (1983: 3-37).

To glean an idea of PP ideology we can refer to the way PP describes its history and its ideology as well as to its 2008 electoral program, as shown below. On its website<sup>53</sup> PP describes itself as follows:

A principios de los años 70, Manuel Fraga interesó a un grupo de personas en la idea de crear y articular una organización de talante reformista y con ideología de centro, con el fin de ofrecer una nueva alternativa política a la sociedad española (my emphasis).

It defines itself as a center-wing, moderate and reformist party. As De Santiago-Guervós states (see also Morales-López & Prego-Vázquez 2002), since its foundation PP has attempted to occupy the center of the political space:

Fraga intentó borrar de su partido la imagen de ‘derecha de toda la vida’, continuación del régimen de Franco, asumiendo la terminología *centro* en sus definiciones. [...] Así presentará a su partido como centro-derecha. [...] El partido popular sigue la misma línea política que AP hasta su desaparición; continuación de la política de conquista del centro, del espacio y de la palabra (De Santiago-Guervós 1996: 21-22).

In defining itself as a center-wing and reformist party, PP strategically backdates this ideological feature to its very foundation, the early 1970s, playing down any connections with Francoism. Failing to mention its relationship with Francoism reveals PP’s will to hide it, in order to re-present itself as moderate as possible, and hence occupy the center. These observations can be corroborated by analyzing PP’s 2008 manifesto. In the section entitled *Nuestros Principios*, it defines itself in the following way:

Somos una formación política de centro. Defendemos los valores de la libertad, la igualdad, la concordia y la justicia que inspiran nuestra España democrática. Somos un partido joven que ha nacido y crecido con esta democracia, y que asume la tradición del liberalismo español surgida con la Constitución de Cádiz (PP 2008: 8).

PP erases any connection with Francoism (“hemos nacido con esta democracia”). This shows how important it is for PP to present itself as a “center” party anchored in

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<sup>53</sup> [http://www.pp.es/conocenos/historia\\_2.html](http://www.pp.es/conocenos/historia_2.html) (12/July/2012).

Democracy. Note that in order to completely erase Francoism from its past, PP backdates its liberalism to the first Spanish Constitution (1812).

Analyzing the PP manifesto allows us to corroborate its ideological principles and political priorities, as well as the main propositions of its electoral discourse. As for economic liberalism: the word *liberty* is frequently used, especially in the form of *economic liberty*, but we can also read statements such as “Las únicas diferencias justas serán las que nazcan del trabajo, del esfuerzo y del mérito” (2008: 20), together with references to individual initiative. As for Spanishism: we can find several references to nation, Spain, Spaniards, territorial cohesion, expressions aimed at glorifying the nation, such as “Spain is a very old nation”, “and we want to be proud of Spain” (PP 2008: 33, 326), etc. Many references are made to terrorism and the Autonomous State i.e. the question of centralism/federalism, territorial cohesion, the defense of Castilian against other languages such as Catalan, Galician or Basque, regional devolution, etc. These issues feature strongly in the manifesto and considerable space is dedicated to *consensus* in issues such as terrorism or territorial cohesion.

Considerable attention is also given to the question of equality, seen as the equality of Spaniards regardless of their place of residence, i.e. as a synonym of territorial and political unity. Equality intended as the people’s right to not to be discriminated against for reasons of gender, sexual orientation, political ideology, origin, race or religion, only occupies a few paragraphs (2008: 20). In the long chapter dedicated to equality, PP refers to equality policies for women, families, the elderly, the disabled and young people, yet there are no references to those discriminated against on the basis of their sexual orientation, race, or religion. In the 326 page document there is only one reference to sexual difference (2008: 164) and one to racial/religious difference and discrimination (2008: 214). The word *homosexual* is absent as well as the word *race*.

In order to show how Catholicism is entrenched in PP ideology, it should be noted that there are no such words as *cato\** (católico/a/s) in the PP manifesto, whilst in the PSOE manifesto it appears once, stating that the party withdrew VAT exemption from the Catholic Church and favored the laicity of State. Furthermore, the words *cato\** has a strong presence in the IU manifesto, related to PP national-Catholicism and its claims for a more secular state. Interestingly, rather than expressing a lack of interest, the absence of a word implies the unproblematized acceptance of status quo: i.e. the acceptance of the current relationships between Spanish Reign and Catholic Church.

As for paternalism and patriarchalism, it should be stressed that the cover image of the chapter dedicated to equality does not portray a working woman (in reference to equal pay), a homosexual (in reference to sexual equality<sup>54</sup>), or a member of a minority racial/ethnic/cultural group (in reference to racial equality), but instead depicts a pregnant woman, related to the concept of motherhood and therefore to the (traditional) family. As for topics such as global poverty, climate change, equality and dependency, which traditionally did not form part of PP's ideological background, their (marginal) presence responds to what I call *convergence*, and to an attempt not to leave these issues completely in PSOE hands.

As we will see, during the debate, PP will make major efforts to present itself as a moderate party and its opponent in a radical light.

### Figures: votes and members of parliament

We will now consider the electoral results of PP in the general elections. In the two figures below we can observe the number of MPs (fig. 1) and the votes obtained (fig. 2) from 1977 to 2008<sup>55</sup>.




Figure 21. PP MPs (1977-2008)

<sup>54</sup> This is a great difference, for instance with PSOE or IU, who to a certain degree flaunt the idea of homosexuality: in several of its television commercials, PSOE uses well-known homosexual Spanish actors, directors, singers, etc.; IU shows the rainbow flag, related to LGTB movements in many countries.

<sup>55</sup> The data come from the official PP website ([http://www.pp.es/esp/congreso-diputados\\_184.html](http://www.pp.es/esp/congreso-diputados_184.html)) and have been cross-checked with those from the Spanish official electoral agency (<http://www.juntaelectoralcentral.es>).




Figure 22. PP votes (1977-2008)

These data are discussed briefly in the final section with those corresponding to PSOE and IU.

#### 2.3.2.2.2. PSOE

##### How the party describes itself

Reading what parties says about themselves is crucial, not only to obtain a solid discourse-historical basis (Wodak & Meyer 2001b), but also to observe their ideology, the way they wish to be seen and the type of electorate they target, etc.

On its official website<sup>56</sup>, PSOE describes itself as a party born “to express the eagerness of the new working classes”, and a party which has always worked to “realize the great emancipatory ideals of Socialism, with the obvious changes the historical moments have imposed in each situation, freely and democratically chosen by cardholders”.

PSOE describes itself as a party with clandestine and republican origins<sup>57</sup> that defends workers’ rights, targets social critics, and has *always* confronted the Right. PSOE reproaches the Spanish Right for being against the improvement of workers’ conditions, for instance in the agrarian reforms launched during the II Republic (1931-36). It also blames the Spanish Right for encouraging Franco’s coup d’état, the

<sup>56</sup> <http://web.psoe.es/ambito/historiapsoe/docs/index.do?action=View&id=460110>

<sup>57</sup> Interestingly PSOE has progressively weakened its Republican position; accepting the present Parliamentary Monarchy, as ratified by the Constitution of 1978, and erasing Republic from its discourse. This is one of the main differences vis-à-vis IU, which is clearly Republican. PSOE abandoned its former Republican ideas and it currently supports the Monarchy together with PP, even if this institution is a Francoist legacy that represents continuity with past. This gives IU a good foothold to attack PSOE as a false Left party too similar to PP.

consequent Civil War and the subsequent repression, where PSOE considers itself to be a “victim”.

PSOE defines itself as a party that evolves with society, as a democratic and reformist party that has rejected Marxism since at least 1979<sup>58</sup>.

In order to present itself as a supportive, progressive and liberal party, PSOE refers to some of its achievements such as decentralization, the depenalization of abortion, policies for the equality of women, increasing public universal healthcare, educational reform, the extension of unemployment benefits, the creation of a free public universal and compulsory education and the rise in the number of scholarships and grants. PSOE emphasizes public and social policies in order to guarantee the Welfare State, thereby granting the equal opportunities to everyone, in line with its main ideological axis of social solidarity.

PSOE also describes the moment when it lost power (for the first time since it gained it, i.e., since 1982), defining the victory of PP in the election of 1996 as a “technical draw”, thereby minimizing its opponent’s positive results. At the same time PSOE states it made “una oposición fuerte y condicionante ante tentaciones reaccionarias [of PP]”, and in doing so PSOE presents itself as the party protecting democracy against a reactionary right<sup>59</sup>.

PSOE places major importance on the election of José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero as its Secretary General, claiming that he led the party through a “quiet change”. This description positively presents the candidate as a conciliating and dialoguing leader<sup>60</sup>.

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<sup>58</sup> This is a very important point; in fact it constitutes the first and the main reason for being attacked by the Left, for betraying its Marxist past and by the Right, precisely for its Marxist past. On this point it is worth quoting De Santiago-Guervós observations on PSOE shift from Marxism to socialdemocracy and from it to the center (1996: 14 et seq.): “este corrimiento que inicia el PSOE a partir del 1975 hacia ideas más conservadoras ha continuado imparablemente, porque la realidad ha seguido cambiando, porque la sociología del elector es cada vez más conservadora. Y con el PSOE los demás partidos del arco parlamentario han tenido que ir ocupando o disputándose los huecos que han ido quedando. Así el PSOE abandona la socialdemocracia. [...] IU intenta ocuparla” (De Santiago-Guervós 1996:15-16). Since the political field is relational, parties occupy the space let free by others. So the moving is the following: “de socialista a socialdemócrata y de ahí al centro para el PSOE. De comunista a eurocomunista y socialista y de ahí a socialdemócrata en el PCE. De derecha al centro-derecha y de ahí al centro en el PP” (De Santiago-Guervós 1996: 16). Interestingly, in the 1970s PCE reproached PSOE for abandoning Marxism in favor of Social-democracy, while in the 1980s, IU, accused PSOE for abandoning Social-Democracy, as it continues to do today. So historically IU political strategy is to accuse PSOE of not being far enough to the left, not without reason, since in the 1980s Felipe González was convinced of PSOE’s need to “ampliar la base del PSOE hacia la derecha” (apud De Santiago-Guervós 1996: 16; see also Méndez-Lago 2005).

<sup>59</sup> These statements indicate a pattern of de/legitimation.

<sup>60</sup> PSOE presents Zapatero more or less as a “protector father”, in terms of Lakoff (2004). Remember that Lakoff himself advised PSOE for the 2008 electoral campaign (Bassets 2008: 4; Molpeceres-Arnaiz 2009).

The party is described as an organization fighting for freedom, equality and solidarity, oriented towards citizenship and the defense of individual freedoms. As for the economy, PSOE argues that State has to regulate the market adequately, and that it has to be supportive, provide opportunities and satisfy the basic needs of every citizen. Also PSOE presents itself as a party aimed at “guaranteeing progress in a free, equal and cohesive society”.

PSOE also describes the recent years of its long history. This is a critical point, for PSOE takes into account the years of opposition and especially those of the return to power, and the way it happened (strongly contested by the Right). We must remember that PP did not accept the results of 2004 general elections, when PSOE won; PP accused PSOE of winning the elections thanks to the terrorist attacks of 11 March 2004. In order to detract from these criticisms, PSOE claims that in the second half of Aznar’s term of office (PP) a certain desire for change was evident among the electorate, as shown by the positive PSOE results in the municipal elections and in regional Catalan elections of 2003. This desire is presented as precluding the electoral turnaround in 2004.

Interestingly enough, PSOE makes no reference to the 3 main reasons that seem to have definitely moved the electorate, namely the ecological disaster of the Prestige; the Iraq war fought with George W. Bush; and the Jihadist attack of 11M. This last point is especially important, since during the debates PP continues to consider it the real element that conditioned the 2004 elections. As we will see, it constitutes an element for de/legitimation (I will return to this issue). Yet, in order to change the shift among voters, PSOE refers mainly to its mature and conciliatory opposition and to poor PP administration between 2000 and 2004. PSOE blames PP for “its culture of imposition and lack of dialogue in its eight years in government”, compared to Zapatero’s determination for dialogue and negotiation. This description presents a very positive image of Zapatero and a negative image of PP.

As for political ideology, PSOE presents equality, solidarity and justice as its main values and claims its policies target middle class, the young, women and immigrants. PSOE also refers to a (Francoist) past that caused economic underdevelopment and social tardiness. These references to the past will also feature in the debates as a means of de/legitimizing.

It should be noted that Socialism continues to be present only in the name PSOE: in fact, it has increasingly moved towards the center, through privatization or

deregulating the public sector. Nevertheless, to a certain extent it continues to encourage some types of public social policies and public investments, professes (at least) to defend the environment, and is somewhat critical of the Catholic establishment, having approved homosexual marriage and legalized abortion. A closer analysis of the 2008 manifesto sheds greater light on its ideology and demands. I analyzed its assumptions in describing the current situation, and the perspectives expressed in the preamble, as well as the policies set out for the future. Examining the manifestos allows for the corroboration of the political cleavages, the topics chosen, their footing in relation to specific themes, the way parties deal with them, in order to better the way they legitimize themselves and delegitimize the opponent.

For instance, the PSOE presents itself as a liberal party, the party that modernized Spain after dictatorship, represented as “backwardness”, an idea Zapatero also expressed in the televised debates. PSOE defines itself as a responsible and reliable party in government as well as in opposition; as a party looking for social harmony, consensus, and peace, in Spain as well as worldwide; a party that has tried to and will continue to redistribute wealth, maintaining public services such as education, health care, and pensions, sustaining the weakest (women, disabled, elderly, immigrants, young people); PSOE also defines itself as a secular party *ma non troppo*<sup>61</sup>, protecting individual freedoms such as abortion, homosexual marriage, euthanasia, etc.

### **Figures: votes and members of parliament**

We will now consider the electoral results of PSOE in the general elections. In the two charts below we can observe the MPs (fig. 3) and votes (fig. 4) from 1977 to 2008<sup>62</sup>.

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<sup>61</sup> It is especially true if compared to the radical laicist position of IU, as we can see analyzing its left-wing ideological assumptions, its manifesto and its discourse.

<sup>62</sup> Data come from the official PSOE website (<http://www.psoe.es/ambito/resultadoselectorales/docs/index.do?action=View&id=99188>) and have been cross-checked with those from the Spanish official electoral agency (<http://www.juntaelectoralcentral.es>).






Figure 23. PSOE MPs (1977-2008)




Figure 24. PSOE votes (1977-2008)

As the charts show, PSOE and PP have been the two main parties in terms of cardholders, of absolute votes and in terms of MPs since the early 1980s. The third most voted party is IU, which is discussed in the following section.

### 2.3.2.2.3. IU

#### How the party describes itself

In terms of absolute votes IU is the third most voted Spanish party, but it has a very scarce parliamentary representation, due to the Spanish electoral system<sup>63</sup> currently in force (art. 162 and 163 of the Ley de Regimen Electoral General in accordance with

<sup>63</sup> See for instance Bilbao-Arrese (1994).

article 6 of the Spanish Constitution) which uses the D'Hont system to distribute seats among the parties. This proportional electoral system favors larger or local parties, as occurs in Spain with PP and PSOE on the one hand<sup>64</sup>, and with the regionalist parties from Catalonia (ERC, CiU), Galicia (BNG) and Basque Country (PNV) on the other. In this sense, in the 2008 Spanish general elections, PSOE obtained 11,064,524 votes, PP 10,169,973 and IU 963,040, but PSOE obtained 169 MPs, PP 153 and IU only 2. It means that PSOE got 1 MP for every 65,470 votes, PP one member for every 66,470 votes and IU one for every 481,520 votes.

As Urdanoz-Ganuza (2008) says, this electoral system hampers the birth of a third party as a moderator, or regulator, of the dynamics between PP and PSOE, who obviously defend status quo, since it favors their interests; moreover it “rewards” local parties for their democraticness. For this reason, if IU launches a strong attack on PP, it also attacks PSOE, since it considers both parties responsible for “an unjust electoral system” (IU: 72). This is important since it is an argument for the de/legitimation discourse of IU.

As for its history and electoral program, the political association Izquierda Unida was officially founded on 27 April 1986, after the positive experience of the platform *Izquierda Unida* created in the campaign against the entry of Spain into NATO. For that referendum, left-wing groups except PSOE, then in the government, joined forces to support the NO-NATO vote. Among those groups there were: *Partido Comunista de España* (PCE), which would become the core of the future coalition, *Partido de Acción Socialista* (PASOC), *Izquierda Republicana* (IR), *Federación Progresista* (FP), *Partido Humanista* (PH) and *Partido Comunista de los Pueblos de España* (PCPE).

IU defines itself as a “socio-political movement, which hopes to embrace groups, persons, and parties, who claim for a human-emancipatory Left”. As we can read in the IU foundational document, IU arose as consequence of “the center-wing attitude of the PSOE Government (1982) vis-à-vis the economy and its right-wing attitude vis-à-vis the defense policy and foreign policies”. IU defines itself as “an alternative left-wing project” rooted in working-class movements, renewed according to the social and historical changes, in environmentalism, and in democratic socialism, aimed at “unifying a left-wing movement that wishes to drive contemporary progressive policies”.

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<sup>64</sup> See for instance Colomer (1998: 141).

Coherently with its Socialist (social-democratic) assumptions, in its program IU presents itself as contrary to Capitalism and the current Neoliberal model of production-consumption; against the increasing privatization of services, IU calls for a strong public sector; it is against the Catholic establishment, favoring a neat laicism. Furthermore, it is Republican and Federalist, albeit contrary to the particularistic view of peripheral nationalistic parties, especially right-wing groups, such as CiU or PNV; IU defends labor, workers and unions, ecology and a new way of life less subjected to market dictatorship, and more supportive and collective; IU defends social justice and peace worldwide.

**Figures: votes and members of parliament.**

The data shown in the charts below, indicate the MP (fig. 5) and the votes obtained (fig. 6).




Figure 25. IU MPs (1977-2008). For 1977, 1979, 1982 the data concern PCE. Eventual coalitions with other parties have not been counted, except for 2000 and 2004, where the data of IU and ICV have been aggregated




Figure 26. IU votes (1977-2008). For 1977, 1979, 1982 data concern PCE. Eventual coalitions with other parties have not been counted

The following section presents a summary of the discussion so far, as well as two charts and a number of observations.

### 2.3.2.3. Observations

As stated above, as occurs in many Western countries, political parties are the main agents of Spanish institutional politics. As in other countries, they have constructed, expressed and (institutionally) channeled the main cleavages of Spanish society: the socioeconomic conflict (owners-workers) as well as the center-periphery conflict. The present Spanish party system can be called multi-party, but in reality two parties, PP and PSOE, have increasingly assumed a predominant role. Consequently, even though this definition can be disputed, the Spanish party system is clearly two-party<sup>65</sup>. According to the figures and charts presented above, PP and PSOE account for 80% of the representatives of all legislative national or local assemblies.

I would like to draw attention to the following charts: the first (fig. 27) represents the results (MPs) of the three main Spanish parties from 1977 to 2008 and the second one represents the evolution of the regionalist parties (MPs).

<sup>65</sup>See, for instance, Colomer (1998: 179-181) about the limits of actual Spanish system defined as bipolar.




Figure 27. MPs in Congreso of PP, PSOE, IU and UCD (1977-2008)<sup>66</sup>

Considering the first chart (fig. 27) it can be noted that:

1) Between 1977 and 1982 Spanish politics was dominated by UCD, the party built around the charismatic personality of Adolfo Suarez, who led Spain out of the long dictatorship through a rather pacific transition. UCD electoral success depended on the historic moment of the Transition itself, when electors considered an excessive polarization between Right and Left as dangerous, and political agents were convinced that it was necessary to find common ground, all making concessions in order to gain ground in other areas (De Santiago Guervós 1996: 19-20). In 1982 Suarez founded another party, *Centro Democrático y Social* (CDS), which after a difficult start (2 MPS in 1982) obtained very good results in 1986 (19 MPs) and in 1989 (14 MPs); both UCD and CDS declined once Suarez resigned as president, proving that it also was a personalistic party. CDS' members moved to PP or PSOE.

<sup>66</sup> In drawing up this chart I have not considered the coalitions, but I have aggregated some data in order to simplify it. As for PSOE, I aggregated data of PSOE with those of PSC, the Catalan formation of PSOE. For 1979 I did not aggregate the seats of PSA-PA with those of PSOE. As for IU, in the chart I considered for the 1977, 1979 and 1982 elections the results of PCE. I did not aggregate the seats of IC, which sometimes stands in coalition with IU. In the three cases for PP, PSOE and IU I have not counted these associations in order to simplify. As for PP: in 1977 PP participated in the elections as AP, in 1979 as Coalición Democrática, in 1982 as Alianza Popular-Partido Demócrata Popular and in 1986 as Coalición Popular, and has only been known as PP since 1989. In counting PP seats I always aggregated those of UPN that has always stood in coalition with PP since 1989. For 1989 I aggregated seats of PP with those of Partido Popular-Centristas de Galicia (CP-CG), which since then has merged with PP. For 1996 I aggregated to PP the seats of Partido Popular-Partido Aragonés (PP-PAR). As for UCD, it participated in the 1977, 1979 and 1982 elections and then literally disappeared.

2) In addition to the UCD crisis, when votes went to PP and PSOE, PCE also experiences a period of crisis between 1982 and 1989, when it lost many votes to PSOE.

3) The years between 1982 and 1989 were dominated by PSOE. This wide support in the years immediately following the end of the dictatorship is due to many factors: a reaction to Francoism, through a polarization on the opposite side of political field; the charismatic figure of PSOE's leader, Felipe González; the conciliating profile of PSOE politics; a move towards the center and the delay of the Right in creating and offering a moderate (center) image, whereby AP was still perceived as too Francoist. As a result of this widespread support, PSOE obtained 3 absolute majorities between 1982 and 1989.

4) Equally in the same years we can observe a weak support for the Right, due on the one hand to a reaction to Francoism, as well as to the reorganization of the Right. From this perspective, PP's rise and the fall of UCD are two faces of the same political movement, intended as a systemic electoral displacement: the *electoral* (rather than political) space of UCD is progressively occupied by PP. In a certain sense, the fact that UCD emerged from within Francoism and that its fall coincides with the rise of AP/PP, demonstrate the links between PP and Francoism, in terms of leaders and representatives, ideology, votes and voters.

5) 1993 marks a turning point: PSOE obtains only a relative majority and PP definitively emerges as its antagonist. Since then PSOE and PP become the two majority parties and start to concentrate the highest number of votes in Spain. The party system clearly defines itself as two-party and the results of one party are mirrored by those of its principal opponent; since 1993 PP and PSOE alternated in government with absolute majorities (in 2000 and 2011) or relative majorities (PSOE in 1993, 2004 and 2008; PP in 1996). Interestingly, this inflection point has been sanctioned by the first two televised presidential debates between PP and PSOE candidates that took place in 1993<sup>67</sup>. As a consequence, more radical options, such as IU, started to lose traditional social support: one can therefore observe an increasing ideological *convergence*. By pursuing a chimerical *centerness*, PP and especially PSOE (who moved towards the right) increasingly assumed conservative Neoliberal positions and policies underwent an increasing uniformization.

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<sup>67</sup> On the monopoly of PP and PSOE on the public and private TV, see Fernandez-Sarasola (2009b: 335-338).

6) We can observe that IU and PSOE results are related: a loss of votes for IU means an increase in votes for PSOE; this is particularly evident in the two peaks of 1982 and 2004. Likewise, a loss of votes for PSOE often means an increase in votes for IU, as in 1996. Despite ideological differences (IU is more Socialist, more environmentalist, more Republican and more laic), the systematic relation between IU and PSOE results proves that PSOE and IU electors (or at least some of them) are somehow close, moving from one party to the other depending on contingent circumstances; we also may think that IU obtains most votes when electors are dissatisfied with PSOE policies, for instance due to an excessive PSOE move to the center.

7) IU has consistently lost voters since 1996.

8) Equally, since the early 1990s, the Right has increased its representation, probably due to the overall upward economic trend of Spain, and the increase in GDP (gross domestic product). It is well-known that richer electors tend to be more conservative, since they have something to conserve. Moreover, the Spanish population, like that of many other European countries, is becoming increasingly elderly and it is common for elderly electors tend to vote for conservative parties, mainly because they have more to conserve (materially and symbolically) vis-à-vis youngsters.

The observation of the following chart (fig. 28) highlights several other factors:




Figure 28. MPs of the peripheralist parties in the *Congreso* (1977-2004)

Peripheralist parties (regionalist, federalist or separatist) began emerging during the 1979 elections. In the early 1980s the institution of CCAA as politico-administrative entities<sup>68</sup> increased the role of parties such as CiU, PNV, ERC, HB, and CC in their respective regions as well as in the *Congreso*, as shown in the chart above. Even though they play minor roles in national assemblies, regional parties have featured strongly in the regional assemblies and governments of the Basque Country, Catalonia, Galicia, and the Canary Islands.

Although all 17 Spanish regions are autonomous, three regions are especially important for historical and ideological reasons: the Basque Country, Catalonia, and Galicia, and especially the first two. This is particularly relevant because during the 2008 debates candidates broadly refer to the *Estado de las Autonomías*, the decentralized form of the Spanish State established by the Constitution. In particular they deal extensively with issues concerning the Basque Country and Catalonia. The *Estado de las Autonomías* changed the centralist vision of the Spanish State that, with the exception of a number of reforms carried out during the II Republic, had lasted since 1714. Decentralization tried to provide an institutional solution to peripheralism necessary to disenable separatist movements, especially in the Basque Country and Catalonia. In this way centripetal forces were split among the moderates, who accessed institutions and were legitimized on the condition of accepting the new status quo, and the radicals, increasingly pushed towards the margins of the system.

In order to understand the unique nature of the situation in Catalonia and the Basque Country, consider that in the regional parliaments of 11 regions PP and PSOE have more than 80% of votes, but in Catalonia and the Basque Country the situation is radically different. Since the first regional elections (1980), and apart from a short parenthesis (PSC-ICV-ERC), Catalonia has been governed by CiU, which has a solid representation in the *Congreso* (4.3% of MPs in 2000 and 3% in 2004), in the Catalanian Parliament (27-47%) and in provincial and municipal assemblies. In the Basque Country PNV has been in power since the first regional elections (1980), sometimes in coalition, apart from a short period (1987-1990), when PSE governed. PNV is also well represented in the *Congreso* (2% in 2000 and 2004), in the Basque parliament, and in provincial and municipal assemblies. The case of Galicia is

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<sup>68</sup> 1980 saw the creation of the Basque and Catalanian regional parliaments; the Galician Parliament was founded in 1981, followed a year later by the Andalusian Parliament. The first elections for the remaining 13 regional parliaments were held in 1983.



considerably different: since the first regional elections (1981) AP/PP has been in power, apart from two parentheses of PSOE (1987-1990) and PSOE-BNG (2005-2011). In Galicia, peripheralism is not so entrenched as in the Basque Country and Catalonia and centralism has always been strong; indeed PP is traditionally well-established, due partly to the fact that Francisco Franco and Manuel Fraga were Galician. The second party in Galicia is PSdG, the Galician section of PSOE, and only in third place do we find the regional party, BNG, which, as we have seen above, is well represented in the regional, provincial and municipal assemblies, and since 1996 also in the *Congreso*. Generally speaking, 1993 also constitutes a turning point for peripheralist parties. Even though their role is reduced, they have MPs in the *Congreso* or *Senado* (CiU, PNV, CC, PAR, CHA, PA, BNG, and ERC), and play a particularly relevant role in the event of relative majorities of PP and PSOE: indeed, CiU, PNV and CC have all supported PP or PSOE in government (see Fernández-Sarasola 2009b).

## 2.4. Summary

Section one of this chapter provides an insight into the Spanish political and administrative structure, such as the division of power and administrative divisions into regions, provinces, and city and town councils. It also includes details of the main electoral processes at a national, regional, provincial and municipal level. For each level I have provided charts and figures to clearly show the relations of force between the main actors of Spanish political field. In doing so, I have demonstrated the monopoly exerted by PP and PSOE in Spain's political field.

Section two of this chapter describes the Spanish party system, succinctly introducing the main Spanish national and regional parties. At the end of this second section, in order to provide more details about the structure and the dynamics of the Spanish political field, I have focused in particular on the three main Spanish parties: PP, PSOE and IU. I have briefly recalled the recent Spanish history, then I have provided an historical background for each of these three parties; I tried to point out the main ideological features, focusing in particular on the way the parties present themselves. Finally this chapter also outlines the main figures of their electoral results for the *Congreso*, the principal stage for institutional politics in Spain. This section ends with some general remarks on the three parties and their relative situation within the Spanish political field: in particular I have focused on the systemic, reciprocal and relational links between the results of the three parties (PP-PSOE; PP-UCD; PSOE-IU) and the duopoly of PP and PSOE, as it emerged in 1993; this duopoly was sanctioned by 1993 televised debates and the 2008 debates, thereby perpetuating this structural constitution of the Spanish field.

The next chapter addresses questions concerning data collection, organization and treatment.

### **3. DATA. Collection, treatment and organization**

#### **3.1. Introduction**

This chapter deals with the data collection and organization methods. I will describe my data, explaining the reason for my choice of information, and pointing to a number of observations regarding *representativity*. Since I am dealing with audiovisual data, I will justify some methodological choices in favor of a simplified transcription. The chapter also includes an explanation of the way the materials are organized in the appendix and the reference system used. It ends with an introduction of the data treatment.

### 3.2. Selection of material

The data were collected over a period of approximately one month, from early February to 11 March 2008. This period embraces the entire electoral campaign, which officially opened on 22 February 2008, and closed on 7 March, with the so-called *día de reflexión* just before the vote, that took place on 9 March.

Although the focus is on the televised debates, I also have collected many other materials that can be considered secondary. However, some observations need to be made about this point. First of all I wish to highlight the fact that due to their nature, i.e. the fact of being part of electoral discourse aimed at popularizing and promoting candidates, all the materials were publicly and freely available within the public space, so no particular ethical issues were involved.

Living in Spain during the electioneering allowed me to follow closely political news, broadcasts, etc. However, I have not systematically collected all the discourses produced over the period in question. Instead, I adopted a more impressionistic –not illogical– approach. My exposure to the discourse of the candidates and other political agents mirrored that of the average Spanish citizen with an interest in the elections and electioneering.

In order to collect the data, each day I monitored the main websites of Spain's three major parties<sup>69</sup>, using printscreen to record the main contents. I recorded the songs used by the parties for electoral propaganda, as well as the main electoral videos<sup>70</sup>. I also collected the main texts appearing on the websites, as well as statements, declarations, etc., all the campaign slogans, and the manifestos of the three parties. Finally I recorded the videos of the two debates, which are the main object of my analysis.

I also transcribed all audiovisual materials: songs, electoral videos, and the televised debates<sup>71</sup>. The issue of transcription will be dealt with in greater detail at a later stage.

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<sup>69</sup> Official websites, personal websites created specifically for campaign purposes, and the main web platforms linked from the main websites: For Zapatero: [www.psoe.es](http://www.psoe.es); [www.lamiradapositiva.es](http://www.lamiradapositiva.es); [www.plataformaapoyozapatero.es](http://www.plataformaapoyozapatero.es); for Rajoy: [www.pp.es/marianorajoy](http://www.pp.es/marianorajoy); [www.pp.es](http://www.pp.es); [www.hazteoir.org](http://www.hazteoir.org); for Llamazares: [www.gasparllamazares.es](http://www.gasparllamazares.es); [www.izquierda-unida.es](http://www.izquierda-unida.es).

<sup>70</sup> I considered as main videos those produced by the parties or hosted on their official websites.

<sup>71</sup> On the Internet it is possible to find transcriptions of both debates, but they are normally incomplete or too approximate and inaccurate.

In short, the corpus consists of the following: 2 videos of the televised debates (approximately 190 minutes, the transcription of which totals more than 35,000 words); 51 videos, including the official party political broadcasts (22 for IU, 14 for PP, and 15 for PSOE, the transcription of which totals more than 6,200 words<sup>72</sup>); 2 songs (the transcription of which totals 550 words); the 3 electoral programs (more than 23,500 words) and the slogans and various texts featured on the main websites. Apart from the main corpus, constituted by the transcription of the two debates, the other data (videos, songs, slogans, electoral programs, etc.) can be considered secondary data, but they are vital for triangulation: they allow for a comparison between my main object of analysis (debates) and other texts or other communicative events produced in the same period, within the same domain (electoral), by the same authors, with the same function (persuasion), in order to determine how they contribute to the construction of presidentialiability.

This point of triangulation is related to the issue of representativity in my corpus. The material collected is *representative* in the sense that it allowed me to observe the emergence of some kind of patterns, more or less constant, and therefore explicative of my *quaestio*. This issue of representativity is also related to that of coherence and cohesion. It is reasonable to assume that a party engaged in electioneering, and therefore aiming for re/election, will produce texts targeting a similar purpose; consequently, each part of its discourse is representative of the whole, as a metonymy. In terms of data collection this issue is methodologically significant in that, even though a corpus needs to be of a certain size (in order to check the discursive consistency), it does not have to cover the entire phenomenon under analysis, in this case the entire discursive manifestation of the electioneering; which is totally unattainable. This impossibility lies not only in physical limitations, but especially in the characteristic of text and discourse itself: each text is only a *discretized* part of a larger continuous macro-text or macro-discourse<sup>73</sup>. Discourses are always part of the other discourses to which they refer: they are intrinsically *hypertextual*<sup>74</sup>. Therefore, regarding the relation between coherence and consistency and representativity, it is reasonable to assume that the texts constituting the

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<sup>72</sup> I transcribed only the main ones: 7 for IU, 12 for PP and 13 for PSOE.

<sup>73</sup> This is particularly true if we assume dialogicity and intertextuality (and/or also poly-authoriality) as inherent features of every text and discourse (Bakhtin 1981; 1986; Kristeva 1980; 1986) or the fact that text and discourses are infinite in the sense that they are immersed in a continuous discursive flow (Foucault 1970), or in a semiotic whole (Lotman 1996a[1984], 1996b[1981], 1996c[1992]).

<sup>74</sup> On the concept of hypertext, see Nelson (1991[1972], 1992[1987]), Landow (1992: 3-4), Cassany (2006: 171-233).

macro-text definable as “PSOE electoral discourse during 2008 general elections” are more or less coherent in strategies, purposes, even in the propositions used, and any deviation (incoherence or inconsistency) will prove highly remarkable and meaningful<sup>75</sup>. For instance, the propositions that ZP expresses in the debates will not differ from those expressed in the slogans; the lyrics of the song *Defender la Alegría* says will not differ (at least not too much) from the content of the political party broadcasts, etc.<sup>76</sup>

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<sup>75</sup> We can actually assume that coherence, consistency, and cohesion are *normal* features of any *normal* (i.e. not pathologic) discourse. Moreover, consistency becomes especially important for institutional discourses where the multiplicity of speakers require greater care to be taken over “unison”.

<sup>76</sup> This obviously cannot *a priori* exclude incoherence, but incoherence will be notable in that it is unexpected (abnormal).

### 3.3. The reason for choosing the debates

To avoid making the same mistakes as Borges' cartographer, who, obsessed with being as precise as possible in his geographic description, drew a full scale and therefore useless map of the Earth (Borges 1974[1960]: 847), I selected materials based on criteria of representativity rather than mimesis. Moreover, my approach to electoral discourse was more that of normal citizens than a researcher; far from being exposed to every text, they are only exposed to a certain number of them, even though they display a high degree of coherence and consistency. This has its counterpart in the well-known way in which (persuasive) discourses circulate due to the organization of the mass media system: high *redundancy*, i.e. the same texts or the same propositions appear repeatedly in different texts. In short, although a *fortiori* partial, my corpus tried to be *representative* of the discourse produced by the three parties and other agents of the political field<sup>77</sup>.

I therefore chose to analyze debates because they respond better than other texts to my research question: *they are the key communicative event for analyzing the discursive construction of presidentiability*; they epitomize electioneering as a stage for ritual confrontation; they *show* the mediatization and personalization of politics; they show the dialogicity and dialectic of facework, of the performance of self (Junod & Maillat 2010) and of stance-taking; they occur at the height of the election campaign and are watched by millions of Spaniards, turning them into the party political broadcast with the largest audience for both main parties, who receive the positive sanction (or legitimation) of TV; they are the space from which the two main Spanish parties can spread out the (dominant) discourse they produce, their *doxa*, for instance allowing the exclusion of ideological alternatives, such as IU. From this perspective, the lack of representation of Llamazares and IU and the fact that this party disappears at a certain point of my dissertation should not be seen as an incoherence of my analysis, but rather as a central feature of the Spanish political field.

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<sup>77</sup> These clarifications are necessary to avoid criticism targeting (C)DA (Levinson 1983; Widdowson 1998, 2004; Blommaert 2005). Note that, as Wodak & Meyer say, "there is no typical CDA way of collecting data" (2001a: 23); they continue to state that "there is little discussion about statistical or theoretical representativeness of the material collected. Although there are no explicit statement about this issue, one might assume that many CDA studies (perhaps with the exception of Teun van Dijk and Ruth Wodak) mostly deal with only small corpora which are usually regarded as being typical of certain discourses" (2001a: 25, but see also 31 footnote 7).

### 3.4. Multimodality and simplified transcription

My chosen method of data analysis requires a number of observations. Since my aim is to analyze the discursive construction of presidentiability within the two debates, through interactive moves and discursive-argumentative devices, I focused on certain elements of discourse, playing down others. This leads to a number of observations on two points: 1) multimodality; 2) transcription.

Regarding multimodality, I am aware that the choice of audiovisual materials requires a greater focus on multimodality. I recognize the importance of non-verbal aspects of discourse (Wodak & Meyer 2001a; Blommaert 2005; Fairclough 2001; Kress & van Leeuwen 1996; Kress et al. 1997; Kress & van Leeuwen 2001; Royce 2007; Ventola et al. 2004), but I preferred to deal only with textual features because they proved sufficient in order to answer the questions posed.

This point had consequences in terms of the way I transcribed the audiovisual data of the debates, opting to use a simplified transcription of spoken data. This choice is due to the large amount of data, which would have complicated a detailed micro-linguistic transcription, as well as to the fact that the interaction produced in the debates is closer to “(spoken) written discourse”, which could justify a textual approach, and the desire to simplify the reading process. Yet furthermore, the particular objects of my interest were the *patterns*, leading me to carry out an *extensive* rather than an *intensive* analysis. Other, more precise and faithful kinds of transcription, would have been useful for responding other *quaestiones*, but would have not been forcefully more useful (more explicative) in order to answer my research question: from this perspective a more detailed transcription would not have added to my analysis.



### **3.5. Organization of materials**

All the transcribed materials are included in an appendix at the end of the dissertation, including the transcription of the two televised debates, the transcription of the main videos, the two songs and the main slogans and texts; the “primary” materials (a recording of the televised debates, videos, songs, manifestos, etc.) will be included on a DVD attached to this paper.

As for the transcription of the two debates, which is the main object of analysis, the text reproduced in the appendix is numbered on each line, to guarantee easy access to every point. In-text references to corpus will have a specific form: for referring to the transcription of the debate I will use the following system: for instance I.128 refers to line 128 of the first debate; II.1155-1170 refers to lines 1155-1170 of the second debate, etc. Manifestos are referenced like books, with the author (PP, PSOE, IU), the year (2008) and the page (XX), whilst videos or songs will be referred to only by their title (in the appendix videos appear in alphabetic order for PP, PSOE and IU).

### **3.6. Data treatment**

A more detailed discussion of the data is given in the following chapter (4). Here I simply point out that the data analysis aims to establish patterns in the implementation of PP and PSOE moves and strategies of de/legitimation. My analysis is qualitative, descriptive and contrastive. It is a hermeneutic analysis of discourse that tries to compensate a textual approach with an interactive perspective. Following Wodak & Meyer (2001a), I have firstly sequentially analyzed my corpus, to pinpoint recurrent interactive moves of de/alignment or (verbal) discursive devices and patterns in their use, for instance, the recurrence of some uses of deixis, implicatures, metaphors, topoi, etc. I have then interpreted the results in order to determine how the candidates implemented their strategies of presidentiability construction.

The analysis of the discourse produced and circulated during the 2008 election campaign, together with the observation of the Spanish political and administrative structure as well as of Spanish political party system, will give a general picture of the Spanish political field and of the way it worked at the time of the 2008 general elections.

### **3.7. Summary**

This chapter has addressed the collection, organization and treatment of data. I have explained why I chose my data and presented my idea of representativity. I also presented my reasons for opting not to focus on multimodality and for using a simplified transcription. The next chapter (4) describes the analytical framework and the analytical tools used in my analysis.

#### 4. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK. Interactional and discourse analytical approaches

##### 4.1. Introduction

This section presents the analytical framework for the analysis of the discourse deployed during the two debates. This study can be situated in the strand of the Discourse Analysis or, better, in that of the Discourse Studies. Put simply, **Discourse Analysis** (also known as DA) studies discourse (Angermuller et al. 2014; Blommaert 2005; Brown & Yule 1983; Gee 2005; Harris 1952; Jaworski & Coupland 1999; Johnstone 2002; Renkema 2004; Schiffrin et al 2001; Stubbs 1983; van Dijk 1997b). The problem is that the term “discourse”, used for the very first time by Harris (1952), and since then widely employed in the humanities and the social sciences, is a fuzzy word. Discourse can be considered, as in the words of Harris himself, as “language above the sentence”. However, as Cameron shows (2001; see also Widdowson 2004), this definition is somehow insufficient. Discourse can be conceived as coherent units of varying length of spoken or written language used by speakers and hearers for a variety of purposes<sup>78</sup>. It is also possible to conceive discourse as a social practice determined by social structures as well as determining social structures and social practices. As Gee & Handford say:

Discourse analysis is the study of language in use. It is the study of the meaning we give language and the actions we carry out when we use language in specific contexts. Discourse analysis is also sometimes defined as the study of language above the level of sentence, of the way sentences combine to create meaning, coherence and accomplish purposes (Gee & Handford 2012: 1).

These authors go on to state that the term “discourse analysis” applies both to texts and talks. In order to refer to the different approaches for analyzing any “naturally occurring” significant semiotic event, the term **Discourse Studies** is therefore probably more appropriate than Discourse Analysis. Discourse Studies deal with communicative events. As in “pure” DA, my analysis addresses various levels or dimensions of interaction: genres, words selection, rhetoric, meanings, speech acts, moves, strategies,

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<sup>78</sup> The term discourse could also apply to other forms of human communication, such as images, but language is the preeminent semiotic mode analyzed.

turns, the relation between discourse and context, the relation between discourse and power, etc. The field of the DA is very broad, dealing with an enormous variety of objects of analysis and of perspectives: among the main theoretical and analytical approaches relevant for the present work, mention should be made of at least the following: **Conversation Analysis; Ethnography of Communication; Pragmatics; Rhetoric and Argumentation; Critical Discourse Analysis**. It is important to bear in mind that different as these approaches may seem, and even though they address different facets of language-in-use, they are all based on the idea that language is social interaction, and deal with the discourse as well as the social contexts in which discourse is entrenched.

**Conversation Analysis** (also known as CA) studies talk-in-interaction, i.e. verbal and non-verbal conduct, in situations of everyday life (Garfinkel 1967; Goffman 1983; Schegloff 1995; Sacks et al. 1974; Sacks 1995; Cameron 2001; Hutchby & Wooffitt 2008; Atkinson & Heritage 1984; Psathas 1995; Schegloff 2007; Sidnell 2010; Sidnell & Stivers 2012; Ten Have 2007; Wooffitt 2005)<sup>79</sup>. Herein this case, I follow CA by working on a transcription of recorded data (the debates), even though my transcription is not as detailed as usual in CA. As in CA, my analysis is driven by data and attempts to find recurring patterns of interaction. It is important to mention that one of the main concerns of CA, turn-taking, is strictly defined in the debate, and this influences the debaters' interaction. Another key factor for consideration is that CA differs from **Interactional Sociolinguistics** (Gumperz 1982; see Cameron 2001) in that it does not consider it necessary to interview the protagonists of the interaction for the analysis of talk-in-interaction. In this sense, I have not consulted or interviewed participants (candidates or others involved in the event) about their interaction. My approach also differs from 'pure' CA in that in my work I have included an analysis of larger sociocultural phenomena.

**Ethnography of Communication**, combining the study of culture with that of linguistic codes, deals primarily with "the description and understanding of communicative behavior in specific cultural settings" (Saville-Troike 2003: 13-14); it studies how members of particular speech communities use language in context and in relation to their social and cultural practices and beliefs (Hymes 1962; 1964; 1972; 1974; Cameron 2001). However, as Cameron says, the study of a text's context is so

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<sup>79</sup> Note that even if DA is the general term used for indicating the analysis of spoken interactions or spoken discourse (Cameron 2001), some scholars oppose CA and DA (see for instance Wooffitt 2005).

important that an analyst will spend more time describing context than analyzing text<sup>80</sup>. In this sense, Blommaert blurred the boundaries between text and context (2001; 2005). The Ethnography of Communication not only studies the communicative event in all its components, but also the functions it has within a given culture. In this work I have analyzed the presidential debates as communicative events, with all their structural features, but I have also analyzed them within the socio-historical context and the culture they are embedded in.

**Pragmatics** analyzes the contribution of context to the construction of meaning(s): i.e. the fact that speaker and listener do not construct meaning based exclusively on their shared knowledge of the structural features of language, but also on the context of the interaction, previous knowledge of the interlocutors, their inferred aims, and other factors. Since Pragmatics covers such issues as speech act theory, conversational implicatures, inferences, etc. (Austin 1962; Searle 1965; 1969; 1975; 1979; Grice 1989; Levinson 1983; 2000; Brown & Levinson 1978; Mey 1993; Sperber & Wilson 2005; Verschueren et al. 1995; Yule 1996), in my analysis I will use some of the tools offered by this discipline in order to understand how candidates manage their presidentialiability.

**Rhetoric** is the study of the ability to persuade. It is very difficult to separate it from **Argumentation**, which is the study of how conclusions result from logical reasoning, i.e. claims based on premises, either soundly or not (van Eemeren & Grootendorst 2004; van Eemeren 2001; van Eemeren et al. 1993; 1996; van Eemeren & Grootendorst 2004; Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 1958). As van Eemeren & Grootendorst define it:

Argumentation is a verbal, social, and rational activity aimed at convincing a reasonable critic of the acceptability of a standpoint by putting forward a constellation of propositions justifying or refuting the proposition expressed in the standpoint (2004: 1).

Since debate is a form of taking a position and defending it, I have referred to some of the tools of Argumentation, such as arguments and loci or topoi.

As for **Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA)**, it analyzes discourse as language-in-use as well as “a form of social practice that constructs the objects of which it purports

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<sup>80</sup> According to Cameron, a difference between CA and EC lies in the balance between the importance given to text and context (2001: 51).

to speak” (Cameron 2001: 123; see also Blommaert & Bulcaen 2000; Caldas-Coulthard & Coulthard 1996; Chouliaraki & Fairclough 1999; Fairclough 1992; 1995; 2001; 2003a; Fowler et al. 1979; Jaworski & Coupland 1999; van Dijk 1993c; 1993d; Weiss & Wodak 2003; Wodak & Meyer 2001c)<sup>81</sup>. Since it is concerned with the enactment of power and the unveiling of social inequalities, it focuses mainly on the analysis of institutional discourses, and in particular on mediated discourses. CDA has been criticized for its open commitment, for its lack of clear analytical methods, for its hermeneutic nature, for the fact of being mainly a textual approach –strictly linked to literary criticism– and for focusing on non-ordinary discourses (Cameron 2001; Widdowson 2004)<sup>82</sup>. Under this premise my decision to analyze the televised debates can be seen as an adherence to this discipline. However, in order to overcome the limitations of CDA, I have tried to combine some points of this approach with others from the disciplines referred to above, in particular interactional approaches.

I will now discuss the analytical tools employed to study the debate in interactional terms, mainly as a (ritual) practice of stance taking, de/alignment, footing and as facework. Part two of this section focuses on the discursive devices employed by candidates for (re)presenting and categorizing events and actors in terms of de-legitimation moves: metaphors, presuppositions, narratives, reported speech and quotations, deixis, argumenta, fallacia, and loci (or topoi). A reflection on these devices is then necessary in order to analyze the candidates’ discourse. Obviously these two plans of analysis, the interactional and the discourse approach, are intertwined rather than disarticulated.

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<sup>81</sup> Cf. also the dispute on CDA between Widdowson and Fairclough (Widdowson 1995; 1996; 1998; Fairclough 1996b; see also Widdowson 2004, where some of these contributions *contra* CDA have been collected).

<sup>82</sup> One could disagree with Cameron’s criticism of the lack of ordinariness of the object of analysis of CDA, as in our Western society, institutional talks seem to be as ordinary as other “ordinary” talks.

## 4.2. Interactional approaches

In order to gain a proper insight into debates, and to analyze the de-legitimation moves, the discursive strategies as well as the discursive mechanisms used to implement them, we have to bear in mind that the main feature of this discursive practice is interactivity.

### 4.2.1. The interactional construction of stances

Debates are a stage for politicians to publicly perform stance taking. Even if the turns are so strictly defined and organized that they make a debate look like two parallel monologues<sup>83</sup>, debates are clearly interactions due to the polyphonic and intertextual nature of discourse as well as to the intrinsic interactional and dialogic feature of stance taking. During the debates, candidates are engaged in a specific type of discursive action, stance taking<sup>84</sup>. A stance can be defined as follows:

as a public act by a social actor, achieved dialogically through overt communicative means (language, gesture, and other symbolic forms), through which social actors simultaneously evaluate objects, position subjects (themselves and others), and align with other subjects, with respect to any salient dimension of value in the sociocultural field. I have argued for a particular configuration of actors and actions as the defining feature of stance. Key to this configuration is a set of three entities (first subject, second subject, stance object) and a set of three actions (evaluation, positioning, alignment) (Du Bois 2007: 169).

In this definition there are some points that need closer definition: dialogicity and the polyphony are widely intended as a means of responding to the discourse or subjectivity of others, as for instance in (textual or paraphrased) reported speech, but also in terms of constitutive intertextuality or interdiscursivity<sup>85</sup>. Du Bois is extremely clear about the importance of prior discourse in the construction of a stance and of a convergent or divergent alignment as well as the multimodal nature of communicative means (language, gestures, etc.). The evaluative nature of the process of stance taking relates it with the formation and expression of ideology (Voloshinov, [1929]1973; Bourdieu

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<sup>83</sup> This feature seems to be favorable to candidates that can perform their speech easily, i.e. they can easily manage their presidentiability (enhancing their image and detracting from that of their opponent), without incurring in open, hence unpredictable, conversation that can threaten their face and which is therefore risky for both competitors.

<sup>84</sup> In this sense, stance taking is similar to argumentation: as van Eemeren says, “argumentation always pertains to a specific point of view with regard to a certain issue” (2001: 11). For a discussion on the relationship between the terms *footing*, *alignment* and *stance*, see Hale (2011).

<sup>85</sup> For an overview of the concept from a clear sociolinguistic perspective, see Jaffe (2009).



2000). Finally, alignment is the relative stance of each subject about one object and it counts as a process and product of the negotiation.

In the case of these debates we will see that candidates take a stance on various issues. For our purposes here the issues are the topics discussed by the candidates (the economy, immigration, terrorism, nationalism, etc.). In taking their stances, candidates produce ideological-evaluative discourses mobilizing many semiotic resources. Although I recognize the multimodal nature of the stance taking, in this analysis I will focus primarily on linguistic structures and mechanisms. Since stance taking is never an isolated process, occurring instead in a discursive flow, a proper analysis of the discourse deployed in the debates by the candidates should at least take into account the main intertextual and interdiscursive references. By the same token, since each candidate utterance is linked to those of the other candidate, it will be crucial to show the interactional enchainment of the moves that each candidate makes to manage his own and the other's presidentiability. In this sense, considerable attention will be given to the reaction to other's stance taking, especially in terms of reported speech. In terms of presidentiability management, reported speech is important in that it relates to the "public" owning and the responsibility of a stance (Du Bois, 2007: 173).

#### **4.2.2. Participation frame: Turn taking, Participants, Interactional space**

Finally, I will take into account the fact that the candidates share the same **participation frame** about "what is it that's going on here" (Goffman 1974: 8), i.e. about the debates (polarization, rules, confrontation, etc.), and the way they engage in their stance taking: for instance it will be evident that, due to the ritual nature of the communicative event and the polarization it entails, the candidates will exaggerate and over-perform their opposition through constant *dealignment*. This point is obviously linked to my conceptions of debates as performed rituals of confrontation (see section 5.3).

In this sense, in the debates in question the **turn taking**, which is a crucial object of analysis for interactional approaches (Sacks et al. 1974; see also Bachmann et al. 1991), is previously organized and established: turns are fixed and candidates are not allowed to interrupt the speaker or to exceed the allotted time. The participants know the rules and breaking them will have a negative impact on their self-image. However, in some cases the candidates do overlap their speech in order to contrast their own stance with that of their opponent: in those cases the candidate that interrupts attempts

to reduce the persuasive force of speaker's argument or move; the interrupter tries to discredit the other's statements or refute the accusations.

As for the **Interactional space** (see Mondada 2005), in the debates, the space where interaction occurs is constructed in order to give the impression of confrontation between the candidates, who are positioned face-to-face, and of the neutrality of the moderator, situated equidistantly between the candidates. Conveying neutrality is also the reason for the color of the stage, which is neither red nor blue (the corporate colors of the two parties) or in any other color with political significance (black, orange, green), but rather a "neutral" beige. These issues will be further considered in chapter 5.

#### **4.2.3. Faces, faces in interaction and facework**

The concept of *face*, like those of *political capital* and *ethos* (see chapter 1), is crucial for understanding politicians' behavior<sup>86</sup>. In my introduction to presidentiability management I referred to the issue of *attributes*: even in the classical conception provided by Goffman, the notion of *face* is related to the issue of *approved attributes*: "Face is an image of self delineated in terms of approved social attributes" (Goffman 1972[1967]: 5). I also have often referred to the *rituality* of political interaction during the debate, and Goffman himself deals extensively with ritual roles of the self in facework (1972[1967]: 31-32).

In his analysis of facework (see Goffman 1972[1967]: 12 for a definition), Goffman also defines a situation that perfectly matches that of political debates (*id*: 24-26): an interaction whereby the interlocutors attack each other, or, in Goffman's terms, threaten each other's face, in order to increase own face and decrease that of the other interactant. It is clear that this is the situation here: each candidate attacks the other in order to increase his own presidentiability and decrease that of his opponent.

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<sup>86</sup> On face, see among others, Haug (2013); Arundale (2013); and Hernández-Flores (2013).

### 4.3. Discourse analytical approaches

This section describes the principal tools used to analyze the political discourse of the two presidential debates of the 2008 election campaign. It includes a discussion of the way candidates (re)present events, actions and actors: the way they categorize agents, the narratives employed, the arguments deployed or the loci referred to, the way they use metaphors and exploit presuppositions as devices for implementing wider delegitimation moves, the way they use deixis for managing (their own or the opponent's) agency, or for creating desalignment, the way they use reported speech or quotations and more in general interdiscursivity to present a description of reality favorable to their socio-discursive strategies.

Since there are many relevant variables and many different closely intertwined levels of analysis, it is impossible to use them all, and, as van Dijk states, “we must make choices, and select those structures for closes analysis that are relevant for the study of a social issue” (2001a: 99).

It goes without saying that also many other features of the discourse deployed by both candidates –which I have not taken into account here– could have shed light on the ways the candidates manage presidentiability: for example, intonation, voice, mimic, proxemic features, etc. This selection is naturally open to criticism, but I am convinced that the analytical tools used are sufficiently relevant in order to shed light on the strategies deployed by the two candidates in order to manage presidentiability. In analyzing the positive self-presentation the negative presentation I will try to take into account the fact that meaning is constructed at different levels: lexico-semantic + morpho-syntactic + logico-pragmatic. In keeping with the nature of this work, I will draw from different disciplines including **Pragmatics, Semantics, Argumentation and Rhetoric**. I will consider the usefulness of *implicitness* and *indirectness*, *presupposition*, *inferences*, *implicatures*, *entailments*, etc. in strengthening persuasion as well as the strategic use of personal *deixis* to present a polarized division of the world, where “we” are good and “they” are bad; I will analyze how the candidates use *narratives* for the strategic (re)presentation of social actors and actions; I will investigate the way politicians use *arguments*, *topoi* and *fallacies*, *metaphors*, as well as *reported speech* for positive self-presentation and the negative presentation of the other. All these categories are rather classic features in political discourse analysis (see, for instance, van Dijk 2000e).

I wish to clarify that these tools do not work as closed sets, independent from each other, but rather as intertwined levels of analysis. For instance, metaphors are a lexical choice with semantic implications; they could appear in a certain narrative and constitute a fallacy or form part of reported speech, etc.

The following section provides a number of examples of these. Chapters 7-10 provide a deeper analysis of presidentiability management during the debates in relation to the four main topics of the 2008 campaign; in this way I will show how interactional and discourse analytical approaches can be useful in understanding the construction of presidentiability.

#### **4.3.1. Metaphor**

As the seminal work of Lakoff & Johnson (1980; 1981; see also Underhill 2011: chs. 2 and 3) has proven, metaphors play a relevant role in everyday language, since they have crucial cognitive functions: metaphors make it possible to understand unfamiliar ideas in terms of something that is already familiar; they shape human experience, as well as the way people act, according to certain metaphors.

Since antiquity scholars have investigated the role played by metaphors in discourse, in literary texts as well as in political discourse, and, in more recent years also in ordinary language (Black 1981[1955]; Davidson 1981[1978]; Searle 1981[1979]; Lakoff 1993; Underhill 2011)<sup>87</sup>. Due to the power of metaphors for constructing meanings and behavior, it is not surprising that metaphors are of such particular relevance in political discourse, where they are very frequent (see, among others, Wilson 1990; Musolff 2000; Lakoff 1995; 2002[1996]; Mio 1997; Ghafele 2004; Chilton 2004: 51-52). Lakoff & Johnson are very clear on the importance of metaphors in political discourse:

No political ideology addresses the main issue head-on. [...] Political and economic ideologies are framed in metaphorical terms. Like all other metaphors, political and economic metaphors can hide aspects of reality. But in the area of politics and economics, metaphors matter more, because they constrain our lives. A metaphor in a political or economic system, by what it hides, can lead to human degradation (Lakoff & Johnson 1980: 236).

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<sup>87</sup> For a general introduction to metaphor from Discourse Analysis, see Calsamiglia-Blancafort & Tusón-Valls (1999: 345-350); for an approach to metaphor from Pragmatics, see Escandell-Vidal (1993: chap. 11); for a revisitation of Lakoff & Johnson's "experientialist" approach (1981: 286), see Musolff (2012).

Metaphors can take many forms: they can be local, global or archetypical. A local metaphor only acts at sentence level, while a global metaphor acts at the level of the entire text, as a feature conditioning the discourse. As I have shown (Screti 2013), during the 2008 PSOE electoral campaign, the whole idea of *defending joy*, where *joy* represents the PSOE, its policies, and its electors, is an example of a global metaphor: it underlies not only the entire text of the song *Defender la Alegría*, but also several other videos and was the *concept* underpinning the entire (electoral) discourse of Zapatero the candidate. Archetypical metaphors (Gill & Whedbee 1997; Osborn 1967) act across many discourses or texts, across generations, always construing the same meanings.

Both Zapatero and Rajoy use metaphors for the purpose of positive self-presentation and the negative presentation of their opponent. An example is when ZP refers to PP as an *obstacle*, framing PP as an impediment to PSOE's government. Through this metaphor, ZP describes PSOE as actively trying to do something, while PP as the passive element that impedes PSOE's action. This description obviously frames PSOE in positive terms and PP in negative ones. Another example is when RJ describes immigration as an *avalanche*. This widespread metaphor, where immigrants represent a threat for Spaniards, allows RJ to present himself as a defender of the Spanish against Zapatero's passivity: the description allows for the positive framing of PP and the negative framing of PSOE.

#### **4.3.2. Inferential meanings: presuppositions, entailments, implicatures**

The balance between the speaker's duties and hearer's needs in terms of amount of information has been investigated by Grice (1975). In general people say less than they mean (and mean much more than they say), because speaker and hearer share some information about context, (more or less) the same language, a certain amount of background, as well as an encyclopedic knowledge of the world. So, many of the blanks left by speakers are filled in by hearers.

In political discourse, implicit aspects of discourse normally create ideological meanings (Wilson 1990). According to van Dijk (2000e), it is frequent that in polarized ideological speeches, such as those that are the object of this work, implicitness is used for a positive self presentation and a negative presentation of the other, for instance to emphasize our good points and deemphasizing our bad ones as well as for emphasizing their bad points and deemphasizing their good ones (van Dijk 1995a; 2006a; 2006b). Since most of the information conveyed by discourse is not expressed, but is only

implied or presupposed, and the fact that an active role of the hearer in co-constructing the meaning strengthens persuasion (Eco 1979), candidates use presuppositions in their discourse: for instance candidates exploit semantic entailments, which establish a common ground among interlocutors and allow a construction agreement on the basis of common assumptions, despite actual disagreement on arguments (this will be discussed further at a later stage).

There are different kinds of implicitness: on the one hand allusions, ambiguity, vagueness, etc., and on the other, pragmatic presuppositions, also called *conversational implicatures*. Grice's seminal work (1975) has amply investigated these forms of implicitness and the role of implicatures depending on context (Strawson 1950; Levinson 1983: ch. 3; Mey 2001[1993]: 45-52).

Finally, there is a third kind of presupposition, more strictly "linguistic", that does not depend on the common knowledge of the context widely intended (which can be defined as pragmatic inferences), but on logic inferences based on the literal meaning of the words, i.e. semantic inferences. These inferences are often triggered by verbs such as *to manage* (it implies 'to try'), *to stop*, *to begin*, *to return*, adverbs such as *again*, *anymore*, etc. but also a noun such as *defender* triggers inferences, since it presupposes a *threat*, etc. These words are in fact termed *presupposition triggers* (Levinson 1983: ch. 4; Mey 2001[1993]: 27-29; in particular for the study of inexplicit meanings in political discourse, see Chilton (2004: 61-65); on the power of implicit discourse see also Amossy (2010a[2000]: 142-148) among others). For instance, when RJ says during the debate

RJ: Corregir el rumbo [correct the course]

he is activating a semantic presupposition, based on the literal meaning of the presupposition trigger *corregir* [to correct], which logically implies that the actual course is not correct. By the same token, when ZP says:

ZP: Continuar creciendo económicamente [keep growing]

He is logically implying that Spain's economy has previously experienced a period of growth. Obviously these inferences are ideologically determined. Interestingly enough, there is an important conversational presupposition that implies that only PP will be able to correct the course or PSOE to make Spain's economy grow.

It is evident that presuppositions play a role in strengthening persuasion regarding de-legitimation. But what is especially interesting is the importance of presupposition triggers in spreading the *doxa*, the dominant discourse: they establish as presupposed (than shared) contents that in reality are not, contents that are disputed (Santulli 2005: 81-84; Sbisá 1999). Through semantic or pragmatic presuppositions, the speaker subtracts premises to discussion; establishes them as a common ground for discussion and in doing so strengthens his own premises. In the examples shown above, such as *corregir el rumbo*, the verb *corregir* triggers a semantic presupposition that “the present course is wrong”, establishing a negative situation – attributable to PSOE government – as common ground, which only PP can change. In doing so, the speaker has presented the opponent negatively and himself in a positive light.

There is also an important contextual feature that provides implicitness all its strength: *inference*. Given the contextual information (the election campaign, the highly polarized nature of the elections, etc.), receivers infer that PSOE lacks what PP has and vice versa. Inferences are a constant in human communication: if we always say less than we effectively mean to convey, the addressee has to actively reconstruct the meaning. This is very important in electoral discourse, whose end is persuasion. As Campany clearly puts it:

What people deduce is more important than what you tell them. So, if you just limit yourself to providing some suggestions or some elements of reflection, you could better motivate their support (2005: 151, my translation).

Inferences contribute to implementing the de-legitimation strategy and presidentiability management. This is evident in both debates. By listing some positive features as typical of themselves, RJ or ZP imply conversationally (Grice 1975; Levinson 1983; Wilson 1990; see also the “invited inferences” of Lycan (1986) apud Wilson 1990) that the opponent lacks these characteristics. Thanks to their knowledge of context (electioneering, polarization, etc.), receivers know that in electioneering the construction of identity is differential, so they infer that such positive features only

belong to speaker. By associating these positive features to himself and dissociating them from his opponent, the speaker legitimizes himself and delegitimizes the opponent.

#### 4.3.3. Narratives

In general terms, a narrative is any account of connected events presented by an addresser in a sequence. Narratives are a fundamental part of social life with key socio-cognitive functions such as organizing and giving sense to experience (Labov 2010; White 1980; Bruner 1987; 1990; 1991; Goffman 1974; 1981[1976]; Hoffmann 2010). They are a fundamental way of describing social actors and actions, which in turn is a basic tool for framing the other(s) and otherness (van Leeuwen 2003[1996]).

Due to its polarized nature, narratives are crucial in political discourse (Santulli 2005: 70 et seq.) and are used strategically (Shenav 2005; 2006; Hsu 2001; Duranti 2006; Larat 2005; Bennett & Edelman 1985). Indeed, politicians can use narratives to associate positive values with themselves and negative values with others whilst describing themselves and the others.

According to Edelman (1988), citizens mainly have experience of politics through its linguistic description, so politics *is* political language. In this sense, political narratives play a key role in the ideological and hence polarized descriptions of actors and (past) actions. Politicians use narratives for positive self-presentation and the negative presentation of the other in order to win votes<sup>88</sup>. In political narratives, (Santulli 2005: 72 et seq.) the narrators are always *homodiegetic*, i.e. internal to the story, and often *autodiegetic*, since they are the protagonists of the story; the protagonist is often the listener, either the politician on the stage or the citizen watching the political broadcast on television. Normally the speaker and the listener play different *actantial roles* (Greimas 1966; 1987[1973]; 1990) –the agonist and the antagonist respectively– and are characterized as the classic *hero* and *villain* explored in narratology (Propp 2000[1928]).

For instance, Schubert says that politicians carefully chose a selection of past events with “the function of presenting the speaker in a favorable light or making derogatory remarks about the political opponent” (2010: 144). In his work, Schubert

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<sup>88</sup> Labov & Waletzky (1997[1967]) distinguish two main functions of narratives: referential and evaluative, which is the most relevant for this work (see also Hoffmann 2010: 3).



also provides a classification of the functions fulfilled by narratives in political discourse:

<b>Personalization</b>	<i>I have done...</i>
<b>Integration</b>	<i>we have done...</i>
<b>Exemplification</b>	<i>he has done...</i>
<b>Polarization</b>	<i>we did (good)/you did (bad); we did not (bad)/ you did (bad)...</i>

As we will see, the narratives presented by Zapatero and Rajoy fulfill these 4 fundamental functions: they serve to focus attention on the candidate, as when RJ says (1); to create a group (see also the section on deixis) as when ZP says (2); to present clear and vivid *exempla* of what is going on through hypotyposis<sup>89</sup>; to polarize the world between we and them (see also deixis), where we did things well and you did things badly, as in (2).

(1) yo formé parte de un gobierno en el año 1996, que tuvo que pedir un crédito en el mes de diciembre para pagar las pensiones

(2) Hemos desbloqueado lo que ustedes frenaron que es la investigación con células madre, [...] ustedes nunca han apoyado las leyes que han supuesto avances de derechos, no apoyaron la ley del divorcio, [...] no han apoyado ningún avance de derechos de los ciudadanos en este periodo democrático [...] desde hace 30 años no han movido un dedo para que los españoles tengan más derechos

All four functions are employed for a positive self-presentation and a negative presentation of the opponent. According to Fetzer:

in the context of political discourse, small stories are used strategically to support the politician's argumentation, to reconstruct her/his credibility, to express alignment with the audience and to reconstruct common ground and group coherence, thus presenting the political self as a multifaceted identity who knows how to perform appropriately in different spheres of life (2010: 181).

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<sup>89</sup> According to Schubert, "since narrative has the potential of dramatizing and visualizing political matters, it obviously holds strong popular appeal for broad audiences" (2010: 144). The author also states that the importance of narratives in political discourse is increased by the role played by media in enhancing audiences; this observation is linked to the tendency of the media system to personalize and simplify events and facts (see chapter 5 and in particular section 5.3 on personalization).

Narratives also allow candidates to present themselves as coherent (Fetzer 2010: 180; Duranti 2006: 486), which helps to construct their credibility. As seen in the discussion on the key attributes of presidentiability (chapter 1), coherence is related to credibility: people tend to trust coherent rather than incoherent persons. So ZP and RJ constantly try to present themselves as coherent (and therefore trustworthy) and their opponent as incoherent (and by extension untrustworthy), as, for instance, when ZP reproaches RJ for criticizing PSOE's immigration policy whilst the PP government, with RJ as Minister of the Interior, did even worse.

ZP: de las cinco regularizaciones, señor Rajoy, que hizo el PP, tres pertenecen a su etapa de ministro. Requisitos: bastaba una factura de una noche de hotel o un bono-bus. Señor Rajoy, ¿con qué cara habla usted de regularizaciones, usted que como ministro regularizó inmigrantes con un bono-bus?

Narratives also work as a polarized presentation of the actors: both debates contain frequent references to the opposition between good and evil constructed over time (before/now) and persons (we/you, if candidates speak to each other or we/them if candidate speak to the audience):

before – we – good	vs.	now – they – bad
before – they – bad	vs.	now – we – good

As will be seen in the analysis of the debates (chapters 7-10), these kinds of narratives are common, as they are highly effective devices for improving polarization, and enacting the positive self-presentation and negative presentation of the other.

Apart from narratives, there are also many other devices used by politicians to demonstrate that their opponents are incoherent, in contrast to their own coherence. One such example is **reported speech** or the **quotation**.

#### 4.3.4. Reported speech and quotations

References to the discourse of others as (direct or indirect) quotations or as reported speech are to be understood under the more general idea of dialogism<sup>90</sup> and intertextuality (Bakhtin 1981; 1986; Kristeva 1980; 1986; Voloshinov 1973[1929]; Fairclough 1992; see also Barthes' reflections (1977: 159) on text as *fabric*) and interdiscursivity (Blommaert 2005: 253; Fairclough 1992). Fairclough (1992: 117) distinguishes between "constitutive intertextuality", the structural polyphony of discourses, also referred to as interdiscursivity, i.e. the fact that all discourses are made of other (piece of, reference to) discourses, and that there are no isolated discourses (see also Foucault 1970) and "manifest intertextuality" –which is of greater relevance here– which refers to a discourse that openly presupposes or recalls other discourses. According to Voloshinov, every discourse is a situated social practice with evaluative meanings and directed at certain social aims that take place between interlocutors. Each discourse is therefore a piece of dialogue: hence dialogicity and dialecticalness are common features of discourse. Moreover discourse is not an autonomous event: it does not arise *ex abrupto* and *ex nihilo*, for it is necessarily connected with what was uttered before and is a premise for what will be uttered after (this is related to Foucault's reflections (1970) on discourse). From this perspective, no discourse is independent from other discourses, but in a way or another it more or less overtly and consciously quotes them or some parts of them: it echoes, presupposes, refutes, denies, comments, recasts and entextualizes (Bauman & Briggs 1990; Silverstein & Urban 1996; Blommaert 2005: 47-48) them. As Blommaert clearly defines it:

Entextualisation refers to the process by means of which discourses are successively or simultaneously decontextualised and metadiscursively recontextualised, so that they become a new discourse associated to a new context and accompanied by a particular metadiscourse which provides a sort of 'preferred reading' for the discourse. This new discourse has become a 'text' (2005: 47).

This idea, whereby someone's words are 'used' by other speakers with other socio-discursive ends, is very useful in the analysis of political electoral discourse, since, due to its polarization, the discourse of one candidate presupposes the opponents' discourses, if only to deny them or take an opposite stance. The cases where the

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<sup>90</sup> Note that, as Blommart says, dialogism does not imply cooperation or sharedness or equality (2005: 44-45).

discourse of one candidate refers to previous turns or even discourses before or outside the communicative event of the debate are numerous and require a deeper analysis (chapters 7-10). Here I will deal with the open reference made by candidates to their own or others' previous turns or discourses. We will see how candidates quote each other, how they use pieces of the discourses of others –either opponents or allies– to construct their own discourse, putting their opponent in a negative light by using their discourse, re-footing opponents' discourse or re-reading it in a preferred reading which is favorable to them and strategically functional to achieving their own discursive aims (managing presidentiability to obtain votes).

Thus I will deal with the special kind of *polyphony* that is reported speech<sup>91</sup>. According to Voloshinov (1973[1929]: 115-123), “reported speech is speech within speech, utterance within utterance, and at the same time also speech about speech, utterance about utterance” (id.: 115) so that the reported utterance becomes a theme of one's utterance<sup>92</sup>. Voloshinov says that:

Reported speech is regarded by the speaker as an utterance belonging to someone else, an utterance that was originally totally independent, complete in its construction, and lying outside the given context (id.: 116).

According to Santulli (2005: 159 et seq.), reported speech can be seen as a form of narrative that becomes more dramatized through the use of direct discourse, bringing the (quoted) protagonist to the foreground (id.: 163-164).

Quoting the opponent through direct or indirect discourse is a frequent resource of political discourse, as reflected in the debates analyzed in this work. In presidentiability management, the opponent's words are cited for reducing his ethos, threatening his face, contrasting his positive self-representation, decreasing the opponent's credibility, presenting him as a liar, as incoherent, as untrustworthy or more generally blaming him for all behavior improper of a good candidate or a good president. The importance of one's own or another's speech –hence the frequent references that politicians make to their or to other's *dictum* and the wide use of *verba dicendi*– can be understood only under the perspective, theoretically outlined above, of the importance of political discourse as a political action, and (in obvious relation to the latter) the concept of ethos

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<sup>91</sup> On this see also Calasmiglia-Blancafort & Tusón-Valls (1999: 148-153).

<sup>92</sup> On themes see, again, Voloshinov (1973[1929]: 99), who defines them as “the general meaning of an utterance” or van Dijk (2003: 68) for whom themes are the most important information of a discourse.

as being discursively constructed (see chapter 1). As we have seen, ethos is something candidates construct discursively, not (only) or only slightly through their open statements about themselves, but rather more through general statements about other issues; ethos then has to be inferred from the candidate's discourse. As Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca claim (1958: 426), discourse is the manifestation par excellence of the person, of the speaker, so that speakers are judged by their actual discourse, in relation to other discourses, and according to the relation between their *persona* and their discourse(s), as well as according to the relation between their discourse and their actions. Therefore, and in relation to the implicitness I referred to above, even if candidates sometimes directly accuse the opponent of not being credible, they very seldom lay claim to their own credibility; rather they invite the addressee to infer it. A number of examples illustrate this point.

RJ: usted en su programa electoral decía que iba a subir las pensiones de las viudas, la base reguladora del 52 al 70. ¿Por qué ha mentado a las viudas y no cumplió su programa electoral?

RJ: quisiera decir que usted ha dicho dos mentiras

ZP: su credibilidad sobre lo que ha dicho en materia de política social, [...] es exactamente igual que la credibilidad que ha tenido con las preguntas de la economía y su interés por la economía en estos 4 años

All the examples are taken from the block on immigration included in the two debates, although the other blocks provide many more examples. They show that the two candidates try to negatively present their opponent, stressing that what he said was false (denoting some foul play or some dirty intentions or aims) or, especially, that what he said is in contrast with what he said before or later or what he did before or later: in doing so candidates accuse each other of being unfair, untruthful or incoherent, thus each candidate decreases the other's credibility and increases his own; not only by denying the accusation of being incoherent or inconsistent, but in a more subtle way: Since accusing presupposes the right of accusing, the accusing candidate increases his own presidentiability and decreases the presidentiability of the accused candidate.

There are also two more interesting cases of (quasi) reported speech, concerning the use of other's word. In the first case RJ uses the word *talante* (I.115) to attack ZP as incoherent and consequently untrustworthy. As Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca say (1958: 144-145):

Lorsque quelqu'un observe une règle, et particulièrement lorsqu'il proclame qu'il l'observe, il manifeste qu'elle est bonne à suivre. Cette prise de position est assimilable à un aveu, qu'on pourrait, le cas échéant, rappeler. [...] Il est efficace de reprendre, pour l'utiliser contre lui, tout ce que l'on peut considérer, à cause de l'adhésion qui s'y manifeste, comme un aveu de l'adversaire.

Beside the clarification of the discursive value of ethos and its performativity (claiming that to follow a norm equates to following it), it is interesting that what an opponent says can be used against him. And this is exactly what Rajoy does when, during his first intervention in the first debate, says of ZP that:

RJ: Ningún gobernante ha sembrado en la historia de la Transición Moderna tanta tensión y tanta cizaña, a la vez que hablaba de entendimiento, de talante y de convivencia.

Note that *talante* was one of the keywords of ZP's self-presentation in the 2004 election<sup>93</sup>. In quoting ZP's keywords in order to twist them, presenting a gap between what he said and what he did, RJ delegitimizes ZP, presenting him as incoherent and a liar and thus untrustworthy. Indeed, in order to delegitimize his opponent through what Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca call *aveu*, RJ uses the very words employed by his opponent. ZP employs the same device when he uses RJ's word *orden* to talk about government immigration politics. RJ accuses ZP of letting too many immigrants into Spain and at the same time insistently asks for more order<sup>94</sup>. But ZP takes up RJ's words and uses them against him.

ZP: Y me habla usted de rigor, de orden... y de seriedad...

<sup>93</sup> *Entendimiento*, *convivencia* and especially *talante* were so frequent in ZP's discourse that they were used in imitations or caricatures (see Screti 2012: 38).

<sup>94</sup> RJ uses the word *orden* 5 times and makes one reference to *desorden* in relation to immigration and one to *inmigracion desordenada*.

ZP: tengo aquí (enseña un dossier) todas las regularizaciones de casos concretos con lo que he dicho, con una rueda de bicicleta [...] Eso es la falta de seriedad, de rigor. ¡Como para hablar ustedes de orden!

Beside these cases of indirect reported speech there are other examples where the opponent's speech is literally reported word for word, obviously for the purpose of twisting them and using them against the speaker.

RJ: "No se puede tolerar que en España, como está pasando ya en muchos ayuntamientos que soportan la política de integración de los inmigrantes, haya españoles que pierdan derechos sociales porque vienen extranjeros que tienen un nivel de renta más bajo, que pierden ayudas al comedor y otras ayudas sociales". Esto lo dijo, cuando el problema era cuatro veces menos grave, el señor Rodríguez Zapatero

ZP provides a further example

ZP: antes de que hable usted de inmigración necesita credibilidad. Credibilidad. Esta declaración es suya: "Los inmigrantes vinieron a España cuando gobernaba el PP". Y es verdad: con su gobierno, con usted de ministro del interior

As we have seen in the examples above, the candidates use direct and indirect references to their opponent's words as a means of attack.

#### **4.3.5. Deixis**

Deixis, a term stemming from the Greek verb *δείκνυμι* [*deiknumi*] 'to indicate', is one of the main concepts in Pragmatics and "the single most obvious ways in which the relationship between language and context is reflected in the structures of languages themselves" (Levinson 1983: 54). As Levinson states:

Deixis concerns the ways in which languages encode or grammaticalize features of the context of utterance or speech event, and thus also concerns ways in which the interpretation of utterances depends on the analysis of that context of utterance (ibid.).

As we will see, this reference to context is far from being unproblematic. Deixis is generally distinguished in personal, time, place, discourse, and social (Levinson, 1983: 68-94). What matters most to me here is personal deixis, as a way not only for referring to persons of discourse, but especially as a way for polarizing the social world in an opposition between *we* vs. *them*.

I will begin with a number of general observations about the first plural person or 4<sup>th</sup> person pronoun, before considering the political use of this pronoun (*we/us*). As Bossong (2014) showed, in all European languages the 4<sup>th</sup> person pronoun is ambiguous; in many languages including Chinese, Malayo, Tagalog, Tok Pisin, Quechua, etc., the 4<sup>th</sup> person pronoun clearly expresses the inclusion or exclusion of the receiver, so that *we(+you)* is grammatically or morphologically different from *we(–you)*. In contrast, in European languages (as for many others around the world) the 4<sup>th</sup> person pronoun (*we*) and more generally all the 4<sup>th</sup> person deictics (*we* and *our*, *ours*, *us*) can include or exclude receivers. According to Wodak et al. (1999: 164) the pronoun *we* comprises all other personal pronouns (see table 1):

<b>we</b>	I	+	you (s)	s/he	you (p)	They
	I		you (s)	s/he	you (p)	
	I		you (s)	s/he		
	I		you (s)			
	I			s/he		
	I					

Table 1. The pronoun “we”

“We” can also flexibly adjust to include or exclude one of the other persons. In this sense, the semantic reference of *we/us/our* is always ambiguous (Blas-Arroyo 2000: 6; Atkinson 2011: 142; Gelabert 2000). The speaker decides (or imagines) who is included or excluded<sup>95</sup>. This ambiguity is strategically can be used to create social sets or discursively constructed groups. This problem was clearly individuated by Benveniste (1966[1946]: 233-236). As he says:

<sup>95</sup> The inclusion logically implies exclusion.



«nous» n'est pas un «je» quantifié ou multiplié, c'est un «je» dilaté au-delà de la personne stricte, à la fois accru et de contours vagues. De là viennent en dehors du pluriel ordinaire deux emplois opposés, non contradictoires. D'une part, le «je» s'amplifie par «nous» en une personne plus massive, plus solennelle et moins définie; c'est le «nous» de majesté. D'autre part, l'emploi de «nous» estompe l'affirmation trop tranchée de «je» dans une expression plus large et diffuse: c'est le «nous» d'auteur ou d'orateur. [...] D'une manière générale, la personne verbale au pluriel exprime une personne amplifiée et diffuse. Le «nous» annexe au «je» une globalité indistincte d'autres personnes (id. : 235).

Therefore, given the semantic impossibility of having many “I”, “we” is either an “I” to which somebody else is added (“you” for inclusive “we” or “s/he” for exclusive “we”) or an enhanced (*pluralis maiestatis*) or diminished “I” (*pluralis modestiae*) (against this position, see Almela-Pérez 2000). As Manetti shows (2014) regarding the first option (“we” as “I + somebody else”) it must be remembered that “we” is an improper deictic, since in order to understand the utterance reference, it is not enough simply to know the person of the speaker (as is the case for the proper deictic “I”). Indeed, according to Recanati (2001), “we” is an expression half-way between deictic (whose meaning depends on the context of utterance), and intentional (whose meaning depends on speaker’s intentions): it is the speaker’s intention that defines who “we” refers to, or, in other words, who is included within or excluded from “we” (see also Íñigo-Mora 2004: 35). “Therefore, and by virtue of its ambiguous nature, “we” allows for the strategic manipulation of inclusion/exclusion. Apart from *maiestatis* and *modestiae*, “we” ranges from a minimum meaning as “I + someone else” to a maximum meaning as “I + all human beings”. This idea has been brilliantly illustrated by Wilson in his extended treatment of deixis in political discourse (1990: 45-76). Drawing from Urban (1986), Wilson provides the image of the concentric circles (see figure 1, adapted from Wilson 1990: 49): “we” works like a circle that can be expanded to include more or less interlocutors depending on context, but especially depending on the *speakers’ strategic interests*.




Figure 1. The pronoun “we”.

Within this elasticity of “we”, which is crucial for the construction of groups, lies all its rhetorical value (Atkinson 2011: 142), since its ambiguity allows for the strategic discursive construction of groups, based on the principle of inclusion and exclusion. This latter observation leads us to the role played by deixis in political discourse. Many studies have been conducted on the role played by deixis in the construction and transmission of ideology, and especially by the 4<sup>th</sup> person (Maitland & Wilson 1987; Wilson 1990; see also Fairclough 1989: 127-128 on the “we” in political editorials in newspapers); many of them analyze Spanish parliamentary discourse (Gelabert 2006; Atkinson 2011) or Spanish presidential debates (Blas-Arroyo (2000 in a study of the 1993 Spanish presidential debates, Fernández-García (2008), and Hernández-Flores (2013) who analyzed the 2008 Spanish presidential debates). For politicians, “we” is fundamental (Santulli 2005: 109 et seq.; Santulli 2004), since it is part of “speaker’s electoral, political and ideological strategies, that is, as an aspect of political rhetoric that is used for persuasive purposes” (Hernandez-Flores 2013: 178-179). Through “we” the speaker constructs a group, identifying himself with the hearers; through contraposition we/them speaker involves (privileged) addressees and excludes opponents negatively polarizing them (Santulli 2005: 98). Since groups do not exist beyond discourse but are constructed and maintained discursively, and thanks to the intrinsic ambiguity in relation to inclusion-exclusion, 4<sup>th</sup> person deixis is typical of **ideological** discourse, because it allows for the strategic construction of groups,

entailing a “them”, against which it creates an opposition and ideology which emerges from situations of polarization<sup>96</sup>.

When politicians use *we/us/our* they build a group and place themselves within it, speaking from and to a group. This group may be the party (excluding the electorate), the group of politicians, the faction (the party including electors), the entire nation, etc. As Santulli says:

non sempre è facile individuare [...] la natura esclusiva o inclusiva: accanto a casi molto evidente nell'uno o nell'altro senso, ve ne sono molti che restano (forse volutamente, e spesso comunque effiacamente) ambigui (2005: 121).

This is precisely what happens in the discourse of the two candidates, RJ and ZP. In both debates we can see an opposition between *we* vs. *them* or between *we* vs. *you*. Normally the opposition is between *nosotros* vs. *ustedes* (which is the Spanish formal pronoun for *you* and is usual in political debates). Sometimes the *nosotros* refers to Spain, sometimes to Spaniards, sometimes to politicians, but more often to their own party or government (PP or PSOE). Differences have emerged in the use of deictic pronouns by the two candidates in the debates (Hernandez-Flores 2013: 178; Fernandez-Garcia 2008, Fuentes-Rodríguez 2009). Hernandez-Flores shows that ZP had a slight preference for *nosotros* to refer to the in-group and *ustedes* for the out-group, while RJ used preferably *usted* for addressing the opponent and *yo* for referring to himself (2013: 176). In this sense, RJ personalized references to the other and self-references more than ZP did. Both candidates used *nosotros* to refer to Spain as a nation, but Zapatero's preference for *nosotros* has to be seen as an effort to present himself as member of a group (PSOE) linked to the history of democratization of Spain. On the other hand, Rajoy's preference for personalization (*yo/usted*) is designed to increase his own visibility and strengthen his own leadership, which was questioned within his own party, and to detract from ZP's image through personal attacks (basing it on his strong leadership and visibility). It was also a means of isolating ZP, separating

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<sup>96</sup> This use of “we” is clear in the nationalistic discourse. It should be noted that institutional political discourse is always a nationalistic discourse, since institutional politics is enacted in nation-states or presupposes nation (Billig 1995; Duchêne 2008). The nation, like other groups, is produced and reproduced by discourse, especially when mediated by media, which permits physical constraints such as closeness (Anderson 1983; Gellner 1997; Wodak et al. 1999) to be overcome, thanks to its ambiguity in relation to inclusion/exclusion and to its ability for entailing a “they”, 4<sup>th</sup> person deixis is typical of nationalistic discourse (Billig 1995; Wodak et al. 1999; Íñigo Mora 2004; Petersoo 2007).

him from his collaborators and electors, to whom RJ's discourse is partially directed. It serves RJ's *argumenta ad personam* and *argumenta ad hominem*. At the same time ZP's preference for the plural *nosotros/ustedes*, is due to his stable leadership within PSOE, and is aimed at creating a wider group and especially at generalizing the opponent's flaws to the collective story of PP as heir to Franco's dictatorship and fascist ideology.

A number of examples illustrate this point: In his opening statement, where, as in the closing statements, the candidates directly address citizens, RJ addresses citizens as *ustedes*, he uses an ambiguous *nosotros*, and finally he uses an inclusive *nosotros* that situates him within Spaniards.

RJ: A ustedes qué les parece, ¿estamos mejor que hace cuatro años? Depende de a quién le hagamos la pregunta. Si se la hacemos al señor Zapatero nos dirá que estamos en el mejor de los mundos, pero si se la hacemos a la gente, a ustedes, algunos nos dirán que hay cosas que están bien, otras regular, y que en los últimos tiempos hay cosas que están mal y otras que están muy mal. [...] En Inmigración, toda Europa ha protestado por el desorden que provoca este gobierno y nosotros los sufrimos

In this second example, RJ uses the opposition between you/me.

RJ: Somos el segundo país del mundo, sólo superado por EEUU, a la hora de entrar ciudadanos extranjeros. [...]. Usted no ha hecho nada más que complicar las cosas [...] se limita a decir lo bien que va todo y a ignorar la realidad. Y, además, cuando alguien hace propuestas, como es mi caso, las descalifica y las tilda de ridículas, de inútiles e incluso de xenófobas. Yo he propuesto prohibir la regularización masiva por ley, he propuesto el contrato de integración, he propuesto la igualdad de derechos, oportunidades, deberes y obligaciones. He propuesto que se expulse a los extranjeros que cometan delitos, y para usted eso no tiene ninguna importancia

In his opening statements, ZP firstly uses a *nosotros* that could refer to the entire group of Spaniards, and then he uses a *nosotros* that refers more specifically to the government or, more largely to PSOE. This latter *nosotros* clashes with *ustedes* (PP).

ZP: [...] España es un país que se ha convertido en la octava potencia económica del mundo. Hemos superado en renta per cápita a Italia [...] Un país que ha trabajado con diálogo social, hemos tenido el periodo de menos huelgas de la historia de la Democracia [...]. Esta es la tarea que hemos hecho. Hemos trabajado con firmeza, con convicción y con humildad [...]. La disyuntiva en las próximas elecciones es: diálogo o confrontación, aquellos que buscamos soluciones o quienes fabrican problemas, aquellos que desde el poder servimos a los ciudadanos y aquellos que han intentado utilizar a los ciudadanos para llegar al poder.

It is therefore clear that the speakers play with the ductile nature of the pronoun *nosotros* to create different groups in accordance with their discursive strategies.

I wish to conclude this section by highlighting a paradox intrinsic in the use of “we”. Every time a speaker says “we” s/he is usurping somebody else’s voice, since speakers can legitimately speak only in their own name, i.e. as “I”. Even when expressly delegated by others to speak in their name as a spokesperson, speakers steal others’ voices in order to give them a voice and it is never clear to what extent they are actually speaking on their behalf. Nevertheless, if this paradox is structural of representative democracies, due to the logic of representation and the need to concentrate social capital (Bourdieu 1981), it is equally true that the intrinsic ambiguity and ductility of “we” makes it the preferred pronoun of πόλις and politics, and hence the preferred pronoun of power<sup>97</sup>.

#### 4.3.6. Argumenta, falacia, loci (or topoi)

Electoral discourse is aimed at inducing certain behavioral response in addressees, after having convinced or persuaded them (on the distinction between *convincing* and *persuading* see Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 1958: 34-40). For this analysis I have chosen to use Rhetoric, because, since its beginnings, it has been closely linked with the performance as well as the study of political discourse (consider Aristotle, Cicero or Quintilian)<sup>98</sup>. Rhetoric has historically dealt with the analysis of *effective* persuasion.

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<sup>97</sup> See also Brown & Gilman’s (1960: 255) observations about the plural as a form of power, since powerful speakers represent others so that they can speak as if plural. On the other hand there are other cases where “we” can be seen as a pronoun of solidarity.

<sup>98</sup> For a historic survey of Argumentation theory see van Eemeren et al. (1997: 210-219).

The founders of New Rhetoric, Charles Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca, defined the discipline as follow:

L'étude des techniques discursives permettant de provoquer ou d'accroître l'adhésion des esprits aux thèses qu'on présente à leur assentiment : une argumentation efficace est celle qui réussit à accroître cette intensité d'adhésion de façon à déclencher chez les auditeurs l'action envisagée (action positive ou abstention), ou du moins à créer, chez eux, une disposition à l'action, qui se manifestera au moment opportun (1958: 5).

They highlight the perlocutive (in pragmatic terms) effect of a successful persuasive discourse.

As Gill & Whedbee state, despite the difficulties in defining the meaning of the word *rhetoric*, two things are clear: 1) the aim of rhetoric is to “influence an audience towards some end”; and 2) “the essential activities of rhetoric are located on political stage” (1997: 158; see also Santulli 2005: 59).

(New) Rhetoric is the study of the discursive means that lead to (effective) persuasion<sup>99</sup>. There are several devices, but I will focus on topoi or loci (of quantity and quality), and arguments, in particular the argumentum ad hominem, argumentum ad personam, the example, the metaphor as particular case of analogy<sup>100</sup>, discussed earlier, and the argumentum ad verecundiam, both ab auctoritate or ad populum.

As described previously, ideological discourse is discourse with evaluative meanings. The expression of partial (*partisan*) stances takes place through word selection: some adjectives, names<sup>101</sup>, verbs, adverbs, etc. are chosen instead of others that are equally plausible and grammatically correct to positively present “us” and negatively present “them”. In terms of lexical choice, in my analysis, apart from the observations on metaphors or deixis, I will offer some brief reflections on **quantifiers** (*all, always, never, many, some, few, often, only*, etc.), which are fundamental implementing strategies of de-legitimation, especially absolute quantifiers (*none, always, never*). They are used to fix positive or negative features described by speakers

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<sup>99</sup> Van Eemeren et al. say that “*classical* rhetoric has to do with effective persuasion: with principles that lead to assent or consensus” (1997: 213, my italics), but, as the words of Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca show, New Rhetoric is also interested in the same object.

<sup>100</sup> On the persuasive effectiveness of metaphor in rhetoric, see Gill & Whedbee (1997: 172-173).

<sup>101</sup> See for instance the use of words such as *revolución, revuelta, proyecto, apuesta* in the PP electoral song *Revolución Popular* (Screti 2013; on this lexical transformation of a normal peaceful election in a “revolution”, see also Santulli 2005: 89).

beyond the contextual contingency and to emphasize negative aspects of “them” and positive aspects of “us”.

As van Eemeren et al. define it, “argumentation uses language to justify or refute a standpoint, with the aim of securing agreement in views” (1997: 208). This definition entails disagreement about a standpoint. Nevertheless, this definition only partially fits in with electoral discourse. Ideally, argumentation takes place through syllogisms, complete arguments with true premises that demonstrate the truth or conclusion, but in most cases, and in electoral discourse in particular, speakers use *enthymemes* to persuade receivers (Gill & Whedbee 1997: 171-172; see also van Eemeren et al. 1997: 213; Amossy 2010a[2000]: 110-114), a sort of abbreviated or incomplete syllogisms, or, instead of complete logic arguments, pseudo-arguments (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 1958: 149), or fallacious arguments, also called actually *fallacies* (van Eemeren 2001; van Eemeren & Grootendorst 2004: ch. 7; Amossy (2010a[2000]: 127-129) defines them *paralogismes* in opposition to the term *sylllogisme*). According to van Eemeren & Grootendorst, the English philosopher John Locke, first defined the three main types of fallacies: *ad verecundiam*, *ad ignorantiam*, *ad hominem* (2004: 159). However, there are many others, such as *ad baculum*, *ad populum*, *ad nauseam*, *ad misericordiam*, etc. Each one is used by politicians, and would require an individual treatise in itself, but here I will focus on argumentum *ad verecundiam* and *ad populum* (that is a particular case of the former) and especially on *argumentum ad hominem*, that for Bourdieu –due to the logic of the political champ and political capital– is the most used in political discourse (1981: 18).

The term *argumentum ad hominem*<sup>102</sup> originally made reference to the use of opponent’s concessions, and it was also defined as *argumentum ex concessis*; although it currently indicates a direct or indirect attack on the opponent (van Eemeren & Grootendorst 2004: 159-160; see also Amossy 2010a[2000]: 131-134). The *argumentum ad hominem* can appear under three variants: a) the *abusive* variant: direct

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<sup>102</sup> Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, who speak of the fallacious nature of arguments *ad hominem*, defining them pseudo-arguments (1958: 148-150), neatly distinguish them from arguments *ad personam* (which is the term they use for those arguments now generically called *ad hominem*); this is a very common confusion, and, as noted above, Bourdieu also confused the two terms (1981: 18). On this shift of the term *ad hominem*, van Eemeren says: “Originally the *ad hominem* made use of the other party’s concessions in one’s argument, but now it is a general term for the fallacy of attacking the other party’s person either directly by depicting them as stupid, bad or unreliable (abusive variant) or indirectly by casting suspicion on the opponent’s motives (circumstantial variant) or pointing out a contradiction in the other party’s words or deeds (*tu quoque* –you too! –variant)” (2001: 143; see also Walton 2001; van Eemeren & Grootendorst 2004: ch. 7). In the present text, whilst acknowledging this shift I will consider *ad hominem* as the fallacious argument of attacking the opponent.

personal attacks in which the opponent is represented as stupid, dishonest, unreliable, etc. (lack of intelligence or integrity); b) the *circumstantial* variant: the suggestion that the opponent is self-interested, hence his arguments are invalid (lack of impartiality); c) the *tu quoque* variant: highlighting contradictions between current statements and previous ones (or principles) or between current statements and past or future behavior (lack of coherence and consistency) (van Eemeren & Grootendorst 2004: 177-178).

In the two presidential debates, ZP and RJ use the *argumentum ad verecundiam*, *ad populum* and especially the three variants of *argumentum ad hominem* to discredit their opponent and construct credit for themselves. These examples will be discussed in greater depth in the analytical chapters (7-10).

As for arguments, two things should be born in mind: the presence of spectators and indirectness. The reciprocal attacks that ZP and RJ launch on each other would probably not take place in private discussions, and are amplified by the presence of (mediated) audience. Due to the constitutive polarization of the electoral context (and contest) and to the presence of spectators, the candidates *enact* struggle and opposition, but this struggle is probably less real and more symbolic and ritual (in Edelman's terms; see also Martín-Rojo 2000a). This issue will be discussed in the next chapter (in particular in section 5.3), where I explore the extensive *mediatization* of politics and its *rituality*. As for indirectness or implicitness, as van Eemeren & Grootendorst say, "personal attacks are often more effective if they are made in veiled terms or indirectly" (2004: 180). As we will see, many attacks are implicit.

I will now move onto another key resource in persuasive discourses, and particularly in electoral discourse: τόποι or *loci communes*. According to Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, who refer to Cicero, Quintilian and Aristotle, they can be considered as "stocks of information" to obtain arguments (1958: 112). Of the two kinds of loci, *loci communes* and *loci specifici*, the former are more general so they can be used in any circumstances. In an operative way, Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca (1958: 114) classify all the possible loci in 6 main categories: "lieux de la quantité, de la qualité, de l'ordre, de l'existant, de l'essence, de la personne".

This work focuses only on the two main categories, since they are the most used by the two candidates. As for the loci of quantity, some have more value than others for quantitative reasons, so that more (good) is better than less (good); but since this also applies in the negative, less (bad) is better than more (bad). So for instance, in the debates, ZP tries to demonstrate that his government had more social policies: according



to the (accepted) presumption that increased public spending on social policies is positive, this movement legitimizes ZP<sup>103</sup>. RJ and ZP use the issue of quantity in a negative sense, each accusing the other of allowing large numbers of immigrants to enter Spain. According to the (accepted or *unchallenged*) premise that the lesser immigration the better, the arguments based on this locus work as follows: through his claims, RJ delegitimizes ZP and legitimizes himself, simply by making it an issue; in turn, when ZP accuses RJ of having done the same during the previous PP government, by using the same argument, the same locus, and the same premises, he delegitimizes RJ on two counts: firstly for having let immigrants in, and secondly for being incoherent and self-interested (circumstantial and *tu quoque* variants of *argumentum ad hominem*).

Another example of the use of the locus of quantity is the discursive desire to be the “President for all (Spaniards)”, a claim that is common amongst political candidates (Santulli 2005: 129 et seq.); as will be seen in the analytical chapter, candidates extensively use this resource.

Another clear example of locus of quantity is that of the habitual, normal: usual is better than unusual<sup>104</sup>, and interestingly, there is a fairly natural shift from normal to normative (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 1958: 118), so that abnormal or unusual is bad. Examples of this use include RJ’s reproach that ZP was the first President to break the consensus of the Transition in matters of terrorism or of the Catalan issue. Since the normal (how it has been done) is normative (how it has to be done), and since ZP has interrupted this norm, RJ’s criticisms delegitimize ZP.

As for the loci of quality, Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca (1958: 118-120) indicates that of uniqueness (id.: 120)<sup>105</sup>. Novelty and change are also recurrent locus of quality: as the old is valorized as indicating tradition, the news valorized as original (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 1958: 130). As for other loci, they can be used either positively or negatively. An example of the use of the topic of uniqueness in negative terms is RJ’s

<sup>103</sup> Indeed this is not so straightforward, since for PP public spending to support social policies is not good.

<sup>104</sup> As Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca say (1958: 128-132) Romanticism has changed this locus considerably, so that also originality and anormality can be seen as a positive argument, and especially novelty as opposed to tradition (id.: 130). In any case, the claim that arguments can be constructed according to the quantitative value of something is still valid: what changes is only the sign (positive or negative) related to the quantity (more or less). The relativity of values is not a problem for the theory. Indeed, every locus can receive a positive or a negative value, as for the locus of quality of uniqueness (uniqueness can be negative or positive), but this does not undermine the validity of the theory that speakers use loci to construct their (positive or negative) arguments.

<sup>105</sup> Uniqueness is still a quantity locus (one). As for this locus, Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca say (ibid.) that “La valeur de l’unique peut s’exprimer par son opposition au commun, au banal, au vulgaire. [...] L’unique est original, il se distingue [...]”.

description of ZP as the worst President in Spanish history (1); another example is the presentation of the situation of the Spanish education as the worst in the countries of references (2):

(1) RJ: ningún gobernante [...] ninguno

(2) RJ: somos los que estamos más abajo

Through this locus, RJ presents ZP as the worst, thereby detracting from his presidentiability. However, ZP also uses loci of quality, such as that of uniqueness, by claiming that his government has spent more on social policies than any other government.

ZP: Mi Gobierno ha sido el primero en la historia de nuestro país que ha dedicado al gasto social más de la mitad de todo el Presupuesto

In doing so he legitimizes himself as the best option for governing Spain (given the premise that public spending for social policies is good) and delegitimizes the opponent.

#### **4.4. Summary**

This chapter presents the principal discursive devices used by both presidential candidates to construct presidentiality during the two 2008 presidential debates. These devices constitute the main analytical tools used to analyze candidates' discourse. An intertwined framework has enabled me to employ tools based on interactional analytical and discursive analytical approaches. This choice proves the multidisciplinary of my analysis, since the tools I selected are situated at the crossroads of many disciplines, namely Sociolinguistics, Pragmatics, Semantics, Semiotics, Argumentation, Rhetoric, etc. In particular I have tried to combine interactional tools and discourse analytical tools in order to correct the limitations of an overly textual approach. This section also contains a brief introduction to the concepts used and several examples. These tools proved useful in understanding the functioning of the two candidates' presidentiality management (construction and destruction) through moves of de/legitimation.

The following chapter begins with an introduction to presidential debates as communicative events in which presidentiality management occurs (chapter 5).

## **5. THE DEBATES AS A STAGE. A place for the construction of presidentiability**

### **5.1. Introducing the debates**

During the election campaign, the two candidates present themselves in a positive manner and their opponent in a negative light for the purpose of self-legitimation and delegitimation of the other respectively. In doing so, they employ all types of media and channels: speeches, interviews, slogans, institutional websites, personal websites expressly created for the elections, videos, songs, television shows, broadcasts, etc. These texts constitute a hyper-text of the positive self-presentation and negative presentation of the other. Within this flow of electoral discourse aimed at constructing/destructing presidentiability, the two televised presidential debates played a crucial role: they took place at the height of the campaign; they epitomize and embody the struggle for power, and attract the highest audiences (for what are essentially party political broadcasts) of the campaign.

This chapter presents the two 2008 presidential debates between José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero (PSOE) and Mariano Rajoy (PP). I will first frame Spanish presidential debates within the history of presidential debates in the main Western democracies, highlighting debate analysis trends. I will then focus on the debate as a mediatized communicative (pseudo)event, insisting on the issue of mediatization, personalization and ritualization. Subsequently, I will describe the structure and the main features of the 2008 Spanish presidential debates, concluding the chapter with some observations on their contribution to constructing the candidates' presidentiability.

## 5.2. Presidential debates in Western democracies and as a field of inquiry

The tradition of political TV broadcast debates dates back to September 1960 in the USA, with the first of the four encounters between Richard Nixon and John Fitzgerald Kennedy. The *personalization* and *spectacularization* of politics has been traditionally greater in the USA, where *mediatization* took place earlier in comparison with other countries, and where presidentialism and a two party electoral and political system favored the representation of Politics as a face-to-face encounter between two persons (Santulli 2005: 41) that embody two opposing (?) political stances. This explains why the USA has a long-standing tradition of such debates, as the following list of presidential elections where presidential debates were held show (the list is limited to debates between presidential candidates):

1960: 4 debates between Richard Nixon and John Fitzgerald Kennedy

1976: 3 debates between Jimmy Carter and Jerald Ford

1980: 1 debate between Ronald Reagan and Jimmy Carter

1984: 2 debates between Ronald Reagan and Walter Mondale

1988: 2 debates between Gorge H. W. Bush and Michael Dukakis

1992: 3 debates between Gorge H. W. Bush, Bill Clinton and Ross Perot

1996: 2 debates between Bill Clinton and Bob Dole

2000: 3 debates between Gorge W. Bush and Al Gore

2004: 3 debates between George W. Bush and John Kerry

2008: 3 debates between Barack Obama and John McCain

2012: 3 debates between Barack Obama and Mitt Romney

Presidential debates have been analyzed from many perspectives and there is a vast amount of literature on US presidential debates especially in the field of Communication Studies, Political Studies, or Social Psychology, for the study of the effects of debates on voters (Abramowitz 1978; Chaffee 1978; Miller & Mackuen 1979; Vancila & Pendellb 1984; Lanoue & Schrott 1989; Schrott 1990; Zhu et al. 1994; Kraus 1996; Benoit et al. 2002; Benoit et al. 2003).

In European democracies electoral debates are much less common<sup>106</sup>. For instance, in UK the first televised debate between candidates for the post of Prime Minister was held in 2010. Three candidates took part: Nick Clegg, David Cameron and Gordon Brown (three debates in April 2010).

In Germany there is little tradition of face-to-face televised debates between candidates. The tendency is instead for a debate between all the candidates of the major parties represented in the German Parliament (from 1972 to 1987). Due to the German federal structure and political system (based on coalitions) and for avoiding over-personalization in politics after the Second World War, face-to-face debates have been rare until very recently. Indeed, the first real televised duel between two presidential candidates was held in 2002 between Gerard Schroeder and Edmund Stoiber (two debates in August and September). Since then televised presidential debates have become slightly more common: in September 2005 a unique duel took place between Gerard Schroeder and Angela Merkel; in September 2009 a duel took place between Angela Merkel and Frank-Walter Steinmeier; and finally the last one was held in September 2013, again between Merkel and Peer Steinbrück.

In Italy, despite the “videocracy” inaugurated by Silvio Berlusconi after his arrival on the political stage<sup>107</sup>, debates are rare. Indeed, only three have been held: in March 1994 between Silvio Berlusconi and Achille Occhetto; two debates in April 1996 between Silvio Berlusconi and Romano Prodi; and finally two debates in March and April 2006, again with the same protagonists. This is probably due to the Italian political system, which is not presidential, the proportional electoral system, which does not favor polarization, and the traditional social fragmentation of the electorate. Still it is possible to notice a clear trend within European democracies toward personalization, polarization and mediatization.

In contrast, France is the European country with the longest-standing tradition and the greatest number of presidential debates, attributable to its presidential political system<sup>108</sup>. The first debate took place in May 1974 between Valéry Giscard D’Estaing and François Mitterrand, who were also the protagonists of the one held in May 1981<sup>109</sup>.

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<sup>106</sup> I refer here only to presidential debates between the two main candidates and not to the very numerous debates that take place on the TV between politicians and journalists or between many candidates.

<sup>107</sup> See Mazzoleni (1995); see also Erik Gandini’s documentary *Videocracy* (2009).

<sup>108</sup> In their edited volume, Kaid et al. (1991) deal with similarities between France and USA in terms of presidentialism and of mediation of political discourse.

<sup>109</sup> See Verón (1989).

Another debate took place in April 1988, between François Mitterrand and Jacques Chirac. Chirac also engaged in a debate in May 1995 with Lionel Jospin. In May 2007 a presidential debate took place between Ségolène Royal and Nicolas Sarkozy, who took part in a second presidential debate in May 2012 with François Hollande<sup>110</sup>.

As for Spain, the first time that two candidates engaged in a presidential face-to-face debate was in May 1993, and the protagonists were Felipe González and José María Aznar: they had two debates on 23 and 31 May 1993. During the 2008 election campaign two debates took place, between José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero and Mariano Rajoy, on 25 February and on 3 March. Finally in November 2011 Mariano Rajoy and Alfredo Pérez Rubalcaba engaged in a new debate.

The Spanish debates have been the object of extensive study, not only in terms of their impact on voters from the perspectives of Sociology or Political Studies (Barreiro & Sánchez-Cuenca 1998; Callejón-Lledó 2001) but also from the field of Communication Studies (Canel 1998; Herrero & Benoit 2009; Quintas-Froufe & Quintas-Froufe 2010); they have also been studied from the perspective of Discourse Analysis (Cortés-Rodríguez & Bañón-Hernández 1997; Bañón-Hernández 2005; 2010a), Rhetoric (Fuentes-Rodríguez 2009; 2010), and especially, within Discourse Studies, from the perspective of the analysis of the (im)politeness (Fernández-García 2009; Mapelli 2010; Ridaio-Rodrigo 2010; Bañón-Hernández 2010b). More generally, within the field of Discourse Studies Blas-Arroyo has been the major scholar to analyze Spanish presidential debates (1998a; 1998b; 1999; 2000a; 2000b; 2001; 2009; 2010), and his studies on the dramatization of discursive political conflict have been included in a recent book (2011).

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<sup>110</sup> Literature on French presidential debates is vast, but in more recent years Kerbrat-Orecchioni has analyzed it from a rhetorical and interactional perspective (Doury & Kerbrat-Orecchioni 2011; Constantin de Chanay et al. 2011; Kerbrat-Orecchioni 2012; 2013a; 2013b; 2013c; 2013d; 2013e; forthcoming).

### 5.3. Mediatization, personalization and polarization: debates as rituals of confrontation

Election campaigns have been often defined as a *ritual* connected to myth (Rey-Fuentes et al. 1999: 31; Del Rey-Moratò 1989: 171, highlighting the ritual character of confrontation; Gerstlé 1989; Huici-Módenes 1996: 145; Abèlés 1989; but also Edelman 1964; 1971 links politics, myths and rituals): they are ritual in that they are regularly repeated in accordance with pre-defined patterns, they have symbolic value, are based on certain often *mythical* beliefs (mythical in the sense that they determine, explain, and justify the current social structure, but they also reassure who believe in them); in our case some myths are the belief of vote as free choice, the election as highest expression of democracy, the opposition between right and left, etc. In his paper, Abèlés distinguishes *rituals of confrontation* and *rituals of consensus* (1989: 130-132): among the former the author includes meetings, rallies, etc. where (ritual) antagonism is the main feature; whilst the latter includes anniversaries, inaugurations, etc. I will also include (televised) presidential debates in the first group. More generally, and I will come back to this issue, what all these rituals have in common is the fact that they are *pseudo-events* (Boorstin 1961; 1989[1987]; Del Rey-Moratò 1989: 172; Edelman 1988): by this term I mean that they are organized and carried out for the purpose of being reproduced, commented, contested, evaluated, reported or *quoted* (see Wilson 1990) by newspapers, websites, television channels, etc. This is linked to the fact that politicians take advantage of what I have defined the *permeability of media system*, i.e., the fact that contents pass through different media (Screti 2011). This is also related to the fact that politicians are in constant need of attention (Wodak 2009a; Atkinson 1984), as shown by the etymology of the word *candidate*: in ancient Rome it indicated those persons covered with a shining white tunic, called *candida*; the persons aspiring to elective public offices used to wear white *candida*, in order to be noticed by voters. The need for attention is obviously at its height during the election campaign when media space and time –especially on television– is crucial for victory (Santulli 2005: 31; Campmany 2005: 241). This point is not only coherent with what has been defined as the *mediatization* of Politics (among others, Wodak 2009a<sup>111</sup>; 2009b; Forchtner et al. 2013), but especially with the idea of what has alternatively been defined as the

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<sup>111</sup> This term must be distinguished from what Wodak (ibid.) defines the “fictionalization of politics” and “politicization of fictions”, since they refer to different phenomena (see also Wodak 2010; Wodak & Forchtner 2014).



“eventization”, “theatralization” or “spectacularization” of Politics (as studied in Spain, for instance, by Rey-Fuentes et al. 1999: 35-6; Del Rey-Moratò 1989: 136, 172, 174; Muñoz-Alonso 1989: 71, 136, 139, among others; see also Bourdieu 1981: 11). This idea is also aligned with the interdependency of the political and media fields, i.e. the symbiotic relationship between journalists and politicians, as well as the idea that politicians perform like media celebrities. This issue leads us to some further considerations.

1) As Rey-Fuentes et al. say (1999: 34) the advent of (new) mass media such as radio and television in particular, dramatically increased the number of addressees beyond direct (immediate or face to face) interaction, thereby mediatizing the political space (Santulli 2005: 22-23; see also Thompson 1995; Livolsi & Volli 1999). As a consequence, political interaction today increasingly targets TV audiences rather than the direct participants of the interaction (not only, but especially on the frontstage)<sup>112</sup>. This increase has had many more consequences: political discourse has changed in terms of its nature, contents and functions (Atkinson 1984: xiii and ch. 6).

2) Given the emergence of a media system, the main actors of this system, journalists and reporters, have become increasingly central to the political spectacle. Despite their efforts to present themselves as neutral (*contra* see Tuchman 1972), journalists are not mere spectators of what happens on the frontstage, even though they may be ratified participants (Goffman 1981[1976]: 9-10); they are rather actual actors of the political field (Bourdieu 2000).

3) Given the emergence of the media system, the political field has been increasingly mediatized and spectacularized, so that politicians have become *dramatis personae* (Santulli 2005: 37 et seq.; Thompson 1995; Sampedro-Blanco & Vizcaíno-Laorga 2008) and act and are treated like *celebrities* (Rieffel 1989; Charaudeau 2008; Wodak 2009a). Inherent to the structure of the media system (in capitalist societies) is the consideration of the monetary value of Politics as a spectacle: in this sense, due to their huge audiences, debates have to be seen as very profitable programs, generating money through advertising placement.

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<sup>112</sup> Wodak (2009a) and Okulska & Cap (2010) distinguish performances on the *frontstage* from those on the *backstage*. As for the audience, Albaladejo-Mayordomo calls *poliacroasis* (1998, 1998-1999, 2000) the existence of many audiences; according to Mazzoleni (1998: 66) the politician’s interlocutor is less the other politician than the audience watching the debate on TV (see also De Santiago-Guervós 1996:3).

If it is true that the logic of representation favors the concentration of capital in one representative, in one leader (but on leadership see Edelman 1964: ch. 4), it is also true that the media and especially television favor the simplification of politics and focus attention on one or few *personae*. Indeed, paraphrasing Edelman, Politics is a parade of personae, of leaders (note, for instance, that Atkinson's book (1984) is entirely focused on leaders' discourses). Television has also favored the *spectacularization* of politics, transforming citizens into spectators of a political show (Santulli 2005: 42; Thompson 1995; Mazzoleni 1995; 1998: 116-119; Edelman 1988) and assimilated political communication to marketing (on this see Screti 2012: 40-41). Election campaigns intensify spectacularization and personalization, with spectators that, according to the logic of the media system, are pushed to follow incidents and stories of actual personae rather than complex and faceless collective entities with their intricate historic, cultural and ideological references (Santulli 2005: 43, although it should be noted that the author lacks the Bourdieuan reflections on social and political capitals).

4) This spectacularization of politics has been and continues to be favored by the structure of the media system, in the sense that for instance television with its narrations favors figures on the ground, thereby favoring personae, i.e. protagonists, rather than complex chains of abstract historical events. On the other hand, growing audiences –as well as the enlargement of the census (Rey-Fuentes et al. 1999)– and the new way of communicating through television lead to a simplification of forms and contents of discourse (Popper & Condry 1996; Bourdieu 1996); one of these simplifications is precisely the personalization of politics (see, among others, Langer 2007; Volli 1997), another is the extreme polarization that erases *continua* and complexities<sup>113</sup>; another example is the extreme simplification of the discussion to an enchainment of slogans, catchphrases and fallacies (cf. the overuse of *ad hominem* arguments).

5) As a result, politicians became actors of narrations played out in the media, and especially on television, where Politics is simplified as a fight between agonist and antagonist<sup>114</sup>. Politicians are party to this game, employing easily understandable slogans and easily understandable but often fallacious arguments.

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<sup>113</sup> Del Rey-Moratò says that the distinction itself between right and left, two definitions “arbitrary and far from undisputable”, is a simplification *ad usum delphini*, for electors (1989: 128; on this simplification in the form of polarization, see also Bourdieu 1981: 10; Edelman 1988: ch. 4).

<sup>114</sup> On Politics as narratives with a plot featuring heroes vs. villains, see Volli (2000).

The epitome of this *mise en scène*, of the political spectacle, is the presidential debate, where personalization, polarization, and simplification reach their acme: with two candidates face-to-face, one for each party, dealing over a two-hour period with the most complex problems in a way that is comprehensible to everyone on the other side of the screen.

#### 5.4. Spanish televised debates as a means of sanction for the two-party system

Despite their rarity compared to countries as France, televised debates in Spain can also be considered a ritual. One of the main features of Spanish televised presidential debates (called *debates cara a cara*) is that since the first debates held in 1993 they have acted as a means of sanctioning the two-party system; the debates held in 2008 and 2011 confirmed this trend. As we have seen in the previous chapters, in Spain there are clearly two majority parties (PP) and (PSOE) and a third national party (with a national scope and electors throughout Spain), IU. It is true that there is a huge difference in the number of votes (PSOE and PP around 10 million, and IU 1 million), but these three are the three most voted *national* parties. Yet despite this, the debates only took place between the candidates of PP and PSOE, respectively Aznar and González (1993), Rajoy and Zapatero (2008) and Rajoy and Rubalcaba (2011). As for the two 2008 debates, even though Llamazares (IU) pushed to take part in the debate, Zapatero and Rajoy (actually their respective communication managers) refused to do so, legitimizing this denial with the argument that they are the only two candidates with a real chance of becoming President<sup>115</sup>.

From the point of view of this work, the fact that the third candidate (Llamazares) is absent from the debates should not be seen as a limitation, since it is a consequence of the structure of the electoral system and of the workings of the political field. By “electoral system” I refer not only to the system of laws which regulate electioneering in Spain, but also the way the agents of the political field, the politicians and journalists, implement these laws: for instance only inviting the candidates from the two main parties, PP and PSOE, to take part in the debates. This behavior, does not respond to any law about the presence of politicians in electoral debates (there are no laws stating that presidential debates should take place only between the candidates of the two main parties), but in itself shapes political confrontation, silencing all other minority options, such as IU.

This issue of the presence of only two candidates is very important. A debate with three candidates would present and represent the existence of an alternative to PP and PSOE political thinking. These two parties, despite ritual formal confrontation, are actually very similar (I have called this *ideological convergence* or *centerization*). In

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<sup>115</sup> This is obviously a circular argument, since if nobody else receives the same public visibility as PP and PSOE candidates, nobody else will ever have the chance to become President.

inviting only candidates from PP and PSOE, the media system shapes the political field and sets the agenda, eliminating *alternative* options from the mainstream<sup>116</sup>.

The current structure of the Spanish political field is perfectly represented by the two presidential debates: a ritual confrontation between the two main parties that excludes the only national party which is especially critical of Neoliberalism, and hence against the two parties that since 1982 have alternately been in power in Spain. This issue of playing down or under-representing a party was one of IU's principal claims during the election campaign, and one of the most repeated propositions, under the form of multiple slogans such as *debate plural*, *ley electoral injusta*, *debate fraude*, etc.

This organization of the political field and the subsequent claims of an inequitable representation within media (mediatization) have lead also to the preparation of two more debates between the main Spanish parties. This is of particular relevance in understanding the Spanish political field. The two presidential debates took place on Monday 25 February 2008 and on Monday 3 March 2008 both at 10 p.m., which is *prime time* in Spain, i.e. the time of maximum audience. But according to a decision of the Junta Electoral Central<sup>117</sup>, the two debates between Zapatero and Rajoy could only take place if two more debates with all the parties represented in the *Congreso* took place. In application of this condition, two debates were organized on Spain's principal public television channel (RTVE1). These debates were defined as "debate a siete", due to the number of politicians present. The first one was broadcast on Thursday 28 February 2008 and the second one on Wednesday 5 March 2008. The politicians that took part in the first debate, moderated by the journalist Ana Blanco, were Ramón Jáuregui (PSOE); Esteban González Pons (PP); Montserrat Muñoz (IU); Jordi Jané (CiU); Josu Erkoreka (PNV); Joan Ridao (ERC); Fernando Bañolas (CC). To the second one, moderated by Ana Pastor, took part Ramón Jáuregui (PSOE); Esteban González Pons (PP); Joaquin Nieto (IU); Jordi Xuclá (CiU); Josu Erkoreka (PNV); Agustí Cerdà (ERC); and Ana Oramas (CC).

Some observations need to be made about these issues. All four 2008 debates were televised by the state television channel RTVE1 and in all cases the moderator was

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<sup>116</sup> This is actually a free choice between limited options (Preve 2002).

<sup>117</sup> Based in Madrid, the Junta Electoral Central is the highest organ for electoral administration in Spain. According to the Spanish law on Electioneering, its main mission is to "guarantee [...] the transparency and objectivity of the electoral process and the principle of equality" (BOE 1985: 191129, my translation).

a journalist well-known in Spain and often engaged in political broadcasts<sup>118</sup>. However, there are major differences between the *cara a cara* debates and these *debate a siete*. The *cara a cara* debates were also televised by two of the major private (open access) national television channels, LaSexta and Cuatro, together with other digital or analogical media. This was not the case with the *debate a siete*, which was only shown on RTVE1. The time of the broadcast also constituted major difference. Indeed, it became a cause of dispute. Interestingly enough, due to the low audience numbers of the first *debate a siete* (see below), originally RTVE set the broadcast of second debate a siete at midnight, in a secondary time; but the Supreme Court, after a complaint presented by the interested parties (IU, CiU, PNV), forced RTVE1 to bring the debate forward to a prime time slot, 10 p.m. This is so also because of the lower profile (given by the media system, in accordance with its interest) of the candidates taking part in the *debate a siete*, compared to the importance in terms of a media event of the two presidential debates, for which there was no doubt about the time, and which took place at prime time. So the *cara a cara* debates were major events in the media system and were treated as such: there were numerous commercials before and after the debates<sup>119</sup>, they were commented on other programs or media (TV, radios, internet, etc.), they were enthusiastically presented by moderators as unique and crucial television and political events. In contrast, the *debate a siete* did not receive so much media attention. There is also a difference in audience numbers; as Gallego-Reguera & Martínez-Martínez (2013: 149) show, the two 2008 *cara a cara* debates were extremely successful, with 13 and 12 million viewers respectively (62% and 58% share). However, the first *debate a siete* attracted just 1.75 million viewers (11% share). And figures for the second *debate a siete* were no better. Actually on Wednesday 5 March, Spain's most popular football team, Real Madrid, played the return leg of the round of 16 in the Champions League, Europe's most popular football tournament: matches start at 8.45 p.m. and end at 10.30 p.m., unless they go into extra time, when they can end as late as midnight. Wednesday 5 March 2008 was a "Champions League night", with many of the most famous

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<sup>118</sup> Ana Pastor, Ana Blanco, Olga Viza and Manuel Campo Vidal (also president of the Academia de las Ciencias y las Artes de Televisión), who also moderated the first of the two 1993 presidential debates.

<sup>119</sup> As Gallego-Reguera & Martínez-Martínez (2013: 148-154) show the Academia de las Ciencias y las Artes de Televisión (no-profit entity, founded in 1997, and uniting the professionals of audiovisual media), responsible for the organization of the two events, started its "publicity" of the debates, throughout press releases, on 13 December 2007 (more than two months before the first debate) and finished on 26 March 2008 (almost one month after).

European teams playing for a place in the quarter finals and as it is widely-known, football is Spain's most popular sport.

Some other considerations need to be made regarding these debates: the *debates a siete* were conceived to appear to give space and media visibility to secondary parties, actually to all parties with their own group in the *Congreso* (PSOE, PP, CiU, ERC, IU, CC, and PNV). The structure was very similar to the *cara a cara* debates between Zapatero and Rajoy: in the two hour show, each candidate had 3 turns of one minute for each topic discussed; turns were ordered according to the size of parliamentary group from the smallest to largest: CC, IU, PNV, ERC, CiU, PP, and PSOE. Yet in doing so, the two *debate a siete* diluted attention on many personae. Compare, for instance the photos of the two debates:



Figure 1. The “undistinguishable” 7 politicians participating in the *debate a siete* (left); compared to the two recognizable candidates (right) of the *cara a cara* debate (photographs: El Pais, RTVE).

In the *debate a siete* photographs it is impossible to distinguish the actors; whilst in the others it is very easy, since the *cara a cara* debates focused attention only on two personae. In addition, the amount of speech time allotted to every candidate varied radically between the two kinds of debates: in the *cara a cara* debates each candidate talked for 41 minutes, whilst in the *debate a siete* programs this time was reduced to 17

minutes. Moreover, Zapatero and Rajoy talked twice, whilst not all candidates in the first *debate a siete* took part in the second debate.

Finally, PP and PSOE had a double representation: an exclusive representation in the two *cara a cara* debates and a further representation in the *debate a siete* programs.

It is probably due to this evident inequality that the participants in these two *debate a siete* programs were all politicians holding minor positions in their respective parties: the main figures being Llamazares (IU); Durán i Lleida (CiU); Íñigo Urkullu (PNV); Josep Lluís Carod Rovira (ERC); Paulino Rivero (CC).

The conclusion that can be drawn by the elements presented above is that the two *cara a cara* debates sanction (legitimize) the current two-party system, but the system is also reinforced through the use of the *debate a siete* format: they are shown on days with other major programs (football); they fail to receive the same publicity; politicians receive little visibility; and PP and PSOE have a double representation.



### 5.5. Norms, organization and structure of 2008 Spanish debates

Probably the only constant of all the debates held in Western democracies and referred to earlier is the fact that they are highly regulated by the candidates' communication assistants. In the case of the two 2008 debates between Zapatero and Rajoy, strict rules were set, the result of long and complex negotiations between the candidates' communication teams. Indeed, the debates were straightjacketed: everything was pre-established. The timing, the position of the two candidates, presenters, order of speech, turn taking, etc. were all determined beforehand. The candidates sat on either side of the presenter. A different journalist presented the second debate, and the candidates swapped sides (see figure below). Some observations must be made in relation to the position of the two candidates: the fact that they sit facing each other symbolizes their opposition, as the medium-shot of the camera frame highlights<sup>120</sup>. In addition, the position of the moderator at the center of the scene, between the two candidates, is meaningful and is aimed at representing journalistic neutrality. This neutrality was enacted by presenters through a minimum amount of intervention: in fact, they merely opened and closed the debates and introduced the topics, and most of the time their utterances were limited to distributing turns or reestablishing order in the event of overlapping.



Figure 2. In a medium-shot, the two candidates and the presenter in the first (left) and the second (right) debate. Same set, different presenters, candidates' place inverted

Everything was set to appear neutral: the presenters were considered neutral in the sense that they could not be associated to PP or PSOE; they were physically situated as equidistant from PP and PSOE; the set colors were neutral (grey and beige), but also

<sup>120</sup> The two debaters talk *directly* to the TV viewers only in the opening and the closing statements, whilst during the rest of the debates they talk to each other. Still, as I have highlighted, candidates talk *for* TV viewers.

frames and shots were as objective as possible<sup>121</sup>. As the image below shows, only two planes were possible for the three-shot (which framed the two candidates and the presenter): a medium-shot, as shown above, or a long-shot, as shown below:



Figure 3. Long-shot of the two candidates and the presenter in the first (left) and the second (right) debate

As for the presenter, in order to give the sensation of neutrality, they could be framed only from in front and in a bust-shot, as shown in the images below:



Figure 4. In-front bust-shot of the two respective presenters in the first (left) and the second (right) debate

As for the candidates: only two frames were allowed: a quasi-frontal bust-shot, as in the figure below (the two on the left from the first debate, and the two on the right from the second one):

<sup>121</sup> For a reference on the grammar of visual data, and the meaning or function of frame, for instance in terms of objectivity/subjectivity, proximity/distance, realism/hyperrealism/surrealism, etc. see Kress & van Leeuwen (1996; 2001).



Figure 5. Quasi-frontal bust-shot of the two candidates in the first (left) and the second (right) debate: candidates' places are inverted.

Or alternatively, a quasi-frontal close-up of face, as in the figure below (the two on the left from the first debate, and the two on the right from the second one):



Figure 6. Quasi-frontal close-up of the two candidates in the first (left) and the second (right) debate: candidates' places are inverted.

Apart from the opening and closing and the transitional frames (when the moderator takes and gives the floor), where the moderator is framed alone or with the candidates, only one of the two candidates appears in the frame: the one speaking, with some takes of the other candidate. During the opening and the closing statements only the speaker is framed. In the other blocks the candidate who is not speaking is framed briefly (few seconds) 2-5 times whilst the other candidate is speaking. From the shots shown above it can be seen that the candidates' positions are inverted: in the first debate, Zapatero was on the viewers' left, and Rajoy on the right, whilst in the second debate, Rajoy was on the left and Zapatero on the right. Moreover, the candidates looked at camera when directly addressing audience, i.e. in opening and closing statements, and were framed as looking at the opponent during the turns (as one can see in the figures above). It goes without saying that order and time of speech were measured precisely, as was the turn taking. The order of interventions was inverted in the second debate: in the first one Rajoy was the first to speak, whilst in the second debate Zapatero opened the debate. The only role for the presenter was to ensure that speakers complied with the times allotted to them<sup>122</sup>, and except for the welcoming and closing statements and the interventions to close one topic and introduce the next one, the moderators only employed 'transitional questions' or utterances (Agha 1997: 471, footnote 10).

<sup>122</sup> Soengas-Pérez is somewhat critical of the passive role of the moderator (2009: 998)

## 5.6. The structure and the themes of the debates

As discussed earlier, the structure was previously agreed between the candidates. The debate, opened and closed by the moderator, was divided into 7 parts: 1) candidates' opening statements (OS), 2) economic policies and employment (EP), 3) social policies (SP), 4) foreign policy and security (FP), 5) on institutional policies (IP), 6) challenges for the future (CFF), 7) candidates' closing statements (CS). The first and last parts were organized as single monologic interventions of three minutes per candidate. The other five parts were organized as follows: 3 interventions of 2 minutes for the first candidate, with 3 responses of 2 minutes for the other one, with a final minute for each candidate per block.




Figure 7. Structure of the first debate: each colored square indicates a minute; the black square indicates the moderator's turn (often lasting less than a minute, except for the welcoming intervention; other very short turns used just for giving the speech to candidates are not considered), the blue one indicates Rajoy's turn, and the red one Zapatero's turn. In the second debate the order of the two candidates was inverted, but the structure was the same.

More generally the structure was typical of any political-electoral debate<sup>123</sup>. The moderator's interventions served to open the *frame* of the debate as mediated event, a televised program, and close it, i.e. welcoming viewers and politicians, introducing and concluding each one of the 5 blocks, distributing the candidates' turns, as well as calling

<sup>123</sup> According to Cortés-Rodríguez & Bañón-Hernández the face-to-face Spanish electoral-political debate has a five-step structure: 1) short presentation of moderator, 2) short exposition of the problem by each candidate, 3) development of argumentation and debate, 4) last message for each candidate, 5) closure by the moderator (1997: 16).

them to order when they overlapped or exceeded their turn, and saying goodbye to them and the viewers<sup>124</sup>.

The debate is a communicative event, but not a *spontaneous* interaction: everything was meticulously prepared, organized and expected; candidates knew the themes, the questions, etc., they prepared their speeches and they performed them<sup>125</sup>. At some points, such as the opening and closing statements and to a lesser extent the first turns of each block, they took the form of two parallel monologues. This further contributed to the impression of the debate as a ritual. Indeed, except in rare cases, suddenly interrupted by the presenter, turns were clearly defined, as previously agreed, and open dialogue was impossible. This format makes the debates look like other rituals and highly formal(ized) discursive practices such as parliamentary debates (Alcaide-Lara 1999), albeit with a lesser degree of formality. The aim was to allow each candidate to present himself and his stance –and if possible to introduce slogans or arguments prepared by communication consultants– preserving them from unpredictable interaction. This observation obviously does not mean that the debate did not constitute an interaction with statements and responses, reformulations, criticisms, quotations, etc. In fact, it is through interaction that the two candidates can dynamically negotiate, manage and construct/deconstruct their presidentiality.

The first block, which includes the opening statements, is a general one, in which each candidate presents himself and the current situation. It goes without saying that these opening statements are crucial in framing the debate right from the beginning. The final block containing the closing statements is also of vital importance, as it represents the candidates' last chance to address the electorate.

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<sup>124</sup> It would be of interest to consider in greater depth the passive role of the journalist from the Bourdieuan perspective of the journalist as an agent of the political field: both journalists in their opening and closing addresses contribute to the *mise en scène* and sanction the debate as a political and mediated pseudo-event; they contribute to its publicity with all the rhetoric of uniqueness (Este es en España el primer debate del siglo XXI de esta envergadura), of the historic value of debates (En la historia electoral española quedará la fecha de hoy), of the worldwide interest on this debate; they also evidence the connivance with politicians (Nuestro agradecimiento, desde la Academia, a los dos partidos políticos, que nos han honrado con su confianza [...] y a los dos candidatos). The journalists present the debate as crucial (estamos en la fase decisiva y ante el debate definitivo) and as an event in which the future of the country is at stake; at the same time they increase expectation (Lo cierto es que la expectación es indudable) and, interested in the mediatic value of the event, they urge a repetition (esto ha sido un verdadero honor. Y creo interpretar un deseo general si digo que no tengan que pasar otros quince años para que esto se repita).

<sup>125</sup> See, for instance, Soengas-Pérez (2009).

I will now consider the principal topics dealt with in each block: in the five blocks, candidates addressed the main themes of the campaign. These issues are naturally strategically established by parties themselves in accordance with their aims, in the sense that the agenda is set by the parties themselves; the topics were chosen *before* the debate was set up by the communication managers of each candidate. The themes were as follows:

- **Economic policies:** Macroeconomics, prices, salaries, unemployment, productivity, etc.
- **Social policies:** pensions, health care, education, immigration, dependency, equality, family, etc.
- **Foreign policy and Security:** diplomacy, international cooperation, development, defense, terrorism, city safety, road safety, etc.
- **Institutional policies:** autonomous regions, devolution, constitutional reforms, justice, etc.
- **Challenges for the future:** research, technology, climate change, sustainable development, housing, infrastructures, etc.

It can be seen (see also chapter 6 on themes and cleavages) that many issues were discussed, but I have chosen the most important ones, in accordance with my personal observation, Pujol's study (2008), and Gabriel Elorriaga's declarations (Crawford 2008): I will thus focus on 4 issues that can be considered as the main terrains of struggle: the economy, immigration, terrorism, and the unity of Spain.


### 5.7. Debates as a stage for managing presidentiality

According to the observations above, the two major pseudo-events of the 2008 electoral campaign were the two televised debates between ZP and RJ. This is due to at least three reasons: 1) because they were magnified by the main agents of the political field and the media system (journalists), for instance, presenting them as a historical event and insisting on the fact that in 30 years of democracy it was only the second time that two candidates had confronted each other in a televised debate; 2) because, due to the fact that they took place at the height of the election campaign, they concentrated in little space and time the discourses of the electoral campaign; the electoral campaign lasted from 9 February to 8 March 2008, while the two debates, that took place on 25 February and 3 March, were (and were presented as) the very center of electioneering; 3) due to the visibility they received, and to the permeability of the media system, they were reported, commented, discussed, etc. in other media, with the effect of increasing their dissemination.

But in particular, the debates constitute a crucial space for the implementation of the strategies of construction and deconstruction of presidentiality. Not only due to the absolute visibility of the event, but especially for the opportunity of showing off and enacting the self and self-image on television. They play out the widespread metaphor of Politics as a performance of actors on a stage. Indeed, the debates allow the candidates to present themselves in a unique event, which epitomizes the representation of Politics; it allows politicians to portray themselves as they wish to be seen by electors (Sampedro-Blanco & Seoane-Pérez 2008; Sampedro-Blanco & Roncero 1999). Debates are the *stage* or better the *frontstage* for performing opposition and confrontation; for increasing one's own presidentiality by enacting positive self-presentation, and for decreasing other's presidentiality through the negative presentation of the other.

Politicians aim to win citizens' votes. Vote is a form of legitimation: it legitimates politicians to exert their authority (on this type of legitimacy and on a discussion on the issue see Weber 1958[1922]; Peter 2014; Bensman 2014). The fact that politicians receive the social sanction they need to govern legitimately through votes is so important that even totalitarian regimes periodically submit themselves to citizens' consensus. In order to obtain votes, candidates first need to be visible and recognizable and therefore need to show themselves off, presenting themselves as presidential through a positive self-presentation: at the same time they need to present negatively their opponents.

The televised debate is an ideal space for constructing one's own presidentiality and destroying that of an opponent. It allows politicians enormous visibility, enabling them to perform the fight for power in a ritual confrontation to define the most presidential (the legitimate president): *the winner of the debate*. This confrontation takes place in verbal terms and discourse is by far the principal means by which candidates can manage their own image or ethos or face. During the debate politicians present themselves as *good* –good politicians, good citizens, good men, good husbands, good fathers, good debaters, etc.– in order to appeal to citizens' for their vote, the logic assumption being that voters will not vote for a reprehensible person (they will not vote for a person that they believe is shameful).



The basic claim of this work, as discussed in chapter 4, is that the construction of presidentiality is mainly discursive<sup>126</sup>, so to this end, politicians on the stage of the debate put their face to citizens' judgment. However, their image is constructed through what they say and the way it is expressed, i.e. through discourse. Debate, which is the main place where candidates interact face-to-face and where discursive interaction is the main way of managing self and the image of the other, is thus the prime stage for managing presidentiality.

The perlocutive object (end) of discourse produced during the debate is for addressees to give their vote to the addressers (see also Santulli 2005: 31). Addressers' main communicative intentions are to *make know* and *make do* (Greimas & Courtés, 1979), hence speech acts constituting the interaction constructed during the debate are of two main types: assertive or directive (Searle 1965; 1975):

- 1) assertive speech-acts: *we are good* and *they are bad*;  
illocutive intention (force): make know;
- 2) directive speech-acts: *vote for us*;  
illocutive intention (force): make do.

<sup>126</sup> This point requires deeper discussion in relation to the Bourdieuan concept of *habitus* (Bourdieu 1980: chs. 3 and 4; 2000[1972a]; 2000[1972b]).



Whether assertive or directive, the perlocutive object of the speech-act is the same: to obtain votes. On the other hand, as we will see, assertions and requests are rarely formulated directly, but rather indirectly. Candidates very rarely say “I am good” or “you are bad”, but through the tools discussed above in chapter 4 (narratives, deixis, arguments, reported speech, etc.) they constantly try to legitimize themselves through a positive self-presentation and to delegitimize their competitor through a negative presentation.

A communicative event such as the presidential debate has a dialectic structure and is highly polarized, for the purpose of *mettre en scène* (staging) in an embodied manner (i.e. by two candidates physically present) the competition for power and for limited social and symbolic resources. At a discursive level, many devices contribute to representing this polarization through a divergence between “I/us” and “you” or “us” and “them”. Each candidate tries to align himself with electors and to disalign himself from the opponent, whilst at the same time attempting to disalign electors from the opponent<sup>127</sup>.

Since the victory of a candidate means the defeat of the other, each candidate increases his own image, by generalizing and emphasizing his positive aspects and limiting or omitting his negative aspects, and adds to the negative image of the other, by omitting his positive aspects and by generalizing and emphasizing his negative ones (van Dijk 1998; 2001a: 107-108; 2003: 57; see also Wodak et al. 1999: 33-45; Wodak 2009a: 40-45). I refer to this basic strategy, whereby candidates only attack the opponent perceived as the real competitor in the struggle for power (Morales-López & Prego-Vázquez 2002: 211), as legitimation and delegitimation (Chilton & Schaffner 1997; see also van Dijk 1998: ch. 26; 2003): each candidate’s self-legitimization means that he *justifies* his election because he is better than others, or, in other words, he is more presidential than the opponent. And the debate is the place where the candidates show their presidentiality.

In managing their presidentiality both ZP and RJ follow the same socio-discursive strategy: self-legitimation (through positive self-presentation) and delegitimation of the other (by framing him in a pejorative manner). Presidentiality management is verbally implemented by different devices, such as the choice of certain

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<sup>127</sup> This kind of discourse is obviously ideological (van Dijk 1998; 2001b; 2003; 2006b), since ideology arises when opposition for resources exists; the construction of identity and the diversity (sameness and otherness) are constructed through an ideological discourse (Wodak et al. 1999: 10-18; Wodak 2009a: 12-13; see also Atkinson 1984: 37-45).

lexical items, morpho-syntactical features, pragmatic elections (such as deixis or implicatures), or rhetorical features (such as metaphors, hyperboles, arguments, etc.) and according to some specific themes.

## **5.8. Summary**

This chapter provides a more detailed insight into the two 2008 presidential debates between ZP and RJ. I firstly introduced the story of presidential debates in the main Western democracies, in particular in the USA, UK, Germany, France, Italy and then in Spain. I also very briefly outlined the main trends in debate analysis. I then went on to frame the debate as a mediatized communicative (pseudo)event, i.e. as an event created only to generate notoriety. In this section I insisted on the mediatization of politics and of the symbolic and ritual feature of Politics and on personalization. The debate is a ritual of confrontation based on some myths such as the existence of opposing parties and the myth of the free choice of citizens that allows society to keep its structure. Subsequently I analyzed the Spanish debates and their role in sanctioning the two-party political system. Finally I described and analyzed in detail the structure and the main features of the 2008 Spanish presidential debates. I concluded the chapter with some observations about how debates work as a stage on which candidates enact their identities and thus construct their presidentiability.

The next section addresses in greater depth the themes according to which candidates constructed their presidentiability within the debates, and their relation with traditional cleavages of Spanish society.

## **6. FROM CLEAVAGES TO THEMES. The terrains of struggle for managing presidentiability**

### **6.1. Introduction: Cleavages and Themes**

This chapter takes a closer look at the themes around which the candidates have managed their presidentiability. I will discuss this issue against the general background of the traditional political cleavages of the Spanish political field, in order to clearly define the position of the three main Spanish parties. The chapter starts with an introduction of the concept of cleavage. It then moves from the general to the particular in the main cleavages of Spanish politics. Finally, there is a discussion of the topics that expressed these cleavages in the 2008 general elections and the debates in particular.

## 6.2. Cleavages

### 6.2.1. Definition of cleavages

Cleavages<sup>128</sup> are generic and general ideological divisions about wide-ranging questions, and are few in number, tending to be the same for all Western democracies. They can be considered, as Bornschier (2009) points out, as “a deep and lasting division between groups based on some kind of conflict”. Bornschier also points out that this is far from being an easy concept, but I am going to use it here in an operative way, very close to this intuitive definition.

According to Lipset & Rokkan (1967), cleavages can be reduced to 3 or 4 main questions on which people (individuals or groups) normally assume two different and opposite positions, among which there are nonetheless possible intermediate positions: **religion** (clericalism vs. laity; Judaism vs. Islamism; Catholicism vs. Protestantism; etc.), the **economy** (Capitalism vs. Socialism; owners vs. workers; etc.), **administration** (center vs. periphery; centralism vs. federalism; unionism vs. separatism; etc.). Take, for instance, religion and the opposition laicity/clericalism: themes concerning such a cleavage can be the degree of religiosity/laicity of public education. In the case of the **economy**, the cleavage concerns the opposition owners/workers, i.e. between classes (whatever this word means today), but also ideas about the public/private, i.e. how public or private certain sectors such as healthcare, transport and education should be, but also ideas about taxes, such as tax rises or cuts, etc. As for **administration**, also referred to as **center/periphery**, the cleavage concerns the opposition centralism/federalism, but it could also define different positions on the monarchy/republic or the union/split of a region from a country, etc.

I voluntarily omit to deal with a fourth classic cleavage that is urban/rural opposition. Despite its historical importance, in our days its role in Western democracies seems to be reduced. This does not mean that it did not leave some traces throughout the history in the construction of social and political allegiances and divisions within Spain.

In Bornschier's definition, the term *cleavages*:

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<sup>128</sup> The classic reference on cleavage is Lipset & Rokkan (1967); see also Gallagher et al. (2011a); for an overview on Spanish political parties see Gallagher et al. (2011b: 220-222); for a critical review of the term ‘cleavage’ and a discussion on its validity for new social and political contexts, see Bornschier (2009).

Denotes a specific type of conflict in democratic politics that is rooted in the social structural transformations that have been triggered by large-scale processes such as nation building, industrialization, and possibly also by the consequences of post-industrialization. One of the great appeals of the concept thus lies in its ability to link individual political behavior to macro-historical processes, and to make sense of the way “critical junctures” may shape politics in path-dependent ways for decades. In a perspective of comparative methodology, the cleavage approach helps us to understand the origins of similarities and differences between party systems and countries (2009).

As noted above, cleavages are generic and stable ideological divisions (the results of long historical processes) on general issues. Many of these distinctions on an individual scale could be transversal or cross-cutting, but for simplicity here I consider socio-political clusters –electors as well as parties– as mainly homogeneous entities.

### **6.2.2. Old and new political cleavages and the 2008 election campaign**

Generally speaking, we can say that PSOE is a center-left party (even though it was formerly clearly left wing), PP is a center-right party (even though it tries to present itself as center and was formerly right), IU is a left wing party (even though it was far-left). These labels are obviously oversimplifications, but can be used operationally. Nevertheless, a number of observations must be made regarding the positioning of these three parties.

It must be remembered that political positioning is *relational* and diachronically and synchronically dynamic (Bourdieu 1981: 6, 9, 11 indicated it as a crucial feature of *champs*, and especially of the political field). This means that the positioning of every party is related to that of others, and that any change in one element of the field leads to changes in other elements: if a party changes its stance, this change affects the stance of other parties: or, in other words, any move of a party causes a move in other parties. For instance, PP PSOE and IU did the following moves: “de socialista a socialdemócrata y de ahí al centro para el PSOE. De comunista a eurocomunista y socialista y de ahí a socialdemócrata en el PCE [=IU]. De derecha al centro-derecha y de ahí al centro en el PP” (De Santiago-Guervós 1996: 16).

In these general moves towards less radical positions, hence to less distant stances (more central), it can clearly be seen that PP and PSOE have been trying to occupy the center (see also Morales-López & Prego-Vázquez 2002). As De Santiago-Guervós states:

La lucha por el centro es otra larga historia. Definido en la transición como la propia moderación, equilibrio entre los extremos, interclasista frente a la lucha de clases, se personifica en UCD [Unión de Centro Democrático, n.d.r.], que se encarga de colocar la palabra en el centro de sus siglas. En aquellos momentos centro suponía para el electorado cierta ausencia de compromiso ante la insidiosa pregunta: ¿derecha o izquierda? (1996: 19-20).

In this fight to occupy the center the two main actors are PP and PSOE, who fight to gain floating electors, the less ideologically stable ones. As for PP, De Santiago Guervós stated that since its beginnings PP has been trying to erase its links with Francoism, and is doing so by using the word *center* in its self-definitions (1996: 21-22). As for PSOE, as we have already seen above, “el PSOE modera sus posturas para llegar a un más amplio espectro del electorado con el fin de acceder al poder” (De Santiago-Guervós 1996: 22).

This is a very important point: it is coherent with Bourdieu’s vision, namely that the political field is organized around two major poles such as left/right, progressivism (*liberalism* for US readers)/conservatism, in this case PP/PSOE. Yet it also clearly shows that political parties, especially the large national ones, are becoming increasingly similar. Indeed, it is increasingly difficult to differentiate between them on the ideological grounds, the result of their ideological *convergence*. At the same time and partially as consequence of the previous phenomenon, parties need to exteriorly differentiate themselves on the surface (see also Rey-Fuentes et al. 1999), as the importance of branding and marketing operation<sup>129</sup> can show. In this sense, it is no coincidence that Bourdieu and De Santiago-Guervós refer to electors as *clientele* or *clients* as if they were going to buy something, for instance, candidates or parties. It is therefore not surprising that politicians use marketing to sell themselves and that advertisers or analysts consider politicians as products or brands (Campmany 2005).

Interestingly enough, parties not only describe and situate themselves in different ways (for instance PP situates itself at the center –with Fraga as well as with Rajoy–, displacing PSOE to the left, and IU to the extreme left), but also dynamically change these self-descriptions and positioning along the political space during the election campaign: for instance PP accuses PSOE of being radically left wing, while PSOE

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<sup>129</sup> On this see also Bourdieu (2000: 35). See De Santiago-Guervós 1996 about the similarity between political and commercial language; this is to some extent obvious, since both are rhetorical and persuasive discourses, but it is true that they increasingly base their argumentation on emotive arguments (*pathos*) rather than logical reasoning (*logos*).

accuses PP of being far Right; in turn, IU accuses PSOE of being too far center or insufficiently left wing and PP of not being center at all, but instead positioned on the far right<sup>130</sup>, etc. These issues are crucial in the implementation of de/legitimation strategy.

In short, the definitions of PP as center-right, PSOE as center-left and IU as left differ from parties' self-definition –the way each party defines itself and other parties– and will help us to understand the de/legitimation strategies.

Coming back to the issue of cleavages, we can represent, simplifying, the general ideological positioning of PP, PSOE and IU, depending on how parties position themselves in terms of these three axes: religion, economy, type of state. The claims each party makes about key issues in the election campaign will corroborate this positioning. We can represent each cleavage as a polarized line along which each party situates itself in terms of more/less radical position or in terms of agreement/disagreement.

According to Colomer, traditional cleavages in Spanish society, for instance around the 1930s, are socioeconomic, religious, linguistic-cultural (center/periphery), and political: on the one hand conservative, Catholic, centralist, monarchist; and on the other, progressive, laic, federalist, republican (1998: 11)<sup>131</sup>. After the agreements between Suárez and the Communists, that led the latter to accept the monarchy (vs. republic), this cleavage (monarchy vs. republic) became less relevant (Colomer 1998: 15). In contrast, the center vs. periphery cleavage continued to be important, although the Communists, like other anti-Francoist groups, sacrificed the idea of a federalist state. Based on my personal observations, and assuming the classic definition of cleavage and the taxonomy given above, the main elements of the 2008 electoral campaign were:

**1) Religion:** relations with the Catholic Church (laity vs. confessionality); individual freedoms regarding divorce, homosexual marriages, abortion, euthanasia (yes vs. no); education with the school subject of religion (teaching vs. not; evaluating vs. not), and Civic Education (yes vs. no), strictly related to the prior subject of the relationship with Catholic establishment due to its nature;

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<sup>130</sup> In the preamble of its electoral program, IU accuses PSOE of being too similar to PP, and PP of being “far right” and “nationalcatholic” (IU 2008: 10, 16-18). As we will see during the first debate Rajoy states Zapatero was Marxist, and Zapatero links Rajoy to Alianza Popular, implying it was Francoist.

<sup>131</sup> On cleavages and electoral behavior see Ruiz-Contreras (2007: 36-43) and Gunther et al. (1986).



**2) Type of State:** (federalism vs. centralism) under this cleavage falls the question of terrorism and the Government's relationship with the Basque independence movement ETA (dialogue vs. non-dialogue), as well as the relationship between Spain and Catalonia or all issues concerning Castilian and other languages such as Catalan, Basque and Galician;

**3) The economy:** all kinds of economic policies (tax decrease vs. increase, growth, inflation, housing, etc.), and also the question of immigration (permissive vs. restrictive policies), which, far from being seen as a humanitarian issue, is seen and dealt with as an economic problem. It should be noted that the economic crisis of 2008 and the negative economic results of PSOE (also due to the negative global economic conjuncture), compared to the successful economic results of the last two PP governments (also thanks to the positive global economic conjuncture) made this key theme of macroeconomics even more relevant, giving PP (but also IU, albeit from different perspectives) a firmer foothold to attack PSOE on issues related to growth, unemployment, etc. This will be seen in greater detail in the following chapters.

The aforementioned cleavages (religion, economy, type of state) are enough to draw a general ideological distinction between the three parties: in accordance with my observations (see also Gallagher, Laver & Mair 2011b: 220-222), we can represent PP, PSOE and IU in relation to these three cleavages.

PARTY	CLEAVAGES		
	ECONOMY	TYPE OF STATE	RELIGION
PP	Liberalism	Monarchism Centralism	(Catholic) Confessionality
PSOE	less Liberalism than PP less Socialdemocracy than IU	Monarchism less Federalist than IU	less Confessionality than PP less Laity than IU
IU	Socialdemocracy	Republicanism Federalism	Laity

Table 1. The three parties' ideological stance about the main cleavages of Spanish society

This table provides a picture of the three parties' political position. We could add a fourth column concerning a new cleavage such as **individual freedoms**, which concerns, for instance, abortion, homosexual marriage, divorce, euthanasia, etc. This could give us a clearer image of parties in terms of their conservativeness or progressiveness. Nevertheless, despite its obvious importance, I preferred not to include this cleavage for two reasons: firstly because it can be easily subsumed under the cleavage of religion, since choices in issues concerning individual are strictly intertwined with Catholic moral(ism) and the position of CEE, *Conferencia Episcopal Española* [Spanish Bishops' Council], the highest official institution of Spanish orthodox Catholic establishment. Secondly, because there is no agreement amongst scholars regarding rifts concerning individual freedoms as a cleavage<sup>132</sup>. Nonetheless, it would be possible to consider individual freedom as a fourth cleavage without incurring in any serious conceptual error.

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<sup>132</sup> This kind of cleavage is what scholars have called “value-based divide”, it has been acknowledged as increasingly important in post-industrial societies, also due to the weakening of the class-based vote in this post-modern societies; Bornschie (2009) discusses in detail the scholars' positions whether to consider or not this kind of value-based divide as a cleavage, due to the fact that it did not result from a large macro-historical and persistent process but from rather young processes whose persistency has not yet been proven.

### 6.3. Themes

In this section I will present the main topics used by the candidates to construct their presidentiality<sup>133</sup>. I define here themes simply as ‘what discussion is about’: they are the terrains on which the two candidates struggle to positively present themselves and negatively present the other.

Electoral discourse is always about something, addressing certain topics. Normally these themes are significant, and can be considered as symbols in the sense of Edelman (1964). Themes polarize electors in terms of choosing one party or another, according to the way each party (throughout the spokesperson of its candidate) foots itself about each theme. It should be noted that themes and cleavages are related but different things and it is important not to confuse them: cleavages are general and stable divisions about themes, themes are particular and contingent local problems where cleavages become visible. For instance, the issue of education (public/private) or healthcare (public/private) is related to the socioeconomic cleavage; but the issue of education (religious or laic education) is also related to the religious cleavage; the theme of Spanish minority languages (Catalan, Basque, Galician) is related to the center-periphery cleavage (federalism/centralism), etc.

In the following pages I will list the main themes for the 2008 election campaign. Yet before listing these topics, it is necessary to make a series of observations regarding the difficulties involved in selecting topics from electoral discourse.

#### 6.3.1. Difficulty of selecting themes from electoral discourses

Trying to outline a scheme, even summary, of themes and questions dealt with during the election campaign is a complex task for at least three reasons.

1) First because within the theoretical framework used here, institutional political activity is entirely understandable as an uninterrupted electoral campaign, since all politicians’ activity (performances and discourses) is geared towards (re)election. Politicians are constantly engaged in an electoral campaign, and the terms pre-campaign and campaign are fictitious: although the duration of electoral campaign is legally fixed by law (BOE 1985: 19.116), parties are always occupied in preserving their political capital, their image, positively presenting themselves and negatively presenting the other. Hence establishing those topics that can be considered the object of stance taking

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<sup>133</sup> I consider *theme* and *topic* as synonym, but other scholars distinguish between these two terms (see, among others, Brown & Yule 1983: ch. 3 and p. 126).

during the election campaign is difficult: on the one hand any decision to include or exclude a topic could be considered arbitrary, and on the other hand there could be a tendency to include them all, which analytically is of little or no use.

2) Secondly, because in electioneering absolutely all topics emerging from current events is susceptible to becoming an element for polarization, and therefore a relevant theme in the political (and media) agenda, according to its ideological meaningfulness, contextual pertinence, and relationship with other issues. This is exacerbated by the situation being highly polarized.

3) Thirdly because in electoral discourse implicit or explicit intertextuality and entextualizations, under the form of reformulations, critics, (pre)suppositions, inferences, quotes, parodies, premises, citations, denials, etc., are very evident and especially important, probably much more open and evident or explicit than in other discourses<sup>134</sup>. As a result, themes discussed during an election campaign are inevitably linked to others that are relatively close *in time and space*, which can be referred to or remain latent or in the background, but are present in some way<sup>135</sup>.

### 6.3.2. Treatment of themes by politicians

I argue that not all topics receive the same treatment: some of them are extensively treated while others appear as *topoi*, as just names or short phrases, as synthetic symbols, *which stand for something else*, referring to other elements of polarization<sup>136</sup>.

I wish to stress that the amount of space/time dedicated to a theme is not always directly proportional to the importance the topic could have for presidentiality management. Sometimes the relationship is direct and very important themes are treated extensively, with ample space, time, and words, yet this is not always the case. In many cases we face *topoi* with great symbolical meaning and a strong polarization capacity; in these cases the theme is reduced to one word that –like a synecdoche– implies and sums up all the discourses generated on it in the past. Therefore, in the case of *topoi* the

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<sup>134</sup> This point strengthens the Foucaultian conception of discourse as an uninterrupted flow and Bakhtinian observation that every text is polyphonic.

<sup>135</sup> This observation is coherent with the need of historical inquiries for understanding political elections, and the fact that political and ideological oppositions are historically built up (Lipset & Rokkan 1967: 2-3).

<sup>136</sup> Note the difference between *themes* and *topoi*. Here I use the term *theme* for indicating “the general meaning of an utterance” (Voloshinov 1973[1929]: 99). Themes are the most important information of a discourse. Sometimes themes are so generalized that they become information which does not need to be dealt with: they become *topoi*. *Topoi* are merely cited under the form of only one general word, such as *justice* or *freedom*. As van Dijk puts it, “*topoi* are used as ready-made arguments that do not need to be discussed or defended: they are basic criteria of argumentation” (2003: 68, my translation).

relationship between the amount of space employed and strategic importance seems to be indirect, but because of their intrinsic quality of synthesis they resume in one word or in a short phrase all the time past “talking” about it, disputing about it, positioning pro/con about it, all the space and time dedicated to it in news, videos, songs, films, schoolbooks, informal conversations, etc.

### **6.3.3. How to select (relevant) themes**

This section deals with some methodological questions related to the way I selected the topics discussed by politicians during the elections and in particular during the debates.

For reasons of economy, I have opted to focus on those topics that most clearly allow me to show how candidates have managed their presidentialiability. As I focus on the two televised debates, the height of the election campaign, I will make a brief reference to the division of the debates by topics. Particular attention will be given to the economy, immigration, terrorism and the unity of Spain (which will include the Catalan question). The two debates constitute privileged material to determine the key themes of the election campaign: indeed, since they occurred in the middle of the campaign, on 29 February and on 3 March, they concentrate all the topics dealt with in the campaign and even previously within a short space and time, even though candidates may only refer to them with a single word which acts as a *topos*, or through an indirect reference, a citation or an allusion.

Nevertheless, I have triangulated this choice with: a) my personal observations; b) an analysis of other materials collected; c) the declarations of PP communication manager, Gabriel Elorriaga (see below); d) Pujol’s report on the media coverage of 2008 Spanish general elections (2008).

As for the debates, after long negotiations between the communication managers of the two candidates, they were structured around 5 main blocks: Economic policy; Social policies; Foreign policy and Security; Institutional policies; Challenges for the future. Each block allows for the discussion of multiple topics (the following is just a short list, based on the introductory statements of the two presenters):

1. Economic policy: macroeconomics, prices, salaries, unemployment, productivity, etc.
2. Social policies: pensions, health care, education, immigration, dependency, equality, family, etc.

3. Foreign policy and Security: diplomacy, international cooperation, development, defense, terrorism, city safety, road safety, etc.
4. Institutional policies: autonomous regions, constitutional reforms, justice, etc.
5. Challenges for the future: research, technology, climate change, sustainable development, housing, infrastructures, etc.

It is clear that the four issues I selected are the crucial themes addressed in the first four sections of both debates.

I have chosen these themes also contrasting with my **personal observation**. I lived in Spain between 1999 and 2006 for discontinuous but extended periods in different cities. During this time, personally witnessing current Spanish life, interacting with people living in Spain, reading newspapers or books, watching TV, etc., in short being immersed in Spanish culture enabled me to build up a strong cultural and political background about Spanish history and politics. Moreover I was settled in Spain from 2006 to 2011, actively observing and following Spanish politics. Living in Spain allowed me to absorb the discourses (institutional or not, formal or not) circulating in that period within Spanish society: within the media, in in/formal discussions, broadcast debates, news, (instant) books, newspapers, etc. Thanks to my observation, I can corroborate that the four themes I selected were really central to the Spanish political space, also thanks to the agenda-setting role of the media.

On the other hand, I have carefully triangulated the debates with the other materials collected for this work: websites, videos, debates, and manifestos. Reading on Rajoy's website the phrase "Zapatero ha conseguido que los precios suban incluso en las rebajas", allows us to reasonably suppose that one of the topics dealt with by Rajoy is rising prices; actually the same topic appears in the two televised debates between Zapatero and Rajoy, as well as in several of PP's election videos (*Precios*; *Castillo de naipes*; *Rajoy: Precios*), or in its manifesto (2008: 111-115, 153, 157, 235, 268, 272, 275, 302).

Finally, I referred to Pujol's quantitative study (Pujol 2008: 21). It allowed me to corroborate my empirical observations, as well as my own analysis of the corpus. Calculating the number of news items that appeared in the main Spanish and Latin-American media dealing with each subject matter, Pujol found that the most relevant subject matters were, in this order, terrorism, the economy, employment, immigration,

foreign policy, education, housing, tax, inflation, climate change, digital canon<sup>137</sup>, abortion, family. Pujol also traced a comparison between the two parties in relation to the time/space dedicated by each party to the issues reported above. According to Pujol (2008: 23), the most relevant issues for PSOE were: terrorism, the economy, employment, immigration, foreign politics, and education, as shown in the figure below<sup>138</sup>.




Figure 1. PSOE's most relevant campaign issues

The most relevant issues for PP (id.: 25) were: housing, tax, inflation, climate change, digital canon, abortion, family (see figure below).

<sup>137</sup> In 2007, PSOE government extended the existing tax for personal copying to all digital devices (CDs, DVDs, USBs, memories, HardDiscs, MP3s, PDAs, Tablets, Cells, etc.). The tax was created to compensate the economic losses of the record and cultural companies as a consequences of digital file sharing programs and technologies; actually the tax was paid to the SGAE (Sociedad General Autores y Editores [Spanish General Society for Authors and Publishers]). Since this compensation was paid to SGAE there was no distinction between using a CD player to copy music or personal data. PP exploited the opposition to this tax (especially from young people) to attack PSOE.

<sup>138</sup> Figures indicate the percentage of total news appeared on the main Spanish and Latin-American media dealing with each subject matter.




Figure 2. PP's most relevant campaign issues

According to Pujol, “el discurso [del partido] socialista ha estado mas asociado a la política con respecto al terrorismo, así como el empleo y la vivienda. Por su parte el partido popular se ha asociado mas a los temas de inmigración, al cambio climático y al canon digital” (2008: 25).

The following chart shows a comparison between the relative importance of the issues in the electoral campaign for PP and PSOE.






Figure 3. Comparison between the PSOE and PP's key campaign issues

It is evident from these graphs that terrorism, the economy and immigration attracted considerable attention from both parties, but they also indicate that no space seems to have been dedicated to the unity of Spain (*contra* see Ruiz-Jiménez 2010). I am unable to explain the reason for this difference. On the other hand, the space and time dedicated by PP to immigration<sup>139</sup> should be noted, indicative of its strategic importance for PP, in line with other research addressing racism among the Spanish Right (Martín-Rojo & van Dijk 1997; Rubio-Carbonero 2011; Ruiz-Jiménez 2010). Still on the question of immigration, another significant fact is the way issues received varying degrees of attention before and during the (official campaign). For instance, in the figure below (from Pujol 2008) we can see how the agenda changed from pre-campaign to the campaign. Issues such as terrorism, immigration and education received far more attention, while issues as economy and employment received less attention. As Pujol (2008: 26) puts it:

El tema que mayor crecimiento ha experimentado es el de la inmigración, seguido por la educación, la política exterior y el terrorismo, [...] la campaña se ha desplazado por lo tanto hacia la inmigración, uno de los temas que más asociados están al PP.

<sup>139</sup> <http://www.publico.es/espana/53744/rajoy-promete-ser-implacable-con-la-inmigracion>




Figure 4. Key election issues: the difference between pre-campaign and campaign

The fact that immigration has become so important is due to PP's election strategy, as reported by Gabriel Elorriaga, PP communication strategist and in charge of Rajoy's campaign. Since PP was unable to mobilize more of its own voters, it needed PSOE voters –considered by Elorriaga as less disciplined than PP voters– not to vote for PSOE; PP needs a high abstention rate to win, so PP's message targets PSOE voters:

Our whole strategy is centred on wavering Socialist voters [...]. We know they will never vote for us. But if we can sow enough doubts about the economy, about immigration and nationalist issues, then perhaps they will stay at home [...]. It will be difficult to increase our vote [...], but [PSOE] voters are less disciplined than ours [...] That is why we are directing our message at them. We are saying, 'your government has not taken care of your problems'. The election result will depend on the impact of that message (*apud* Crawford 2008).

These statements, together with the place given to them in the two debates, my personal observations, Pujol's report and Ruiz-Jiménez study, confirm the importance of the themes I have selected: the economy, immigration, terrorism and the unity of Spain (the last two themes can go under the term used by Elorriaga of "nationalist issues").

Another issue deserves some attention: the considerable relevance given by PP to the topic of climate change, which could seem contradictory in a party which has not demonstrated a great sensitivity towards environmental matters. This attention is due not to a change in ideology, i.e. not to a new and greater interest of PP in environmental and ecologic questions, but as a defense strategy in the light of previous attacks by

PSOE about PP's (supposed) lack of interest in environmental issues. It is a way for PP to detract this issue from the Left, or at least to contend the Left's (quasi) monopoly of the defense of the environment and sustainability. This usage of environmental issues is also a form of what I have defined ideological *convergence*, which will be discussed in greater depth at a later stage.

#### 6.4. Themes and the construction of presidentiality

It is obvious that topic selection is crucial for presidentiality management. Elorriaga's statements quoted above have shown the importance of using the economy, immigration and nationalist issues in persuading electors not to vote PSOE.

Topics can therefore be considered the terrains in which the struggle to impose one's own principle of vision and division of the world, as well as the positive self-presentation and negative presentation of the other take place.

As the following sections show in greater detail, PP chooses the economy to paint a gloomy picture of the current situation, and by extension projecting a negative image of PSOE. It bases its arguments on the idea that unlike PP in 1996 and 2000, PSOE failed to address the real problems. Moreover PP tries to present itself as more "lefty", including in its agenda topics normally associated with PSOE, such as environmental issues, but especially by presenting itself as interested in the problem of Spanish laymen as mortgages, price raising, etc. Furthermore PP uses immigration to present PSOE as disordered and insensitive to "poor" Spaniards threatened by the "avalanche of immigrants". Also PP uses terrorism to present PSOE as a party that is threatening the State, because of its agreements with ETA terrorists. In addition PP uses the *Estatut de Catalunya* and the reforms conducted by PSOE to give Catalonia greater autonomy, to present PSOE as the party that is breaking up Spain. In doing so PP tries to separate PSOE from electors. This negative presentation of the other is always accompanied by a positive self presentation: PSOE did it badly, we did it right; PSOE is disorder PP is order, etc.

In this sense, all the topics used by PP to attack PSOE and erode its positive image (and therefore to reduce its electoral support), are used by PSOE to defend itself from attacks and positively present itself. So PSOE uses the economy to present itself as a supportive party caring of the weakest segments of society (the elderly, women, immigrants, youngsters, precarious, students, etc.); Immigration is used to present an image of a tolerant party opposed to the xenophobic PP; the *Estatut de Catalunya* is used to present PP as centralist and intolerant, unlike PSOE, which is a progressive party open to increased decentralization, etc.

## **6.5. Summary**

This chapter considered the main cleavages that define and differentiate the three main Spanish parties and discussed the main topics of the 2008 electoral campaign that express these cleavages. The aim was to show the main terrains of struggle within which PP and PSOE during the election campaign. This is of particular importance in showing that the themes discussed during the debates were deeply entrenched in the discourse circulating in Spain at the time of the election campaign. They match the thematic division of the debates. On this point something else needs to be said: they were chosen by candidates and their teams, because they were considered as the most relevant for Spaniards, but at the same time their use as the central topics for debate also converted them into the most relevant for Spaniards.

Moving from the general to the particular, the next 4 chapters focus on how the two candidates manage presidentiability within the terrain of the 4 main themes (the economy, immigration, terrorism, the Catalan question). After providing some historical information in an introductory section, I will proceed to analyzing the main moves and discursive devices employed for managing the presidentiability.

## 7. THE ECONOMY: ENRICHING OR IMPOVERISHING LAYMEN

### 7.1. Introduction: the economy in Spanish politics

As stated by senior PP member Gabriel Elorriaga, the economy is, together with immigration and nationalist issues (i.e. terrorism and the Catalan question), one of the 4 main issues of the political agenda strategically set by PP in order to win votes from PSOE: for this reason the economy was one of the main terrains of struggle in the 2008 election campaign.

During the campaign PP framed the political debate depicting an unprecedented crisis under the indifference, the passivity and the incapacity of ZP, who they accused of failing to realize the importance of the situation and an inability to adopt the right decisions. PP launched videos such as *Embargo* and *Castillo de naipes*. In the first, an average Spanish family is shown in their room, watching ZP on the TV saying that everything is going fine and that Spain is among the best economies in the world, while two people are taking away all the family's goods, executing a repossession order. In the second video, two hands build a castle of playing cards; the playing cards feature ZP's posters with his optimistic election slogans. The speaker declares that ZP is indifferent and does nothing to solve the Spaniards' problems. At the end of the video, the castle falls down. PP's strategy for subtracting electors to ZP is to worsen the situation and stating that ZP did not care about their problems, especially economic ones, while PP will do.

This populist position is not only typical of PP. During elections populism<sup>140</sup> is common among both left and right wing parties, with politicians trying to present themselves as defenders of people, even though they specifically favor the interests of the same groups in power (Edelman 1964; 1971; 1977; 1988). This issue of the proximity to or distance from the people is especially interesting, since, as Enzensberger shows (1992), in reality politicians are far removed from citizens: materially, through bodyguards, armored cars, preferential seats and locations, opaque and impenetrable spaces, etc.; and also symbolically, through representations that show the politicians' exceptionality (Edelman 1988). Politicians move closer to citizens during election

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<sup>140</sup> Populism is a disputed term: some attach negative values to it (demagogy) and others positive ones (the defense of people's interests); here I will use it in its first sense.

campaigns because they need electors' legitimacy, i.e. their votes (Santulli 2005). Both ZP and RJ fight to present themselves as the defenders of citizens' interests. Consequently, there are frequent references in the two debates to laymen and moves to position themselves next to them.

This fight for **proximity to citizens** must be linked to two episodes of the campaign preceding the debates. On the one hand, what happened during the TV show *Tengo una Pregunta para Vd.*, where ZP, asked by a citizen, was unable to answer properly about the price of a coffee, showing the distance between him and citizens' everyday life (Arroyo-Martínez & Yus de La-Fuente 2011: 66); and on the other hand, PSOE's response to RJ's efforts to present himself as the spokesperson and defender of the working class: this requires a short digression, since it is crucial in the electoral strategy of 2008 elections. On 4 October 2007, responding to a previous video of Juventudes Socialistas (PSOE's youth organization) that defined *members of PP* as ultra-Catholic nationalists and intolerant snobs, RJ declared to the media that "PP is a party of workers [*currantes*] [...], I am the president of this party and I am a worker [*currante*]". During the campaign RJ insisted on this idea of his being as a worker and of PP as the worker's party, showing that this was one of the main campaign strategies to win over traditional PSOE votes. On 17 February 2008, during a meeting in Logroño, RJ asked workers and wage-earners "abandoned" by ZP to vote for him. Some days before, he defined the PP election program as one of "*socialistas clásicos* [classic Socialists]", trying to mobilize PSOE's former electors who felt betrayed by ZP's politics. At that meeting RJ mentioned all the topics he would later use in the debates: ZP's lack of interest and incapacity vs. PP interest and capacity, as proven by Aznar's governments; he defined ZP as a trickster [*embustero*], accused him of dealing with things nobody cares of. He attempted to target middle-class voters, those waking up early in the morning to go to work (an image he would use repeatedly in the debates). He also accused the government of having neglected Spaniards' everyday problems, promising that PP would deal with them. He accused ZP of taking no interest in economic policy and recalled the positive economic results of former PP governments.

This self-presentation was aimed at attracting wavering PSOE voters, as RJ said himself in the CS of the second debate, where he clearly indicates that his discourse targets discontented former PSOE voters (II.1652-1656). Obviously, RJ's attempt to present himself as the defender of workers' interests was refuted and contested by

PSOE during the campaign (for instance, in a video of a meeting embedded in PSOE web, ZP makes fun of RJ's self presentation as a worker) as well as during the debate. The issue of the "legitimate" representative of working class voters is not secondary, in that it is related to the most common self-representations that parties give of themselves and that voters have (or are supposed to have) of parties. During the debates, ZP uses multiple resources to present PSOE as the only party that defended the working class. In doing so, ZP lays claim to the votes of working-class electors. This negotiation is interesting in terms of strategic face-work, since on the one hand it shows PSOE's interest in maintaining its image as the party traditionally committed to working-class struggles, independently from current politics (which can be seen as manipulation), and also PP's interest in constructing a self-image different from the classic one as a traditional conservative party committed to owners' interests, with the aim of getting votes (which, again is manipulation). But it is also linked to the ideological convergence and the discursive hybridation (see below).



## 7.2. The economy in the debates: Strategies, moves, devices

According to the structure of debates, the economy is the first theme addressed, which is indicative of its importance. However, it is also a topic that cuts across at least 3 blocks within the debate, that of Economic policy (EP), Social policies (SP) and Challenges for the future (CFF). In this sense I have adopted an integral approach to the issue of the economy, as it features in all the debate blocks.

The analysis will show that candidates manage their presidentiality according to the general and local **attributes of the presidential** as discussed in chapter 1 and which are briefly recalled here:

**General attributes:** Unity; Sincerity; Strength; Realism; Loyalty; Coherence and Consistency; Defending people's interests; Supportiveness; Activity, capacity, efficacy; Centerness and moderation;

**Particular attributes:** being a nurturing father (talkativeness, optimism, supportiveness); Being a strict father (authority, realism).

What follows is a discussion of the main moves employed by both candidates to manage their presidentiality.

### 7.2.1. RJ's moves to manage presidentiality

#### 7.2.1.1. Ability: PP as an effective administrator and PSOE as incapable

PP's strategy to reduce the number of electors willing to vote for ZP is to distance him from them employing two main moves: a) to present him as incapable and indifferent to his voters' needs; and b) to present RJ as the defender of the Spaniards' interests. Since RJ's aim is to get votes from wavering PSOE electors dissatisfied with the PSOE government, he has to paint a darker picture. He therefore describes the situation as unprecedentedly dramatic. This representation of situation and actors is extensively employed throughout both debates (I.82-128). RJ's narratives are aimed at presenting the situation as worse than 4 years before (under PP government), due to rising prices, mortgages and unemployment rates in a frame of a serious economic crisis. The outline of these narratives, that can be found also for other terrains of struggle<sup>141</sup>, is always the

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<sup>141</sup> We can find the same narrative structure for the economy (II.190), terrorism (I.711, II.734), and the Catalan question (II.111).

same: “before (under PP) we were fine; now (under PSOE) we are in a difficult situation” or “PP management was good; PSOE was bad” or “when ZP came to power things were fine, now (after his government) things are bad”. Through this strategic description of the situation, RJ presents **ZP as unable** to cope with this negative situation, and himself as the *real* defender of workers: in doing so RJ aims at obtain the favor of former PSOE electors. For this reason RJ’s discourse is aimed at presenting ZP as far away from people and himself as responsible, realistic, close to laymen and able to *corregir el rumbo* [put things back on an even keel]. In short, RJ’s discourse constructs the following propositions:

RJ→ZP: distant from laymen, did not deal with their problems; removed from reality, incapable

RJ→RJ: close to laymen, interested in their problems, realistic, capable.

To win the favor of **laymen**, RJ often refers to *gente*, *ciudadanos* or *españoles de a pie*, talks of laymen issues (prices, job, housing, mortgage, etc.<sup>142</sup>) with terms that are easily understandable, through expressions such as *apretarse el cinturón* [tighten the belt], and references to the prices of typical foods of laymen’s diet, including milk, eggs, chicken, bread, anchovies and potatoes, or about the difficulties of people waking up early to go to work or with difficulties in finding a place in kindergartens for their children, etc. Through these *hypotyposis* and with references to specific examples, RJ tries to get closer to classes traditionally inclined to vote for PSOE, presumably dissatisfied with the economic situation and therefore probably ready to punish PSOE.

RJ also uses narratives of the negative economic situation left by previous PSOE governments (1982-1996). These narratives are based on the agreement existing on the implicit assumption that some favorable macroeconomic indicators are desirable. Through this device, RJ decreases ZP’s presidentiability, focusing on the *traditional* **PSOE incapacity** to manage the economy and increases his presidentiability by framing PP as able to solve problems.

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<sup>142</sup> As Edelman says (1971; 1988), these are the problems of laymen, but the fact that politicians talk about these issues does not implies that they solve them once elected.

nos dejaron la Seguridad Social quebrada, una tasa de paro del 22%, un déficit público y una deuda pública y unos tipos de interés que no nos permitían en ningún caso cumplir los requisitos del Euro y entrar en Maastricht (I.337-343)

sabemos hacerlo, lo hemos hecho en su momento y volveremos a hacerlo (II.390-391)

RJ's attacks are aimed at showing **PSOE's incapacity for managing the economy** in contrast with **PP's capacity**, as recent history proves (I.413-417; I.1602-1603). It is important to note that RJ's presentation of **PP as able** and with proven expertise in solving the problems left by previous (PSOE) governments goes in hand with the presentation of **PSOE as an irresponsible** party leaving black holes in the state balance. According to these narratives, the occasional achievements of the PSOE government are the consequence of previous PP governments (I.202-208): when referring to this point, RJ uses the expression *herencia e inercia* [inheritance and inertia]<sup>143</sup>. But see also the following excerpt:

hicimos una ley reconociendo las pensiones por ley, hicimos una ley donde se decía que las pensiones subirían al menos como el IPC, cuando ahora han cobrado los pensionistas una paga a final de enero fue por la ley que hizo el Partido Popular. Le dejamos un fondo de reserva, subimos las pensiones y mire, ahora vamos a volver a subirlas (I.601-606)

This kind of narratives **of the past** whereby PP solved Spaniards' economic problems inherited by PSOE as in 1996 are very frequent in both debates (II.242-283; II.336-342; II.389-391). Through these narratives RJ represents PSOE as the party who is unable to manage Spanish economy and **ZP as passive**, whilst PP is the party of efficiency:

Lo que hay que hacer es una política económica, que es lo que ustedes no hicieron. Ustedes se quedaron sentados tranquilamente, dijeron "qué bien se vive de la herencia y de la inercia, qué bien

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<sup>143</sup> The issue of *herencia e inercia* will be repeatedly used by RJ throughout the two debates (I.204; II.200, II.321, II.323, II.266, II.370, II.389), as a key-word for negatively presenting ZP ("you/he did it badly") and positively present PP ("we did it fine").

nos lo han dejado estos señores del Partido Popular y ahora vamos a no hacer nada. A dedicarnos a la Alianza de Civilizaciones, a enter... a entretenernos con la memoria histórica, vamos a negociar con ETA y otras cosas". [...] Hagan reformas económicas y una auténtica política económica, que es lo que no han hecho a lo largo de estos 4 años (II.263-274)

The effective management of the economy is linked to the importance PP places on economic issues: in the CS, for instance, RJ insists on the importance of the economy and the necessity of not becoming entangled in debates on other secondary issues.

Me ocuparé de la economía. La economía es capital. La economía lo es todo y de la economía, de una buena política económica depende todo [...] Por eso, debemos prestarle toda la atención y no enredarnos con debates sobre Naciones o alianzas de civilizaciones como ha ocurrido en esta legislatura. La economía por encima de cualquier otra consideración (II.1667-1680)

The insistence on the importance of the economy clearly reflects a Neoliberal ideology. RJ presents himself as an **efficient and pragmatic leader**, as when he refers to *realismo, trabajo y humildad*, able to solve Spaniards' problems with Neoliberal formulas favoring growth and competitiveness, such as tax reduction and cuts in public spending (as he said to ZP during the debate). RJ's presentation of the economy as the main problem on the political agenda is based on the macroeconomic success of former PP governments (1996-2004). Moreover, when referring to this, RJ presents himself as the pragmatic leader of all Spaniards, oriented to relaunching economy and growth, far from "entangling" debates in secondary issues. Obviously this self-representation is aimed at increasing his own presidentiability and at decreasing **that of ZP, whom he presents as indifferent or incapable** (cf. PP slogan "con Z de incapaz" that transforms PSOE one "con Z de Zapatero"), as **having confused priorities** and having dealt with secondary issues nobody cares about, such as the *Alianza de Civilizaciones*, *Ley de Memoria Histórica*, *Ley de Educación para la Ciudadanía* (I.678; II.385) or that only **divided and confronted Spaniards** such as discussing the idea of nation and negotiations with ETA.

Some observations need to be made about the deixis used in these narratives: even if RJ mainly uses *usted-yo*, every time he refers to the success story of PP in 1996, he uses the opposition *ustedes-nosotros*. He does so to refer to situations where actually neither RJ nor ZP were present, as José María Aznar and Felipe González were at the forefront of Spanish political life at the time. The use of the plural therefore refers to PP and PSOE and serves to frame PP as a party in positive terms and PSOE in negative ones.

Finally I wish to draw attention on the metaphor used by RJ in his representation as being able to solve Spaniards' problems:

Quiero que esta noche se vayan a dormir con la tranquilidad de que podemos encarrilar las cosas.

The power of this metaphor of a State as a means of transportation goes in hand with the implicit meanings that it activates: it implicitly refers to ZP, through the semantic presupposition triggered by the verb *encarrilar* [put back on track], which, logically implying a derailment, sets out the common (undisputed) presupposition that the present situation is off track, and furthermore that ZP is responsible for Spain's derailment. Consequently, RJ implicitly decreases ZP's presidentiability (*descarrilar*) and explicitly increases his own (*encarrilar*).

#### 7.2.1.2. Ability: ZP as passive

Connected to the previous move of **PP as an able manager of the economy**, there is the presentation of ZP as **inactive, unrealistic** or a **liar**, as someone talking positively instead of realizing the seriousness of the situation. These moves are aimed at implementing the strategy of connecting with laymen and **distancing ZP from them**. So, for instance, in the OS of the first debate, RJ accuses ZP of **failing to face up to reality** (1); of **having confused priorities** (2); of **having forgotten the essential issue, i.e. economy** (3); of **not having coped with Spaniards' real problems**, such as the economy, immigration, education, focusing instead on secondary issues, such as the state model and agreement with ETA, where he failed (4).

(1) no se puede negar la realidad porque quien niega la realidad, como hace el señor Zapatero, pues es imposible que pueda afrontarla

(2) ¿Qué ha pasado en los cuatro años? Pues que el Gobierno de España ha equivocado las prioridades

(3) se ha olvidado lo esencial, que es la economía, que son los precios, que es la vida de las personas, que es su forma de sentir, de vivir, son sus preocupaciones

(4) el Gobierno de España ha equivocado las prioridades. Ha tenido dos grandes proyectos: el primero, cambiar España y el segundo, negociar con ETA. Ambos han sido un fracaso

These negative representations of ZP as being removed from reality, as having confused priorities and neglecting the economy, are implemented in many points of both debates, representing ZP as an inactive player (I.209-215; II.450 among others):

Ustedes en materia de política económica no han hecho nada (I.413)  
esta es la consecuencia de no haber hecho ninguna política económica [...] vamos a hacer una política económica ordenada y seria, lo que ustedes no hicieron (II.326-327)

[...] al que no le ha importado la economía es a usted, que además era el presidente del Gobierno, que ha preferido dedicarse a otras cosas como le he dicho antes: a negociar con ETA, o a hacer cábalas sobre España eh... que al final han terminado como han terminado, o a entretenerse con cosas y cuestiones que no le importaban a nadie. Usted es el que no le ha dedicado ni un sólo minuto a la economía (II.379-386)

In this move, as in others, quantifiers such as *ninguna*, *ni una sola*, *nada* play an important role in absolutizing and stabilizing the negative image of the opponent beyond specific and particular behavior.

In terms of the dialogic and interdiscursive construction of stance taking it is interesting to note that to respond to the accusation of inactivity that he received one week earlier, in the second debate ZP explicitly presents himself as active, as implementing concrete measures, and takes advantage of any opportunity to present RJ as a pessimist:

Estas son medidas inmediatas, efectivas y constructivas, no como su habitual catastrofismo señor Rajoy, sólo se dedican a sembrar dudas cada día, a meter miedo sobre la economía, a describir una situación catastrófica. La verdad es la que se le ha escapado a uno de sus dirigentes, al señor Elorriaga, en un prestigioso periódico extranjero, cuando ha declarado "toda nuestra estrategia es desalentar a los votantes socialistas para que no voten, si sembramos dudas sobre la economía, sobre la inmigración y sobre las cuestiones nacionalistas, quizás se queden en casa". Esa es la razón por la que siembran tantas dudas, y meten tanto miedo, intentar ganar votos.

I will return to this strategy of depicting the opponent as pessimistic through the use of abusive and circumstantial arguments.

#### **7.2.1.3. Defense of people's interests: Proximity to or distance from people**

As mentioned above, as RJ is attempting to win votes from former PSOE voters, one of the main moves in his discursive strategy is to **get closer to laymen** and to **distance ZP from them**. RJ implements this move through various discursive devices and propositions. One such way is to accuse ZP of "hiding himself behind macroeconomic data that nobody understands" (I.251-281). This point is linked to the presentation of the other as **insincere and a bad debater**. Obviously, getting closer to laymen implies mitigating the image of being a Capitalist party and constructing an image of a center party concerned with the Spaniards' welfare. In his attempt to connect with laymen and reverse the image of an (excessively) right-wing party, RJ accuses ZP of having contributed to increasing social inequality:

[...] Pero lo más grave, lo más grave de lo que ha dicho usted es lo de la igualdad de las rentas. Yo tengo aquí los datos de Eurostat es que hemos perdido en igualdad el 20% más rico gana hoy bastante más que el 20% más pobre (I.343-347)

In this way, and in line with PP's overarching strategy of winning over doubtful PSOE voters, **RJ presents himself as the defender of the poorest segments of society**. This theme of social in/equality and distribution of wealth has traditionally been exploited by the Left, and ZP himself said *el crecimiento para nosotros supone distribuir la riqueza* (I.230). This is the reason why RJ's appropriation of the issue is so significant. This move goes in hand with that of separating ZP from citizens, for instance through accusations of failing to talk about what matters, which allows RJ to present ZP as a bad debater, and therefore a bad president (I.349-353). RJ insists on the topic of the **laymen** with expressions like *personas de carne y hueso* (I.407<sup>144</sup>), to present himself as the **defender of people** and for reduce ZP's traditional support; in doing so RJ says that ZP does not even know the laymen (*parece que usted no los conoce*).

In constructing his self-image of a candidate close to **laymen**, RJ introduces the theme of housing (I.1311-1338). It is a delicate issue in Spain, especially for working-class, and particularly during the beginning of the credit crunch and the burst of real estate speculative bubble. As he did for prices, salaries, pensions, *talking* about housing is used by RJ to win over former PSOE voters by demonstrating that ZP has been insensitive to their problems, while RJ is concerned about them. This is based on the performativity and discursivity of ethos: the fact of talking about something *makes* RJ concerned with it. Obviously RJ uses the issue of housing to **present ZP as incapable** (his action was insufficient and wrong). In order to strengthen his **connection with laymen** RJ deploys hypotyposis, i.e. a realistic picture of people suffering and presents **ZP as insensitive or unrealistic** and as an obstacle to the solution of the problem (II.83-96; cf. also II.195: *no hay peor médico que el que no quiere ver la enfermedad*); hypotyposis widens the gap with regard to ZP's indifference or ignorance:

Yo voy a hablar de lo que afecta fundamentalmente a los españoles, y voy a hablar de cómo viven los españoles, que no viven como usted cree que viven los españoles (II.175-178).

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<sup>144</sup> RJ uses here the same definition used by ZP in the previous intervention (I.357), when he tried to regain his connection with citizens.



According to RJ's description, ZP is unable to solve people's problems, because he is simply unaware of them. RJ constructs his alignment with laymen through references to the rise in **the price of basic foods** such as *leche, huevos, pollo, pan*, etc. showing that RJ talks about what citizens talk about, that he deals with citizens' problems, especially of those of *asalariados* [wage-earners] (II.255). This last point is crucial because –albeit simplifying somewhat– wage-earners are traditionally PSOE voters. This also shows that in order to achieve his electoral ends RJ adjusts his discourse in a clear example of discourse hybridation: a right wing party talks about wage-earners, although it is a traditional theme of Left discourse, and uses 'lefty' arguments to dismantle ZP's workface aimed at presenting himself as a defender of laymen:

*cuidaremos a las personas que tienen menos ingresos, que han sido las grandes atacadas por su política porque hoy la desigualdad de renta entre españoles es mucho mayor* (II.392-395; see also I.343-347)

*las personas más pobres son las que más sufren las subidas de los precios y las consecuencias de su política* (II.345-347)

RJ exploits the increased **differences between rich and poor** (a constant in contemporary Neoliberal societies) to dismantle ZP's positive self-presentation and represent **ZP as unsupportive and incapable**. In line with PP's global strategy of representing ZP as neglecting Spaniards' problems and especially those of his former electors, RJ presents ZP as betraying his voters, as betraying the Left, and presents himself as the *new* defender of workers, with a discourse that includes lefty words and themes.

In the fight for proximity to laymen, ZP contests RJ's facework, deconstructing **RJ's image of defender of Spaniards' interests** through a narrative that recalls economic measures taken by the previous PP government such as the freezing of civil servants' wages. The agreement is on the negativity of this measure. So ZP delegitimizes **RJ as a pretender** and, repositioning PSOE as the "legitimate" defender of working class interests, reconstructs the image of PSOE as standing beside workers and of PP aligning itself with Capital. ZP does so through explicit abusive arguments such as *Usted no es creíble para representar a la gente de la calle* (I.310-311) or through polarized narratives, where RJ made Spaniards poorer (bad) and

ZP made them wealthier (good). Aware of PP's strategy and the electoral difficulties that he could face if he permits RJ to distance him from laymen, ZP tries to regain the connection with people. For this reason, in both debates he employs expressions like *vamos a hablar de la vida real, de salarios y de la economía familiar* (I.283). This attempt to keep the connection with laymen is more visible in the second debate, maybe on the recommendation of his advisors, in which, like his opponent, he refers to basic popular foods and goods such as *pan, leche, pollo, frutas, patatas, vestidos o electrodomésticos* (II.227-233). ZP tries to keep the **connection with people**, also through performative statements showing his commitment to them:

Pero yo quiero hablar de los problemas de los ciudadanos. Y el primero para el bienestar de una economía es el empleo (II.298-299)

Quiero hablar de política sociales, porque tienen mucho interés los ciudadanos en conocer nuestras propuestas (II.408-410)

In order to refute RJ's argument of having betrayed his former electors, neglecting wage-earners, the poor, etc. ZP presents himself **as a supportive leader and RJ as unsupportive** through expressions like *Creo en la creación de riqueza y en la distribución la riqueza, ustedes no* (I.304). In doing so ZP repositions PSOE on the Left and RJ in his "natural" ideological space: beside Capital. By exposing this left idea, ZP increases his presidentiability and decreases his opponent's, the local agreement –i.e. on the Left– whereby wealth should be equally distributed. For the same reason he uses an *argumentum ab auctoritate*, quoting a UN document on the Human Development Index:

Cuando ustedes llegaron al Gobierno, España estaba en el puesto número 11; con su Gobierno perdimos diez puestos y llegamos al número 21 en 2003; ahora [...] llegamos al puesto 13 (II.308-317)

ZP tries to **stay connected to citizens** with (positive) facework, through which he presents himself as the **defender of weakest** (II.410-435; II.483-515). The need for ZP

to present himself as a supportive leader is so important in deactivating RJ's attacks, that, in both debates he dedicates the final part of his CS to it (I.1673-1677):

Gobernaré con sensibilidad, y estaré muy cerca de los que no tienen de todo. Buenas noches y buena suerte (II.1639-1640)

Again, ZP refers to a lefty theme, that of social protection and presents himself as supportive and PP as unsupportive. I will return to this issue in the next section.

## 7.2.2. ZP's moves to manage presidentiability

### 7.2.2.1. Un/supportiveness: PSOE supportive vs. PP unsupportive

This move is strictly connected with the previous one. Since there is a general and particular (within the Left) agreement on the fact that solidarity is positive, PSOE's overarching strategy for de/constructing presidentiability is to use narratives that refer to a past where **PP is represented as an unsupportive party** that did not defend the weakest and the present where **PSOE is depicted as a supportive party**. This move is coherent with the electoral strategies suggested for Liberals by Lakoff (2002[1996]; 2004): in order to win elections the Left should offer values like, as in this case, solidarity. ZP increases his presidentiability, presenting himself as committed to the weakest taking care of young people, women, the elderly, and the disabled, promoting social dialogue, and promoting public healthcare and public education (I.145-159; I.419-431; I.472-506). The description of the situation is always polarized on the opposition we/you for presenting PP as bad (56,000 public houses vs. €0 per person for young people in housing benefits; 3 billion € for research vs. freezing spending on education and scholarships) and PSOE as good or better (100,000 public houses; €200 per person in housing benefits; 7 billion € for research; etc.) (I.1339-1374). ZP presents RJ as a conservative that cuts public spending on housing, education, research, cooperation and development or immigration and himself as a liberal and supportive leader committed to the weakest segments of society (I.620-653; I.1419-1433).

In this sense, the final point of the CS in the first debate is particularly worthy of mention:

No puedo prometer que todas las personas tengan éxito en su vida, pero sí me puedo comprometer a trabajar para que todas las personas tengan las mismas oportunidades para tener éxito, y aquellas que no lo alcancen tendrán siempre el amparo de nuestro país. Buenas noches y buena suerte (I.1673-1678)

Here ZP expresses a social-democratic ideology where life is conceived as a quest for success, whose result depends on the participants' ability and starting conditions and where the politicians' role is to guarantee equal opportunities (social justice) and the protection for those who do not achieve this success (welfare state).

ZP continues to construct the image of a supportive leader concerned by gender equality, work precariousness, safety at work, etc. right from the start of the second debate (OS), claiming that his aim is *traducir ese crecimiento económico en crecimiento social* (II.51). Throughout the debate he presents himself as the defender of the weak (the disabled, those at risk of exclusion, women, young people, children, etc.) (II.140-173; II.410-435; II.483-515). At the same time he presents **PP (and by extension RJ) as an unsupportive party**. The following passage is a good example of a narrative polarized on the format *yo/nosotros* (good) vs. *ustedes* (bad) (II.410-435):

<i>yo/nosotros</i>	<i>usted/ustedes</i>
<u>Mi Gobierno</u> ha sido el primero en la historia de nuestro país que ha dedicado al gasto social más de la mitad de todo el Presupuesto del Estado	con <u>su</u> voto en contra
<u>nosotros</u> impulsamos las políticas sociales	con <u>Ustedes</u> se frenan
	<u>Su</u> Gobierno no dedicó ni un euro a la dependencia y además, ahora <u>obstaculizan</u> la aplicación de la Ley
el gobierno andaluz {PSOE} [ha reconocido a] a 65.000 [dependientes]	La Comunidad de Madrid {PP} sólo ha reconocido a 3.000 dependientes
<u>Este</u> es el gobierno que ha financiado la educación de 3 a 6 años al 100%.	<u>Ustedes</u> la aprobaron en su ley educativa, pero no pusieron ni un duro, ni una memoria económica
la hemos financiado <u>nosotros</u>	

Obviously in this kind of representation of reality deixis plays a crucial role in constructing the opposition and in associating positive or negative values to the

opposing sides. This insistence on lefty values is so important that it also features in the CS of the second debate, where ZP again presents himself as a **supportive and sensitive leader**, concerned with the weakest members of society (II.1617-1627):

Porque estoy convencido que un país es fuerte si da las mismas oportunidades a todos los ciudadanos y apoya a los más débiles, porque estoy comprometido con terminar con todas las discriminaciones, empezando por las que afectan a las mujeres, porque estoy convencido que el crecimiento económico nos debe llevar al pleno empleo. Porque estoy comprometido con que la mayoría de los recursos públicos se dediquen a la educación, a la sanidad, a subir las pensiones, a apoyar a los jóvenes para que encuentren empleo, a apoyar a los trabajadores y a sus familias.

Through this performative profession of social-democratic faith ZP tries to reconnect with people, in response to RJ's attempts to distance him from them, and he also presents himself as lefty, contesting RJ's attempts to present him as having betrayed the Left.

#### 7.2.2.1. Fair play: PSOE fair player PP unfair player

One of the main moves enacted by ZP for de/constructing presidentiability is the usage of narratives of the past where **PP/RJ are represented as unfair players** that failed to abide by the rules of the political game, and **PSOE/ZP as fair player**<sup>145</sup>. This strategy is again based on the idea of proposing general values –as widely agreed on as possible– upon which to construct the self- and the other's image, rather than directly attacking the opponent on particular issues that can be reversed. ZP implements this strategy from the OS of the first debate:

Buenas noches, me alegro que por fin tengamos este debate. Mi satisfacción no es por mí mismo, si no por los ciudadanos que van a poder comparar esta noche dos proyectos políticos bien definidos y diferentes (I.133-136)

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<sup>145</sup> ZP's efforts to present himself as sincere, loyal, and democratic sustained the entire campaign: throughout the two debates as well as in other texts, such as the videos of the series *Vota con todas tus fuerzas*, where PSOE invited citizens to vote for whatever party, or other statements appeared on his website as "la abstención es perder todos", etc.

He presents the debate as an occasion for citizens' to compare two different political projects. After this legitimization based on **selflessness**, ZP delegitimizes PP in reference to its disloyal opposition, defining it as the main hurdle [el principal obstáculo] of the legislature. RJ describes PP as undemocratic, since, it did not accept an unfavorable election result, insulted the opponent, tensed the environment, divided citizens, lied and exaggerated, failed to support the government on key national issues and used terrorism and the victims' pain for its own electoral ends (I.161-175). This argument works since it is commonly assumed that a president has to be a sincere democrat, i.e. that *democraticness* is one of the main attributes of a president, and hence presidentiability depends on it. The following passage of the OS shows how the management of presidentiability is two-folded:

La disyuntiva en las próximas elecciones es: diálogo o confrontación, aquellos que buscamos soluciones o quienes fabrican problemas, aquellos que desde el poder servimos a los ciudadanos y aquellos que han intentado utilizar a los ciudadanos para llegar al poder (I.171-175)

Through a Manichean representation of reality, ZP presents the vote as a choice between what is generally considered as good (dialogue, solutions, serving citizens) and bad (confrontation, problems, using citizens). Highlighting **PSOE's selflessness** and **PP's opportunism**, ZP defines PSOE (us) as a **fair player** and PP (them) as **unfair player**.

By presenting the opponent as unfair player ZP deactivates all criticism coming from RJ, as coming from a disloyal –hence untrustworthy– subject, i.e. he reduces the credibility of his opponent's criticisms. Most importantly, ZP does not criticize RJ for some contingent elements of his behavior and does not respond to criticisms about concrete deeds; instead, he employs *argumentum ad hominem*, to criticize his opponent for (allegedly) stable features of his personality such as **disloyalty to democracy** or, as elsewhere, pessimism, intolerance, backwardness, etc. One of the ways of stabilizing negativity in the opponent is to base the argument on the topic of uniqueness, as in the following example:

Ustedes nunca han apoyado en nada al Gobierno, no tienen parangón con ninguna oposición democrática de los países que conocemos (I.388-391)

Quantifiers (ninguna) make the case of PP unique, stabilizing and generalizing (nunca) the negative feature of PP as permanent and not contingent. But quantifiers are also crucial for self-legitimation, as shown in the following examples:

En toda mi vida política, tanto en la oposición como en el gobierno, he servido a España con lealtad, he colaborado en los asuntos de Estado (I.1643-1645)

En toda mi trayectoria política he intentado que el insulto, que la descalificación, no contamine el debate público (II.67-69)

Here *toda* stabilizes and generalizes the attribute of **loyalty and selflessness** beyond contingency. This move works thanks to the fact that voters reasonably agree that **selflessness** and **loyalty** are necessary presidential attributes. RJ also employs a variant of this argument, presenting himself in his CS as a **disinterested patriot** (I.1606-1608).

The last point where ZP presents himself as a loyal democrat is the first part of ZP's CS:

Quiero aprovechar esta ocasión para expresar mi profundo agradecimiento a los que me dieron la confianza en aquella ocasión. Mi agradecimiento también a los que en estos años, han expresado el apoyo a las acciones de Gobierno y también mi agradecimiento a los que han discrepado con respeto. Quiero que todos los españoles sepan que tanto el apoyo como la crítica me han servido de estímulo para esforzarme y trabajar por mis compatriotas (II.1606-1614)

This is not only a *captatio benevolentiae* towards his electors and especially those who did not vote for him, which is undeniably useful for winning their votes; instead, thanking also who criticized him, **ZP presents himself as a fair player**, as a self-critic, a moderate and mature leader, and particularly as a president for everybody (see below). It is obvious that all these features (maturity, moderation, self-critic, unity) are agreed

upon as essential attribute of the president. In order to boost their presidentiality candidates therefore have to construct their image in relation to them, which shows how performative discourse is in constructing ethos. I will insist on this, albeit from another perspective, in the next section.

### 7.2.2.3. Sincerity and Ability: Good debater vs. bad debater

In many points of the two debates we can see the equation “**good/bad debater = good/bad president**”, i.e. the fact that good –sincere as well as effective– oratory is linked to presidentiality. This idea is based on the features of ethos discussed in chapter 1. Since ethos is created discursively, bad oratory, i.e. insincere or ineffective, is considered as a flaw for a president. The second point is less common than the first; we can see an example in ZP’s criticism of RJ when discussing Spain’s participation in the Iraq war. That war was harshly criticized by Spain’s civil society, people and parties except PP, and was one of the main problems of PP faced in government; so ZP considers that RJ makes a *faux pas* by raising the issue.

no sé quién le ha aconsejado que venga ahora a discutir... (II.854-856)

In highlighting RJ’s *faux pas*, ZP shows that he is not a good debater and therefore presidential.

Nevertheless, criticism tends to focus on the debater as insincere, rather than ineffective. For instance, RJ tries to dealign the audience from ZP, accusing him (I.251; I.276-277; I.326-327; I.351-352) of hiding himself, of trying to disorient interlocutors and audiences with figures that nobody understands, of shirking his responsibilities and by extension of being **insincere**. On the other hand, and to present himself as a good debater, ZP uses performative speech acts in which he states that he wants to talk about what people are interested in:

yo sí quiero hablar de los precios que afectan a los ciudadanos (II.218-219; see also II.297-298; II.408-410)

This is part of a positive facework that responds to RJ’s attempts to present ZP as a bad debater, as well as an attempt to remain close to the people (see above). The issue of



sincerity is obviously linked to the open accusation of lying, even though they are different cases of the same discursive construction of ethos, the open attack of lying is simpler, but also very effective and very common.

To boost the construction of his image as a sincere politician, in the second debate, and as a consequence of RJ's accusation of lying in the first one, ZP added an effective theatrical move: he said he brought a *white paper* with all the data referred to throughout the debates (II.71-78). This fact of presenting himself as an **honest debater**, whose statements and data can be checked in a supposed white paper he offers in his intervention, and explicitly referring to the truth (*La verdad por delante y por escrito, para que no haya ninguna duda*), is highly relevant in increasing his presidentiability. ZP presents himself as sincere and he guarantees it with a *theatrical* and performative gesture: nobody could really check his data, but it is enough for him to enact sincerity and honesty. This indicates the importance of *discursive ethos*: being a sincere speaker and telling the truth gives the orator his credibility and increases his presidentiability. Obviously, sincerity is recognized as a fundamental attribute for a president.

These last points are especially interesting in that they demonstrate the candidates' meta-communicative and meta-pragmatic intentions; the performative power of discourse in constructing the self-image and the discursive character of the construction of ethos.

#### 7.2.2.4. PSOE dialogue PP authoritarian

Another of the moves used by ZP to de/construct presidentiability is the usage of narratives of the past where **PP is represented as an authoritarian party** that unilaterally took decisions and of **PSOE as open to discussion**, as shown by the numerous references to agreements with owners and unions (I.376; I.633; II.498; II.515; II.657; II.48-49; II.147-152.).

This move also has to be seen within the global PSOE electoral strategy as defined in the suggestions given to the Liberals by Lakoff (2002[1996]; 2004): in order to win elections the Left should offer values, as, in this case, *dialogue*. ZP presents himself and PSOE as open to discussion and PP as authoritarian.

If ZP does so it is because there is a general and particular agreement on dialogue as a crucial attribute for a president.

#### 7.2.2.5. Selflessness: PP opportunistic vs. PSOE selfless

Indubitably one of the main moves used by ZP to detract from RJ's presidentiality is to suggest that RJ is interested in the economy solely out of electoral interests:

Pero, ¿ahora a qué viene usted si no se ha preocupado por la economía en cuatro años? Si hemos tenido tres debates sobre el Estado de la Nación, y en sus discursos, que son largos, sólo ha dedicado una media de tres minutos a la parte de la economía... Si usted no se ha dedicado en nada a la economía (I.242-249)

This clear example of the circumstantial variant of *argumentum ad hominem* is fundamental because it allows ZP to deactivate all RJ's attacks as coming from someone not really interested in citizens' problems, but interested only in his own electoral objectives. As we will see below, this issue will also play a central role in the second debate, where the issue of **RJ's first question to ZP in the Congreso** will receive great attention from both candidates. More generally, ZP's strategy is based on presenting **PP as lying** and opportunistically manipulating the interpretation of economic figures only for electoral ends, and he does so through a *tu quoque* argument:

Mire, los precios en sus últimos cuatro años de Gobierno crecieron al 3,4 de media anual, ahora han crecido al 3,2, prácticamente igual. Lo que entonces era un milagro hombre, ahora es desolador (I.295-298)

The presentation of **RJ as an opportunist** goes in hand with the presentation of the opponent **as pessimistic**:

Estas son medidas inmediatas, efectivas y constructivas, no como su habitual catastrofismo señor Rajoy, sólo se dedican a sembrar dudas cada día, a meter miedo sobre la economía, a describir una situación catastrófica. La verdad es la que se le ha escapado a uno de sus dirigentes, al señor Elorriaga, en un prestigioso periódico extranjero, cuando ha declarado "toda nuestra estrategia es desalentar a los votantes socialistas para que no voten, si sembramos dudas sobre la economía, sobre la inmigración y sobre las cuestiones nacionalistas, quizás se queden en casa". Esa es la

razón por la que siembran tantas dudas, y meten tanto miedo, intentar ganar votos (II.162-173)

In this way pessimism (see the section below), which is already a negative feature, is worsened by opportunism. RJ's pessimism *is* opportunistic: he sows doubt in order to win elections (circumstantial argument). In this representation the role of reported speech and *argumentum ab auctoritate* are crucial. RJ cannot deny these statements. Through this representation, ZP deactivates RJ's criticism as proceeding from an interested –hence not objective and therefore untrustworthy– person. Describing the opponent as a strategic pessimist, who criticizes only to win elections, gives a negative image of the opponent as an unfair player and contrasts with the image ZP offers of himself as selfless (I.1643-1645; II.68).

#### 7.2.2.5. Optimism vs. pessimism: PSOE optimistic and PP pessimistic

The opposition between optimism and pessimism was also one of the main moves in PSOE's strategy to increase ZP's presidentiability and decrease that of RJ. It is crucial in the PSOE de/legitimation strategy, and indeed informed the entire campaign: the opening act of its election campaign, its main pseudo-event, was the presentation to media of the song *Defender la alegría* (on this see Screti 2013); in that event, the presenter talked of “defender la alegría contra los cenizos [defending the joy against jinx]”, implicitly referring to PP. Moreover, one of the videos of the PSOE campaign, *No seas él* [don't be him] featured a jinx always expecting or foreseeing the most negative side of things. The idea is that existing agreement on the fact that optimism is a positive attribute, associating it with ZP will increase his presidentiability and at the same time, associating RJ with pessimism will decrease his presidentiability.

As a result, in both debates ZP tries to present himself as an optimist and PP as a pessimist. One way of expressing optimism is by **minimizing** the gravity of the present situation referring to it through a euphemism such as *desaceleración*<sup>146</sup> instead of *crisis*, which is the word used by RJ, or by blaming the global crisis, which reduces his responsibility. Another way of enacting optimism, and at the same time minimizing his mistakes and maximizing his achievements, is to present the upside of the situation:

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<sup>146</sup> ZP will use this term 5 times in the first debate and 2 in the second one (I.226-227; I.369; I.373-374; II.50; II.150).

A pesar de la desaceleración, seguiremos creciendo [...] La desaceleración no va a ser ni profunda, ni prolongada. Va a ser una desaceleración, para la cual nuestro país está mejor preparado que nadie, por la fortaleza de su Sistema Financiero, por la fortaleza de sus Cuentas Públicas (I.369-376; see also II.140-173)

Esta noche, me propongo explicar cuál es mi proyecto para los próximos cuatro años, para un país que debe continuar creciendo económicamente, que juntos empresarios, sindicatos y Gobierno-, podemos superar un momento de desaceleración económica que vive España en un contexto mundial, para traducir ese crecimiento económico en crecimiento social (II.46-52)

Another way of expressing optimism is to explicitly refer to it, something ZP does in the CS of the first and second debates.

Tengo plena confianza en las enormes posibilidades de la España libre y unida. Creo que nuestro país puede continuar avanzando, incrementar su prosperidad (I.1640-1642)

llegaremos mejor al futuro si tenemos confianza y no pesimismo (II.1634)

Worthy of note is the role of expressions such as *seguiremos creciendo*, *continuar avanzando*, and *continuar creciendo*: the verbs *continuar* and *seguir* semantically imply that Spain is already progressing and growing. The persuasiveness of these expressions is based on the power of implicit meanings triggered by the verbs, which state as common ground something that was disputable and in fact disputed by PP, namely economic growth. These expressions convey optimism by establishing economic growth as being taken for granted.

As we have seen, ZP's self-presentation as an optimist goes in hand with his presentation of RJ as a pessimist. If we refer to passage (II.162-173) quoted above, we will see that ZP presents himself as active (also in response to the accusation of inactivity received one week earlier in the first debate) and positive, whilst presenting RJ as a pessimist. Through this representation, ZP deactivates RJ's criticism as proceeding from a person who is naturally pessimistic –and therefore not objective– (su

habitual catastrofismo; abusive argument), and especially from an opportunist sowing doubts only to win elections (circumstantial argument). In this delegitimation of the opponent the role of his reported speech is crucial in realistically representing his **pessimism and opportunism**.

These accusations of pessimism are obviously disputed by RJ, who starts his CS of the first debate using words such as *tranquility, optimism, hope*.

Quiero que esta noche se vayan a dormir con la tranquilidad de que podemos encarrilar las cosas [...] Podemos mirar al mañana con optimismo y con esperanza (I.1598-1602)

It is obviously an attempt to **mitigate or avoid accusations of pessimism** in response to those formerly received from ZP and PSOE during the campaign. Note that the metaphor *encarrilar las cosas* [put things back on track] is crucial, for what it says and for what it implies. It refers to the widespread metaphor of the State as a collective means of transport (train, boat, bus, plane), and as such activates references to the need for a captain, control, driving straight, etc. But the very verb *encarrilar* semantically implies important meanings logically established as common ground and hence undisputed, namely that up until now Spain has been in a state of derailment<sup>147</sup>.

### 7.2.3. A particular case: the first question RJ asked ZP in the *Congreso*

I already briefly referred above to the **first question RJ asked ZP in the *Congreso***. I will now consider in greater depth this seemingly minor issue, but which is actually a key issue that appears in both debates (see also Fuentes-Rodríguez 2010: 35-38).

It arose during the first debate, when ZP rhetorically asked RJ about his sudden interest in the economy, after 4 years without talking about it in his long discourses (I.242-249). On that occasion, ZP used circumstantial argument to deactivate all RJ's attacks in the field of economy as coming from an opportunistic person, not really interested in citizens' economic problems, but only in his own electoral ends.

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<sup>147</sup> The same is valid for *corregir el rumbo* that RJ used in the last part of his OS of the first debate.

In the second debate, it is RJ who first brings up this issue. Both candidates refer to it extensively throughout the block on the economy (II.197-378) as well as across many other sections: ZP refers to it in the section of SP (II.406-407), and RJ in the section of IP (II.1028-1034), and again ZP in the same section (II.1079-1086). This is due to the intrinsic importance of this issue in the de/construction of presidentiality. ZP uses it to delegitimize RJ, presenting him as an opportunist and liar; while RJ uses it for self-legitimation purposes, presenting himself as a responsible leader concerned with citizens' economic problems since the very beginning of ZP's legislature.

From the point of view of the strategic production and circulation of discourses it is interesting to note that RJ takes up the theme in the second debate, probably on the advice of his communication consultants who saw it as an effective attack by ZP that required a response, albeit a week later. The way this issue is treated also shows **intertextuality** and **interdiscursivity**, i.e. the interconnection of the discourse produced within the debates with other earlier discourses as well as the **interactional** nature of the debate, where turns for stance taking, even if constructed as to seem as monologic, are intrinsically **dialogic**: candidates always respond to previous stance taking and moves, and even their lack of response is in itself a form of reacting to opponent's stance through dealignment.

RJ brings up the issue in the middle of his first intervention on the economy (II.175-211). This point is a response to ZP's moves in the first debate of presenting PP as pessimistic and opportunistic.

[...] Usted lleva mucho tiempo hablando de catastrofismo, de que nosotros somos unos exagerados, pero yo ya la primera pregunta que le hice en el Congreso de los Diputados en el año 2004 era que debería hacer usted reformas económicas porque si no, la herencia y la inercia se iban a terminar como así ocurrió y así nos encontramos en la situación en la que estamos [...] (II.195-201)

So in response to ZP's innuendos about his *late* interest in Spanish economy (I.242-249), RJ *backdates* it to the first question he asked ZP in the *Congreso*, in 2004<sup>148</sup>, well before the crisis or the elections (2008). By presenting a different and opposed

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<sup>148</sup> In reality RJ was not referring to the *Debate sobre el Estado de la Nación*, as ZP erroneously did (Cortes Generales 2004), but rather to the *Debate de Investidura*, held on 15 April 2004 (Cortes Generales 2005).

narrative, according to which in the first question he asked ZP he talked about the economy, RJ deactivates ZP's accusation of being an opportunist and a pessimist and attempts to present himself as sincerely interested in the Spaniards' problems, as a responsible and provident politician that advised ZP, who as an irresponsible or incapable president, ignored RJ's advice and did not react.

This issue is crucial in the respective strategies of presidentiability management: for presenting the opponent as opportunistic (ZP→RJ) or as incapable (RJ→ZP), and for presenting the self as loyal (ZP→ZP) or concerned with Spaniards' economic problems (RJ→RJ). The decision of both candidates to tackle this therefore comes as no surprise. For instance, ZP responds by insisting on saying that RJ did not talk about the economy in his first question:

debería de tener un poco más de memoria sobre la primera pregunta que me hizo en el Parlamento siendo usted líder de la oposición y yo presidente del Gobierno porque no fue ni de economía ni de precios (II.214-218)

In the next turn, RJ again opens his intervention by claiming that he did indeed talk about economy:

Bien, eh... la primera pregunta que yo le hice al señor Zapatero en el Congreso de los Diputados fue de economía la primera y por tanto le ruego que no falte a la verdad, esto se podrá comprobar en el día de mañana (II.242-245)

In the following turn, ZP again insists that RJ did not talk about economy:

Sí, señor Rajoy, me sorprende la poca memoria o el intento que usted tiene de manipular. Yo tengo aquí su primera pregunta realizada como líder la oposición (enseña un folio del que lee) y dice así: "¿Cómo valora usted los primeros días de su Gobierno?". Y en esa pregunta habla de la coordinación del Gobierno, de los hechos que han sucedido, de los anuncios. No hay nada de precios [RJ: Y de las reformas económicas... que es lo que le pido...] ni de la economía [RJ: la reformas económicas es lo que le pido] No, no, déjeme. La primera pregunta que usted hace de precios, de la

subida de los precios ha sido hace pocas semanas. No ha tenido usted ninguna pregunta sobre subida precios, hace pocas semanas, prácticamente cuando ya estaban las elecciones. No le ha importado este tema (II.285-297)

This final passage reveals ZP's strategy of accusing RJ of dealing with economy only once since the start of the election campaign. To support his own position, ZP quotes RJ's speech as evidence, concluding that RJ was not interested in the economy.

RJ opens his turn trying to turn ZP's innuendos in his favor through the reference to *herencia e inercia* of previous successful PP governments:

En la primera pregunta que hice en el Congreso de los Diputados hablé de la necesidad de hacer reformas económicas y no de vivir de la herencia y de la inercia. Y si no hablé de precios hasta hace pocos meses es que, como ustedes vivieron de la inercia y de la herencia, durante un cierto tiempo las cosas fueron bien (II.319-324)

So RJ concedes that he did not talk about price rising until few weeks earlier, but he did so because of the long-lasting positive results of PP's previous legislatures, which is a way of presenting a positive self-image as an effective manager.

The strategic value of this issue is evident in the fact that it is the sole topic in ZP's next turn, accusing RJ of tricking citizens with his false and sudden interest in the economy and prices, motivated only out of electoral interests:

Sí señor Rajoy, me sorprende y le acabo de referir (ensena un folio) y tengo aquí la pregunta parlamentaria, la primera que hizo, que no habló de economía ni era de economía ni de precios, habló de los primeros días de la valoración del Gobierno y de la coordinación de anuncios que habían hecho los distintos Ministerios. Usted ha estado engañando a los ciudadanos. A usted los precios sólo le han preocupado hace unas semanas, porque la primera pregunta que hizo sobre precios fue el 19 de diciembre de 2007, prácticamente ya [R: Se lo acabo de explicar....] estábamos en las elecciones. [RJ: Se lo acabo de explicar... al terminar la inercia y la herencia], no, no, usted, usted ha dicho que la primera pregunta fue de economía [RJ: y hablé de economía], y la



tengo aquí y no habló de economía. Preguntó sobre la acción del Gobierno. Está engañando, engañando, no se ha preocupado de la economía. Los precios no le han interesado hasta hace unas semanas. ¿Sabe lo que le ha importado a usted la subida de los precios a los ciudadanos y la economía de las familias? Un bledo, eso es lo que le ha importado señor Rajoy (II.360-378)

It should be noted that both candidates attack each other in relation to **sincerity**, especially ZP who through a *climax* goes from poca memoria through intento de manipular to usted ha estado engañando.

On the other hand, RJ insists on the herencia e inercia as a strategy for delegitimizing any PSOE achievements and legitimizing PP, and on the *tu quoque* argument for accusing ZP of not failing to deal with the economy, focusing instead of issues that nobody cares about:

Bueno, Ha estado usted muy brillante, señor... al que no le ha importado la economía es a usted, que además era el presidente del Gobierno, que ha preferido dedicarse a otras cosas como le he dicho antes: a negociar con ETA, o a hacer cábalas sobre España eh... que al final han terminado como han terminado, o a entretenerse con cosas y cuestiones que no le importaban a nadie. Usted es el que no le ha dedicado ni un sólo minuto a la economía. Ya le he dicho antes por qué no le he hablado de precios, porque las cosas los primeros años fueron bien, porque vivían ustedes de la herencia y de la inercia, se lo dije absolutamente hasta la saciedad (II.379-289)

This issue of the first question is so important that ZP returns to it again in the SP block:

Sí muchas gracias, señor Rajoy, ha quedado claro la credibilidad de sus palabras y lo que ha pasado durante todos estos meses con su engaño a los ciudadanos (II.406-408)

As this passage shows, the candidates insist on this issue because it is a way for them to increase or decrease their credibility not only on the topic of the economy, but more generally in relation to the attribute of **sincerity**. Following RJ's response, when he

addresses immigration, ZP again returns to it to make further inroads into RJ's credibility:

Sí, señor Rajoy, su credibilidad sobre lo que ha dicho en materia de política social [...] es exactamente igual que la credibilidad que ha tenido con las preguntas de la economía y su interés por la economía en estos 4 años, la misma (II.478-482)

Recalling the first question ZP aims to demonstrate that **RJ is an opportunist, and therefore not credible**, and that he tricks citizens and thus not presidentiable.

The debate moved onto other topics, and following a pause, probably on the advice of his communication strategists, RJ again returned to his first question in the *Congreso*. This again shows its importance for the construction of credibility, which is the main objective of the debate in order to win votes. RJ opens his turn in the IP block with a reference to it:

sí, quisiera comenzar, para dejar claro alguna cosa, que en la primera pregunta que hice en el Parlamento, esto es para que veamos la credibilidad del señor Zapatero, hablé del IVA, la financiación autonómica, los cien euros, del cálculo de las pensiones... Esto es fútbol ¿no? para usted, señor Zapatero, es decir, esta es la muestra de que usted no le dice la verdad a los españoles e incluso con un papel delante (II.1028-1034)

J's intention is to present ZP as a liar. But again ZP insists on his presentation of RJ as an opportunist interested only in the election results:

Sí, muchas Gracias, señor Rajoy. Eso que se refiere de la primera pregunta del IVA y de los cien euros, no era de economía sino sobre comentarios que hacía sobre lo que decían los ministros, sobre si se iba a aplicar o no. Aquí está la pregunta [RJ: IVA, financiación autonómica, cien euros y cálculo de pensiones... eso no es economía?] No, no. [RJ: ¿Ah, no es economía?] No, no, no, aquí está la pregunta. Era de lo que decían. [RJ: El IVA es fomento... ¿y la financiación económica? ¿Y el cálculo de pensiones?...] Ni era de economía ni de los precios, ni de la economía ni de nada. [RJ: Así se explica la situación de la economía española a fecha de hoy

conociendo su...] Era de lo que decían los ministros, porque usted intentaba denunciar en la pregunta que había descoordinación. No, no, que había descoordinación, si luego lo van a ver todos los ciudadanos lo que ha preguntado... (II.1079-1086)

In reality, what matters is the fact that a seemingly insignificant issue that arose during the first debate is introduced transversally into the second debate due to its strategic importance in the de/construction of speakers' ethos and therefore their presidentiability. As we have seen above, through a certain narrative (in this first question RJ did not talk about the economy) and circumstantial argument, this issue allowed ZP to present RJ as an opportunist only interested in the economy for his own personal electoral interests, i.e. to obtain votes. It also allowed ZP to deactivate RJ's criticisms, as coming from an interested –and hence unobjective– person, and a liar (he is lying in the first question); through this move ZP reduces RJ credibility, and he also explicitly refers twice to RJ's (lack of) credibility. Through another opposed narrative (in this first question he did talk about the economy), RJ deactivates ZP's accusation of being an opportunist and a pessimist; he can demonstrate that he has long been concerned about Spain's economic situation, as responsible and provident, and that ZP is irresponsible or incapable. The propositions constructed by candidates can be summarized as shown below:

ZP→RJ: opportunist, liar

RJ→ZP: passive and incapable, liar

ZP→ZP: sincere

RJ→RJ: sincere, concerned with Spaniards' economic problems

It is clear that the importance of the issue is only marginally related to capability, while it is mainly linked to sincerity, both as politicians, in relation to opportunism, and as debaters, in relation to telling the truth about the question itself, which is one of the main attributes of presidentiability.

### 7.3. Observations

In this subsection I have presented the way candidates have managed their presidentiability in the debate in relation to the issue of the economy according to the attributes of the presidentiable: **general attributes** (unity, sincerity, loyalty, coherence, consistency, defending people's interests, activity, capacity, efficacy) and **particular attributes** like being a nurturing father (open to dialogue, optimistic, supportive) or a strict father (strict, realistic, strong).

I have also presented the main **moves** employed by candidates to manage their presidentiability. They can be summed up as follows:

RJ→ZP: inactive, incapable, indifferent, unrealistic, a liar, confusing priorities, distant from laymen, a divider;

RJ→RJ: an effective manager of economic issues, close to laymen, realistic, capable, sincere, a unifier.

ZP→RJ: unsupportive, does not defend people, a pretender, unfair player (opportunist, disloyal, divider), liar, authoritarian, pessimist;

ZP→ZP: supportive, defends people, fair player (selfless, loyal, unifier), sincere, open to dialogue, optimistic.

As we can see, these moves concerned the main general and particular attributes of a president.

As for the main **discursive-argumentative devices** employed, we can see that candidates have extensively used the *tu quoque* or **circumstantial argument** to demonstrate the opponent's incoherence or inconsistency. They also used the abusive argument, for accusing the opponent of lying. A particular case of this is the accusation of failing to keep a promise (L607-610), since it detracts from the other's credibility, especially during an election campaign, when politicians promise many things and try to present themselves as credible<sup>149</sup>. In order to increase/decrease credibility we can also see the widespread use of **argumentum ab auctoritate** through references to other

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<sup>149</sup> The proposition **you failed to keep your promise** is very important for decreasing the opponent's presidentiability and this explains its recurrence in the debates, since it is directly linked to un/trustworthiness: it should be noted that a promise is a source of potential danger for the image and with great costs for speaker; moreover, not keeping one's own promise is a violation of hearers' logic expectations, since promise is based on the condition of *sincerity* (see Austin 1962; 1979[1961]; Searle 1965; 1975; Grice 1975).

politicians or organisms such as the EU, UN, Banco de España, etc. (RJ.II.1417; ZP.II.309) or the use of **reported speech** (ZP.II.1465-1467). ZP's quoting of Elorriaga's statements that unveil PP's election strategy shows the importance of the discursive construction of ethos: candidates are what they say.

A central role is played by **narratives** such as "when we X(+), now you Y(-)" (as RJ in II.1417-1421 or ZP in II.1404-1408); the **lexical choice** is also crucial: as when RJ tries to get close to laymen by using simple terminology and popular expressions, or when, in order to delegitimize his opponent says that he *entertained* (a verb that denotes the lack of the sense of duty) himself with issues *nobody cares about*. In this sense, **presumptive meanings** triggered by particular verbs like *continuar*, or by the metaphor of *encarrilar*, etc. are also crucial in de/legitimizing. In the polarized representation of the situation **deixis** is also important in aligning the audience to the speaker or dealigning it from the opponent. In the strategic description of actors, **quantifiers** (*todo*, *ningún*) and the **topic of uniqueness** contributed to absolutizing positive or negative dispositions.

The **ideological convergence** and the **hybridation** of the discourse produced by candidates deserve further observations. Since PP's overarching strategy is to separate ZP from citizens, especially from previous PSOE voters, PP tries to present itself as close to people as possible; and it does so by speaking the language of people and the language of the Left. To achieve his electoral ends RJ adjusts his discourse: using themes and words of the Left, as the excerpts above have shown (I.343-347; II.327-329; II.345-347; II.392-395). RJ's decision to talk about prices, housing, mortgages, social inequality, etc. is strategic in getting closer to laymen. In particular the issue of social in/equality and distribution of wealth is historically the domain of the Left, and ZP himself referred to them at the beginning of the first debate (I.230); this is the reason why RJ's attempt to appropriate them is so significant.

These statements *apparently* in favor of the poor have to be understood in terms of the global strategy of presidentiability management, according to which RJ presents ZP as someone who failed to address the Spaniards' problems and especially his former electors' problems. Coherently with Elorriaga's statements on PP electoral strategy, to win over ZP's voters, PP has to show that ZP betrayed his voters, and that he betrayed the Left; in addition RJ must present himself as the new defender of former left wing voters, with a discourse that includes lefty words and topics. Yet even though RJ's discourse exemplifies a discursive hybridation, it is nothing but a simple manipulation

and not a real ideological convergence. Ideological convergence is rather a movement towards the Right, and seldom towards the Left. The widening **gap between the rich and the poor** is a constant trend in contemporary Neoliberal societies, but RJ only exploits it for dismantling ZP's arguments or ZP's positive self-presentation. He did not solve it and will never do so, since given his right wing ideological assumptions he could never eliminate social inequality. And evidence of this lies in the debate itself: the **war of figures** between ZP and RJ about rising prices unfortunately reveals how prices constantly rose under PP as well as PSOE; the fact that both candidates accuse each other of having impoverished Spaniards (I.327-330) and of being demagogues (I.221; I.343; but also I.479, I.1563-1564, II.224, II.1276), not only shows the use of the same arguments, but leads to conclude that maybe both are demagogues that made the Spanish poorer.

Moreover, the fact of dealing with the economy and SP (public scholarships, integration of immigrants, pensions, salaries, public housing, etc.) as two separate issues, in two different blocks, demonstrates the undisputed ideological assumptions that both candidates share: the way they conceive the economy and social politics as two separate issues. Despite their attempts to present themselves as close to people as possible, social policies, that mean the wellbeing of citizens, especially of the weakest, are considered as separable from the economy (growth). This clearly indicates candidates' priorities: macroeconomic indicators are more important than the Spaniards' wellbeing; indeed the economy, or rather, the condition of some macroeconomic indicators, is considered as the main concern, and actually it is the main block after the opening statements. This formal organization of the debate reveals the Neoliberal stance of both candidates. This is actually the point indicating ideological convergence, as the underlying idea that growth, competitiveness, balance, etc. are absolute positive values per se: this is the place of agreement<sup>150</sup> in the argumentative discourse deployed by both candidates, since both embrace a Neoliberal ideology. This attempt to present the Neoliberal choice as undisputed is also reinforced by the exclusion from the debate of Gaspar Llamazares. His exclusion erased and silenced any alternative to the single Neoliberal thinking, according to which PP and PSOE only vary in terms of degrees.

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<sup>150</sup> On agreement (*accord*) see Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca (1958: ch. 1). For a study on agreement in French presidential debates in terms of alignment between candidates, see Doury & Kerbrat-Orecchioni (2011).

## 8. IMMIGRATION. The rhetoric of *coladero*

### 8.1. Immigration and Spain

Intranational and international socio-economic inequalities, together with the development of transport and the media, the end of decolonization processes, and the trans-nationalization of capital and labor, led to growing movements of population (van Dijk 1989: 199-200). The direction of these movements is often from poor(er) countries towards rich(er) ones. Immigration has become a crucial issue on the political agenda only over the last twenty years, at least in the actual terms the issue is framed (van Dijk 1992a: 108; 1993b: 186-187), even in those countries, such as the UK or France which have a long-standing tradition of immigration.

As for Spain, which until the end of Francoism was a country of emigration, immigration is an even more recent phenomenon. If we observe the chart below<sup>151</sup>, the number of immigrants arriving in Spain dramatically increased since the early 1990s, peaking in the 2000s. According to these official data, over a twenty-year period, the number of immigrants in Spain rose from 400,000 in 1992 to 5.4 million in 2012. In 2008, the year of the general election, the number of immigrants stood at 4.4 million, 11% of the population. The chart shows that the immigration rate rose dramatically since the 2000s, due to the spectacular economic development of the Spanish economy; immigration income began to stabilize around 2010, registering lower rises than in previous years. This changing trend coincided with the years immediately following to the global economic crisis of 2008, which had a particularly harsh impact on Spain.

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<sup>151</sup> Drawn up by the author according to the data of the INE (Instituto Nacional de Estadística), of the Ministerio de Empleo y Seguridad Social (formerly Ministerio de Trabajo e Inmigración), and of the Observatorio Permanente de la Inmigración, created in 2001: <http://extranjeros.empleo.gob.es>  
<http://www.ine.es>




Figure 1. Evolution in the number of immigrants included on the municipal registers since the early 1990s (source: INE)

The chart below gives an idea of the geographic origin of immigrants living in Spain<sup>152</sup>,




Figure 2. Origin of immigrants included on the municipal registers in Spain (source: INE 2006)

As Martín-Rojo says (2000a; 2000b), at the beginning of the 21st century, immigration was still a recent and relatively small phenomenon for Spain, which explained the infrequency of parliamentary debates on this issue<sup>153</sup>. The fact that immigration was not an issue on the political agenda is proven by its absolute absence in the two televised debates of 1993 between Felipe González (PSOE) and José María Aznar (PP)<sup>154</sup>. Further evidence of its irrelevance is that the Permanent Observatory on Immigration, a

<sup>152</sup> Drawn up by the author using the data from the Spanish governmental institutions cited above. I took the year 2006, which for the average of the figures, can be considered representative of the real situation.

<sup>153</sup> Interestingly enough, Martín-Rojo shows that the first shift in the Spanish legislation about immigrants, with the definition of the case of the *illegal* immigrant, occurred in 1985, and that this change coincided with an economic crisis.

<sup>154</sup> I wish to thank Professor José Luis Blas-Arroyo for kindly providing me with his transcriptions of the two 1993 presidential debates.



government institution, was not set up until 2001. However, the situation changed, and during the 2008 election campaign immigration became a core issue.

The situation of 2008 is characterized by a “traditional” xenophobia, by a more recent fear of the other, especially Muslims<sup>155</sup>, and particularly by a harsh crisis, with high unemployment rate and reduced access to social services, due to cuts in public spending on social policies. In this new scenario, it was obvious that the right wing party would exploit immigration as a terrain for managing presidentiability.

Immigration was actually one of the main themes of PP’s campaign, together with the economy, terrorism and the Catalanian question (Elorriaga apud Crawford 2008; Ruiz-Jiménez 2010). As Pujol’s report cited in chapter 6 (Pujol 2008) proves, PP was the party that devoted the greatest attention to this issue. In a certain sense PP set the political agenda on this issue, for evident strategic reasons that will be discussed later. The chart below shows the relative importance of the issue in the electoral campaign for PP and PSOE.




Figure 2. Comparison between the PSOE and PP’s most relevant issues during the campaign (Pujol 2008)

<sup>155</sup> Although it increased after the 9/11 and other jihadist attacks as 11M, this fear of Muslims is historically entrenched in Europe for historical reasons such as the wars for the control of the Mediterranean Sea and in the case of Spain the *Reconquista* (see Wodak & Forthner 2014; van Dijk 2005b: 21 and 22).

It is clear that PP dedicated far more time to immigration, because this topic was strategically more important to them<sup>156</sup>. This situation is coherent with other research into racism in Spanish right wing parties (Martín-Rojo & van Dijk 1997; Rubio-Carbonero 2011, etc.). Moreover as the chart below shows, PP stepped up its attention to immigration between the pre-campaign period and the actual campaign.




Figure 3. The most relevant electoral issues: difference between the pre-campaign and campaign periods (Pujol 2008)

As Pujol puts it “El tema que mayor crecimiento ha experimentado es el de la inmigración, [...] la campaña se ha desplazado por lo tanto hacia la inmigración, uno de los temas que más asociados están al PP” (2008: 26). This relevance of immigration for PP must be understood in relation with its election strategy, as reported by Gabriel Elorriaga, PP’s communication strategist. Since PP cannot mobilize more of its own voters, it needs PSOE voters (that Elorriaga considers less disciplined than PP ones) not to vote for PSOE, i.e. PP needs a high abstention rate to win, so PP’s message targets PSOE voters:

Our whole strategy is centred on wavering Socialist voters [...]. We know they will never vote for us. But if we can sow enough doubts about the economy, about immigration and nationalist issues, then perhaps they will stay at home [...]. It will be difficult to increase our vote [...], but [PSOE] voters are less disciplined than ours [...]. That is why we are directing our message at them. We are saying, ‘your government has not taken care of your problems’. The election result will depend on the impact of that message (*apud* Crawford 2008).

<sup>156</sup> <http://www.publico.es/espana/53744/rajoy-promete-ser-implacable-con-la-inmigracion>

This statement clearly shows PP's communicative strategy both in the campaign and in debates.

## 8.2. Immigration in the debates: Strategies, moves, and devices

The debates do not occur in isolation in the discursive space; instead they are immersed in a continuous flow of discourse produced by the political actors and circulating within society. In this sense, debates are merely the epitome of electoral discourse. As during the entire campaign, immigration is one of the topics that received the most extensive treatment during the debates, and both candidates use it to implement their electoral strategies and according to their needs. However, a number of differences are visible in the treatment of immigration by both candidates: for instance, during the first debate within the block of SP, RJ dedicated 62% of his time to talking about immigration, compared with 43% in the case of ZP. This indicates the importance of this issue for PP. In the second debate both candidates increased the total amount of time dedicated to immigration, but even though the difference between the two candidates narrowed (from 19% to 15%), RJ still talked more about this issue: 74% of his time, compared with 59% in the case of ZP<sup>157</sup>. As will be seen final section, this shift between the first and second debate and ZP's alignment with RJ's agenda (dedicating to this issue almost the same time that RJ dedicated to it in the first debate) interestingly shows the dynamics and the interactivity of the debates, and the ideological convergence of the discourse produced by both candidates: this last point will be supported by a deeper analysis on the representations of immigrants that emerged from the debate.

RJ's main strategy, as for other terrains of struggle, is to separate ZP from his electors, from laymen. One of the ways he does this is to present **ZP as incapable** and as **not having dealt with Spaniards' interests**. This last point is particularly important in the block on immigration, since it allows for the representation of **ZP as a non-patriot**, the premise being that favoring immigrants is antipatriotic. This discourse presupposes that immigrants are not Spaniards; hence they have fewer rights than Spaniards. Other moves include constructing the **opposition between talks and deeds**; constructing the image of a **bad debater** who avoids some topics, which is linked to the attribute of **sincerity**; the presentation of ZP as inactive, as unaware, unserious, lax,

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<sup>157</sup> The figures are based on the percentage of words dedicated to immigration out of the total of each candidate's words on the block of SP: in the first debate, out of a total amount of 1399 words, RJ dedicated 864 to immigration; ZP instead, out of a total of 1169 words dedicated 507 to immigration; in the second debate, out of a total of 1300 words, ZP dedicated 765 to immigration, whilst RJ, out of a total of 1535 words, dedicated 1129 to immigration. I have not counted the space RJ dedicated to immigration in his OS of both debates; in this case, obviously the total amount of time dedicated to immigration would have resulted even higher for RJ and lower for ZP.

irresponsible, incapable, inconsistent, incoherent, and liar; as being feeble and isolated in Europe.

The main **attributes** according to which RJ manages presidentialiability are the following:

- sincerity
- defense of Spaniards' interests
- activity, capacity and efficacy
- strictness vs. laxity
- strength vs. weakness
- supportiveness
- realism vs. unrealism
- coherence and consistency
- patriotism

As we have seen in the introduction, ZP dedicates less space to immigration than RJ. Indeed, while RJ addresses it from the OS of both debates, ZP postpones it until late in the 3<sup>rd</sup> turn of the SP block; RJ uses this to attack him (I.508-510; I.575-577; II.459-460; II.488). In order not to disrupt the interaction, in his first turn, ZP makes a brief reference to immigration, but only to attack RJ on the number of illegal immigrants under PP government (I.472-476). He then uses a metapragmatic statement to postpone the issue in order not to overly align himself with RJ's agenda. Furthermore, he uses RJ's insistence on immigration to accuse him of not having social policies (I.544-546). In doing so ZP "responds" to RJ, by dismantling prior accusations of not being aware of Spaniards' needs by explicitly referring to citizens (I.475-476). This move is obviously strategic in **getting close to people**. In addition, ZP's disalignment continues through his widening of the discussion to include other SP issues such as education, scholarships, equality, dependency, pensions, housing and the family. Interestingly enough, ZP begins to address the issue of immigration just when RJ turns to other SP issues, brought up by ZP. Through this strategic de/alignment ZP tries to present himself as setting the debate agenda. Nevertheless, in the second debate, maybe at the suggestion of his advisors, ZP makes extensive references to immigration, to prevent any indication that he is avoiding the issue (see also II.460).

The main moves adopted by ZP for self-legitimizing and delegitimizing the opponent concerns the general attributes of capability, coherence, selflessness and sincerity, and the **particular attributes** that can be summarized in the **frame of the nurturing father (dialog, progressiveness, solidarity with the disadvantaged and weak, including the elderly, women, the disabled and young people).**

In short, the attributes referred to by ZP in this turn for managing presidentiability are as follows:

- supportiveness
- dialogue
- progressiveness
- activity, capacity and efficacy
- coherence and consistency
- xenophobia
- selflessness
- sincerity
- strength and strictness

### 8.2.1. RJ's moves for managing presidentiability

#### 8.2.1.1. ZP as incapable

RJ implements his strategy of separating ZP from people through moves aimed at **disqualifying the opponent as incapable<sup>158</sup>, inactive, indifferent, and insensitive**. To achieve this he begins by offering a very negative description of the present situation in Spain, with references to economic problems (price, mortgage and unemployment rising) and to immigration, framed *as a problem* between economic uncertainty and a lack of safety in cities.

Buenas noches. A ustedes qué les parece, ¿estamos mejor que hace cuatro años? Depende de a quién le hagamos la pregunta. Si se la hacemos al señor Zapatero nos dirá que estamos en el mejor de los mundos, pero si se la hacemos a la gente, a ustedes, algunos nos dirán que hay cosas que están bien, otras regular, y que en los

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<sup>158</sup> Think to PP slogan “Con Z de incapaZ” that responds to PSOE slogan “Con Z de Zapatero”.

últimos tiempos hay cosas que están mal y otras que están muy mal. Y eso se comprende, porque en los últimos tiempos han subido los precios, las hipotecas, vuelve el desempleo y hay muchos españoles que tienen muchas dificultades para llegar a fin de mes, y tienen que apretarse y muy mucho el cinturón. ¿Cómo se puede decir que España está muy bien?, ¿en qué otras materias de las verdaderamente importantes estamos bien, en Vivienda, en Educación? Estamos a la cola de Europa, según dicen los organismos internacionales. En Inmigración, toda Europa ha protestado por el desorden que provoca este gobierno y nosotros los sufrimos. En Seguridad, la inseguridad ciudadana crece de una manera alarmante e importamos delincuentes organizados en bandas muy violentas. ¿Qué es lo que ha hecho el Sr. Zapatero a lo largo de estos 4 años además de discutir la Nación, y entretenerse con la Alianza de Civilizaciones, la Memoria Histórica u otras cuestiones? Ha hecho dos cosas, se ha centrado en dos cosas y las dos las ha hecho mal: la estructura de España y los tratos con ETA. Ha querido modificar por su cuenta el modelo de Estado y ha querido negociar con los terroristas por su cuenta. Ambas operaciones le han salido mal. [...] Sr. Zapatero, no estará de acuerdo conmigo. Espero que él exponga sus razones y no me critique a mí, que es lo que está haciendo normalmente. Él es el que estado gobernando en España. (I.82-123)

In his narratives, RJ presents the **situation as worse than 4 years earlier** (i.e. under a PP government), the result of **ZP's indifference and incapacity**. According to RJ's narrative, **ZP has not dealt with the issues that matter**, but has instead *entertained* himself with "issues nobody cares about" (I.678; II.385) such as the *Alianza de Civilizaciones*, *Memoria Histórica*, and *Educación para la Ciudadanía*, or with two issues that ended badly: modifying the structure of the State and negotiating with terrorists. RJ does the same in the second debate, where he will show **ZP as lacking** some attributes considered fundamental for a president, namely as the **capacity to prioritize, efficacy, and sensitivity to people's problems**:

¿Qué ha pasado en los cuatro años? Pues que el Gobierno de España ha equivocado las prioridades [...] se ha olvidado lo esencial, que es la economía, que son los precios, que es la vida de las

personas, que es su forma de sentir, de vivir, son sus preocupaciones (II.124-131)

In order to distance ZP from citizens, RJ represents ZP as neglecting what really matters. People reasonably want a president capable of addressing and solving their problems; presenting **ZP as passive, distracted by accessory issues, unable to solve problems** due to his incapacity, as a **liar, saying that things are fine when they clearly are not**, enables RJ to detract from ZP's presidentiability.

Since the **disqualification of the opponent is based on emphasizing his mistakes**, RJ highlights ZP's **agency**, presenting him as holding **direct responsibility for the problems** (Él es el que estado gobernando en España, I.123; no lo pued[e] remediar quien lo ha causado, I.126; esa es su gestión, I.526; aquí hay que poner orden y control que es lo que usted no quiere hacer, I.539). Obviously, in this move to draw attention to ZP's incapacity, deixis plays a crucial role in **personalizing** attacks.

Since RJ has to convince wavering supposedly middle or working class PSOE voters, he constructs a discourse by appealing to laymen: for this reason he refers to their specific problems, such as prices, mortgage, unemployment, etc. (Edelman 1988; 1971)<sup>159</sup>, and uses a popular expression as *apretarse el cinturón* [tighten the belt]. In order to align with the viewers at home, RJ also uses an inclusive personal deixis as *nosotros en nosotros lo sufrimos*, situating himself alongside lay Spaniards, who are supposedly suffering due to uncontrolled immigration. RJ tries to get the audience's favor and dealign ZP from the audience as he did with the construction of his self-image as a *currante* [worker].

The description of **ZP as incapable** recurs in many points of both debates. In the following excerpt which presents **ZP as incapable**, RJ constructs his arguments by stating that immigrants affect the feasibility of Spain's social policies, and it is therefore necessary to order and control immigration. He provides a number for the immigrants that entered in Spain under ZP's government to prove that Spain is under an *avalanche* of immigrants:

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<sup>159</sup> The fact that politicians talk about these issues does not imply that they solve these problems once elected.



[...] Es evidente que esto no está controlado, es evidente que esto es una avalancha. Usted no ha hecho nada más que complicar las cosas, provocando hace tres años un efecto llamada que se oyó en todo el mundo. Y en lo demás, pues, se limita a decir lo bien que va todo y a ignorar la realidad. Y, además, cuando alguien hace propuestas, como es mi caso, las descalifica y las tilda de ridículas, de inútiles e incluso de xenófobas. Yo he propuesto prohibir la regularización masiva por ley, he propuesto el contrato de integración, he propuesto la igualdad de derechos, oportunidades, deberes y obligaciones. He propuesto que se expulse a los extranjeros que cometan delitos, y para usted eso no tiene ninguna importancia [...]. ¿Mantiene usted que no pasa nada, que es lo que le ocurre a usted habitualmente y que no hay nada más que hacer en esta materia, salvo seguir como estamos? (I.457-471)

RJ presents ZP as passive or as taking decisions that make the situation worse (I.457-461). By referring to the metaphor of the *avalancha*, which suggests that Spaniards are facing an enormous risk, and presenting ZP as unaware, inactive and a liar (he **lies about the reality by saying that everything is alright**), RJ reduces the opponent's presidentiability, exploiting the assumption that a good president should save the citizens from the risks they face and should not lie. By describing ZP as being unaware, ignoring reality and lying about it, RJ presents ZP as **irrational**, distancing him from *real* people.

In order to portray ZP as incapable or as inactive, **RJ emphasizes his opponent's mistakes**. In the following excerpt, for example, RJ says that despite ZP's efforts, the results of his action are pitiful:

Su política de inmigración: usted puede decir lo que quiere, pero le he dado unos datos que son demoledores. Es que hay más del doble de personas con permiso de residencia desde 2004 hasta hoy. Es que esto ha sido un auténtico coladero. Es que a usted lo han puesto de vuelta y media en la UE y luego me critica a mí por unas regularizaciones que hice pactadas con la UE. Dice usted que ha hecho un gran esfuerzo. Ha hecho un gran esfuerzo, pero el resultado ha sido absolutamente lamentable (I.663-671; see also II.672-683).

To delegitimize him, RJ also often uses the *ab auctoritate argument*, as in other points of the debate, referring to the EU's criticisms of ZP's policies or even reporting the speeches of some EU ministers criticizing ZP's immigration policies, in order to prove that **ZP's incapability is also recognized by the EU**.

RJ also represents **ZP as inactive**. Given the premise that a president should do things to improve citizens' conditions, ZP's inactivity towards something that worsens Spaniards' conditions, like immigration, indicates that ZP makes the Spanish people's situation worse. There are numerous references to ZP's inactivity (I.671-674; I.941-945; II.453-454; II.470-471; II.517-524; II.641-643), as shown by the following excerpts:

¿y sabe por qué pasa esto? Pues porque no hay control, señor Rodríguez Zapatero entonces aquí hay que poner orden y control que es lo que usted no quiere hacer (I.536-539)

Hay que luchar contra la inmigración ilegal y hay que trabajar por la integración, que es exactamente lo que usted no ha hecho a lo largo de estos años (II.611-614)

ZP's **inactivity** is constructed in the reference to people interests (II.523: le ha generado muchísimos problemas a los españoles), to that ZP does not act on behalf of the people.

#### 8.2.1.2. RJ as capable

Parallel to the moves aimed at disqualifying the opponent, RJ also makes moves aimed at self-legitimation. These moves are often implicit, since, as Pereleman & Olbrechts-Tyteca say, self-praise can be counterproductive. After disqualifying ZP for the lack of some attributes, RJ, without explicitly referring to himself, talks about what is needed for the future of Spain:

Creo que se necesita un Gobierno que dé certidumbre, un Gobierno que dé seguridad, que se ocupe de los problemas reales de los españoles, que busque acuerdos, que sea un Gobierno para todos y que no divida a los españoles.

This final part of the statement refers to such attributes as **security** and **defense of Spaniards' interests**. Obviously RJ lets the audience infer that he has these attributes, while the person who has run the government so far lacks them. It should be noted that this self-legitimation works thanks to the performativity of language and the discursive construction of ethos: for the mere fact of saying what he says, RJ constructs a self-image as defender of citizens' interest.

RJ also openly self-legitimizes through a polarized description where he presents himself as **serious and committed** with order and control, and **the opponent** as **only speaking without acting**:

Este es un asunto que hay que tomárselo en serio y yo desde luego me lo voy a tomar en serio, porque esto requiere orden y requiere control y no palabras, que es lo que usted hace (II.530-533).

As in other points of the debates the opposition between **words and deeds** is crucial in presenting the opponent as incoherent, inconsistent, and insincere or even as a manipulator (cf. an open reference to *propaganda*, a word that occurs 3 times in the second debate). Together with the delegitimation of the opponent, RJ legitimizes himself through an argumentation based on the explicit *premise* that immigration is an issue that ought to be taken seriously and on the *promise* that he will take it seriously.

#### 8.2.1.3. Distancing ZP from citizens: ZP as indifferent, insensitive, unaware

One of the main moves employed by RJ to implement the strategy of distancing ZP from the people is to represent him as indifferent and insensitive to his electors' needs, as the two excerpts below show:

En junio de 2004 había en España 1.776.000 personas con permiso de residencia. En diciembre de 2007 hay tres millones 900, es decir, mucho más del doble, ésa es su gestión. Esto para usted no plantea ningún problema pero hay gente a la cual sí que se lo plantea los que quieren una plaza escolar, los que quieren becas comedor, los que van a la sanidad, los que buscan el acceso a la vivienda pública y hay que trabajar para que los derechos de uno porque todos tienen derecho evidentemente no perjudiquen a los otros. Eso

a usted no le importa pero a mucha gente sí (I.520-532; see also II.458-469)

In order to distance ZP from the people RJ presents ZP as indifferent in the face of the huge number of (legalized) immigrants in Spain, supposedly sapping the resources of the social services. This move of presenting **ZP as being unconcerned about Spaniards' problems**, constructs the image of ZP as **a non-patriot** and of **RJ as a patriot because of his defense of Spaniards' interests**. This move is obviously aimed at aligning with the audience and dealigning ZP from them. In doing so RJ uses hipotiposis, i.e. realistic *exempla* of actual problems of real persons lacking access to public services such as kindergartens, hospital beds, etc. This device gains RJ laymen's consensus and **distance ZP from them**, causing him to lose people's favor.

Another move carried out by RJ in order to discredit his opponent is to say that **ZP is not aware of the problem**:

usted no es consciente de los grandes problemas que le está generando a muchos ciudadanos españoles (II.528-530)

Through this move, RJ **demonizes his opponent** as unpresidentiable, the agreed premise being that being aware of and solving citizens' problems is one of the main attributes of a president.

#### 8.2.1.4. ZP far removed from reality

Another move carried out by RJ to discursively **distance ZP from people** and connected with the previous one, is to present him **as removed from reality**. This move is implemented by two related descriptions of the opponent: a) ZP as describing a reality that does not exist; and b) ZP as denying reality or in a different reality. The first move is introduced at the start of the OS in the first debate:

A ustedes qué les parece, ¿estamos mejor que hace cuatro años? Depende de a quién le hagamos la pregunta. Si se la hacemos al señor Zapatero nos dirá que estamos en el mejor de los mundos, pero si se la hacemos a la gente, a ustedes (I.82-86)

Presenting ZP's perception of reality as different from that of people dealigns ZP from audience, and aligns RJ with them. RJ hints that ZP is a **liar, saying that situation is good, when it is bad** (¿cómo se puede decir que España está muy bien? [...] as in I.92) or at least a fool or naive. This has very important consequences for the construction of presidentiability, since there is obviously agreement on the fact that only a **realistic** person should be in charge of a country's government. Representing **ZP as saying the contrary of the reality**, thereby portraying him as a liar or a manipulator is crucial, as, due to the discursive construction of ethos, describing the opponent as insincere detracts considerably from his presidentiability. The following excerpt clearly shows the construction of the **difference between what ZP says and reality**: with a metapragmatic utterance RJ represents ZP as taking a stance on immigration ("immigration is under control"<sup>160</sup>) and denies it; he aligns with the audience thanks to the inclusive deixis *nos dice*, disaligning from ZP through an opposite description of the situation (immigration is not under control):

El señor Zapatero también nos dice que la inmigración está controlada. Yo no estoy de acuerdo. La inmigración no está controlada y hay que poner orden y control (II.96-99)

The second description used by RJ represents ZP as ignoring or negating reality. This device appears at many points in the debates:

Usted [...] se limita a decir lo bien que va todo y a ignorar la realidad (I.457-461; see also I.469)

no se puede negar la realidad porque quien niega la realidad, como hace el señor Zapatero, pues es imposible que pueda afrontarla (II.94-96; see also II.118-119)

no está usted en la realidad (II.1335; see also II.1456)

By presenting **ZP as denying reality** RJ not only decreases his presidentiability in relation to the attributes of **realism** (a president should be realistic), but in particular

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<sup>160</sup> Actually ZP never stated it in the debate.

demonizes the opponent as mad (denying reality is a typical feature of madness) with the abusive argument *no está usted en la realidad*<sup>161</sup>.

#### 8.2.1.5. Strength and strictness vs. weakness and laxity

Presidentiability management not only occurs in relation to a number of generally agreed attributes, but also to certain particular attributes. One such attribute is that of strength and strictness, which can be subsumed under the label of the frame of the strict father. This frame is accepted by PP electors, but not by PSOE ones. Within this frame and according to the set of attributes associated with strict leaders, RJ increases his own presidentiality by presenting himself as a tough leader that controls and orders, whilst at the same time detracting from ZP's by portraying him as **messy, weak and unserious**. In the negative representation of the opponent, RJ highlights ZP's **agency** with **personalization** at a level of deixis and at a lexical level with the verb *querer*:

aquí hay que poner orden y control que es lo que usted no quiere  
hacer (I.538)

Insisting on ZP's agency, RJ increases ZP's responsibility in a negative issue, thereby detracting from ZP's presidentiality.

On the other hand, RJ tries to increase his presidentiality by presenting himself as a strict leader (strong, exerting authority, being severe)<sup>162</sup>. RJ's self-presentation as a strict father is based on references to seriousness and the use of the expression *order and control*. Opposing disordered immigration to order and control instills **fear** in the audience and also allows RJ to act as a **strict father**, traditional in right wing Rhetoric. The opposition between disorder/control and strictness/laxity is evident in the following passage:

Este es un asunto que hay que tomárselo en serio y yo desde luego me lo voy a tomar en serio, porque esto requiere orden y requiere control y no palabras, que es lo que usted hace (II.530-533)

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<sup>161</sup> On its website PP also demonized ZP by presenting him as mad: cf. the expression “va como un poseso”.

<sup>162</sup> RJ does so in relation to immigration, but also in relation to the issues of education, and terrorism (see chapter 9).

The de/legitimation is implemented in sentences that contrast the deontic modality of what ought to be done, with what ZP does or has done (I.450; I.538; II.99; II.103). They delegitimize the opponent, working as premise to show what the opponent did not do and legitimize the speaker, who performatively, merely by stating them, presents himself as legitimated for stating what has to be done (discursive ethos), and lets audience infer that once elected he will do it.

De/legitimation can be explicit or implicit. In the excerpt above, it is explicit, unlike in the following example, where it is implicit. Without explicitly referring to himself, RJ presents himself as the solution to Spaniards' problems:

Creo que se necesita un Gobierno que dé certidumbre, un Gobierno que dé seguridad, que se ocupe de los problemas reales de los españoles (II.131-133)

Merely by talking about the **ability to offer certainty and security** and due to the polarized situation of electioneering, RJ lets the audience infer that the current President lacks these attributes, whilst he has them (performativity of language).

Yet at other stages of the debate RJ makes explicit references to ZP's weakness and lack of firmness:

su política de inmigración ha sido débil, sin firmeza (II.684-686)

Presenting the opponent as **feeble** naturally reduces his presidentiability, since there is an agreement on the fact that president should be strong.

#### 8.2.1.6. Sincerity and coherence: words and deeds

As at many other points of the debate, reference to attributes such as sincerity and coherence are crucial in de/constructing presidentiability. An effective way of referring to such attributes used by RJ in this block is to create an opposition between words and deeds. See the following excerpt:

Su política de inmigración: usted puede decir lo que quiere, pero le he dado unos datos que son demoledores. Es que hay más del doble de personas con permiso de residencia desde 2004 hasta hoy. Es que esto ha sido un auténtico coladero. [...] Usted en esta

política, como en la económica, se ha limitado a no hacer nada, a decir: "Oiga, esto va muy bien. Qué listos somos, qué bien hacemos las cosas" (I.663-675)

By this move RJ also highlights ZP's incapacity and inactivity: he talks but does not act (cf. II.531-533). However, it is mostly used to present the opponent as incoherent, inconsistent, and insincere or even as a manipulator (as occurs later on through the reference to propaganda). Consider the following example:

Vamos a ver eh... Señor... Zapatero. Lo que usted dice no tiene absolutamente nada que ver con lo que ha hecho a lo largo de estos años. Claro me dice que la inmigración tiene que ser una política europea y yo recuerdo a los ministros del Interior de Francia, del Reino Unido, de Italia, de Alemania y de Polonia, poniendo de vuelta y media, y perdón que utilice esta expresión, al Gobierno de España por su actuación en esta materia (II.599-606)

RJ's metapragmatic utterance (Lo que usted dice [...]) rejects ZP's discourse, the stance ZP took on immigration in the previous turn and his positive self-presentation. In order to **discredit him**, RJ presents ZP as **incoherent**, as someone who **does the opposite of what says**. As we know, one of the principal devices for representing the opponent as incoherent is to quote his speech and contrast it with other speeches or his actions. The previous excerpt show RJ's move to present ZP as incoherent. The following is a further example:

pero mire [ZP: está aquí], escúcheme, escúcheme, sí ya sé que está ahí, escúcheme... "No se puede tolerar que en España, como está pasando ya en muchos ayuntamientos que soportan la política de integración de los inmigrantes, haya españoles que pierdan derechos sociales porque vienen extranjeros que tienen un nivel de renta más bajo, que pierden ayudas al comedor y otras ayudas sociales". Esto lo dijo, cuando el problema era cuatro veces menos grave, el señor Rodríguez Zapatero en el Congreso de los Diputados en un debate del Estado de la Nación, por eso nos han llamado a nosotros xenófobos y otras lindezas. Si es que usted cambia de criterio cada cuarto de hora [ZP: No, no, no, no, yo estoy de acuerdo con eso, lo que no estoy de acuerdo es exigir un contrato



para que sean presuntos delincuentes los inmigrantes, eso es lo que no estoy de acuerdo] [OV: ahora tendrá su turno] dice una cosa y la contraria, no tiene ninguna propuesta. En materia de integración de inmigrantes, ninguna propuesta. Que la Comunidad de Madrid dedica el 2,5 por ciento, y la comunidad el 97,5, son los datos, y en Valencia igual. Yo también tengo datos, y también son ciertos (II.627-645)

RJ reports some ZP's previous declarations (Cortes Generales 2002), where ZP deplored that some Spaniards had lost access to certain social services due to the immigrant integration policies implemented by the Government of José María Aznar. RJ twists these declarations in order to present ZP as a xenophobe who criticizes immigrants<sup>163</sup>. RJ uses circumstantial argument to hint that ZP used the same arguments against PP that RJ is now using against PSOE, but when the problem was 4 times less serious. This move has three aims: a) to **discredit the opponent as incoherent and opportunistic**; b) to demonize him as **psychologically instable** through an abusive argument: *usted cambia de criterio cada cuarto de hora; dice una cosa y la contraria*; and c) to reverse previous accusations of xenophobia received by PSOE and suggest that PSOE is also **xenophobic** through a *tu quoque* argument or PSOE is lying in accusing PP of xenophobia. In both cases ZP is negatively represented. There is actually agreement on the need for coherence and stability, as well as the fact that a president should not be xenophobic. This point shows at once the interdiscursivity and dialogicity of stance taking and the construction of presidentiability, but in more general terms it is linked with the dominant discourse circulating on immigration and the hiding of (open) racism. I will return to this issue at a later stage.

#### 8.2.1.7. Re-Constructing supportiveness and defending Spaniards' interests

Since ZP tries to increase his presidentiability by constructing a self-image of a supportive candidate and decrease RJ's presidentiability by presenting him as uninterested in social politics (II.486-489: *Ya veo que usted no tiene política social, ni de educación, ni de pensiones, ni de familia, ni dependencia...*), or even as responsible for cutting or obstructing public spending on

<sup>163</sup> In a certain sense ZP, at the time in opposition, was doing what RJ is doing: criticizing the government to show that it does not care about citizens' problems. The difference is that, according to his ideological background, ZP asks Aznar for more public spending "Eso no se puede consentir por su falta de política social" (Cortes Generales 2002: 8981).

welfare (II.431-433), RJ needs to balance this negative representation. He does so by accusing ZP of lying about public spending cuts and contesting figures on state funding for the *Ley de Dependencia*, compared to what regions spend on it claiming that the autonomous regions spend more than State (I.510-520). With these statements, RJ reconstructs his own image as a supportive leader, rejecting ZP's accusations and instead **accusing him of being a liar** (ha dicho dos mentiras; mentido usted); then providing figures on how much Madrid region spends on *Dependencia*: choosing Madrid, traditionally run by PP, is a means of indirect self-legitimation. RJ tries in this way to contrast the monopoly on social politics discursively constructed by ZP. In order to respond to ZP's accusations and reconstruct his own legitimacy, RJ firstly states that he supports Ley de Dependencia; then in order to discredit the opponent decrying the importance of his achievements, states that regions assume the spending of the law and that Madrid (ruled by PP) spends more than other regions ruled by PSOE.

Usted habla de la dependencia [...]. Yo voté a favor de la ley de dependencia y estoy a favor de la ley de dependencia. [ZP: pues diga a sus comunidades que no la boicoteen] ¿Pero cómo la vamos a boicotear? [ZP: mire Andalucía, mire Asturias] Si son las Comunidades Autónomas las que se están gastando el dinero en dependencia. ¿Sabe usted cuántos centros hay de dependencia y cuántas personas se atienden en Madrid? 45.000. En Cataluña 38.000 y en Andalucía 17.500. ¿Qué se están gastando? [ZP: Pues dígales que no la boicoteen] Ustedes hablan mucho, no se gastan nada y no tienen ninguna política social sobre ningún asunto. Lo suyo es puramente propaganda. Yo desde luego voy a dotar la ley de dependencia, creo que es capital, de los más importantes, es fundamental para que la gente pueda también conciliar la vida laboral y familiar, para que se dé un gran salto en el empleo y para que logremos que puedan trabajar, como le he dicho antes, tantas mujeres fuera de casa como hombres en España. Ese es uno de los objetivos que tengo más importantes a lo largo de los próximos 4 años (II.533-553)

This move also is based on the **opposition words vs. deeds**: PSOE talks but fails to act, turning its words into mere propaganda. This representation, together with the use of absolutizing quantifiers as *nada*, *ningún*, *ninguna* allows RJ to present PSOE as absolutely unreliable, and to delegitimize PSOE's discourse as manipulation. In terms

of **re-constructing supportiveness**, particular note should be taken of the reference to gender equality at the end of the turn.

Two more moves deserve some brief comments: the representation of ZP as a bad debater, linked to the attributes of sincerity and ability and the presentation of ZP as being isolated in Europe.

#### 8.2.1.8. Good debater bad debater: RJ as the Spaniards' spokesperson

One important move carried out by RJ to manage presidentiability is to accuse ZP of avoiding the issue of immigration for his own interests with a meta-stance utterance that works as a circumstantial argument:

Bien, ya veo que usted no tiene el más mínimo interés en hablar de inmigración pero yo sí. Y los españoles también y por lo tanto yo voy a hablar de inmigración (I.508-510)

RJ uses this move in response to ZP's previous speech to dealign himself from ZP's topics and hint that ZP wishes to conceal his own failures. This is agreed as unfair and reduces presidentiability in relation to the attributes of **sincerity**. Moreover he presents **ZP as a bad debater**, and being a bad debater implies being a bad president (Kerbrat-Orecchioni 2013e; Agha 1997). In contrast, by presenting himself as the candidate who talks about what matters to Spaniards, RJ increases his own presidentiability, presenting himself as **the Spaniards' spokesperson**, related to the construction of an image as **a defender of Spaniards**. This opposition between the candidate that does not talk about what matters to Spaniards (ZP) and the candidate that does (RJ), is implemented through a polarized deixis (yo vs. usted). RJ will insist on this move also in his next turn, which again opens with a meta-stance narrative according to which ZP avoids talking about immigration:

Bien, es evidente que el señor Zapatero no quiere hablar de inmigración después de las críticas que ha producido su política [ZP: no hablaré cuando... cuando yo crea conveniente, Sr Rajoy]. Uno de los asuntos más importantes que tenemos planteado hoy en España (I.575-577)

Bien, a usted esto le puede parecer bien o le puede parecer mal, ya sé que no le parece ningún problema y por eso no quiere hablar de este asunto (II.459-460; see also II.488)

This discursively constructed difference regarding the treatment of topics not only increases dealignment, and therefore differentiation from the opponent, in terms of interaction, but also in relation to image, since, due to the performativity of discourse and the discursive nature of the construction of ethos, speakers are what they say. By this move, RJ represents ZP as unpresidentiable in that he is a **bad debater** and an **opportunist**. There are many reasons why RJ uses this move. Immigration is one of the main topics used by right wing parties in Western societies. It is an easy symbol, linked to another myth of political discourse such as the idea of nation, and is an easy way of winning votes from discontented electors. Yet it constitutes an ideological dilemma for Left, and ZP's strategy of avoiding the issue somehow shows this. RJ then takes advantage of this ideological dilemma. I will return to this issue later on.

Moreover, this opposition between the candidate that talks about what matters to people, such as immigration (regardless of whether he has actually set the agenda himself in order to bring this topic to the fore) and the one that avoids the issue, allows RJ to **distance ZP from electors** by depicting him as **being out of touch with people's interests**, in line with PP's overarching strategy. Equally, it allows RJ to present himself as sincerely **interested in laymen's problems** and as a **defender of people from immigrants** for the mere fact of performatively talking about it.

#### **8.2.1.9. The EU as authority: ZP as being isolated in Europe**

Given the freedom of mobility within the EU and interconnection between member states, immigration is a European issue. Moreover the supranational organism works as a justification of policies and as legitimating authority in judging Prime Ministers of member countries. RJ repeatedly refers to EU for two ends: 1) to increase his own presidentiability through narratives according to which EU agreed with his policies in immigration (when he was Ministry of the Interior); and 2) to detract from ZP's presidentiability through narratives according to which the EU criticized ZP's policies. RJ applies this move on many occasions in both debates:

Es que hay más del doble de personas con permiso de residencia desde 2004 hasta hoy. Es que esto ha sido un auténtico coladero. Es que a usted lo han puesto de vuelta y media en la UE y luego me critica a mí por unas regularizaciones que hice pactadas con la UE (I.664-669; see also II.520-524; II.602-606)

Pero fíjese usted cómo lo juzgaron a usted en Europa. Ministro de Interior francés: la regularización española crea un efecto llamada y provoca nuevas llegadas. Ministro el alemán, otro sí, socialista: "La regularización en España afecta a otros Estados, porque los inmigrantes regularizados podrán desplazarse libremente". El alemán fue muy rotundo: "Pedir dinero a otra persona, porque usted fue a pedirlo a Europa, es siempre la manera más fácil de resolver el problema". Y fíjese lo que dijo la de inmigración de Holanda: "España es en parte el responsable del problema por haber legalizado a los inmigrantes. Las mafias vieron en ello una señal positiva" (II.672-683)

**RJ personalizes his attacks** in order to ZP as being isolated in Europe. The attacks are based on the *ab auctoritate* argument and at some points RJ even reports speeches from ministers of several EU countries that have criticized ZP's immigration politics. RJ tries to demonize ZP by presenting him as being isolated in Europe and as begging the EU for money. This abusive argument is important in terms of interdiscursivity in that it recalls the famous incident during the 1993 debates, when Aznar calling González a "*pedigüeño* [beggar]" in reference to the negotiations on the EU funds during the Edinburgh summit held in December 1992<sup>164</sup>.

## 8.2.2. ZP's moves to manage presidentiability

### 8.2.2.1. Supportiveness

While RJ refers to immigration right at the start of the debates, in order to attack ZP for his incapacity and distance him from the people, ZP does not apply this tactic. Instead, and in an attempt to legitimize himself right from the onset, ZP presents narratives that highlight his achievements (capacity) and minimize his mistakes, by blaming the

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<sup>164</sup> See the documentary on the debates between González and Aznar (Fernández-Villa 2008). See also: [http://elpais.com/diario/1992/12/13/espana/724201207\\_850215.html](http://elpais.com/diario/1992/12/13/espana/724201207_850215.html)

opponent's unfairness and implements PSOE's *global* strategy for managing presidentiability: the opposition between good (us) and evil (them) in relation with abstract values such as fairness and supportiveness. This is a particular attribute (nurturingness) but there is a growing general consensus (*accord*) on the fact that defense of the weak is one of the main attributes of a president. Consequently, right from the initial phases of both debates, ZP increases his presidentiability by presenting himself as belonging to a **supportive party committed to helping the weak** (I.145-159; II.44-78), taking care of young people, women, the elderly and the disabled, promoting social dialogue, promoting public healthcare and public education, as a sincere, loyal and **responsible democratic and dialoguing leader**, associating himself with positive attributes such as **solidarity, dialogue, ecology**, etc. Interestingly, in the OS of the second debate, ZP also refers to unity and **patriotism**, praising the virtues of Spain as a world power (*una gran potencia como es España*). Through this reference to nation, ZP **realigns himself with the audience** and redresses RJ's attempts to monopolize the defense of the idea of nation and professions of **patriotism**. Patriotism is particularly salient in the issue of immigration, since it has to do with (national) identity and otherness: we are Spaniards; they are not.

This description of the leader is coherent with Lakoff's theory (2003; 2004; see also Bassett 2008) that liberals represent the model of the **nurturing father**, in contrast to the conservatives' ideal of the **strict father**. It is also coherent with Edelman's critical ideas (1964; 1988) that the political spectacle is crucial in order to reassure electors –either from a frame of nurturing or strictness - and protect them from threats (often created artificially by the politicians themselves for the purpose of the electoral game).

This move is more evident in the SP blocks, where ZP clearly represents PSOE as **caring for all citizens, especially the weakest** ones and **PP as uncaring or obstructing social policies or cutting public spending**. This move is essential in increasing his own presidentiability as there is a general consensus that a (good) president should take care of citizens, and there is a particular agreement on the fact that a left wing president should take care of the weakest ones. Nevertheless, this move is also a response to RJ's previous accusations (early in the debate or in the campaign) of not caring about citizens.

The following excerpt is of particular interest in this sense:

Señor Rajoy, usted como ministro de Educación redujo las becas. Hoy hay 250.000 estudiantes que disponen de becas después de la política de este gobierno. Hay que comparar los hechos y la demagogia, con las palabras que ustedes pronuncian. Política de igualdad. Hemos hecho una ley de igualdad entre hombres y mujeres, sin su apoyo. [...] Hemos aprobado la Ley de la Dependencia, ustedes no hicieron nada por apoyar a las personas que no se pueden valer por sí mismas y ahora tenemos como un derecho el apoyo a más de un millón de dependientes que va a ser un cambio histórico en nuestro modelo social. Hemos subido un 30% las pensiones mínimas más en cuatro años que ustedes en ocho cuando la economía según ustedes iba muy bien y hemos subido el salario mínimo al 30%, eso es política social. Hemos apoyado a los jóvenes para la vivienda en alquiler con una renta de emancipación [RJ: Sí eheheh...] que va a ayudar a 350.000 jóvenes, ustedes ni un euro para los jóvenes en alquiler, hemos establecido una prestación de 2.500 euros por nacimiento y ustedes que tanto hablan de la familia no hicieron ninguna prestación, ningún apoyo por nacimiento a las familias en este país (I.476-501; see also I.620-623)

ZP's employs polarized narratives (nosotros vs. ustedes), generally based on group deixis; but in some points ZP also directly attacks RJ through the use of personalization as in the first line (usted como Ministro de Educación redujo las becas).

Another key point in dealigning from the opponent in interactive terms (un/following the agenda) and in terms of representation is presenting the self as being **concerned with all social policies, not just immigration:**

Señor Rajoy no tiene ninguna política social corresponde a la trayectoria del gobierno del Partido Popular, ni ninguna propuesta, solo habla de inmigración, luego me referiré a ella (I.544-546)

Ya veo que usted no tiene política social, [RJ: sí, sí... el que no quiere hablar es usted de inmigración] ni de educación, ni de pensiones, ni de familia, ni dependencia... (II.486-489)

To contest RJ's appropriation of **defense of citizens and recover the connection with laymen** (those presumably most interested in public spending for social policies,

traditionally lefty electors), ZP firstly disenable RJ's attacks, accusing him of having implemented no social policies and of having no proposals at all (*ninguna*), suggesting through the use of circumstantial argument that RJ's interest in talking about immigration is **opportunistic** due to this lack of proposals.

As for the decrease in presidentiability, two more points are worthy of note here: the use of absolutizing quantifiers (*ninguna*) to consolidate an image of PP as not being concerned with laymen's needs; and ZP's metapragmatic statement (*luego me referiré a ella*) aimed at denying RJ's previous accusations of avoiding the issue of immigration, defending his own face from RJ's threatening and presenting himself as managing the agenda of the debate<sup>165</sup>.

At many stages throughout the debate ZP insists on representing PSOE as the party of supportiveness and PP as that of unsupportiveness (II.410-413). See the following excerpt:

Los ciudadanos saben que nosotros impulsamos las políticas sociales y que con Ustedes se frenan. Su Gobierno no dedicó ni un euro a la dependencia y además, ahora obstaculizan la aplicación de la Ley (II.430-433)

**Discrediting the opponent** through the use of **polarized description**, where we increase public spending (*impulsamos las políticas sociales*) and **you not** (*con Ustedes se frenan*), is based on the particular agreement that increasing public spending for social policies is positive. Two further points should be noted: the *ad populum* variant of *argumentum ad verencundiam* (*Los ciudadanos saben*), aimed at increasing **alignment with the audience**; and absolutizing quantifiers such as *ni un euro* [not even a euro] in order to **draw maximum attention to the opponent's mistakes**. However, the same move is also visible at many other stages of the debate. (II.483-493). ZP modulates the deixis and although he mainly tends to flatten the agency of the two candidates within a group (*nosotros vs. ustedes*), he also personalizes his attacks against RJ, in order to portray him as the agent of social cuts (*villain*)<sup>166</sup>.

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<sup>165</sup> Cf. for instance, ZP's statement during RJ's next turn, responding to the same accusation: *no, hablaré cuando... cuando yo crea conveniente, Sr Rajoy (I.577-578)*.

<sup>166</sup> It should be noted that in an increasingly personalized political field, flattening RJ within the PP group instead of making his figure standing out also is a form of detracting from the opponent's image.



Obviously ZP's efforts to monopolize the terrain of social policies will be contested by RJ, who attempts to recover legitimacy on public policies:

diera la sensación de que las políticas sociales en España empezaron con el señor Zapatero; antes no había educación pública, ni sanidad pública, ni había dependencia (II.437-439).

#### 8.2.2.2. Capability and Coherence

One of the main moves carried out by ZP to dismantle RJ's facework and his attempts to present himself as the patriot that defends order and control is to attack him on the number of illegal immigrants that entered in Spain under the PP's government and the legalization processes. Numerous examples of this can be found in both debates (I.623-634; I.637-653; I.681-684; II.565-588). The following excerpt is particularly representative:

Pero mire, antes de que hable usted de inmigración necesita credibilidad. Credibilidad. Esta declaración es suya: "Los inmigrantes vinieron a España cuando gobernaba el PP". Y es verdad: con su gobierno, con usted de ministro del interior se colaron más de un millón de inmigrantes sin papeles. Hicieron 5 regularizaciones. Nuestra única regularización se hizo a trabajadores con contrato de trabajo en vigor, sin antecedentes penales y se hizo con el acuerdo de empresarios y sindicatos. Ustedes dieron papeles sin exigir contrato de trabajo, sin examinar los antecedentes penales de los países de origen en algunas regularizaciones. Bastaba presentar un bono para el autobús, un recibo de un televisor o la factura de una sola noche de hotel. No sé si fue por su conocida afición al ciclismo, Sr. Rajoy, pero se regularizaron inmigrantes con el recibo de compra de una rueda de bicicleta. Y me habla usted de rigor, de orden... y de seriedad... está aquí (II.649-665)

ZP employs **polarized** narratives, where PSOE (nosotros) legalized (illegal) immigrants under strict conditions, and PP (ustedes) did not. This move is based on the assumption that controlling illegal immigrants and repatriating them is positive. The structure of the excerpt can be represented as in the table below:

You (-)	We (+)
5 legalizations	1 legalization
no job contract	with job contract
criminal record	with no criminal record

These narrative of past can be used to **discredit the opponent** dismantling with a *tu quoque* argument the image that RJ offers of himself and of PP as engaged with ordered and legal immigration (**you are not as ordered as you say**). ZP attacks PP as group but he also **personalizes** attacks against RJ –at that time Minister of the Interior – suggesting that **he was responsible for the failure of PP border control policies** (I.624; I.650-652). By insisting on his agency, ZP can decrease RJ's presidentiability in relation to the attributes of **capability by emphasizing his mistakes**. Yet ZP also decreases RJ's presidentiability in relation to two main attributes: **sincerity (RJ pretends to be ordered but he is not)**, and **coherence (RJ is incoherent)**. Likewise, he increases his own presidentiability in reference to **capacity**, in relation to the efficacy of his policies and his **strictness** towards illegal immigrants. Showing PP's incoherence as not as ordered as it seems, detracts from RJ's right to criticize ZP for his laxity, precisely because of his own failings in this sense (*tu quoque*). ZP's narratives on strict immigration policies and repatriations also allow for the self-legitimation of ZP as being ordered and strict (PSOE combats illegal immigration) within the frame of the **strict father**.

In order to occupy the ideological terrain contended with and so far monopolized by RJ, ZP tries to recover the image of a strong leader, describing the **PSOE government as concerned with firmly and tenaciously fighting illegal immigration** (I.637; II.569). This move, which completes the description of RJ as being not as strict as he pretends to be, answers RJ's accusation of lack of order and control, building a positive image of **PSOE as committed to legality**. The obvious premise is the agreement on legality as a value, as well as on the existence of the distinction between legal and illegal immigrants. Through this move ZP detracts from RJ's monopoly on order and control; he can *talk* to electors whose opinions of immigration lie within this frame of *strictness*.

One more observation must be made on the metapragmatic construction of credibility. Through a metapragmatic utterance, ZP decreases RJ's credibility (II.649-652) quoting RJ's own previous declarations, apparently aligning with him (this

declaration is yours [...] and it is truthful). But this alignment only preludes the following dealignment, expressed in the distinction between “us vs. you”.

Using a discursive device like reported speech is highly effective, since RJ cannot deny his own declarations, unless he wishes to appear incoherent. With this move ZP effectively disables the image RJ tries to offer of himself as a leader able to maintain “order and control”. By using *tu quoque* and circumstantial arguments ZP presents **RJ as unserious** (he legalizes immigrants too easily) and **incoherent** (he now claims control, when he failed to control immigration). A particular **inconsistency between words and deeds** is highlighted as the evidence for untrustworthiness and incoherence: ZP in fact metapragmatically refers to RJ’s speech to portray his presidentiability as incoherent (*y me habla usted de rigor*; cf. also II.691-698). The opposition deeds/talks is crucial in dismantling the discursively constructed ethos: *Hay que comparar los hechos y la demagogia, con las palabras que ustedes pronuncian* (I.479-480). Interestingly, ZP also uses a meta stance narrative on what PP says also at another point of the debate on SP **discredit his opponent** through a circumstantial argument aimed at showing PP’s **incoherence**: *ustedes que tanto hablan de la familia no hicieron ninguna prestación, ningún apoyo por nacimiento a las familias en este país* (I.499-501).

### 8.2.2.3. Progressiveness

One of the moves ZP employs to manage presidentiability is to avoid dealing with immigration, opting instead to raise social policy that allow him to increase his presidentiability in relation to one particular attribute: **progressiveness**, thereby implementing the overarching strategy of presenting PSOE as the defender of individual freedoms and PP as an obstacle to the progress. This move was used mainly in the first debate, where ZP dealigns himself from RJ’s agenda, referring to issues such as stem cell research, divorce, abortion, the universality of free public healthcare and education, homosexual marriage, etc.<sup>167</sup> So through a **polarized** narrative, ZP **self-legitimizes by emphasizing his own achievements** (PSOE promoted policies improving individual freedoms) and presenting PSOE as the **party of progress, freedom and civil rights** and **delegitimizes the opponent, emphasizing his faults** (PP opposed them), and presenting PP as the **party of conservatism and regression**.

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<sup>167</sup> This also shows the ideological shift from class to subjectivity that left wing parties have taken in recent years (cf. Fairclough 2003).

En esta legislatura se han producido importantísimos avances para los derechos sociales y ciudadanos de nuestro país. Hemos desbloqueado lo que ustedes frenaron que es la investigación con células madre, [...] Quizá los jóvenes necesiten o sería bueno que los jóvenes les dijéramos lo que ha pasado en el periodo democrático, ustedes nunca han apoyado las leyes que han supuesto avances de derechos, [...] no han apoyado ningún avance de derechos de los ciudadanos en este periodo democrático [...] Si ustedes hubieran gobernado durante 30 años seguidos lo que es evidente es que en España hubiera habido menos Educación, menos Sanidad, menos derechos, peores pensiones... Desde luego seríamos un país menos libre y más intransigente (I.547-573)

This move is based on the existence of a particular agreement that defending personal freedoms is positive and attacking them is negative. ZP increases his presidentiability by associating PSOE with progress and freedom, and PP with a (Francoist) past and intransigence, which is also visible in other texts such as *Defender la Alegría*<sup>168</sup>.

In the second debate ZP also opts not to start with immigration, addressing instead other social policy issues that fit in with the Left's self-image and its topos of solidarity. This move is also aimed at proving that ZP's vision of social policy extends to a broad spectrum, setting him apart from RJ who appears concerned solely with immigration.

#### 8.2.2.4. Dialogue

In the second debate, immediately after RJ's first accusation of avoiding the issue of immigration (II.487-488), ZP instantly addresses it. However, he avoids moving within the terrain of immigration in relation to the attributes established by RJ (**strictness**, **activity** and **efficacy**); instead he uses the topic to delegitimize RJ in other attributes (**authoritarianism**). As a result the interactive dealignment on the theme is followed by a dealignment on the attributes with which these topics are dealt with. However, as we have seen, in both debates ZP also ends up using **strictness**, **activity** and **efficacy** in order to delegitimize RJ through the *tu quoque* argument. In doing so, ZP tries to handle the debate agenda and to manage presidentiability according to general attributes as well as according to particular attributes belonging to both the frames of **nurturing** and **strict father**.

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<sup>168</sup> This topic has been employed also by Felipe González in the two 1993 presidential debates against José María Aznar.

In order to dealign himself from RJ, ZP tries to increase his presidentiability and decrease that of RJ by depicting PSOE as **being open to dialogue** and PP as **authoritarian** for its inability to debate and negotiate. ZP constructs a polarized narrative “PP=bad” and “PSOE=good”, based on the local agreement that authoritarianism is negative and dialogue and debate positive:

Ustedes cuando hablan de inmigración se olvidan de una, de una cosa fundamental que es el acuerdo, el diálogo social... Ya sé que esto del diálogo les produce cierta alergia, pero no se puede hacer una política de inmigración eficaz de si no hay acuerdo con empresarios y sindicatos. Mire, toda la política de inmigración que hemos hecho en estos 4 años ha tenido el acuerdo de empresarios y de sindicatos. El diálogo social es verdad que nunca ha sido su punto fuerte, ni siquiera hablaron de él para hablar de inmigración. [...] Y esa es también una diferencia entre dos proyectos, usted es el proyecto del ordeno y mando, de hacer una política impositiva, en materia de inmigración, lo que quieran sin hablar con nadie, sin dialogar con nadie y lo nuestro es una política de diálogo con empresarios y sindicatos en materia de inmigración (II.494-515)

This positive self representation (dialogue) and negative representation of the other (authoritarian) shows PSOE’s general electoral strategy of constructing frames based on abstract positive values rather than discussing concrete elements<sup>169</sup>.

Of particular importance here is the metaphor of *allergy* in order to describe PP’s difficulty in establishing debate and dialogue. Furthermore, quantifiers (*toda*, *nunca*) stabilize this negative PP feature beyond the contingent situation, portraying it as a physical attribute, as an incurable sickness.

#### 8.2.2.5. Immigrant integration

Another crucial point is for self-legitimation according to a frame of **solidarity** and **supportiveness** is ZP’s reference to PSOE spending on immigrant integration:

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<sup>169</sup> Even though, for avoiding criticism of abstractness, ZP in many points repeats that he put in practice *concrete measures* (II.162; II.220).

Ustedes no dedicaron un duro a la integración de inmigrantes, nosotros 200 millones a los ayuntamientos para la integración de inmigrantes (I.645-647)

Hemos invertido hasta ahora 800 millones en esta legislatura en integración, en dinero que va a las comunidades autónomas y a los ayuntamientos. Y vamos a llegar a 2.000 millones hasta 2010 para la integración de trabajadores en los municipios donde más inmigración hay, para que haya más ayudas sociales, más becas y, por supuesto, ningún ciudadano se vea perjudicado por ello (II.592-598; see also II.647-649)

In particular, this final statement is ZP's response to RJ's accusation of not caring about Spaniards' problems, but in doing so he accepts the assumption that immigrants be detrimental for citizens. ZP's insistence on integration is functional to the self-representation in accordance with the left wing values of solidarity and opposed to the representation of the Right as xenophobic and rejecting immigrants within the frame of strictness. The issue of xenophobia will be considered in greater depth in the final section.

#### **8.2.2.6. Selflessness and sincerity**

As we have seen, RJ's main strategy is to connect with citizens and distance ZP from them. Precisely in order to maintain this connection, ZP insists on the citizens' interests at many points throughout the debates. In order to separate RJ from the audience, ZP establishes a contrast between selflessness and opportunism. In ZP's argument, RJ deals with immigration because he is opportunistic (he has no social policies) (I.544-546; II.486-489), whilst ZP deals with what matters to people. This move responds to RJ's accusations of his being removed from the people and avoiding certain issues for opportunistic purposes.

Quiero hablar de política sociales, porque tienen mucho interés los ciudadanos en conocer nuestras propuestas (II.408-409)

Through this reference to citizens' interests, ZP legitimizes himself as a **defender of Spaniards' interests** and their **spokesperson**.

Another move adopted by ZP to **maintain the connection with citizens** is, besides referring to them and their interests, to present himself as **selfless**:

Espero que el debate esta noche sea útil para todos los ciudadanos. En toda mi trayectoria política he intentado que el insulto, que la descalificación, no contamine el debate público. Deseo que esta noche tengamos un debate de ideas, de propuestas y de soluciones; es lo que nos exigen los ciudadanos, con limpieza, con limpieza y con veracidad (II.66-71)

This move also allows ZP to portray himself as a **fair player**; and there is agreement that **sincerity**, as respect for the rule of the political game is essential for a president. In his narrative the quantifier *toda* plays a crucial role in absolutizing fair play as a stable quality of his personality. As for sincerity, ZP also employs a *coup de théâtre*: he shows off a white paper containing data and figures used by ZP during the debates. This enactment of sincerity, related to fair play and selflessness, creates the image of a good debater (which is frequently challenged by RJ). As we know, and given the discursive nature of the construction of ethos, the ability to debate is homologically related with presidentiability: being a good debater increases presidentiability. The decrease in RJ's presidentiability is implicit: due to the polarization of the communicative event, the audience infers that is ZP's opponent who *pollutes the public debate with insults*, the **unfair player**.

### 8.2.3. A particular case: disputing xenophobia

An important point in the debate is the dispute surrounding xenophobia, since it shows the relevance of intertextual connections of what is said in the debates with other texts and discourses (polyphony). As in many other Western societies, a dominant discourse circulates in Spain that mainly reproves open xenophobic stances. A month before the elections, at the beginning of the campaign, in a pseudo-event aimed at setting the agenda regarding immigration (*Jornadas sobre inmigración*, Barcelona), RJ presented the *contrato de integración* [integration agreement]: an agreement that immigrants should sign in order to enter in Spain<sup>170</sup>. It is a populist measure that highlights the

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<sup>170</sup> Cf. [http://elpais.com/diario/2008/02/07/espana/1202338806\\_850215.html](http://elpais.com/diario/2008/02/07/espana/1202338806_850215.html); [http://elpais.com/elpais/2008/02/06/actualidad/1202289436\\_850215.html](http://elpais.com/elpais/2008/02/06/actualidad/1202289436_850215.html)

difference between *us-here* (Spaniards) and *them-there* (others)<sup>171</sup>. PSOE responded to this by accusing PP of xenophobia<sup>172</sup>. Since this accusation is extremely harmful for a party trying to present itself as moderate right wing, RJ needs since the very beginning to refute it by presenting some disclaimers (I.444-446) or by openly denying it:

cuando alguien hace propuestas, como es mi caso, las descalifica y las tilda de ridículas, de inútiles e incluso de xenófobas. Yo he propuesto prohibir la regularización masiva por ley, he propuesto el contrato de integración, he propuesto la igualdad de derechos, oportunidades, deberes y obligaciones (I.461-466)

In this instance RJ increases his presidentiability and decreases ZP's in accordance with the idea of **activity: I am not xenophobic, I do things; you do nothing; you just talk; you accuse those who do things of being xenophobic**. Nevertheless, one of the most effective moves for self-legitimizing and delegitimizing the opponent is for ZP to retake RJ's reference to *contrato de integración* in his own favor, presenting himself as the defender of immigrants:

Ahora usted propone un papel para evitar que los inmigrantes aquí cometan delitos como la ablación, la poligamia o las ablaciones. ¿Sabe las penas que tienen en el Código Penal? La poligamia hasta un año. La ablación del clítoris hasta 12 años. Y lo que representa la lapidación hasta 20 años. Está en el Código Penal. Es un papel inútil [**RJ**: que lo tiene toda Europa]. Señor Rajoy, señor Rajoy junto a los españoles hay inmigrantes en este país como voluntarios en las ONGs, como donantes de órganos... [**RJ**: Si ya lo sé] y también entre los fallecidos en las misiones de paz del Ejército español. Y en los atentados terroristas del 11 de marzo y de la T-4. ¿Deberíamos pedirles que firmen su papel de delincuente potencial a todos los inmigrantes que nacen, viven y mueren con nosotros y a veces por nosotros, señor Rajoy? (I.685-698)

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<sup>171</sup> This agreement is based on the fear of diversity, especially towards Islam and some of its practices such as the veil, ablation, polygamy, lapidating, etc. The supposed defense of human rights under which it is veiled turns out to be especially contradictory for a Catholic and conservative party unconcerned with gender equality or freedom, except in terms of the freedom of economic activity. On the difference of freedom (preferred by liberals) and liberty (preferred by conservatives), see Edelman (1964: 121-122).

<sup>172</sup> [http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/spanish/international/newsid\\_7234000/7234027.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/spanish/international/newsid_7234000/7234027.stm)



ZP presents immigrants positively, contributing to Spaniards' well-being in health (voluntarios en las ONGs, donantes de órganos) or as soldiers (fallecidos en las misiones de paz del Ejército español), and in particular as *one of us*, whilst at the same time portrays RJ as framing them as *potential criminals*, thereby suggesting that he is **xenophobic**<sup>173</sup>. ZP places the blame directly on RJ through the use of deixis (usted; su papel).

ZP can increase his own presidentiability and detract from RJ's thanks to the generalized rejection in contemporary Western societies of overt displays of xenophobia, which means that presidents cannot be xenophobic. RJ not only repeatedly denies being xenophobic, in the second debate he will reverse this accusation and instead accuse ZP of being xenophobic. The excerpt is very significant:

Escúcheme... "No se puede tolerar que en España, como está pasando ya en muchos ayuntamientos que soportan la política de integración de los inmigrantes, haya españoles que pierdan derechos sociales porque vienen extranjeros que tienen un nivel de renta más bajo, que pierden ayudas al comedor y otras ayudas sociales". Esto lo dijo, cuando el problema era cuatro veces menos grave, el señor Rodríguez Zapatero en el Congreso de los Diputados en un debate del Estado de la Nación, por eso nos han llamado a nosotros xenófobos y otras lindezas. Si es que usted cambia de criterio cada cuarto de hora [ZP: No, no, no, no, yo estoy de acuerdo con eso, lo que no estoy de acuerdo es exigir un contrato para que sean presuntos delincuentes los inmigrantes, eso es lo que no estoy de acuerdo] [OV: ahora tendrá su turno] dice una cosa y la contraria, no tiene ninguna propuesta (II.628-642)

RJ reports ZP's speech and twists his declarations in order to represent ZP as xenophobic through a *tu quoque* and circumstantial argument: RJ implies that ZP used the same arguments against PP that RJ is now using against PSOE, but when the problem was 4 times less serious<sup>174</sup>. RJ therefore **discredits the opponent** by reversing previous accusations of xenophobia and suggesting that ZP is also **xenophobic**,

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<sup>173</sup> This representation of immigrants and this self-presentation as being humanitarian is consistent with the traditional self-representation of the Left.

<sup>174</sup> In a certain sense ZP, who at that time was in the opposition, was actually doing what RJ is doing in this campaign. The strategy is the same: criticizing the government for showing that it does not about citizens' problems. What changes is that, according to his ideology, ZP asks Aznar for more public spending "Eso no se puede consentir por su falta de política social".

**incoherent and voluble** (Si es que usted cambia de criterio cada cuarto de hora dice una cosa y la contraria).

The importance of reported speech for the construction of ethos is linked to the nature of political interaction and mainly dialogic and interdiscursive stance taking, as well as the construction of ethos, which is mainly discursive: candidates are what they say and the way they say it. Reporting speech thus means representing the opponent realistically in his *actions* and his *being*. Furthermore, this device obliges the opponent to align with what he said before in order not to seem incoherent. For this reason, twisting the opponent's previous utterances and using them in the speaker's own favor is an effective form of de-legitimation.

### 8.3. Observations

This chapter has dealt with how ZP and RJ manage their presidentiability within the terrain of struggle of immigration; i.e. how they use immigration for positive self-presentation and negative presentation of the other. The representations of the opponent can be summarized as follows:

RJ→ZP: inactive, unaware, lax, incoherent, inconsistent, a liar, feeble, a bad debater, non-defender of Spaniards' interests, non-patriot;

RJ→RJ: active, capable, strict, a defender of Spaniards' interests, patriot, good-debater.

ZP→RJ: unsupportive, a liar, incoherent, incapable, authoritarian, xenophobic, opportunistic, not a defender of Spaniards' interests;

ZP→ZP: supportive, tolerant, talkative, sincere (also a good-debater), capable.

Both debates follow mainly the same patterns, with the same strategies, and almost the same moves and devices, nevertheless some differences can be observed between the first and the second: a week has elapsed between the two and candidates have read news and comments on the debates; they have received suggestions from their communication managers on what to say, correct, or change; they have received feedback on the issues viewers wish to hear about, etc. Furthermore, and as seen above, in the second debate RJ deals with immigration even more extensively than in the first debate, as does ZP, who dramatically increases the time dedicated to this issue. It is reasonable to think that ZP's advisors recommended that he should not give the impression of avoiding the topic, in order not to detract from his presidentiability in accordance with the attribute of the good debater and to attract electors by framing immigration as a Police issue.

The main **discursive devices** used to implement the discursive strategies and moves are the *circumstantial* and *tu quoque* variant of *argumentum ad hominem* and the *ab auctoritate* and *ad populum* variant of *argumentum ad verecundiam*; reported speech; narratives; disclaimers; metaphors (*threat, danger, allergy*); the strategic use of deixis (such as RJ's *our* to create a community and aligning with Spaniards; and *you* for personalizing attacks against the opponent); hipotiposis; and quantifiers. In the representation of actors and actions, quantifiers (*nada, ningún\*, las únicas, tod\**,

siempre, etc.) served to permanently stabilize the negative or positive features implied. As for the *ab auctoritate* argument RJ repeatedly appeals to the EU, as does ZP, albeit less frequently. I will return to this issue and the EU role in Spanish immigration policies. As for deixis, as in other points of the debate, even though RJ sometimes widens his criticisms to PSOE, he mainly personalizes his attacks against ZP in order to highlight ZP's agency in the negative situation. **Personalization** is not only a way for reducing the disputes between parties in government and opposition to an easily understandable "fight between you and me", which is the result of the personalization of politics. Personalization is also aimed at blaming ZP without threatening the face of PSOE voters, to whom RJ also addresses his discourse.

The following lines address the **main representation of immigration produced on the stage of debates**; this is capital because debates are a privileged place from which powerful speakers build and spread their hegemonic discourses. In this sense, candidates' discourse on immigration allows us to see the dominant representations of immigrants spread by both candidates during the debates.

RJ mainly represents **immigration as a problem** amongst other serious issues such as the economy (prices rising, mortgages, unemployment) and lack of safety; these problems are particularly relevant for working-class and middle-class Spaniards (see both RJ's OSs). By juxtaposing immigration with references to the crisis and insecurity, RJ creates a logical relationship (cause-effect or before-after) between these issues. RJ refers to **immigration as a threat for the feasibility of social policies**: pensions, health and education are basic pillars of social policies and immigration can damage (*afectar*) these pillars (I.439-451). RJ hints that immigration could determine the fall of the Spanish system, as evoked by the architectural metaphor of *pillars*. This frightening metaphor, reinforced by expressions such as *an emerging new* (then unknown) *and growing* (then unstoppable) *phenomenon* is not the only one; RJ also represents immigration through the classic metaphor of the **avalanche** (I.457-458; II.672) to create a sensation of insecurity among the audience that can be reassured by the strict father. It is under this category that RJ's representation of **immigrants as criminals** should be interpreted, through a reference to the foreign criminals entering Spain or to the number of immigrants among the prison population (I.941-945; II.533-536). This representation of immigrants as a problem or as a threat to public order or the social system, which needs to be faced by a police solution, is typical in right wing discourse (Martín-Rojo 2000a; 2000b, who points out that immigration has traditionally been an issue dealt with

by the Ministry of Interior) and especially in PP discourse on immigration (Rubio-Carbonero 2011). Note that framing immigration as an issue in need of strict *order and control* serves to construct the **frame of a strict father** that has proved highly successful for the Right (Lakoff 2003). All these representations, together with the **victimization of Spaniards**, are crucial in obtaining audience support (II.101; II.523) and in presenting himself as the defender of the Spanish<sup>175</sup>. The populist defense of Spaniards is strategic because in debates such as these, utterances are directed more at the electorate watching the program than the opponent.

This representation of immigrants as a threat for social policies is especially successful during economic crises, such as that affecting Spain since 2008. These arguments allow politicians **to shift their burden** and unload citizens' frustrations by blaming the weakest and unprotected segments of the population, easily identifiable as alien. Blaming immigrants excuses politicians for cutting social services; the responsibility lies not with the government for its constant welfare cuts in response to the dominant Neoliberal ideology, but rather with the immigrants who demand more and more services. Presenting immigration as the *greatest threat* (II.447) or a *danger* (II.451) for *our social politics*, allows RJ to save current Neoliberal policies. Coherently with his ideology, the threat for "our social politics" is not Neoliberalism, an ideology predicating the weakening of the State's role in balancing market-determined inequalities, the reduction of social solidarity, compulsive privatization, the marketization of social services (not as a means for satisfying basic rights but marketable wares), but immigration. So if Spaniards experience greater difficulties in accessing social services it is not because in obeying the Neoliberal credo the two main Spanish parties (PP and PSOE) increasingly reduced or privatized public services, but because of the immigrants. Obviously by shifting the burden and blaming immigrants RJ increases his presidentiability.

Nevertheless these very negative presentations of immigrants could earn RJ the accusation of being xenophobic, which would wound his face. So RJ needs to **deny racism**: he does so by providing positive representation (immigrants as workers), although it is always followed by a *but*.

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<sup>175</sup> On this alleged defense of our poor countrymen by right wing parties, see van Dijk (2000c).

Son personas que vienen a España, que trabajan y que, en su mayoría, contribuyen. Pero también son los más necesitados y, por tanto, demandan muchos servicios sociales (I.444-447)

Hay mucha gente que viene aquí a trabajar, se gana la vida dignamente, tiene derechos y debe tener los mismos derechos que los españoles, pero hay muchos derechos de españoles que se ven perjudicados (II.99-102)

Like many other moderate right wing parties, RJ expresses a moderate racism that is often disguised or mitigated through well-known **disclaimers** always introduced by adversative conjunctions such as *pero* (Hewitt & Stokes 1975; van Dijk 2000a; 2000d: 92; Wodak & Reisigl 1999: 185-186). Disclaimers are fundamental in the construction of presidentiability, since they allow RJ to produce a racist discourse whilst at the same time avoiding accusations of xenophobia.

As is widely recognized, racism is not only typical of marginal violent radicals, even though mainstream politicians try to persuade citizens otherwise (van Dijk 1992a: 95-96; 1992b: 22; 1992e). Indeed, despite the existence of a mainstream politically correct(ed) and antiracist discourse (van Dijk 1993a: 97), racism is common within political and administrative elites (1992a; 1992b; 1992d: 201-207; 1992e; 1993a; 1993b; 2000b; 2002: 148-149; 2004; 2005b) and is spread through the media mainly by them (van Dijk 1987; 1989; 1992c; 2000a; 2002). As van Dijk demonstrated, political debates are a key space in which to frame immigration and immigrants in racist terms, as a problem or as a threat (1992e: 56; 1997: 61; 2004a), and Spain is no exception (van Dijk 2005b: 22 and 23; 2006b)<sup>176</sup>. This is especially true in the case of right wing parties, but this discourse is also contaminating the left wing, because of the relative lack of interest shown towards immigrants by trade unions (Wodak, personal conversation, but *contra* see van Dijk 2005b: 22).

Consequently, given the stigmatization of open racism, before he takes a stance on immigration as noxious to Spaniards, RJ firstly denies accusations of xenophobia or racism (I.461-463; I.530-531)<sup>177</sup>, as shown in the following excerpt:

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<sup>176</sup> He refers to parliamentary debates, but his observation can also be generalized to presidential debates.

<sup>177</sup> As for the strategy of denying accusations of racism that could detract from his image, note the parenthetical reference to the right of immigrants: *porque todos tienen derecho evidentemente*.

Yo estoy a favor de la inmigración, pero la inmigración debe ser legal y con contrato (II.610-611)

This move is crucial in order to increase his presidentiality; he presents himself not as a racist but as a **pragmatic leader**, based on the agreement that a (good) president cannot be racist, but should be **realistic**.

As for realism and the *rightization* of left wing discourse on immigration it is worth analyzing the fact that ZP frames immigration in the terms of both the nurturing father (selfless, supportive and open to dialogue) and strict father (legality, fight against illegal immigrants). As we can see in the excerpts below, ZP's construction of the image of a strict leader (1) is balanced by framing immigrants in positive terms (2):

(1) Sí, gracias Señor Rajoy... Voy a hablar de inmigración y de la política que hemos realizado. Nuestra política de inmigración tiene un principio: sólo pueden venir y quedarse los que puedan trabajar de acuerdo con la ley. Es decir, lucha con firmeza contra la inmigración ilegal [...]

(2) Pero hemos de recordar una cosa: la mitad del crecimiento económico que hemos tenido en los últimos años es como consecuencia de la inmigración. Lo que cotizan a la Seguridad Social los inmigrantes equivale al pago de casi un millón de pensionistas españoles.

This balancing of the frames of the nurturing father (referring to values such as solidarity and tolerance) and strict father (referring to values such as authority and inflexibility) is aimed at obtaining maximum support even from electors belonging to different groups: it is an example of how to widen the electoral base with a **hybrid discourse** but it also shows the surface of **ideological convergence**. Again as for realism and ideological convergence, we should consider the main representations of immigrants produced by ZP. In general, ZP frames immigrants in more positive terms than RJ, trying to express some kind of empathy, as shown in the following excerpts:

¿Deberíamos pedirles que firmen su papel de delincuente potencial a todos los inmigrantes que nacen, viven y mueren con nosotros y a veces por nosotros, señor Rajoy? (I.696-698)

hemos incrementado tres veces la ayuda al desarrollo para la cooperación con los países de origen, donde hay hambre, donde hay miseria, para dar más oportunidades a los jóvenes que son los que escapan de allí, lamentablemente, en busca de una esperanza. (I.641-645)

ZP prefers to represent **immigrants as workers** (I.971-977; I.472-473). Apart from expressing empathy and tolerance, this move enables ZP to draw attention to his fight against illegal immigration, as a work contract is a requisite for entering Spain (I.632; II.572-574; II.596; II.654-656). By framing immigration in positive terms, as a resource, ZP deactivates RJ's arguments: if immigration is positive, RJ's accusations are not grounded. But the reference to immigrants as workers, despite displaying a positive attitude towards immigration, actually hides the assumption of Neoliberal ideological perspectives, as shown in the following example:

Pero hemos de recordar una cosa: la mitad del crecimiento económico que hemos tenido en los últimos años es como consecuencia de la inmigración. Lo que cotizan a la Seguridad Social los inmigrantes equivale al pago de casi un millón de pensionistas españoles (II.588-592)

It should be noted how evident the ideological dilemma is: ZP acknowledges that persons entering Spain illegally are desperate (expressing humanitarianism and empathy), but works to prevent them from leaving their countries or takes them back (expressing pragmatism and legalism). So for coherence with PSOE self-image (and its electors' expectations) of a social-democratic party committed with solidarity, ZP presents himself as open to immigrants (solidarity). However –and it is here that the ideological dilemma comes to the surface– this openness is not based on humanitarianism, but on economicism: it is due only to the fact that they contribute to *our* social security, and therefore to Spaniards' well-being (economic rationalism). ZP considers immigrants as a resource: in terms of costs-benefits they must be rejected, even if they are hopeless, unless they contribute to our economy, as labor, to pay for *our* pensions. This is a crucial issue in left wing discourse on immigration and the apparent solution to this ideological dilemma is an example of manipulation. ZP's goody-goody discourse is aimed at obtaining more votes from “supportive” voters as well as from



immigrants, whilst ideological assumptions of social policy converge toward Neoliberal conceptions of human beings as a resource and human relationships as being based on economicism. So the positive representation of immigrants only constitutes a superficial dealignment from RJ's stance, useful in performing diversity and disagreement, but in no way challenging ideological assumptions or proposing new ones.

Two more points can be seen as examples of ideological convergence. This lack of ideological dealignment concerns the way RJ conceives **aid for developing countries**: it is not a way of reducing global inequality, but a means of solving the problems of developed countries such as the increasing number of immigrants. Funds for poor countries are represented as the *logical* counterpart for repatriations of persons coming to Spain from those countries. Obviously RJ does not talk about creating together a fairer world where people are free to move but not obliged to do so to escape terrible conditions; he is only interested in mechanisms that will keep immigrants away from the richer parts of the world. If this is coherent with RJ's right wing ideology, it nevertheless constitutes an incoherent solution of the ideological dilemma for left wing parties. Interestingly enough, ZP never challenges this view, openly declared by RJ. When in the first debate ZP referred to development aid, accusing RJ of having frozen it during his government, he did so closely to the issue of repatriation, even though he tearfully talked of famine, poverty, and penury (I.640-645).

The ideological convergence is also visible in the role that candidates assign to the **EU as last instance of Spanish immigration policies**. Both candidates try to present their policies in line with EU ones: RJ when he refers to integration agreement in answer to ZP's criticism (ZP: *es un papel inutil*, RJ: *lo tiene toda Europa* I.690-691) or again when he repeatedly depicts ZP as being criticized by EU (I.96; I.688; II.601-606; II.673-683; II.522-523). In response to this, in the second debate ZP refers to his immigration policies as in line with the EU (II.585-588; II.606-608). These references to EU are not simple *ab auctoritate* arguments. They have a long history in Spanish political discourse on immigration, since the EU is somehow considered as the ultimate instance of the immigration policies; the instance that obliges parties to take their decisions: this provides both the Right and the Left with a means for self-legitimation and allows the former to avoid accusations of xenophobia, and the latter of not being supportive enough (Martín-Rojo & van Dijk 1997; Martín-Rojo 2000a; 2000b).

In conclusion, both candidates try to exploit immigration for their own electoral interests: RJ to present himself as an *authoritarian father*, and ZP to present himself as a *nurturing father*. These two different self-representations are well known in political discourse (Lakoff 1995; 2002; 2004; for Spain see Molpeceres-Arnáiz 2008). The issue of *paternal* figures threatening and/or reassuring electors is linked to the deep psychological functions satisfied by institutional politics (Edelman 1964; 1971; 1977; 1985; 1988; 2001)<sup>178</sup>.

Beside this convergence in strategies, the analysis has shown the degree of convergence of the dominant discourse produced on the stage of presidential debates: although it presents immigrants in more positive terms, ZP never challenges RJ's frame of immigrants as an element of public order, to be treated as a police issue (as in RJ's terms). ZP does not challenge the dichotomy *legal/illegal* immigrants; he does not even challenge the reification of persons (immigrants as economic resource), as posited by RJ. With his discourse, ZP accepts this conception and, despite the effort for performing opposition, the ideological assumptions underlying the discourse are widely shared. Moreover, the policies implemented by PSOE and PP are very similar, demonstrating the ideological convergence highlighted here and in other points of this work.

ZP turns out to be unable to produce an *emergent* discourse, limiting his production to an *oppositional* discourse (Raiter & Muñoz 1995; Raiter 1999; Giménez-Montiel 1983). Oppositional discourse does not challenge the ideological assumptions of the discourse it disputes; in contrast, emergent discourse completely rejects them, tracing a totally new terrain of political struggle, based on *new* categories. As the analysis carried out here has shown, ZP's discourse shares the ideological assumptions of PP's discourse. Sharing the same ideological assumptions, both candidates use same categories, such as *legal-illegal*, the same arguments and reproaches on who let in or legalized more illegal immigrants; and quite the same expressions: ZP uses the verb *colarse* ['to strain' or 'to gate-crash'] and RJ the noun *coladero* ['strain', or figuratively 'place where is easy to enter']. This is because the two candidates' arguments follow the same pattern of mutual attack on the number of illegal immigrants legalized. This commonality of arguments shows ideological convergence. The **war of figures** about how many illegal immigrants have been legalized indicates the existence of **undisputed**

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<sup>178</sup> It is not haphazard that Lakoff as well as Edelman have a background in Psychology and are interested in analyzing the way politicians use signs for influencing citizens' minds.

**assumptions on immigrants** such as the fact that letting in and legalizing immigrants in Spain is an error, hence an index of incapacity.

This inability to produce a new discourse on migration is a defeat for the Left: despite references to integration and expressions of solidarity or empathy, embracing the same Right ideological assumptions, ZP (immigration as a police issue and the distinction between legal/illegal immigrants) stresses that he *also* fought illegal immigration; that he *also* prevents *desperate persons* from leaving their country and entering Spain; that he *also* sends back those who managed to enter. This shows that the Left has followed the Right in its agenda, discourse and ideology. It is possible that left wing parties are more open to solidarity and humanitarianism (van Dijk 1997c, 2000b), whilst right wing parties present themselves as rationalist and pragmatist<sup>179</sup>. Yet the Left seems unable to frame the debate on immigration in terms other than those established by the Right. In fact, the most positive representation of immigrants produced by ZP is that of immigrants as a resource: he is unable to frame immigration in other terms than *economicistic* ones, whereby immigration is positive only if it pays *our* pensions or sustains *our* economy. In embracing this perspective, where immigrants have to be treated according to cost-benefit ideology, the Left contributes to the dehumanization of persons and to the economization of the debate, reinforcing Neoliberal market ideology (Fairclough 2003b: 20).

One can witness an ideological convergence and a *centerization* (move toward the center) of political positions. It is not only an attempt to avoid overly radical positions in order to gain the majority of electors by catching the wavering (less ideologized, hence ‘moderate’) electors, supposedly at the center of the political spectrum; it is rather a real shift in the institutional parties, whose ideologies converge towards a form of undisputed *centerism*. In their constant race to catch all electors, which involves occupying the center space, parties are increasingly leaning towards similar positions, positions that display a growing conservatism: preserving status quo, erasing alternative

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<sup>179</sup> Van Dijk shows that there is a constant tension in elite political discourses about immigration between these two tendencies of humanitarianism-solidarity on the one hand and rationalism-pragmatism on the other. This tension seems partially to reflect the political distinction between Left and Right, but is also largely present in political discourse on racism, especially in right wing discourse (in order to avoid accusations of xenophobia). In general terms, politicians say “we are a supportive country (humanitarianism), *but* we cannot help all immigrants (pragmatism)”. In his analysis of the denial of racism by the elites, van Dijk (1992a, 1993b) shows that to deny racism many Right MPs use in their parliamentary discourses the declaration of principle of solidarity and humanitarianism. But actually we can witness that right wing (anti-immigrant) discourses include keywords of left wing discourse (solidarity) and vice versa.

visions, and never disputing the basic pillars of the current capitalist world order. This centerization is especially evident within the Left, since the Right seems more able to conceal its radical positions, mitigating them under the veil of (economic) rationality and pragmatism or the defense of (actual) order. Moreover, for the Left, centerization means moving towards the Right. It is for these reasons that I consider that immigration constitutes an ideological dilemma for the Left, since it does not match with left wing self-perception of the supportive party, based on humanitarianism and aimed at solidarity.

## 9. TERRORISM. The hero (PP), the villain (ETA) and its accomplice (ZP)

### 9.1. The role of ETA in Spanish politics

The military and political activities of some Basque radical organizations, often simply referred to as *terrorismo Vasco*, has traditionally been one of the main topics of Spanish political discourse, and one of the most hotly debated within Spanish society. It is especially important for PP, since, as we have seen, according to De Santiago-Guervós (1996), Terrorism, Marxism and Separatism epitomized the deepest threats to society for Francoism: the disappearance of private property, chaos and the disaggregation of Spain. Since PP emerged from the Francoist ideology, it is not surprising that terrorism dominates its political agenda, together with the economy and the unity of Spain. Indeed, PP works to cut public spending and fight against separatism to preserve the country's unity.

Nevertheless, terrorism is a transversal cleavage, since it interests the whole of Spanish society, and the entire political spectrum from Right to Left, with different stances: PP electors are mostly convinced that it is necessary to repress terrorism militarily, as well as reduce the claims of independence of (some segments of) Basque society, since they defend the unity of Spain. Among PSOE electors there are some that strongly oppose the use of violence to achieve autonomy or independence, and also some contrary to the claims of independence of some Basques. Although in the past part of PSOE silently approved the role ETA played in fighting Francoism (Cercas 2012: 68, 257-258), PSOE electors are almost unanimously against ETA, but prefer to solve issues of Terrorism through dialogue than military repression (Ruiz-Jiménez 2010).

Terrorism is one of the main terrains of struggle of the 2008 electoral campaign. Crossing my personal observation of the discourses produced and circulated in Spain in the early 2000s, with Elorriaga's statements that appeared in *The Financial Times* (Crawford 2008), and with the analysis of other texts (Cortes Generales 2005), I can state that it is one of the key themes used by PP to secure its own traditional voters and win indecisive voters from PSOE. For the purpose of this work I use the word *terrorism* in reference to the armed activities carried on by the Basque independentist armed organization called *Euskadi Ta Askatasuna* [Basque Country and Liberty], founded in 1959.




Figure 1. ETA flag and logo

Trying to even loosely sketch the intricate history and situation of ETA is a very complicated task<sup>180</sup>; I will here limit myself to presenting some summary information, dates and ideological references. ETA emerged in the early 1950s as a group of young Basqueist university students from PNV<sup>181</sup>, aimed at defending and reinforcing the historical, cultural and linguistic heritage of Basques in the frame of Francoism, which severely repressed peripheral nationalisms, cultures and languages such as Basque.

Since its beginnings, ETA defined itself as a *Movimiento Revolucionario Vasco de Liberación Nacional* [revolutionary Basque movement of national liberation]: its main ideological features were the independence of the Basque territories situated between Spain and France, the official use of Basque language, representative democracy, a form of mitigated liberalism with social aims, and the laity of State. These last three points, together with the use of Basque as diacritic of identity, instead of surname or race, are the main differences from the racist Basque nationalism of PNV's founder, Sabino Arana. From these initial positions, and through a complex process made up of several meetings, discussions, documents, etc. ETA became increasingly left wing, embracing Socialism, and progressively separating from PNV. In this process of separation from PNV, ETA adopted an increasingly active commitment to the liberation of the Basque Country from Spanish occupation through direct actions, following the example of the (Marxist) decolonizing movements that arose in the 1950s and 1960s in Africa, Latin America and Asia. ETA declared the definite split from PNV in 1964 (Idoyaga 2009). That same year ETA decided to embrace armed conflict as the means of achieving its objectives. Since its first murder, in 1968, to the present day ETA has killed 829 persons, more than the half of them soldiers, and most of them of

<sup>180</sup> See, for instance, Mata (2005); Woodworth (2005).

<sup>181</sup> *Partido Nacionalista Vasco* [Basque Nationalist Party] is the right wing, Catholic and once racist Basqueist party founded in 1898 by Sabino Arana.

right wing ideology. Indeed, the main association of the victims of terrorism, the Asociación de Víctimas del Terrorismo (AVT<sup>182</sup>), founded in 1981, is essentially right wing, and, like other right wing Spanishist Catholic movements (Manos Limpias) or media (Libertad Digital, COPE, VeoTV, Intereconomía, ABC), adopts an aggressive stance toward terrorists and in general toward Basqueism and peripheralism. In December 2001 ETA was defined as a “terrorist organization” by the EU, and in February 2002 the U.S. Department of State did the same<sup>183</sup>.

Dealing with the role played by ETA in Spanish politics is extremely complex, so here I will just point out briefly some questions about the issue of the **truce**, in order to pave the ground for understanding the interventions of the two candidates in the debate<sup>184</sup>. Throughout its history ETA has declared numerous truces. Traditionally the Right has claimed that ETA takes advantage of truces to rearm itself after having been weakened by military repression (captures and confiscation of arms by police). A short list of all the truces includes the following: 28 January–19 March 1988 (the first), 8 January–12 April 1989, 24 June–1 July 1996<sup>185</sup>. The two first truces took place during Felipe González’s government, and the third during José María Aznar’s period in office. On 16 September 1998 ETA, again under Aznar’s government, declared an “indefinite truce” that lasted until 28 November 1999. On 22 March 2006 ETA declared a “permanent truce” that, despite the bomb in the car park at Madrid Airport on 30 December 2006, officially lasted until 5 June 2007. This last truce is of interest for this work, since it took place during ZP’s government and was a key issue on the political agenda during the entire PSOE legislature and the election campaign<sup>186</sup>.

Generally speaking truces coincide with political negotiations between the Government or some of its members (often from an unofficial position) and ETA or some of their emissaries. It would therefore not be surprising to learn that ZP’s government was negotiating with the armed organization in order to find a political solution for the situation in the Basque Country that excluded armed options.

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<sup>182</sup> <http://www.avt.org/historia-y-fines/>

<sup>183</sup> Official Gazette of the European Community 28.12.2001, p. L 344/96 EN  
[http://europa.eu/legislation\\_summaries/justice\\_freedom\\_security/fight\\_against\\_terrorism/133208\\_es.htm](http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/justice_freedom_security/fight_against_terrorism/133208_es.htm)  
<http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/article/2007/04/20070425112939idybeekcm0.9128382.html#>

<sup>184</sup> Obviously candidates’ discourses are completely immersed in the wider discourses (determined by the respective ideologies) about the Basque country, Spanishism and Basqueism, terrorism, etc.

<sup>185</sup> <http://www.elpais.com/especial/eta/treguas.html>

<sup>186</sup> More recently, on 20 October 2011 ETA announced “the definitive end of armed activity”, calling on the French and Spanish governments to look for political solutions to the Basque situation.

## **9.2. Terrorism in the debates: Strategies, moves, devices for managing presidentiability**

As we know, PP's head of the election campaign, Gabriel Elorriaga, said that the main campaign issues would be the economy, immigration and nationalist issues. Indeed, RJ would devote considerable time to terrorism, as part of the nationalist question. It must be noted that I have separated the Basque question, dealt with as a problem of National Security in the FP block (under the label of terrorism), from the Catalan question, dealt with as a problem of IP in the corresponding block (under the label of the Catalan question).

RJ presents ZP as incapable, incoherent, a divider and liar in order to detract support from him.

In turn, ZP also will construct his presidentiability in relation to the attribute of ability, confuting RJ's attacks by presenting his antiterrorist policies as being more efficient as the PP's; he will also accuse RJ of being opportunistic in using terrorism for his political ends. These moves are visible from the OS of both debates (I.133-175; II.44-78), where ZP presents PP as a hurdle (*obstáculo*), a disloyal group that contested the election result, insulted (here there is a personal reference to RJ), tensed the atmosphere, lied, exaggerated, divided citizens, and used terrorism and the victims' pain for its own electoral ends, as well as failing to support the government. While PP is framed in the light of negative features (confrontation, problems, opportunism) PSOE is framed according to positive ones (dialogue, solutions; selflessness). This dichotomist description allows ZP to present himself as sincere, selflessness, poen to dialogue , sensitive, responsible and progressive, and delegitimizes RJ as insincere, opportunist, authoritarian, insensitive, irresponsible and a cheat.

### **9.2.1. RJ's moves to manage presidentiability**

#### **9.2.1.1. Ability: ZP as incapable**

According to the overarching strategies, RJ increases his own presidentiability and decreases ZP's through narratives that indicate ZP's failure to deal with the real problem (the economy), but *entertained* himself with secondary questions *nobody cares about*, such as the Alianza de Civilizaciones and Memoria Histórica, and only did two things: modifying the structure of the Spanish State and negotiating with terrorists (I.100-105; II.124-127; II.264-270; II.379-385). From the OS of both debates RJ deploys the main moves for delegitimizing ZP in reference to Nation (Terrorism and the



Catalonian question): 1) representing **ZP as incapable, inexperienced, frivolous, and weak**; 2) **as having broken the traditional agreements** between government and opposition in the form of state and terrorism; 3) of **being incoherent**; and 4) of **being a liar**.

¿Qué es lo que ha hecho el Sr. Zapatero a lo largo de estos 4 años además de discutir la Nación, y entretenerse con la Alianza de Civilizaciones, la Memoria Histórica u otras cuestiones? Ha hecho dos cosas, se ha centrado en dos cosas y las dos las ha hecho mal: la estructura de España y los tratos con ETA. Ha querido modificar por su cuenta el modelo de Estado y ha querido negociar con los terroristas por su cuenta. Ambas operaciones le han salido mal. Ninguna de esas dos cosas contaba con el apoyo de los electores, porque no figuraban en su programa electoral. Lo ha hecho sin encomendarse a nadie, por eso para salirse con la suya, necesitó romper todos los consensos de la Transición, incluido el Pacto contra el Terrorismo, para no tener testigos. Necesitó mentir a los españoles sobre lo que estaba haciendo, y necesitó dividir a la opinión pública para silenciar cualquier protesta. Ningún gobernante ha sembrado en la historia de la Transición Moderna tanta tensión y tanta cizaña, a la vez que hablaba de entendimiento, de talante y de convivencia. Ninguno ha transmitido a los españoles una sensación comparable de falta de rumbo, de improvisación y de vivir pendientes de la ocurrencia cotidiana (I.100-120)

el Gobierno de España ha equivocado las prioridades. Ha tenido dos grandes proyectos: el primero, cambiar España y el segundo, negociar con ETA. Ambos han sido un fracaso (II.124-127)

Given the space dedicated to this issue during the campaign, in the manifestos or the debates, we can conclude that terrorism is one of the main topics on RJ's agenda, but he accuses **ZP of having mixed priorities**. This is only apparently incoherent, since terrorism is intended by RJ as *a fight against* terrorists with military means, and not as *negotiating with* them.

In RJ's narrative, ZP holds sole responsibility for any negotiations with terrorists: he did it all alone (*por su cuenta*), without the support of his electors or of the more experienced members of PSOE (II.752-755). Insisting on ZP's agency, RJ tries to weaken his strong leadership and personal appeal, **distancing him from the electors and his party**, and showing that *he* is the country's real problem. This is the reason why RJ's attacks are so personalized, as shown by the use of the deictic *usted*.

RJ presents **ZP as inexperienced** through words such as *improvisación* or the metaphor (II.752) of *aprendiz de brujo* [sorcerer's apprentice]<sup>187</sup>; **and incapable** (the only two things that ZP did, he did them badly: *han salido mal; han sido un fracaso*).

In order to delegitimize ZP on a personal level RJ also presents him as being **naïve and frivolous**.

Lo que hizo usted fue una frivolidad, que benefició a los terroristas y que perjudicó a los demás (I.730-731)

These representations decrease ZP's presidentiability since there is agreement on the fact that a president should be experienced, capable, realistic and serious.

#### 9.2.1.2. Unity: ZP as a divider and breaker of traditional consensus

At many points in the debates RJ presents **ZP as having broken the traditional consensus** between the two main national parties (I.110-111; I.715-723; II.736). According to RJ, the truce and talks were not previously agreed with PP, as had been the case since the Transition; this allows RJ to use an argument based on the topic of tradition, according to which acting in line with tradition is positive and the contrary is bad:

necesitó romper todos los consensos de la Transición, incluido el Pacto contra el Terrorismo [...] y necesitó dividir a la opinión pública (I.110-111)

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<sup>187</sup> RJ uses this metaphor twice and always in relation with nationalist issues: once in reference to terrorism and Basque Country (II.753), and once to Catalonia and Estatut (II.1051). On this metaphor see Pedrero (2006).

This argument, according to which **ZP divides the Spanish**, works thanks to the agreement that the quest for consensus and unity is considered one of the main presidential attributes (see also below).

### 9.2.1.3. Coherence and consistency: ZP as incoherent

Another move is that of presenting **ZP as incoherent**, since he does not do what he says (Ningún gobernante... convivencia). The discursive devices for implementing this move are the *tu quoque* argument and the topic of uniqueness. As for the latter, quantifiers such as *ningún* absolutize representations beyond the contingency of events and fix flaws as stable aspects of the opponent's personality. Another device for highlighting inconsistency is the quotation of key words ZP normally uses in his own discourse to positively frame himself (*entendimiento, talante, convivencia*) in an entextualization that frames him negatively. Both the arguments of ZP as a breaker of consensus and as incoherent are aimed at presenting him as a **divider**; this can be seen from RJ's clear accusations of his having divided the Spaniards (I.113-117).

In detracting from ZP's credibility, RJ repeatedly highlights **ZP's incoherence and inconsistency** (he says something and does the opposite or says something and then says the opposite), through the abusive argument (liar) or the *tu quoque* argument (incoherence); apart from the examples presented above (I.114-117), this is also clear from the long narrative presented at (I.787-805) or the following examples:

Ha dicho una cosa y la contraria muchísimas veces (I.870)

Usted mintió a los españoles cuando dejó que De Juana Chaos se diera paseos por San Sebastián. Luego lo metió en la cárcel, cuando le vino bien. [...] Usted mintió a los españoles cuando dijo que nunca hablaría de política con ETA. Y, sin embargo, habló de política con ETA (II.900-916)

As at other points of the debate, the role played by reported speech or other metapragmatic statements based on *verba dicendi* is again crucial in order to demonstrate incoherence and inconsistency. As we have seen, coherence and consistency are two of the main presidential attributes.

#### 9.2.1.4. Sincerity: ZP lies to Spaniards

One of the main moves used by RJ for delegitimizing ZP is to accusing him of lying to Spaniards. It is very common throughout the debates and especially in this terrain of struggle (I.112; I.805; I.868; I.945; II.741). It is easy for RJ to attack ZP on this lack of sincerity, since this kind of negotiations are normally held in secret to prevent any external interference. The two following passages are particular interesting:

Usted mintió a los españoles cuando dijo que nunca hablaría de política con ETA. Y, sin embargo, habló de política con ETA. Lo ha dicho todo el mundo. Lo ha dicho usted. Lo ha dicho usted Tengo aquí los datos. Se lo puedo enseñar. "Con ETA no se hablará nunca de política". Habló de política (II.892-919)

Usted ha mentido. Porque usted miente siempre, usted no dice la verdad nunca, ése es el problema (II.971-973)

Of course RJ insists on representing **ZP as liar** because lying is one of the greatest forms of betrayals to electors, and one of the most common ways for losing credibility; indeed, accusing a candidate of lying is one of the easiest ways to detract from his presidentiability. Reported speech is used to mimetically represent the speaker and oblige him to stick to his previous declarations, whilst quantifiers (*siempre, nunca*) are employed to stabilize the negative features.

#### 9.2.1.5. Strength vs. weakness: Fighting against vs. negotiating with terrorists

PP's strategy is based on particular narratives, according to which PP's repressive policies managed to weaken ETA, enabling RJ to present PP as a **strong and severe party fighting disorder and evil**. According to RJ's narrative, PP excluded from councils and Parliament those parties that politically supported ETA, illegalizing them through the *Ley de Partidos* [Law of Political Parties] (BOE 2002: 23600), while ZP, through his negotiations, included ETA in the political debate as an interlocutor, allowing them access to councils and Parliament. In short, ZP strengthened ETA, in accordance with the agreed premise that ETA is bad, and ZP's behavior is bad.

cuando llegó usted al Gobierno ETA estaba más débil que nunca, llevaba un año sin matar porque no podía. Batasuna estaba fuera de

los ayuntamientos y del Parlamento. El terrorismo callejero se había liquidado. Y lo más importante es que había un pacto entre el Partido Popular y el Partido Socialista que quitaba a ETA toda esperanza de negociación. ¿Qué hizo usted? Negoció con ETA, rompió el pacto, les dio esperanza, nos dijo que querían retirarse, que mostraban una voluntad inequívoca, que usted había verificado. Que no iba a hablar de política. ¿Cuál fue su resultado? ETA está en los ayuntamientos y en el Parlamento con nuestro dinero. Vuelve la violencia callejera, han vuelto a matar, ha roto un gran acuerdo nacional que iba a suponer el fin de ETA... [...] Y además dividió a la sociedad y se enfrentó a las víctimas. Esto ha sido lo que usted ha hecho. Una muestra de imprudencia y de irreflexión de la que por lo visto no está dispuesto a arrepentirse. [...] Lo que hizo usted fue una frivolidad, que benefició a los terroristas y que perjudicó a los demás. Y no busque precedentes, no los busque. Porque lo que hizo usted, negociar políticamente con una organización terrorista, como le han denunciado en numerosas ocasiones, han aparecido en los medios declaraciones, y usted mismo ha reconocido, es algo que no hizo absolutamente nadie en España. Este es el fracaso más importante de esta Legislatura. Ha afectado a la dignidad del Estado, ha sido lesivo en la lucha contra ETA, y yo desde luego le garantizo que yo nunca negociaré como nadie hizo nunca en España salvo usted, políticamente con una organización terrorista (I.711-741)

With these narratives (I.858-859; II.734-740 II.953-959) RJ represents the **PP government as the hero** that weakened ETA and **ZP as the villain** that strengthened it, acting as its **accomplice**. These narratives, “when we X(+), then you Y(–)”, are very common throughout the two debates and allow for the positive self-presentation and negative presentation of the other thanks to the opposition in personal deixis, the tense of the verbs, in lexis, as well in different semantic propositions. The main propositions used by RJ for delegitimizing ZP are that he negotiated with ETA instead of fighting it, broke traditional consensus, lied to the Spaniards, and was incoherent (I.103-106; I.807; I.857-867; II.124-127; II.264-270; II.379-385; II.727-767). They are repeated *ad nauseam* throughout both debates, but the excerpt given above is particularly significant: it shows how RJ creates the difference between *negotiating with* and *fighting against*: by narrating ZP as negotiating with ETA, RJ’s presents **ZP as weak**, surrendering to terrorists and their blackmail (I.807-809: *ha cedido ante los*

terroristas y ha aceptado el chantaje); equally he let the audience infer that **he is a strong leader** (cf. II.131-132: se necesita un Gobierno que dé certidumbre, un Gobierno que dé seguridad). This opposition between a strong leader fighting terrorists and a weak one negotiating with them (or suspiciously close to them) is coherent with the self-representation of right wing leaders as authoritative and left wing leaders as open to dialogue (Lakoff 2004). Worthy of note is the use of the topic of uniqueness for representing ZP as the only president in Spanish history to negotiate with terrorists (I.732-736; I.857; II.751), and therefore a **unique (negative) phenomenon**.

#### 9.2.1.6. ZP's contiguity with terrorists

Representing **ZP as being close to terrorists** is one of the main moves of the 2008 election campaign. In his attempts to detract from ZP's presidentiability, RJ describes **ZP as helping terrorists** such as José Ignacio De Juana-Chaos<sup>188</sup> or politicians close to ETA such as Arnaldo Otegi<sup>189</sup>, whilst at the same time **betraying the victims of terrorism** or antiterrorist activists like María San Gil<sup>190</sup>. This use of real persons as representing terrorism (villains) or victims (heroes) is functional to RJ's strategy of doggedly depicting ZP as a friend of terrorists and foe of the victims, Spaniards and the rule of law and the State.

Usted [...] dejó que De Juana Chaos se diera paseos por San Sebastián. [...]. Usted [...] calificó al señor Otegui como un hombre de paz, señor Zapatero. Usted como hombre de paz, que trató al señor Otegui mejor que a María San Gil (II.900-904)

According to RJ's narrative, ZP benefitted terrorists and damaged victims (cf. I.730-731). Throughout this narrative the de/legitimation strategy is based on the premise that negotiating with terrorists, instead of militarily repressing them, is anti-patriotic. And indeed at a point of the debate RJ goes as far as to question ZP's ability to show any form of patriotism (I.958-961): RJ does so, since, as De Santiago-Guervós (1996) states,

<sup>188</sup> Member of ETA, and found guilty of 25 murders.

<sup>189</sup> Arnaldo Otegi is a Basque politician and the main representative of the *izquierda abertzale*, the radical Marxist Basqueist political movement aimed at the Independence of the Basque Country.

<sup>190</sup> María San Gil Noain is a Basque politician and one of the main representatives of the Basque PP. Catholic and Spanishist, she spent the most of her political career fighting ETA, after having witnessed the murder of a colleague of hers by ETA.

in Spain the concept of the fatherland has traditionally been monopolized by the Right, and hence any action which is not in line with right wing policy cannot be patriotic. This is not only a means of denigrating the opponent and damaging his image; this is a strategy aimed at highlighting the legitimate ownership of the concept of patriotism. In doing so, RJ restates the right wing monopoly on the concept of the fatherland and its defense, even if in his CS of the second debate, RJ appeals to socialist Spanishists, in a clear example of ideological convergence, typical of the fight for the center<sup>191</sup>.

RJ's presentations of ZP as being close to terrorists and removed from victims were constant throughout the election campaign as well as the debates (I.1523-1547): they are aimed at reinforcing the opposition between the hero (RJ), friend of victims and the villain (ZP), friend of terrorists. Yet PP started sowing suspicions about ZP's (ideological) proximity with terrorists as far back as 2006, when former PP MP and former Minister of the Interior, Ángel Acebes, said that ZP's program was ETA's program<sup>192</sup>. Moreover, in many AVT rallies against ETA during 2005 and 2006, one of the most popular banners was the slogan ZETAP, where the acronym with which José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero is known in Spain, "ZP" read as /θeta'pe/, encompasses the three letters of the acronym of ETA typographically highlighted (see fig. 2).




Figure 2. The letters "ZP" encompassing the letters of ETA (right); Zapatero depicted as a snake (left)

During the 2008 campaign, in a video hosted on a PP official website, ZP was represented as a snake (fig. 2), in reference to the symbol of ETA, a snake wrapping an axe (fig. 1), speaking with his typical pronunciation, where the final <d> sounds like /θ/ instead of /ð/. The figure of the snake is an archetypal metaphor for someone that is untrustworthy. In addition, many other campaign texts linked ZP to ETA: in some

<sup>191</sup> In a certain sense nation is for Left a form of *ideological dilemma* (Billig et al. 1988).

<sup>192</sup> [http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2006/06/05/actualidad/1149458406\\_850215.html](http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2006/06/05/actualidad/1149458406_850215.html)

images the PSOE logo (a rose in a fist) was spoofed as a rose wrapped in a snake; or in the video *Que no viva por ti ¡rompe con Zapatero!* references were made to the many rallies that took place between 2005 and 2008 against the antiterrorist politics of PSOE<sup>193</sup> and to the controversial case of De Juana Chaos.

## **9.2.2. ZP's moves to manage presidentialiability**

### **9.2.2.1. Ability: PP antiterrorist politics less effective than PSOE**

ZP's strategy for increasing his presidentialiability and decreasing that of RJ is based on challenging RJ's narratives of ETA as near to defeat in 2004, as PP insinuates, since otherwise PP would not have accused ETA of being the author of the terrorist attack of 11M, and ETA could not have killed 11 times more persons (46) than in the ZP's term in office (4 persons).

Mire, señor Rajoy. Cuando llegué al Gobierno veníamos de una Legislatura en la que había habido 238 víctimas mortales por el terrorismo. 46 a manos de ETA y 192 en el atentado del 11 de marzo a manos del terrorismo islamista. Mi primer objetivo, mi primer deber moral como presidente del Gobierno era eliminar o reducir al máximo estas cifras de víctimas mortales de ETA. Lo que lamento, lo que más lamento es no haber podido evitar las cuatro víctimas mortales a manos de ETA que hemos tenido en este periodo. [...] hora lanza usted su última mentira. Lo ha hecho aquí ahora. Afirma que ETA estaba acabada al final de su legislatura. ¿Cómo es posible que ETA estuviera acabada cuando ustedes le atribuyeron el atentado más grave de la historia de Europa, que fue el atentado del 11-M del 2004? Usted mismo lo dijo en la jornada de reflexión: "Tengo la convicción moral de que era ETA". Y estaba acabada... Ni convicción, ni moral [...] Señor Rajoy (I.743-772)

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<sup>193</sup> During those years many rallies took place, often organized by AVT or the right wing Spanishist Fundación DENAES Fundación para la Defensa de la Nación Española [Foundation for the Defense of Spanish Nation] often with the official cooperation of PP: 22 January 2005, 4 June 2005, 25 February 2006, 10 June 2006, 1 October 2006, 25 November 2006, 3 February 2007, 2 March 2007, 10 March 2007, 12 May 2007, 10 July 2007, 24 November 2007.



Through this refutation<sup>194</sup> ZP presents **PP antiterrorist politics as being less effective than PSOE's** (11 times fewer victims); but especially frames **RJ as a liar**. Moreover it allows ZP to refer to the **11M terrorist attack** (see below). In an act of self-legitimization ZP says he tried to negotiate with ETA to prevent more deaths, presenting himself as **committed to peace**. Peace is essential in the definition of ZP's image as a pacifist in opposition to PP: after the 2003 rallies against the Iraq war, ZP promised during the 2004 election campaign that if elected he would withdraw Spanish troops from Iraq, which he did in fact do. And in the speech to present the *Plataforma de Apoyo a Zapatero*, two references were made to peace, as well as in the videos *Con Zapatero vuelve a creer en la política* and *No seas él*. In accordance with PSOE's overarching strategy of positively present itself as Joy, a metonym for values universally judged as positive such as optimism, peace, solidarity, freedom, democracy, fair play, etc., ZP increases his own presidentiability by constructing the image of a leader engaged with peace; but also as a **unifier**, an **able** and **selfless** politician. On the other hand he decreases RJ's presidentiability through three main moves: the opposition **opportunism vs. selflessness**; that between the **fair and the unfair player**; and the many references to the bombs of **11M**. These will be dealt with separately.

#### 9.2.2.2. Opportunism vs. Selflessness

The opposition between selflessness and fair play vs. opportunism and unfair play has been extensively used by ZP as means for de/legitimation in many campaign texts: in the song *Defender la Alegría*, in the videos for presenting the *Plataforma de Apoyo a Zapatero* or in the videos of the series *Vota con todas tus fuerzas*. In all these texts ZP presented himself as selfless, for instance inviting voters of each party to vote to prevent a high rate of abstention and to exercise democracy; at the same time he presented PP as an opportunistic and unfair player. In both debates one of the main moves ZP uses to delegitimize RJ is to present both him **and PP as using terrorism for their own electoral ends**:

ustedes han sido un partido que en el Parlamento y en la calle no han hecho más que debilitar al Gobierno en la lucha contra el

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<sup>194</sup> Cf. also ZP's interruption: señor Zapatero, cuando usted llegó al Gobierno, ETA estaba debilitada y ETA llevaba un año sin matar y además se actuaba con la dignidad del Estado [ZP: Sí, ¿ah sí? Por eso dijeron que era ETA la autora del atentado del 11-M] (II.952-957).

terrorismo. Son el único partido el único partido del mundo que se ha manifestado contra el Gobierno por la lucha contra el terrorismo (I.760-764, see also I.247-249)

Sí, señor Rajoy, vuelve usted a hacer uso del terrorismo y la verdad es que lo han hecho desde hace varios años hasta para justificar la guerra de Irak lo hicieron [...] Dejen ya de utilizar el terrorismo, unas veces para justificar la guerra de Irak, otras para hacer oposición al Gobierno de España con el terrorismo y la lucha contra el terrorismo de ETA (II.769-793; see also II.857-859; II.948-951)

In this representation, the topic of uniqueness plays a crucial role (Son el único partido) in aggravating the negative features. Since **selflessness** is one of the main presidential attributes, and presidentiality management is a two-fold activity, on the one hand ZP presents RJ as an opportunist and on the other he presents himself as **selfless**. This attribute is linked to that of **patriotism and democraticness**. This move is based on the agreement that a president should be democratic and loyal above his party's interests. ZP implements this move through expressions that essentialize dis/loyalty beyond the contingency and link them to the candidates' inner personality (es lo que me sale de dentro).

En política antiterrorista, mis principios y mi convicción es apoyar al Gobierno entre demócratas. Eso es lo que me sale de dentro. Y a usted lo que le ha salido es hacer oposición con el terrorismo y utilizarlo partidistamente (I.829-833)

In this description, ZP's loyalty and RJ's disloyalty are linked to stable and continuous features of their respective characters. As for **patriotism** and **democraticness** the following excerpt must also be considered:

Ustedes, siempre están siempre que van al extranjero denigrando el Gobierno de España. Y yo, en la Cumbre de Chile, defendí al Sr. Aznar, de los ataques que públicamente le lanzaba el Sr. Chávez, el Sr. Chávez, como patriota lo hice, como patriota lo hice, como persona con principios democráticos (I.954-964)

Through this narrative where ZP defended former Spanish PM Aznar (PP), while PP *always* denigrates the PSOE Government when abroad, ZP constructs a difference between **patriotic**, and therefore presidentialiable, candidates, and those that are not. As we have seen, ZP's attempt of to portray himself as a patriot is rejected by RJ.

### 9.2.2.3. Unity: the quest for agreement

This move is connected with the moves on the attributes of selflessness and patriotism and democraticness. In response to RJ's claims that he has divided the Spanish, ZP presents himself and PSOE **as committed to reaching an agreement** with PP:

Cuando era líder de la oposición propuse, firmé un pacto antiterrorista para dar mi apoyo pleno al Gobierno. Sin condiciones. Nunca critiqué al Gobierno, nunca llevé al Parlamento ningún debate terrorista. Siempre di mi apoyo con un cheque en blanco. ¿Por qué? Porque para mí es inmoral usar en la lucha partidista el terrorismo. Inmoral. Forma parte del espíritu de la Transición colaborar siempre con los gobiernos democráticos en la lucha contra el terrorismo. Forma parte del espíritu constitucional (I.751-759; see also I.796-798)

The **quest for agreement** is crucial in constructing presidentialiability, since **unity** is one of the main presidentialiable attributes. ZP also legitimizes himself through references to the Transition and the Constitution, using the topic of tradition. In these strategic narratives, positive self-presentation and negative presentation of the opponent are strengthened by quantifiers such as *siempre* or *nunca*: they stabilize (positive/negative) features of personality beyond the contingency. This essentialization of positive or negative features of candidates in description is a useful mechanism for increasing or decreasing presidentialiability.

### 9.2.3. A particular case: *11M* for Spain: a bad debater and fair play

The event known in Spain as *11M* is the jihadist attack of March 11 2004, when 10 bombs exploded in different points of Madrid's metropolitan train network: 191 people were killed and almost 2000 were wounded. The PP government immediately accused ETA, and partially maintained this position even when soon after a Spain based jihadist group claimed responsibility for it. This attitude of PP, at the time in government, seems

to have been the responsible for the unexpected loss of the 2004 elections of 14 March. Like RJ at the time, some conservatives still believe that ETA provided some kind of support for jihadist terrorists and were actively involved in the attack, which had a decisive influence on the unpredicted results of the 2004 elections. Although the police investigations and trials concluded that there was no evidence to prove ETA's involvement in the attack, some conservatives think that the judicial power and even the police somehow conspired with ETA and jihadists to return PSOE to power.

PP tried to blame ETA, because in doing so it could reinforce the image of a party fighting terrorism and it could gather (conservative or not) Spanishists around a figure of strong, paternalistic and authoritarian father, as is often the case in situation of threat (consider the election success of George W. Bush after the attack of 11 September 2001). But PP mystification had the opposite effect of favoring PSOE. Even though PSOE's success in the 2004 elections was due to numerous factors, including the lack of a clear leadership in PP after Aznar's decision to quit<sup>195</sup>; ZP's charismatic leadership; PP's inadequate management of the ecological crisis of the Prestige<sup>196</sup>; PP's authoritarian decision to get involved in the Iraq war acting against public opinion<sup>197</sup>; a general desire for change, expressed in the Catalan municipal and regional elections; the events of 11M with PP accusing ETA and Spaniards feeling betrayed certainly contributed to putting PSOE back in government.

This issue is very important for both parties and candidates, albeit for contrasting reasons and results. The historical context helps explain why it is used extensively by ZP, and –at least initially– avoided by RJ. In this sense, there are clear differences between the first and second debates: in the first, RJ avoids the issue (I.851-854; I.930-931), whilst in the second he uses it to attack ZP through a *tu quoque* argument (II.917: Usted usó el 11-M. Usted apoyó lo que ocurrió en el 11-M). This issue is

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<sup>195</sup> See, for instance, Campmany (2005).

<sup>196</sup> On 19 November 2002 a Liberian mono-hull oil tanker under Bahamas flag sank in front of Galician coast. The slow and poorly-organised reaction of regional (Galician) and national governments, both run by PP, caused one of the biggest ecological disasters in the recent history of Spain. It also strengthened the image of a party unconcerned with ecological matters. This accident also seemed to give a solid argument for changing the Government in Galicia: actually for the first time since the restoration of democracy, PP was defeated in the land of Fraga and PSOE governed in coalition with the Galician nationalist party (BNG).

<sup>197</sup> On 19 March 2003, thanks to its absolute majority and despite the opposition of all other parties and the majority of Spaniards, who repeatedly demonstrated in rallies against the war, Aznar (PP) sent Spanish troops to invade Iraq alongside the USA, UK, Italy and Australia. The adduced motive (that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction and that the USA would help Spain in fighting against ETA), was accepted by only a few, and was later proven to be false (see also van Dijk 2005a; Pujante & Morales López 2008).

absolutely strategic for ZP in presenting **PSOE as a responsible and sincere party committed to peace** and **PP as a party that lies to the Spanish in order to obtain power**, imagining conspiracies and carrying out a **disloyal opposition** against PSOE. ZP does so through circumstantial argument and a narrative that favorably presents PSOE and negatively presents PP; also it should also be noted that ZP mainly delegitimizes PP as a group rather than RJ personally, so personal references to him are rare (but *contra* see I.764).

Well aware of the fact that even the mere recollection of this issue could damage PP's image, RJ refuses to engage in the discussion of this issue (I.779; I.851-854). RJ accuses ZP of avoiding addressing the present situation and of using this argument strategically to win the elections:

Oiga ¿Usted quiere que le voten por lo de la otra vez? ¿Bush, el 11-M, Iraq, Aznar? Oiga, cambie un poco de discurso y hable de lo que le importa a los españoles (I.931-933)

Usted ha ganado unas elecciones por Irak y por el 11-M. Da la sensación de que quiere volver a ganar unas elecciones por Irak o por el 11-M (II.959-961)

Even though candidates know, as the audience does, that their intention is to win the elections, they present themselves as **uninterested and selfless**. Therefore, revealing the opponent's real intentions (winning the elections) constitutes an attack. More specifically, RJ uses circumstantial argument to present **ZP as an opportunist**, and metapragmatic statements on ZP's discourse to present **ZP as a bad debater** avoiding certain issues such as ETA terrorism, thereby making him less presidential. In the second debate RJ uses the same move of accusing ZP of having won the election thanks to the 11M terrorist attack and of continuing to use it for electoral ends (II.917). In doing so RJ creates a connection between ZP and terrorists. This shows that despite efforts (I.774) to remove himself from the position that senior PP members used during the 11 M crisis (accusing ETA and ZP), and despite as attempts to portray himself as moderate, RJ insists on delegitimizing **ZP as having been involved with the attacks**.

Even though both ZP and RJ use 11M to attack each other, the issue is far more profitable for ZP, who refers to it far more frequently than RJ: he is the first to introduce this issue, accusing PP in general (*ustedes*) and RJ in particular (I.769-772) of having lied regarding responsibility for the attack out of electoral interests (I.743-772). ZP accuses PP of inventing a conspiracy, because it did not accept the (unexpected) election result (I.814-819). In order to disable RJ's attacks and discredit him, ZP represents **PP as an unfair player** of the electoral game that failed to accept the election results. The following excerpt is very significant:

en cuanto ganamos las elecciones tuvimos que ir a una comisión de investigación del 11-M, yo respondí como no ha hecho ningún presidente 14 horas en esa comisión de investigación, y en el 2005, en el primer debate de Estado de la Nación, ya me dijo que traicionaba a los muertos. Y el Sr. Acebes, ha dicho que mi proyecto era el proyecto de ETA. Todos los españoles han visto que ustedes han utilizado de manera partidista, sólo han tenido un objetivo de oposición, ETA y el terrorismo (I.901-909)

Through circumstantial argument, ZP represents RJ as an unscrupulous opportunist who uses terrorism for his own electoral interests; as he did for the block of the economy, through this move ZP deactivates RJ's attacks by presenting them as coming from an untrustworthy person. As he did in the case of the economy ZP backdates PP and RJ's attacks to the beginning of the PSOE legislature, showing that RJ *always* accused ZP of contiguity with ETA, and not only in the present circumstances as consequence of the negotiation. In doing so, ZP deactivates RJ's accusations, showing that they are *business as usual*.

ZP insists on referring to 11M, as it is a means of portraying both PP and **RJ as unfair players**, as *unreasonable* and liars (II.872-881) and therefore not presidential. The following passage is particularly meaningful:

Sí, señor Rajoy, aquí está su declaración (enseña un periódico): "No le quepa la más mínima duda de que, al final, el terrorismo islamista y el de ETA estarán relacionados". 2004. ¿Dónde está la relación? Han estado intoxicando, creando confabulaciones hipotéticas sobre el 11-M, sobre el atentado más grave que nos costó 192 muertos en toda la legislatura, poniendo en cuestión el

sumario judicial, poniendo en cuestión a las fuerzas y cuerpos de seguridad del Estado, todo porque no asumieron el resultado electoral (II.926-934)

ZP insists on presenting RJ as using ETA for his electoral ends; to strengthen his attack, ZP reports RJ's speech from a newspaper before shifting the deixis (from *usted* to *ustedes*) to accuse PP of having *intoxicated* the legislature and of unpresident-like behavior, such as casting doubts on the integrity of the police and judges. This point is obviously crucial in detracting from RJ's presidentiability, since a president respects democratic institutions<sup>198</sup>. As in the block on the economy, this description of RJ as disloyal and opportunistic contrasts with descriptions of ZP as loyal and selfless. Since there is agreement on the fact that a responsible president acts for the good of the State and democracy, these polarized descriptions increase ZP presidentiability and decrease that of RJ.

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<sup>198</sup> The same move will be used again by ZP in the second debate when discussing the issue of education, for accusing RJ of criticizing Spanish teachers (II.1374-1390) and will be immediately contested by RJ with a *tu quoque* (II.1449-1455).

### 9.3. Observations

In this subsection I have presented the way candidates managed their presidentiability in the debate in relation to the issue of terrorism according to the main presidentiable attributed: **general attributes** (unity, sincerity, loyalty, coherence, consistency, activity, capacity, efficacy, selflessness, strength, realism, experience, etc.) and **particular attributes** like being a nurturing father (dialogue) or a strict father (strictness).

The main **moves** employed by candidates for managing their presidentiability can be resumed as follow:

**RJ → ZP:** villain (negotiates with terrorists); removed from victims; feeble (cedes to terrorists' blackmail); a liar; broke traditional agreement between PP-PSOE; raised ETA to the level of a political interlocutor; removed from victims (betrays victims); incapable, inexperienced, frivolous; a divider; incoherent and inconsistent; opportunistic (he used 11M); a bad debater (does not speak about what matters).

**RJ → RJ:** hero (fights terrorists); strong; close to victims.

**ZP → RJ:** ineffective in fighting terrorism; a liar; unfair player; opportunist, disloyal; a divider.

**ZP → ZP:** effective in fighting terrorism; concerned with peace; a fair player; selfless; loyal; a unifier; sincere; a patriot; democratic.

As one can see these moves concerned the main general and particular attributes of a president.

As for the main **discursive-argumentative devices** employed, we can see that candidates have extensively used different and often opposing narratives to describe the situation. Lexical choice played a crucial role in the description of reality in positive or in negative terms (*fracaso; improvisación; indigno; inmoral*); among them metaphor deserves a particular space, as that of *aprendiz de brujo* [sorcerer's apprentice]. In the polarized representation of the situation, deixis has proved important in de/personalizing attacks.

The use of reported speech, in the form of quoting the other's statements or key words, such as when RJ entextualizes ZP's words *entendimiento, talante, convivencia*, not only shows the intrinsic dialogicity of the debates, as well as their



polyphony and interdiscursivity, but is also relevant in observing how candidates use them as the basis for their arguments, for instance for showing incoherence or lies. Particularly, together with quantifiers (*siempre*, *nunca*, *ningún*), they essentialize and stabilize positive or negative features of the candidate. Quantifiers also construct the topics of quality and quantity, as well as that of *uniqueness*, thereby demonstrating the absolute positivity or negativity of the candidates.

As for the arguments, we can see that *ad hominem* is frequently used. There are also examples of the abusive, *tu quoque* and circumstantial variants for representing the other as a liar, incoherent and opportunistic. The *ad populum* variant is also used for the purpose of alignment with the audience: *Todos los españoles han visto* (I.907).

Finally, the metapragmatic statements deserve at least a mention for their role in directing the debate; they show that ethos is discursively constructed and that what is said is crucial in dis/constructing credibility. On this same line, it should be noted that one of the main accusations the use to attack each other is that of being a liar. Given the value of discourse in the construction of ethos, accusing someone of not telling the truth is crucial in reducing their credibility.

Some observations need to be made about the similarities and differences between the first and second debates. Even if differences exist, showing the dynamicity of the construction of discourse, some common patterns emerge in the de/construction of presidentiability, which sometimes are common to how the presidentiability has been constructed in relation to other themes. For instance, the presentation of the situation where PP is *against* terrorists and *with* victims while ZP (and not PSOE) is *with* terrorists *against* victims is aimed at isolating ZP from his (former) electors and his party. Something similar occurred in the block on the economy. RJ's accusations are personalized towards ZP, rather than against PSOE, in order to damage his own image and leadership, which is one of his main electoral assets. In fact, RJ presents ZP as the first and the only president to break the traditional consensus between PP and PSOE, portraying him as inexperienced, frivolous, irresponsible, and weak, as well as (somewhat absurdly) damaging to victims. This description is obviously based on the attributes that a president should have: experience, seriousness, responsibility and strength, and that RJ, referring to inflexibility, which is a local attribute (the strict father), for instance, attaches to his persona. In doing so, he increases his presidentiability and decreases ZP's. As for personalization, criticizing ZP alone, presenting him as separate (different) from the rest of PSOE executives, cardholders and

electors, RJ isolates ZP and demonstrates that *he* is wrong, and not the entire PSOE establishment, nor all PSOE electors, whose votes PP is trying to get, and whose *face* PP should not threaten. PP aims less at convincing PSOE voters to reject their beliefs than at convincing them not to vote for ZP, because *he* is incapable and a liar: the problem was *him*. Given ZP's strong leadership within PSOE, RJ tries to disalign electors from him, by reducing his personal appeal among PSOE electors but also executives, trying to persuade them that the electoral risk for PSOE is personified in ZP.

The next chapter addresses the terrain of struggle of the Catalan question.

## 10. THE CATALAN QUESTION. Patriot or non-patriot

As we have seen above, in his statements on the electoral campaign, Elorraiga stressed that PP's election strategy was based on sowing doubts about "the economy, immigration and nationalist issues"; in relation to this final point, I have already dealt with terrorism and I will now address the Catalan question<sup>199</sup>.

The following pages provide an introduction to the question of the unity of Spain<sup>200</sup>, before going on to the Catalan question. Moving from the general to the particular, I will focus on the issue of the *Estatuto de Autonomía de Cataluña*, since it was a significant topic before and during the 2008 election campaign. To a certain degree it epitomizes the question of unity of Spain. Again, I will firstly historically introduce the question, before arriving 2008. I will then analyze how the two candidates articulate their discourses on this issue –which is central to Spanish politics– in order to manage their presidentiability, discussing the moves and discursive devices they employ.

### 10.1. The Catalan question from the 15th century to the present

Spain is one of the oldest European nation-states: its unification began in 1479, when the sovereigns of two of the major realms of the Iberian Peninsula, Isabelle I of Castile and Ferdinand II of Aragon, were married. Later, in 1492, these monarchs completed the *Reconquista*, i.e. the conquest of the kingdom of Granada, until then ruled by the Moors. From 1479 to 1715 the kingdom of Spain is constituted by two distinct but integrated realms, Castile&Leon and Aragon. Even if in condition of coordination, Castile was in a more favorable position, for example, exclusively owning the rich American colonies. The two realms kept their respective legal orders called *fueros* and any attempt to homogenize them sparked a reaction, especially in Aragon<sup>201</sup>. This last point is central since it is the origin of dispute concerning *fueros* (see below). Even at

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<sup>199</sup> Interestingly enough, when Spanish politicians talk about nationalism(s), they refer to peripheralism as Basqueism, Catalanism and Galicianism, and never to Spanishism, which goes unnoticed and is taken for granted as *patriotism* (see Billig (1998) about *their* nationalism *our* patriotism).

<sup>200</sup> See Comellas Garcia Llera (1999); Vilar (2001); Balfour & Quiroga (2007). The issue of unity of Spain practically does not concern Galicia (only briefly referred to in II.1273) due to the lukewarm nature of Galician nationalism: as for the Basque Country instead it is treated rather as a problem of Terrorism.

<sup>201</sup> The term *fuero(s)* refers to a system of local rights, norms, and privileges in use in some regions of Iberian Peninsula from the Middle Ages.

the risk of oversimplification it is safe to say that by the beginning of the 16th century Spain was already a unified kingdom, despite its many historical, cultural, juridical, and linguistic differences, rooted especially in three areas: 1) in what is today called the Basque Country and Navarra, roughly corresponding to the former kingdom of Navarre; 2) in what is today called Catalonia, which corresponded to the earlier kingdom of Aragon; 3) and in what is today called Galicia, which corresponds to the former kingdom of Galicia. These historical, cultural, juridical and linguistic differences were the motive for internal tensions throughout modern Spanish history between the centralist (Castilianist) and peripheralist forces.

Each of the three movements of resistance to centralization, i.e. Basqueism, Catalanism and Galicianism, has its own historical and cultural specificities. The Catalan case is by far the most interesting: together with the Basque one is more radical than the Galician one; but unlike the Basque movement, its evolution has been less violent. Actually the violent drift of a part of Basqueism, for instance ETA, allows Spanish centralist parties to deal with it in terms of national security or fight against terrorism, whilst Catalan resistance is considered as a “purely” political issue. The thematic division of the debates reflects this ideological division: Basqueism has been treated as a problem of FP and national security, while Catalanism will be dealt with as a problem of IP. Moreover, tensions between Castilianism and Catalanism seem to be rooted more deeply in the past compared to Basqueism.

Indeed tensions between Castile and Catalonia were already apparent in the 17th century, as shown by the *War of Separation* and the *Revolta dels Segadors* (1640-1652), or the anti-Catalanism expressed in some of the works of one of the main Spanish (Castilian) literati as Francisco de Quevedo: *La vida del Buscón* and *La rebelión de Barcelona no es por el huevo ni por el fuero* (Balcells 1974; Arredondo 1998; Simon 2006).

These tensions increased during the *War of Spanish Succession* (1701-1713) between Philip V Bourbon Duke of Anjou (of France) and the pretender Archduke Charles Habsburg (of Austria). The Castilians supported Philip, whilst the Catalonians supported Charles in an attempt to maintain their *fueros*. The historic capital of Aragon, Barcelona, faithful to the Archduke, was militarily besieged and then occupied by Bourbon troops: the war finished 11 September 1714 with the capitulation of Barcelona. This day, also known as the *Diada*, is considered Catalonia’s national(istic) feast day to commemorate those that died defending Barcelona. After succeeding to the throne,

Philip unified the two crowns under the Spanish crown, imposed a Castile-based central policy and extended the Castilian political, legal and administrative model to the territories of Aragón: all *fueros* were abolished, except those of Navarra and the Basque Country, due to the nobility's loyalty to Philip during the war. Catalan nationalists consider these events to mark the start of the Castilian oppression of the Catalonians. Indeed, after 1715 Aragón passed from a situation of *coordination* to one of *subordination* with the other Spanish regions.

Although not all historians agree, *fueros* were also the motive for three Carlist Wars (1833-1840; 1846-1849; 1872-1876), a sort of succession wars between those supporting moderate and liberal sovereigns and those supporting integralist Catholic sovereigns (Moreno 2002). Although an in-depth study of this fascinating yet confusing period of Spanish history is not appropriate here, it is important to state that the Liberals (whose position were very close to centralist nationalism based on the example of the French Revolution) were fought by the Catholic elite as well as the Basque, Navarre, and Catalan elite, who saw them as an opportunity to regain local rights, *derechos forales*, currently referred to as *derechos históricos*, lost during the War of Spanish Succession. This coincides approximately with the emergence of two progressively radicalized cleavages, which predominate in Spain for almost two centuries: centralism vs. peripheralism and confessionality vs. laity.

Although some historians disagree (Canal 2008: 42, 53-54), others associate Carlism with separatism (Oyarzun 2008[1944]: 486-488). Others, such as Elias de Tejada (1971), think that when people lost all hope of maintaining or recovering *fueros* with and within a centralist Spanish Monarchy, they also lost faith in the Monarchy and centralism, embracing anti-monarchism (republicanism) and anti-Spanishism (separatism). However it is reasonable to think that Catalanism is rooted partly in Carlism, which was traditionalist, conservative, monarchic and catholic, and partly in Catalan Republican Federalism (see Figueres 2010). These two trends towards conservatism and republicanism are still present in the institutional expression of Catalanism: on the one hand Convergència i Unió (CiU), a coalition of right wing conservative Catalanist parties, and on the other Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC), a left-wing progressive republican Catalanist party (Dowling 2005)<sup>202</sup>.

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<sup>202</sup> Catalanism also received the influence of Romanticism: for example the celebration of the *Diada* started in 1886 (Anguera 2008: 8-10, 20). History is used for inventing tradition, for de/legitimation and

In order to gain an insight into Catalanism in Spanish society we must focus on four more periods: the two dictatorships, the Second Republic, and the transition to democracy, because the echoes of these periods have a major influence on the Spanish political field.

The Castilianization process which began in 1715 reached its peak during the dictatorship of General Primo de Rivera (1923-1930), Prime Minister under King Alphonse XIII; despite growing calls for autonomy from Basqueists, Catalanists, and Galicianists, Primo de Rivera's dictatorship was Monarchist, Catholic and Centralist/Unitarian, as would be that of Francisco Franco<sup>203</sup>. These features are still common to Spanish right wing parties. In contrast, laicism, federalism and republicanism would, in varying degrees, constitute common characteristics of Spain's left wing parties.

During the Second Republic (1931-1939), the central government devolved a number of competencies to regions, allowing, within their historical territories, the use of Basque, Catalan and Galician, which were prohibited during Primo de Rivera's dictatorship. The 1931 Constitution tried to solve the two major cleavages within Spanish society: 1) centralism vs. peripheralism, or, the "problema catalán", as Primo de Rivera called it in some of his discourses (Cambó 1991: 835-852; Jacob & Jordá 1998); and 2) clericalism vs. laity. With the regards to the first problem, the decision was to integrate centralism and federalism (CE1931: art. 1, par. 3), recognizing some prerogatives to peripheralisms. As for the second, the choice was laicism (CE1931: art. 3). This openness to peripheralism and laicism seemed too dangerous to extremist Spanishist conservatives (the Catholic Church, monarchists and the Army), since they interpreted it as the breakup of the five hundred unity of Catholic Spain<sup>204</sup>, something which still is fetishized today, as RJ's words show (I.1264). Right wing national Catholics grouped together under the CEDA (Confederación Española de Derechas Autónomas), which supported the second government of the Republic. This second government tried to correct some of the reforms of first Republican government,

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for strategically reinterpret past in connection with new or contemporary claims (Anderson 1991[1983]; Bauman & Briggs 2003; Billig 1995; Gellner 1997; Hobsbawm 1990; Wodak et al. 1999).

<sup>203</sup> Actually Franco considered Primo de Rivera as the first Francoist and the first savior of the nation against atheism, communism, and separatism.

<sup>204</sup> In Spain the Catholic religion is strictly linked to Nation: the unification process starts recovering and reconvertng to Catholicism peninsular territories under Muslims and since then, Spanish sovereigns were the only awarded by Roman Church with the title of "Catholic Monarchs". Unitarianism is so linked to Catholicism that there exist a term such as *nacional-catolicismo* for defining this link.

especially in the fields of laicism and peripheralism. When in 1936 the left wing Frente Popular won the elections, the highly radicalized right wing Catholic nationalist forces decided to put a stop to this situation at any cost. They carried out a coup d'état, which led to the Spanish Civil War and the dictatorship of Francisco Franco<sup>205</sup>. During the dictatorship peripheralisms were severely repressed, since the main ideological elements of Francoism were Unitarianism, Centralism, Castilianism (the idea of the superiority of Castilian), Catholicism, militarism, and anticommunism. The principal Francoist slogan was “[España] una, grande, libre”. As the official Francoist emblem (Esparza-Leibar 2006: 247-248), reproduced below shows, Unitarianism was the first and foremost ideological axis of Francoism.



Figure 1. The Spanish Francoist emblem

Unitarianism was so crucial to Francoism that during the Spanish Civil War its forces were known as the *bando nacional*, framing its opponents as anti-national. The concept *Nacional-catolicismo*, i.e. the sum of (Spanish) Nationalism and Catholicism was absorbed by Spain's new right wing parties such as AP and PP<sup>206</sup>.

Transition meant a new opportunity for peripheralism. The current structure of the Kingdom of Spain as stipulated in the 1978 Constitution and ratified by referendum, is called the *Estado de las autonomías*, in reference to the fact that the State is organized

<sup>205</sup> Note the role played by military in the Spanish politics; during the 113 years from 1868 until 1981, military led 7 coup d'état: September 1868, January 1874, December 1874, September 1923, August 1932 (unsuccessful), July 1936, and February 1981 (unsuccessful). Military are contrary to federalism or separatism, Communism, atheism and Republic.

<sup>206</sup> Although PP tries to moderate this ideological feature, especially in strategic terms in the run-up to elections, other subjects, including IU, still use this term to define PP, in an attempt to bring PP ideology to the fore (IU 2008).

in regions (*comunidades autónomas*) with a high degree of legislative, executive and administrative devolution in an attempt to balance centralism and peripheralism. Nevertheless, the Spanish Constitution clearly favors centralism: autonomy is possible within the *indivisible* unity of the Spanish Nation (CE1978: art. 2); other languages can be used *but* the official language is Castilian (CE1978: art. 3); etc. The *Estado de las autonomías* is the form agreed upon during the Transition by opposition groups in order to overcome the post-Francoism impasse and resolve tensions between centralist and federalist radicals. These two irreconcilable positions only could reach a minimum agreement. However, this agreement, which at the beginning seemed to work well, would sooner or later show its limits, especially for peripheralists<sup>207</sup>. In recent years peripheralist forces, convinced that the dictatorship is now sufficiently removed in time and that conservative radicals lack the power to impose their will, are trying to change the status quo in order to obtain considerably greater administrative and symbolic recognition.

Now that the historic development of the struggle between centralism and peripheralism in Spain has been discussed, I will provide a detailed insight into one of the main issues of the struggle regarding the unity of Spain: the *Estatut de Autonomia de Catalunya*. I will briefly present its genealogy and then the relative position of PP and PSOE towards the Catalan question, the unity of Spain, and the type of administration, with particular attention to the space this issue occupies in party manifestos.

### **10.1.1. The Estatut de Autonomia de Catalunya**

The *Estatut de Autonomia de Catalunya* or *Estatuto de Autonomía de Cataluña* in Spanish is the basic institutional statute of Catalonia: it establishes autonomous competencies and self-government for Catalonia. First approved by the Spanish Parliament in 1932, during the Second Republic, it was abolished during Franco's dictatorship. Then in 1979, after the end of dictatorship, a new *Estatut* was approved. This last text was reformed in 2006, under the first ZP government. On 18 June 2006, the reformed *Estatut*, approved by both Spanish Parliament and Senate, was ratified in a referendum by the Catalonians. Together with other issues, it deals with the Catalan

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<sup>207</sup> It worked because at the beginning of the transition the need for avoiding dictatorship continuity exceeded every other ideological claim. Actually all groups lost something for getting something else (see De Santiago-Guervós 1996: 19-20).



institutional system, its forms and governing bodies, its competencies, citizens' rights and duties, linguistic politics and policies, institutional relationships and funding. It was approved despite the harsh opposition of PP, of other Spanish regions governed by PP, and of many Right catholic and conservative groups and media.

The 1932 text conferred a high degree of autonomy for Catalonia, although it failed to satisfy the Catalanists' demands. Prior to its ratification by the Spanish Parliament, it underwent a number of modifications: from "Catalonia as autonomous state" to "an autonomous *region* within the Spanish State"; and from "Catalan as the *only* official language" to "Catalan and Castilian as co-official languages". Towards the end of the Spanish Civil War, when Francoist troops entered Barcelona in January 1939, they immediately abolished the *Estatut*.

The 1979 *Estatut* emerged against a complex background of negotiations and fragile agreements, just after the end of Franco's dictatorship and the promulgation of a new Constitution (1978). Although granted Catalonia some degree of autonomy, in terms of the most symbolic issues it was similar to the 1932 *Estatut*. Indeed, it was if time had stood still: fifty years on, the Catalanists still had the same degree of autonomy as in 1936.

During the Catalanian regional elections of 2003, ZP, the PSOE candidate for the 2004 general elections, promised that if he was elected he would support a new *Estatut* put forward by the Catalanian Parliament. In contrast, the Catalonia section of PP made no reference in their program to any modification of the 1979 *Estatut*.

It must be stated that in the most disputed topics concerning nationalism, language, abortion, etc. PP prefers *immobilism*. Most of these highly symbolic issues were agreed on in the early years of Spain's young and fragile democracy. All decisions taken at that time regarding the preeminent cleavages of Spanish society, crystallized by the 1978 Constitution, are the result of that search for balance between conservative and progressive movements. The latter accepted moderate agreements in order to secure democracy in the hope that they could be improved and extended in the future. This democracy is actually often defined as imperfect precisely because of the way it arose (Colomer 1998). This partially explains the attempts of progressive movements to change the 1978 Constitution, as well as the conservatives' *fetishism* for 1978 Constitution and the agreements established in it. PP's constant and staunch defense of the 1978 Constitution is an excellent example of conservatism.

In 2003 the three co-allied ruling parties that emerged from the 2003 Catalanian elections, as known as *Tripartit* (PSC, ERC, ICV-EUiA), in office for the first time after a quasi-monopoly of the Catalanist conservative liberal Catholic and bourgeois party CiU, reached an agreement with CiU regarding the modification of the existing Estatut on issues such as defining Catalonia as a nation and the obligation to be able to speak both Catalanian and Castilian. Catalonia's Parliament, with the sole opposition of PP, approved the draft. In November 2005, the Spanish Parliament agreed to consider the draft, opposed only by PP. After a period of negotiation, the new Estatut was approved, with the abstention of ERC, which called for a greater degree of federalism, and the opposition of PP, which demanded the opposite. It came into effect on 20 July 2006 (BOE 2006a). Whilst the Catalanists celebrated the passing of the new *Estatut*, an appeal was presented before the Constitutional Court by PP MPs as well as by the governments of some Spanish regions governed by PP. PP's appeal was based on the claim that 187 (out of 223) articles of the Estatut were unconstitutional.

Even though we can measure the level of opposition to the new *Estatut* by the number of articles appealed against, it is equally true that some articles were more important than others, with a greater capacity for polarizing electors in favor and against, and therefore received greater media attention. This is so not only because they are legally crucial for determining the right of Catalonia to autonomy or independence, but also because of their symbolic significance. They were the articles defining Catalonia as a nation and Catalan as a national language<sup>208</sup>. Legislative competencies, the administration of justice, funding or competencies regarding infrastructures, etc. (which were the object of most of the articles appealed) are key factors in determining the level of autonomy of a region, but it is very difficult to convince electors to take a stance on such complex issues. It is far easier to polarize electors about simpler but highly symbolic issues such as the definition of Catalonia as a nation and policies on the “national” language<sup>209</sup>; since people –politicians as well as electors– need symbols (Edelman 1964).

The case of the *Estatut* also shows that when it comes to symbolically critical issues such as the laws approved by PSOE on homosexual marriage, *Educación para la Ciudadanía*, *Memoria Histórica* and *Estatut de Catalunya*, the battle engaged by PP

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<sup>208</sup> Preamble and articles 5, 6.1, 6.2, 8.1, 33.5, 34, 35, 50.5 (BOE 2006a: 27.269-27270).

<sup>209</sup> This is always a delicate theme, since it is related to identity, and to nation in the actual “monolingual” ideology of nation-states (Duchêne 2008).

was not only discursive but also legal, through appeals to Constitutional Court with the aim of abolishing them. This is also related to the idea of de/legitimation, since the Supreme Court's decisions will de/legitimize parties: a decision of unconstitutionality legitimizes the appealing party, delegitimizing those that promulgated the law, whilst in contrast decision of constitutionality legitimizes the party that promulgated the law, delegitimizing the one that appealed.

### 10.1.2. Unity of Spain for PSOE and PP

An extensive introduction to the historic background and the genealogy of the *Estatut* was necessary in order to grasp fully its importance with Spain's political field and to understand the construction of presidentiability in relation to this issue, the stance adopted by the candidates and their strategies for positive self-presentation and the negative presentation of the other.

As we have seen, the unity of Spain is a deeply-rooted cleavage in Spanish politics: it is a political *myth* and a crucial symbol that caused major tensions and wars. For (Catholic) conservatives in particular, unity is a political fetish, which has value per se, by virtue of recalling a glorious colonial past (cf. I.1264: *España es una nación con cinco siglos de historia*).

According to De Santiago-Guervós, since the Transition, Marxism, Separatism and Terrorism the most negative words for the Right (1996: 18, 56). Manuel Fraga, founder of AP-PP, was clearly contrary to separatism and to Marxism (apud De Santiago-Guervós 1996: 19). To some extent these three issues (socio-economic measures, form of state, and terrorism) still lie at the center of the political debate, proving the continuity between Francoism and PP. It should also be noted that the Right attribute the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War to Marxism and separatism (ibid.). Since the years of Transition, PP has used the memory of the Civil War as an argument for maintaining the status quo, according to the implicit premise that changing things could lead to a new conflict<sup>210</sup>. At present this argument is still used by PP through the fetishization of the **agreement reached during the Transition between right and left**, as shown in RJ's references to division and tensions or the expression "opening old

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<sup>210</sup> The failed attempt of coup d'état of Colonel Tejero on 23 February 1981 was due to the reaction of ultra-conservatives in the light of innovative measures such as the legalization of PCE and the *Estado de Autonomías*.

wounds” in topics such as *Memoria Histórica*<sup>211</sup>, *Educación para la Ciudadanía*<sup>212</sup> or *Estatut de Catalunya*.

One more observation needs to be made about the word *Spain*. As De Santiago-Guervós states:

*España* es una palabra que llega a la Transición española a la democracia casi como sinónimo de derecha, de extrema derecha e incluso de fascismo. Sólo la derecha habla de *España*, símbolo de unidad, de imperio, de nacionalismo español. Los que desean ser identificados como derecha llevan la bandera de española en su reloj, en su coche, etc. Algunos partidos, como Alianza Popular (antecedente inmediato del Partido Popular actual) la utilizan incluso como bandera de su partido y en sus mítines ondea por doquier. Digamos que hay una apropiación de la palabra y la bandera por parte de la derecha. Decir *España* es decir derecha, sobre todo si observamos que los partidos más progresistas y los nacionalistas [catalanes, gallegos, vascos, n.d.r.] hablan de *Estado español* o, simplemente, de *este país* (1996: 2).

So *Spain*, the concept of a united nation but also the word itself, is the property of the Right. For the Right *Spain* means ‘one-and-the-only-nation’; while for the Left it means a ‘nation-of-nations’<sup>213</sup>. Since federalism constitutes for Spanishists a risk to the unity of Spain and as a result of PP’s effort to set the political agenda, PP’s politicians and conservative media (LibertadDigital, Hispanidad, HazteOír, ABC, El Mundo, La Razón,

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<sup>211</sup> It is widely-known that contemporary democratic Spain is built upon collective oblivion (Aguilar-Fernández 1996; Resina 2000; Bernecker 2009; see also Renan (1987[1882]: 7) on the relationship between memory and oblivion in the national construction). The so called *Ley de Memoria Histórica* (BOE 2007b), recognizes and increases rights for those persons persecuted during the Civil War and the Francoist dictatorship. Proposed by PSOE in 2006, it was approved at the end of 2007, a few months before the 2008 elections. The law recognizes the illegitimacy of sentences issued by Francoist tribunals and the legitimacy of the previous Republic; the Spanish state would help to locate, identify and exhume of missing victims or buried in communal graves. All objects commemorating Francoism will be removed from public spaces. A *Centro Documental de la Memoria Histórica* will be created in Salamanca. PP and conservative groups and media criticized the law, accusing PSOE of opening old wounds or of seeking revenge. On 20 February 2008 RJ promised to withdraw public funds for the law for finding bodies in communal graves if he won the 2008 elections.

<sup>212</sup> *Educación para la Ciudadanía y los Derechos Humanos* (BOE 2007a: 715-721) is the name of a subject designed for the last cycle of mandatory primary education (children aged 10-12) and for compulsory secondary education (young people aged 12-16) in Spain by ZP’s Socialist government, and approved by the Spanish Parliament. In accordance with a recommendation of the European Council (12/2002), it aims to teach democratic and constitutional values and promote freedom, pluralism, tolerance, and respect for human rights. In its last reform of the education laws (BOE 2006b; BOE 2007a; BOE 2006a), PSOE included this new subject matter, *Educación para la ciudadanía*. PP, the Catholic Church and conservative associations severely criticized and opposed the law, obstructing its enforcement and presenting an appeal before the Supreme Court or Constitutional Court. Like the rest of his party, RJ was highly critical of this new subject, declaring that he would repeal the law if elected in 2008. .

<sup>213</sup> The relative positions of Left and Right on nation, centralism, federalism, etc. have changed throughout history (Balfour & Quiroga 2007, especially ch. 4 and 5; Balfour 2005b; Nuñez-Seixas 2005), but the picture I portray here is quite faithful.

TeleMadrid, InterEconomía, Actualidad Económica, COPE, etc.) continually stressed the importance of Spanish unity, as an unquestionable vital issue, presenting a dramatic image of disruption, as with the slogan “(con Zapatero) España se rompe<sup>214</sup>”, and insisting on the question of languages (Castilian vs. Catalan), due to their symbolic significance in nation-building processes.

Since for PP unity of Spain is an undisputable value that cannot undergo any revision or change, as a *fetish*, much of the PP election program is dedicated to this issue from a Spanishist and Castilianist stance<sup>215</sup> (PP 2008: 7-8, 11-12, 22-45). This overwhelming presence of unity of Spain in PP’s discourse (manifesto, debates, etc.) shows the relevance that this issue had and continues to have for the Spanish Right. In its manifesto PP calls for a strong central government, expressing a clear preference against change and in favor of tradition, aligning itself full with the Constitution.

In contrast PSOE, which is not a separatist party, but has a greater sensitivity towards regional idiosyncrasies, dedicates relatively little attention in its program to the unity of Spain. Moreover, it addresses this issue in a radically different manner, with numerous references to concepts such as agreement, collaboration, cooperation, and coordination between central and peripheral government institutions.

Now that we have considered the importance of this issue, we can analyze the way it is addressed during the two televised debates.

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<sup>214</sup> <http://www.elmundo.es/opinion/columnas/isabel-san-sebastian/2009/07/17424027.html>

<sup>215</sup> By these two terms I refer respectively to the ideology according to which Spain must be a Unitarian nation and to the ideology according to which Castilian is the main language.

## 10.2. The Unity of Spain in the debate: strategies, moves, devices

As stated by senior PP member Gabriel Elorriaga (Crawford 2008), the Catalanian question is, together with the economy and immigration, one of the 4 main themes on the political agenda strategically set by PP in order to win votes from PSOE: for this reason it was one of the main terrains of struggle of the 2008 election campaign. The Unity of Spain and administrative issues were dealt with in the IP. The analysis will show that candidates manage their presidentiability according to the **general and local presidentiable attributed** described in chapter 1.

### 10.2.1. RJ's moves to manage presidentiability

#### 10.2.1.1. Ability: ZP as incapable

As in the blocks on the economy, immigration and terrorism, one of RJ's key strategies at all stages of both debates is to present **ZP as incapable: as mixing priorities**, as only having achieved two things, namely negotiating with terrorists and modifying the structure of state, neither of which led to a positive outcome: *las ha hecho mal* (I.103-104); *le han salido mal* (I.107); *ha equivocado las prioridades* (II.124-125); *ambos han sido un fracaso* (II.126-127); *no lo ha conseguido* (I.1028); *usted aquí ha fracasado* (II.1289); *este con su negociación con ETA fue el gran fracaso de esta legislatura* (II.1054-1055). This is a very easy move in order to detract from the opponent's presidentiability, since it is agreed that citizens need an able and capable president.

#### 10.2.1.2. Unity: ZP as a divider

Another move employed by RJ is to present ZP as a **divider**. This point must be understood in two different but related senses: a divider of citizens and a divider of parties, through the **breaking of the agreements of the Transition**. As with other moves, here too RJ frequently employs narratives based on the scheme "before(+) vs. now(-)", where ZP is represented as the first and the only president to interrupt the (positive) tradition. This representation is constructed through the topic of uniqueness (ZP is negatively unique). As in many other points of the debate RJ uses the *tu quoque* argument (ZP says one thing and does the opposite) in order to present **ZP as incoherent**. Interestingly, in order to highlight what ZP says and what he does, RJ quotes (positive) keywords of ZP's discourse as *entendimiento*, *talante* and

convivencia, while ZP is presented as sowing discord. We can clearly see this move in the OS of the first debate.

¿Qué es lo que ha hecho el Sr. Zapatero a lo largo de estos 4 años además de discutir la Nación, y entretenerse con la Alianza de Civilizaciones, la Memoria Histórica u otras cuestiones? Ha hecho dos cosas, se ha centrado en dos cosas y las dos las ha hecho mal: la estructura de España y los tratos con ETA. Ha querido modificar por su cuenta el modelo de Estado y ha querido negociar con los terroristas por su cuenta. Ambas operaciones le han salido mal. [...] para salirse con la suya, necesitó romper todos los consensos de la Transición [...] Ningún gobernante ha sembrado en la historia de la Transición Moderna tanta tensión y tanta cizaña, a la vez que hablaba de entendimiento, de talante y de convivencia (I.100-118)

The same moves are implemented in the OS of the second debate, where RJ gives a negative description of the situation through references to one of the most historically entrenched fears in Spanish society, namely the **risk of secession** represented by the referenda of separation put forward in Catalonia and the Basque Country:

Se nos dice que España está más unida y cohesionada que nunca, pero tenemos un referéndum de separación convocado para este año y tenemos uno anunciado para el futuro. Al señor Zapatero sé que no le gusta que le diga esto, se enfada conmigo, pero debiera enfadarse con quien convoca los referéndum. Hay españoles que han visto cómo sus derechos han sido afectados. Hay españoles que son conscientes de que se ha perdido la igualdad en muchos temas. Cuando él llegó al Gobierno, recibió un modelo de Estado en el que había un acuerdo sustancial entre los españoles y un modelo de financiación de las autonomías que trataba todo por igual. Ahora todo está en el alero y todo está abierto (II.104-115)

Here again we can see a narrative according to which before ZP things were fine; there were agreements between PP and PSOE and equality among Spaniards (*acuerdo, igualdad*), while now everything is up in the air, based on the notion that “equality” must be understood as ‘unity’.

¿Qué ha pasado en los cuatro años? Pues que el Gobierno de España ha equivocado las prioridades. Ha tenido dos grandes proyectos: el primero, cambiar España y el segundo, negociar con ETA. Ambos han sido un fracaso. Se ha dividido a los españoles, se ha generado mucha tensión y, sobre todo, se ha olvidado lo esencial, que es la economía, que son los precios, que es la vida de las personas, que es su forma de sentir, de vivir, son sus preocupaciones. Creo que se necesita un Gobierno que dé certidumbre, un Gobierno que dé seguridad, que se ocupe de los problemas reales de los españoles, que busque acuerdos, que sea un Gobierno para todos y que no divida a los españoles (II.124-134)

RJ presents ZP as a **divider** (Se ha dividido a los españoles, se ha generado mucha tensión), and therefore **unpresidentiable**. The conclusion of RJ's argumentation is an explicit positive self-presentation, the implicit premise being that RJ possesses the qualities that ZP lacks: **stability, strength, prioritization, agreement, and unity**. So RJ presents himself as **Unitarian**: as the **President of all Spaniards** and as the **defender of the unity of Spain**.

At many other points of the debate in the IP block RJ deploys his moves to present **ZP as a divider** and as **breaking traditional consensus**, as shown by the following excerpt:

no sé si sabía usted, pero antes de llegar usted al gobierno las cuestiones que afectaban al modelo territorial de España se pactaban entre los grandes partidos. Y usted rompió ese acuerdo como ha roto otros muchos en España. Los resultados están a la vista ha creado usted enfrentamiento entre las CCAA por el patrimonio, por la financiación, por las inversiones, por el agua... ha dividido a los españoles y ha afectado a su igualdad. Por primera vez desde 1978, por primera vez eh, con usted de presidente del Gobierno, un estatuto se ha pactado sin el acuerdo de los grandes partidos nacionales (I.1015-1025)



These two moves are repeatedly employed in both debates, almost through the same propositions:

Enfrentó a todas las comunidades autónomas entre sí [...]. Dividió a los españoles [...]. Propició por primera vez en la historia un Estatuto que no contaba con el acuerdo de todos (II.1055-1061)

la primera vez desde 1977 que esto se ha roto ha sido con usted [...] Jamás hubo un estatuto que no fuera apoyado por los grandes partidos nacionales (II.1276-1283)

As we can see, RJ implements this move through a narrative based on the scheme “before(+) vs. now(–)” and through the topic of uniqueness to represent ZP as extraordinarily negative. ZP is presented as the **agent** who worsens the situation (Así ha conseguido usted que nos vean, I.1009). RJ uses deixis (nosotros) to align himself with Spaniards, dealigning them from ZP (usted dividió a los españoles, II.1055). In order to realistically represent ZP as a divider, RJ reports ZP’s own words on the concept of nation (comenzó usted su mandato diciendo aquello de que “el concepto de nación es discutido y discutible”, I.1009-1010). In doing so, RJ presents ZP as being unconcerned about the unity of Spain and therefore an anti-patriot.

Since the management of presidentiability is always twofold, RJ also constructs a positive image of himself in relation to this issue. He presents himself and PP as the agents of unity: i.e. as **the defenders of Spain and Spanishism and as the agents of collaboration between PP and PSOE**.

Oiga, yo tengo, he pactado muchas cosas con su partido. El Pacto Autonómico del 1992, fui a Moncloa, lo firmé con González, lo firmó Aznar, yo estaba con él, luego en el año 1996 (I.1252-1261)

#### 10.2.1.3. Sincerity: ZP as a liar or as removed from reality

As in the other blocks, RJ refers to the attribute of sincerity. Again, detracting from the opponent’s presidentiability is implemented through metapragmatic statements. RJ’s aims to present **ZP as a liar** or at least **as naive or irresponsible**. In order to achieve this, RJ constructs a **contrast between what ZP says and reality**:

Se nos dice que España está más unida y cohesionada que nunca, pero tenemos un referéndum de separación convocado (I.104-107)

¿De verdad cree que España como dice usted, está más unida y cohesionada que nunca? (I.1034-1035)

usted sigue diciendo que estamos muy unidos [...] hay convocado un referendum de separación [...] ¿Sigue usted creyendo que estamos muy unidos? (I.1097-1104)

The premise being that a president should be sincere and by no means naive or removed from reality, this move is very effective in eroding ZP's credibility, and indeed it has been employed also in other terrains of struggle. This move is a way of **demonizing the opponent** in his personal features (intelligence, realism, etc.), through the abusive argument. It is used widely throughout the debates, principally by RJ as in *usted no se entera* (II.1399; II.1436; II.1441; these attacks are responded by ZP in II.1437; II.1537). Here again deixis is crucial in aligning RJ with the audience (*se nos dice*) and in dealigning the audience from ZP.

#### 10.2.1.4. ZP as ignorant and unserious, inexperienced and irresponsible

Related to the move of **demonizing the opponent** through personal attacks –the principal feature of RJ's interaction– is his recurrent use of abusive argument in order to represent **ZP as ignorant**, for instance through propositions like “nobody knows your idea of Spain/you have no idea of Spain” (I.1012-1013; I.1111-1112; I.1261-1267; II.1049-1069; II.1144-1161; II.1220-1224); as if he is **frivolizing serious issues**:

Usted no tiene una idea de España, [...] usted no tiene una idea de España. España es una nación de más de quinientos años de historia y usted se lo ha tomado a broma (I.1261-1266)

Also **RJ represents ZP as being inexperienced and irresponsible**, through the metaphoric expression *actuó de aprendiz de brujo* [you acted as sorcerer's apprentice] (II.1051), as he previously did in the block on terrorism (II.753).

In order to portray ZP as a **person with no clear ideas**, and therefore a bad president, RJ presents ZP as a person for whom everything is normal:

Tiene dos referéndums convocados. ¿Le parece que eso es normal? Para separarse de España. Uno este mes... este año, en octubre. A usted ¿eso le parece normal? A usted todo le parece normal (I.1186-1198)

This can also be compared with following passage where ZP is represented as having no clear ideas:

Le da igual una cosa que la contraria, [...]. Si es que usted, usted es el que quien no tiene ningún criterio sobre este asunto [...] no tienen ningún criterio (II.1220-1224)

Obviously, all these propositions aimed at **demonizing the opponent** are based on the personalized deixis *usted*, and are part of the strategy to isolate ZP as irrational, unserious, foolish and irresponsible, etc.

#### 10.2.1.5. ZP as isolated and radical

RJ also implements two further moves designed to delegitimize the opponent through a personalized demonization: to present **ZP as isolated** and **as radical**. The first is particularly coherent with the general strategy of separating ZP from his own electors as well as from potential ones, as we have seen in the terrains of the economy and terrorism. Moreover, both moves are aimed at presenting ZP as a threat to Spaniards' wellbeing: their economic security, their safety, and their unity.

RJ attempts to present ZP as being distant and removed from other citizens (as we have seen in the block addressing the economy) as well as from other members of his own party (as in the block on terrorism). In this sense, RJ employs expressions that depict ZP as standing alone (*por su cuenta*) and doing things nobody asked him to. Another very effective way is to report the speeches of some **respected PSOE veterans**, including González, Leguina, and Guerra, who severely criticized ZP's institutional policies (I.1092-1097). The *argumentum ad verecundiam* that ZP is unable

to contest without generating conflict within his own party ranks enables RJ to appeal to PSOE voters without threatening their face: the problem is ZP, not PSOE.

RJ also hints that as ZP has reached agreements with radical groups (ERC, IU), this also makes him radical. This representation is mirrored on the PP website with the expression “va como un poseso”, to describe ZP’s intention to reach an electoral agreement with IU and ERC, which PP class as radical parties. This move, aimed at counteracting ZP’s efforts to present himself as a moderate leader, detracts from ZP’s presidentiability, the premise being that moderation is a central feature of a president (Usted es el que ha querido pactar con partidos [...] radicales y extremistas, I.1186). This question is dealt with in greater depth in section 10.3.

#### 10.2.1.6. ZP as antidemocratic and incoherent

Among the moves employed by RJ to decrease ZP’s presidentiability is the representation of ZP as being incoherent and antidemocratic, through the reference to *Pacto del Tinell*, signed by ERC, ICV and PSC (the Catalanian federations of IU and PSOE respectively), and that in a clause explicitly excluded agreement with PP at a regional or state level<sup>216</sup>. The corollary of this issue is that **ZP broke the traditional consensus, is incoherent, antidemocratic and intolerant:**

El Pacto del Tinel [...] es el mayor rasgo de intolerancia que se ha hecho en la historia democrática española. ¿Sabe quién es usted, señor Rodríguez Zapatero? Es un señor que con una mano predica el entendimiento; con otra mano, con la otra, le prohíbe a los demás que nos den los buenos días, y para colmo... me echa la culpa de todo. Ese es exactamente usted. Usted es el que ha sembrado la discordia. Usted es el que ha querido pactar con partidos [...] radicales y extremistas. Usted es el que ha impedido que el Partido Popular tuviera la más mínima posibilidad de llegar a un entendimiento en estas materias. Usted ha querido excluarnos (I.1188-1190)

Again thanks to the topic of quality, ZP is presented as *the most intolerant of the Spanish democratic history and the most antidemocratic*, as he will say shortly after (I:1248-1249). As in other negative narratives, RJ highlights **ZP’s agency in impeding**

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<sup>216</sup> [http://elpais.com/diario/2005/11/16/espana/1132095611\\_850215.html](http://elpais.com/diario/2005/11/16/espana/1132095611_850215.html)

**consensus** between PP and PSOE, choosing to ally with radicals, thereby making him directly responsible for any tension.

In reference to the *Pacto* RJ can also present **ZP as incoherent**: and RJ does so by retaking, as at other points in the debate, ZP's keywords (*entendimiento*) in order to question them and refute ZP's action/words with a *tu quoque*.

#### **10.2.1.7. The idea of Spain: ZP as not sharing the notion of a (united) Spain**

One of the main propositions stated by RJ in the debate is that ZP did not have a notion of Spain; or in other words, that he did not share the notion of Spain as a unified nation. This point is of interest when considering the changes between the first and second debates, the way the candidates adopt their corresponding stances and respond to each other, reformulating their statements for the purpose of alignment or dealignment in relation to the audience and each other. In the first debate RJ accused ZP of not having an idea of Spain:

lo hizo sin dejar establecido antes cuál era su idea de España  
(I.1012-1013)

Usted no tiene ninguna idea de la nación española (I.1111-1112; see  
also I.1261-1267)

In the second debate ZP responds to RJ's attacks by echoing these words and through references to the Constitution: *Esta es mi idea de España, la de la Constitución, la de la cohesión* (II.1025-1026; also of relevance in this sense are his references to PSOE as the party of Constitutional agreements with *all* Spanish parties since the Transition in II.1090-1095). These references, which enable him to align himself with the tradition of the Transition, are strategic for retaining PSOE Spanishist electors and gaining wavering (PP) ones. Moreover, they allow ZP to dispute the monopoly on the Transition and on agreements.

However, RJ obviously insists on his propositions that ZP has no idea of Spain (II.1049-1069), referring to secession referenda and the alleged repression of Castilian-speakers in Catalonia (II.1144-1155).

#### 10.2.1.7. Patriotism vs. Anti-patriotism: ZP as a threat to the unity of Spain

One of the principal moves RJ uses to detract ZP's presidentiability is to present him as **threatening the unity of Spain**, claiming that he is not committed to the unity of the Spanish people and their equality, has no (clear) idea of Spain or fails to take the notion of the Spanish nation seriously. RJ also portrays ZP as being irresponsible or inexperienced and failing to heed the advice of PSOE veterans in matters of IP. He also accuses him of being a radical that broke the traditional consensus held with a supposedly moderate PP in order to ally himself with extremists. RJ also refers to ZP's impression of normality in calling two separation referenda in the Basque Country, where a positive result would result in **secession**<sup>217</sup>. In corroborating his representation of Spain as a country that is being broken up and fragmented and the role of **ZP as for a threat to the unity of Spain**, RJ reports ZP's speech:

yo no he dicho nunca que la transición se hizo mal y que España no estaba cuajada, eso lo ha dicho usted [...] Yo no he dicho que los vascos tuvieran el derecho a decidir, ni los extremeños, ni los murcianos, ha sido usted (I.1104-1115)

With this device, RJ can construct the image of a ZP that disputes and challenges Spanish unity. Quoting an opponent's speech in one's own interests is a highly effective device, since the opponent cannot deny or refute it without seeming to contradict himself, and appearing to be incoherent or a liar. With this move RJ presents **ZP as an anti-patriot**, which is extremely damaging for a president, the accepted premise being that a president must assume and defend the unity of Spain. ZP's anti-patriotism is also constructed through references to his agreements with ERC, the most radical Catalanist party and the promoter of an independence referendum and to his indifference to the supposed repression of Castilian in Catalonia: in short, **ZP is represented as an accomplice to separatists**, and therefore as being unrepresentable. I will discuss the issue of Castilian-speakers in Catalonia separately.

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<sup>217</sup> Obviously this issue of referenda is strategically avoided by ZP, who never refers to them, and strategically employed by RJ, who makes repeated references to it (I.1099; I.1103; I.1194; I.1301; II.105-109; II.1148; II.1155), even in the block referring to CFF and to have the last word on IP (I.1300-1302).

Patriotism is also constructed according to seriousness: if ZP is unpresidentiable **because he has joked about the idea of Spain**, RJ is presidentiable because he expresses his **pride in being Spanish** through the topic of the glory of the nation:

España es una nación de más de quinientos años de historia y usted se lo ha tomado a broma, y eso a mí, me parece inaceptable [...] y quiero que lo sepa, inaceptable (I.1261-1267)

Through this opposition, where **ZP (more than PSOE) is anti-patriotic** due to his lack of seriousness and **RJ is the only patriot**, the sole defender of the nation, RJ also re-appropriates the Nation as belonging to the Right. This reproach goes hand in hand with the sentence where RJ questions ZP's patriotism (I.958-961). RJ again uses his self-presentation as a patriot at the end of his CS in the first debate (I.1627-1636), in the extended hypotyposis where he refers to a little girl "born in Spain", with "a deep pride in being Spanish, for belonging to such an ancient and admirable nation". Through this move RJ tries to obtain the goodwill of the Spanish through his Spanishism and his commitment to a united nation: *España es cosa de todos y debemos tomárnosla muy en serio* (I.1634-1635).

Even though in March 2008 some mistrust still remained in Spain towards the idea of the Nation<sup>218</sup>, Spanishism was nonetheless also considered a positive value among the majority of PSOE voters. As a result, RJ's discourse did not run the risk of seeming far-right. Moreover, coherently to PP strategy, it also targeted PSOE voters. As we can see more clearly in the CS of the second debate, where RJ openly refers to them, RJ tries to catch PSOE voters who are dissatisfied with ZP's decisions on *nationalist issues*. For this reason he has presented ZP (and only him, instead of the whole PSOE) as a **threat to the unity of Spain**; under this perspective deictic ambiguity is crucial: to whom does the deictic *nosotros* refer? To PP? To PP and Spanishist PSOE voters? To all Spaniards? This ambiguity allows PSOE voters to be included in the statements, as shown in the following excerpt:

Buenas noches. Yo creo que España es un gran país, una gran nación, una nación de ciudadanos libres e iguales que en estos momentos tiene problemas, pero creo que si actuamos con realismo,

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<sup>218</sup> This mistrust changed considerably after the victories of Spain's national football team (Screti 2010).

si actuamos con trabajo y si actuamos con humildad, vamos a superarlo en el futuro. Yo quiero que la próxima legislatura no sea la legislatura de la tensión y de la división entre los españoles. Quiero que sea una legislatura de consenso entre todos. Le voy a proponer al principal partido de la oposición acuerdos en los temas importantes. Quiero que España sea lo que todos los españoles queremos que sea. Una gran nación de ciudadanos libres e iguales. Sé que hay muchos votantes del partido socialista, la inmensa mayoría de los votantes del partido socialista que creen que España es una gran nación de ciudadanos libres e iguales, y hay cosas que no se han hecho bien. [...] Yo seré fundamentalmente el presidente del Gobierno de todos los españoles porque mi objetivo es gobernar sin generar tensiones, ni confrontaciones, ni divisiones. [...] Se necesita que todos los españoles estemos unidos, que España esté unido en sus tierras y esté unido en sus gentes. Eso es fundamental. El Estado de las autonomías es lo que yo defiendo, pero hay que hacer que funcione bien y que sirva para fortalecer al conjunto (II.1642-1690)

RJ's first idea, repeated three times, that Spain is one great nation of free and equal citizens is intended to display his unquestionable Spanishism. RJ's open appeal to PSOE Spanishist voters is not only discursive evidence of PP's electoral strategy, but seems to corroborate what I called *convergence*, i.e., the fact that since the center of both parties' electorate is unstable, and could therefore vote either PP or PSOE, the two parties *become* ideologically increasingly similar, as do their discourses. RJ refers on two separate occasions to tensions and divisions, establishing a difference between the past **legislature (PSOE) characterized by discord** and the future (supposedly PP) **legislature of concord**. In doing so, RJ, like ZP before him, presents himself as the **president of all Spaniards**, a very common topic in electoral discourse (Santulli 2005: 129).

## 10.2.2. ZP's moves to manage presidentiality

### 10.2.2.1. Unity: PP as a divider

Presenting **PP as a divider** is also one of the main moves ZP uses to detract from his opponent's presidentiality. This move is evident right from the OS of the first debate, where he represents **PP as a disloyal opposition**:



hemos tenido que superar obstáculos. El principal obstáculo ha sido una oposición [...] Que ha crispado, que ha enfrentado a ciudadanos de unas comunidades con otras, que se ha movido entre la mentira y la exageración, que no ha dado respaldo al Gobierno en ninguna de las grandes cuestiones de Estado, [...]. Una oposición que ha establecido la crispación y la división. La disyuntiva en las próximas elecciones es: diálogo o confrontación, aquellos que buscamos soluciones o quienes fabrican problemas, aquellos que desde el poder servimos a los ciudadanos y aquellos que han intentado utilizar a los ciudadanos para llegar al poder (I.160-175):

ZP repeatedly insists on this presentation of **PP (more than RJ) as a divider** and often refers to **its agency in creating discord**, for instance when he claims that PP did not have a constructive attitude:

Mire, le tengo que recordar que en nuestro país hay un modelo autonómico que ha funcionado bien, cuando se tiene una voluntad constructiva, y ustedes no la han tenido. Ustedes han utilizado las reformas de los estatutos (I.1213-1217)

#### **10.2.2.2. PP as authoritarian vs. PSOE as open to dialogue and progressive**

Another move for de/legitimization, in line with PSOE's overarching strategy of providing abstract positive values, is to present **PP as authoritarian and conservative**, and **PSOE as open to dialogue and progressive**:

Quien ha sembrado la discordia y el enfrentamiento entre comunidades han sido ustedes. [...] Mire, nosotros creemos en el Estado de las Autonomías, estamos convencidos que ha sido muy bueno para bienestar de España, que favorece la libertad eliminando el centralismo. Y ustedes siempre han estado a rastras con el Estado Autonómico. El PSOE siempre ha votado todos los estatutos, en todos los consensos. Ustedes no. [...] Hemos hecho reformas de los estatutos para mejorar el autogobierno, y en este periodo hemos vivido más cooperación y menos conflictividad ante el TC que en cualquiera de sus ocho años de gobierno. Tienen una gran desfachatez, han sembrado discordia entre los ciudadanos y, especialmente, con el Estatuto de Cataluña. La que han liado con

la enseñanza del castellano, que es la misma regla que hace 20 años, incluso cuando usted era ministro de educación (I.1046-1073)

ZP uses the *tu quoque* device to present **RJ** as a **divider** and a polarized description in which **PP** is **represented as centralist, conservative and authoritarian** and **PSOE** as **peripheralist, progressive and dialoguing, as the party of agreement and consensus**. In this description, the metaphoric expression *estar a rastras* [dragging along the ground] visually portrays **PP's backwardness** and the quantifiers *siempre* and *todos* stabilize PSOE's positive features.

As for ZP's presentation of RJ as regressive, it should be noted that references to the past are an effective means of implementing the delegitimation of PP, since they allow ZP to present **PP as still holding ties with Francoism**<sup>219</sup>. He will use this argument of **PP as past, as conservative** again in his CS (I.1638-1645). Referring to PP as past, and by extension as being Francoist, is a very effective move, and has been used since the first debate between Felipe González and José María Aznar<sup>220</sup>.

At many other stages of the debate ZP presents himself as open to dialogue **and inclusive**, promoting agreements, dialogue and transparency and **PP as an authoritarian party that sows discord**, as shown in the following passage:

Lo que sucede, Sr. Rajoy, es que este país que es plural, que es diverso hay que construirlo entre todos con el diálogo, y no sembrando la discordia entre unas Comunidades y otras, como han hecho ustedes [...], sin excluir a nadie. Y desde luego, con un gobierno, que es lo que ha practicado el mío, que intente dialogar. He tenido un diálogo fecundo con todas la Comunidades Autónomas. Ahora todos los presidentes entran en Moncloa, no como en la etapa del Sr. Aznar. He convocado la Conferencia de Presidentes en tres ocasiones, para coordinar, cooperar y unir a todas las Comunidades Autónomas con el Gobierno de España, eso es fortalecer el Estado y fortalecer España (I.1269-1287)

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<sup>219</sup> As for the representation of PP as a party of the past, see also PSOE slogan "Ahora que avanzamos, por qué retroceder".

<sup>220</sup> This move was used also in the 1993 and 1996 PSOE party political broadcasts (Décobert 2011).

ZP uses a polarized narrative to establish the difference between Aznar's former government (representing PP), which he portrays as being authoritarian and less democratic than his own government.

At another crucial point in the debate, ZP situates **PSOE** at the *center of the Spanish political spectrum, as the party of dialogue, consensus and agreements*, despite differences with interlocutors and as the **main actor of the *Estado de las Autonomías*** (II.1090-1101). The positive description of **PSOE as open to dialogue and unifier** goes in hand with the presentation of **PP as divider** (II.1102-1110). Interestingly enough, ZP's appropriation of the *center* of Spanish politics will elicit mutual **accusations of extremism** between the two candidates (see section 10.3).

#### 10.2.2.3. PP as incoherent and opportunistic

Presenting the opponent as incoherent and opportunistic is always a very effective move to detract from presidentiability. In order to highlight **PP's incoherence and opportunism**, ZP quotes the main PP candidate in Catalonia, who says that Castilian is not oppressed in Catalonia, in contrast to claims made by PP; ZP also claims that the legislation remains unchanged from when RJ was Minister of Education (I.1070-1073; see section 10.2.3). ZP insists on the ideas of incoherence and opportunism on many occasions in the debates (I.1200-1213; I.1220-1225). An example of this is his reference to two very similar articles in the statutes of Andalusia and Catalonia, highlighting the fact that PP only appealed against it in the latter case (I.1143-1157). In some instances ZP refers explicitly to PP's incoherence and opportunism:

Usted ha utilizado los territorios, las comunidades autónomas para enfrentar, para dividir. Presume tener una idea de España, pero le voy a decir cuál es desde mi punto de vista: la que a usted le interesa en cada momento, lo que a usted le interesa en cada lugar. [...] Usted no ha tenido coherencia y por tanto no tiene una idea global de España (II.1163-1197; see also I.1202)

ZP presents **PP and RJ as opportunistic**, classifying RJ's claims as being **insincere, interested and designed exclusively for electoral ends**. ZP also defines this behavior of creating and using a language conflict for electoral gain as **irresponsible**, thereby reducing RJ's presidentiability (II.1254-1268).

Although this **accusation of opportunism** is a recurrent feature of ZP's discourse, it is also used on occasions by RJ:

Oiga, yo tengo, he pactado muchas cosas con su partido. El Pacto Autonómico del 1992, fui a Moncloa, lo firmé con González, lo firmó Aznar, yo estaba con él, luego en el año 1996. Ustedes el Estatuto Catalán quisieron dejarlo fuera a propósito, si no no se explica que [...] no nos aceptaran ni una sola enmienda y no nos venga, con el viejo truco de decir, que somos anti-catalanes (I.1252-1259)

Yo he recorrido Andalucía a lo largo de estos cuatro años, me he ocupado de sus problemas, he estado con mucha gente, he visto muchos lugares. Usted sólo ha ido allí en campaña electoral (II.1123-1130)

The narratives presented in the two excerpts allow RJ to delegitimize the opponent as an opportunist and divider and legitimize himself as the defender of Spaniards' interests and as a unifier. In order to neutralize the accusation of having used the *Estatut* for opportunistic ends, RJ uses a *tu quoque* move to blame **PSOE for not seeking an agreement or consensus on the Estatut** and ZP of using the *old trick* of accusing PP of being anti-Catalan. In doing so, **RJ rejects the accusation of being anti-Catalan**.

#### 10.2.2.4. Optimism vs. pessimism

As has emerged in the case of other terrains of struggle, one of ZP's main moves in order to delegitimize the opponent is to present **RJ as a pessimist**, in line with PSOE's overarching strategy for the 2008 election campaign. It is very effective, since it automatically delegitimizes all the opponent's statements, effectively terming them as being irrational:

Mire señor Rajoy, su Apocalipsis, que es lo que ha hecho en estos cuatro años parece que se retrasa en la historia. Ni "España se rompe", [...] ni "Cataluña está en un proceso de secesión", más bien está más unida porque ahora ya hay Alta Velocidad (I.1117-1122):

estoy comprometido con una España unida, en convivencia y que respete la diversidad. Porque el futuro es la convivencia y no la división, porque llegaremos mejor al futuro si tenemos confianza y no pesimismo (II.1631-1635)

ZP legitimizes himself through references to **confidence** and delegitimizes the opponent through references to **pessimism** (Apocalypse). The construction of this opposition **PSOE=optimism vs. PP=pessimism** is consistent with the general strategy implemented in other texts, videos, songs, etc. Interestingly, ZP quotes PP discourse (*se rompe España* I.1061; I.1119; I.1209) in order to present PP as **pessimistic** and **opportunistic**: the party attempts to make the situation appear worse in order to win votes (circumstantial argument).

In order to dispel any accusations of pessimism, and despite insisting on the negative situation left by ZP's government, RJ also refers, for instance in his CS, to *optimismo y esperanza* and presents himself as **selfless** (*yo sólo quiero lo que todos queremos*).

#### 10.2.2.5. PSOE, the defender of joy and freedoms vs. PP a threat to freedom

In line with the previous move is ZP's attempt to increase his presidentiability and detract from that of RJ with regards to the topic of freedom and civil rights, whereby he presents **himself and his party as open to dialogue and defending freedom**:

Lo cierto es que en materia de autonomías, en materia de libertades, en estos cuatro años hemos avanzado; hay más autogobierno, más unidad y más fortaleza del Estado. Hay también más derechos y libertades, porque hay nuevas leyes del divorcio, del matrimonio homosexual, de igualdad, de rehabilitación de memoria, de las personas, de su dignidad... Hay más diálogo y más democracia. El ejemplo es este debate que están retransmitiendo varias televisiones, como la televisión pública, que ahora es plural, independiente y que con ustedes, tuvo una condena de la Audiencia Nacional por manipulación. Cuando ustedes gobiernan, se resiente la democracia, se pierde el pluralismo (I.1225-1238)

This move is crucial in the overarching strategy of using abstract values to present **PP as a threat to freedom and joy**, and PSOE as their defender, of presenting **PP as the (Francoist) past**, and **PSOE as progress**.

In this sense it is also important to note the reference to the debate: ZP appropriates the debate as a space for democracy, and at the same time represents PP as manipulating information, through a reference to High Court sentence against PP (*argumentum ab auctoritate*). The conclusion of ZP's argument, related to the attribute of a **fair player**, clearly delegitimizes **PP as being antidemocratic**: Cuando ustedes gobiernan, se resiente la democracia, se pierde el pluralismo. We have also witnessed this shift at other stages of the debate, when ZP avoids contesting the topics put forward by RJ, turning instead to issues such as euthanasia, individual freedoms, and laicism, in order to present himself as a modern and progressive leader (I.1143-1157; I.1225-1238; I.1284-1287).

#### 10.2.2.6. Unity

We have seen above that ZP presents PP and RJ as dividers. This presentation goes hand in hand with the presentation of **PSOE and ZP as unifiers**. He does so in his CS by insisting on **unity (both in terms of unity of nation, and of agreements between parties)**:

Tengo plena confianza en las enormes posibilidades de la España libre y unida. Creo que nuestro país puede continuar avanzando, incrementar su prosperidad y ese avance, lo podemos hacer trabajando unidos (I.1640-1643)

This reference to *España libre y unida* could seem a discursive hybridation with and an ideological convergence toward right wing discourse (cf. the Francoist slogan: *España: una, grande y libre*), in order to appeal to Spanishist PSOE electors and even to PP electors. Yet it seems to be rather a reference of the unity within the difference. This interpretation is doubtlessly coherent with PSOE ideology, its history, and its stance concerning territorial organization, and could be corroborated by the numerous references to regional autonomy and central government cooperation in PSOE manifesto (where expressions like *en colaboración con* or *de acuerdo con* or *en*

*cooperación con las comunidades autonomas* are repeated extensively), and by the reference to *convivencia* and *unidad* made in the OS and the CS of the second debate:

una gran potencia como es España. Un país en convivencia, con más derechos para todos, y un país unido (II.64-65)

estoy comprometido con una España unida, en convivencia y que respete la diversidad (II.1631-1635)

Note that the reference to Spain as a major power is an expression of Spanishism and is crucial in representing ZP as a patriot, an idea that is constantly challenged by RJ.

As we have seen, one of ZP's main self-legitimizing moves, in line with PSOE's overarching electoral strategy, is to associate himself and PSOE with general positive values. ZP implements this move by **reframing the unity of Spain** under three new ideas: economic and social solidarity, territorial infrastructural interconnection and respect for diversity through **dialogue and cooperation** (II.994-1026). ZP's argumentation is aimed at aligning himself with the topic RJ has brought up, but at the same time dealigning from RJ's ways of framing it; he enhances the issue of unity of Spain beyond the administrative relationship with the central government (the right wing idea of territorial and administrative cohesion); in doing so he reduces RJ's capacity for maneuver, displacing particular issues such as the *Estatut de Catalunya* or Castilian-speakers in Catalonia. ZP relates the unity of Spain to greater *economic* equality, better infrastructural connections and better institutional cooperation between central and peripheral regions<sup>221</sup>. ZP's argument is that the economic convergence of regions, whose level of income per person was far below that of Madrid, is a way of uniting Spain, reducing territorial inequalities. Changing the former radial conception of communication (all railways or highways starting from Madrid) to a different and more integrative conception is a way of uniting Spain. Thirdly, ZP refers to the dialogic cooperation between central and regional governments. Madrid is obviously referred to as the geographical center of Spain and as symbolizing centralism, especially if we consider that Madrid's regional and municipal councils have been governed by PP since the early 1990s. In displacing the discourse of the unity of Spain from the administrative

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<sup>221</sup> Interestingly, candidates give different meanings to ideologically disputable polysemic terms such as *equality* or *cohesion*: they for RJ mean 'territorial unity'; whilst for ZP they represent 'social cohesion'.

relationships to economic and social convergence, ZP cannot only present some of his government's achievements, but can also **self-legitimize as contributing to the unity of Spain**. Moreover, in reframing it, ZP disputes the Right's claims to this idea. In order to realign himself with the audience in terms of the respect for tradition and unity (this was one of main RJ's accusations) he refers to the **Constitution** (*Esta es mi idea de España, la de la Constitución, la de la cohesión*, II.1025-1026) which safeguards the unity of Spain.

### 10.2.3. A particular case: the Castilian language in Catalonia

The use of Castilian and Catalan languages as synecdoches for the nations they refer to and for constructing the dis/unity of Spanish State and people is absolutely strategic. Language is a central issue in Nationalism, in that it is the very means<sup>222</sup> that allows for the construction and maintenance of the *imagined community*, the construction of in-group identity, especially in relation with others, but also participation in the workings of the State, for relations with administration, for access to the job market, education, etc. (Anderson 1991; Woolard 1989; Bourdieu 1982; Shohamy 2007, 2009; Blommaert & Verschueren 1992)<sup>223</sup>.

In Spain (meta)discourses on languages have long been circulating; but during the 2008 election campaign, and linked to the approval of the new *Estatut de Catalunya* (2006), which controversially established the preeminence of Catalan over Castilian in Catalonia, discourses on languages became particularly salient. Those produced by politicians received widespread media coverage. Obviously, these discourses on languages are connected to those on nation-building. The Catalan and Castilian languages indeed work as synecdoche for their respective speakers, and, moreover, for the political and glotopolitical stances and the complete set of ideologies, discourses and situations they refer to: Catalanism (separatism, peripheralism) and Spanishism (Unitarianism, centralism). In a certain sense they are political symbols that are easily understandable: it is easy to take (or to suggest) a stance on them and therefore they epitomize the struggles for the unity/separation of Spain.

It is therefore of no surprise that the language issue was introduced into the debates, featuring particularly in the IP block. Even though it is first mentioned by ZP,

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<sup>222</sup> Actually, as Bauman & Briggs (2003) have shown, beside the language itself, are rather the ideological constructions of the metadiscourses produced and circulated *on* language that allows creating and keeping the unity.

<sup>223</sup> The role of language for defining a nation is well known since at least Renan (1987[1862]).



RJ is quick to take it up, an indicator of the significance of this issue. A brief review of the party manifestos reveals that PP dedicates a lot of space to this issue (PP 2008: 35, 38-39, 52, 142-145, 214, 219-220, 241, 250, 305), always from a Spanishist and Castilianist stance. In contrast, the PSOE program contains very few references to language(s), and they are mainly concerned with the development of the Instituto Cervantes and the promotion of Spanish abroad (PSOE 2008: 9, 299, 312, 313) as well as the protection of the linguistic diversity of Spain. Indeed, the preferred form is the plural “nuestras lenguas” (id: 144, 251, 264, 265). Coming back to the debate, even though the issue appeared to hold greater relevance for RJ, it was used by both candidates as part of their discursive and election strategies: RJ presents ZP as a threat to the unity of Spain, whilst ZP portrays RJ as being incoherent and opportunistic.

As for the first debate, ZP is the first to raise the issue in order to represent **RJ as a divider**, sowing discord for electoral ends, and therefore **incoherent** and **opportunistic**, employing *tu quoque* and circumstantial arguments.

[...] cizañando con el tema del catalán, para que ahora veamos como hoy su candidata número uno, la señora Nadal, ha dicho que el castellano no se persigue en Cataluña. [...] La que han liado con la enseñanza del castellano, que es la misma regla que hace 20 años, incluso cuando usted era ministro de educación (I.1062-1073)

RJ's incoherence is constructed by referring to the speech of PP's main candidate in the Catalan elections and by referring to RJ's time as Minister of Education. According to ZP's narratives, PP has presented two opposing ideas (“Castilian is persecuted” and “Castilian is not persecuted”) merely out of electoral interests. The attack is also personalized against RJ, who during the campaign used the teaching of Castilian to create divisions, even though legislation in this sense has remained unchanged since his time as Minister of Education.

This stance is immediately contested by RJ: he takes up ZP's words, aligning with the topic, but adopting an opposing stance:

El castellano no se persigue en Cataluña, pero lo que es evidente es que no se puede estudiar en castellano (I.1074-1075)

Interestingly RJ does not even argue his stance; he simply states the opposite by reformulating ZP's statements. No further references are made to this issue in the first debate, although it will be addressed more extensively in the second, when it is RJ who brings it up, probably after receiving advice and instructions from his team.

In the second debate, RJ brings up the issue with an example of a Castilian speaker who is discriminated against in Catalonia:

Y fíjese usted, las cosas que hacen ustedes en Cataluña. Tengo aquí un expediente de un ciudadano catalán, me lo ha dado (lee de un folio), al que se le ha multado con 400 euros porque en la fachada de su comercio consta "Fincas Nebot AP-compra venta de pisos, solares y rústicos", y por lo visto eso vulnera los derechos lingüísticos de los consumidores. Eso lo hace un Gobierno suyo, del Partido Socialista, suyo (II.1155-1161)

This narrative on the alleged repression of Castilian speakers works as synecdoche for the threat of the unity of Spanish State. RJ tries to present **ZP as anti-Spanishist**, due to his indifference in the light of the persecution of Castilian-speakers. This victimization of the dominant language (Castilian), and its defense, allows RJ to present himself as the **defender of Spaniards** and Spanishness. In contrast, ZP's indifference reduces ZP's presidentiability, constructing the image of an **anti-patriot**. In his presentation RJ highlights ZP's agency through a shift in deixis from *ustedes* to *usted* and the expression *eso lo hace un gobierno suyo*.

During his turn, ZP responds on this same issue, insisting on the same argument used in the first debate: linguistic laws are the same as 20 years ago and PP uses the issue of language exclusively for its electoral ends:

Mire, usted con su política territorial no ha dejado de enfrentar unas Comunidades con otras, incluso a ciudadanos de una misma Comunidad. Como, por ejemplo, con el tema de la lengua. La política lingüística que se sigue en Cataluña, señor Rajoy, es la misma de los últimos 20 años. La misma. Ustedes estuvieron 8 años de Gobierno [...] y usted fue ministro de Educación y nunca le escuché nada sobre el problema o los problemas que el castellano pudiera tener en Cataluña. Ahora lo han cogido para dividir y para enfrentar. [...] Presume tener una idea de España, pero le voy a

decir cuál es desde mi punto de vista: la que a usted le interesa en cada momento, lo que a usted le interesa en cada lugar. Si hay que... si interesa en Cataluña hacer una tarea en contra del catalán y diciendo que el castellano se discrimina, porque le interesa en el resto de España, lo hacen; [...] Usted no ha tenido coherencia y por tanto no tiene una idea global de España (II.1163-1197)

Through circumstantial and *tu quoque* arguments ZP presents **PP as being incoherent and opportunistic**. In the last part ZP also explicitly accuses RJ of **incoherence and opportunism**: *Usted no ha tenido coherencia* (II.1197; see also I.1202). In doing so, ZP deactivates RJ's criticisms as being biased.

Instead of responding to ZP's accusations of incoherence and opportunism, RJ retakes his own previous statements on the supposed repression of Castilian speakers in Catalonia to accuse ZP of supporting sanctions on those writing in Castilian in Catalonia. The aim is to present **ZP as an accomplice of the repressors of Castilian**:

¡Todos lo han visto! Es evidente que el señor Zapatero apoya que una persona por poner el título de su negocio en castellano se le multe, y es lógico porque quien le multa es el partido socialista. Es decir, a mí me gustaría que desautorizara esta resolución porque desgraciadamente hay muchas como esta. Mire, yo le hago una propuesta: yo voy a hacer una ley para garantizar que todos los ciudadanos puedan mandar a sus hijos a estudiar en castellano en toda España. ¿Usted la va a apoyar o no la va a apoyar? Porque claro, España es el único país del mundo donde hay ciudadanos que en determinadas zonas del territorio nacional no pueden estudiar en castellano, yo voy a hacer esa ley y espero que me diga si la apoya o no... No, no, no, luego me dice si la apoya o no... La resolución sancionadora, voy a ver si usted apoya o no esa resolución sancionadora. [...] Pero yo le digo, es decir, a mí me gustaría conocer su criterio porque usted representa a un partido nacional. ¿Va a aprobar esa ley, la va a apoyar cuando yo la presente en parlamento esa ley? ¿Su grupo parlamentario lo va a hacer? ¿Está usted de acuerdo? ¿Va a hacer algo? ¿Se cree que es normal un país donde por poner un letrero en castellano automáticamente se te sancione? ¿Hay algún país del mundo donde ocurra eso? Sólo en este, en el que gobierna usted, señor Zapatero, ¿qué ha hecho usted? (II.1198-1240)

RJ's intervention is made up of two parts: in the first one ZP is presented as being responsible for the repression of Castilian; in the second he presents himself as the defender of Spaniards through the defense of Castilian, promising that if he is elected, he will promulgate a law to guarantee the right to study in Castilian in all regions of Spain, and asking ZP if he will support this proposal. The question is intended to show the audience the dealignment between the candidates and between ZP and the audience. RJ uses the topic of uniqueness to refute ZP's arguments; he defines Spain as *the only* country where someone is punished for displaying a sign in Castilian (II.1206-1209; II.1237-1240). As the logical premise is that it is absurd for a Spaniard in Spain to be punished for speaking Spanish, RJ presents the situation as aberrant and ZP as aberrant. RJ therefore starts and ends his turn by presenting ZP's in/action as the cause of the problem.

ZP does not respond to RJ's questions, insisting on presenting PP claims in defense of Castilian as **insincere, interested and seeking electoral ends**, through the argument that the linguistic policy is the same as 20 years before. Even though the deixis switches from *usted* to *ustedes* and *usted* again, in this turn ZP personalizes his attacks against RJ, through references to his role as Minister of Education, and presents him as **incoherent, opportunistic and irresponsible** for creating and using a language conflict for electoral ends.

**ZP:** Sí, señor Rajoy, llevamos veinte años con el mismo régimen lingüístico, que por cierto, apoyó Alianza Popular.

**RJ:** En absoluto, no es verdad. No es verdad. Alianza Popular no aprobó el Estatuto pero sí esto, hombre por favor, por favor, por favor...

**ZP:** Y usted fue ministro de Educación.

**RJ:** Sí, pero empezaron ustedes con Maragall en el 2003...

**ZP:** pero ¿qué hizo usted como ministro de educación? ¿Habló alguna vez del castellano en Cataluña?

**RJ:** Sí, sí, hombre, que si hablé del castellano... infinidad de veces

**ZP:** No podían hablar, porque era la etapa del Majestic, del catalán en la intimidad, [**RJ:** no, no, no, hablé muchas veces del catalán] [**OV:** señor Rajoy] entonces el catalán era una lengua de todos [**RJ:** Muchas veces, muchas veces], era una lengua que había que defender... [**RJ:** Yo defiendiendo el catalán y el castellano] Ahora, como no están en La Moncloa ni en Cataluña tienen ninguna

representatividad, pues han cogido lo de Cataluña para crispar,  
para intentar poner a gente a los ciudadanos del resto de España  
frente a Cataluña y eso es una irresponsabilidad, porque ustedes  
gobernaron con el apoyo de partidos catalanes, de Convergencia i  
Unió. Usted como ministro de Educación nunca defendió nada ni la  
pío, [RJ: Absolutamente falso] sobre el castellano en Cataluña. No  
la pío ni hizo nada como ministro [RJ: Esto es falso], lo cual a  
mí tampoco me extraña que no hiciera nada (II.1254-1268)

RJ responds to ZP's attacks by returning to his first statement, presenting ZP's lack of response to his question as evidence that ZP supports the repression of Castilian. In doing so RJ presents **ZP as an accomplice of the Catalanists**, and therefore **a threat to the unity of Spain**.

Bien, eh... Creo que ha quedado claro eh... que al señor Zapatero le  
parece bien que a una persona que rotule en España en castellano  
se le multe y le parece bien que haya muchísimos ciudadanos, no  
sólo en Cataluña, sino en otras zonas, en el País Vasco, empiezan  
en Galicia, que no pueden estudiar en su idioma, algo que no  
ocurre en ningún país del mundo. Queda constancia de que a usted  
le parece bien [...] (II.1269-1275)

He again uses the topic of uniqueness to represent the situation as extremely aberrant: no ocurre en ningún país del mundo. RJ will return to this issue of the repression of Castilian in the CFF block, when dealing with the issue of education, to criticize ZP's education policies. In his words the low level of Spanish education is due to the fact that ZP did not do what he is expected to do and instead does something he should not do:

usted mientras tanto está con la Educación para la Ciudadanía o  
con quitarle a la gente la posibilidad de estudiar en castellano  
(II.1358-1359)

In RJ's representation of reality, ZP *revokes* people's right to study in Castilian and therefore he **is a threat to Castilian**. Here again, as at other points of the debate, RJ highlights **ZP's agency** in doing what is agreed as a bad thing: in this case, preventing a

Spaniard in Spain from studying in Spanish. The ultimate aim is to present ZP as a non-patriot and therefore unpresidentiable.

### 10.3. Observations

In this chapter, I have dealt with the fourth terrain of struggle that confronts ZP and RJ: the Catalan question, as epitomized by the *Estatut* and the issue of the Catalan language. In order to historically contextualize the reasons for the tensions between the center and periphery I have first briefly mentioned the history of the process of unification of Spain since 1479. I have fixed 1714 as the inflection point. This chapter also includes a short discussion of tensions between Spanishism and Catalanism in the context of the II Republic and the two dictatorships of the 20th century before arriving at the Transition (late 1970s) and the present day. In this overview I briefly traced the history of Catalonia's three statutes of autonomy. I have also presented the way the two candidates use the unity of Spain and in particular the *Estatut* and languages for the purpose of positive self-presentation and negative presentation of the other. I analyzed the overarching strategies of the two candidates, as well as the local moves and the discursive devices employed in terms of arguments, metaphors, deixis, reported speech, quantifiers and implicitness.

We have seen that in general and unlike RJ, ZP does not dedicate much space to the issue of nation. This observation can be corroborated by triangulating this point with the observation of secondary data: for instance, the unity of Spain was not a major issue in the PSOE program. It was instead a key point in PP's election strategy, occupying considerable space in its program. The question of the unity of Spain is a cardinal point in PP ideology that has a strong historic and ideological symbolism, deep implications and meanings and that groups together national-Catholic Right forces, i.e. Spanishists, around PP<sup>224</sup>. Indeed as De Santiago-Guervós (1996) states, Separatism is one of the three obsessions of Francoism, and it passed to the Francoist ideological heirs of AP and then to PP.

As we have seen candidates managed their presidentiability in relation to this topic according to **general presidentiable attributes** (unity, sincerity, loyalty, selflessness, coherence, consistency, defending people's interests, activity, capacity, efficacy) and **particular attributes** like being a nurturing father (open to dialogue, optimistic) or a strict father (authoritarian, realistic, strong).

The main representations provided by candidates to manage their presidentiability can be summarized as follows:

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<sup>224</sup> On National-Catholicism see Pérez-Agote (2003).

**RJ → ZP:** incapable (confusing priorities), isolated, a divider (citizens; parties: a threat to the unity of Spain and breaker of the Transition consensus), incoherent, a liar (naive or unaware), ignorant (unserious), inexperienced and irresponsible, radical, opportunist, antidemocratic, anti-patriotic;

**RJ → RJ:** moderate, a patriot (proud of being Spanish), unifier (citizens: the president of all Spaniards; parties: consensus), selfless (*yo sólo quiero lo que todos queremos*), the defender of Spain unity, Spaniards and Spanishness;

**ZP → PP RJ:** a divider, authoritarian, centralist, conservative, regressive (past, Francoism), undemocratic, a threat to freedom and joy, pessimistic, incoherent, opportunistic, radical;

**ZP → PSOE ZP:** progress, democracy, a defender of liberty and joy, open to dialogue, a peripheralist, optimist, unifier (citizens: economic convergence and parties: agreements), moderate.

As can be seen, these representations concerned the main general and particular attributes of a president.

As for the main **discursive-argumentative devices** employed, we can see that candidates have extensively used the *tu quoque* or **circumstantial argument**, to demonstrate their opponent's incoherence or inconsistency. RJ made extensive use of the **abusive argument**, as when he states that **ZP says meaningless things**: *eso que usted dijo es lisa y llanamente una de esas cosas que usted dice y no significa nada* (II.1129-1130). The abusive variant is the *argumentum ad hominem* that most directly attacks the opponent's personal features, damaging his integrity, but in this case it is even more effective, in that, as we have seen, credibility is constructed discursively, so claiming that discourse is meaningless is a direct attack on the speaker's ethos.

In order to increase/decrease credibility and de/align with the audience or credible speakers, RJ also used *argumentum ab auctoritate* with references to other politicians, newspapers, etc. and *ad populum* through references to the people, like in *todos lo han visto* (RJ.II.1198). ZP also uses this argument in *todos los españoles lo han escuchado* (I.1209). Also common is the use of **reported speech** either as *argumentum*



*ab auctoritate* to support the speaker's own argument or as a way for demonstrating the opponent's incoherence. We have seen that **narratives** such as “when we X(+), now you Y(–)” play a central role. Of course the **lexical choice** is decisive: as when RJ uses the **metaphor** of *sorcerer's apprentice* to class ZP as being inexpert and irresponsible, as in the block on terrorism.

In the strategic description of actors, **quantifiers** (*único, ningún*) and the **topic of uniqueness** played a particular role in absolutizing the positive or negative dispositions.

I wish also to point out the importance of **implicit** and **presumptive meanings** and their ability to surreptitiously persuade receivers by building common ground meanings in disputed issues. For instance, when referring to the unity of Spain, RJ states:

Yo creo que España es una nación de ciudadanos libres e iguales y que sobre España decidimos todos y cada uno de los españoles (I.1111-1115)

España es el único país del mundo donde hay ciudadanos que en determinadas zonas del territorio nacional no pueden estudiar en castellano (II.1206-1209)

ha quedado claro que al señor Zapatero le parece bien que a una persona que rotule en España en castellano se le multe (II.1269-1271)

All these expressions presuppose –i.e. establish as a logical premise– the fact that Catalonians are Spaniards or that Catalonia is Spain, which is precisely the object of dispute. And this is indeed the force of implicit meanings: they establish as agreed what actually is the object of discussion.

In the polarized representation of the situation **deixis** also plays an important role in aligning the speaker with the audience or disaligning the opponent from the audience, as well as de/aligning the speaker to/with the opponent. Deixis also merits a further observation in terms of the **un/personalization of attacks**: by shifting it, candidates can be represented as standing out from their group or not. In this block, as in other blocks, we can observe a difference in the use of deixis: RJ mainly personalizes his attacks

against ZP (*usted*) more than against PSOE (*ustedes*), while ZP mainly depersonalizes his attacks against PP (*ustedes*) more than RJ (*usted*). This responds to RJ's strategy of **distancing ZP from PSOE and from his electors**, in order to present him as *the* problem and not to threaten electors' face. On the other hand ZP prefers to link RJ to the past (AP, Francoism, Aznar) and to the negative features it represents. Obviously, these are general trends and ZP often shifts *ustedes*→*usted* to personalize his attacks against RJ.

I wish to draw attention to the role played by metapragmatic statements<sup>225</sup> regarding who said what at what time. They are crucial in that ethos is constructed discursively, i.e. candidates *are* what they say and *how* they say it (mainly at a verbal level, but also at a proxemic level, and in particular paralanguage and kinesics). See, for instance what I noted above regarding the abusive argument. In this sense there is a passage of particular interest, where we can observe a high concentration of these statements: RJ denies having said that *España se rompe*, as ZP claimed. But in order to support the argument that Spain is being broken up, he reports the speeches of some **PSOE veterans** that criticized ZP's institutional policies:

[...] Mire usted, usted ha dicho que España, me ha imputado que España... que yo dijera que España se rompía. Yo nunca he dicho eso y va a tener que demostrarlo usted, pero ¿sabe usted quién dijo que en España se está centrifugando el Estado? Felipe González. Que el señor Zapatero ha abierto el melón del Estado sin saber a dónde van, don... el señor Leguina. Lo que está pasando en España se parece a la disolución de la Unión Soviética, don Alfonso Guerra. El Estado se está fragmentando, el señor Leguina, pero usted sigue diciendo que estamos muy unidos. Pues mire, el 25 de octubre de este año hay convocado un referéndum de separación en el País Vasco y no lo convocó Batasuna, lo convocó el lehendakari del Gobierno Vasco. ¿Sigue usted creyendo que estamos muy unidos? Y un socio de gobierno suyo, el vicepresidente del Gobierno de Cataluña ha anunciado otro referéndum para el año 2014, ¿sigue usted creyendo que estamos muy unidos? Mire usted, yo no he dicho nunca que la transición se hizo mal y que España no estaba cuajada, eso lo ha dicho usted, yo no he dado a entender [...] a los nacionalistas que me proponía a refutar España, ha sido usted [...].

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<sup>225</sup> On metapragmatic statements in politics see Wortham & Locher (1999).

Yo no he dicho que los vascos tuvieran el derecho a decidir, ni los extremeños, ni los murcianos, ha sido usted. (I.1089-1111)

RJ's metapragmatic statements serve four different aims: 1) to present ZP as a liar (usted ha dicho, [...] yo nunca he dicho eso y va a tener que demostrarlo usted); 2) to present ZP as naive, constructing an opposition between what ZP says (usted sigue diciendo que estamos muy unidos) and reality (hay convocado un referendum de separación), and therefore dealigning him from PSOE's audience and especially **distancing him from his own party**; 3) to corroborate his arguments by reporting the speeches of PSOE veterans on the risk of secession; 4) to represent ZP as a threat to the unity of Spain (yo no he dicho nunca que la transición se hizo mal y que España no estaba cuajada, eso lo ha dicho usted) through the reporting of ZP's speeches. Quoting the opponent's speech is a very effective move, since it obliges the opponent to align with it: indeed he cannot deny or refute it without seeming problematically incoherent or a liar.

Further observations must be made about the discourse produced and spread in terms of **ideological convergence and discourse hybridation**. Since PP and PSOE are catch-all parties, their electoral strategy is to catch wavering voters, i.e. the less ideologized and therefore the most *central*, i.e. those closest to (or rather less far from) the other party's positions. For this reason parties that are already becoming increasingly similar (because they share more and more ideological features, such as Neoliberalism, human rights protection, etc.) try to moderate their discourses during elections. One of the outcomes of this premise is that PP and PSOE fight to occupy the center. This outcome is visible in the fact that discourses already similar in the arguments used, given the characteristics of the communicative event and the polarized situation, become increasingly hybridized in themes and formulas.

One of the principal moves in the construction of presidentiability is for a candidate to build his *centerness* or moderation, i.e. his relative position in the center of political spectrum. Since there is general agreement on moderation or centerness as a fundamental attribute of a president, presenting a candidate as radical delegitimizes him, whilst presenting him as moderate legitimizes him. As a consequence of this we can observe how the candidates accuse each other of being radical and presenting themselves as moderate. The first example comes from ZP, who, in order to draw attention to RJ's regressive and conservative nature, refers to **his past in AP**. Since AP

emerged from the ashes of the Francoist regime, and that there is a majority opinion that Francoism was negative, this reference to AP linking PP to Francoism could be very pernicious for RJ, who through a *tu quoque* argument accuses ZP of the same, i.e. of being radical, attempting to damage his image with reference to PSOE's Marxist past, the premise being that Marxism was radical and therefore bad (I.1049-1055):

RJ: [...] Fui vicepresidente de la Xunta...

ZP: [...] sí, como Alianza Popular, que fue militante de Alianza Popular [...]

RJ: y el PSOE era marxista hace 30 años

ZP: [...] sí, pero usted era de Alianza Popular

Since a center candidate receives more votes, the battle for the center proves crucial in the strategy of self-legitimation. At various stages of the debate RJ describes ZP as radical and therefore unpresidentiable, for having reached agreements with radical parties such as ERC or IU (I.1187-1188). The fight for the center also emerges in the second debate, where ZP, in response to RJ's accusation of breaking agreements, presents PSOE as a dialoguing party and situates it at the ***center of the Spanish political spectrum***:

Usted se atreve a hablar de nuestro modelo de España, de los consensos constitucionales, señor Rajoy, ¡Pero si el PSOE es el eje central de la democracia en España! [RJ: el eje central...] [...]

Un partido que ha estado en todos como eje central (II.1090-1101)

This move of self-legitimation (PSOE as *the central axis of Spanish democracy*) and the following **accusations of extremism** between the two candidates corroborate the importance of centerness and prove the efforts each party makes to present itself as the "center". RJ's quick denial that PSOE is the center is coherent with De Santiago-Guervós' observations on **PP's ongoing obsession for occupying the center** since it was first founded. As a result RJ is eager to fight ZP for the center of Spanish political spectrum:

RJ: Dice que el PSOE es el centro o el eje central, mire, perdone usted, sinceramente, en el centro de este país en este momento está el PP

ZP: No.

RJ: sí, lo que pasa es que usted pierde perspectiva porque se ha ido muy, muy hacia el extremo y entonces nos ve en otro lugar.

ZP: No. Ustedes están en la derecha, en la derecha (II.1130-1138)

As the previous passage shows, each candidate tries to occupy the center and displace the opponent to the right or the left. Interestingly enough openly speaks of the “extreme”. Again, presidentiability management is two-fold: **occupation of the center and self-presentation as moderate** go hand in hand with the accusation of **radicalism or extremism**.

As a corollary of the convergence to the center, we can also witness the increasing **hybridation of discourse**<sup>226</sup>. One example of this is what RJ said regarding who is responsible for decisions regarding the unity of Spain: *decidimos todos y cada uno de los españoles* (I.1115). Now compare this expression with one of the 14 slogans of ZP’s campaign<sup>227</sup>, which reads “vivimos juntos, decidimos juntos”. This slogan quoted a statement made by ZP in response to the rejection of the *Plan Ibarretxe* in the Spanish Parliament on 1 February 2005. The Plan Ibarretxe was a proposal to reform the existing Statute of the Basque Country (1979). The plan, presented by the then president of the Basque Government Juan José Ibarretxe, was perceived as being overly independentist and was rejected by the Spanish Parliament, with PSOE, PP and IU voting against it. RJ and ZP coincide in their choice of words, indicating ideological convergence and the hybridation of discourse.

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<sup>226</sup> Obviously this is a trend and in no way implies that they are *completely* similar.

<sup>227</sup> Under the general slogan “Motivos para Creer”, the slogans for the 2008 electoral campaign were the following: “Por todo lo que merece la pena”; “Comprometidos con la Igualdad”; “Vivimos juntos, decidimos juntos”; “No es lo mismo”; “Porque lo estamos consiguiendo”; “Somos más”; “Soñar con los pies en la tierra”; “Por todo lo logrado”; “Por el pleno empleo”; “Porque no está todo hecho”; “La octava potencia económica, la primera en derechos sociales”; “Ahora que avanzamos, por qué retroceder”; “Podemos llegar tan lejos como queramos”.

## 11. CONCLUSIONS. Presidentiability, the field, and the ideological convergence

### 11.1. Introducing the conclusions

This dissertation began with a discussion on the structure and the working of the field of Spanish institutional Politics. This field works as a field of battle where candidates, the main actors, together with journalists, fight for power by imposing their principles of vision and division of the world, i.e. their ideology on a majority of citizens. I based the discussion on two main concepts drawn from Bourdieu's sociology: field and capital. Candidates try to modify the relations of force of the field. In particular they fight for political capital, which is a particular form of symbolic capital based on recognizability and (good) reputation. Thanks to the convertibility of capital, political capital can be converted into social capital, i.e. votes, which in representative democracies *represent* the social support of a party.

In order to connect the structure and the functioning of the field with the functioning of a particular discursive practice such as that of the debate, it was necessary to enhance the scope of the concept of capital; for this reason I have related it to the concepts of *face*, which highlights the interactivity of social encounters and the reference to more or less socially shared attributes, and with that of *ethos*, which refers more widely to the role of discourse and argumentation as well as pre-discourse in the construction of speaker's credibility. These three concepts have allowed me to articulate the discussion around the interactivity of the debates and face-working and around the analysis of the main argumentative-discursive devices employed for managing *presidentiability*. This latter term must be understood as subsuming the three concepts of political capital, face and ethos, integrating and enhancing the main theoretical and operational reaches of the three concepts: the link with the field structure and with its main stake (political capital), interactivity, and discursivity.

The main ideas underlying this work are that politics is a competitive game and that the game is conducted mainly through discourse and also symbols. The description of the structure and the working of political field as a competitive zero-sum game, where candidates fight for capital can help to explain why politicians are constantly engaged in positive self-presentation and negative presentation of the other: candidates acquire capital by detracting it from their opponents. I have called this process presidentiability management. The de/increasing of presidentiability is related to the

main features of ideological discourse, i.e. de/legitimation. This process preludes the extra-discursive legitimation that candidates receive by the fact of being voted.

Given the centrality of the structure of the political field in explaining candidates' interaction on the front-stage of the debates, I have extensively described and analyzed the Spanish party system and the political-administrative structure, providing information about the main electoral processes at national, regional, provincial and municipal levels. Through charts and figures I have shown the relations of force between the main actors of Spanish political field, and hence the monopoly exerted by PP and PSOE on the Spanish politics. I have analyzed in great detail the main Spanish parties and the relations of force between them; in particular I have shown the systemic links between the results of the three parties (PP-PSOE; PP-UCD; PSOE-IU) and the duopoly of PP and PSOE, as it emerged in 1993. This duopoly was sanctioned by the 1993 televised debates and consolidated by the 2008 debates.

The theoretical framework presented, where the term *presidentiability* subsumes the concepts of political capital, face and ethos, has had its logical counterpart in the analytical tools I have employed for the analysis. Trying to compensate the limits of an analysis that could have proved overly textual, I have employed an interactional analytical approach and a discursive analytical approach. All the tools employed were at the crossroads of many disciplines, mainly Sociolinguistics, Pragmatics, Semantics, Semiotics, Argumentation, and Rhetoric.

In the part most properly dedicated to the analysis, I have firstly pointed out some of the main features of the debates. They are to be seen as a *front-stage* where candidates enact their identities and thus construct their *presidentiability* through an interaction that is mainly verbal. In particular I have framed the debate as a mediatized communicative (pseudo)event, i.e. as an event created with the sole aim of being talked about. From this perspective, I have highlighted the mediatization, personalization, and rituality of the Spanish politics, conceiving the debate as a ritual of confrontation based on myths such as the existence of opposing parties and the citizens' freedom of choice. I have also recalled the role of debates in perpetuating the Spanish two-party political system.

I have described the structure of the debates, focusing in particular on their thematic organization. In line with the design of the dissertation, constructed as a triangular discussion around the attributes of the *presidentiable*, the themes about which the *presidentiability* is constructed and the discursive devices employed, I have

dedicated part of my discussion to the topics. In order to frame the debate as a homological representation of the Spanish political field, I have shown the relationship between the themes and the traditional and new cleavages of Spanish society. The main topics on which presidentiability is constructed during the debates are the same as those employed during the rest of the campaign: the economy, immigration, terrorism and the unity of Spain. All four topics were deeply entrenched in the discourse circulating in Spain during the period of the election campaign and were related to the traditional cleavages defining and distinguishing the main Spanish parties.

In the four analytical chapters I have analyzed the way the two candidates have managed presidentiability in relation to the 4 main themes, namely the attributes they have invoked, how they have interacted, the moves employed by the candidates in implementing their strategies, and the argumentative-discursive devices they deployed in order to increase their presidentiability and detract from that of their opponent.

After this short overview I will proceed now to draw the main conclusions.



## 11.2. The main values invoked through the attribute of the presidentialiable

Candidates have managed their presidentialiability in both negative terms, detracting from that of their opponent, and in a positive manner, building up their own, in relation with the following general and particular attributes:

**RJ→ZP:** inactive; incapable; indifferent; unrealistic; a liar; not keeping his promises; confusing priorities; distant from laymen; a divider; unaware; lax; incoherent; inconsistent; feeble; a bad debater (does not speak about what matters); a non-patriot (not defending Spain and Spaniards' interests); a villain (negotiates with terrorists); removed from victims; a divider (breaking a traditional PP-PSOE agreement; dividing the Spanish); inexperienced; frivolous; naive; opportunistic; isolated; irresponsible; radical; antidemocratic.

**RJ→RJ:** active; capable; strict; close to laymen; a patriot (defending Spain and Spaniards' interests); a good debater; a hero (fights against terrorists); strong; close to victims; moderate; a unifier (defends traditional PP-PSOE agreements; unifies Spaniards); selfless; realistic; capable; sincere.

**ZP→RJ:** unsupportive; far from laymen; a pretender; an unfair player (disloyal); a divider; a liar; authoritarian; ineffective; incoherent; incapable; xenophobic; a centralist; conservative; regressive (past, Francoism); undemocratic; threat to freedom and joy; pessimistic; radical; opportunistic.

**ZP→ZP:** supportive; close to laymen; a fair player (loyal); sincere; open to dialogue; optimistic; tolerant; a good-debater; capable; effective; pacifist; a patriot; democratic; progressive; a defender of freedom and joy; a peripheralist; a unifier (traditional PP-PSOE agreements; unifies Spaniards economically); moderate; selfless.

As we can see, and coherently with the observations made in the previous chapters, candidates have referred mainly to the same attributes, except for some differences in the main frames used, such as those of the nurturing or strict father<sup>228</sup>.

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<sup>228</sup> Moreover, not all the attributes have been mobilized at the same time for all the terrains of struggle.

### 11.3. The main devices employed for constructing presidentiability

Candidates have used many devices for managing their presidentiability; the following lines provide a summary of the most important ones. Yet before doing so, two observations must be made. Firstly, these devices should not be seen as belonging to closed categories; they are instead intertwined and work on different planes of the process of constructing meaning, so, for example, the topic of uniqueness is inserted into narratives through the use of certain quantifiers and deixis, etc.

Secondly, the differences and analogies between the first and second debates must be considered. Even though both debates follow essentially the same patterns, implementing the same strategies, making almost the same moves and deploying practically the same devices even in relation to different themes, it would nevertheless be a mistake to consider them as perfectly equal. A week elapsed between the first and second debates, and the candidates have received feedback on the impressions they made on lay and expert audiences. It is therefore reasonable to assume that debaters have changed or corrected some stances, modifying their style in line with the comments that appeared on the news or in other media on the debates, etc. This point is essential for recognizing the dynamicity of the construction of discourse, the circulation of metadiscourses about the debate, the complexity (non-linearity) and stratification of discursive construction. Nevertheless, it is still possible to see a number of patterns in the discursive construction of presidentiability.

As for **arguments**, for instance, candidates have extensively used the *ad hominem* in all the three variants: *tu quoque*, *circumstantial*, and *abusive*. The first two variants have been used to demonstrate the opponent's incoherence, inconsistency, and opportunism, while the last one has been employed for directly destroying the opponent's credibility, as when RJ stated that ZP says meaningless things: *eso que usted dijo es lisa y llanamente una de esas cosas que usted dice y no significa nada* (II.1129-1130). Yet these direct attacks failed to be so efficient, and gave an aggressive image of RJ that could have been proved negative for his electoral results. In addition, *ad verecundiam* has been extensively used: as for the *ab auctoritate* variant, the candidates have referred to other politicians, newspapers or organisms such as the EU, UN, Banco de España, etc. often in connection with reported speech. As for *ad populum*, it has been mainly used for aligning with audience through references to the people: *todos lo han visto* (RJ.II.1198); *todos los españoles lo han escuchado* (ZP.I.1209).

The candidates made extensive use of **reported speech** either as an *argumentum ab auctoritate*, for instance quoting other's words to support their own argument or as circumstantial or *tu quoque* in order to demonstrate their opponent's incoherence. In this latter case, we should consider the quotation of the opponent's statements or key words, as when RJ entextualizes ZP's words *entendimiento*, *talante*, *convivencia*, in order to show his incoherence. This move, together with other metapragmatic moves, not only demonstrates the intrinsic dialogicity of the debates, their structural polyphony and interdiscursivity, but also the fact that the construction of presidentiality is mainly discursive. An example of this is ZP's move of quoting Elorriaga's statements in order to reveal PP's election strategy. In terms of reported speech mention must be made of all the **metapragmatic statements** such as "you said/I said" for their role in directing the debate, for instance in constructing the de/alignment with the opponent. Re-saying what has been said shows that *candidates are what they say* and *what they have said*, i.e. that the construction of ethos is discursive as well as pre-discursive. This kind of statements are used to deny, retract, corroborate, one's own previous statements or those of the opponent and serve as the main tools in de/increasing presidentiality.

A central role has been played by **narratives** such as "when I/we p(+), now you q(-)"; candidates have used different and often opposing narratives to describe the situation and actors in different ways that have de/legitimized them.

It is obvious that in a competitive situation where the main weapon is discourse, **lexical choice** is fundamental in the strategically polarized description of the world and actors, as well as for conveying particular ideological meanings. When RJ tries to get close to laymen, he uses simple terms, popular expressions, and refers to foods typical of laymen's diet (eggs, milk, and potatoes), a move that will be imitated by ZP for the same reason. For instance, in delegitimizing ZP, RJ says that ZP *entertained* himself with issues *nobody cares about*, denoting a lack of the sense of duty. Particular lexical choice could be used to describe reality in positive or negative terms, such as when ZP uses *desaceleración* and RJ *crisis* to refer to the drop in the same macro-economic indicators.

Among the lexical choices, particular mention must be made of the **metaphor**, for its power in shaping the phenomenon it refers to and directing human attitudes and responses to such descriptions. Apart from metaphors on immigration (*threat*, *danger*) that allow RJ to describe ZP as inactive, or the metaphor of *allergy*, according to which PP is unable to talk, one metaphor is particularly interesting since it appeared twice in

issues concerning Nationalism (once for terrorism and once for the Catalan question): that of *aprendiz de brujo* [sorcerer's apprentice] used by RJ to criticize ZP as being inexperienced and irresponsible.

As a particular kind of lexical choice, at the crossroads between pragmatics and semantics, we can consider those expressions that trigger particular **presumptive meanings**, verbs like *continuar*, or the metaphor of *encarrilar*, etc. These devices are important for their ability to surreptitiously persuade receivers by constructing common ground meanings in issues that are the object of dispute. If we consider RJ's following statement *Sobre España decidimos todos y cada uno de los españoles* (I.1112-1115), the expression presupposes that Catalonians are Spaniards, which is precisely the object of the dispute. The force of implicit meanings lies in forcing hearers to take as agreed, as common ground, the very object of discussion.

In the polarized representation of the situation **deixis** is also important in aligning the speaker to the audience, dealigning the opponent from the audience or de/aligning the speaker from/with the opponent. If we look carefully at how speakers have used it, we can notice some differences between the two candidates: even though he sometimes widens his criticisms to PSOE with a plural *you*, RJ mainly personalizes his attacks against ZP through the use of a singular *you*; in referring to himself he mostly uses *I* and uses *we* for creating a community and aligning with Spaniards. In contrast, ZP mainly criticizes PP rather than RJ, using the plural instead of the singular *you* and mostly uses *we* instead of *I*, widening the self-reference to his Government or PSOE. ZP also uses *we* to align himself with the Spanish. This **personalization** in deixis is the result of the personalization of politics, which reduces complex disputes to an easily understandable "fight between you and me". However, this strategic de/personalization of attacks also has other functions. In line with the main PP electoral strategy of separating ZP from other PSOE executives, cardholders and electors, RJ personalizes his attacks, highlighting ZP's agency in the negative situation. By doing so, RJ reduces ZP's face and leadership, which is one of his main electoral assets and avoids threatening the face of PSOE voters, to whom he also addresses his discourse. Equally, RJ's personalization in referring to himself (*I*) is aimed at increasing his instable and disputed leadership within PP. We can see the opposite in ZP's discourse: he mainly depersonalizes his attacks against PP, preferring to flatten RJ against a group (PP), which allows him not to draw attention to his leadership and referring to the entire history of the party also in relation with Aznar or even Francoism. Obviously, RJ also occasionally refers to PP as

a group (*we*), depersonalizes his attacks against PSOE (plural *you*) and ZP also personalizes his attacks on RJ (singular *you*) or uses *I* for self-reference.

Another particular kind of lexical choice, this time at the crossroads between semantics and rhetoric, are the **quantifiers** (*todo, nada, ningún, único, siempre, nunca*, etc.): they have proved crucial in the strategic description of actors. They are related to the **topic of quality** and **quantity**, and in particular to that of **uniqueness**: together they contributed to absolutizing the positive or negative dispositions of the candidates and persons described.

Finally, one more rhetorical device needs to be mentioned due to its role in the construction of presidentiability: **disclaimers**. They are used to balance the image of the speaker between two different representations or when invoking two contrasting attributes. There is a clear example of this in the block on immigration: RJ says that *immigrants contribute, but they are needy*: the first part is a concession that creates a positive image of immigrants, through which RJ refers to attributes such as solidarity and tolerance, while the second part, by portraying immigrants as needy, entailing that they drain the social services, gives a negative image of immigrants and preludes the reference to the attribute of strictness. The disclaimer thus balances strictness with tolerance. ZP uses the same structure albeit with a different aim when he says *he fights strongly against illegal immigration, but immigrants are productive*. The first part, a concession to the need for controlling immigration, allows him to present himself as being strict, while the second part, by representing immigrants as productive, and therefore implying that they are beneficial, allows ZP to refer to the attribute of tolerance. In doing so, ZP balances strictness with tolerance. Through these moves, candidates can stay at the center and create a discourse characterized by *centerness*. This moves shows ideological convergence and the hybridization of discourse, which will be discussed in the following section.

#### 11.4. The discourse produced: hybridization and ideological convergence

The discourse that the two candidates produce and disseminate on the front-stage of the debates is characterized by two main features: **hybridization** and **ideological convergence**; both features are related: the former refers to the existence in one candidate's discourse of topics and expressions traditionally belonging to the opponent's discourse and the latter to the ideological similarity of the discourses produced by the candidates.

For instance, we can see RJ discursively presenting himself as a “lefty”. Since PP's overarching strategy is to distance ZP from previous PSOE voters, RJ tries to present himself as close to laymen as possible. He does so by *speaking* the language of the people (*apretase le cinturón*) and referring to the issues that concern them (mortgages, prices, etc.). However, he also *speaks* the language of the Left, for instance referring to social inequalities or the redistribution of wealth. These statements *apparently* in favor of the poorer segments of society are in line with the global strategy of presidentiability management, whereby RJ presents ZP as being removed laymen. In order to win votes from ZP, RJ portrays him as having betrayed laymen and insufficiently left wing, whilst at the same time portraying himself as the new defender of former voters of the Left, employing a discourse peppered with “lefty” words and topics.

Nevertheless, despite this discursive hybridation where lefty words appear in RJ's discourse, ideological convergence is rather a movement towards the Right. In line with his Neoliberal ideology, RJ does not aim to solve the **divide between rich and poor**, which is a constant feature of Neoliberal societies; instead he exploits it for his own electoral ends. The dynamics of the debate seem to prove that both candidates converge on this: the **war of figures** and mutual accusations about rising prices, mortgages, housing, etc. show that prices have risen, housing is hard to get, social services have diminished and the Spanish have become poorer, regardless of who is in power.

Yet there are also other ways of constructing and spreading ideologically marked assumptions that are accepted as common ground throughout the debate: an example is the thematic organization of the debate: treating separately the economy and social policies in two blocks demonstrates that both candidates, despite their attempt to present themselves as being close to laymen, conceive the wellbeing of citizens, as being separate from the economy. This formal organization of the debate reveals the candidates' acceptance of Neoliberal postulates.

From this perspective, the exclusion of Gaspar Llamazares (IU) cancelled any ideological alternative to the undisputedly assumed Neoliberal values, on which PP and PSOE seem to vary only in terms of degrees.

Another clear example of hybridization and ideological convergence is the way both candidates handle the issue of immigration. Besides the superficial differences, where RJ negatively presents immigrants as a problem (for the safety of the country or for the feasibility of social policies) and ZP presents them positively as a resource, in reality both representations are based on the same ideological assumptions. In this case too, both candidates **hybridize** their discourse: RJ balances his racist positions with mitigating disclaimers and by framing immigration as a matter of realism and pragmatism; ZP balances his lefty and tearful representation of immigrants as fleeing hunger with references to strictness, realism and pragmatism, which is a form of *rightization*. It can be seen that each candidate hybridizes his discourse with his opponent's stances in a move determined by the nature of the Spanish political field, and in particular the fact that both PP and PSOE are catch-all parties.

Again this hybridization does not exclude **ideological convergence** towards Neoliberalism. On the one hand, RJ's strategy of **shifting the burden** for the worsening of Spaniards conditions of life determined by cuts to social services, allows him to save Neoliberalism and its policies of weakening the State role in balancing market-determined inequalities, privatizing and marketizing social services. On the other hand, ZP's representation of **immigrants as workers**, under the superficial enactment of a positive attitude towards immigration, actually conceals the assumption of Neoliberal ideological perspectives. Openness to immigrants is based not on humanitarianism but on economicism: immigrants are a resource and they are good if and only if they pay our pensions.

Ideological convergence is also evident in the way candidates categorize immigrants as legal/illegal, assuming the same ideological definitions; in the way they conceive on the **aids to developing countries** as a counterpart for repatriations of illegal immigrants; and in the role that both candidates assign to the **EU as ultimate authority on Spanish immigration policies**.

We can see that, despite the efforts to enact opposition, the ideological assumptions underlying the discourse of both candidates are widely shared. Obviously, this ideological concomitance becomes visible in the candidates' discourse: both use the same categories, such as *legal-illegal*, the same arguments such as the reproaches as to

who legalized more illegal immigrants, and the same expressions, such as the metaphor of the *coladero*. The **war of figures** about how many illegal immigrants have been legalized indicates that both candidates assume that legalizing immigrants detracts from their presidentiality.

Another very clear example of ideological convergence is the fight for the center. It is clear that *centerization* of political positions is not only an attempt to avoid overly radical stances in order to gain the majority of electors by catching wavering ones (less ideologized, hence “moderate”), supposed to be in the center of the political spectrum; it is rather a real shift in parties’ ideologies. This also is due to the way the political field functions: as PP and PSOE are catch-all parties and since electoral victory mainly lies in the occupation of the center, PP and PSOE increasingly lean toward similar positions in a growing trend towards conservatism: preserving the status quo, erasing alternative visions, and never questioning the basic pillars of the present capitalist world order. This centerization is especially serious for the Left, since it implies a definite shift to the Right. The fight to occupy the center and efforts to avoid overly radical positions is corroborated by similarities in the discourse of both PP and PSOE.

These similarities include the arguments, the discursive devices employed, the subjacent categories of their discourse and the terms used. For instance, one of the moves employed by candidates in de/legitimizing the other is to present themselves as moderate (situated in the center) and presenting the other as radical (situated either to the Right or Left). In the first debate ZP reproaches RJ for his relationship with AP and RJ accuses ZP of being Marxist; in the second debate ZP and RJ fight to present their party as being situated at the center of Spanish politics, whilst situating their opponent’s party at one of the two poles of the spectrum, i.e. the Right or Left. These similarities are determined by the specific structures of the field and of the debate as particular communicative practice, which is entirely entrenched in the field and which homologically represents it.



### 11.5. Contribution to the academic field, limitations and further developments

The major **contribution** of this study is the light it will help to shed on the Spanish political field in contemporary late capitalistic society, showing its structure, functioning, and specificities, in relation with its particular historical and cultural features. From this perspective, by considering the way candidates construct their discourse in relation to certain attributes and themes, this dissertation can also provide cultural and sociological insights into the values perceived or constructed as relevant by political organizations, providing a deeper vision of contemporary Spanish society and the representations circulating within it.

One of the aims of this dissertation was to contribute to the analysis of political discourse by providing a record of the main rhetoric-discursive strategies, moves and devices used in the 2008 election campaign. Furthermore, it attempts to contribute to the theory of political discourse analysis throughout the articulation of a multidisciplinary framework that by integrating different but related theoretical backgrounds is able to correlate the social structure and the discourse produced at a certain point of the social organization in a particular communicative event. As for this latter point, the present study was intended to add to the wide literature on presidential debates in Western countries; in particular, it aspired to providing a major historic record of a particular moment in Spanish democracy, namely the 2008 general elections.

In terms of advocacy, and linked to my personal activism, this work intended to provide a coherent theoretically-based argument to the discussions of alternative groups on the workings of the institutional political field, shedding light on the idea often put forward that PP and PSOE have become increasingly similar. From this perspective, I tried to prove this point through a detailed analysis of the political field and of the discourse produced in it.

I am well aware that, despite my efforts, this work suffers many **limitations**. From a methodological perspective, my multidisciplinary theoretical framework could seem too undisciplined; it could also seem too deterministic in the way it postulates that the social structure mainly determines the way discourse is constructed on the front-stage of the debates. My analytical approach could seem overly textual, even despite my attempts to balance it with interactive approaches that insisted on the dialogicity of the stance-taking and of the face-work. My analysis could seem to have paid scant attention to the multimodality of audiovisual data and to the paralinguistic and kinetic features of such a complex communicative event as a debate. From the perspective of the textual

organization of this work, it is possible to find the analytical chapters difficult to read, due to the many excerpts presented, the density of the information provided and some repetitions. I chose to present the analysis in this detailed but somehow uneasy way with the idea of showing as much as possible that my claims were based on a fine-grained analysis of data. It is also possible to observe a certain imbalance between chapters, in particular chapters 8 and 10 that address the topics of immigration and Catalan question, which are far longer than those dealing with the economy (7) or terrorism (9). In the case of the latter, for example, following the permanent truce declared by ETA, the sociological, cultural and political salience and topical interest of terrorism seems to have reduced dramatically, especially compared to the former topics, which are of major relevance in present day Spain. Moreover, and with regards to immigration and the Catalan question, I must admit that they fit in better than others with my personal interest in nations and nationalisms, on the construction of otherness and the treatment of the other; in particular they seem to me of special interest in that they clash with internationalism and class-based categorization of society that should prevail in left wing parties. Therefore, their interest lies in the institutional Left's inability to produce emergent discourses on global poverty and inequalities as a consequence of the abandoning of a principle of vision and division of the world based on socio-economical categories such as that of *class*.

**Further development** of this work would include a comparative analysis of the 2008 debates with the other Spanish presidential debates (1993 and 2011), in order to see the analogies and differences; to contrast the validity of the basic assumption posited here that the structure of political field mainly determines the way candidates construct their discourse; to observe the contextual specificities concerning the topics treated and attributes invoked, and therefore to note any historical continuities or breaking points. It would also be of undoubted interest to compare the 2008 debates with the debates of other countries in order to contrast the discursive behavior of candidates on the front-stage of the debates, revealing the analogies and differences and to determine which are related to historical, cultural and geographic idiosyncrasies or particularities.

At the time of writing the Spanish political panorama has experienced dramatic change. The movement of *indignados* that emerged on 15 May 2011 and referred to *15M* has finally concretized into a new political party, called *Podemos*, which is changing the Spanish field and its relations of force. The 15M and Podemos have

highlighted the erosion of the two party system and a desire for new political options and new political discourses, beyond the ideological convergence of PP and PSOE towards the center, clearly represented by the expression “PPSOE”, where the parties’ names are fused into one in order to show their sameness (see, for instance, Hughes 2011; De Nieves 2013). Consequently, after two legislatures by PP, after the emerging of new political forces that represent the 15M claims, in the light of the 2008 global economic crises, with the rise of a *new (lefty) populism* characterized by its proximity to laymen’s demands<sup>229</sup>, it may be necessary to completely rethink this work, which, on reaching its conclusion, appears only to have arrived at a new starting point.

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<sup>229</sup> The term *populism* has here a new meaning that challenges the traditionally negative definitions (Gerbaudo 2015; Laclau 2005).

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## Appendix I. First debate

### Transcription of the first presidential debate between Mariano Rajoy and José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero (22:00h, Monday 25 February 2008)<sup>1</sup>

#### PRIMERA PARTE

##### 1. APERTURA

1 **Manuel Campo Vidal (MCV):** Bienvenidos todos al primer debate  
2 electoral cara-a-cara, antes de las elecciones del 9 de marzo,  
3 en en... en este caso de los candidatos a la presidencia del  
4 gobierno en un debate organizado por la Academia de las  
5 Ciencias y las Artes de Televisión. Han pasado casi 15 años  
6 desde aquellos cara-a-cara Felipe González-Aznar y por fin  
7 recuperamos los ciudadanos la oportunidad de escuchar frente a  
8 frente los candidatos de las formaciones políticas con mayor  
9 representación parlamentaria. Este es en España el primer  
10 debate del siglo XXI de esta envergadura. Este es el primer  
11 debate de esta naturaleza en la era de la información así que  
12 tenemos que saludar a los telespectadores, a los oyentes de  
13 radio y también a los internautas. Telespectadores de las más  
14 de 30 televisiones que nos siguen en España: 3 generalistas  
15 nacionales, la 1, 4, y la sexta, varias autonómicas,  
16 Telemadrid, Televisión de Galicia, de Asturias, Castilla la  
17 Mancha, Canal Nou, IB3 de Baleares, de Murcia, de Extremadura y  
18 también televisión Castilla y León, televisiones de ámbito  
19 nacional, televisión nacional terrestre, tdt, como VeoTV y  
20 NetTV así como cadenas de televisiones locales, TDT's,  
21 autonómicas y de grandes ciudades hasta superar el número de  
22 30. Un saludo también a los telespectadores que nos siguen  
23 desde otros países, en Europa y en América, a través de los  
24 canales internacionales de TVE y del canal Antena 3  
25 Internacional, y a los que reciben la señal en varios países de  
26 forma fragmentada, fragmentos de este debate. Por ejemplo en  
27 Portugal, en México, en Alemania, en Italia, en Austria y en  
28 otros países. Sus equipos profesionales están aquí con nosotros  
29 hoy en Madrid. Un saludo también a los que prefieren escuchar,  
30 seguir este debate a través de la radio. Oyentes de Cadena Ser,  
31 de RNE, de Onda Cero, de Cope, Punto Radio, Cataluña Radio, RAC  
32 U, IBE3 y otras emisoras. Y bienvenidos los internautas de todo  
33 el mundo, que siguen, a través de medios digitales este debate.  
34 Un debate verdaderamente global, podríamos decir. Todos los  
35 medios tecnológicos y ninguna frontera. En la historia  
36 electoral española quedará la fecha de hoy, 25 de febrero del  
37 2008, como el día en que se reanudaron los cara-a-cara entre  
38 candidatos a la Presidencia del Gobierno de España. Nuestro  
39 agradecimiento, desde la Academia, a los dos partidos  
40 políticos, que nos han honrado con su confianza. También a  
41 todas las televisiones, a todas las empresas, a todos los  
42 profesionales, entre ellos muchos académicos actuando de forma  
43 voluntaria, que han hecho posible que pusiéramos en marcha este  
44 complejo dispositivo solo en diez días del momento en que se  
45 produjo la aceptación por parte de los dos partidos. Y de forma  
46 especial, cómo no, nuestra gratitud a los dos candidatos. Sin  
47 su aprobación, sin su decisión final, y tenemos entendido que  
48 de forma personal, estos cara-a-cara tan esperados no podrían  
49 ser una realidad. Buenas noches José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero.  
50 **José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero (ZP):** Buenas noches.

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<sup>1</sup> Video available at: <http://www.rtve.es/alacarta/videos/elecciones-20-n/primer-debate-zapatero-rajoy-2008-integro/1240401/>

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51 **MCV:** Debo pedirle que durante esta media hora del debate  
52 acepte, por favor, que le trate solamente como el candidato del  
53 PSOE y no como presidente del Gobierno en funciones.

54 **ZP:** Por supuesto.

55 **MCV:** Muy bien. Gracias. Bienvenido Mariano Rajoy, candidato del  
56 PP.

57 **Mariano Rajoy (RJ):** Muchas gracias, buenas noches.

58 **MCV:** Buenas noches. También gracias por su confianza y por su  
59 decisión personal de aceptar este cara a cara organizado por la  
60 Academia de Televisión. Bien, los candidatos conocen las reglas  
61 del juego, conocen que básicamente lo que aquí se pretende es  
62 la voluntad de ser estrictos en la administración de los  
63 tiempos, y por supuesto equilibradísimos, y la petición de que  
64 en ningún caso haya alusiones personales como estamos seguros  
65 que así será. Tendremos una primera intervención de los  
66 candidatos, digamos de situación, de apertura del debate, y al  
67 final otra intervención, también de tres minutos mirando al  
68 futuro. Pero en medio habrá un debate cruzado, muy intenso,  
69 esperamos cómo no, estamos en elecciones y hay cosas  
70 importantes que decir, con réplicas y con contrarréplicas sobre  
71 cinco bloques importantes: el primero, economía y empleo;  
72 después políticas sociales; política exterior y seguridad;  
73 política institucional y posteriormente los retos del futuro.  
74 Señoras y señores, sin más preámbulos el debate comienza. Según  
75 lo acordado, Mariano Rajoy abrirá todos los turnos y los  
76 cerrará todos los turnos el señor Rodríguez Zapatero, y la  
77 próxima semana, en el segundo debate será justo a la inversa.  
78 Primera intervención de Mariano Rajoy, por tanto. Vamos a  
79 comenzar. Defínanos, por favor, a su juicio, dónde estamos, el  
80 país, nuestra situación, nuestra perspectiva, es la apertura  
81 del debate. La palabra para Mariano Rajoy, candidato del PP.

82 **RJ:** Buenas noches. A ustedes qué les parece, ¿estamos mejor que  
83 hace cuatro años? Depende de a quién le hagamos la pregunta. Si  
84 se la hacemos al señor Zapatero nos dirá que estamos en el  
85 mejor de los mundos, pero si se la hacemos a la gente, a  
86 ustedes, algunos nos dirán que hay cosas que están bien, otras  
87 regular, y que en los últimos tiempos hay cosas que están mal y  
88 otras que están muy mal. Y eso se comprende, porque en los  
89 últimos tiempos han subido los precios, las hipotecas, vuelve  
90 el desempleo y hay muchos españoles que tienen muchas  
91 dificultades para llegar a fin de mes, y tienen que apretarse y  
92 muy mucho el cinturón. ¿Cómo se puede decir que España está muy  
93 bien?, ¿en qué otras materias de las verdaderamente importantes  
94 estamos bien, en Vivienda, en Educación? Estamos a la cola de  
95 Europa, según dicen los organismos internacionales. En  
96 Inmigración, toda Europa ha protestado por el desorden que  
97 provoca este gobierno y nosotros los sufrimos. En Seguridad, la  
98 inseguridad ciudadana crece de una manera alarmante e  
99 importamos delincuentes organizados en bandas muy violentas.  
100 ¿Qué es lo que ha hecho el Sr. Zapatero a lo largo de estos 4  
101 años además de discutir la Nación, y entretenerse con la  
102 Alianza de Civilizaciones, la Memoria Histórica u otras  
103 cuestiones? Ha hecho dos cosas, se ha centrado en dos cosas y  
104 las dos las ha hecho mal: la estructura de España y los tratos  
105 con ETA. Ha querido modificar por su cuenta el modelo de Estado  
106 y ha querido negociar con los terroristas por su cuenta. Ambas  
107 operaciones le han salido mal. Ninguna de esas dos cosas  
108 contaba con el apoyo de los electores, porque no figuraban en  
109 su programa electoral. Lo ha hecho sin encomendarse a nadie,  
110 por eso para salirse con la suya, necesitó romper todos los  
111 consensos de la Transición, incluido el Pacto contra el

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112 Terrorismo, para no tener testigos. Necesitó mentir a los  
113 españoles sobre lo que estaba haciendo, y necesitó dividir a la  
114 opinión pública para silenciar cualquier protesta. Ningún  
115 gobernante ha sembrado en la historia de la Transición Moderna  
116 tanta tensión y tanta cizaña, a la vez que hablaba de  
117 entendimiento, de talante y de convivencia. Ninguno ha  
118 transmitido a los españoles una sensación comparable de falta  
119 de rumbo, de improvisación y de vivir pendientes de la  
120 ocurrencia cotidiana. Sr. Zapatero, no estará de acuerdo  
121 conmigo. Espero que él exponga sus razones y no me critique a  
122 mí, que es lo que está haciendo normalmente. Él es el que  
123 estado gobernando en España. Yo les voy a decir de verdad, cómo  
124 veo las cosas. Voy a aportar mis soluciones, que pasan por un  
125 cambio de gobierno [MCV: vaya concluyendo quedan dos segundos],  
126 no lo puedo remediar quién lo ha causado. Vamos a elegir entre  
127 seguir dando bandazos o corregir el rumbo. Yo voy a proponerles  
128 un camino y la decisión es de ustedes.

129 MCV: Gracias Sr. Rajoy, ha cumplido el tiempo escrupulosamente.  
130 Tres minutos y un segundo, por tanto, perfecto. La palabra  
131 ahora, al candidato del Partido Socialista, José Luis Rodríguez  
132 Zapatero.

133 ZP: Buenas noches, me alegro que por fin tengamos este debate.  
134 Mi satisfacción no es por mí mismo, si no por los ciudadanos  
135 que van a poder comparar esta noche dos proyectos políticos  
136 bien definidos y diferentes. Curiosamente, es la primera vez  
137 que en los 30 años de democracia, comparecemos como candidatos  
138 a la presidencia de gobierno, dos personas que han estado en el  
139 Gobierno y en la Oposición. Por tanto, se nos va a poder  
140 examinar, no sólo por lo que decimos, sino, también por lo que  
141 hemos hecho en el Gobierno y en la Oposición. Por mi parte,  
142 vengo a pedir el respaldo para un proyecto que está en pleno  
143 desarrollo. Un proyecto ambicioso para España que necesita  
144 cuatro años más. Un proyecto para una España próspera y una  
145 España decente. España es un país que se ha convertido en la  
146 octava potencia económica del mundo. Hemos superado en renta  
147 per cápita a Italia, un país que atiende a los jóvenes, que ha  
148 creado tres millones de empleos en esta legislatura, más de la  
149 mitad para las mujeres. Un país que apoya a los mayores, en  
150 este período hemos subido las pensiones mínimas un 30%, la  
151 mayor subida de pensiones en una legislatura en la Democracia.  
152 Un país que defiende a las mujeres, con la histórica Ley de  
153 Igualdad. Un país que se preocupa por atender a las personas  
154 que no pueden valerse por sí mismo, con la Ley de la  
155 Dependencia. Un país que ha trabajado con diálogo social, hemos  
156 tenido el periodo de menos huelgas de la historia de la  
157 Democracia. Un país que apoya a los más necesitados, con el  
158 brazo de la sanidad pública, de la educación pública, de la  
159 seguridad pública. Esta es la tarea que hemos hecho. Hemos  
160 trabajado con firmeza, con convicción y con humildad. Y hemos  
161 tenido que superar obstáculos. El principal obstáculo ha sido  
162 una oposición que desde el primer día no aceptó el resultado  
163 electoral, que ha practicado el insulto personal, usted mismo,  
164 señor Rajoy, que es una barrera que no se puede traspasar en  
165 democracia. Que ha crispado, que ha enfrentado a ciudadanos de  
166 unas comunidades con otras, que se ha movido entre la mentira y  
167 la exageración, que no ha dado respaldo al Gobierno en ninguna  
168 de las grandes cuestiones de Estado, que no ha dudado de  
169 utilizar el terrorismo con fines partidistas, que no ha dudado  
170 de utilizar el dolor de las víctimas. Una oposición que ha  
171 establecido la crispación y la división. La disyuntiva en las  
172 próximas elecciones es: diálogo o confrontación, aquellos que



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173 buscamos soluciones o quienes fabrican problemas, aquellos que  
174 desde el poder servimos a los ciudadanos y aquellos que han  
175 intentado utilizar a los ciudadanos para llegar al poder.

176 **MCV:** Muchas gracias. Los dos candidatos han abierto el debate  
177 en un análisis particular sobre la situación, y a partir de  
178 ahora el debate avanzará con replicas y contrarréplicas, como  
179 decíamos, con cinco bloques temáticos. El primer de ellos, la  
180 economía y el empleo. Naturalmente, ustedes pueden referirse a  
181 lo que crean conveniente, siempre que estemos en el marco de  
182 ese bloque. Pueden utilizar, por ejemplo, datos  
183 macroeconómicos, hablar de empleo, de competitividad de la  
184 economía española, de precios, de salarios, de fiscalidad... de  
185 lo que crean conveniente. Abre, con dos minutos en este caso el  
186 turno, Mariano Rajoy y la contrarréplica será del señor  
187 Rodríguez Zapatero.

### 2. ECONOMÍA Y EMPLEO

188 **RJ:** Bien, hablamos de economía. En marzo del año 2004, poco  
189 antes de su llegada al Gobierno, según los institutos  
190 oficiales, el 15% de los españoles creían que la situación  
191 económica de España estaba mal. Hoy, es el 47%, el triple. Es  
192 decir, se ha dado una vuelta completa durante su mandato. ¿Y  
193 por qué pasa esto? Pues pasa porque los precios, sobre todo los  
194 artículos de primera necesidad, crecen sin control. Sólo en el  
195 año 2007 la leche ha subido el 29%, los huevos, el 11%, el  
196 pollo, el 10%, el pan, el 13%, porque los salarios y las  
197 pensiones han subido muy por debajo y porque los tipos de  
198 interés de las hipotecas se han doblado en los últimos tres  
199 años. Y porque tenemos un crecimiento de paro que ha sido nada  
200 menos que de 4.500 personas al día en el mes de enero. En los  
201 últimos siete meses de su Gobierno, el paro ha aumentado en  
202 300.000 personas. Por lo tanto, a pesar del crecimiento de la  
203 economía y del empleo en los últimos años, y del estado de las  
204 cuentas públicas, fruto de la herencia y de la inercia que  
205 impulsaba la economía cuando usted llegó... [**ZP:** Vaya inercia... ]  
206 La gente concreta... sí, sí, la gente concreta, señor Zapatero.  
207 Los españoles viven hoy con muchas más dificultades que cuando  
208 usted llegó al Gobierno. Y el Gobierno no ha tomado ni una sola  
209 medida de política económica, no ha tomado ninguna. Estaba en  
210 otras cosas, a las cuales antes he hecho referencia. Es más, ha  
211 permanecido impasible... e insensible, sin tomar una sola medida  
212 ante la subida de precios que se han producido en los últimos  
213 meses. Se ha limitado a ver lo bien que iba todo, hasta que  
214 dejó de ir bien. Usted no le ha dado cuerda al reloj, y el  
215 reloj se ha parado. ¿Sigue usted manteniendo que es lo que  
216 acaba de decir ahora [**MCV:** vaya concluyendo] que la situación  
217 económica de España está mejor que nunca?

218 **MCV:** Primera intervención; bloque de economía.

219 **ZP:** Señor Rajoy, debería haber tomado nota del debate entre el  
220 señor Solbes y el señor Pizarro, para darse cuenta que no vale  
221 la demagogia en la economía. Hemos vivido cuatro años de un  
222 crecimiento magnífico y de una creación de empleo magnífica.  
223 Hemos crecido más que los ocho grandes países industrializados  
224 y hemos creado más empleo que los ocho grandes países  
225 industrializados. Ese balance nos da tranquilidad para asumir  
226 un proceso de desaceleración, que tenemos en estos momentos,  
227 que es una desaceleración mundial. Hemos crecido de media el  
228 3,8%, y cuando llegamos al Gobierno crecíamos mucho menos. La  
229 Comisión Europea acaba de pronosticar que España será el país



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230 que más crezca en 2008. Y el crecimiento para nosotros supone  
231 distribuir la riqueza. Hemos alcanzado el récord histórico de  
232 empleo en estos cuatro años, con más de 20 millones de  
233 ocupados. Con tres millones de nuevos empleos, más de la mitad  
234 para mujeres. El paro está en la cifra más baja de toda la  
235 historia de la democracia, señor Rajoy. Yo lo encontré en el  
236 11,5, y está en estos momentos en el 8,5. La tasa más baja de  
237 la historia de España. Hemos creado 2.000 puestos de trabajo  
238 cada día. Y las cuentas públicas han tenido superávit todos los  
239 años. 70.000 millones de euros de superávit que nos permiten  
240 tener una garantía, una fortaleza para atender cualquier  
241 necesidad. Hemos reducido lo que representan impuestos, y por  
242 supuesto hemos aumentado la productividad. Pero, ¿ahora a qué  
243 viene usted si no se ha preocupado por la economía en cuatro  
244 años? Si hemos tenido tres debates sobre el Estado de la  
245 Nación, y en sus discursos, que son largos, sólo ha dedicado  
246 una media de tres minutos a la parte de la economía... Si usted  
247 no se ha dedicado en nada a la economía. Todo el mundo sabe a  
248 lo que se ha dedicado: a hacer oposición con lo único que no  
249 tenía que haber hecho oposición; con ETA.

250 **MCV:** Debe concluir. Turno para Mariano Rajoy.

251 **RJ:** Mire usted, no se esconda usted, señor Zapatero, detrás de  
252 los datos macroeconómicos, ni nos hable de otros debates. Aquí  
253 estamos hablando usted y yo. Mire, cuando llegamos al Gobierno  
254 nosotros había una inflación del 4,3%. Cuando nos fuimos del  
255 Gobierno, la inflación era del 2,1. Y ahora ustedes nos la  
256 vuelven a dejar en el 4,3. Y mire la tendencia de su última  
257 época; está en el 4,3; está usted exactamente igual que en el  
258 año 1995. No me hable de paro, porque nosotros, el señor Solbes  
259 nos dejó una tasa de paro del 22%, que era un auténtico récord.  
260 La bajamos al 11% y cuando nos fuimos de Gobierno había dos  
261 millones de parados, señor Zapatero. Y ahora hay 2.200.000  
262 parados. Y aquí están los datos del INEM: 300.000 parados más  
263 en los últimos siete meses. Esos son sus datos... Pero lo más  
264 importante no es eso. Lo más importante es que España, como  
265 consecuencia de los acontecimientos que se han producido, está  
266 en una situación mucho peor que otros países para abordar los  
267 problemas económicos que nos vienen por delante. Está en una  
268 situación porque España tiene un déficit exterior del 10%, que  
269 es el más alto de todos los países desarrollados. Hoy hay un  
270 problema de liquidez; hoy nadie da un euro. Y pregúntele a  
271 todas esas personas que tienen que pedir un crédito, pequeñas y  
272 medianas empresas, si alguien le da un euro. Y ese es el  
273 problema señor Zapatero, que nosotros necesitamos para mantener  
274 nuestro nivel de crecimiento financiación exterior y esa  
275 financiación en estos momentos es muy difícil de conseguir. Por  
276 tanto, ni me hable de cifras macroeconómicas ni me dé datos que  
277 nadie entiende. Aquí pregúntele a los españoles por los  
278 precios, pregunte a los españoles que están perdiendo en este  
279 momento su puesto de trabajo y pregunte a la gente que va a  
280 pedir un crédito al banco y no lo recibe. Eso es la economía y  
281 eso es lo que le importa a los españoles.

282 **MCV:** Adelante.

283 **ZP:** Señor Rajoy vamos a hablar de la vida real, de salarios y  
284 de la economía familiar. Le recuerdo que usted siendo Ministro  
285 de Administraciones Públicas congeló el sueldo de los empleados  
286 públicos. Y le recuerdo que ustedes en el gobierno hicieron  
287 perder poder adquisitivo a las rentas más bajas, a los  
288 trabajadores que cobran el Salario Mínimo Interprofesional.  
289 Mire, estos son los datos del crecimiento económico y la  
290 comparación con otros países. Estos son los datos de la

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291 evolución de ocupados en este período que hemos llevado al  
292 mayor nivel de ocupados de la historia de España. Y la  
293 reducción máxima de la tasa de paro que le debería de alegrar  
294 que tengamos la tasa de paro más baja de toda la democracia.  
295 Mire, los precios en sus últimos cuatro años de Gobierno  
296 crecieron al 3,4 de media anual, ahora han crecido al 3,2,  
297 prácticamente igual. Lo que entonces era un milagro hombre,  
298 ahora es desolador y con una diferencia que los precios del  
299 petróleo y de los cereales en el mercado internacional con  
300 ustedes estaban tres veces más bajos. Nosotros sí hemos, tres  
301 veces más bajo en su período, hemos hecho medidas para apoyar a  
302 la gente. Hoy mismo una medida que ha anunciado el  
303 Vicepresidente económico en relación con las hipotecas. Hemos  
304 reducido lo que ha sido un crecimiento del precio de la  
305 vivienda, hemos duplicado la construcción de viviendas  
306 oficiales, le diré, en sus ocho años de Gobierno los salarios  
307 de los españoles perdieron poder adquisitivo, en el 2007 están  
308 ganando poder adquisitivo. El aumento medio en su período de  
309 gobierno fue de 400 euros al año de los salarios y con el  
310 nuestro 650 euros. Hemos subido el salario mínimo. Usted no es  
311 creíble para representar a la gente de la calle porque cuando  
312 gobernaban toleraron lo que fue la vergüenza del redondeo con  
313 el euro. No hicieron nada, Precios, cosas que valían cien  
314 pesetas pasaron a valer un euro. No tienen credibilidad [MCV:  
315 Debe ir cumpliendo] y usted era miembro de ese Gobierno.  
316 **MCV:** Señor Rajoy  
317 **RJ:** Eh... Mire usted, señor Zapatero, según los datos suyos,  
318 porque yo sólo utilizo datos suyos, los datos del gobierno, el  
319 salario medio español ha subido desde el primer trimestre de  
320 2004 hasta el tercer trimestre del 2007 un 10% y la inflación  
321 ha subido un 14,5% pero si quiere le vuelvo a dar más datos de  
322 lo que han subido los productos de primera necesidad. Solo el  
323 año pasado el pan el 13%, la carne de ave el 10%, los huevos el  
324 10%, la leche el 29, los productos lácteos el 10, las frutas  
325 frescas el 8, las legumbres y hortalizas el 10%. ¿Qué me dice  
326 usted? Dígaselo eso a los españoles, es decir, deje de dar  
327 cifras macroeconómicas que nadie entiende. Con quien han  
328 perdido poder adquisitivo los españoles es con usted, la tasa  
329 de paro [**ZP:** NO, fue con ustedes con quien perdieron poder  
330 adquisitivo] no, fue con usted y la tasa de paro es que le he  
331 dado los datos. No me hable de tasas de paro, cuando usted  
332 llegó al Gobierno había 2 millones de parados, ahora hay  
333 2.200.000 parados y además en las últimas fechas en los últimos  
334 meses [**ZP:** Porque ha subido afortunadamente la población  
335 activa, señor Rajoy] se ha aumentado en 300.000 parados, no me  
336 interrumpa, 300.000 parados, esta es la tendencia que deja  
337 usted. No me diga usted que la congelación de los sueldos de  
338 los funcionarios es que nos dejaron la Seguridad Social  
339 quebrada, una tasa de paro del 22% [**ZP:** Eso es falso], un  
340 déficit público y una deuda pública y unos tipos de interés que  
341 no nos permitían en ningún caso cumplir los requisitos del Euro  
342 y entrar en Maastricht, por tanto no me hable ni me haga  
343 demagogias con esas cosas. Pero lo más grave, lo más grave de  
344 lo que ha dicho usted es lo de la igualdad de las rentas. Yo  
345 tengo aquí los datos de Eurostat es que hemos perdido en  
346 igualdad el 20% más rico gana hoy bastante más que el 20% más  
347 pobre, son los datos que da la Comisión Europea, los datos que  
348 da el señor Almunia, que también pone de relieve los datos de  
349 competitividad de la economía española. Mire, yo le pido que se  
350 deje de darnos datos macroeconómicos y que le diga a la gente  
351 los precios, cómo lo va a resolver, que hable del paro, que

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352 hable de los temas que importan, del nivel adquisitivo de los  
353 salarios, no me cuente lo demás.

354 **MCV:** Debe concluir, última intervención de dos minutos para el  
355 señor Zapatero.

356 **ZP:** Sí, señor Rajoy, los tres millones de empleos son personas  
357 de carne y hueso, muchas de las cuales nos podrán estar  
358 escuchando esta noche y la tasa de paro la más baja de la  
359 historia. Ahora vivimos un momento de recesión económica  
360 mundial. Similar a lo que pasó en el 2002, ¿Qué hicieron  
361 ustedes en aquel momento? El Decretazo. Un decreto para  
362 restringir derechos de los trabajadores, para facilitar el  
363 despido libre que provocó una huelga general. Hace alusión,  
364 usted, de vez en cuando a que debemos dar cuerda al reloj de la  
365 economía. Sr. Rajoy, quizá no se ha enterado que hoy los  
366 relojes van a pilas y nosotros hemos cargado las pilas de la  
367 Economía, tenemos 3 millones más de empleos, superávit y hemos  
368 reducido la deuda, el país que más lo ha hecho del mundo  
369 desarrollado, 130.000 millones. A pesar de la desaceleración,  
370 seguiremos creciendo porque tenemos una buena salud de las  
371 cuentas públicas, porque hemos hecho la creación de 3 millones  
372 de empleos, porque además hemos hecho políticas sociales. La  
373 desaceleración no va a ser ni profunda, ni prolongada. Va a ser  
374 una desaceleración, para la cual, nuestro país está mejor  
375 preparado que nadie, por la fortaleza de su Sistema Financiero,  
376 por la fortaleza de sus Cuentas Públicas y trabajaremos con los  
377 sindicatos y empresarios, para seguir promoviendo empleo para  
378 ayudar a las familias que puedan tener más dificultades,  
379 como hemos hecho nosotros a diferencia de lo que hacían  
380 ustedes. ¿Sabe cuál es la diferencia? Que ante una dificultad,  
381 nosotros hemos propuesto una medida, que es devolver 400 euros  
382 a asalariados, a pensionistas y a autónomos. Una medida  
383 parecida, la ha tomado el Sr. Bush en los EE.UU. de  
384 Norteamérica, de 600 euros, ¿sabe lo que ha hecho allí la  
385 oposición, que también están en campaña presidencial? Apoyar.  
386 Hay muchas diferencias entre el gobierno del Sr. Bush y el mío,  
387 pero las diferencias entre la oposición de España y la  
388 oposición norteamericana son totales. Ustedes nunca han apoyado  
389 en nada al Gobierno, no tienen parangón [**MCV:** debe ir  
390 concluyendo... debe ir concluyendo] con ninguna oposición  
391 democrática de los países que conocemos.

392 **MCV:** Vamos al último minuto de este bloque. Yo les ruego, han  
393 sido ustedes extraordinariamente disciplinados, y les ruego,  
394 que cumplan también este minuto. Sr. Rajoy en primer lugar, el  
395 Sr. Zapatero a continuación.

396 **RJ:** Nunca creí que el Sr. Zapatero pusiera de ejemplo al Sr.  
397 Bush. Mire usted, con los 400 euros que dice usted que va a  
398 devolver, si gana las elecciones en Junio, a un señor que gana  
399 un millón de euros le va a devolver 400 euros, y a los que  
400 ganan 10.000, 11.000, 12.000 o 13.000 o 14.000 euros pues no  
401 les va a devolver usted ni un solo euro como es perfectamente  
402 entendible. Celebro que usted hable de superávit, porque en el  
403 año 2003 dijo usted, como recordará, que en España nunca habría  
404 superávit mientras hubiera déficit de camas hospitalarias, o  
405 déficit de centros de días, o déficit de pensiones. En  
406 cualquier caso, me gustaría decirle una cosa, Sr. Zapatero.  
407 Quienes son de carne y hueso son las 300.000 personas que han  
408 perdido su empleo. Quienes son de carne y hueso son todos los  
409 españoles que se levantan todos los días a las 7 de la mañana y  
410 que van a comprar [**ZP:** y a las 5] y que ven lo que han subido  
411 los precios... y a las 5, y a las 6. Todos, todos esos son de  
412 carne y hueso, pero parece que usted no los conoce. Y son de

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413 carne y hueso también los pensionistas. Ustedes en materia de  
414 política económica no han hecho nada. Nosotros en el año 96  
415 demostramos que se podían hacer las cosas, hemos presentado un  
416 gran programa económico y lo vamos a llevar a la práctica para  
417 relanzar nuestra economía.

418 MCV: Muchas gracias.

419 **ZP:** Sí. No ha dado ninguna idea, nosotros sí. Hemos apoyado  
420 subiendo las pensiones mínimas, el salario mínimo,  
421 estableciendo nuevas prestaciones como los 2.500 euros,  
422 manteniendo la, el poder adquisitivo de los empleados públicos,  
423 que ustedes congelaron. Hace cuatro años, en el primer debate  
424 de investidura me dijo usted: "España debe crecer al 3% y crear  
425 dos millones de empleos. Por esas cifras le juzgaremos el PP y  
426 la sociedad española". Me retó a crecer al 3%, y hemos crecido  
427 al 3,7%. Me desafió a crear dos millones de empleos y hemos  
428 creado tres millones de empleos. Y me dijo además: "No olvide  
429 esto que acabo de decirle". Haga ahora su valoración. Hemos  
430 superado todo lo que usted nos exigía. Señor Rajoy, no olvide  
431 esto que acabo de decirle.

432 **MCV:** Bien señores, hemos concluido este primer bloque en  
433 relación con la economía y el empleo. El segundo bloque es el  
434 de la política social, en general, las políticas sociales, se  
435 puede hablar aquí de lo que crean conveniente los candidatos:  
436 pensiones, sanidad, educación, inmigración, dependencia,  
437 igualdad y familia. Política de familia. Doy, de nuevo, la  
438 palabra en primer lugar al candidato del PP Mariano Rajoy.

### 3. POLÍTICA SOCIAL

439 **RJ:** Bien, los pilares fundamentales de cualquier política  
440 social son fundamentalmente la sanidad, la educación y las  
441 pensiones. No sólo son los únicos, pero sí son los  
442 fundamentales. Pero en los últimos años ha surgido un fenómeno  
443 nuevo y creciente, que es la inmigración, que puede afectar a  
444 estos pilares a que acabo de hacer referencia. Son personas que  
445 vienen a España, que trabajan y que, en su mayoría,  
446 contribuyen. Pero también son los más necesitados y, por tanto,  
447 demandan muchos servicios sociales y los recursos de esos  
448 servicios pues a veces se quedan cortos. Por lo tanto para que  
449 lo que puede ser una operación de éxito no se convierta en un  
450 drama hay que poner un orden y control en el fenómeno  
451 migratorio. Voy a dar algunos datos. En el año 2005, entraron  
452 en España más de 700.000 extranjeros. En el año 2006, más de  
453 670.000, más que Francia, Alemania y el Reino Unido juntos. En  
454 el año 2007, más de 725.000, también más que Francia, el Reino  
455 Unido y Alemania juntos. Somos el segundo país del mundo, sólo  
456 superado por EEUU, a la hora de entrar ciudadanos extranjeros.  
457 Es evidente que esto no está controlado, es evidente que esto  
458 es una avalancha. Usted no ha hecho nada más que complicar las  
459 cosas, provocando hace tres años un efecto llamada que se oyó  
460 en todo el mundo. Y en lo demás, pues, se limita a decir lo  
461 bien que va todo y a ignorar la realidad. Y, además, cuando  
462 alguien hace propuestas, como es mi caso, las descalifica y las  
463 tilda de ridículas, de inútiles e incluso de xenófobas. Yo he  
464 propuesto prohibir la regularización masiva por ley, he  
465 propuesto el contrato de integración, he propuesto la igualdad  
466 de derechos, oportunidades, deberes y obligaciones. He  
467 propuesto que se expulse a los extranjeros que cometan delitos,  
468 y para usted eso no tiene ninguna importancia [**ZP:** Está en la  
469 ley...] Sí, está en la ley. ¿Mantiene usted que no pasa nada, que

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es lo que le ocurre a usted habitualmente y que no hay nada más que hacer en esta materia, salvo seguir como estamos?

**ZP:** Mire señor Rajoy, cuando llegué al Gobierno había 700.000 inmigrantes sin papeles en España trabajando ilegalmente, pero luego me referiré a la inmigración. Voy a hablar de los aspectos básicos de una política social que afecta a los ciudadanos. Empezaré por la educación. Señor Rajoy, usted como ministro de Educación redujo las becas. Hoy hay 250.000 estudiantes que disponen de becas después de la política de este gobierno. Hay que comparar los hechos y la demagogia, con las palabras que ustedes pronuncian. Política de igualdad. Hemos hecho una ley de igualdad entre hombres y mujeres, sin su apoyo. Hemos establecido más medidas en defensa de la maternidad, en defensa del derecho a la paternidad para conciliar la vida laboral y la vida familiar. Hemos sufragado la educación infantil de tres a seis años al 100% y ahora nos proponemos hacerlo del cero a tres por cien [n.d.r. de cero a tres años]. Hemos aprobado la Ley de la Dependencia, ustedes no hicieron nada por apoyar a las personas que no se pueden valer por sí mismas y ahora tenemos como un derecho el apoyo a más de un millón de dependientes que va a ser un cambio histórico en nuestro modelo social. Hemos subido un 30% las pensiones mínimas más en cuatro años que ustedes en ocho cuando la economía según ustedes iba muy bien y hemos subido el salario mínimo al 30%, eso es política social. Hemos apoyado a los jóvenes para la vivienda en alquiler con una renta de emancipación [**RJ:** Sí eheheh...] que va a ayudar a 350.000 jóvenes, ustedes ni un euro para los jóvenes en alquiler, hemos establecido una prestación de 2.500 euros por nacimiento y ustedes que tanto hablan de la familia no hicieron ninguna prestación, ningún apoyo por nacimiento a las familias en este país. La estadística es abrumadora, y déjeme que subraye este último ejemplo 2.500 euros a 500.000 familias al año, ustedes cero euros. Cero. 500.000 familias dividido por cero es infinito. Lo mismo que la diferencia entre su política social y la nuestra que es abrumadora [**MCV:** Tiene que ir concluyendo] e ineficaz.

**MCV:** Mariano Rajoy...

**RJ:** Bien, ya veo que usted no tiene el más mínimo interés en hablar de inmigración pero yo sí. Y los españoles también y por lo tanto yo voy a hablar de inmigración. Pero antes quisiera decir que usted ha dicho dos mentiras: la primera sobre mi gestión en las becas, mire según datos del Ministerio de Educación que usted dirige hay más becarios en el año 1999 cuando yo era ministro que en el año 2007. En becarios universitarios y en el resto del modelo educativo, por lo tanto ha mentido usted. En el tema de la dependencia nosotros hemos apoyado la ley de dependencia pero mientras Madrid, simplemente un ejemplo la Comunidad de Madrid le dedica 700 millones de euros al año usted el año pasado 2007 le ha dedicado 200 millones de euros al año. Pero voy a hablar de la inmigración, mire, antes le di los datos de las personas que entraron en España en 2005, 2006 y 2007, ahora le voy a dar los datos de su gobierno, de sus permisos de residencia. En junio de 2004 había en España 1.776.000 personas con permiso de residencia. En diciembre de 2007 hay tres millones 900, es decir, mucho más del doble, ésa es su gestión. Esto para usted no plantea ningún problema pero hay gente a la cual sí que se lo plantea los que quieren una plaza escolar, los que quieren becas comedor, los que van a la sanidad, los que buscan el acceso a la vivienda pública y hay que trabajar para que los derechos de uno porque

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531 todos tienen derecho evidentemente no perjudiquen a los otros.  
532 Eso a usted no le importa pero a mucha gente sí, como a usted  
533 no le importa el hecho de que siendo el 10% de los extranjeros,  
534 de los extranjeros que viven en España siendo el 10% el número  
535 de reclusos en las cárceles españolas sea de reclusos  
536 extranjeros, el 34% y el 40% en Cataluña, ¿y sabe por qué pasa  
537 esto? Pues porque no hay control, señor Rodríguez Zapatero  
538 entonces aquí hay que poner orden y control que es lo que usted  
539 no quiere hacer inmigración legal y con contrato, lucha contra  
540 la inmigración ilegal y desde luego contrato de integración y  
541 que todos iguales derechos y obligaciones, iguales deberes,  
542 iguales oportunidades.

543 **MCV:** Señor Zapatero...

544 **ZP:** Señor Rajoy no tiene ninguna política social corresponde a  
545 la trayectoria del gobierno del Partido Popular, ni ninguna  
546 propuesta, solo habla de inmigración, luego me referiré a ella.  
547 En esta legislatura se han producido importantísimos avances  
548 para los derechos sociales y ciudadanos de nuestro país. Hemos  
549 desbloqueado lo que ustedes frenaron que es la investigación  
550 con células madre, la investigación bio-médica para dar  
551 esperanza a enfermedades tan graves como el Alzheimer, como el  
552 Parkinson o como la Diabetes... Quizá los jóvenes necesiten o  
553 sería bueno que los jóvenes les dijéramos lo que ha pasado en  
554 el periodo democrático, ustedes nunca han apoyado las leyes que  
555 han supuesto avances de derechos, no apoyaron la ley del  
556 divorcio, no apoyaron la ley de despenalización del aborto en  
557 determinados supuestos, no apoyaron la ley que establecía la  
558 universalización de la sanidad pública, no apoyaron la ley que  
559 establecía la escolarización gratuita hasta los 16 años y ahora  
560 han vuelto a hacer lo mismo, no han apoyado la ley que elimina  
561 los trámites farragosos del divorcio, no han apoyado la ley que  
562 amplía derechos individuales como la ley de matrimonio  
563 homosexual, no han apoyado ningún avance de derechos de los  
564 ciudadanos en este periodo democrático y ¿sabe cuál es la  
565 reflexión que me lleva a hacer? Que desde hace 30 años no han  
566 movido un dedo para que los españoles tengan más derechos ni en  
567 la Sanidad, ni en la Educación, ni en las libertades  
568 individuales, ni en la expectativa a través de la investigación  
569 biomédica. Si ustedes hubieran gobernado durante 30 años  
570 seguidos lo que es evidente es que en España hubiera habido  
571 menos Educación, menos Sanidad, menos derechos, peores  
572 pensiones... Desde luego seríamos un país menos libre y más  
573 intransigente. Esa es la realidad señor Rajoy.

574 **MCV:** Adelante Señor Rajoy... su tiempo

575 **RJ:** Bien, es evidente que el señor Zapatero no quiere hablar de  
576 inmigración después de las críticas que ha producido su  
577 política [**ZP:** no hablaré cuando... cuando yo crea conveniente, Sr  
578 Rajoy]. Uno de los asuntos más importantes que tenemos  
579 planteado hoy en España. Habla de Educación... ¿sabe lo que  
580 hicieron ustedes en materia de Educación? Mire 48 horas después  
581 de llegar al Gobierno derogaron la Ley de Calidad de la  
582 Educación que no había entrado en vigor. Tras dos años de  
583 debates y de polémicas y disputas aprobaron una ley que era  
584 igual que la que existía desde hace años... Al día siguiente cesó  
585 a la ministra de Educación... ¿Y sabe lo que dice el Informe  
586 Pisa, sabe lo que dice? Que somos el tercer país de la Unión  
587 Europea en tasa de abandono escolar, el tercero, el 31 de la  
588 OCDE en Ciencias, el 32 en Matemáticas, el 35 en Lectura... ¿Sabe  
589 lo que hay que hacer en materia de Educación? usted que le  
590 gusta tanto hablar de derechos: mérito, trabajo, esfuerzo,  
591 autoridad del profesor que es el que enseña y el alumno es el



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592 que aprende, nivel de exigencia, menos Educación para la  
593 Ciudadanía y más inglés, sociedad de la información y nuevas  
594 tecnologías. Su gestión en materia de educación ha sido un  
595 clamoroso fracaso como saben todos los españoles. Me habla de  
596 pensiones y presume. Mire: yo formé parte de un gobierno, yo,  
597 en el año 1996, que tuvo que pedir un crédito en el mes de  
598 diciembre [ZP: Eso es falso] para pagar... Eso es absolutamente  
599 cierto [ZP: Ya se lo explicó Solbes a Pizarro, hombre, ya se lo  
600 explicó], las pensiones de la Seguridad Social. Para pagarlo.  
601 Tuve que pedir un crédito. Luego hicimos una ley reconociendo  
602 las pensiones por ley, hicimos una ley donde se decía que las  
603 pensiones subirían al menos como el IPC, cuando ahora han  
604 cobrado los pensionistas una paga a final de enero fue por la  
605 ley que hizo el Partido Popular. Le dejamos un fondo de  
606 reserva, subimos las pensiones y mire, ahora vamos a volver a  
607 subirlas. Por cierto, usted en su programa electoral decía que  
608 iba a subir las pensiones de las viudas, la base reguladora del  
609 52 al 70. ¿Por qué ha mentido a las viudas y no cumplió su  
610 programa electoral? Yo, sin embargo, sí lo voy a cumplir. ¿La  
611 ley de dependencia? Insisto. No la ha dotado económicamente. Es  
612 uno: gasta mucho más Madrid, la Comunidad, el Ayuntamiento,  
613 Valencia o Navarra [ZP: 900 millones de euros. La Comunidad de  
614 Madrid lo que tiene que hacer es cumplir sus obligaciones]  
615 Nada, no la ha dotado. 700 millones de euros. No, no, no. [ZP:  
616 y lo sabe muy bien Esperanza Aguirre] La Comunidad de Madrid  
617 gasta mucho más sólo en Madrid que usted en toda España.  
618 ZP: No, está boicoteando la ley.  
619 MCV: Tiene ahora dos minutos, señor Zapatero.  
620 ZP: Señor Rajoy, en política educativa ustedes hicieron dos  
621 leyes sin memoria económica y sin financiación. Tuvo que llegar  
622 este Gobierno para financiar la educación de tres a seis años y  
623 en su etapa redujo las becas. Inmigración: mire, cuando llegué  
624 al Gobierno, usted ha sido ministro del Interior responsable de  
625 la inmigración. Cuando llegué al Gobierno había en España un  
626 millón de ciudadanos sin papeles que se les colaron a ustedes  
627 porque no controlaron las fronteras ni hicieron una política de  
628 inmigración mínimamente ordenada. Hicieron cinco  
629 regularizaciones, cinco. 500.000 inmigrantes a los que dieron  
630 papeles. Y cuando llegamos al Gobierno todavía se les había  
631 colado 700.000 más que tuvimos que regularizar. Eso sí,  
632 nosotros hicimos la regularización con contrato de trabajo, con  
633 acuerdo entre empresarios y sindicatos y ustedes hicieron las  
634 regularizaciones con un bono-bus, ¿qué valía un bono-bus siendo  
635 usted ministro del Interior?  
636 RJ: ¿Qué es eso? Eheheeh ¿Un bono bus?  
637 ZP: Sí, ahora se lo explicaré. Nosotros hemos hecho una lucha  
638 tenaz en contra de la inmigración ilegal, hemos aumentado los  
639 medios en colaboración con Europa para controlar las fronteras,  
640 hemos hecho acuerdos con los países de origen para repatriar  
641 más y hemos incrementado tres veces la ayuda al desarrollo para  
642 la cooperación con los países de origen, donde hay hambre,  
643 donde hay miseria, para dar más oportunidades a los jóvenes que  
644 son los que escapan de allí, lamentablemente, en busca de una  
645 esperanza. Ustedes no dedicaron un duro a la integración de  
646 inmigrantes, nosotros 200 millones a los ayuntamientos para la  
647 integración de inmigrantes. Y sí, de las cinco  
648 regularizaciones, señor Rajoy, que regularizó... que hizo el PP,  
649 tres pertenecen a su etapa de ministro. Requisitos: bastaba una  
650 factura de una noche de hotel o un bono-bus. Señor Rajoy, ¿con  
651 qué cara habla usted de regularizaciones, usted que como

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652 ministro regularizó inmigrantes con un bono-bus? Diga usted si  
653 es cierto o no.

654 **MCV:** Debe ir concluyendo. Bien, estamos en el minuto final de  
655 este bloque. Yo les ruego eh, que sean lo más ajustado al  
656 tiempo posible. Un minuto final para concluir. Don Mariano  
657 Rajoy.

658 **RJ:** Señor Zapatero, en relación a eso es mentira. La reducción  
659 de becas es mentira. Su política de educación ha sido un  
660 fracaso, y lo sabe todo el mundo. No me hable de derechos ni me  
661 haga eslogans. Ha sido un fracaso y hay que modificar el  
662 modelo. Se necesita trabajo, esfuerzo, mérito. Hay que  
663 modificarlo. Su política de inmigración: usted puede decir lo  
664 que quiere, pero le he dado unos datos que son demoledores. Es  
665 que hay más del doble de personas con permiso de residencia  
666 desde 2004 hasta hoy. Es que esto ha sido un auténtico  
667 coladero. Es que a usted lo han puesto de vuelta y media en la  
668 UE y luego me critica a mí por unas regularizaciones que hice  
669 pactadas con la UE. Dice usted que ha hecho un gran esfuerzo.  
670 Ha hecho un gran esfuerzo, pero el resultado ha sido  
671 absolutamente lamentable. Usted no ha hecho nada para la  
672 integración de los emigrantes. Usted se opone ahora al contrato  
673 de integración. Usted en esta política, como en la económica,  
674 se ha limitado a no hacer nada, a decir: "Oiga, esto va muy  
675 bien. Qué listos somos, qué bien hacemos las cosas". No se ha  
676 ocupado de lo importante, ha estado en otras cosas. En las  
677 Civilizaciones, en la Memoria Histórica... [**ZP:** Risas] Si sí, en  
678 lo que no le importa a nadie. Y lo fundamental lo ha  
679 desatendido.

680 **MCV:** Último minuto, señor Zapatero.

681 **ZP:** Sí. Aquí hay un expediente de regularización con un bono-  
682 bus. Está aquí, a su disposición, señor Rajoy. Hemos repatriado  
683 a 200.000 inmigrantes irregulares más que ustedes en su periodo  
684 de gobierno. 200.000 más por eficacia en la colaboración [**RJ:**  
685 **XXX personas**]. Ahora usted propone un papel para evitar que los  
686 inmigrantes aquí cometan delitos como la ablación, la poligamia  
687 o las ablaciones. ¿Sabe las penas que tienen en el Código  
688 Penal? La poligamia hasta un año. La ablación del clítoris  
689 hasta 12 años. Y lo que representa la lapidación hasta 20 años.  
690 Está en el Código Penal. Es un papel inútil [**RJ:** que lo tiene  
691 toda Europa]. Señor Rajoy, señor Rajoy junto a los españoles  
692 hay inmigrantes en este país como voluntarios en las ONGs, como  
693 donantes de órganos... [**RJ:** Si ya lo sé] y también entre los  
694 fallecidos en las misiones de paz del Ejército español. Y en  
695 los atentados terroristas del 11 de marzo y de la T-4.  
696 ¿Deberíamos pedirles que firmen su papel de delincuente  
697 potencial a todos los inmigrantes que nacen, viven y mueren con  
698 nosotros y a veces por nosotros, señor Rajoy?

699 **MCV:** Debe ir concluyendo... Concluye y entramos, señoras y  
700 señores, en el último bloque de esta primera parte del debate.  
701 Hemos hablado de economía y empleo, de políticas sociales, y  
702 ahora de política exterior y seguridad. Es difícil meter la  
703 vida del país en estos turnos, en estos réplicas y  
704 contrarréplicas, pero vamos a intentar hablar, ahora en  
705 política exterior y seguridad, de nuestra política exterior, de  
706 la cooperación internacional, de la ayuda al desarrollo, de la  
707 política de defensa y la lucha contra el terrorismo que hay  
708 aquí y contra el terrorismo internacional. Seguridad ciudadana,  
709 seguridad vial, etc. Don Mariano Rajoy.

### 4. POLÍTICA EXTERIOR Y SEGURIDAD



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710 **RJ:** Vamos a empezar por lo que más le interesa a la gente, que  
711 es el terrorismo. Mire, cuando llegó usted al Gobierno ETA  
712 estaba más débil que nunca, llevaba un año sin matar porque no  
713 podía. Batasuna estaba fuera de los ayuntamientos y del  
714 Parlamento. El terrorismo callejero se había liquidado. Y lo  
715 más importante es que había un pacto entre el PP y el PS que  
716 quitaba a ETA toda esperanza de negociación. ¿Qué hizo usted?  
717 Negoció con ETA, rompió el pacto, les dio esperanza, nos dijo  
718 que querían retirarse, que mostraban una voluntad inequívoca,  
719 que usted había verificado. Que no iba a hablar de política.  
720 ¿Cuál fue su resultado? ETA está en los ayuntamientos y en el  
721 Parlamento con nuestro dinero. Vuelve la violencia callejera,  
722 han vuelto a matar, ha roto un gran acuerdo nacional que iba a  
723 suponer el fin de ETA... [**ZP: Usted.**] No, usted. Y además dividió  
724 a la sociedad y se enfrentó a las víctimas. Esto ha sido lo que  
725 usted ha hecho. Una muestra de imprudencia y de irreflexión de  
726 la que por lo visto no está dispuesto a arrepentirse. Y no me  
727 diga eso que dice usted de que buscó la paz. Todo el mundo la  
728 buscó. Ni de que habló de buena fe, hizo las cosas de buena fe.  
729 ¿Es que hace usted algunas cosas de mala fe? La buena fe se le  
730 presupone a un político. Lo que hizo usted fue una frivolidad,  
731 que benefició a los terroristas y que perjudicó a los demás. Y  
732 no busque precedentes, no los busque. Porque lo que hizo usted,  
733 negociar políticamente con una organización terrorista, como le  
734 han denunciado en numerosas ocasiones, han aparecido en los  
735 medios declaraciones, y usted mismo ha reconocido, es algo que  
736 no hizo absolutamente nadie en España. Este es el fracaso más  
737 importante de esta Legislatura. Ha afectado a la dignidad del  
738 Estado, ha sido lesivo en la lucha contra ETA, y yo desde luego  
739 le garantizo que yo nunca negociaré como nadie hizo nunca en  
740 España salvo usted, políticamente con una organización  
741 terrorista.

742 **MCV:** Señor Zapatero.

743 **ZP:** Mire, señor Rajoy. Cuando llegué al Gobierno veníamos de  
744 una Legislatura en la que había habido 238 víctimas mortales  
745 por el terrorismo. 46 a manos de ETA y 192 en el atentado del  
746 11 de marzo a manos del terrorismo islamista. Mi primer  
747 objetivo, mi primer deber moral como presidente del Gobierno  
748 era eliminar o reducir al máximo estas cifras de víctimas  
749 mortales de ETA. Lo que lamento, lo que más lamento es no haber  
750 podido evitar las cuatro víctimas mortales a manos de ETA que  
751 hemos tenido en este periodo. Cuando era líder de la oposición  
752 propuse, firmé un pacto antiterrorista para dar mi apoyo pleno  
753 al Gobierno. Sin condiciones. Nunca critiqué al Gobierno, nunca  
754 llevé al Parlamento ningún debate terrorista. Siempre di mi  
755 apoyo con un cheque en blanco. ¿Por qué? Porque para mí es  
756 inmoral usar en la lucha partidista el terrorismo. Inmoral.  
757 Forma parte del espíritu de la Transición colaborar siempre con  
758 los gobiernos democráticos en la lucha contra el terrorismo.  
759 Forma parte del espíritu constitucional. Eso es lo que pienso.  
760 Y ustedes han sido un partido que en el Parlamento y en la  
761 calle no han hecho más que debilitar al Gobierno en la lucha  
762 contra el terrorismo. Son el único partido el único partido del  
763 mundo que se ha manifestado contra el Gobierno por la lucha  
764 contra el terrorismo. Y hora lanza usted su última mentira. Lo  
765 ha hecho aquí ahora. Afirma que ETA estaba acabada al final de  
766 su legislatura. ¿Cómo es posible que ETA estuviera acabada  
767 cuando ustedes le atribuyeron el atentado más grave de la  
768 historia de Europa, que fue el atentado del 11-M del 2004?  
769 Usted mismo lo dijo en la jornada de reflexión: "Tengo la

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770 convicción moral de que era ETA". Y estaba acabada... Ni  
771 convicción, ni moral [MCV: Tiene que ir concluyendo, tiene que  
772 ir concluyendo] Señor Rajoy.  
773 MCV: señor Rajoy  
774 RJ: Hubo mucha gente que lo pensaba en aquél momento. Yo me  
775 enteré de este asunto porque oí al señor Ibarretxe, presidente  
776 del Gobierno vasco en la radio. Usted dijo, sin embargo, en los  
777 medios de comunicación, y estuvo llamando a todos, que había  
778 tres terroristas suicidas. Eso fue lo que hizo usted en  
779 aquellos momentos. Pero yo creo que hay que hablar de lo que ha  
780 pasado ahora. Usted dice que no se le ha apoyado... Mire, usted  
781 no apoyó a un Gobierno. Usted apoyó la política antiterrorista  
782 de un Gobierno que había pactado con usted [Z: no]. Que era una  
783 política eficaz y que, además, excluía las negociaciones  
784 políticas [ZP: Apoyé al Gobierno sin condición alguna... sin  
785 condición alguna] perdón, si usted hubiera hecho lo mismo que  
786 yo, si usted hubiera hecho lo mismo que yo, yo no sólo le  
787 hubiera apoyado... Yo le hubiera aplaudido. Señor Rodríguez  
788 Zapatero: ¿cuándo había que apoyarle a usted? ¿A qué Zapatero  
789 hay que apoyar? ¿Al que dice hace tres años que Partido  
790 Comunista de las Tierras Vascas es legal? ¿O al que tres años  
791 después, ahora, porque hay elecciones y por oportunismo  
792 político quiere ilegalizar? ¿Al Zapatero que hace un año dice  
793 que ANV es legal o al Zapatero que ahora, un año después,  
794 porque hay elecciones, por puro oportunismo político quiere  
795 ilegalizar? ¿Al Zapatero que deja pasear a De Juana Chaos por  
796 la calle en San Sebastián o al que luego lo mete en la cárcel  
797 porque le conviene? ¿Al Zapatero que dice que Otegi es un  
798 hombre de paz y no actúa contra él, o al Zapatero que mete a  
799 Otegi en la cárcel? ¿Al Zapatero que dice... mire usted, mire,  
800 lea (enseña periódicos): "no voy a hablar de política con ETA"  
801 o al Zapatero que dice: "hablamos de política con ETA"? ¿O al  
802 Zapatero que dice después del atentado de la T4 que nosotros no  
803 vamos a volver a hablar con ETA nunca más, y tengo aquí un  
804 sinfín de declaraciones, o al que luego dice que volvió a  
805 hablar con ETA? Usted ha mentido. Usted ha engañado a todos los  
806 españoles. Primero a mí, y al conjunto de los españoles. Ha  
807 negociado políticamente con ETA; ha puesto en tela de juicio el  
808 Estado de Derecho; ha jugado con la Ley; ha cedido ante los  
809 terroristas y ha aceptado el chantaje. Es usted el primer  
810 presidente del Gobierno de la historia de España de De Juana  
811 Chaos, como todos los españoles, con tristeza, pudimos  
812 comprobar.  
813 MCV: Señor Zapatero.  
814 ZP: Quienes mintieron fueron ustedes con el atentado terrorista  
815 del 11-M. No sólo mintieron, sino que estuvieron toda la  
816 primera fase de la legislatura intentando crear una  
817 conspiración; una fabulación indigna, inmoral, sobre lo que  
818 había representado aquel atentado, porque no asumieron el  
819 resultado electoral. Señor Rajoy, yo apoyé al señor Aznar, que  
820 dijo que ETA era el movimiento de liberación nacional vasco,  
821 que es la afirmación política más grave que yo he oído en  
822 democracia... No hay ningún gobierno del mundo que se haya  
823 atrevido a decir de ETA que es un movimiento, o sea, no un  
824 grupo terrorista, de liberación, porque hay alguien que  
825 sojuzga; nacional, porque se refiere a una nación, vasco. Eso  
826 lo dijo el señor Aznar, quien le ha designado a usted. Yo apoyé  
827 al señor Aznar en ese momento. Y apoyé cuando decidió  
828 ilegalizar Batasuna. Cuando usted me llamó por teléfono y en un  
829 minuto le dije: "Adelante". En política antiterrorista, mis  
830 principios y mi convicción es apoyar al Gobierno entre

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831 demócratas. Eso es lo que me sale de dentro. Y a usted lo que  
832 le ha salido es hacer oposición con el terrorismo y utilizarlo  
833 partidistamente. Esa es la realidad. Pero, no sólo preocupa a  
834 los ciudadanos el terrorismo, también la seguridad. Usted fue  
835 ministro del Interior, la seguridad ciudadana, su filosofía era  
836 conocida: "la seguridad para el que se la pueda pagar". [RJ:  
837 ohohhehheh] Nosotros tenemos una defensa de la seguridad  
838 pública. Ustedes redujeron 7.500 policías. Usted es el ministro  
839 que tiene el record de menos policías de la historia de la  
840 Democracia. Nosotros hemos aumentado en 17.000. Con usted, los  
841 delitos más graves llegaron al nivel más alto de la democracia.  
842 1.200 homicidios, ahora los hemos reducido a 800. Pero también  
843 hemos trabajado en otra seguridad que importa mucho a los  
844 ciudadanos, como la seguridad vial, porque los accidentes de  
845 tráfico son la primera causa de víctimas mortales en este país.  
846 Cuando usted era ministro hubo 4.000 muertes en la carretera,  
847 [MCV: vaya concluyendo] y ahora lo hemos reducido a 3.000,  
848 porque no nos resignamos. Nosotros hemos trabajado por la  
849 seguridad pública.

850 MCV: Señor Rajoy...

851 RJ: Ya veo que el señor Zapatero quiere hablar del 11-M y  
852 quiere hablar de Aznar. Pero el problema es que aquí estamos  
853 hablando del terrorismo de ETA. El 11-M ya lo ha juzgado la  
854 justicia, y Aznar ya no está en la vida política española... [ZP:  
855 no es usted, es usted...] No, no no, no, sí, no soy yo. [ZP: es  
856 usted... es usted...] Yo le voy a decir que usted con ETA negoció  
857 políticamente, cosa que nadie se había atrevido a hacer en  
858 España nunca. Usted, con ETA, le dejó ir a los Ayuntamientos y  
859 al Parlamento, de donde los habíamos expulsado, y ahora  
860 pretende dar marcha atrás. Usted dejó que su partido se  
861 entrevistara, con las televisiones delante, con una  
862 organización terrorista como es Batasuna. Usted le dio a ETA la  
863 categoría de interlocutor político. Sabe usted que la política  
864 la hacen los partidos y los votantes, la gente, los ciudadanos.  
865 Y usted y lo que hace el terrorista es usar el terrorismo como  
866 arma para hacer política, y usted, al negociar con ellos, dijo:  
867 "el terrorismo es un instrumento hábil para hacer política". Y  
868 usted, sobre todo, ha mentido, ha engañado, ha faltado a la  
869 verdad pero en infinidad de ocasiones, se lo he demostrado. Ha  
870 dicho una cosa y la contraria muchísimas veces. [ZP: Nunca,  
871 jamás, nunca jamás...] Siempre, señor Rodríguez Zapatero [ZP:  
872 nunca]. Ya me hubiera gustado a mí, ya me hubiera gustado poder  
873 apoyarlo, ya me hubiera gustado. Pero era imposible. Hasta lo  
874 fui a apoyar después de la tregua y me engañó. [ZP: ¿A apoyar?,  
875 ¿a apoyar? ¿Apoyar?...] Y mintió, como mintió a los españoles. Y  
876 ahora vamos a hablar de seguridad ciudadana. Mire, tengo aquí  
877 los datos de seguridad ciudadana, porque a usted le gusta decir  
878 que yo soy... como usted no habla de cómo está España en este  
879 momento, sino de lo que hicimos los demás hace tiempo... [ZP: no  
880 comparo, comparo] No no no, pues mire, yo voy a comparar.  
881 Cuando fui ministro del Interior, el número de infracciones en  
882 España fueron de 2.044.000. Ahora, en el año 2006, son de  
883 2.260.000. Usted ha dado datos homicidio. Violencia de género.  
884 Pues mire, 52 personas, cuando yo era ministro, y éste ha sido  
885 el peor año de la Democracia. Policías y guardias civiles. En  
886 el 96, cuando llegamos al Gobierno, 1.400 ofertas de empleo  
887 público de policía. Cuando yo llegué al ministerio la  
888 tripliqué: 4.275. [MCV: debe ir concluyendo... ] no mienta, por  
889 favor, no mienta...

890 ZP: no, pero bueno, por favor [RJ: no mienta, no mienta].

891 Policías y guardias civiles en España (enseña un gráfico) [RJ:

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892 pero si me es igual, me es igual]: el momento más bajo, 113.000  
893 con usted [RJ: pero me es igual, es igual] de ministro del  
894 Interior, y ahora hemos recuperado hasta 136.000 [RJ: me es  
895 igual, me es igual] si a usted [RJ: Es igual, yo yo yo tengo  
896 mis datos, si si...] la seguridad pública no les importó... no  
897 estos son datos oficiales, ¿no? mire ¿Pero habrá alguna  
898 nominación política mayor que llamar a ETA "Movimiento de  
899 liberación nacional vasca"? Era su gobierno, que era su  
900 gobierno, y nadie les dijo nada. A usted nunca le ha salido de  
901 dentro apoyarme. Nunca. Y la prueba es evidente es que en  
902 cuanto ganamos las elecciones tuvimos que ir a una comisión de  
903 investigación del 11-M, yo respondí como no ha hecho ningún  
904 presidente 14 horas en esa comisión de investigación, y en el  
905 2005, en el primer debate de Estado de la Nación, ya me dijo  
906 que traicionaba a los muertos. Y el Sr. Acebes, ha dicho que mi  
907 proyecto era el proyecto de ETA. Todos los españoles han visto  
908 que ustedes han utilizado de manera partidista, sólo han tenido  
909 un objetivo de oposición, ETA y el terrorismo. Yo quiero  
910 referirme también, a la Política Exterior, que es muy  
911 importante para España, pero ya veo que para usted, no. ¿Cuál  
912 fue su política exterior? Al Sur, Perejil; al Norte, unas  
913 malísimas relaciones con Francia; en América Latina, se  
914 dedicaron a reclutar soldados para Bush en la guerra de Iraq. Y  
915 lo que se recuerda de su Política Exterior, fue la foto en las  
916 Azores. Ahora han cambiado las cosas, tenemos buenas relaciones  
917 con el Sur, con todos los gobiernos europeos. Prueba de ello,  
918 es que han puesto a Felipe González al frente del Grupo de  
919 Reflexión para diseñar la Europa del futuro. En América Latina  
920 hemos duplicado la ayuda a la cooperación al desarrollo y para  
921 luchar contra la pobreza, y desde luego, ahora hay un país en  
922 el mundo defiende la paz, la cooperación internacional a  
923 diferencia de su período, que fue defender las guerras  
924 ilegales, estar sometido al presidente Bush y congelar, porque  
925 no subieron nada, los recursos para la ayuda al desarrollo a la  
926 cooperación y la lucha contra la pobreza y la miseria [MCV:  
927 debe concluir, muchas gracias] Ustedes.  
928 MCV: Vamos al último minuto, vamos al último minuto. Es su  
929 tiempo (Rajoy).  
930 RJ: Oiga ¿Usted quiere que le voten por lo de la otra vez?  
931 ¿Bush, el 11-M, Iraq, Aznar? [ZP: no, por lo que he hecho  
932 ahora, comparemos] Oiga, cambie un poco de discurso y hable de  
933 lo que le importa a los españoles. Si, mire, yo voy a comparar.  
934 En Seguridad Ciudadana, fíjese usted, cuando yo era Ministro  
935 del Interior, se celebraron, aquí en España, dos Consejos  
936 Europeos, presidíamos la Unión Europea y 17 de Ministros.  
937 Ustedes tuvieron que suspender un Consejo de Ministro de la  
938 Unión Europea de Vivienda en Barcelona, porque no eran capaces  
939 dijeron ustedes, de mantener la seguridad de los ciudadanos.  
940 Esos para la imagen de España, es algo verdaderamente notable.  
941 Como por cierto, es verdaderamente notable el número de bandas  
942 organizadas de delincuentes extranjeros especialmente violentos  
943 que están llegando a España sin que el Sr. Rubalcaba, más  
944 preocupado por otras cosas, ni Usted, pueda hacer nada en este  
945 sentido. En el tema de ETA, Sr. Zapatero, usted ha mentido. ¿Yo  
946 quiere que le apoye en lo de De Juana Chaos o en lo de ANV?  
947 [ZP: no XXX nada, si lo saben los españoles, en nada] Es que no  
948 le puedo apoyar, [ZP: XXX partidismo] porque usted rompió el  
949 acuerdo... Y en Política Exterior, mire, yo Merkel y Sarkozy; y  
950 usted, Chávez y Castro. Ese es el resumen de su Política  
951 Exterior.  
952 MCV: Último minuto.

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953 **ZP:** sí, ahora que me cita usted a Chávez, le voy a decir que  
954 esas son las diferencias entre los dos proyectos. Ustedes,  
955 siempre están siempre que van al extranjero denigrando el  
956 Gobierno de España. Y yo, en la Cumbre de Chile, defendí al Sr.  
957 Aznar, de los ataques que públicamente le lanzaba [RJ: su amigo  
958 Chávez] el Sr. Chávez, el Sr. Chávez, como patriota lo hice  
959 [RJ: ¿patriota usted?], como patriota lo hice, como persona con  
960 principios democráticos, con respeto democrático y ustedes han  
961 estado [RJ: ¿patriota usted?] han estado han estado cuatro años  
962 denigrando al Gobierno de España. El Sr. Aznar diciendo que  
963 estábamos en un proceso de Balcanización, y usted, siempre  
964 haciendo declaraciones en contra del Gobierno de España.  
965 Afortunadamente ahora la imagen de España es la de la paz, es  
966 la de la paz [RJ: no va usted por Europa para ver la imagen de  
967 España], es la imagen de la cooperación, es la imagen de la  
968 solidaridad. Mire lo de Felipe González, si le ha apoyado toda  
969 Europa [RJ: sí, sí], a un español y socialistas [RJ: sí, sí],  
970 aunque les pese a ustedes, [MCV: por favor, vaya concluyendo] y  
971 desde luego, concluyo. Y desde luego, volviendo a los  
972 inmigrantes, mire España ha sido un país de inmigrantes [RJ: sí  
973 yo soy gallego, yo soy gallego y lo sé, soy gallego y lo sé].  
974 Hay muchos que nos están viendo, hay muchos que nos están  
975 viendo, les doy un saludo y desde aquí le digo, [MCV: debe ir  
976 concluyendo señor Zapatero] que tenemos que tener mucha  
977 prudencia con las personas que vienen a trabajar con nosotros  
978 [RJ: con esos sí, con los delincuentes no].  
979 **MCV:** Terminamos este bloque de Política Exterior y Seguridad.  
980 Es un debate realmente intenso. Es un debate, se lo digo con  
981 toda sinceridad, Sr. Rajoy, Sr. Zapatero, magnífico. Vamos a  
982 continuar después de una breve pausa. Tenemos todavía algunos  
983 asuntos muy importantes que debemos referirnos, que es la  
984 política institucional y los retos que tiene este país para el  
985 futuro y desde luego además de la investigación y el desarrollo  
986 todas las cuestiones relativas al cambio climático, las  
987 infraestructuras, la vivienda, etc. Estamos en el primer cara a  
988 cara decíamos del siglo XXI, en la era de la información, dos  
989 candidatos a la presidencia del gobierno organizado por la  
990 Academia de las Ciencias y las Artes de la Televisión y después  
991 de una breve pausa volvemos y continuamos. Muchas gracias  
992 señores.

### SEGUNDA PARTE

993 **MCV:** Continuamos, continuamos en el primer debate electoral  
994 cara a cara entre los candidatos a la presidencia del Gobierno,  
995 Mariano Rajoy por el Partido Popular y José Luis Rodríguez  
996 Zapatero, candidato del Partido Socialista. Vamos a hablar en  
997 esta segunda parte, algo más corta, del debate primero de  
998 política institucional, como saben y después de los retos del  
999 futuro, temas que nos interesan en sobremanera a los  
1000 ciudadanos. Comenzamos si les parece por la política  
1001 institucional aquí se puede hablar de lo que ustedes crean  
1002 conveniente, Estado autonómico, reformas constitucionales,  
1003 justicia... tiene la palabra el candidato del Partido Popular,  
1004 Mariano Rajoy.

### 5. POLÍTICA INSTITUCIONAL

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1005 **RJ:** Bien, hace poco más de un mes, uno de los principales  
1006 periódicos europeos se preguntaba sobre España. Qué se puede  
1007 esperar de un país en el que sus habitantes no se pueden poner  
1008 de acuerdo sobre cuántas naciones son ¿qué le parece? Así ha  
1009 conseguido usted que nos vean, y no es raro porque comenzó  
1010 usted su mandato diciendo aquello de que el "concepto de nación  
1011 es discutido y discutible". Inició un debate absurdo y abrió un  
1012 melón que no reclamaba nadie. Además lo hizo sin dejar  
1013 establecido antes cuál era su idea de España, es decir a dónde  
1014 quería llevarnos y como en todo lo hizo por su cuenta porque no  
1015 sé si sabía usted, pero antes de llegar usted al gobierno las  
1016 cuestiones que afectaban al modelo territorial de España se  
1017 pactaban entre los grandes partidos. Y usted rompió ese acuerdo  
1018 como ha roto otros muchos en España. Los resultados están a la  
1019 vista, ha creado usted enfrentamiento entre las CCAA por el  
1020 patrimonio, por la financiación, por las inversiones, por el  
1021 agua... ha dividido a los españoles y ha afectado a su igualdad,  
1022 ha propiciado un estatuto de autonomía que tiene siete recursos  
1023 ante el tribunal constitucional. Por primera vez desde 1978,  
1024 por primera vez eh, con usted de presidente del Gobierno, un  
1025 estatuto se ha pactado sin el acuerdo de los grandes partidos  
1026 nacionales. Claro, decía usted que es que quería integrar a los  
1027 nacionalistas en el sistema a costa de echar a la mitad de la  
1028 población española. Pues, mire usted, no lo ha conseguido, los  
1029 ha radicalizado. Y en muchos casos los ha mandado al monte.  
1030 Claro, no me diga ahora usted que España es ahora más plural,  
1031 porque ya era plural antes de que fuera usted el presidente del  
1032 Gobierno. Era muy plural, pero los españoles tenían los mismos  
1033 derechos y las mismas obligaciones. ¿Podría usted explicarnos  
1034 para qué hizo todo esto y si de verdad cree que España como  
1035 dice usted, está más unida y cohesionada que nunca?

1036 **ZP:** Mire señor Rajoy. Ha puesto usted el ejemplo del agua.  
1037 Quien ha sembrado la discordia y el enfrentamiento entre  
1038 comunidades han sido ustedes. Resulta que ahora para que se  
1039 haya demostrado que ustedes el trasvase del Ebro, ni le iban a  
1040 hacer ni le mantienen en su programa. Lo cual, constituye un  
1041 engaño bastante grave a todos los ciudadanos de la Comunidad  
1042 Valenciana y de Alicante, que, por cierto, afortunadamente, han  
1043 visto como en este periodo tienen 335 hectómetros cúbicos más  
1044 de agua, gracias a las inversiones que estamos haciendo,  
1045 después de que en su periodo de gobierno no tuvieron ni un  
1046 hectómetro cúbico más de agua. Mire, nosotros creemos en el  
1047 Estado de las Autonomías, estamos convencidos que ha sido muy  
1048 bueno para bienestar de España, que favorece la libertad  
1049 eliminando el centralismo. Y ustedes siempre han estado a  
1050 rastras con el Estado Autonómico [**RJ:** ¿Pero qué dice usted? Fui  
1051 vicepresidente de la Xunta...] a rastras sí, como Alianza  
1052 Popular, que fue militante de Alianza Popular, que le recuerdo  
1053 que no votaron el Estatuto de Cataluña, ni el Estatuto del País  
1054 Vasco [**RJ:** Y el PSOE era marxista hace 30 años...], o sea que...  
1055 no, sí, pero usted era de Alianza Popular. El PSOE siempre ha  
1056 votado todos los estatutos, en todos los consensos. Ustedes no.  
1057 Ahora ha habido siete propuestas de reforma de estatutos, de  
1058 las cuales hemos votado juntos seis. Una en contra, que fue la  
1059 propuesta del Plan Ibarretxe. Y sólo en Cataluña, y menuda la  
1060 que han montado con el Estatuto de Cataluña. Crispando,  
1061 trasladando a todas las comunidades el "se rompe España", lo  
1062 cual era radicalmente falso, cizañando con el tema del catalán,  
1063 para que ahora veamos como hoy su candidata número uno, la  
1064 señora Nadal, ha dicho que el castellano no se persigue en  
1065 Cataluña. Hemos hecho reformas de los estatutos para mejorar el



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1066 autogobierno, y en este periodo hemos vivido más cooperación y  
1067 menos conflictividad ante el TC que en cualquiera de sus ocho  
1068 años de gobierno. Tienen una gran desfachatez, han sembrado  
1069 discordia entre los ciudadanos y, especialmente, con el  
1070 Estatuto de Cataluña. La que han liado con la enseñanza del  
1071 castellano, que es la misma regla [MCV: debe ir concluyendo]  
1072 que hace 20 años, incluso cuando [MCV: debe ir concluyendo]  
1073 usted era ministro de educación.

1074 **RJ:** El castellano no se persigue en Cataluña, pero lo que es  
1075 evidente es que no se puede estudiar en castellano. En cuanto  
1076 al tema del agua, la discordia es suya. Había un plan  
1077 hidrológico votado por el 80% del Consejo Nacional del Agua,  
1078 votado por Castilla la Mancha y Extremadura donde gobernaba el  
1079 PSOE y con la abstención de... de Andalucía, del señor Chaves. Sí  
1080 sí, eso es lo que pasó en su día. Yo desde luego no le quepa la  
1081 menor duda que yo haré las obras del pacto del agua en Aragón,  
1082 las voy a hacer y luego haré transferencias a las otras  
1083 cuencas, haré trasvases, claro que sí.

1084 **ZP:** ¿El trasvase del Ebro lo hará? ¿Hará el transvase del Ebro?  
1085 ¿Hará el transvase del Ebro? ¿Hará el transvase del Ebro?

1086 **RJ:** Yo haré, haré el trasvase del agua cuando abran las aguas  
1087 del Pacto de Aragón. ¿Sabe cuál es usted la alternativa que ha  
1088 dado? Llevar agua de Almería a Barcelona, ésa es la única  
1089 alternativa que ha hecho en materia de agua. Mire usted, usted  
1090 ha dicho que España, me ha imputado que España... que yo dijera  
1091 que España se rompía. Yo nunca he dicho eso y va a tener que  
1092 demostrarlo usted, pero ¿sabe usted quién dijo que en España se  
1093 está centrifugando el Estado? Felipe González. Que el señor  
1094 Zapatero ha abierto el melón del Estado sin saber a dónde van,  
1095 don... el señor Leguina. Lo que está pasando en España se parece  
1096 a la disolución de la Unión Soviética, don Alfonso Guerra. El  
1097 Estado se está fragmentando, el señor Leguina, pero usted sigue  
1098 diciendo que estamos muy unidos. Pues mire, el 25 de octubre de  
1099 este año hay convocado un referéndum de separación en el País  
1100 Vasco y no lo convocó Batasuna, lo convocó el lehendakari del  
1101 Gobierno Vasco. ¿Sigue usted creyendo que estamos muy unidos? Y  
1102 un socio de gobierno suyo, el vicepresidente del Gobierno de  
1103 Cataluña ha anunciado otro referéndum para el año 2014, ¿sigue  
1104 usted creyendo que estamos muy unidos? Mire usted, yo no he  
1105 dicho nunca que la transición se hizo mal y que España no  
1106 estaba cuajada, eso lo ha dicho usted, yo no he dado a entender  
1107 [ZP: no, nunca he dicho eso] a los nacionalistas que me  
1108 proponía a refutar España, ha sido usted [ZP: nunca he dicho  
1109 eso] [MCV: tendrá su turno]. Yo no he dicho que los vascos  
1110 tuvieran el derecho a decidir, ni los extremeños, ni los  
1111 murcianos, ha sido usted. Usted no tiene ninguna idea de la  
1112 nación española. Usted piensa que cada uno puede decidir lo que  
1113 quiere, mire yo pienso distinto. Yo creo que España es una  
1114 nación de ciudadanos libres e iguales y que sobre España  
1115 decidimos todos y cada uno de los españoles.

1116 **MCV:** Señor Zapatero...

1117 **ZP:** Mire señor Rajoy, su Apocalipsis, que es lo que ha hecho en  
1118 estos cuatro años parece que se retrasa en la historia. Ni  
1119 "España se rompe", ni "Navarra ha sido entregada a ETA", más  
1120 bien gobiernan ustedes Navarra con el apoyo del Partido  
1121 Socialista, ni "Cataluña está en un proceso de secesión", más  
1122 bien está más unida porque ahora ya hay Alta Velocidad. Bueno,  
1123 nos hemos enterado al menos que ya no hay trasvase del Ebro y  
1124 por qué le parece mal que el agua que produce una desaladora en  
1125 Carboneras en Almería vaya a Cataluña ¿es que reniega? [**RJ:** No,  
1126 en absoluto, no en absoluto, ya sabe usted que no]... ¿que vaya a

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1127 Cataluña? [RJ: no en absoluto] Pues a mí me parece un modelo de  
1128 solidaridad [RJ: es un gran modelo] y de cohesión en nuestro  
1129 país [RJ: sobra agua en España y hay que mandarla ahí] que unas  
1130 CCAA puedan llevar agua a otras cuando tengan necesidad [RJ: de  
1131 otras a Barcelona]. Y el hecho de que Barcelona esté con  
1132 problemas de agua o pueda estar [RJ: Es por lo que hicimos en  
1133 su idea el Plan Hidrológico Nacional] pone de manifiesto, pone  
1134 de manifiesto que el Trasvase del Ebro era una medida absurda,  
1135 me alegro que hayan venido a nuestra posición [RJ: No, no XXX y  
1136 no he venido... XXX] y se hayan olvidado ya del trasvase del Ebro  
1137 [MCV: Después tendrá su turno, después tendrá su turno] usted  
1138 ha dicho aquí que no hará el Trasvase del Ebro.  
1139 RJ: Me ha entendido mal.  
1140 ZP: Pues diga que diga que lo hará.  
1141 MCV: Después tendrá su turno, señor Rajoy tendrá su turno  
1142 después...  
1143 ZP: hemos entendido lo que hemos entendido claramente. Mire, le  
1144 voy a leer un texto del Estatuto de Cataluña: "Todas las  
1145 personas tienen derecho a recibir un adecuado tratamiento del  
1146 dolor y cuidados paliativos integrales y a vivir con dignidad  
1147 el proceso de su muerte", artículo 20.1 del Estatut de  
1148 Catalunya. El art. 20 del Estatuto de Andalucía dice lo mismo.  
1149 Ustedes en el Estatuto de Cataluña votaron en contra de este  
1150 artículo y lo recurrieron ante el Tribunal Constitucional y en  
1151 el Estatuto de Andalucía diciendo lo mismo votaron a favor y  
1152 aquí en Madrid, en el Severo Ochoa, a los profesionales que  
1153 practicaban los cuidados paliativos les han querido encarcelar.  
1154 Ésa es su actitud de discordia en Cataluña votan en contra en  
1155 Andalucía a favor y en Madrid quieren encarcelar a quien  
1156 practica desde su profesionalidad el intento de paliar el dolor  
1157 ante una muerte inevitable.  
1158 MCV: Señor Rajoy...  
1159 RJ: Vamos a hablar de discordia, señor Zapatero. Usted ha  
1160 hablado del Estatuto andaluz y del Estatuto catalán y a mí me  
1161 han reprochado que yo haya apoyado el estatuto andaluz y que no  
1162 haya apoyado el estatuto catalán. Mire usted... En el Congreso  
1163 presentamos 73 enmiendas al Estatuto catalán y en el Senado 74.  
1164 Nos aceptaron cero. Al andaluz presentamos 150 enmiendas, lo  
1165 corregimos, es constitucional y por eso lo apoyamos. Pero mire  
1166 usted... hablando de discordia, le voy a leer una cosa que a  
1167 usted le sonará. El Pacto del Tinel. Fíjese de discordia... "Los  
1168 partidos firmantes del presente acuerdo se comprometen a  
1169 impedir la presencia del PP en el Gobierno del Estado, y  
1170 renuncian a establecer pactos de gobierno y pactos  
1171 parlamentarios estables en las cámaras estatales". Bueno, aquí  
1172 está el origen de todo lo que ha pasado en esta legislatura con  
1173 el Estatuto catalán. Y por qué usted rompió por primera vez en  
1174 la historia el acuerdo PP-PSOE a la hora de aprobar el  
1175 estatuto. Sí, sí... Y por eso no es de extrañar lo que pasó en el  
1176 Estatuto catalán ni por qué rompió usted el pacto  
1177 antiterrorista. Porque usted prefirió hacer el pacto del Tinel,  
1178 que le voy a decir lo que es... El Pacto del Tinel, que es la  
1179 obsesión [ZP: su obsesión] no no, sí sí, por dejar fuera de  
1180 juego a media España... mire, es el mayor rasgo de intolerancia  
1181 que se ha hecho en la historia democrática española. ¿Sabe  
1182 quién es usted, señor Rodríguez Zapatero? Es un señor que con  
1183 una mano predica el entendimiento; con otra mano, con la otra,  
1184 le prohíbe a los demás que nos den los buenos días, y para  
1185 colmo... me echa la culpa de todo. Ese es exactamente usted.  
1186 Usted es el que ha sembrado la discordia. Usted es el que ha  
1187 querido pactar con partidos [ZP: usted] radicales y



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1188 extremistas. Usted es el que ha impedido que el Partido Popular  
1189 tuviera la más mínima posibilidad de llegar a un entendimiento  
1190 en estas materias. Usted ha querido excluarnos, y usted ahora  
1191 habla del Apocalipsis. Del Apocalipsis hablaron los que he  
1192 citado antes: González, Guerra [ZP: Haga caso a González] y  
1193 Leguina [ZP: Haga caso a González lo que está diciendo] Y ¿qué  
1194 tiene que decir usted de los referéndums? [ZP: haga caso a  
1195 González ya que le cita] Tiene dos referéndums convocados. ¿Le  
1196 parece que eso es normal? Para separarse de España. Uno este  
1197 mes... este año, en octubre. A usted ¿eso le parece normal? A  
1198 usted todo le parece normal

1199 **MCV:** Tiempo para el señor Zapatero.

1200 **ZP:** Mire, señor Rajoy. Ustedes sembraron la discordia con el  
1201 Estatuto de Cataluña y la prueba de ello es que han sido  
1202 profundamente incoherentes, porque hay 20 artículos del Estatut  
1203 de Cataluña que han recurrido al Tribunal Constitucional que  
1204 son exactos que en el Estatuto de Andalucía, que ustedes  
1205 votaron a favor. No les importaba el contenido del Estatuto, ni  
1206 los artículos. Les importaba sembrar la discordia; alarmar con  
1207 la secesión de Cataluña, para ver si así en el resto de España  
1208 podían obtener algún respaldo. Eso es lo que hicieron, al grito  
1209 de "Se rompe España", que todos los españoles lo han escuchado  
1210 [RJ: Eso lo dijo González y Guerra] Sí, igual que Navarra...  
1211 igualJ que Navarra [RJ: González y Guerra] Que fue usted a  
1212 Navarra [RJ: le voy a hablar de Navarra] a decir lo que dijo,  
1213 para que ahora estén gobernando con nuestro apoyo. Mire, le  
1214 tengo que recordar que en nuestro país hay un modelo autonómico  
1215 que ha funcionado bien, cuando se tiene una voluntad  
1216 constructiva, y ustedes no la han tenido. Ustedes han utilizado  
1217 las reformas de los estatutos, y no me hable del pacto del  
1218 Tinel, porque hemos votado junto cinco reformas del estatuto...  
1219 Es una invención. [RJ: ¡Menos mal!] Es una invención Cinco [RJ:  
1220 ¡Menos mal!] Cuando les interesaba porque gobernaban en esas  
1221 comunidades autónomas, como en Valencia, que venía la reforma,  
1222 ahí sí. Pero en Cataluña, que no tienen representación  
1223 prácticamente, no tenían nada que ganar ni que perder, lo  
1224 utilizaron para poner a todos los ciudadanos, o intentar poner  
1225 a los ciudadanos, en contra de ese proyecto. Lo cierto es que  
1226 en materia de autonomías, en materia de libertades, en estos  
1227 cuatro años hemos avanzado; hay más autogobierno, más unidad y  
1228 más fortaleza del Estado. Hay también más derechos y  
1229 libertades, porque hay nuevas leyes del divorcio, del  
1230 matrimonio homosexual, de igualdad, de rehabilitación de  
1231 memoria, de las personas, de su dignidad... Hay más diálogo y más  
1232 democracia. El ejemplo es este debate que están retransmitiendo  
1233 varias televisiones, como la televisión pública, que ahora es  
1234 plural, independiente y que con ustedes, tuvo una condena de la  
1235 Audiencia Nacional por manipulación. Cuando ustedes gobiernan,  
1236 se resiente la democracia, se pierde el pluralismo [MCV: debe  
1237 ir concluyendo] y no hay debates [RJ: XXX]. Este es el mejor  
1238 ejemplo.

1239 **MCV:** Debe ir concluyendo y entramos en el último minuto. Les  
1240 rogaría que cumplieran, porque son desde luego muy  
1241 disciplinados y se lo agradezco en los tiempos. Último minuto  
1242 para cerrar este bloque de la Política Institucional. Candidato  
1243 del Partido Popular, Mariano Rajoy.

1244 **RJ:** Mire, hablar de discordia una persona que firma el Pacto  
1245 del Tinel, cuyo objetivo es echar fuera del del mapa político  
1246 de España [ZP: yo no he firmado ese pacto nuca], a un partido  
1247 que representa a la mayoría [ZP: yo no he firmado ese pacto  
1248 nunca, ni lo conozco]... a la mitad de los españoles. Esto es lo

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1249 más antidemocrático que se ha producido en España. Usted ha  
1250 actuado en consecuencia, esos son sus pactos, esos son sus  
1251 socios, eso es la gente con la que ha pactado, y por eso se ha  
1252 producido lo que se ha producido en España. Oiga, yo tengo, he  
1253 pactado muchas cosas con su partido. El Pacto Autonómico del  
1254 1992, fui a Moncloa, lo firmé con González, lo firmó Aznar, yo  
1255 estaba con él, luego en el año 1996. Ustedes el Estatuto  
1256 Catalán quisieron dejarlo fuera a propósito, si no no se  
1257 explica que [ZP: ustedes, ustedes, ustedes] no nos aceptaran ni  
1258 una sola enmienda y no nos venga, con el viejo truco de decir,  
1259 que somos anti-catalanes. Venga, eso es mentira, porque yo voté  
1260 en contra del Estatuto Andalúz, y cuando se reformó en la  
1261 Cortés, 150 artículos, voté a favor. Usted no tiene una idea de  
1262 España, [ZP: pero si hay 20 artículos exactos que ustedes votan  
1263 en un sitio y luego votan en contra] [MCV: por favor, por  
1264 favor] usted no tiene una idea de España. España es una nación  
1265 de más de quinientos años de historia y usted se lo ha tomado a  
1266 broma, y eso a mí, me parece inaceptable [MCV: debe ir  
1267 concluyendo] y quiero que lo sepa, inaceptable.  
1268 **MCV:** Último minuto.  
1269 **ZP:** Lo que sucede, Sr. Rajoy, es que este país que es plural,  
1270 que es diverso hay que construirlo entre todos con el diálogo,  
1271 y no sembrando la discordia entre unas Comunidades y otras,  
1272 como han hecho ustedes [RJ: discordia], sin excluir a nadie. Y  
1273 desde luego, con un gobierno, que es lo que ha practicado el  
1274 mío, que intente dialogar. He tenido un diálogo fecundo con  
1275 todas la Comunidades Autónomas. Ahora todos los presidentes  
1276 entran en Moncloa, no como en la etapa del Sr. Aznar. He  
1277 convocado la Conferencia de Presidentes en tres ocasiones, para  
1278 coordinar, cooperar y unir a todas las Comunidades Autónomas  
1279 con el Gobierno de España, eso es fortalecer el Estado y  
1280 fortalecer España. Hemos promovido, además, que el Gobierno se  
1281 someta más al control, a la crítica en el Parlamento. Yo he  
1282 respondido preguntas en el Senado y en el Congreso, como  
1283 actitud democrática, el doble de preguntas de la oposición que  
1284 en la etapa anterior [MCV: debe ir concluyendo]. Y desde luego,  
1285 hemos puesto en marcha la Formación Cívica de los más jóvenes,  
1286 y hemos acabado con el intento de que la Religión fuera  
1287 evaluable en la Escuela.  
1288 **MCV:** Debe concluir, debe concluir. Bien, vamos al último bloque  
1289 de este interesantísimo debate entre Mariano Rajoy y José Luis  
1290 Rodríguez Zapatero. Vamos a hablar ahora de los retos de  
1291 futuro, porque todo el mundo sabe que estamos en una sociedad  
1292 en transición y desde luego, la investigación, el desarrollo  
1293 tecnológico, la innovación son absolutamente fundamentales,  
1294 porque estamos ya en la Sociedad del Conocimiento, y además,  
1295 hay otras cuestiones que nos preocupan: el cambio climático, el  
1296 desarrollo sostenible, y desde luego, muchas cosas muy  
1297 cercanas, muy inmediatas, como la vivienda y las  
1298 infraestructuras. Es el último bloque de este Debate. Tiene la  
1299 palabra Mariano Rajoy.

### 6. RETOS DE FUTURO

1300 **RJ:** Permítame que le diga antes, porque me ha hecho gracia,  
1301 dice España está muy fortalecida, pero con un referéndum de  
1302 Autodeterminación convocado para el mes de octubre. Pero en  
1303 fin, vamos a hablar de los retos de futuro. Uno de los cuales  
1304 es ese, por cierto. El mayor reto de futuro que tenemos en este  
1305 momento es la Globalización, para que se entienda, China e

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1306 India, el 38% de la población mundial están creciendo al 10%,  
1307 en los últimos años y por tanto ya nada es lo mismo. Y por  
1308 tanto, vamos a vivir un nuevo mundo y hay que trabajar, para  
1309 que eso, que es un reto, pues se convierta en una auténtica  
1310 oportunidad. Ahora bien, yo quisiera decir una cosa, para los  
1311 españoles de a pie, y sobre todo, para los más jóvenes, el reto  
1312 más importante de futuro es disponer de una vivienda. Y es  
1313 natural que esto les preocupe, porque durante su gobierno el  
1314 precio de la vivienda ha aumentado en un 43%, porque los  
1315 intereses que tienen que pagar por las hipotecas se han  
1316 duplicado durante su Gobierno, y porque quienes quieran  
1317 alquilar no encuentran viviendas en alquiler, ya que no hay  
1318 garantías jurídicas y económicas bastantes para los  
1319 propietarios. Usted creó un Ministerio de Vivienda, anunció  
1320 grandes planes, cambió a su titular, la señora Trujillo, sin  
1321 que hubiera ejecutado ninguno, y nombró a otra persona que  
1322 también anunció grandes planes, nada menos que para la  
1323 emancipación de los jóvenes. De momento hemos sabido que la  
1324 Sociedad Pública de Alquiler, lo cual es una vergüenza, tiene  
1325 cient... mil... 1200 pisos vacíos que los está pagando, lo cual es  
1326 una vergüenza. Señor Zapatero, usted ante un problema como esto  
1327 ha estado instalado en una sucesión de ocurrencias  
1328 disparatadas. Hemos visto aquello de las zapatillas a los  
1329 jóvenes, hemos visto los mini-pisos, las soluciones  
1330 habitacionales. Oiga, ha habido muy poquita reflexión y ha  
1331 hecho muy pocas cosas para resolver uno de los problemas más  
1332 importantes que tiene nuestro país, que usted había dicho que  
1333 lo iba a resolver y creó el Ministerio de la Vivienda. Ha sido  
1334 un fiasco colosal. ¿Cómo se explica usted que uno de los países  
1335 de la UE con menor densidad de población, que es España, pues  
1336 sea mucho más caro que Holanda, que tiene casi cinco veces más  
1337 población [MCV: Tiene que ir concluyendo] por kilómetro  
1338 cuadrado que España? ¿Cómo se lo explica?

1339 **ZP:** Mire señor Rajoy, vamos a hablar de vivienda. Ésta es la  
1340 evolución del precio de la vivienda con el gobierno del Partido  
1341 Popular, que llegó al máximo histórico, y la evolución con el  
1342 Partido Socialista que ha ido decreciendo hasta estar en una  
1343 subida del 4,8%. ¿Sabe cuántas viviendas protegidas construían  
1344 en el último año de su mandato? 56.000. ¿Sabe cuántas se  
1345 inician ahora? 100.000 viviendas protegidas para que las  
1346 familias puedan acceder, y tengo el compromiso de que sean  
1347 150.000 cada año en la próxima legislatura. ¿Cuántas ayudas  
1348 hacían ustedes a los jóvenes para el alquiler de vivienda? Cero  
1349 euros. Nosotros 200 euros para 350.000 jóvenes que van a poder  
1350 tener vivienda. Pero para mí la prioridad es la educación y la  
1351 investigación. Esa es la gran prioridad del futuro, la base.  
1352 Una educación en donde hemos duplicado la inversión en este  
1353 periodo, una educación en donde hemos hecho dos leyes  
1354 educativas con acuerdo y con memoria económica. Una educación  
1355 en donde hemos reforzado la lectura, las matemáticas y el  
1356 inglés con becas para jóvenes. 50.000 jóvenes han tenido una  
1357 beca para viajar durante un mes al extranjero, con ustedes  
1358 ninguna. Y en los próximos cuatro años vamos a llegar a los  
1359 200.000. Futuro es investigación. ¿Sabe que hemos multiplicado  
1360 por tres el gasto en I+D+i? No llegaba a 3000 millones con  
1361 ustedes y ahora está en más de 7000 millones de euros. ¿Sabe  
1362 que hay 40000 investigadores más en España que cuando ustedes  
1363 gobernaban? ¿Sabe que somos el segundo país de Europa que más  
1364 aumenta en patentes? ¿Y sabe que en Internet cuando llegamos al  
1365 Gobierno solo disponían de él, de acceder a él uno de cada 10  
1366 ciudadanos y ahora son cinco de cada 10? Por el contrario,

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usted en materia de investigación y en materia de educación, lo mismo que en materia de Interior: en vez de reducir los delitos, que es lo que tenía que haber hecho, redujo los policías. En materia de investigación, en vez de aumentar el gasto y en materia de educación, aumentar las becas, lo que hizo fue reducir y congelar el gasto, las becas [MCV: Tiene que ir concluyendo] el apoyo a lo que representa el futuro que es educación.

MCV: Mariano Rajoy

RJ: Lleva una temporada diciendo que soy el peor ministro de la democracia a todos los ministerios en los que estamos. En fin, seguramente usted es el mejor presidente del Gobierno de España [ZP: no no] desde los Reyes Católicos, pero ese no es el tema. Me ha hablado de vivienda, y de las viviendas que han construido. Mire, viviendas protegidas: Comunidad de Madrid, Andalucía y Cataluña. Aquí gobierna el Partido Popular y aquí gobierna el Partido Socialista. ¿Precio de la vivienda? Viviendas de protección oficial: año 2004, 112.000 euros, año 2008, con ustedes, 200.000 euros. Pero es que el espectáculo que han dado ustedes con esto del alquiler... solo el Ayuntamiento de Madrid alquila más viviendas, sólo el Ayuntamiento de Madrid que el propio Ministerio de la Vivienda. Fíjese usted, Vivienda pide a bancos y cajas que den ya las ayudas al alquiler aunque no tengan comprobados los datos, claro y los bancos dicen oigan aunque estemos en elecciones, está aquí, hay que cumplir la ley. Las ayudas al alquiler un coladero de fraudes... mire, el espectáculo ha sido grotesco, es que ya no es lo de las zapatillas ni los mini-pisos es que ha sido grotesco lo que ha hecho usted en el Ministerio de la Vivienda. Ha vuelto a hablar de educación, oiga ¿pero es que usted no se lee los datos del Informe Pisa? ¿Qué ha hecho usted en educación? Nos ha anunciado la educación para la ciudadanía y que se puede pasar de curso si uno suspende cuatro asignaturas pero si se lee los informes internacionales oiga en matemáticas, en lectura, es que estamos muy mal, es que hay que cambiar el modelo, se necesita trabajo, esfuerzo, mérito, es que eso es fundamental porque es el elemento más competitivo para el futuro de España, no vamos a competir con petróleo, vamos a competir con personas y esas personas tienen que estar muy bien formadas. Me parece muy bien que hable usted del I+D+i porque es un elemento para la competitividad de la economía española muy importante, bueno usted ha dado una serie de datos que no sé de donde se saca... [ZP: Están en los presupuestos públicos y en los informes de la Unión Europea] pero yo sí le digo que lo más relevante es que usted ha eliminado la deducción en I+D+I en el Impuesto de Sociedades y por tanto [ZP: No, ya se lo explicó el señor Solbes al señor Pizarro] las empresas que tienen dificultades... no no, sí sí, pero a mí no me hable del señor Solbes y el señor Pizarro, hábleme de usted y yo. [ZP: es un cambio normativo como consecuencia de...] no no, usted las ha eliminado, las ha eliminado.

MCV: Bien, tiempo...

ZP: Sí, señor Rajoy pero lo cierto es que con ustedes subió el precio de la vivienda a los niveles máximos, que con nosotros ha bajado, que ustedes construían 56.000 al año, que nosotros 100.000 que no tenían ninguna ayuda al alquiler a los jóvenes y nosotros sí. Que en educación y en investigación ustedes congelaron el gasto, no hubo ningún avance sustancial en I+D+i, ahora sí lo ha habido en un año solo de gobierno con datos de 2006 ya llegamos al 1,20 de gasto de Investigación Desarrollo e Innovación. 40.000 investigadores más y desde luego una

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1428 capacidad mucho más fuerte de nuestro país por ese esfuerzo que  
1429 tiene más productividad para que la economía sea más  
1430 competitiva en el futuro. A mí me interesa hablar del cambio  
1431 climático, le he oído estos días decir que propone una ley  
1432 integral del cambio climático ahora, bueno en fin ya sé que es  
1433 muy aficionado a los refranes.  
1434 **RJ:** Sí.  
1435 **ZP:** Le diría, a buenas horas mangas verdes, señor Rajoy. [**RJ:**  
1436 **Eso se lo expliqué yo**] Y nunca mejor dicho, nunca mejor dicho,  
1437 porque ustedes aumentaron un 40% las emisiones de gases con  
1438 efecto invernadero [**RJ:** **Qué barbaridad**] ahora las hemos  
1439 reducido nosotros [**RJ:** **Qué barbaridad**] a partir de 2006 un 4% a  
1440 pesar del gran crecimiento económico y hemos establecido todas  
1441 las medidas necesarias para que la lucha contra el cambio  
1442 climático, que comprendo no es un tema que a usted le sea muy  
1443 atractivo [**RJ:** **no, no, me es muy atractivo**], sea un elemento  
1444 central de lo que es el futuro de nuestro país que además  
1445 supone una gran oportunidad económica porque tenemos empresas  
1446 que son líderes en el mundo en energías alternativas como en  
1447 energía solar o energía eólica, a las cuales hemos apoyado,  
1448 vamos a apoyar porque tenemos el objetivo que ha marcado la  
1449 Unión Europea de llegar en el 2020 al 20% a través de esas  
1450 energías.  
1451 **RJ:** Ehhh bueno, el señor Rodríguez Zapatero ha vuelto al  
1452 pasado, a lo que subió el precio de la vivienda cuando  
1453 gobernaba el Partido Popular, oiga no debió subir mucho cuando  
1454 en su época ha tomado la decisión o gracias a sus gestiones ha  
1455 subido el 43% ¿no? Lo que desde luego sí ha subido también este  
1456 es el precio de las viviendas de protección oficial éste sí que  
1457 es un tema importante, de 112.000 euros a 200.000 euros.  
1458 Insisto ha sido un verdadero fiasco. Yo estoy dispuesto a  
1459 hablar con usted del cambio climático, el Partido Popular fue  
1460 el primer partido que creó en España un Ministerio de Medio  
1461 Ambiente en el año 1996, no lo creó el PSOE en 14 años de  
1462 Gobierno [**ZP:** **Que no hizo nada**]. Fue un gobierno del partido  
1463 popular el que firmó el Protocolo de Kioto y fui yo quien lo  
1464 firmó en representación de la Unión Europea como presidente del  
1465 Consejo porque Aznar estaba ausente por motivos de agenda.  
1466 España en estos últimos cuatro años es uno de los países que  
1467 más incumple sus compromisos frente al cambio climático con un  
1468 exceso de emisiones del 38%, es que usted habla y luego actúa  
1469 de forma distinta a como habla. Dice una cosa y hace  
1470 exactamente lo contrario. En el año 2006 las energías  
1471 renovables y yo estoy de acuerdo en que es bueno que haya  
1472 energías renovables representaron apenas poco más del 6% del  
1473 consumo de la energía primaria, pero luego, señor Zapatero, ha  
1474 habido muchos incendios en España a lo largo de estos años en  
1475 Huelva, en Guadalajara, en Galicia, ¿cuál fue su actuación ahí?  
1476 ¿Qué hizo usted? ¿Cuál ha sido su política forestal? ¿Fue usted  
1477 sensible con la gente? ¿Lo fue en Guadalajara? ¿Atendió a la  
1478 gente? ¿Atendió sus necesidades? A usted que le gusta tanto  
1479 hablar de la gente... porque yo estuve allí con la gente, con sus  
1480 problemas y hubo mucha tensión y usted no fue capaz, usted no  
1481 atendió a la gente [**ZP:** **siempre he intentado atender a la**  
1482 **gente, siempre**] y ahora quiere procesarlos... No hombre no, usted  
1483 no atiende a nadie [**ZP:** **siempre**], usted fue con una cámara de  
1484 televisión en un helicóptero [**ZP:** **siempre, siempre, siempre**]  
1485 para salir en el telediario, eso es exactamente lo que hizo  
1486 usted.  
1487 **ZP:** No, no, no, no hice como los ministros [**MCV:** última  
1488 intervención] de su gobierno que cuando había problemas... [**RJ:**

## Appendix I. First debate

1489 ya vuelve a su gobierno... qué barbaridad... yo no tuve ningún  
1490 gobierno] en Galicia, el chapapote... cuando había problemas se  
1491 iban de caza. Eso solo pertenece a su Gobierno [RJ: sí sí, pero  
1492 yo estaba dando la cara ahí ¿eh? Yo estaba dando la cara ahí y  
1493 usted organizándose manifestaciones]. Eso solo pertenece a su  
1494 Gobierno... mire esta es la evolución de los gases de efecto  
1495 invernadero, con el Partido Popular cada año en aumento con el  
1496 PSOE ya se ha empezado a reducir. [RJ: Pues no XXX con su  
1497 Ministerio porque yo quiero hablar de su Ministerio...] quiero  
1498 hablar de futuro quiero hablar de futuro, no, son datos  
1499 oficiales de la Unión Europea. Quiero hablar de futuro [RJ: ah  
1500 bueno, entonces su ministerio está equivocado] y de lo que  
1501 representa el esfuerzo que este país tiene hacer en materia de  
1502 educación y en materia de cultura. Mire, señor Rajoy, España  
1503 sufre un atraso que estamos recuperando en materia de educación  
1504 y en materia de ciencia. El Gobierno ha acompañado a los  
1505 cuidadores y a los investigadores. Hace unos días un conjunto  
1506 de personas investigadores, rectores, gente de la cultura  
1507 nombres tan representativos como Mikel Barceló, como Serrat,  
1508 como Sabina expresaron su apoyo a mi candidatura y usted les  
1509 llamó "untados", [RJ: ¿cómo?] les llamó "untados", a las  
1510 personas que habían salido de la cultura y de la investigación  
1511 apoyando mi candidatura. Señor Rajoy, un país que desprecia a  
1512 sus profesores, a sus creadores, es un país que vuelve la  
1513 espalda al futuro y un político que incurre en ese desprecio a  
1514 la gente de la cultura, a la gente de la investigación no  
1515 merece presidir un país.

1516 MCV: Última intervención, tienen ahora un minuto para concluir  
1517 este bloque. Por favor, sean estrictos en los tiempos que lo  
1518 hacen fantásticamente. Señor Rajoy, un minuto.

1519 RJ: oiga, mire usted, yo defiendo a los creadores, yo he sido  
1520 ministro de cultura y defiendo a los artistas pero yo no estoy  
1521 dispuesto a que me llamen a diez millones de votantes del  
1522 Partido Popular para apoyarle a usted "turba de imbéciles y de  
1523 estúpidos" eso se puede hacer. Yo lo que nunca haría sería  
1524 agredir a las víctimas del terrorismo como ha hecho usted,  
1525 porque eso sí que son personas indefensas y no el señor Serrat  
1526 y esos señores [ZP: Yo no he agredido a ninguna víctima del  
1527 terrorismo, y no le acepto que diga eso] que ha citado usted.  
1528 No no no eso es lo que no haría yo [ZP: ¿que yo he agredido a  
1529 una víctima del terrorismo?] yo estoy a favor... no no si si si  
1530 si siempre [ZP: no no no se lo acepto señor Rajoy, es una  
1531 afirmación muy grave], es que me es igual que no me lo acepte  
1532 [ZP: yo no he agredido a ninguna víctima del terrorismo no  
1533 puede decir eso] porque ustedes han estado en campaña  
1534 continuada contra las víctimas del terrorismo [ZP: no puede  
1535 decir que yo he agredido a una víctima del terrorismo] es que  
1536 me es igual que no lo acepte [MCV: vamos a hacer una cosa] si  
1537 es que me trae completamente sin cuidado [ZP: no pero es que es  
1538 muy grave] no no pero es que es la verdad [ZP: eso es muy  
1539 grave] es la verdad... como que no han agredido [ZP: que yo no he  
1540 agredido a ninguna víctima del terrorismo] pero si han  
1541 manifestado XXX ocasiones [ZP: yo no he agredido a ninguna  
1542 víctima del terrorismo].

1543 MCV: Señor Zapatero, tendrá ahora su turno para contestar... Y  
1544 prorrogamos un poco más el tiempo que tenía usted. Adelante,  
1545 señor Rajoy...

1546 RJ: Yo mantengo lo que he dicho: que el señor Zapatero ha  
1547 agredido a las víctimas del terrorismo. Lo mantengo. Que quede  
1548 claro. Yo, desde luego, lo que es evidente es que yo no puedo  
1549 aceptarle a una persona que pide el voto para usted que insulte



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1550 a los demás. Porque eso es inaceptable. Se llame Serrat, o sea  
1551 la persona más humilde del mundo. Se llame como se llame. Hay  
1552 que tener un poco de tolerancia. Y un poco de respeto a las  
1553 personas. Y hay muchas personas que votan al Partido Popular  
1554 porque quieren y porque les apetece. Y hay que tratarlos con  
1555 tolerancia, como yo trato también a la gente. [MCV: vaya  
1556 terminando] Ahora, yo tengo que defender a la gente. Y usted  
1557 debería haber defendido a aquellas personas que fueron  
1558 insultadas por todos aquellos que estuvieron en el acto de los  
1559 artistas. [MCV: vaya terminando] ¿Por qué no defendió a los  
1560 insultados?  
1561 MCV: Tiempo para el señor Zapatero.  
1562 ZP: Señor Rajoy, usted vinculó su declaración de untados al  
1563 canon digital, intentando hacer demagogia populista, [RJ:  
1564 demagogia la suya] y descalificó a gente de la cultura, a gente  
1565 como Mikel Barceló, como Joan Manuel Serrat, como Joaquín  
1566 Sabina, como Pedro Duque, que estaban en ese acto de la  
1567 Plataforma. Creadores que son universales y que dan la imagen  
1568 de España al mundo. Mire, aquí dije que iba a haber claramente...  
1569 que se iba a advertir una diferencia de proyectos políticos.  
1570 ¿Sabe cuál ha sido la diferencia? Usted apoyó a un grupo de  
1571 deportistas, algunos de ellos que nos dan una brillante imagen  
1572 en el mundo, y yo lo respeto. Tienen derecho, me parece bien  
1573 que le apoyen a ustedes [RJ: Pero no le insultaron a usted...]  
1574 No... El señor Barceló, el señor Pedro Duque, no... No insultaron a  
1575 nadie. [RJ: ah no, ehhh] Usted les atacó, porque les llamó  
1576 "untados por el canon digital". Y alguien que ofende a gente de  
1577 la cultura. A quien transmite la creación española, como hoy  
1578 Javier Bardem, que ha terminado su intervención dedicando a  
1579 España su Oscar... [MCV: Tiene que ir terminando, señor  
1580 Zapatero]... hay que defenderles [RJ: yo lo he felicitado]. Y  
1581 alguien que les ofende y les descalifica, no puede presidir  
1582 este país [RJ: Y a las víctimas del terrorismo...] Yo no he  
1583 descalificado a las víctimas del terrorismo. [RJ: usted, sí]  
1584 Nunca [RJ: Y yo no he descalificado a los artistas] nunca,  
1585 nunca, sí, usted les llamó "untados" [RJ: No, no. A los que nos  
1586 descalificaron a nosotros] "Untados por el canon digital" [RJ:  
1587 A los que nos descalificaron a nosotros] y yo respeté [RJ: oiga  
1588 es que yo desde luego estoy en contra del canon digital. Usted  
1589 estará a favor] y yo respeté a quien apoya [RJ: Y tiene derecho  
1590 a hacerlo...] y quien le ha apoyado.

### 7. CIERRE

1591 MCV: Señores... Estamos en el último turno de este debate. Saben,  
1592 tanto señor Rajoy como señor Rodríguez Zapatero, que tienen  
1593 tres minutos cada uno para sacar conclusiones si lo desean, o  
1594 también, para plantearnos ideas para el futuro. Son tres  
1595 minutos, siempre en el orden que hemos establecido en este  
1596 primer debate... El señor Mariano Rajoy en primer lugar; el señor  
1597 Rodríguez Zapatero, a continuación. Últimos tres minutos.  
1598 RJ: Quiero que esta noche se vayan a dormir con la tranquilidad  
1599 de que podemos encarrilar las cosas. Las elecciones nos ofrecen  
1600 una gran oportunidad y no debíamos perderla. No queremos  
1601 renunciar a nada. Podemos mirar al mañana con optimismo y con  
1602 esperanza. Sabemos perfectamente cómo se hace, porque ya lo  
1603 hicimos todos juntos en peores circunstancias. Yo estoy  
1604 dispuesto. El plan de trabajo está preparado, y las  
1605 herramientas a punto. Solamente falta que usted decida que nos  
1606 pongamos en marcha. No le pido el voto para mí. Yo no soy lo  
1607 que está en juego. Yo no soy quien gana o pierde estas

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elecciones. Lo gana o pierde España entera. Está en juego todo lo que podemos hacer si vamos juntos. Y todo lo que podemos perder si no lo hacemos. Por eso es muy importante que acertemos con lo que España necesita. Necesitamos los votos, pero me importan más los compromisos. Porque yo sólo quiero lo que todos queremos. Y hay un ejemplo que resume todas mis ideas y que todo el mundo puede entender. Yo quiero que la niña que nace en España tenga una familia y una vivienda y unos padres con trabajo. Esto es lo mínimo que debemos exigirnos para todos, una familia, una vivienda y unos padres con trabajo. Yo me esforzaré principalmente para que la familia esté atendida, y la vivienda se pueda conseguir y para que no falte el trabajo. Quiero que esa niña nazca donde nazca reciba una educación, que sea tan buena como la mejor. Quiero que se pueda pasear por todo el mundo sin complejos, porque sabrá idiomas y porque tendrá un título profesional que se cotice en todo el mundo. Quiero que sea un heraldo de la libertad, de la tolerancia y de los derechos humanos, porque habrá crecido en libertad y no tendrá miedo a las ideas de los demás. Y habrá aprendido a respetar a todos los que respetan la ley. Quiero que sienta un hondo orgullo por ser española, por pertenecer a esa nación tan vieja, tan admirable, que le habrá ofrecido las mejores oportunidades, pero que habrá sabido ser exigente con ella para convertirla en una mujer madura y responsable. Eso es lo que quiero. Esto y todo lo que esto lleva implícito. Y ¿por qué no? Nada nos impide lograrlo, podemos hacerlos si ustedes quieren que caminemos juntos, porque España es cosa de todos y debemos tomárnosla muy en serio. Muchísimas gracias y muy buenas noches.

**MCV:** Última intervención.

**ZP:** Sí, muchas gracias. Desde que España recuperó la libertad, España está fortalecida y hemos dado un gran avance histórico. Tengo plena confianza en las enormes posibilidades de la España libre y unida. Creo que nuestro país puede continuar avanzando, incrementar su prosperidad y ese avance, lo podemos hacer trabajando unidos. En toda mi vida política, tanto en la oposición como en el gobierno, he servido a España con lealtad, he colaborado en los asuntos de Estado. Hace cuatro años pedí el voto para que volviéramos a la legalidad internacional y los soldados de Iraq regresaran de una guerra ilegal. Pedí el voto para incrementar la prosperidad y el bien estar de España, y hemos crecido económicamente y hemos creado 3 millones de empleo. Pedí el voto para incrementar las pensiones mínimas, para hacerlas más dignas y las hemos subido. Pedí el voto para incrementar el Salario Mínimo Interprofesional, y lo hemos hecho. Pedí el voto para avanzar en la igualdad de las mujeres y en sus derechos, y lo hemos hecho con la Ley de Igualdad. Pedí el voto para atender a los más necesitados, y lo he hecho con la Ley de la Dependencia. He trabajado en este período con toda mi fuerza y con toda mi humildad. He reconocido errores. He puesto toda mi energía para hacer un país más próspero. Y en los próximos cuatro años, me propongo seguir aumentando la prosperidad, llegar al pleno empleo, trabajando juntos empresarios y trabajadores. Estoy resuelto a que la igualdad de hombres y mujeres, en derechos, en salarios haga compatible la vida familiar y el trabajo avanzando en la conciliación y en las plazas para los menores de 3 años. Estoy decidido a que España esté en la vanguardia del cambio climático, de la lucha contra el Cambio Climático, en la calidad de la Educación, en Infraestructuras, está a nuestro alcance. Estoy decidido a que España esté siempre en el mundo defendiendo la paz, lejos de



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1669 las guerras ilegales, incrementando la ayuda al desarrollo  
1670 hasta el 0,7%. Todo esto es posible, está a nuestro alcance.  
1671 Trabajaré inspirado por los mayores, trabajaré con la ilusión  
1672 de hacer un futuro para nuestros hijos y con la ambición de  
1673 progreso que tienen los jóvenes. No puedo prometer que todas  
1674 las personas tengan éxito en su vida, pero sí me puedo  
1675 comprometer a trabajar para que todas las personas tengan las  
1676 mismas oportunidades para tener éxito, y aquellas que no lo  
1677 alcancen tendrán siempre el amparo de nuestro país. Buenas  
1678 noches y buena suerte.

1679 **MCV:** Muchas gracias señores, hasta aquí el debate. Ha sido un  
1680 debate intenso, interesante, equilibrado en los tiempos,  
1681 magnífico. Nuestra gratitud sincera primero por haberlo  
1682 aceptado. Decíamos al principio que el 25 de febrero del 2008  
1683 quedará en la historia electoral española ¿no? Como ese  
1684 recuerdo, ese día que ustedes dos aceptaron, sus partidos  
1685 políticos también, comenzar de nuevo estos cara a cara, y ojalá  
1686 siga siendo así. De momento el próximo lunes lo será. Ustedes  
1687 ya saben que a partir del 9 de marzo el próximo presidente del  
1688 Gobierno de España se llamará Mariano Rajoy o José Luis  
1689 Rodríguez Zapatero. Se llamará Zapatero o se llamará Rajoy. Los  
1690 ciudadanos son los que deciden. Nosotros aquí, como  
1691 profesionales, desde la Academia y con ayuda de las  
1692 televisiones hemos hecho el debate que es lo que nos  
1693 correspondía. Aquí están acreditados hoy 400 profesionales que  
1694 están transmitiendo este debate en diversos medios, y calculamos  
1695 más de 1000, probablemente sean cerca de 2000, los que están  
1696 desde distintas redacciones de televisión, de radio o de medios  
1697 digitales dando difusión para toda España, y en realidad para  
1698 todo el mundo, porque estamos, como se ha dicho aquí, en una  
1699 sociedad global, este debate tan interesante. Desde luego  
1700 nosotros les agradecemos su presencia, les deseamos mucha  
1701 suerte en las elecciones a los dos. También deseamos suerte a  
1702 todos aquellos candidatos de otras formaciones políticas que  
1703 aspiran a tener representación parlamentaria en el Congreso y  
1704 en el Senado que surjan del 9 de marzo próximo. Saben ustedes  
1705 que el próximo lunes, también organizado por la Academia de la  
1706 Televisión, Mariano Rajoy y José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero  
1707 volverán a este plató para depararnos seguramente otro  
1708 extraordinario debate intenso, equilibrado, vehemente, en  
1709 algunos pasajes, claro que sí, pero desde luego absolutamente  
1710 interesante porque estamos hablando de una cuestión  
1711 absolutamente muy seria, que es el futuro de nuestro país.  
1712 Muchas gracias a todos. Gracias a ustedes por su atención,  
1713 buenas noches.

1714 **ZP:** Muchas gracias.

1715 **RJ:** Buenas noches.

**Transcription of the second presidential debate between Mariano Rajoy and José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero (22:00h, Monday 3 March 2008)<sup>1</sup>**

PRIMERA PARTE

1. APERTURA

1 **Olga Viza (OV):** Muy buenas noches señores, el próximo domingo a  
2 estas horas la suerte estará echada. Esa noche tendremos todos,  
3 una idea muy aproximada del resultado que hayan arrojado las  
4 urnas. A seis días de esa cita electoral, les doy la bienvenida  
5 en nombre de la Academia de las Ciencias y las Artes de la  
6 Televisión a este segundo debate "cara a cara" entre los dos  
7 candidatos a la Presidencia de los partidos políticos que  
8 tienen mayor representación parlamentaria. Seis días como digo  
9 para las elecciones, de modo que estamos en la fase decisiva y  
10 ante el debate definitivo. Señor José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero,  
11 muy buenas noches  
12 **José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero (ZP):** Buenas noches.  
13 **OV:** Tal y como ocurrió la semana pasada semana le voy a pedir  
14 que me permita tratarle como candidato socialista, aunque sea  
15 presidente.  
16 **ZP:** Por supuesto.  
17 **OV:** Muchas gracias. Doy la bienvenida también al candidato del  
18 Partido Popular, don Mariano Rajoy. Muy buenas noches  
19 **Mariano Rajoy (RJ):** Buenas noches, muchas gracias.  
20 **OV:** Bienvenido, como digo. Los candidatos, como ven, vuelven a  
21 sentarse en la misma mesa, pero como habrán observado con los  
22 lugares cambiados. También debo decir que el orden también es  
23 inverso respecto al anterior debate. Abrirá los turnos el  
24 candidato socialista. Los cerrará el candidato del Partido  
25 Popular. Son las dos únicas alteraciones respecto al debate de  
26 hace una semana. Lo cierto es que la expectación es indudable.  
27 Más de trece millones de espectadores siguieron el primer  
28 encuentro, además de un altísimo número de oyentes y de  
29 internautas. Nos consta el seguimiento que hubo en muchos  
30 países europeos y el especial interés en algunos países  
31 iberoamericanos como en Argentina, Venezuela, Chile y Uruguay.  
32 Si la pasada semana hablábamos de treinta señales de  
33 televisión, sepan que en esta ocasión se suman otras emisoras,  
34 entre ellas Canal Sur y Canal Cuatro de Castilla y León y  
35 además la UER está distribuyendo en este momento la señal de  
36 este debate a todas las cadenas públicas europeas. Bien, vamos  
37 a comenzar, vamos a comenzar. El señor Zapatero y el señor  
38 Rajoy conocen el procedimiento, ambos. A mí me corresponde  
39 asegurar que se respeten esas pautas. La... la... el debate  
40 comienza como en la anterior ocasión con una intervención de  
41 tres minutos para cada uno. ¿Cómo ven la situación? ¿Dónde  
42 estamos? ¿Cuál es su idea de país? Una reflexión general. Señor  
43 Zapatero.  
44 **ZP:** Buenas noches. El lunes pasado expliqué la gestión  
45 realizada durante estos cuatro años y rendí cuentas de lo  
46 llevado a cabo. Esta noche, me propongo explicar cuál es mi  
47 proyecto para los próximos cuatro años, para un país que debe  
48 continuar creciendo económicamente, que juntos empresarios,  
49 sindicatos y Gobierno-, podemos superar un momento de  
50 desaceleración económica que vive España en un contexto

<sup>1</sup> Video available at: <http://www.rtve.es/alacarta/videos/elecciones-20-n/segundo-debate-electoral-entre-zapatero-rajoy-integro/1239528/>

## Appendix I. Second debate

51 mundial, para traducir ese crecimiento económico en crecimiento  
52 social, para crear dos millones de empleos en los próximos  
53 cuatro años, la mitad de ellos para las mujeres, para reforzar  
54 la estabilidad en el empleo y combatir la precariedad, Para  
55 alcanzar la igualdad plena entre hombres y mujeres, también en  
56 los salarios, para conseguir un país que defienda los valores  
57 del desarrollo sostenible en la lucha contra el cambio  
58 climático y contra la pobreza en el mundo. Para hacer una  
59 España segura, unida contra el terrorismo, más segura en las  
60 calles, más segura en las carreteras pero más segura también en  
61 los centros de trabajo. Que plante cara al delito, a la  
62 imprudencia en las carreteras y, por supuesto, a los accidentes  
63 laborales. Un país que alcance las cotas de educación, de  
64 cultura que se merece una gran potencia como es España. Un país  
65 en convivencia, con más derechos para todos, y un país unido.  
66 Espero que el debate esta noche sea útil para todos los  
67 ciudadanos. En toda mi trayectoria política he intentado que el  
68 insulto, que la descalificación, no contamine el debate  
69 público. Deseo que esta noche tengamos un debate de ideas, de  
70 propuestas y de soluciones; es lo que nos exigen los  
71 ciudadanos, con limpieza, con limpieza y con veracidad. Por  
72 eso, he traído conmigo un libro blanco con todos los datos que  
73 el otro día aporté en el debate, con todos los que voy a  
74 explicar hoy. Lo dejo a disposición de la moderadora; estará  
75 del señor Rajoy, de los medios de comunicación y de los  
76 ciudadanos por internet, mañana, para que puedan contrastar  
77 todo lo que decimos aquí. La verdad por delante y por escrito,  
78 para que no haya ninguna duda. Ninguna, señor Rajoy.

79 **OV:** Muchas gracias señor Zapatero. Señor Rajoy, le escuchamos.

80 **RJ:** Muchas gracias. Muy... muy buenas noches. Yo voy a hablar  
81 también de la verdad y también de la realidad de cómo esta  
82 España y de lo que creo que debemos hacer en el futuro próximo,  
83 a lo largo de los próximos cuatro años. Yo creo que hay una  
84 mayoría de españoles que no lo están pasando bien. Cuando  
85 hablamos de que crece el paro, estamos hablando de personas de  
86 personas que tienen sentimientos, que a veces viven dramas  
87 personales, que tienen niños, que se tienen que preocupar por  
88 ellos. Cuando hablamos de la subida de los precios, también  
89 hablamos de personas, de quien mira su nómina, de quien ve su  
90 pensión, de quien ve lo que puede llenar del carro de la  
91 compra, de quien se tiene que apretar el cinturón para llegar a  
92 fin de mes. Cuando hablamos de hipotecas también hablamos de  
93 personas. Hoy, la situación económica de los españoles, de las  
94 familias españolas es peor que hace cuatro años, y no se puede  
95 negar la realidad porque quien niega la realidad, como hace el  
96 señor Zapatero, pues es imposible que pueda afrontarla. El  
97 señor Zapatero también nos dice que la inmigración está  
98 controlada. Yo no estoy de acuerdo. La inmigración no está  
99 controlada y hay que poner orden y control. Hay mucha gente que  
100 viene aquí a trabajar, se gana la vida dignamente, tiene  
101 derechos y debe tener los mismos derechos que los españoles,  
102 pero hay muchos derechos de españoles que se ven perjudicados.  
103 Por tanto, hay que poner orden y control para que no se  
104 perjudiquen sus derechos sociales. Se nos dice que España está  
105 más unida y cohesionada que nunca, pero tenemos un referéndum  
106 de separación convocado para este año y tenemos uno anunciado  
107 para el futuro. Al señor Zapatero sé que no le gusta que le  
108 diga esto, se enfada conmigo, pero debiera enfadarse con quien  
109 convoca los referéndum. Hay españoles que han visto cómo sus  
110 derechos han sido afectados. Hay españoles que son conscientes  
111 de que se ha perdido la igualdad en muchos temas. Cuando él

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112 llegó al Gobierno, recibió un modelo de Estado en el que había  
113 un acuerdo sustancial entre los españoles y un modelo de  
114 financiación de las autonomías que trataba todo por igual.  
115 Ahora todo está en el alero y todo está abierto. La educación  
116 es un tema capital. No son los organismos internacionales. Lo  
117 sabemos todos los españoles. No va bien. Y este es un tema  
118 decisivo para el futuro y no se puede negar la realidad, sino  
119 que hay que afrontarla. Tampoco va bien la seguridad ciudadana  
120 y hay que afrontar la realidad, crece la delincuencia y hay  
121 muchas personas y muchas bandas organizadas que actúan de forma  
122 especialmente violenta. También el precio de la vivienda ha  
123 subido un 43 por ciento en estos años. ¿Qué ha pasado en los  
124 cuatro años? Pues que el Gobierno de España ha equivocado las  
125 prioridades. Ha tenido dos grandes proyectos: el primero,  
126 cambiar España y el segundo, negociar con ETA. Ambos han sido  
127 un fracaso. Se ha dividido a los españoles, se ha generado  
128 mucha tensión y, sobre todo, se ha olvidado lo esencial, que es  
129 la economía, que son los precios, que es la vida de las  
130 personas, que es su forma de sentir, de vivir, son sus  
131 preocupaciones. Creo que se necesita un Gobierno que dé  
132 certidumbre, un Gobierno que dé seguridad, que se ocupe de los  
133 problemas reales de los españoles, que busque acuerdos, que sea  
134 un Gobierno para todos y que no divida a los españoles.

### 2. POLÍTICA ECONÓMICA

135 **OV:** Muchas gracias señor Rajoy. Después de estas primeras  
136 reflexiones generales, vamos a entrar en los detalles. Abrimos  
137 el primero de los bloques. Macroeconomía, precios, salarios,  
138 cifras del paro, productividad. En definitiva, economía y  
139 empleo. Señor Zapatero.

140 **ZP:** La buena marcha de la economía en estos años tiene un doble  
141 valor: por un lado nos ha permitido elevar el nivel de renta  
142 per cápita hemos subido la media... hemos superado la media  
143 europea; hemos superado a Italia y además nos ha permitido  
144 alcanzar un superávit que nos hace fuertes para afrontar  
145 dificultades, para apoyar a la economía productiva y para  
146 apoyar a las familias. Mi objetivo en la próxima legislatura es  
147 el pleno empleo. Mi primera acción será convocar a sindicatos y  
148 empresarios para firmar un gran acuerdo para toda la  
149 legislatura, con prioridades urgentes, para afrontar las  
150 consecuencias de la desaceleración que vive la economía  
151 mundial, vamos a poner en marcha una batería de acciones para  
152 la reactivación económica con sindicatos y empresarios. Primera  
153 acción: adelantodel Plan de Infraestructuras para compensar la  
154 caída de la construcción. Segundo: la construcción de 150.000  
155 viviendas de protección oficial este año. Tercero: planes de  
156 reciclaje y recolocación para los parados del sector de la  
157 construcción. Devolución del IRPF de 400 euros por  
158 contribuyente. Extensión gratuita del plazo de hipotecas para  
159 que se beneficien las familias con problemas. Sexto: propiciar,  
160 en línea con otros países europeos, un acuerdo con el sector de  
161 la distribución para el autocontrol de márgenes en los precios  
162 de los alimentos. Estas son medidas inmediatas, efectivas y  
163 constructivas, no como su habitual catastrofismo señor Rajoy,  
164 sólo se dedican a sembrar dudas cada día, a meter miedo sobre  
165 la economía, a describir una situación catastrófica. La verdad  
166 es la que se le ha escapado a uno de sus dirigentes, al señor  
167 Elorriaga, en un prestigioso periódico extranjero, cuando ha  
168 declarado "toda nuestra estrategia es desalentar a los votantes  
169 socialistas para que no voten, si sembramos dudas sobre la

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170 economía, sobre la inmigración y sobre las cuestiones  
171 nacionalistas, quizás se queden en casa". Esa es la razón por  
172 la que siembran tantas dudas, y meten tanto miedo, intentar  
173 ganar votos.

174 **OV:** Señor Rajoy.

175 **RJ:** bien eh... Muchas gracias, eh... Yo voy a hablar de lo que  
176 afecta fundamentalmente a los españoles, y voy a hablar de cómo  
177 viven los españoles, que no viven como usted cree que viven los  
178 españoles. Usted ha dicho que hemos superado en renta per  
179 cápita a Italia y que ha mejorado mucho la renta per cápita en  
180 estos últimos años. Seguramente tiene ahí, ya que nos ha  
181 anunciado que va a traer muchos datos, los datos que ha  
182 publicado la UE. Eurostat, año 2006, somos el quinto país de la  
183 Unión Europea 27 en menos crecimiento per cápita, el quinto,  
184 sólo hay cuatro que crecen por debajo de nosotros. Por tanto,  
185 sería bueno que esos datos los conociese el conjunto de los  
186 españoles. Yo le recuerdo que han subido los precios de una  
187 manera eh en fin ciertamente no aceptable en los últimos  
188 tiempos. La leche el 29 por ciento en el último año, los  
189 huevos, el pollo y el pan, todos por encima del diez por  
190 ciento. La inflación en el mes de enero el 4,3 por ciento y en  
191 el mes de febrero el coma eh el 4,4. La cogieron con el cero...  
192 eh... con el 2,1, es decir 0,35 más que la UE [**ZP:** más más...].  
193 Siguen subiendo las hipotecas y el paro está aumentando, 4.500  
194 personas han aumentado en el último mes de enero. Y no hay peor  
195 médico que el que no quiere ver la enfermedad. Usted lleva  
196 mucho tiempo hablando de catastrofismo, de que nosotros somos  
197 unos exagerados, pero yo ya la primera pregunta que le hice en  
198 el Congreso de los Diputados en el año 2004 era que debería  
199 hacer usted reformas económicas porque si no, la herencia y la  
200 inercia se iban a terminar como así ocurrió y así nos  
201 encontramos en la situación en la que estamos. Usted ha citado  
202 a un periódico extranjero que es el Financial Times, yo le voy  
203 a decir lo que en el día de hoy, hoy, dice el Financial Times,  
204 fíjese: "El vencedor de las próximas elecciones se va a tener  
205 que pasar los próximos cuatro años poniendo orden en un  
206 estropicio sin precedentes en la moderna Historia de España.  
207 Nos esperan cinco años -dice el Financial Times- de crecimiento  
208 cero por la caída de la construcción y porque se han acabado  
209 los años en que la gente podía pedir créditos. El principal  
210 reto para el ganador será el modelo de crecimiento basado en la  
211 productividad".

212 **OV:** Señor Zapatero.

213 **ZP:** Sí, muchas gracias señor Rajoy... Hemos superado en renta per  
214 cápita a Italia, hemos superado la media europea, y debería de  
215 tener un poco más de memoria sobre la primera pregunta que me  
216 hizo en el Parlamento siendo usted líder de la oposición y yo  
217 presidente del Gobierno porque no fue ni de economía ni de  
218 precios. Pero hablemos de precios, yo sí quiero hablar de los  
219 precios que afectan a los ciudadanos. Nosotros llevamos en  
220 nuestro programa una medida concreta para contener la subida de  
221 los precios: es un observatorio que compara los dis... los  
222 precios de los distintos proveedores y que estimulará la  
223 competencia. Una medida similar acaba de tomarse en Francia.  
224 Ustedes sólo saben hacer demagogia con los precios. Los precios  
225 han subido lo mismo de media en su etapa de Gobierno que con  
226 nosotros, hay productos que hoy suben más ahora, y otros muchos  
227 que suben menos o que incluso bajan. El plan, el pan, la leche,  
228 y el pollo han subido, en efecto, pero vayamos a otros  
229 productos del mercado. Los huevos con ustedes subieron tres...  
230 veces más, las frutas subieron tres veces más con ustedes, y

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231 las patatas subieron veintidós veces más con su Gobierno. Hay  
232 productos que con su Gobierno subían de precio y ahora incluso  
233 han bajado, como el vestido o los electrodomésticos. Hace poco  
234 usted viajó a Alemania a hacer campaña electoral y afirmó que  
235 quería ser presidente para que la leche costara en España menos  
236 que en Alemania. No hace falta señor Rajoy; es más barata en  
237 España. Ese mismo día el Gobierno alemán había anunciado que  
238 los productos de primera necesidad habían sufrido la mayor  
239 subida de los últimos veintiséis años. También está en el libro  
240 por si lo quiere comprobar alguien.

241 **OV:** Gracias, señor Zapatero. Señor Rajoy.

242 **RJ:** Bien, eh... la primera pregunta que yo le hice al señor  
243 Zapatero en el Congreso de los Diputados fue de economía la  
244 primera y por tanto le ruego que no falte a la verdad, esto se  
245 podrá comprobar en el día de mañana. Yo no sé si va a hacer o  
246 no un observatorio de precios, pero si lo hace va a tener que  
247 ser muy eficaz porque cuando usted llegó al Gobierno (enseña un  
248 gráfico) la inflación los precios subían el 2,1 y ahora suben  
249 el 4,5, más del doble. Me habla de los salarios, de lo que sube  
250 la vida y me habla de las patatas. Fíjese el nivel adquisitivo  
251 de los salarios (enseña un gráfico), el salario medio  
252 descontado de la inflación, estos son datos del Instituto  
253 Nacional de Estadística. Gobierno del Partido Popular, Gobierno  
254 del Partido Socialista: No se han ocupado usted de los  
255 asalariados, señor presidente del Gobierno, y ahora me dice que  
256 va a crear un observatorio. Debería crearlo, porque fíjese lo  
257 que dice el observatorio de precios, que ya lo tiene, del  
258 Ministerio de Agricultura, creará otro observatorio más... lo  
259 dice... entre el día 17 y 24 de febrero, mire lo que dice, los  
260 precios de la anchoa y la patata cayeron hasta un 19% en  
261 origen, hablando de patatas, y se encareció en destino, a la  
262 hora de comprar, entre un 19 y un 7. Ya hay un observatorio,  
263 señor Rodríguez zapatero, lo que hay que hacer es una política  
264 económica, que es lo que ustedes no hicieron. Ustedes se  
265 quedaron sentados tranquilamente, dijeron "qué bien se vive de  
266 la herencia y de la inercia, qué bien nos lo han dejado estos  
267 señores del Partido Popular y ahora vamos a no hacer nada. A  
268 dedicarnos a la Alianza de Civilizaciones, a enter... a  
269 entretenernos con la memoria histórica, vamos a negociar con  
270 ETA y otras cosas". Si quiere hacer una política de precios, le  
271 voy a decir cuatro cosas que a mí me parecen muy importantes:  
272 en primer lugar reduzca el gasto público por debajo del  
273 crecimiento nominal de la economía, que es lo hemos hecho  
274 nosotros en 4 años, en segundo lugar establezca competencia en  
275 los mercados, como hicimos nosotros por ejemplo en las  
276 Telecomunicaciones, hoy el que se compra un teléfono, o  
277 transporte aéreo, que hay muchas compañías en donde no hicieron  
278 nada, en tercer lugar hagan reformas económicas y una auténtica  
279 política económica, que es lo que no han hecho a lo largo de  
280 estos 4 años y en cuarto lugar cuiden aquellos precios que son  
281 regulados, porque con ustedes ha subido el gas y la  
282 electricidad sin parar y con nosotros bajó el gas y bajó la  
283 electricidad.

284 **OV:** Señor Zapatero.

285 **ZP:** Si, señor Rajoy, me sorprende la poca memoria o el intento  
286 que usted tiene de manipular. Yo tengo aquí su primera pregunta  
287 realizada como líder la oposición (enseña un folio del que lee)  
288 y dice así: "¿Cómo valora usted los primeros días de su  
289 Gobierno?". Y en esa pregunta habla de la coordinación del  
290 Gobierno, de los hechos que han sucedido, de los anuncios. No  
291 hay nada de precios [**RJ:** Y de las reformas económicas... que es



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lo que le pido...] ni de la economía [RJ: la reformas económicas es lo que le pido] No, no, déjeme. La primera pregunta que usted hace de precios, de la subida de los precios ha sido hace pocas semanas. No ha tenido usted ninguna pregunta sobre subida precios, hace pocas semanas, prácticamente cuando ya estaban las elecciones. No le ha importado este tema. Pero yo quiero hablar de los problemas de los ciudadanos. Y el primero para el bienestar de una economía es el empleo. Me comprometo a crear 2 millones de empleos en esta legislatura, más estables y un millón doscientos mil para mujeres. Me comprometo a subir las pensiones mínimas hasta 850 euros a los jubilados con cónyuge a cargo y 710 euros para las viudas. Me comprometo a subir otro 30 por ciento el salario mínimo, hasta llegar a 800 euros. Creo en la creación de riqueza y en la distribución la riqueza, ustedes no. Por eso España ha avanzado no sólo en las grandes cifras de la economía sino en la calidad de vida cotidiana. ¿Puede medirse objetivamente el bienestar de un país? Sí, lo hace Naciones Unidas en el informe de desarrollo humano. Cuando ustedes llegaron al Gobierno, España estaba en el puesto número 11; con su Gobierno perdimos diez puestos y llegamos al número 21 en 2003, y ahora ya hemos vuelto a adelantar 8 posiciones y llegamos al puesto número 13. El informe de Naciones Unidas sobre desarrollo humano contrasta la calidad de vida, la educación, el bienestar... No lo digo yo, señor Rajoy, lo dice Naciones Unidas y también figura en el libro el informe oportuno.

OV: Señor Rajoy.

RJ: En la primera pregunta que hice en el Congreso de los Diputados hablé de la necesidad de hacer reformas económicas y no de vivir de la herencia y de la inercia. Y si no hablé de precios hasta hace pocos meses es que, como ustedes vivieron de la inercia y de la herencia, durante un cierto tiempo las cosas fueron bien. Pero mire señor Rodríguez Zapatero (enseña un gráfico), a partir de agosto pasamos de una inflación del 2,2 a una inflación del 4,4. Pero esta es la consecuencia de no haber hecho ninguna política económica. Me ha hablado usted de la distribución de la riqueza. Le voy a dar algunos datos: la diferencia entre los más ricos y los más pobres es mayor en España. Hoy el 20% más rico gana un 5,3 más que el 20% más pobre, datos de la Unión Europea que también tengo yo. El peso de los salarios en la riqueza nacional era del 46,5 y antes era del 48,4. Y las personas en riesgo de pobreza han pasado en su mandato de un 22 a un 24 por ciento. Es decir que según dice la Unión Europea, según dice el comisario Almunia, hoy la diferencia entre los más ricos y los más pobres es mayor. Mire, yo en mi programa electoral voy a hacer algo similar a lo que hicimos en el año 1996 cuando recibimos la herencia económica que todo el mundo conoce, con unos datos demoledores de déficit, de deuda, con un 22 por ciento de tasa de paro y casi un 5 de inflación. Y volveremos a hacerlo, lo primero que voy a hacer es bajar los impuestos. El Impuesto a la Renta sobre Persona Física: todas aquellas personas que no ganen 16.000 euros al año no pagarán el impuesto y no se les retendrá en la nómina. Porque es lo más justo, porque son las personas que más sufren las subidas de los precios y las consecuencias de su política. Vamos a bajar el impuesto de sociedades, para que, sobre todo a medianas y pequeñas empresas, que son las que crean riqueza y empleo, para que puedan competir. Vamos a... hoy en España trabajan 12 millones de hombres y 8 millones de mujeres. El reto es que puedan trabajar tantas mujeres como hombres fuera de casa. Ése es un reto capital. Vamos a

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353 ocuparnos de la educación, una educación basada en mérito, el  
354 trabajo y el esfuerzo. Vamos a tener organismos reguladores que  
355 no se metan en la vida de las empresas y vamos a hacer una  
356 política económica ordenada y seria, lo que ustedes no  
357 hicieron.

358 **OV:** Quiero recordarles que este último turno de intervención es  
359 de un minuto para cada uno de ustedes. Señor Zapatero.

360 **ZP:** Si señor Rajoy, me sorprende y le acabo de referir (enseña  
361 un folio) y tengo aquí la pregunta parlamentaria, la primera  
362 que hizo, que no habló de economía ni era de economía ni de  
363 precios, habló de los primeros días de la valoración del  
364 Gobierno y de la coordinación de anuncios que habían hecho los  
365 distintos Ministerios. Usted ha estado engañando a los  
366 ciudadanos. A usted los precios sólo le han preocupado hace  
367 unas semanas, porque la primera pregunta que hizo sobre precios  
368 fue el 19 de diciembre de 2007, prácticamente ya [**RJ:** Se lo  
369 acabo de explicar...] estábamos en las elecciones. [**RJ:** Se lo  
370 acabo de explicar... al terminar la inercia y la herencia], no,  
371 no, usted, usted ha dicho que la primera pregunta fue de  
372 economía [**RJ:** y hablé de economía], y la tengo aquí y no habló  
373 de economía. Preguntó sobre la acción del Gobierno. Está  
374 engañando, engañando, no se ha preocupado de la economía. Los  
375 precios no le han interesado hasta hace unas semanas. ¿Sabe lo  
376 que le ha importado a usted la subida de los precios a los  
377 ciudadanos y la economía de las familias? Un bledo, eso es lo  
378 que le ha importado señor Rajoy.

379 **RJ:** Bueno, Ha estado usted muy brillante, señor... al que no le  
380 ha importado la economía es a usted, que además era el  
381 presidente del Gobierno, que ha preferido dedicarse a otras  
382 cosas como le he dicho antes: a negociar con ETA, o a hacer  
383 cábalas sobre España eh... que al final han terminado como han  
384 terminado, o a entretenerse con cosas y cuestiones que no le  
385 importaban a nadie. Usted es el que no le ha dedicado ni un  
386 sólo minuto a la economía. Ya le he dicho antes por qué no le  
387 he hablado de precios, porque las cosas los primeros años  
388 fueron bien, porque vivían ustedes de la herencia y de la  
389 inercia, se lo dije absolutamente hasta la saciedad. Pero en  
390 fin, nosotros sabemos hacerlo, lo hemos hecho en su momento y  
391 volveremos a hacerlo. Ya le digo, volveremos a bajar el  
392 Impuesto sobre la Renta, cuidaremos a las personas que tienen  
393 menos ingresos, que han sido las grandes atacadas por su  
394 política porque hoy la desigualdad de renta entre españoles es  
395 mucho mayor. Nos ocuparemos de la generación de empleo,  
396 bajaremos el impuesto de sociedades, atenderemos el I+D+i, y no  
397 haremos esas cosas que hizo usted con las empresas letales para  
398 la seguridad jurídica, como intervenir en la vida de Endesa,  
399 organizar "opas" desde fuera y, al final, después de hablar de  
400 campeones nacionales, son las empresas extranjeras las que se  
401 han hecho con las empresas eléctricas españolas.

402 **OV:** Bien señores, cerramos este primer bloque de economía y  
403 empleo, el segundo bloque gira entorno a la sanidad a la  
404 educación dependencia pensiones inmigración en definitiva todo  
405 aquello que engloba las políticas sociales. Señor Zapatero.

### 3. POLITICA SOCIAL

406 **ZP:** si muchas gracias, señor Rajoy, ha quedado claro la  
407 credibilidad de sus palabras y lo que ha pasado durante todos  
408 estos meses con su engaño a los ciudadanos. Quiero hablar de  
409 política sociales, porque tienen mucho interés los ciudadanos  
410 en conocer nuestras propuestas. Mi Gobierno ha sido el primero



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411 en la historia de nuestro país que ha dedicado al gasto social  
412 más de la mitad de todo el Presupuesto [RJ: Falso] del Estado...  
413 [RJ: Falso] ... y con su voto en contra... [RJ: Falso]. Para el  
414 futuro, tenemos dos metas primordiales. Primero, desarrollar la  
415 Ley de la Dependencia, una ley histórica. Al final de 2010  
416 todos los dependientes graves y severos que no puedan valerse  
417 por sí mismos van a estar atendidos con plazas residenciales,  
418 residencias de noche, teleasistencia, cuidados a domicilio. Y,  
419 al culminar este plan, en 2015, llegaremos a invertir cada año  
420 2.300 millones de euros. Segundo gran reto de política social  
421 para mí: la igualdad definitiva entre mujeres y hombres, con  
422 planes de empresa a empresa, para que se cumpla a rajatabla la  
423 regla de que a igual trabajo, igual salario. Y, como todos los  
424 trabajadores, mujeres y hombres, tienen igual derecho a hacer  
425 compatible su trabajo con la vida familiar, vamos a ampliar el  
426 derecho de paternidad y el derecho de maternidad. También vamos  
427 a crear 300.000 nuevas plazas de guardería, para niños de cero  
428 a tres años, promoveremos plazas de guardería dentro de los  
429 centros de trabajo cuando lo pidan seis trabajadores. Los  
430 ciudadanos saben que nosotros impulsamos las políticas sociales  
431 y que con Ustedes se frenan. Su Gobierno no dedicó ni un euro a  
432 la dependencia y además, ahora obstaculizan la aplicación de la  
433 Ley. La Comunidad de Madrid sólo ha reconocido a 3.000  
434 dependientes, y el gobierno andaluz a 65.000, veinte veces más,  
435 Sr. Rajoy.

436 OV: su turno señor Rajoy.

437 RJ: Bien, eh... diera la sensación de que las políticas sociales  
438 en España empezaron con el señor Zapatero; antes no había  
439 educación pública, ni sanidad pública, ni había dependencia...  
440 Mire usted, ehh... 700 millones de euros dedica al año la  
441 Comunidad de Madrid y 23 millones de euros dedica el Gobierno  
442 que usted preside. Puede prometer todo lo que quiere, pero  
443 tiene un pequeño problema de credibilidad. Puede prometer todas  
444 las plazas de guardería que quiere, porque son exactamente las  
445 mismas que había prometido hace 4 años y que luego no cumplió.  
446 Pero mire, yo le voy a decir una cosa. Todo eso que dice está  
447 muy bien pero ¿sabe usted cuál es la mayor amenaza a nuestra  
448 política social? ¿Sabe usted qué es lo más importante para que  
449 podamos tener una buena política social? Primero, que haya una  
450 buena política económica, que es lo que usted no ha hecho. Y en  
451 segundo lugar hay un peligro, que es la inmigración  
452 desordenada. Yo ya le he dicho el otro día y le reitero ahora  
453 mismo que usted no ha hecho nada en esta materia salvo una  
454 regularización masiva que se oyó en toda Europa. Entraron en  
455 España más de 2 millones y pico de personas en los últimos 3  
456 años y usted ha dado más de 2 millones doscientos mil permisos  
457 de residencia en el tiempo que lleva al frente del Gobierno.  
458 Bien, a usted esto le puede parecer bien o le puede parecer  
459 mal, ya sé que no le parece ningún problema y por eso no quiere  
460 hablar de este asunto [ZP: sí, sí vamos a hablar] Pero hay  
461 muchas personas... ¡Ah! Va a hablar... Pero hay muchas personas que  
462 se siente, que se pueden ver perjudicadas y que se ven  
463 perjudicadas, las personas que vienen de fuera tienen derechos,  
464 pero los españoles también tienen derechos y a la hora de ir a  
465 una plaza escolar, a la hora de ver qué se puede hacer con las  
466 becas comedor, a la hora de ir a la sanidad pública, a la hora  
467 de buscar viviendas, pues algunos españoles se pueden ver  
468 perjudicados. Y de lo que se trata es de poder atender a todos  
469 y ese es un problema, y usted parece que lo ha olvidado. Y  
470 usted desde luego, sus políticas de integración en materia de  
471 inmigración ha sido ninguna. Las únicas políticas que se han

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472 hecho las han hecho las comunidades autónomas, y  
473 fundamentalmente la Comunidad de Madrid y la Comunidad  
474 valenciana donde se ha hecho mayor esfuerzo. Por tanto, el  
475 principal problema para hacer políticas sociales es una buena  
476 política económica y controlar la inmigración.

477 OV: señor Zapatero.

478 ZP: Sí, señor Rajoy, su credibilidad sobre lo que ha dicho en  
479 materia de política social, los datos del dinero que pone el  
480 Gobierno para la dependencia es exactamente igual que la  
481 credibilidad que ha tenido con las preguntas de la economía y  
482 su interés por la economía en estos 4 años, la misma; están ahí  
483 los datos. Este es el Gobierno que ha hecho la ley de la  
484 dependencia, que ha destinado este año 800 millones en los  
485 presupuestos que vamos a llegar a los 1.500 y que deseamos la  
486 colaboración de todas las comunidades autónomas. Ya veo que  
487 usted no tiene política social, [RJ: sí, sí... el que no quiere  
488 hablar es usted de inmigración] ni de educación, ni de  
489 pensiones, ni de familia, ni dependencia... Por cierto, este es  
490 el gobierno que ha financiado la educación de 3 a 6 años al  
491 100%. Ustedes la aprobaron en su ley educativa, pero no  
492 pusieron ni un duro, ni una memoria económica, la hemos  
493 financiado nosotros. Vamos a hablar de inmigración [RJ: Muy  
494 bien]. Ustedes cuando hablan de inmigración se olvidan de una,  
495 de una cosa fundamental que es el acuerdo, el diálogo social...  
496 Ya sé que esto del diálogo les produce cierta alergia, pero no  
497 se puede hacer una política de inmigración eficaz de si no hay  
498 acuerdo con empresarios y sindicatos. Mire, toda la política de  
499 inmigración que hemos hecho en estos 4 años ha tenido el  
500 acuerdo de empresarios y de sindicatos. El diálogo social es  
501 verdad que nunca ha sido su punto fuerte, ni siquiera hablaron  
502 de él para hablar de inmigración. Lo demostraron con el  
503 decretazo y desde luego nosotros vamos a apoyar el diálogo  
504 social en estos próximos 4 años, en materia de inmigración,  
505 pero también para otras cuestiones decisivas, como es reducir  
506 la siniestralidad laboral, los accidentes laborales en  
507 cooperación trabajadores y empresarios, y reducir la  
508 precariedad laboral hasta conseguir que los contratos  
509 temporales estén por debajo del 25%, que es una gran necesidad  
510 de nuestros trabajadores, especialmente de los más jóvenes. Y  
511 esa es también una diferencia entre dos proyectos, usted es el  
512 proyecto del ordeno y mando, de hacer una política impositiva,  
513 en materia de inmigración, lo que quieran sin hablar con nadie,  
514 sin dialogar con nadie y lo nuestro es una política de diálogo  
515 con empresarios y sindicatos en materia de inmigración.

516 OV: señor Rajoy.

517 RJ: Usted en política de inmigración, eh... no es que haya hecho  
518 una política dialogada con empresarios y sindicatos, es que  
519 usted no han hecho absolutamente nada. [ZP: no dialogada,  
520 pactada, pactada con empresarios y sindicatos, pactada] No ha  
521 hecho absolutamente nada, salvo una regularización masiva que  
522 ha sido criticada, que ha sido criticada en toda la Unión  
523 Europea y que le ha generado muchísimos problemas a los  
524 españoles. Usted no le ha dedicado un duro a la integración de  
525 la inmigración, usted no es consciente de este problema. Usted  
526 no es consciente [ZP: el primer gobierno que dedica dinero a la  
527 integración de inmigrante, que reciben los ayuntamientos, el  
528 primero, el mío] No, no, perdón, no, usted no es consciente de  
529 los grandes problemas que le está generando a muchos ciudadanos  
530 españoles. Este es un asunto que hay que tomárselo en serio y  
531 yo desde luego me lo voy a tomar en serio, porque esto requiere  
532 orden y requiere control y no palabras, que es lo que usted

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533 hace ¿no? Usted habla de la dependencia, Fíjese, hoy sale los  
534 datos de la dependencia, es un ejemplo de hoy, es en Castilla  
535 León (enseña un artículo de periódico): doce discapacitados han  
536 recibido ayuda de las leyes de dependencia. Yo voté a favor de  
537 la ley de dependencia y estoy a favor de la ley de dependencia.  
538 [ZP: pues diga a sus comunidades que no la boicoteen] ¿Pero  
539 cómo la vamos a boicotear? [ZP: mire Andalucía, mire Asturias]  
540 Si son las Comunidades Autónomas las que se están gastando el  
541 dinero en dependencia. ¿Sabe usted cuántos centros hay de  
542 dependencia y cuántas personas se atienden en Madrid? 45.000.  
543 En Cataluña 38.000 y en Andalucía 17.500. ¿Qué se están  
544 gastando? [ZP: Pues dígales que no la boicoteen] Ustedes hablan  
545 mucho, no se gastan nada y no tienen ninguna política social  
546 sobre ningún asunto. Lo suyo es puramente propaganda. Yo desde  
547 luego voy a dotar la ley de dependencia, creo que es capital,  
548 de los más importantes, es fundamental para que la gente pueda  
549 también conciliar la vida laboral y familiar, para que se dé un  
550 gran salto en el empleo y para que logremos que puedan  
551 trabajar, como le he dicho antes, tantas mujeres fuera de casa  
552 como hombres en España. Ese es uno de los objetivos que tengo  
553 más importantes a lo largo de los próximos 4 años. De  
554 educación, por favor, no me hable, pero, ¿no conoce usted los  
555 datos del informe PISA? [ZP: Luego hablaremos de educación]  
556 pero si somos los que estamos más abajo. [ZP: Luego hablaremos  
557 de educación en los retos del futuro]. Hábleme de mérito, de  
558 trabajo, esfuerzo, no de que se pueda pasar de curso con 4  
559 asignaturas suspendidas. Hábleme de respeto al profesor, que va  
560 a enseñar, y que el alumno vaya a aprender, no de esas cosas  
561 que han hecho ustedes. Ustedes han hecho una pésima gestión de  
562 la educación pública en España y Están creando muchísimos  
563 problemas a muchísimos ciudadanos.  
564 OV: su turno señor Zapatero.  
565 ZP: Sí, gracias Señor Rajoy... Voy a hablar de inmigración y de  
566 la política que hemos realizado. Nuestra política de  
567 inmigración tiene un principio: sólo pueden venir y quedarse  
568 los que puedan trabajar de acuerdo con la ley. Es decir, lucha  
569 con firmeza contra la inmigración ilegal. Y eso hay que hacerlo  
570 en tres frentes. Permítame que se lo explique. Primero, que no  
571 salgan de sus países de origen personas empujadas por la  
572 desesperación. Segundo, que el control de fronteras impida la  
573 entrada de inmigrantes que no tengan un puesto de trabajo  
574 garantizado. Y, tercero, que se pueda devolver a los países de  
575 origen a las personas que entran ilegalmente aquí. Esto sólo es  
576 posible mediante la firma con los países de origen. Nosotros  
577 hemos firmado una decena de acuerdos con países  
578 fundamentalmente del África subsahariana. [RJ: ¿Puede decirme  
579 esos diez? ¿Una decena son diez?] sí una decena son diez. [RJ:  
580 ¿Eso también lo tiene en los datos?] sí, sí, por supuesto. [RJ:  
581 ah, pues me gustaría escucharlo] sí, y por eso permitimos y  
582 conseguimos una repatriación, que en estos momentos está siendo  
583 fluida y permanente de los inmigrantes ilegales que llegan a  
584 nuestro país. Tanto es así que Francia nos ha pedido colaborar  
585 en este proceso. Hemos impulsado una política en la Unión  
586 Europea. Porque la inmigración ha de ser una política europea,  
587 dado que existe la libre circulación de personas en el  
588 territorio de la UE. Pero hemos de recordar una cosa: la mitad  
589 del crecimiento económico que hemos tenido en los últimos años  
590 es como consecuencia de la inmigración. Lo que cotizan a la  
591 Seguridad Social los inmigrantes equivale al pago de casi un  
592 millón de pensionistas españoles. Hemos invertido hasta ahora  
593 800 millones en esta legislatura en integración, en dinero que

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594 va a las comunidades autónomas y a los ayuntamientos. Y vamos a  
595 llegar a 2.000 millones hasta 2010 para la integración de  
596 trabajadores en los municipios donde más inmigración hay, para  
597 que haya más ayudas sociales, más becas y, por supuesto, ningún  
598 ciudadano se vea perjudicado por ello.

599 **RJ:** Vamos a ver eh... Señor... Zapatero. Lo que usted dice no tiene  
600 absolutamente nada que ver con lo que ha hecho a lo largo de  
601 estos años. Claro me dice que la inmigración tiene que ser una  
602 política europea y yo recuerdo a los ministros del Interior de  
603 Francia, del Reino Unido, de Italia, de Alemania y de Polonia,  
604 poniendo de vuelta y media, y perdón que utilice esta  
605 expresión, al Gobierno de España por su actuación en esta  
606 materia [**ZP:** pero si ha sido el Gobierno de España que ha  
607 promovido una política europea de inmigración en la primera  
608 Cumbre de Inglaterra] yo le voy a hablar, sí, sí, le voy a  
609 hablar de lo que yo creo que hay que hacer en materia de  
610 inmigración. Yo estoy a favor de la inmigración, pero la  
611 inmigración debe ser legal y con contrato. Hay que luchar  
612 contra la inmigración ilegal y hay que trabajar por la  
613 integración, que es exactamente lo que usted no ha hecho a lo  
614 largo de estos años. Hay que expulsar a todos aquellos  
615 extranjeros que delinquen aunque lleven cinco años en España,  
616 hay que prohibir por ley las regularizaciones masivas, hay que  
617 crear una agencia de inmigración y empleo para poder traer y  
618 contratar gente, y en materia europea, le voy a decir lo que  
619 hay que hacer: política común en materia de visados, de  
620 derechos y deberes, de control de fronteras, de reagrupación  
621 familiar y de expulsión de ilegales. Y ayudas al desarrollo.  
622 Hay que hacer ayudas al desarrollo a los países de donde viene  
623 gente y esas ayudas decirle que a cambio, pues lógicamente, les  
624 vamos a traer trabajadores, les vamos a ayudar, pero que nos  
625 acepten las repatriaciones. No le acepto que diga que ha  
626 firmado convenios con diez porque es absolutamente falso, pero  
627 mire [**ZP:** está aquí], escúcheme, escúcheme, sí ya sé que está  
628 ahí, escúcheme... "No se puede tolerar que en España, como está  
629 pasando ya en muchos ayuntamientos que soportan la política de  
630 integración de los inmigrantes, haya españoles que pierdan  
631 derechos sociales porque vienen extranjeros que tienen un nivel  
632 de renta más bajo, que pierden ayudas al comedor y otras ayudas  
633 sociales". Esto lo dijo, cuando el problema era cuatro veces  
634 menos grave, el señor Rodríguez Zapatero en el Congreso de los  
635 Diputados en un debate del Estado de la Nación, por eso nos han  
636 llamado a nosotros xenófobos y otras lindezas. Si es que usted  
637 cambia de criterio cada cuarto de hora [**ZP:** No, no, no, yo  
638 estoy de acuerdo con eso, lo que no estoy de acuerdo es exigir  
639 un contrato para que sean presuntos delincuentes los  
640 inmigrantes, eso es lo que no estoy de acuerdo] [**OV:** ahora  
641 tendrá su turno] dice una cosa y la contraria, no tiene ninguna  
642 propuesta. En materia de integración de inmigrantes, ninguna  
643 propuesta. Que la Comunidad de Madrid dedica el 2,5 por ciento,  
644 y la comunidad el 97,5, son los datos, y en Valencia igual. Yo  
645 también tengo datos, y también son ciertos.

646 **OV:** última intervención de este bloque.

647 **ZP:** Lo cierto es que este es el primer Gobierno que dedica  
648 dinero a la integración, 800 millones en esta legislatura,  
649 vamos a llegar a los 1.000 en 2010. Pero mire, antes de que  
650 hable usted de inmigración necesita credibilidad. Credibilidad.  
651 Esta declaración es suya: "Los inmigrantes vinieron a España  
652 cuando gobernaba el PP". Y es verdad: con su gobierno, con  
653 usted de ministro del interior se colaron más de un millón de  
654 inmigrantes sin papeles. Hicieron 5 regularizaciones. Nuestra

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655 única regularización se hizo a trabajadores con contrato de  
656 trabajo en vigor, sin antecedentes penales y se hizo con el  
657 acuerdo de empresarios y sindicatos. Ustedes dieron papeles sin  
658 exigir contrato de trabajo, sin examinar los antecedentes  
659 penales de los países de origen en algunas regularizaciones.  
660 Bastaba presentar un bono para el autobús, un recibo de un  
661 televisor o la factura de una sola noche de hotel. No sé si fue  
662 por su conocida afición al ciclismo, Sr. Rajoy, pero se  
663 regularizaron inmigrantes con el recibo de compra de una rueda  
664 de bicicleta. Y me habla usted de rigor, de orden... y de  
665 seriedad... está aquí.

666 **RJ:** Sí, sí, ya sé que está ahí. Oiga usted: ¿sabe cómo  
667 regularizaron ustedes inmigrantes? Con una orden de expulsión,  
668 ese era un documento válido. Pregúntele al señor Caldera. Eh...  
669 Anunciaron la regularización seis meses antes de comenzarla,  
670 con lo cual, claro, todas las personas ilegales que había en  
671 Francia, Italia, en el Reino Unido, todas vinieron a España, y  
672 por eso se produjo lo que se llamó la gran avalancha. Pero  
673 fíjese usted cómo lo juzgaron a usted en Europa. Ministro de  
674 Interior francés: la regularización española crea un efecto  
675 llamada y provoca nuevas llegadas. Ministro el alemán, otro sí,  
676 socialista: "La regularización en España afecta a otros  
677 Estados, porque los inmigrantes regularizados podrán  
678 desplazarse libremente". El alemán fue muy rotundo: "Pedir  
679 dinero a otra persona, porque usted fue a pedirlo a Europa, es  
680 siempre la manera más fácil de resolver el problema". Y fíjese  
681 lo que dijo la de inmigración de Holanda: "España es en parte  
682 el responsable del problema por haber legalizado a los  
683 inmigrantes. Las mafias vieron en ello una señal positiva".  
684 Mire, su política de inmigración ha sido débil, sin firmeza, y  
685 que desde luego no podemos mantenerla en el futuro ni un minuto  
686 más, porque vamos a una situación de enormes problemas.

687 **OV:** Cerramos este segundo bloque y buscamos nuevos asuntos de  
688 relaciones internacionales, de terrorismo, de seguridad  
689 ciudadana, los candidatos abordan ahora la política exterior y  
690 seguridad. Señor Zapatero.

### 4. POLÍTICA EXTERIOR Y SEGURIDAD

691 **ZP:** Sí, muchas gracias. Simplemente quiero decir que tengo aquí  
692 (enseña un dossier) todas las regularizaciones de casos  
693 concretos con lo que he dicho, con una rueda de bicicleta, que  
694 no lo ha refutado. Eso es la falta de seriedad, de rigor. ¿Como  
695 para hablar ustedes de orden...! [**RJ:** sí, con una orden de  
696 expulsión, como han regularizado ustedes Si quiere puede hablar  
697 de rigor...], si quiere podemos hablar también de algún caso  
698 concreto, pero no lo voy a hacer. Quiero a hablar de la  
699 seguridad y voy a empezar por el terrorismo. Ahora que nos está  
700 viendo toda España, toda España, todos los españoles, quiero  
701 asumir un compromiso delante de las cámaras: sea cual sea el  
702 resultado del próximo domingo, del próximo día 9, el Partido  
703 Socialista apoyará al Gobierno de España en la lucha  
704 antiterrorista sin condiciones. Ese es el compromiso solemne  
705 que establezco aquí en nombre de mi partido. Me gustaría oírle  
706 decir lo mismo, señor Rajoy [**RJ:** No se preocupe], sería la  
707 mejor noticia que podíamos darle a los españoles [**RJ:** No se  
708 preocupe]. Hablemos de seguridad. Nuestra tasa de criminalidad  
709 está más baja que la media europea, como puede verse en este  
710 gráfico (muestra un gráfico) España con 51 infracciones por  
711 cada mil habitantes está claramente por debajo de países como  
712 Reino Unido, como Francia o como Italia, pero tenemos que

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713 mejorar aún más y, por eso, mi compromiso es llegar a 140.000  
714 policías y guardias civiles. Hemos ya recuperado 15.000 en este  
715 periodo y llegaremos a 140.000. Vamos a crear el Servicio  
716 Nacional de Policía Científica dedicada a los delitos más  
717 graves: homicidios y robos con violencia. Vamos a potenciar los  
718 planes contra la venta de droga en los centros educativos y  
719 vamos a luchar contra la violencia de género haciendo un  
720 registro público de maltratadores, reforzando todo lo que son  
721 los medios judiciales y policiales para que esos 85.000  
722 cobardes machistas sientan la presión del Gobierno y de toda la  
723 sociedad.

724 OV: Su tiempo, señor Rajoy.

725 RJ: Bien, eh... sea cual sea el resultado electoral yo apoyaré al  
726 Gobierno si el Gobierno quiere luchar contra ETA, pero desde  
727 luego no apoyaré a ningún Gobierno que niega, que quiera  
728 negociar políticamente con ETA, [ZP: Nosotros sin condiciones,  
729 señor Rajoy] como ha ocurrido a lo largo de esta legislatura  
730 [ZP: Nosotros sin condiciones, nosotros sin condiciones]. Yo  
731 apoyo la lucha contra el terrorismo pero lo que no puedo apoyar  
732 es la negociación con los terroristas [ZP: Nosotros sin  
733 condiciones]. Y por eso yo apoyé, señor Zapatero, en el año  
734 2000, el pacto antiterrorista y por eso usted lo firmó. ETA  
735 estuvo más débil que nunca cuando usted llegó al Gobierno en el  
736 año 2004, y usted, se le ocurrió a usted, rompió el pacto  
737 antiterrorista y empezó una negociación política. Le dio a ETA  
738 la categoría de interlocutor político, la llevó al parlamento  
739 europeo, y luego los volvió a meter en el Parlamento. Metió a  
740 ANV, metió al Partido Comunista de las Tierras Vascas. Y señor  
741 Zapatero, mintió usted a los españoles, es decir, engañó usted,  
742 primero me engañó a mí como jefe de la oposición, luego engañó  
743 al Congreso de los Diputados, y luego engañó al conjunto de los  
744 españoles. Sí que lo engañó, después de la T-4. Es el caso más  
745 evidente. Después del asesinato de Barajas, usted le dijo al  
746 conjunto de los españoles que se había acabado cualquier  
747 negociación y luego continuó todavía. Hizo usted muchas  
748 negociaciones políticas y lo ratifican las propias personas del  
749 PNV, por tanto, que participaron en las mismas. Fíjese, El PSOE  
750 pasó a la frontera a negociar con ETA cuestiones políticas.  
751 Esto no lo había hecho nunca nadie antes en España. Éste ha  
752 sido su verdadero problema. Es decir, usted ha actuado como  
753 aprendiz de brujo, usted no ha hecho caso a nadie de las muchas  
754 personas dentro de su propio partido que conocían bien este  
755 tema. Se metió en una operación absurda, negoció políticamente  
756 con ETA, engañó a todos y creó mucho daño al conjunto de los  
757 españoles. Y ahora dice que va a apoyar al Gobierno. Oiga, yo  
758 apoyaré al Gobierno que quiera derrotar a ETA pero desde luego  
759 no estoy dispuesto a apoyar a un Gobierno que quiera negociar  
760 con una organización terrorista. Eso no lo hago yo, y entiendo  
761 que no lo hacen muchísimos españoles. Mi política en materia  
762 contra el terrorismo es muy clara: derrotar a ETA con la Ley y  
763 [ZP: Utilizar el terrorismo] y con el Estado de Derecho, con la  
764 Ley y con el Estado de Derecho. [ZP: Utilizar el terrorismo],  
765 Utilizarlo lo utiliza usted cuando dice lo que ha dicho al  
766 principio [ZP: partidistamente] en esta intervención. Hay que  
767 derrotar a ETA. No se puede negociar.

768 OV: Señor Zapatero.

769 ZP: Sí, señor Rajoy, vuelve usted a hacer uso del terrorismo y  
770 la verdad es que lo han hecho desde hace varios años hasta para  
771 justificar la guerra de Irak lo hicieron, fíjese, que fue una  
772 de las mayores extravagancias que tuvimos que escuchar en su  
773 momento. Se inventaron que para justificar el apoyo a la guerra



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774 de Irak porque Estados Unidos nos iba a ayudar en la lucha  
775 contra ETA. ¿Se acuerda de eso? [RJ: No] Sí, todos los  
776 españoles. Ya hemos visto el resultado. Irak se ha convertido  
777 en el campo de concentración del terrorismo internacional. Su  
778 Gobierno nos colocó en las peores relaciones con dos países  
779 clave en nuestra lucha contra el terrorismo etarra e islamista:  
780 Francia y Marruecos. Yo hace cuatro años me comprometí a  
781 retirar las tropas de Irak si conseguíamos el apoyo de los  
782 ciudadanos. Fue la primera decisión que tomé como presidente.  
783 Pocos días después usted declaró que la salida de las tropas de  
784 Irak es una decisión insolidaria que hace a España más  
785 vulnerable ante el terrorismo. Esta noche quisiera renovar mi  
786 compromiso personal con todos los ciudadanos españoles mientras  
787 yo sea presidente no saldrá un sólo soldado de España a una  
788 guerra ilegal. Ustedes lo hicieron contra la voluntad del  
789 pueblo español y la verdad es que no han tenido la actitud, la  
790 dignidad de reconocer su grave error. Dejen ya de utilizar el  
791 terrorismo, unas veces para justificar la guerra de Irak, otras  
792 para hacer oposición al Gobierno de España con el terrorismo y  
793 la lucha contra el terrorismo de ETA. Dejen de una vez y  
794 proclame una actitud que están deseando oír todos los  
795 ciudadanos de este país, que es que están dispuestos a  
796 colaborar, a apoyar como el Partido Socialista ha hecho siempre  
797 en su historia democrática, en la historia democrática de  
798 España. Espero que alguna vez podamos escuchar eso de sus  
799 palabras... de su boca.

800 OV: Su turno, señor Rajoy.

801 RJ: Mire usted, le voy a leer algunas afirmaciones suyas que  
802 son muy ilustrativas. Fíjese lo que dijo usted: "Yo quiero que  
803 nuestros soldados puedan regresar cuanto antes, pero entiendo  
804 que debemos responsabilizarnos de lo que por su voluntad, señor  
805 Aznar, hemos contribuido a desencadenar. Si abandonamos Irak a  
806 su suerte, el desastre humano en ese país puede tener  
807 proporciones gigantescas". Eso lo dijo usted en el Congreso de  
808 los Diputados en diciembre del 2003. Le voy a decir algo que es  
809 mucho más importante y que demuestra quién es usted. Después de  
810 retirar las tropas de Irak, usted me refiero a usted, el señor  
811 Zapatero aprobó la siguiente resolución en el Consejo de  
812 Seguridad de las Naciones Unidas. Después de irse, pide a los  
813 Estados miembros y a las organizaciones internacionales y  
814 regionales que presten asistencia a la fuerza multinacional, en  
815 particular, con fuerzas militares. Es decir, usted después de  
816 irse, le pide a todos los países del mundo que manden fuerzas  
817 militares. Pero mire, en cualquier caso, es usted el que por lo  
818 visto quiere volver a hablar de Irak. No quiere hablar de  
819 Afganistán, ni quiere hablar del Líbano, que es donde están los  
820 soldados españoles en este momento. Ha sido usted quien ha  
821 utilizado [ZP: sí, con el apoyo de Naciones Unidas y como  
822 misión de paz], sí, sí, sí. Y con el apoyo de Naciones Unidas  
823 también estaban en Irak. [ZP: no hombre, pero, pero...] Esa es  
824 una de las grandes mentiras, de las grandes contradicciones  
825 suyas a lo largo de esta legislatura.

826 ZP: que diga, que diga... o sea que ¿sigue apoyando la guerra de  
827 Irak? ¿Sigue apoyando la guerra de Irak? No, dígalos, dígalos.  
828 Sería bueno que los ciudadanos lo supieran ¿Usted cree que fue  
829 una buena aventura? ¿Cree que fue una buena aventura? ¡Está  
830 defendiendo la guerra de Irak!

831 RJ: no, el que sigue apoyando la guerra de Irak es usted. Es  
832 usted el que la ha apoyado (enseña un folio) Es usted el que la  
833 ha apoyado en la ONU pidiendo que mandaran fuerzas militares.

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834 **ZP:** Esto sí que va a ser exclusiva mundial, señor Rajoy... ¡decir  
835 que yo apoyaba la guerra de Irak después de las decisiones que  
836 hemos tomado!

837 **RJ:** usted, usted, consejo de seguridad, resolución de la ONU,  
838 usted, usted lo ha apoyado. En cualquier caso, señor Zapatero,  
839 usted le mintió a los españoles porque usted apoyó en el  
840 Consejo de Seguridad el envío de fuerzas militares después de  
841 haberlas retirado para quedar bien internamente y porque creía  
842 que le daba votos y apoyos. Usted sí que utilizó el terrorismo  
843 y no otros.

844 **OV:** Señor Zapatero.

845 **ZP:** o sea que ¿Cumplir la palabra dada a los ciudadanos es  
846 quedar bien? ¿Cumplir la palabra dada de retirar las tropas de  
847 Irak como yo prometí a los ciudadanos hace cuatro años es  
848 quedar bien? ¿Qué concepción tiene usted de la democracia? [**RJ:**  
849 Yo, esta (enseña el folio)]. No, Es dar honor a la palabra  
850 dada. Ahora entiendo muchas cosas, que les importe muy poco la  
851 voluntad de los españoles... [**RJ:** No, no...], aún en temas tan  
852 trascendentes como fue una guerra que ha costado decenas de  
853 miles de muertos y que usted sigue apoyando... [**RJ:** ...ese es el  
854 valor de su palabra...] y que encima y que encima ahora no sé  
855 quién le ha aconsejado, no sé quién le ha aconsejado que venga  
856 ahora a discutir... [**RJ:** Ese es el valor de su palabra]. Pero  
857 bueno, ustedes utilizaron el terrorismo para justificar su  
858 apoyo a Irak, utilizan el terrorismo para hacer oposición al  
859 Gobierno de España en la lucha contra ETA. Y nosotros nos hemos  
860 preocupado de fortalecer la seguridad en la lucha contra el  
861 terrorismo. Hemos aumentado en 1.200 los policías que luchan  
862 contra el terrorismo internacional islamista en nuestro país  
863 que sufrió la tragedia del 11 de marzo, del atentado brutal del  
864 11 de marzo. Vamos a aumentar en 500 más el número de policías  
865 especializados en combatir el terrorismo islamista porque es  
866 una amenaza. Y desde luego quiero hoy reivindicar el trabajo de  
867 las fuerzas de seguridad del Estado, el trabajo de la policía,  
868 el trabajo de la justicia en lo que ha sido la detención y la  
869 condena de los responsables del 11 de marzo, del mayor atentado  
870 terrorista de nuestra historia y en general de toda la tarea de  
871 la Justicia y de las fuerzas y cuerpos de Seguridad del Estado.  
872 ¿Cuál fue su actitud en el proceso del 11 de marzo, señor  
873 Rajoy? El día antes de las pasadas elecciones afirmó que tenía  
874 la convicción moral de que ETA era la autora del 11-M. Está  
875 aquí, lo saben todos los españoles que lo dijo. Más tarde llegó  
876 a defender con rotundidad que no tenía la más mínima duda de  
877 que tarde o temprano aparecerían las conexiones entre Al Qaeda  
878 y ETA. En el colmo de la sinrazón, en un momento dado pidió la  
879 paralización del procedimiento judicial. Yo tengo la convicción  
880 moral [**RJ:** XXX] de que debería pedirle disculpas a los  
881 españoles, señor Rajoy.

882 **RJ:** No sé, lo que hicimos nosotros en el 11-M fue detener a  
883 todos los autores. Y por eso se pudo celebrar el juicio en su  
884 día y por eso pudieron ser condenados. Si dependiéramos de  
885 ustedes, probablemente no se hubiera celebrado el juicio. Yo  
886 creo que quien debe pedir a los españoles es usted perdón pero  
887 por sus múltiples mentiras. Es decir, le he presentado aquí una  
888 resolución del Consejo de Seguridad de la ONU, votada por  
889 usted, por usted, y todavía no ha dado ninguna explicación  
890 aquí. Es que es usted el que pide que se ayude con fuerzas  
891 militares. Es usted, después de haberse ido para hacerse  
892 propaganda. Pero debería sobre todo [**ZP:** pfiiuuu, pero quién le  
893 habrá aconsejado meterse en este debate, quién le habrá  
894 aconsejado] pedir disculpas a los españoles por el sinfín de



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895 mentiras [ZP: quién le habrá aconsejado] que ha hecho usted en  
896 materia de ETA. Usted mintió a los españoles cuando dejó que el  
897 Partido Comunista de las Tierras Vascas, ETA, se presentara a  
898 las elecciones. Usted mintió a los españoles cuando dejó que  
899 una parte de ANV se presentara a las elecciones. Usted mintió a  
900 los españoles cuando dejó que De Juana Chaos se diera paseos  
901 por San Sebastián. Luego lo metió en la cárcel, cuando le vino  
902 bien. Usted mintió a los españoles cuando calificó al señor  
903 Otegui como un hombre de paz, señor Zapatero. Usted como hombre  
904 de paz, que trató al señor Otegui mejor que a María San Gil  
905 [ZP: No]. Usted mintió a los españoles cuando dijo que nunca  
906 hablaría de política con ETA. Y, sin embargo, habló de política  
907 con ETA. Lo ha dicho todo el mundo. Lo ha dicho usted. Lo ha  
908 dicho usted Tengo aquí los datos. Se lo puedo enseñar. "Con ETA  
909 no se hablará nunca de política". Habló de política. [ZP: No  
910 ¿Por qué cree que ETA rompió la tregua?] Usted mintió a los  
911 españoles... [ZP: Porque le dijimos que no a la política. Es tan  
912 de sentido común como eso, porque le dijimos que no a la  
913 política] Usted mintió a los españoles cuando después de la T-  
914 4, dijo que no iba a hablar con ETA. Y luego reconoció que  
915 había hablado con ETA. Usted sí que es el que le debe disculpas  
916 a los españoles. Usted le ha mentido a los españoles en todos  
917 los temas del terrorismo. [ZP: Nunca. Jamás] Usted usó el 11-M  
918 [ZP: Nunca. Jamás]. Usted apoyó lo que ocurrió en el 11-M [ZP:  
919 Nunca. Jamás]. Usted engañó hasta la saciedad [ZP: el 11M, el  
920 11M, ¿con todo lo que han insultado en esta legislatura?] sí,  
921 sí [OV: Ha acabado su tiempo señor Rajoy]. Usted mintió a los  
922 españoles en los temas del terrorismo. Y ahora me dice que pida  
923 disculpas. No, hombre. Disculpas tendrá que pedir las usted y  
924 espero que lo haga ahora mismo.  
925 OV: Señor Zapatero.  
926 ZP: Sí, señor Rajoy, aquí está su declaración (enseña un  
927 periódico): "No le quepa la más mínima duda de que, al final,  
928 el terrorismo islamista y el de ETA estarán relacionados".  
929 2004. ¿Dónde está la relación? Han estado intoxicando, creando  
930 confabulaciones hipotéticas sobre el 11-M, sobre el atentado  
931 más grave que nos costó 192 muertos en toda la legislatura,  
932 poniendo en cuestión el sumario judicial, poniendo en cuestión  
933 a las fuerzas y cuerpos de seguridad del Estado, todo porque no  
934 asumieron el resultado electoral. Yo comparecí catorce horas en  
935 una comisión de investigación para dar cuentas de un atentado  
936 terrorista que se cometió siendo ustedes Gobierno, siendo el  
937 señor Acebes ministro del Interior, y ahora encima pide  
938 explicaciones. ¿Qué política antiterrorista señor Rajoy  
939 prefiere? ¿La de esta legislatura con cuatro víctimas mortales,  
940 o la de la legislatura anterior con 238 víctimas mortales? Esa  
941 es, esa es una buena reflexión, después, después, después de  
942 que en todo momento en la legislatura anterior dimos pleno  
943 apoyo a su Gobierno, después al Gobierno de Aznar.  
944 OV: Última intervención, señor Rajoy.  
945 RJ: No creía yo que usted fuera a utilizar a los muertos y a  
946 presumir de cuánta gente había muerto en una legislatura o en  
947 otra.  
948 ZP: es usted quien ha utilizado al terrorismo y que durante  
949 cuatro años, ha dicho que yo he traicionado a los muertos... No  
950 ha hecho más que utilizar el dolor de las víctimas durante  
951 estos cuatro años.  
952 RJ: es usted, es usted quien lo ha utilizado. Mire, mire señor,  
953 señor Zapatero, cuando usted llegó al Gobierno, ETA estaba  
954 debilitada y ETA llevaba un año sin matar y además se actuaba  
955 con la dignidad del Estado.

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956 **ZP:** sí, ¿ah sí? Por eso dijeron que era ETA la autora del  
957 atentado del 11-M.  
958 **RJ:** Con usted, ETA ha vuelto a los Ayuntamientos y con usted  
959 ETA ha vuelto a matar. Usted ha ganado unas elecciones por Irak  
960 y por el 11-M. Da la sensación de que quiere volver a ganar  
961 unas elecciones por Irak o por el 11-M [**ZP:** Quiero la verdad,  
962 la verdad, la verdad de las cosas], yo creo que los españoles  
963 son lo suficientemente, ya, ya, sí, sí, la verdad ya se la he  
964 dicho. Yo quiero la verdad de ETA, señor Zapatero. Quiero la  
965 verdad de ETA. Fijese lo que dijo usted, lo que dijo usted  
966 después del atentado de Barajas: "He ordenado suspender todas  
967 la iniciativas para desarrollar el diálogo con ETA. Dijo, el  
968 diálogo ha llegado a su punto final". Lo dijo en el Congreso de  
969 los Diputados y lo dijo a los españoles. Y después de decir que  
970 es un dislate decir que ha habido diálogo, reconoció ante todos  
971 los españoles que volvió a dialogar. Usted ha mentido. Porque  
972 usted miente siempre, usted no dice la verdad nunca, ése es el  
973 problema.  
974 **ZP:** No hombre no, no, no, no... nunca.  
975 **OV:** Si usted va a intervenir, señor Zapatero, le daré luego el  
976 uso de la palabra al señor Rajoy. Hemos agotado el tiempo, pero  
977 si ustedes quieren cerrar de alguna manera. El tiempo se ha  
978 agotado.  
979 **ZP:** Vamos a hacer el siguiente. No pasa nada.  
980 **OV:** perfectamente. Hemos conseguido tres bloques de este cara a  
981 cara. Ahora vamos a hacer la pausa para la publicidad. Como ven  
982 queda todavía mucho debate. Hasta luego.

### SEGUNDA PARTE

#### 5. POLÍTICA INSTITUCIONAL

983 **OV:** Saludos de nuevo, desde el Palacio de Congresos del  
984 Ayuntamiento de Madrid. Estamos en pleno debate en el segundo  
985 "cara a cara", el definitivo entre los dos candidatos de los  
986 partidos políticos con mayor representación parlamentaria.  
987 Hasta el momento, en el primer tramo del debate se ha hablado  
988 de economía y empleo, de políticas sociales y de política  
989 exterior y seguridad. El debate se reanuda poniendo sobre la  
990 mesa asuntos como los derechos, las reformas constitucionales,  
991 la justicia, el estado de las Autonomías... Política  
992 institucional. Y, como en todos los tramos fijados, escuchamos  
993 en primer lugar al candidato socialista.  
994 **ZP:** Quiero hablar en primer lugar de la España de hoy, de la  
995 España de las autonomías. Trabajamos por la cohesión  
996 territorial de los españoles. (Muestra un gráfico) En este  
997 gráfico, aparece cómo han avanzado las comunidades autónomas en  
998 renta per cápita acercándose a la comunidad autónoma que más  
999 renta tiene de España, que es Madrid... esto era en los años  
1000 del PP, sólo algunas lo hacían, y ahora prácticamente todas en  
1001 estos años han ganado renta per cápita y por tanto se reducen  
1002 las desigualdades territoriales. También fomentamos la cohesión  
1003 con la mejora de las comunicaciones, que es una de las maneras  
1004 más importantes de vertebrar España: ésta (muestra otro  
1005 gráfico) era la red de Alta Velocidad en 2004, cuando llegamos  
1006 al Gobierno, y ésta va a ser la red de Alta Velocidad en 2020.  
1007 En la próxima legislatura la Alta Velocidad va a llegar a todas  
1008 las comunidades autónomas, empezando por la Comunidad de  
1009 Valencia. Estas eran las autovías del Estado en 2004 (muestra  
1010 otro mapa) y esto es el mapa que vamos a completar en 2020 que  
1011 supera una concepción radial, según la cual, de Madrid salían

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1012 todas hacia el conjunto de las comunidades, y ahora hay  
1013 autovías de norte a sur, de este oeste, y por tanto, una  
1014 concepción mucho más integradora y vertebral. La cohesión de  
1015 España tiene mucho que ver mucho con su igualdad territorial y  
1016 con sus comunicaciones y también con la política de  
1017 cooperación, de diálogo y de cooperación. En esta legislatura  
1018 vamos a celebrar, voy a proponer celebrar tres conferencias de  
1019 presidentes, que ha sido un foro muy útil para unir, para sumar  
1020 esfuerzos entre los Gobiernos autonómicos y el Gobierno de  
1021 España: van a ser sobre Violencia de Género, sobre Educación y  
1022 sobre Cambio Climático. Y además vamos a abordar un nuevo  
1023 modelo de financiación autonómica y local, fundamentalmente  
1024 pensando en las necesidades de la educación y de la sanidad de  
1025 muchas comunidades autónomas. Esta es mi idea de España, la de  
1026 la Constitución, la de la cohesión.

1027 **OV:** Señor Rajoy.

1028 **RJ:** sí, quisiera comenzar, para dejar claro alguna cosa, que en  
1029 la primera pregunta que hice en el Parlamento, esto es para que  
1030 veamos la credibilidad del señor Zapatero, hablé del IVA, la  
1031 financiación autonómica, los cien euros, del cálculo de las  
1032 pensiones... Esto es fútbol ¿no? para usted, señor Zapatero, es  
1033 decir, esta es la muestra de que usted no le dice la verdad a  
1034 los españoles e incluso con un papel delante, como no se lo ha  
1035 dicho en el caso de la resolución de Irak, a la que antes yo he  
1036 hecho referencia. Usted ha hablado, entre otras cosas, ahora  
1037 del Ministerio de Fomento, lo cual resulta verdaderamente  
1038 sorprendente porque nunca en la historia había sido reprobado  
1039 su responsable en el Senado y había sido responsable en el  
1040 Parlamento de Cataluña, donde por cierto, usted gobierna,  
1041 claro. Hacer promesas para el año 2020, después de haber  
1042 retrasado todo el plan del Partido Popular es algo que está muy  
1043 bien, pero mire, el 2020 queda un poco lejos. En Valencia habla  
1044 de AVE, pero es que en Valencia ya tenía que haber llegado el  
1045 AVE, de la misma forma que tenía que haber llegado el agua, de  
1046 la misma forma que tenía que [ZP: Sí, el agua, cómo va a...]   
1047 haber resuelto el problema de la financiación por población y  
1048 de la misma forma que debería haber resuelto la seguridad  
1049 ciudadana. Pero su idea de España me parece sorprendente,  
1050 porque su idea de España, oiga, es que no la conoce nadie.  
1051 Usted abrió aquí un proceso, actuó de aprendiz de brujo y abrió  
1052 un modelo para que todo el mundo hiciese lo que estimase  
1053 oportuno y conveniente sin saber a dónde iba. ¿Y sabe usted lo  
1054 que consiguió? Porque este con su negociación con ETA fue el  
1055 gran fracaso de esta legislatura. Enfrentó a todas las  
1056 comunidades autónomas entre sí, por el agua, por el patrimonio,  
1057 por las inversiones, por la financiación... Dividió a los  
1058 españoles, propició por primera vez en la historia un Estatuto  
1059 que no contaba con el acuerdo de todos y que además pasamos en  
1060 Cataluña de un Estatuto con el 52 por ciento a favor a uno con  
1061 el 35. Por primera vez en la historia y todo esto lo hizo para  
1062 agradar a los nacionalistas y para que estuvieran tranquilos y  
1063 lo que consiguió fue radicalizar mucho más a algunos partidos  
1064 nacionalistas y en algunos casos echarlos al monte. Esa es su  
1065 idea de España. Usted no tiene ninguna idea de España, usted se  
1066 presenta aquí con gráficos para el año 2020 pero usted no tiene  
1067 una idea de su país ni de la igualdad entre los ciudadanos de  
1068 su país, ni de la solidaridad, ni de la cohesión... de eso no  
1069 tiene una idea, señor Zapatero.

1070 **OV:** Señor Zapatero.

1071 **ZP:** Sí, muchas Gracias, señor Rajoy. Eso que se refiere de la  
1072 primera pregunta del IVA y de los cien euros, no era de

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1073 economía sino sobre comentarios que hacía sobre lo que decían  
1074 los ministros, sobre si se iba a aplicar o no. Aquí está la  
1075 pregunta [RJ: IVA, financiación autonómica, cien euros y  
1076 cálculo de pensiones... ¿eso no es economía?] No, no. [RJ: ¿Ah,  
1077 no es economía?] No, no, no, aquí está la pregunta. Era de lo  
1078 que decían. [RJ: El IVA es fomento... ¿y la financiación  
1079 económica? ¿Y el cálculo de pensiones?...] Ni era de economía ni  
1080 de los precios, ni de la economía ni de nada. [RJ: Así se  
1081 explica la situación de la economía española a fecha de hoy  
1082 conociendo su...] Era de lo que decían los ministros, porque  
1083 usted intentaba denunciar en la pregunta que había  
1084 descoordinación. No, no, que había descoordinación, [OV: XXX]  
1085 si luego lo van a ver todos los ciudadanos lo que ha  
1086 preguntado... bueno, sobre el Estado de las Autonomías quería  
1087 hacerle un matiz. Nosotros hemos puesto 700 kilómetros en  
1088 servicio de alta velocidad y ustedes ninguno, porque a Lleida  
1089 llegaba sólo a 200 kilómetros hora y no podía por tanto  
1090 considerarse como alta velocidad. Usted se atreve a hablar de  
1091 nuestro modelo de España, de los consensos Constitucionales,  
1092 señor Rajoy ¡Pero si el Partido Socialista es el eje central de  
1093 la democracia en España... [RJ: el eje central...] Ha estado en  
1094 todos los consensos desde la transición democrática, en el  
1095 consenso constitucional, en todos los consensos autonómicos, en  
1096 todos los pactos antiterroristas, siempre sin condiciones.  
1097 Hemos pactado con UCD, con Alianza Popular, con Izquierda  
1098 Unida, con los partidos nacionalistas; hemos tenido la  
1099 capacidad de llegar a acuerdos con todo y estar en todo,  
1100 siempre. Un partido que ha estado en todos como eje central, el  
1101 Partido Socialista, y hemos desarrollado el modelo autonómico.  
1102 Hay una diferencia muy sencilla de porqué pasa esto y porqué  
1103 ustedes están en esa actitud. Nosotros creemos firmemente que  
1104 para defender España no hay que atacar ni a Andalucía, ni a  
1105 Cataluña ni al País Vasco. Fortalecer el conjunto es defender  
1106 también a cada una de las partes. Por eso he trabajado para con  
1107 diálogo por todas las Comunidades Autónomas, para que todos los  
1108 ciudadanos y todas las comunidades nos sientan cerca. Como por  
1109 ejemplo Ceuta y Melilla. Que he sido el primer presidente del  
1110 Gobierno que ha ido en viaje oficial.  
1111 OV: Señor Rajoy.  
1112 RJ: Yo he ido muchas más veces que usted a Ceuta y Melilla, y  
1113 no he sido de [ZP: Sí, pero no de presidente del Gobierno]  
1114 momento presidente de Gobierno. Ha dicho cosas verdaderamente  
1115 sorprendentes, como que yo ataco ha dejado caer a Andalucía, a  
1116 Cataluña y el País Vasco, podía haber metido y a Castilla-La  
1117 Mancha y a Baleares, y al que pasaba por allí. Oiga el mayor  
1118 ataque a Cataluña que se ha hecho han sido los espectáculos que  
1119 ha dado usted con El Carmelo, con los trenes de cercanías, con  
1120 el AVE, con los apagones. Ese es el mayor espectáculo y la  
1121 mayor agresión que se ha podido producir. [ZP: Ustedes  
1122 recogieron firmas por toda España al grito de "En contra de  
1123 Cataluña"]. Yo he recorrido Andalucía a lo largo de estos  
1124 cuatro años, me he ocupado de sus problemas, he estado con  
1125 mucha gente, he visto muchos lugares. Usted sólo ha ido allí en  
1126 campaña electoral, y yo al País Vasco ¿sabe a lo que he ido? a  
1127 ayudar a mis compañeros del País Vasco a defender la libertad,  
1128 la vida y los derechos individuales de las personas. Por tanto  
1129 eso que usted dijo es lisa y llanamente una de esas cosas que  
1130 usted dice y no significa nada. Dice que el Partido Socialista  
1131 es el centro o el eje central, mire, perdone usted,  
1132 sinceramente, en el centro de este país en este momento está el  
1133 Partido Popular.

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1134 **ZP:** No.

1135 **RJ:** Sí, Lo que pasa es que usted pierde perspectiva porque se  
1136 ha ido muy, muy hacia el extremo [**ZP:** No, no] y entonces nos ve  
1137 en otro lugar.

1138 **ZP:** Ustedes están, en la derecha en la derecha.

1139 **RJ:** Del Ministerio de Fomento, del Ministerio de Fomento  
1140 hablaremos luego, porque toca en el quinto turno, pero lo que  
1141 han hecho ustedes ha sido inaugurar las obras que el PP había  
1142 puesto en marcha, ustedes no ha puesto en marcha nada y además  
1143 han paralizado todo por la peculiar forma de ser de quien  
1144 dirige el Ministerio de Fomento. Pero claro, usted me habla de  
1145 idea de España y todas esas cosas, le recordé el otro día  
1146 algunas afirmaciones de González, de Guerra. No voy a  
1147 repetírselo, pero usted tiene convocado en este momento un  
1148 referéndum en el País Vasco de secesión. Usted. Fíjese lo que  
1149 ha dicho hace poco con ocasión de lo de Kosovo la portavoz del  
1150 Gobierno vasco: "Es un nuevo ejemplo de vigencia del derecho  
1151 democrático a la libre determinación plasmada en legislación  
1152 internacional". Y usted tiene un problema en Cataluña porque  
1153 sus socios con los que se presenta, porque usted va en  
1154 coalición con Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya, tienen  
1155 anunciado otro. Y fíjese usted, las cosas que hacen ustedes en  
1156 Cataluña. Tengo aquí un expediente de un ciudadano catalán, me  
1157 lo ha dado (lee de un folio), al que se le ha multado con 400  
1158 euros porque en la fachada de su comercio consta "Fincas Nebot  
1159 AP-compra venta de pisos, solares y rústicos", y por lo visto  
1160 eso vulnera los derechos lingüísticos de los consumidores. Eso  
1161 lo hace un Gobierno suyo, del Partido Socialista, suyo.

1162 **OV:** Señor Zapatero.

1163 **ZP:** Sí, señor Rajoy hablemos de Andalucía. Ustedes negaron la  
1164 existencia de 400.000 andaluces en el censo para el modelo de  
1165 financiación autonómica y tenían una deuda de 2.500 millones de  
1166 euros con Andalucía que me comprometí a satisfacer y que cumplí  
1167 y di al Gobierno de Andalucía 2.500 millones de euros. Ese es  
1168 el trato que ustedes tuvieron con Andalucía. Mire, usted con su  
1169 política territorial no ha dejado de enfrentar unas Comunidades  
1170 con otras, incluso a ciudadanos de una misma Comunidad. Como,  
1171 por ejemplo, con el tema de la lengua. La política lingüística  
1172 que se sigue en Cataluña, señor Rajoy, es la misma de los  
1173 últimos 20 años. La misma. Ustedes estuvieron 8 años de  
1174 Gobierno, es verdad que era la época en la que se hablaba  
1175 catalán en la intimidad por Génova y ahora. Y usted fue  
1176 ministro de Educación y nunca le escuché nada sobre el problema  
1177 o los problemas que el castellano pudiera tener en Cataluña.  
1178 Ahora lo han cogido para dividir y para enfrentar. Y para  
1179 dividir y para enfrentar, la mejor prueba es que cuando han  
1180 llegado las reformas de los Estatutos ustedes han votado 20  
1181 artículos en Andalucía a favor y en Cataluña han combatido 20  
1182 artículos que dicen lo mismo y lo han recurrido al Tribunal  
1183 Constitucional. Usted ha utilizado los territorios, las  
1184 comunidades autónomas para enfrentar, para dividir. Presume  
1185 tener una idea de España, pero le voy a decir cuál es desde mi  
1186 punto de vista: la que a usted le interesa en cada momento, lo  
1187 que a usted le interesa en cada lugar. Si hay que... si interesa  
1188 en Cataluña hacer una tarea en contra del catalán y diciendo  
1189 que el castellano se discrimina, porque le interesa en el resto  
1190 de España, lo hacen; si en un momento dado había que decir que  
1191 no al Estatuto de Andalucía, hasta que se dieron cuenta de que  
1192 podían cometer un grave error, atacaban el estatuto de  
1193 Andalucía y luego, si les interesaba, apoyaban el estatuto de  
1194 Andalucía que tiene, igual que el valenciano, un número

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1195 elevadísimo de artículos similares al de Cataluña. Usted no ha  
1196 tenido coherencia [OV: vaya concluyendo] y por tanto no tiene  
1197 una idea global de España.  
1198 RJ: ¡Todos lo han visto! Es evidente que el señor Zapatero  
1199 apoya que una persona por poner el título de su negocio en  
1200 castellano se le multe, y es lógico porque quien le multa es el  
1201 partido socialista. Es decir, a mí me gustaría que  
1202 desautorizara esta resolución porque desgraciadamente hay  
1203 muchas como esta. Mire, yo le hago una propuesta: yo voy a  
1204 hacer una ley para garantizar que todos los ciudadanos puedan  
1205 mandar a sus hijos a estudiar en castellano en toda España.  
1206 ¿Usted la va a apoyar o no la va a apoyar? Porque claro, España  
1207 es el único país del mundo donde hay ciudadanos que en  
1208 determinadas zonas del territorio nacional no pueden estudiar  
1209 en castellano, yo voy a hacer esa ley [ZP: Sí pueden] y espero  
1210 que me diga si la apoya o no... [ZP: tienen... en castellano] [OV:  
1211 señor Zapatero]. No, no, no, luego me dice si la apoya o no... La  
1212 resolución sancionadora, voy a ver si usted apoya o no esa  
1213 resolución sancionadora. Oiga, no me diga que yo no tengo una  
1214 idea de España, pero si usted ha dicho que España es una nación  
1215 discutida y discutible... [ZP: No], Si usted dijo del Estatuto de  
1216 autonomía de Cataluña: "aprobaré cualquier cosa que salga del  
1217 parlamento catalán". Fíjese la idea que tendrá: "cualquier  
1218 cosa". Le da igual una cosa que la contraria, que dijera sí o  
1219 que dijera 'sao'. Si es que usted, usted es el que quien no  
1220 tiene ningún criterio sobre este asunto. El estatuto catalán,  
1221 cuando no están de acuerdo, pacta con el señor Mas, engaña al  
1222 señor Mas, vuelve a reunirse con el señor Mas, vuelven a  
1223 cambiar todo... no tienen ningún criterio. En Cataluña, en  
1224 Andalucía aprueban una cosa y luego conseguimos que se  
1225 modificaran los 150 artículos, ¡pero a usted le da igual! [ZP:  
1226 No, a usted le da igual], Recuerdo cuando me dijo aquello de  
1227 que el estatuto catalán es una cosa que no le preocupa a nadie,  
1228 que esto es una cosa que sólo le interesa a los políticos.  
1229 Oiga, fíjese lo que han hecho ustedes: un estatuto que tenía el  
1230 apoyo del 52% del censo, hoy es un estatuto que tiene el apoyo  
1231 del 35% censo; es que lo han votado el 35% de las personas, es  
1232 que hay mucha gente que no está de acuerdo. Pero yo le digo, es  
1233 decir, a mí me gustaría conocer su criterio porque usted  
1234 representa a un partido nacional. ¿Va a aprobar esa ley, la va  
1235 a apoyar cuando yo la presente en parlamento esa ley? ¿Su grupo  
1236 parlamentario lo va a hacer? ¿Está usted de acuerdo? ¿Va a  
1237 hacer algo? ¿Se cree que es normal un país donde por poner un  
1238 letrado en castellano automáticamente se te sancione? ¿Hay  
1239 algún país del mundo donde ocurra eso? Sólo en este, en el que  
1240 gobierna usted, señor Zapatero, ¿qué ha hecho usted?  
1241 OV: Les recuerdo que es la última intervención de un minuto de  
1242 este bloque.  
1243 ZP: Sí, señor Rajoy, llevamos veinte años con el mismo régimen  
1244 lingüístico, que por cierto, apoyó Alianza Popular.  
1245 RJ: En absoluto, no es verdad. No es verdad. Alianza Popular no  
1246 aprobó el Estatuto pero sí esto, hombre por favor, por favor,  
1247 por favor...  
1248 ZP: Y usted fue ministro de Educación.  
1249 RJ: Sí, pero empezaron ustedes con Maragall en el 2003...  
1250 ZP: pero ¿qué hizo usted como ministro de educación? ¿Habló  
1251 alguna vez del castellano en Cataluña?  
1252 RJ: Sí, sí, hombre, que si hablé del castellano... infinidad de  
1253 veces  
1254 ZP: No podían hablar, porque era la etapa del Majestic, del  
1255 catalán en la intimidad, [RJ: no, no, no, hablé muchas veces



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1256 del catalán] [OV: señor Rajoy] entonces el catalán era una  
1257 lengua de todos [RJ: Muchas veces, muchas veces], era una  
1258 lengua que había que defender... [RJ: Yo defiendo el catalán y el  
1259 castellano] Ahora, como no están en La Moncloa ni en Cataluña  
1260 tienen ninguna representatividad, pues han cogido lo de  
1261 Cataluña para crispar, para intentar poner a gente a los  
1262 ciudadanos del resto de España frente a Cataluña y eso es una  
1263 irresponsabilidad, porque ustedes gobernaron con el apoyo de  
1264 partidos catalanes, de Convergencia i Unió. Usted como ministro  
1265 de Educación nunca defendió nada ni la pio, [RJ: Absolutamente  
1266 falso] sobre el castellano en Cataluña. No la pio ni hizo nada  
1267 como ministro [RJ: Esto es falso], lo cual a mí tampoco me  
1268 extraña que no hiciera nada.  
1269 RJ: Bien, eh... Creo que ha quedado claro eh... que al señor  
1270 Zapatero le parece bien que a una persona que rotule en España  
1271 en castellano se le multe y le parece bien que haya muchísimos  
1272 ciudadanos, no sólo en Cataluña, sino en otras zonas, en el  
1273 País Vasco, empiezan en Galicia, que no pueden estudiar en su  
1274 idioma, algo que no ocurre en ningún país del mundo. Queda  
1275 constancia de que a usted le parece bien [ZP: Queda constancia  
1276 de que usted hace demagogia] Creo que con el estado de las  
1277 autonomías hay que hacer lo que hicimos en los últimos treinta  
1278 años: grandes pactos nacionales, en 1992 y en 1996, hay que  
1279 pactar, hay que dialogar y hay que hablar y la primera vez  
1280 desde 1977 que esto se ha roto ha sido con usted. Porque no se  
1281 rompió ni con Suárez, ni con Calvo Sotelo, ni con González, ni  
1282 con Aznar. Jamás hubo un estatuto que no fuera apoyado por los  
1283 grandes partidos nacionales. Y le voy a decir una cosa: el  
1284 estado de las autonomías tiene dos componentes, el Estado  
1285 central y las autonomías. Nos hemos ocupado mucho de las  
1286 autonomías, pero ahora es preciso también ocuparse de un Estado  
1287 fuerte que pueda garantizar la igualdad de todos los españoles,  
1288 en derechos, deberes y oportunidades, la cohesión y la  
1289 solidaridad entre territorios. Usted aquí ha fracasado.  
1290 OV: Bien señores, llegamos al quinto y último de este debate  
1291 antes de las conclusiones, ese último bloque habla de los retos  
1292 del futuro y eso abarca desde la investigación, la vivienda,  
1293 pasando por la educación, desarrollo, innovación, urbanismo,  
1294 infraestructuras, primer turno para el candidato socialista.

### 6. RETOS DE FUTURO

1295 ZP: Nada hay más ligado al futuro que la educación. Hemos  
1296 puesto en este periodo las bases para un modelo educativo de  
1297 más calidad. Ahora tenemos nuevas leyes con financiación y con  
1298 consenso de la comunidad educativa. Pero tenemos  
1299 importantísimos retos para los próximos cuatro años. Hemos  
1300 conseguido la plena escolarización de tres a seis años. Ahora  
1301 hay que conseguir la plena escolarización de cero a tres años.  
1302 Tenemos que lograr que 4 de cada 5 jóvenes sigan estudiando más  
1303 allá de los 16 años, de la educación obligatoria. Para ello  
1304 tenemos nuevas medidas, como las becas-salario. Tenemos que  
1305 potenciar la formación de matemáticas, la lectura, que ya la  
1306 hemos potenciado, y el inglés. Nosotros proponemos que al menos  
1307 el 15% de la actividad en las aulas sea en este idioma, en  
1308 inglés. Y, además, que lleguemos en la legislatura hasta  
1309 200.000 jóvenes becados que puedan ir a perfeccionar el inglés  
1310 un mes fuera de nuestras fronteras. Es un programa que hemos  
1311 puesto en esta legislatura. Hasta ahora han ido al año 50.000,  
1312 por primera vez. Y queremos llegar al final de nuestra

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1313 legislatura a 200.000. Queremos mejorar la formación del  
1314 profesorado y reforzar su autoridad. Pretendemos que el nuevo,  
1315 que nuestro sistema universitario esté entre los diez mejores  
1316 del mundo. Para ello me propongo hacer un gran acuerdo de  
1317 financiación con comunidades autónomas y universidades. Señor  
1318 Rajoy, lleva varias semanas criticando al Gobierno por el  
1319 informe PISA, el último informe PISA. Bien, denigran los  
1320 resultados, que no son para eso, porque tenemos unos resultados  
1321 de orden medio de los países desarrollados. Pero, además, señor  
1322 Rajoy, es lo que menos entiendo, tiran piedras contra su propio  
1323 tejado, porque el informe PISA examina sobre todo su gestión.  
1324 Son los niños de 15 años que lo hacen en el curso 2005-2006.  
1325 Niños que estuvieron el 80 por ciento de su periodo formativo  
1326 con usted en el gobierno [OV: Vaya concluyendo señor Zapatero].  
1327 Por criticarme denigran hasta su propia gestión.  
1328 OV: señor Zapatero [sic]  
1329 RJ: No. En realidad el informe PISA lo que hace es criticar la  
1330 LOGSE [ZP: ah!], que es la ley que hicieron ustedes y que  
1331 nosotros cambiamos pero que no pudo entrar en vigor porque a  
1332 las 48 horas de entrar en el gobierno usted, demostrando que es  
1333 un gran demócrata, a las 48 horas la liquidó. [ZP: Estuvieron 8  
1334 años en XXX] [OV: Zapatero tendrá su tiempo]. Mire, el problema  
1335 que tiene usted es que como en tantos y tantos temas no está  
1336 usted en la realidad. La educación en España está funcionando  
1337 mal, pero no porque lo diga el informe PISA. Los últimos datos  
1338 son realmente pues, pues, pues, que, que, que, para  
1339 entristecerse... [ZP: XXX, no, no, no]. Estamos por debajo del  
1340 puesto 30 del mundo en lectura, estamos en matemáticas, estamos  
1341 en ciencias. Las tasas de abandono escolar y fracaso escolar  
1342 son tremendas, somos el tercero por la cola de la Europa de los  
1343 27. De verdad, es que lo que dice usted de educación no tiene  
1344 ninguna credibilidad. Y me parece muy bien lo que ha dicho  
1345 luego usted del inglés y todas esas cosas y las becas, pero,  
1346 mire usted, ¿sabe lo que es más importante en materia de  
1347 educación?: volver a los principios de mérito, de trabajo y  
1348 esfuerzo. Que para pasar de curso se necesite saber y para  
1349 saber haya que aprobar, y no se puede pasar de curso con cuatro  
1350 asignaturas. Es que no se puede. Es que lo que se ha bajado es  
1351 el nivel de la calidad de la educación en España. ¿Y habla  
1352 usted del profesorado? Podía haber hecho algo. Efectivamente,  
1353 el sistema educativo debe pilotar sobre los profesores y se les  
1354 debe dar autoridad, porque los profesores van a enseñar y los  
1355 alumnos van a aprender. Y luego inglés, ciencias, nuevas  
1356 tecnologías, sociedad de telecomunicación, porque ese es el  
1357 tema capital para poder competir en el futuro y usted mientras  
1358 tanto está con la educación para la ciudadanía o con quitarle a  
1359 la gente la posibilidad de estudiar en castellano. Su política  
1360 educativa, la de los últimos años nos ha conducido a donde  
1361 estamos. Hay otro tema de futuro que es muy importante, que es  
1362 el de la vivienda. Mire usted, los precios han subido el 43 por  
1363 ciento durante su mandato. El otro día dijo que los precios en  
1364 su mandato habían bajado. Han subido las hipotecas. Ha subido  
1365 el esfuerzo que tiene que dedicar la gente a pagar su vivienda,  
1366 y ustedes lo único que han hecho son ocurrencias, las  
1367 zapatillas, crear un ministerio, planes y más planes, el  
1368 alquiler... señor... Rodríguez Zapatero, lo que hay que hacer es un  
1369 gran acuerdo nacional en materia de vivienda para que el suelo  
1370 valga menos y hay que modificar la Ley de Haciendas Locales  
1371 para que los ayuntamientos no tengan que financiarse con el  
1372 precio del suelo.  
1373 OV: Señor Zapatero.



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1374 **ZP:** Sí, señor Rajoy, quiero hacer alguna matización sobre  
1375 educación muy rápidamente. Ese informe corresponde sobre todo a  
1376 8 años en los que los niños estaban bajo su dependencia como  
1377 Gobierno y su Ministerio y sus políticas, y sus cambios de  
1378 leyes y sus decretos. Y su falta de inversiones. Mi opinión es  
1379 que la educación en España necesita mejorar, pero no que la  
1380 podemos denigrar, porque no es justo; no es justo, porque si  
1381 no, este país no habría alcanzado el desarrollo y el bienestar  
1382 que ha alcanzado. Porque tenemos magníficos docentes,  
1383 magníficos profesores, padres que se sacrifican y lo que hay  
1384 que hacer es aumentar los recursos como hemos hecho nosotros en  
1385 estos 4 años. Un aumento del 80% de las becas, 2.500 centros  
1386 con profesores de apoyo y refuerzo para los niños que no  
1387 pueden. Hay que reforzar la autoridad de los profesores,  
1388 invertir en el apoyo a las matemáticas, a la lengua. Pero no  
1389 denigrar nuestro sistema educativo, y menos tratándose de un  
1390 informe que corresponde a su etapa de gobierno. Mire, en  
1391 vivienda, le voy a dar un dato: con su ley del suelo, con la  
1392 ley que empezaron a cambiar en el decreto del 96 y el 98, ¿sabe  
1393 cuánto subió los terrenos del suelo en España? Un 500% con esa  
1394 liberalización. Esa es la consecuencia de su política. Y con  
1395 ustedes la vivienda subió en esa liberalización...

1396 **RJ:** ¿Qué liberalización? ¿De qué liberalización habla? [**ZP:** Sí,  
1397 cuando liberalizaron el suelo...] ¿Si eso no está aprobado,  
1398 hombre! [**ZP:** No no, en la anterior etapa, hombre, que sí] Usted  
1399 es que no se entera. Pero hombre, por favor... la liberalización  
1400 del suelo, pero ¿qué barbaridad!

1401 **ZP:** Sí, un 500% con su ley del suelo. Y un 80% aumentó la  
1402 vivienda en la última legislatura. Y en esta el incremento ha  
1403 ido decreciendo hasta llegar solo al 40% [**RJ:** al 43% ¿y esto le  
1404 parece poco?]. Con ustedes el precio de la vivienda subía seis  
1405 veces más que los salarios [**RJ:** XXX] y con nosotros hemos  
1406 pasado de 50.000 viviendas protegidas cuando llegamos al  
1407 gobierno, y ahora este año vamos a construir 150.000 viviendas  
1408 protegidas. Tres veces más [**RJ:** Y millones en los tres próximos  
1409 años]. Y por cierto, los datos de la comunidad de Madrid son  
1410 viviendas que financia el Estado [**RJ:** Sí, sí], el Estado, y que  
1411 hacen ayuntamientos socialistas. Dígaselo porque la señora  
1412 Esperanza Aguirre, ya sabe lo que dijo, que lo que quería era  
1413 acabar con la vivienda protegida. Y nosotros hemos dado ayudas  
1414 a los jóvenes para el alquiler de XXX [**OV:** Vaya concluyendo  
1415 señor Zapatero].

1416 **OV:** Señor Rajoy.

1417 **RJ:** Eh... le voy a dar datos, ya que a usted le gustan los datos  
1418 (enseña un gráfico). Banco de España: en el año 1995 cuando  
1419 llegamos al Gobierno, llevábamos de cada 100 euros había que  
1420 dedicar 46 al pago de la vivienda. Cuando nos fuimos 31 euros y  
1421 ahora estamos en 46,2 euros, dato del Banco de España.  
1422 Incremento del precio de la vivienda. Porque es que usted,  
1423 claro, es que usted falta a la verdad. Éste es el problema que  
1424 tiene usted. Años 2000 a 2004, 551 euros. Año 2004-2008, su  
1425 etapa, 705 euros. Fuente: El Instituto Nacional de Industria  
1426 proporcionados por el Ministerio de la Vivienda. Entonces eche  
1427 al del INI o eche al de la Vivienda. Precio de la vivienda de  
1428 VPO (vivienda de protección oficial, n.d.r.) (enseña otro  
1429 gráfico). Cuando gobernaba el Partido Popular, 2004, 112.000  
1430 euros, ahora 200.000 euros. Viviendas protegidas, se lo dije el  
1431 otro día, Comunidad de Madrid, Andalucía y Cataluña (enseña  
1432 otro gráfico). Si estos datos no son ciertos, pues tendrá usted  
1433 que echar al de la Vivienda, al Ministerio de Economía por  
1434 decir falsedades. Pero me gustaría decirle alguna cosa, ya le

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1435 digo... Eso de la liberalización del suelo, eso es falso. Usted  
1436 dónde est... usted no se entera. Eso no se ha producido nunca en  
1437 España [ZP: no el que no se entera debe ser usted] [OV: Por  
1438 favor]. Eso es algo que se le ha ocurrido a usted o que se lo  
1439 ha inventado. [ZP: Esa fue su ley del suelo] [OV: Por favor  
1440 señor Zapatero]. Sí, sí, pero eso no entró en vigor nunca. Es  
1441 decir, esto, es que usted no se entera de esto. Mire, le voy a  
1442 hablar de educación. Usted dice hay que hacer, hay que hacer,  
1443 hay que hacer... Pero usted no ha hecho nada [ZP: Sí hemos hecho,  
1444 se lo he contado]. Usted lo único que hizo fue derogar una ley  
1445 que había ahí y echar a la ministra al día siguiente, al día  
1446 siguiente de aprobar la ley usted echó a la ministra. Y  
1447 realmente tenía usted razón y no sé si alguien tendría que  
1448 haberse ido con la ministra. Usted habla de los padres y de los  
1449 profesores, pero no ha hecho nada. Hace poco yo me sorprendí  
1450 con unas declaraciones verdaderamente inusuales e impropias, en  
1451 fin, de una persona que está en la magistratura en la que está,  
1452 echándole la culpa de la educación de los hijos a los padres.  
1453 Comentando lo del informe PISA, usted dice que yo denigro la  
1454 educación y usted le echa las culpas a los padres, si se lo ha  
1455 echado en unas declaraciones públicas que conoce toda España  
1456 [ZP: No]. Yo digo que usted está fuera de la realidad y que  
1457 éste es el tema capital del futuro, porque no vamos a competir  
1458 con petróleo, vamos a competir con personas que tienen que  
1459 estar formadas desde los tres años en inglés, en sociedad de la  
1460 información, en nuevas telecomunicaciones, tiene que estar  
1461 formada. Y tiene que haber un nivel de exigencia que hoy no  
1462 existe. Que ustedes se lo han liquidado. Insisto este es un  
1463 tema capital para España.  
1464 OV: Señor Zapatero.  
1465 ZP: Señor Rajoy, la vicepresidenta electa... la presidenta electa  
1466 (enseña un periódico): "Voy a suprimir la vivienda protegida".  
1467 Esta es la política del Partido Popular.  
1468 RJ: pues evidentemente A juzgar por estos datos (enseña otro  
1469 gráfico) no parece que lo haya hecho... ¿eh?...  
1470 ZP: Vamos a hablar de educación. Nuestro país,  
1471 desgraciadamente, lleva 30 años de libertad y de democracia.  
1472 Muchos otros países europeos, que nos ganan en bienestar y en  
1473 renta per cápita, disfrutaron de democracia décadas antes, y de  
1474 progreso, y de libertades, y de una mejor educación. [RJ:  
1475 Hungría también y Polonia... los países del Este...] [OV: Por  
1476 favor...] Y nosotros hemos partido de una situación de retraso  
1477 histórico [RJ: Sí]. Y ahora estamos recuperando, y hemos hecho  
1478 un tramo importante de recuperación. ¿Nos queda por recuperar?  
1479 Sí, mucho, con esfuerzo. Y claro que lo hemos hecho: 80 por  
1480 ciento más de recurso en becas, apoyo a 2.500 centros y una  
1481 ley, que la nuestra sí llevaba memoria económica. Una ley con  
1482 7.000 millones. Pero yo quiero hablar de otros temas que son  
1483 capitales para el futuro. Nuevas tecnologías: Cuando llegamos  
1484 al Gobierno estábamos a la cola en Internet de Europa, por  
1485 detrás de Chipre. Hoy ya estamos al nivel de Francia y  
1486 avanzaremos más. Accederán a la banda ancha 6 de cada 10  
1487 hogares al final de la legislatura. Y en 2010 todos los  
1488 trámites con la Administración serán por Internet. En  
1489 Investigación y Desarrollo hemos triplicado el presupuesto, en  
1490 I+D+I. Vamos a aumentar en 50.000 el número de investigadores y  
1491 vamos a seguir apostando por los sectores tecnológicos de  
1492 futuro. El sector aeronáutico, del que somos líderes en  
1493 tecnología de reabastecimiento en vuelo, duplicará su tamaño en  
1494 la siguiente legislatura. El sector de las energías renovables  
1495 del que somos líderes en energía eólica y en la energía solar

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1496 también doblará su peso. Y en biotecnología, nuestro objetivo  
1497 es ser líderes en investigación de células madre. La suma  
1498 económica de estos tres sectores será mayor en cuatro años que  
1499 el sector inmobiliario hoy. Esto es apostar por una economía  
1500 productiva, por las nuevas tecnologías... [OV: Concluya señor  
1501 Zapatero, señor Rajoy]

1502 RJ: La pena es que no lo hayan hecho a lo largo de estos cuatro  
1503 años [ZP: Sí claro que lo hemos hecho] que por lo visto  
1504 gobernaron otros en España. Claro, ahora la culpa de la  
1505 educación la tiene la historia de España porque unas eran  
1506 democracias y otros no. Pero mire usted la República Checa,  
1507 Letonia, Estonia o Lituania, países que nos han adelantado en  
1508 buena parte de los puntos fundamentales del informe PISA pues  
1509 son democracias desde hace bastante menos tiempo que España.  
1510 Ese es el problema, señor Zapatero. Me parece muy bien todo lo  
1511 que ha dicho sobre nuevas tecnologías sobre internet pero mire,  
1512 los datos son los datos, los acaba de publicar hace poco  
1513 también la Unión Europea. En los 4 años que median entre 1999 y  
1514 2003 se subió en España la participación en el PIB en el 0,2.  
1515 En los cuatro suyos sólo subió el 0,1. Usted habla, dice, voy a  
1516 hacer... pero es que al final la realidad se impone. En  
1517 cualquier caso yo quería hablar del Ministerio de Fomento [ZP:  
1518 Hemos subido en tecnología 7.500 millones... XXX investigación,  
1519 está aquí] [OV: Por favor]. El Ministerio de Fomento que ha  
1520 sido la expresión más clara de la política de este Gobierno, es  
1521 decir, vive de la herencia, ha hecho mucha propaganda: inaugura  
1522 lo que ya estaba en construcción. Los espectáculos a los que  
1523 hemos asistido en el caso del AVE a Valladolid, o el AVE a  
1524 Málaga o el AVE a Barcelona, pues han sido impropios de una  
1525 democracia avanzada, han retrasado cosas para que pareciera que  
1526 las hizo usted. Es decir, lo que ha pasado en el Aeropuerto de  
1527 Barajas, tardar dos años en inaugurarlo por poner los  
1528 mostradores y la luz, es algo verdaderamente sorprendente. No  
1529 sabemos lo que está pasando en este momento en el aeropuerto de  
1530 Barcelona y hay algunas obras... [ZP: pues que tenemos los  
1531 mejores aeropuertos de Europa y el mundo]. Sí, Sí. Ya, ya, [OV:  
1532 Por favor señor Zapatero], pero hay muchas cosas pendientes  
1533 [ZP: y yo me siento orgulloso de ello] El AVE de Valencia, el  
1534 plan Galicia, el plan ferroviario de Canarias, el plan del  
1535 oeste de su pueblo, en León, y toda la zona del noroeste  
1536 española... De esto no ha habido nada. [ZP: Es que no se ha  
1537 enterado de nada. Usted no se ha enterado]. Ustedes lo que han  
1538 hecho es llegar al gobierno, paralizar un plan como hicieron  
1539 con otras muchas materias, por ejemplo, en el tema de agua.  
1540 Paralizar un plan, retrasarlo todo, y luego hemos visto los  
1541 espectáculos que han ocurrido. Y ese tema es capital. Yo voy a  
1542 aumentar la inversión en infraestructuras, porque creo es un  
1543 tema absolutamente capital para España, voy a aumentar la  
1544 inversión en educación porque creo que es capital para España,  
1545 pero desde luego voy a un modelo educativo más exigente porque,  
1546 si no, no vamos a poder competir en el mundo, y desde luego el  
1547 I+D+I tiene que ser uno de los retos básicos del futuro de los  
1548 españoles. Pero en los presupuestos tiene que plasmarse, señor  
1549 Zapatero, lo demás son palabras.

1550 OV: Última intervención de un minuto en este bloque.

1551 ZP: Sí, nosotros hemos sido los que hemos incrementado la  
1552 inversión en infraestructuras. Fíjese el compromiso: en la  
1553 próxima legislatura, a todas las comunidades llegará la Alta  
1554 Velocidad... y en educación, con los datos que le he aportado.  
1555 Pero yo quiero referirme al cambio climático, porque es uno de  
1556 los grandes retos de futuro. Nuestra apuesta es una apuesta por

## Appendix I. Second debate

1557 el ahorro y las energías renovables, que nos ha permitido  
1558 reducir por primera vez la emisión de gases de efecto  
1559 invernadero en 2006 y contenerlas en 2007. Para nosotros, la  
1560 lucha contra el cambio climático es una gran oportunidad, no  
1561 sólo una prioridad, sino una gran oportunidad económica para  
1562 mejorar la competitividad de nuestra economía, para generar  
1563 investigación, para aportar más valor añadido. Y también  
1564 tenemos un compromiso con el desarrollo rural, con el ámbito  
1565 rural, con ciudadanos que tienen exactamente el mismo derecho a  
1566 tener infraestructuras, equipamientos y servicios que los que  
1567 viven en los ámbitos urbanos. Por eso hemos hecho la Ley de  
1568 Desarrollo rural, que vamos a aplicar en cooperación con las  
1569 comunidades autónomas. Y también un programa de agua: de aquí  
1570 al 2011 me comprometo a que haya ochocientos hectómetros  
1571 cúbicos más en toda la cuenca del Mediterráneo con desalación,  
1572 [OV: Vaya terminando señor Zapatero] que equivale a tres  
1573 millones de personas más que pueden abastecerse.  
1574 OV: Su minuto señor Rajoy.  
1575 RJ: Bien... eh... son, evidentemente, muchos los temas que se han  
1576 planteado. Tengo que decir que yo haré una apuesta muy  
1577 importante, como he dicho antes, por la educación, una apuesta  
1578 muy importante por las infraestructuras: me parece sorprendente  
1579 lo que ha dicho el presidente del Gobierno. Dice que han  
1580 invertido mucho en infraestructuras. En 2004, se invertía el  
1581 2,02% en España y ustedes sólo fueron capaces de ejecutar el  
1582 1,43. Y éste, en el 2007, su inversión es del 1,58. Ha bajado  
1583 la inversión en infraestructuras en España... [ZP: No, no.] no,  
1584 no, no, si estos son los datos pero para mí, las  
1585 infraestructuras serán una prioridad. Ha hablado usted de los  
1586 agricultores, o de los ganaderos, o del campo. Mire usted:  
1587 después de las negociaciones que han hecho ustedes en la Unión  
1588 Europea no tiene usted ninguna autoridad moral para hablar ni  
1589 de agricultores ni de ganaderos. Y desde luego lo que ha  
1590 ocurrido en el tema del agua es sorprendente: han liquidado un  
1591 proyecto y han dejado sin agua Aragón, Cataluña [ZP: Y usted  
1592 mantiene...] Barcelona tiene unos problemas enormemente  
1593 importantes [ZP: ¿Usted mantiene el transvase del Ebro?] [OV:  
1594 Por favor], Castellón, Valencia, Alicante, Murcia, Almería... Yo  
1595 mantengo lo que he dicho en todos los sitios: yo voy a llevar  
1596 agua a todos los sitios, empezando por el pacto del agua y  
1597 llevándolo luego desde las cuencas excedentarias... Haré un  
1598 trasvase, sí, si es eso lo que quiere saber. Usted no ha hecho  
1599 nada y no va a hacer nada y las desaladoras emiten CO2 y van  
1600 contra el cambio climático. Esa es su política.

### 7. CIERRE

1601 OV: Gracia señor Rajoy, bueno usted seguiría seguramente, pero  
1602 hemos agotado los cinco bloques, los cinco temarios, ya saben  
1603 que disponen ahora de tres minutos para dirigirse a los  
1604 ciudadanos para decir lo que quieran lo que estimen oportuno,  
1605 como cierre de debate. Señor Zapatero.  
1606 ZP: Muchas gracias. Hace cuatro años recibí el apoyo de más de  
1607 once millones de españoles. Quiero aprovechar esta ocasión para  
1608 expresar mi profundo agradecimiento a los que me dieron la  
1609 confianza en aquella ocasión. Mi agradecimiento también a los  
1610 que en estos años, han expresado el apoyo a las acciones de  
1611 Gobierno y también mi agradecimiento a los que han discrepado  
1612 con respeto. Quiero que todos los españoles sepan que tanto el  
1613 apoyo como la crítica me han servido de estímulo para  
1614 esforzarme y trabajar por mis compatriotas. En estos debates he

## Appendix I. Second debate

1615 explicado la tarea de Gobierno, he defendido con convicción la  
1616 tarea de gobierno. Ahora quiero pedirles el apoyo para un  
1617 proyecto para los próximos cuatro años. Porque estoy convencido  
1618 que un país es fuerte si da las mismas oportunidades a todos  
1619 los ciudadanos y apoya a los más débiles, porque estoy  
1620 comprometido con terminar con todas las discriminaciones,  
1621 empezando por las que afectan a las mujeres, porque estoy  
1622 convencido que el crecimiento económico nos debe llevar al  
1623 pleno empleo. Porque estoy comprometido con que la mayoría de  
1624 los recursos públicos se dediquen a la educación, a la sanidad,  
1625 a subir las pensiones, a apoyar a los jóvenes para que  
1626 encuentren empleo, a apoyar a los trabajadores y a sus  
1627 familias. Porque tengo el compromiso de afrontar un desarrollo  
1628 sostenible, de luchar contra el cambio climático, de hacer que  
1629 nuestro país lidere esta nueva etapa. Porque estoy comprometido  
1630 con la defensa de la paz, con una España europeísta, con la  
1631 defensa de la legalidad internacional, Porque estoy  
1632 comprometido con una España unida, en convivencia y que respete  
1633 la diversidad. Porque el futuro es la convivencia y no la  
1634 división, porque llegaremos mejor al futuro si tenemos  
1635 confianza y no pesimismo. Por todas estas razones les pido su  
1636 voto y su apoyo para los próximos cuatro años. Gobernaré para  
1637 todos y con respeto a todos. Gobernaré con firmeza, gobernaré  
1638 con convicción. Mejoraré las cosas bien hechas y corregiré los  
1639 errores. Gobernaré con sensibilidad, y estaré muy cerca de los  
1640 que no tienen de todo. Buenas noches y buena suerte.

1641 **OV:** Última intervención de tres minutos, señor Rajoy.

1642 **RJ:** Buenas noches. Yo creo que España es un gran país, una gran  
1643 nación, una nación de ciudadanos libres e iguales que en estos  
1644 momentos tiene problemas, pero creo que si actuamos con  
1645 realismo, si actuamos con trabajo y si actuamos con humildad,  
1646 vamos a superarlo en el futuro. Yo quiero que la próxima  
1647 legislatura no sea la legislatura de la tensión y de la  
1648 división entre los españoles. Quiero que sea una legislatura de  
1649 consenso entre todos. Le voy a proponer al principal partido de  
1650 la oposición acuerdos en los temas importantes. Quiero que  
1651 España sea lo que todos los españoles queremos que sea. Una  
1652 gran nación de ciudadanos libres e iguales. Sé que hay muchos  
1653 votantes del partido socialista, la inmensa mayoría de los  
1654 partidos socialistas... de los votantes del partido socialista  
1655 que creen que España es una gran nación de ciudadanos libres e  
1656 iguales, y hay cosas que no se han hecho bien. Voy a ofrecer al  
1657 líder de la oposición un pacto para derrotar a ETA, no para  
1658 negociar a ETA. También voy a ofrecer un acuerdo en materia de  
1659 política exterior y también un acuerdo en un tema que a mí me  
1660 parece capital de cara al futuro, un acuerdo para modernizar y  
1661 para consolidar nuestro sistema de protección social, sobre  
1662 todo en lo que se refiere a las pensiones y a la sanidad. Y en  
1663 el resto de los temas quiero decir que yo no seré el presidente  
1664 del Partido Popular. Yo seré fundamentalmente el presidente del  
1665 Gobierno de todos los españoles porque mi objetivo es gobernar  
1666 sin generar tensiones, ni confrontaciones, ni divisiones. Me  
1667 ocuparé de la economía. La economía es capital. La economía lo  
1668 es todo y de la economía, de una buena política económica  
1669 depende todo. Yo me ocuparé de luchar contra los precios. Me  
1670 ocuparé de luchar contra el desempleo. Mi gran objetivo, el  
1671 reto básico es que puedan trabajar en España tantas mujeres  
1672 como hombres: hoy trabajan sólo fuera de casa ocho millones de  
1673 mujeres y trabajan doce millones de hombres. Ese es el objetivo  
1674 básico de la próxima legislatura y a él me aplicaré. La  
1675 economía es fundamental para poder mantener las políticas

## Appendix I. Second debate

1676 sociales, para la educación, para la sanidad. Por eso, debemos  
1677 prestarle toda la atención y no enredarnos con debates sobre  
1678 Naciones o alianzas de civilizaciones como ha ocurrido en esta  
1679 legislatura. La economía por encima de cualquier otra  
1680 consideración. Hay que hacer reformas, las vamos a hacer, vamos  
1681 a bajar los impuestos, reformas en el I+D+i, en las  
1682 infraestructuras. Son fundamentales para competir en el futuro.  
1683 Y en la educación. El tema de la educación es el más  
1684 importante, pero se necesita exigencia, se necesita calidad,  
1685 que se valore el trabajo, el mérito y el esfuerzo. No podemos  
1686 vivir de otra manera. Se necesita que todos los españoles  
1687 estemos unidos, que España esté unido en sus tierras y esté  
1688 unido en sus gentes. Eso es fundamental. El Estado de las  
1689 autonomías es lo que yo defiendo, pero hay que hacer que  
1690 funcione bien y que sirva para fortalecer al conjunto. Es muy  
1691 importante también que apostemos por la derrota de ETA. No por  
1692 los atajos, ni por lo apaños, ni por las negociaciones. Que no  
1693 se pierda la dignidad del Estado. La clave es derrotar al  
1694 terrorismo, y se puede hacer con la ley. Señoras y señores. Ya  
1695 termino. El otro día hablé de una niña. En esa niña pienso, en  
1696 esa niña que va a crecer, que tiene que estudiar, que quiere  
1697 tener una vivienda. Esa niña está en mi cabeza, esa niña es la  
1698 que mueve mi sentimiento y mi corazón. Esa niña.

1699 **OV:** Muchas gracias caballeros. Hasta aquí este segundo y  
1700 también intenso debate. Llegarán ahora los comentarios, los  
1701 titulares, las tertulias, pero la ventaja de todo esto es que  
1702 todos los que lo han visto tienen su propia opinión. Les doy  
1703 las gracias a los dos por haber ofrecido a la ciudadanía este  
1704 intercambio de opiniones, estos dos cara a cara. La Academia de  
1705 la Televisión les quiere agradecer a ustedes y a sus  
1706 colaboradores su confianza por aceptar nuestra propuesta de  
1707 organizar estos debates. Gracias también a todos los que han  
1708 colaborado en las televisiones y en los medios de comunicación,  
1709 a los académicos voluntarios que han prestado su experiencia y  
1710 su trabajo. Créanme que para la Academia esto ha sido un  
1711 verdadero honor. Y creo interpretar un deseo general si digo  
1712 que no tengan que pasar otros quince años para que esto se  
1713 repita. Buenas noches. Gracias.



## Appendix II

### Transcriptions of the electoral videos of IU

#### Video: Rimsky Korsakof

[comedian Pepín Tre speaking]

Hola soy Rimsky Korsakof, El que toca el violín tiritititín... Entonces quería yo con m violín apoyar a izquierda unida, Porque voy a votarla claro, Rimsky siempre vota a izquierda unida y Korsakov también los dos vamos a votar ambos. Pero además hay un acto muy bonito de fin de campaña que...

...bueno cuéntalo tu Gaspar porque yo en eso

[Llamazares, IU candidate, speaking]

Bueno el acto es en el auditorio Pilar Bardem, en Rivas Vacías Madrid, el viernes 7 a las 10 de la noche

PT: Yo voy a tocar el violín... tu que tú que tú que tocas, tío?

LL: Yo el violín no porque eso lo toca Zapatero que lo coge con la izquierda y luego lo toca con la derecha

PT: Anda

LL: Y la trompeta tampoco que la trompeta la toca Rajoy que nos tiene los XXX

PT: Y qué tal la toca la trompeta? Como el arcángel san Gabriel lo mismo muy fuerte muy fuerte muy fuerte XXX

LL: Terrible muy fuerte ahora le pone sordina en campaña para que no se le note

PT: Ya más a lo Miles Davies

LL: Pero no nos engaña

PT: No nos engaña es verdad ¿eh? es que los trompetistas son un peligro

LL: No no Yo más bien la voz humana

PT: Ahí estoy contigo estoy contigo [...] Y con un caramelito con un caramelito XXX

LL: XXX Carmina Burana y eso

PT: Ahí me gusta me gusta

LL: Ahahah

[slogan: Que no te cambien el juego

Vota útil

Vota IU

Izquierda Unida (sintonía de IU)]

#### Video: Acueducto de Segovia

[comedian Pepín Tre speaking]

Buenos días eh... soy el Acueducto de Segovia... y... la verdad voy me gusta me gusta apoyar Izquierda Unida. No solo yo ¿eh? que viene también la Catedral de Burgos y el Alcázar de Toledo. Pfff a ese le ha costado... ha habido que estar ahí venga venga vamos... Menos mal que la Plaza de toros de Las Ventas le dijo ¡coño ánimo! Y entonces pues bueno bien al final pues pues que estaremos ahí apoyándoles en el fin de fiesta en el ya en el el final el final el final... Entonces yo creo que va a ser cosa muy bonita... Porque van a salir la Laguna de Ruidera, van a venir también me parece el Ebro, al menos una parte, una parte, la que pasa por Tarragona, O sea que bueno, que va a ser muy entretenido... ¿Dónde va a ser esto oye?

[Llamazares, IU candidate, speaking]

Va a ser en el auditorio Pilar Bardem, en Rivas Vacías Madrid, el día 7 viernes a las 10 de la noche

## Appendix II

PT: Va a ser XXX meterlo ahí va a ser complicado

LL: Eso va a ser, pero se hace, si hay que hacerlo se hace

PT: Y ¿sabes que vamos a hacer además? Piragüismo ¿Te gusta a ti el piragüismo?

LL: A mí me gusta el piragüismo

PT: Es bonito es bonito tío es bonito. Yo me gusta eso muchísimo y... el embutido. Es que está bueno ¿verdad?

LL: Primero el embutido y luego el piragüismo

PT: O viceversa si nos valen las dos cosas... Joder como va a estar eso ¿eh?

[SLOGAN: Que no te cambien el juego

Vota útil

Vota IU

Izquierda Unida (sintonía de IU)]

### **Video: El pensador de Rodin**

[comedian Pepín Tre speaking]

Hola! Amiguitos amiguitas. Soy soy el pensador de Rodin. Todas las esculturas van a dar su apoyo a Izquierda Unida. Y lo van a hacer además acudiendo a un acto, un acto muy bonito. ¿Dónde y cuándo va a ser eso?

[Llamazares, IU candidate, speaking]

En el auditorio Pilar Bardem, en Rivas, el viernes día 7 a las 10 de la noche

PT: Te gusta a ti Copérnico?

LL: Sobre todo los giros copernicanos

PT: Sabes hacerlo?

LL: Un giro... ueeee

[Llamazares gira sobre sí mismo]

PT: Ahahaha

[slogan: Que no te cambien el juego

Vota útil

Vota IU

Izquierda Unida (sintonía de IU)]

{un consejo [www.iloveiu.org](http://www.iloveiu.org)}

### **Video: Symca 1000**

[comedian Pepín Tre speaking]

Treiegnnn grannbbb... Hola soy un Symca 1000... Y me gustaría dentro de lo que es el mundo del automóvil., del motor, pues apoya a IU y además estar en el acto en el acto este final. ¿Cuándo lo va a haber cuando va a ser el acto?

[Llamazares, IU candidate, speaking]

Bueno va a ser en Rivas Vacías, Madrid, en el auditorio Pilar Bardem, el día 7 viernes a las 10 de la noche.

PT: XXX un symca1000 para hacer eso y para hacer el amor también

LL: Eso es ideal

PT: Hombre

XXX

XXX

Vamos que ya verás ya verás sube sube dónde sea

Brruuuumm

Ahahah ahha



## Appendix II

ahhah

[Slogan: Que no te cambien el juego

Vota útil

Vota IU

Izquierda Unida (sintonía de IU)]

{un consejo [www.iloveiu.org](http://www.iloveiu.org)}

### **Video: Voto útil**

[Y ahora izquierda unida]

[Jingle of IU]

[Pilar Bardem speaking:] Vota izquierda unida porque es el voto útil que necesitamos toda España para que haya un gobierno de izquierdas. Siempre juntos. Por Izquierda Unida.

[Xx Xx:] queridos amigos el verdadero voto útil es el de izquierda unida no os dejéis engañar.

[Xx Xx: makes the gesture of the eyebrow, then puts the finger below his eye, miming the Spanish expression “ojo”, i.e. ‘attention’] que no te engañen el voto útil izquierda Unida

[Xx Xx: makes the gesture of the eyebrow, then puts the finger below his eye, then into his nose for poking fun] es que como no sé muy bien cómo se hace esto... pues en fin que hago esto, pero bueno, si queréis, si verdaderamente creéis en el voto útil y para la que la izquierda este representada en el parlamento a pesar de esta ley electoral que hace que la izquierda esté un poco emarginada, pues votad a IU el auténtico voto útil

[Almudena Grandes: makes the gesture of the eyebrow, then puts the finger below her eye] que no te engañen, el voto útil, izquierda unida

[Xx Xx:] oye hay que tener mucho ojo [puts the finger below his eye] mucho ojo, ¿eh? que no utilicen el voto útil [hace gesto de la ceja] para inutilizar a la izquierda

[Xx Xx:] hay una cosa que se escurre por aquí [makes the gesture of the eyebrow, then puts the finger below his eye] que hay que estar ojo abierto... a ver dónde ponemos el ojo [puts his finger into his nose for poking fun] y donde ponemos el dedo

[Xx Xx: makes the gesture of the eyebrow] oye que no te engañen, de verdad el voto útil útil es de izquierda ese es el útil, y lo demás [makes the gesture of the eyebrow] son tonterías

[Guillermo Toledo:] vota Izquierda Unida ¡coño! ¡Hala! ¡hasta luego!

[slogan: llamar/es + izquierda]

### **Video: Contraste**

[military]

porque invadir un país y asesinar a su pueblo

no es solución a ningún conflicto

[student]

porque no me he pasado la vida trabajando

para acabar cobrando cuatro perras de pensión

[businesswoman]

porque estoy harta de hacer contratos basura

[priest]

porque nadie puede decidir qué significa estar enamorado

o qué es una familia

## Appendix II

[posh youngster]  
porque yo defiendo una educación pública y laica  
[middle-aged housewife]  
porque quiero que se respete mi derecho  
a decidir sobre mi maternidad  
[children with the Spanish Republican flag]  
porque tengo memoria y no olvido  
[Llamazares]  
vota Izquierda Unida  
Izquierda Unida es más izquierda  
[slogan: izquierda unida + izquierda]

### **Video: Sin parafernalias**

[a Young man, in smart casual dress comically mimes what politicians do in campaign: speeches, photos with babies, blow kisses, has a case full of Money, jumps, plays with balloons, throws confetti up in the air, laughs, shakes hands, etc.]  
[the character speaking]  
podríamos hacer una campaña así,  
pero no queríamos espectáculos ni parafernalias  
para Izquierda Unida, lo importante son las ideas  
y las personas  
[jingle]  
[slogan: izquierda unida + mas izquierda]

## **Transcripciones videos PP:**

### **Video embargo**

[Zapatero speaking from a TV, while a family is shockingly observing their furniture being forcefully seized, due to their bankrupt]

Y sabéis que en estos cuatro años hemos mejorado los derechos y libertades de los ciudadanos. No hay crisis estamos en la Champions League de la economía no hay crisis nuestra economía es una de las más sólidas del mundo estamos mejor que hace cuatro años. ¿Donde está la crisis?

...and you know that in these last 4 years we improved right and freedoms there is no crisis our economy is in the Champions League there is no crisis our economy is one of the toughest in the world we are now better than 4 years ago where is the crisis?

[PP]

### **Video: Precios**

Sabias que con el gobierno Zapatero el precio medio de un litro de leche ha subido más de un 35%?

El kilo de pan ha subido más de un 30% y lo mismo pasa con el pollo la ternera y la pasta

Los yogures cuestan casi cuatro veces más

Los números hablan

En los últimos 3 años la cuota de una hipoteca media ha subido más de 400 euros al mes

Los precios suben más que los salarios con el gobierno de Zapatero

Te sorprendería saber que España es el país de la Unión Europea en el que los salarios han perdido más poder adquisitivo en los últimos años y la presión fiscal ha aumentado dos puntos desde que Zapatero gobierna

Ya supera el 40% del producto interior bruto

Por todas estas razones y muchas más [Cambio de música] el Partido Popular pondrá en marcha la mayor rebaja de impuesto de la historia de la democracia

Una reforma fiscal en beneficio de las familias y especialmente de aquellas que tienen rentas más bajas

Con nuestra reforma los trabajadores y pensionistas que ganan menos de 16000 euros al año dejarán de pagar el impuesto sobre la renta

Y además aprobaremos una rebaja adicional de impuestos a las mujeres que trabajan fuera del hogar

[slogan: Con Rajoy es posible

Partido Popular]

### **Video: Conejos y chisteras**

En los últimos meses Zapatero se ha gastado 20 millones de euros al mes en propaganda y autobombo.

Escuchar "Gobierno de España" al final de un anuncio nos cuesta 600 mil euros al día

100 millones de las antiguas pesetas

Para tapar los socavones de la gestión de Zapatero

Zapatero gasta 20 veces más en autobombo que en la lucha contra la violencia de género

25 veces más que en guarderías y el doble que en ayudar a las personas dependientes

Con ese dinero se podría pagar la pensión mensual de 26 mil españoles, se podría construir 1 km de autovía a la semana y comprar 3 pisos al día

## Appendix II

100 millones al día es lo que gastan 1300 mileuristas españoles durante todo un mes en la cesta de la compra

Con 600 mil euros se pueden comprar más de 120.000 conejos

En 4 años Zapatero no se ha ocupado de los problemas reales de los españoles

Ahora pretende sacarse conejos de la chistera

[Shift in music, colors and voice tone]

El Partido Popular bajará los impuestos y subirá las pensiones

Otro gobierno de España con Rajoy es posible

### **Video: Castillo de naipes**

Durante 4 años Zapatero ha estado jugando con el bienestar de todos

Los precios suben, aumenta el paro, la economía empeora y él no hace nada

Ninguno de sus problemas ha merecido su atención

Desde que llegó a la Moncloa no sabe lo que cuesta un café

No tiene problemas para pagar su piso y ha olvidado lo difícil que es llegar a fin de mes

Pero hay cosas que caen por su propio peso

[Slogan: Vota PP]

### **Video: Mujer desengañada**

[a Young woman talks with a friend of hers about her relationship]

A: ¡Hola guapa! ¿Qué tal?

B: Bueno... ahí vamos... muy decepcionada la verdad

A: ¿En serio? Con lo contenta que estabas al principio

B: Ya pero es que cada vez es peor

Pasa de mí no le interesan mis problemas

Está todo el día hablando de cosas que solo le importan a él

Me ha fallado

Le he pillado mintiéndome

A: Y ¿Qué vas a hacer?

B: No tengo ningún motivo para creer en él

No volveré a votar a Zapatero

Yo necesito a alguien que tenga las ideas claras

[Slogan: Vota PP]

### **Video: Rajoy precios**

[Rajoy speaking]: La vida ha subido mucho en los últimos años. Mucho.

Por eso creo que si algún esfuerzo tendremos que hacer en los próximos 4 años es atender a eso: a los precios, a los sueldos, a las pensiones.

Porque eso es lo que de verdad afecta a las personas.

Eso es su vida.

Y ayudarles en eso, pues es ayudarles a ser un poco más felices

[Slogan: Con cabeza y con corazón Mariano Rajoy]

[Slogan: Vota PP]

## Appendix II

### **Video: Rajoy: Gobierno no habla de economía, inmigración, seguridad ciudadana**

[Rajoy speaking in a meeting]: Y mientras hablan de lo malos que somos los del PP, de las catástrofes naturales que se pueden producir si el PP llega al gobierno, de economía nada, de inmigración nada, de seguridad ciudadana nada.

De eso no hablan, cierran el pico, no les conviene

Pero eso es lo que les interesa a los españoles y de eso es de lo que voy a hablar yo.

### **Video: ¡Rompe con Zapatero! ¡Rompe con los titiriteros!**

[many current people appear in front of the TV in a médium shot saying the sentence “I break up with Zapatero”]

Yo rompo

Y yo

Rompo con Zapatero

Yo rompo con zapatero

Nosotras rompemos con zapatero

Nosotras también

Yo rompo con zapatero

Yo rompo con zapatero

Yo rompo con zapatero

Yo rompo con zapatero

Yo rompo con zapatero

Yo rompo con zapatero

Rompo con zapatero

Yo rompo con zapatero

Yo rompo

Yo rompo con zapatero

Yo rompo

Rompo con zapatero

Yo rompo con zapatero

[voice off screen]: Ninguno de ellos es famoso

Pero ellos y tú pagáis injustamente el Canon Digital con el que el PSOE ha beneficiado a los artistas de la Plataforma de Apoyo a Zapatero.

Yo rompo con zapatero

### **Video: ¡Rompe con Zapatero!**

¿Sabes todo lo que Zapatero quiere hacer por ti?

No comas

No elijas

No riegues

No pienses

No reces

No salen

No cabes

No pidas justicia

No es digna

No entiendes

No ondees

## Appendix II

No eduques  
No vivas  
No te comprometas  
No llegas  
No te indignes  
No bebas  
No digas la verdad  
¡Que zapatero no viva por ti!  
[slogan: Rompe con Zapatero]

### **Video: ¡yo rompo con Zapatero! 1984**

[Zapatero speaks during a meeting]

¡No son derechos de los ciudadanos! ¡Más política social! ¡Más cohesión! Porque el crecimiento es para todos los ciudadanos... Alguien puede entender porque la derecha hace una batalla por una asignatura como Educación por la Ciudadanía, que intenta que nuestros hijos no solo aprendan conocimientos en la escuela sino que aprendan a tener un carácter democrático, tolerante, de respeto a los derechos humanos, a la libertad, a la diversidad a la paz, porque les molesta que nuestros niños puedan aprender la Constitución, la democracia, los derechos humanos, la libertad, la tolerancia, si esto es la esencia de la democracia... y queremos para los españoles la mejor democracia y sabemos...

[voice off screen:] Bajo las palabras democracia, libertad y derechos humanos, el gobierno socialista está tratando de imponer una asignatura propia de un régimen totalitario. El 9 de marzo rompe con el adoctrinamiento de Zapatero. Tú puedes lograr que 2008 no sea otro "1984".

[Slogan: Rompe con Zapatero]

### **Video: Letras**

[a text appears on the black background forming the following sentences]

Las letras se unen para formar palabras y expresar ideas

Pero solas también tienen personalidad

ADN algunas letras son únicas

I otras son minimalistas

ETC algunas implican mucho más de lo que dicen

SI pueden ser positivas

NO o negativas

IQ otras pueden ser muy inteligentes

IQ o todo lo contrario

KG pueden tener mucho peso

GR o casi ninguno

T las hay sobrias

S sinuosas

H que no dicen nada

BUM otras son muy ruidosas

ETA también las hay asesinas

RIP definitivas

LEY hay letras que merecen respeto y acatamiento

LEY aunque para algunos solo son 'papelitos'

## Appendix II

¡AH! las hay expresivas  
¿EH? que no entienden nada  
¡OH! que te dejan boquiabierto  
PSOE algunas letras pretenden decir mucho  
PSO pero se van  
PS desdibujando...  
P  
^^ hasta llegar a perder todo significado  
Z algunas letras nos hablan de crisis  
Z de falta de ideas de pactos oscuros  
Z de 'tensión'  
Z de fracaso  
Z de final  
[Cambio de música: sintonía del PP y color: azul del PP]  
Pero existen otras letras que nos hablan de  
FUTURO  
R racionalidad  
R reconstruir  
RAJOY  
P propuestas  
P pericia  
P palabra  
P prosperidad  
P posible  
PP  
Con Rajoy es posible  
[Video de blog pro Rajoy para PP]

### **Video: con Z de Chapuzero**

[a puppet caricaturing Zapatero speaks with his accent]  
Palabridaz, inseguridaz y calamidaz  
más catastrofídez, mas torpecidaz y menos formalidaz  
penosidaz ... chapucidaz  
si la verdaz es que meto mucho al pata  
debe ser una cosa innata o quizá que soy gafe  
y bueno pienso que la culpa es vuestra por haberme votado así que mira  
haberlo pensado mejor  
no tenemos ni puñetera idea de cómo vamos a solucionar el caos de Barcelona  
nos gusta improvisar con una sonrisa  
intentamos sacar adelante como sea las obras del AVE pero aparecen socavones  
por todos lados  
quedan muchas cosas por estropear y mucha gente que cabrear  
me gusta el país en que sufrimos  
me gusta la España de hoy catastrófica  
esto es la verdad  
[con z zapatero sin c de cercanías]  
(video broadcast on IntereconomíaTV)

## Appendix II

### Transcriptions of videos of PSOE

#### **El segundo mejor país para ser niño**

España 2004-2008

con z de zapatero

[policía guardia civil]

¿sabías que con el gobierno de zapatero hay diecisiete mil policías y guardias civiles más que con el gobierno del PP?

[x17000 policías más

seguridaz

con z de zapatero]

los números hablan

en los últimos años la economía española ha crecido el doble que Alemania, el triple que Italia, un 50% más que Gran Bretaña y un 25% más que Estados Unidos

[la economía española crece mas

competitividaz

con z de zapatero]

España se ha convertido en la 8ª potencia económica del mundo

[8ª potencia económica del mundo

prosperidaz]

y lo ha hecho sin perder de vista el respeto por el planeta

España ha conseguido por primera vez reducir la emisión de los gases que producen el cambio climático

[responsabilidaz

con z de zapatero]

en estos años hemos vivido el periodo con menos huelgas desde que hay democracia en España

[estabilidaz

con z de zapatero

periodo con menos huelgas]

el gobierno de zapatero ha triplicado la contribución de España al desarrollo de los países pobres

[España ha triplicado la contribución

solidaridaz con z de zapatero]

¿te sorprendería saber que en los últimos 3 años uno de cada tres empleos creados en Europa se ha creado en España?

[la tasa de paro más baja de los últimos treinta años

3000000 empleo

empleo de calidaz

con z de zapatero]



## Appendix II

¿y que un millón y medio de trabajadores con empleo precario han pasado a tener un empleo estable?

[la tasa de paro más baja de los últimos treinta años

1500000 empleos estables

empleo de calidad

con Zapatero]

con el gobierno de Zapatero las pensiones más bajas y el salario mínimo han subido el triple que con el gobierno del PP

[el salario mínimo ha subido el triple

empleo de calidad

con Zapatero]

3 millones y medio de autónomos han visto reconocidos sus derechos

[más derechos 3.500.00

igualdad

con Zapatero]

la ley de dependencia beneficiará a un millón doscientas mil personas y creará trescientos mil puestos de trabajo

[dignidad

con Zapatero

ley de dependencia/300000 puestos de trabajo]

este gobierno ha dedicado a la educación un 75% más que el gobierno del PP

[sensibilización

con Zapatero]

[modernidad

con Zapatero]

e invierte más del doble en investigación y desarrollo tecnológico

para 2010 España será el país del mundo con más kilómetros de AVE

y el país de Europa con más kilómetros de autovías

[alta velocidad

con Zapatero]

1er país del mundo con más Km de AVE

2090km Japón

1890km Francia

2230 km España

el gobierno de Zapatero ha bajado el impuesto sobre la renta al 95% de los ciudadanos dos millones de personas no tendrán que volver a pagar

[equidad

con Zapatero

ha bajado el impuesto sobre la renta al 95% de los ciudadanos]

el año que viene setecientas mil familias podrán desgravarse el alquiler de su vivienda

## Appendix II

[PSOE 700000 familias podrán desgravarse el alquiler de su vivienda]  
y trescientos cincuenta mil jóvenes recibirán ayudas directas para el alquiler de las  
suyas

[accesibilidaz con z de zapatero  
350000 jóvenes recibirán ayudas directas para el alquiler]

por todas estas razones y otras más  
España es según la OCDE el 2º mejor país del mundo para ser niño  
[2º niño]

y el primer destino que elegirían los europeos si tuvieran que irse a trabajar a otro país

¿a qué no es una sorpresa?  
[...a qué no es una sorpresa?]

españa 2004-2008  
con z de zapatero

[españa 2004-2008  
con z de zapatero]  
[PSOE]

### **Con z de Zapatero**

modernidaz, seguridaz, y equidaz  
más baloncestidaz, más dialoguidaz, y menos crispacidaz  
lealtaz, solidaridaz, humildaz  
sí la verdad es que uso mucho la z  
debe ser una cosa de familia o quizá de mi tierra  
y bueno, hemos preparado una explicación de la tarea del gobierno más desenfadada  
habitualmente los políticos tenemos un lenguaje que se aleja de los ciudadanos  
y todo se puede decir con una sonrisa  
lo importante es que todos los españoles conozcan lo que hemos hecho en estos años  
los hechos y los datos  
quedan muchas cosas por resolver  
pero hay muchas cosas que celebrar  
me gusta el país en el que vivimos  
me gusta la España de hoy  
la España democrática  
esto es la verdaz  
[españa 2004-2008  
con z de Zapatero]

### **Con Zapatero vuelve a creer en la política**

[cuando habla dice algo]  
si vivimos juntos, juntos debemos decidir

[defiende a sus adversarios]  
el ex presidente Aznar fue elegido por los Españoles y exijo ese respeto

## Appendix II

[no genera crispación]

a cada insulto que recibamos, nosotros una propuesta  
a cada, a cada descalificación, una idea  
y a cada exageración, una sonrisa

[reconoce sus errores]

quiero reconocer el claro error que cometí ante todos los ciudadanos españoles

[se moja]

hemos dedicado leyes, esfuerzos, medios y recursos  
y dedicaremos aun muchos más  
para combatir con toda la energía la lacra intolerable de la violencia machista  
que hace sufrir a tantas mujeres

[no miente]

la verdad en democracia siempre se abre camino

[sabe reírse de sí mismo]

más baloncestidaz, más dialoguidaz, y menos crispacidaz

[cumple lo que promete]

estas circunstancias me han llevado a adoptar la decisión de ordenar el regreso de  
nuestros soldados con la máxima seguridad, por lo siguiente, en el menor tiempo  
posible

[y tiene un plan]

celebrar los avances sociales de los más débiles y sentirnos orgullosos de que España  
pueda en el mundo por fin después de siglos estar entre los mejores en el siglo veintiuno

[¿qué clase de político es éste?]

acepto la candidatura del partido socialista a la presidencia del gobierno de España

[con Zapatero vuelve a creer en la política]

### **No seas él**

[a person shows a picture of supposedly her wife]

[the character, dressed and behaving as an unlucky, says]

pues ayer la vi cenando con otro

[a person shows the character her new dress, the character says]

te hace como más gorda ¿no?

[the character leaving a cinema addresses a person in the line for buying the ticket]

al final el chico se muere

[the character in a bar with a friend, eating a sandwich says]

¿no te sabe un poco raro?

[the character step into his home door, on the stairs he meets his concierge and says]

qué mala cara ¿eh?

[the character passes behind two elderly playing chess and says to one of them]

¡te va a hacer mate!

## Appendix II

[the character watching live a football match with another person; they support the same team; while the other supports the players about to score, the character says]

lo falla

[the character at work, after having listened to a colleague's business presentation says]

¿no es un plan demasiado optimista?

[the character with another person in the car of the latter; the car does not switch on, and he says]

puf eso va a ser la caja de cambios

[the character visiting a sick person in a hospital]

seguro que es grave

[Zapatero speaks from a TV in a bar]

los ciudadanos confiaron en nosotros para trabajar por la paz para alcanzar nuevos derechos, para que el progreso económico

[the character drinking a beer at the counter says, addressing the TV]

vaya hombre, ya verás

[slogan: no seas él]

[slogan: PSOE la mirada positiva]

### **Defender la alegría**

¿qué tal? ¿cómo estás?

muy bien encantado me alegro gusto

hola qué tal

guapa

...democrático, al día siguiente...

defender la alegría

nos encontramos en plena forma

defender la alegría contra los cenizos, ¿no?

[defendemos la alegría

frente al catastrofismo,

la intolerancia y el retroceso

Plataforma de

Apoyo a

Zapatero]

Defender la alegría como una trinchera,

defenderla del caos y de las pesadillas,

de la ajada miseria y de los miserables,

de las ausencias breves y las definitivas.

Defender la alegría (x 4).

Defender la alegría como un atributo,

defenderla del pasmo y de las anestias,

de los pocos neutrales y los muchos neutrones,

de los graves diagnósticos y de las escopetas.

Defender la alegría como un estandarte,

defenderla del rayo y la melancolía.

Defender la alegría (x 12)

## Appendix II

[Plataforma de  
Apoyo a  
Zapatero]

### **Estoy con Zapatero**

[así empezó todo]

perdón señor presidente  
dime Concha  
antes de terminar este acto  
ya que usted ha dedicado este ultimo parrafo a las personas que o pueden hablar y oír y  
que se expresan con las manos  
que nos digan como se dice "presidente Zapatero"  
estoy con Zapatero  
estoy con Zapatero  
estoy con Zapatero  
estoy con Zapatero  
estoy con Zapatero  
estoy con Zapatero  
estoy con Zapatero

[estamos con Zapatero  
Plataforma de  
Apoyo a  
Zapatero]

### **Que el tiempo no te cambie**

[14 de marzo de 2004  
noche electoral]

[crowd] no nos falles, no nos falles, no nos falles, no nos falles  
[Zapatero] y os aseguro que el poder no me va a cambiar, gracias  
[cuatro años después]  
[María San Miguel] zapatero no me ha fallado: dijo que sacaría las tropas de Irak y el  
tío lo hizo, con un par!  
[Rubén Fernández] antes quitaban las becas, ahora te puedes ir de ERASMUS con los  
6000 euros que te da Zapatero, vaya punto ¿eh?  
[María López y Camino Orejas]  
[ML] a mí no me ha fallado en el compromiso contra el cambio climático  
[CO] ya pero hay que llegar más lejos  
[David Muñoz] ha tenido el coraje de sacar adelante leyes como al del matrimonio  
homosexual: a mí no me ha fallado  
[Elena Moreno] yo creo que se ha preocupado por los que no pueden valerse por sí  
mismos; si somos una potencia mundial, pues, que lo notemos todos ¿no?  
[Carlos San Martín y Beatriz Curieses]  
[BC] pues yo veo que hay más ayudas, se construye más vivienda protegida, los precios  
están un poco mejor

## Appendix II

[CSM] ya vale, vale pero esto sigue siendo un problema eh? zapatero aún queda mucho por hacer

[Elena de las Heras] ahora me garantizan que por el mismo trabajo cobraré igual que un hombre por ley

[Oscar Sánchez] yo soy autónomo, antes era invisible, ahora tengo los mismos derechos que todo el mundo

[Rubén Blanco] ahora si tienes un hijo tienes una ayuda y 15 días para cuidarlo a él a su madre. Zapatero: no me has fallado

[Maria del Prado] sobre todo valoro una cosa, Zapatero no nos ha mentado

[music] no no que el tiempo no te cambie,

no no que el tiempo no te cambie

no no que el tiempo no te cambie no no no

no no que el tiempo no te cambie no no no

no no que el tiempo no te cambie no no no

no no que el tiempo no te cambie no no no

no no que el tiempo no te cambie

no no que el tiempo no te cambie

no no que el tiempo no te cambie

no no que el tiempo no te cambie

[que el tiempo no te cambie]

### **Rajoy currante**

[video on the mini website lamiradapositiva]

[Zapatero] porque ayer oí a Rajoy hablar de los currantes y decía, y decía, y decía que su programa era el de los currantes... sí, hombre, sí, los currantes como Pizarro<sup>1</sup>, ¡que tiene una indemnización de miles de millones de pesetas!

### **Vota con todas tus fuerzas**

[rain and sad music]

[sad images]

dicen los estudios que si la participación es baja

el PP podría ganar las elecciones

tambien dicen que cuando hace mal tiempo

la participación es menor

asi que algunos desean que el domingo llueva con rabia

nieve viento lo que sea para que te quedes en casa

pero hay algo que no saben

para los que votamos con alegría

siempre hace sol

[musica in crescendo

Sun and cheerful music]

---

<sup>1</sup> Manuel Pizarro Moreno, PP MP, broker and vice-president of Madrid Stock Exchange, president of the bank Ibercaja, president of Spanish confederation of saving Banks, former CEO at Endesa (1996-2007), received from this company a millionaire compensation when he left; PP responsible of Economy, during the 2008 electioneering he participated to a TV debate with Pedro Solbes, PSOE responsible of Economy.

## Appendix II

[cheerful images]

[red background] el domingo vota con todas tus fuerzas

[slogan: vota con todas tus fuerzas]

### **Vota con todas tus fuerzas 2**

[Young man speaking] hace 4 años millones de españoles fuimos a votar para cambiar las cosas

ahora siento que mi voto ha valido para mucho

pero hay que continuar

para mí votar es sagrado

por eso voy siempre a buscara a mi madre al pueblo

son trescientos kilómetros sólo por un voto

para que ella vote

y eso que sé que va a votar al PP

[mom] qué hijo, has cambiado de opinión

[son] no mamá sabes que no, y tú

[mom] yo tampoco

[image of a building with the poster of Zapatero and the slogan “vota con todas tus fuerzas”]

### **Vota con todas tus fuerzas 3**

[Elderly speaking] tengo 94 años

he visto casi todo

he vivido grandes esperanzas y también grandes decepciones

pero ahora es diferente

ahora que España empieza a estar donde tenía que estar hace mucho tiempo

quiero vivir para verlo

no me preguntéis porque pero este tío me ha devuelto la ilusión

[Zapatero speaking] celebrar los avances sociales de los más débiles y sentirnos orgullosos de que España

pueda en el mundo por fin después de siglos estar entre los mejores

voy a ir a votar como si fuera la primera vez

[image of a building with the poster of Zapatero and the slogan “vota con todas tus fuerzas”]

### **Vota con todas tus fuerzas 4**

[Young woman speaking] me acabo de ver en las listas del censo

ya puedo votar

estoy nerviosa

deseando que llegue el día nueve

mi padre dice que esa ilusión se pasa con el tiempo

que la vida me ira enseñando que los políticos son todos iguales

puede que sea demasiado joven

pero no soy estúpida

yo miro los políticos

## Appendix II

[Internet newspaper with picture of PP MPs Eduardo Zaplana, Miguel Ángel Acebes y Mariano Rajoy laughing from their seats in the Spanish parliament, under the headline: "Rajoy's cousin. Rajoy neglects climatic change advised by his scientist cousin"]

los escucho y veo lo que hacen

[image of a building with poster of Rajoy and the slogan "las ideas claras"]

[the character riding a bicycle turns her head]

[image of a building with the poster of Zapatero and the slogan "vota con todas tus fuerzas"]

y creo que no se parecen en nada

[PSOE]

### **Video del acto de presentación de la Plataforma de Apoyo a Zapatero y de la canción Defender la Alegría.**

[different famous Spanish film-makers, actors, singers, TV presenters, etc., speaking]

Soy José Luis Cuerda, de vez en cuando hago películas y se me ha encargado que presente a esta amplísima plataforma de personas del mundo de la ciencia, de la investigación, de la universidad, de la literatura, de las artes plásticas, del cine, del teatro, de la cultura en general y estamos aquí como ciudadanos y lo único que queremos propugnar es un apoyo a Zapatero primero porque creemos que lo ha hecho razonablemente bien... pienso y uso en la medida de lo posible con toda justeza el término 'razonable' porque creo que creemos que se pueden razonar cuales han sido sus aciertos y han sido suficientes como para que queramos que vuelva a presidir un gobierno; segundo para que no vuelva esa turba mentirosa humillante que piensa desde su imbecilidad que todos somos más imbéciles que ellos y tercero puesto que Rajoy no piensa pelearse con ellos para que los obispos no nos echen encima una teocracia igualmente humillante y estúpida.

#### **Defender la Alegría**

Antes las elecciones generales del 9 de marzo los hombres y mujeres que suscriben este manifiesto expresan públicamente su apoyo al presidente José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero porque en estos 4 años al frente del gobierno de España Zapatero cumplió su palabra de retirar las tropas españolas de una guerra inmoral e injusta y ha recuperado una política internacional basada en la cooperación, el multilateralismo y la defensa de los derechos humanos ha acompañado los logros en política económica con la mejora del bienestar de todos los ciudadanos, ha situado la defensa de la igualdad entre hombres y entre mujeres en el centro de su acción de gobierno, ha promovido la ampliación de los derechos civiles más importante de nuestra historia reciente, ha profundizado en un modelo de estado plural dentro del marco de la constitución, las mujeres y los hombres que suscribimos este manifiesto hacemos publico nuestro apoyo y nuestro deseo de que el 9 de marzo los ciudadanos vuelvan a apoyar a José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero para que desde el gobierno se mantenga una forma de hacer política basada en el dialogo, la búsqueda de acuerdos y el respeto a las instituciones democráticas, para que la solidaridad siga siendo el eje de la acción de gobierno, y tengan continuidad las políticas sociales impulsadas en esta legislatura, para que todos los ciudadanos tengan los mismos derechos y los mismos deberes, para que ningún credo, opción política o grupo social goce de privilegios, para que todos participen en el progreso de la sociedad y nadie se vea excluido de sus logros, para que el mundo siga mirando a España como un referente en la defensa de la paz y la solidaridad internacional. Las mujeres y los hombres que firmamos este manifiesto confiamos en la capacidad de la sociedad



## Appendix II

española para avanzar en paz y en libertad sin tutelados ni imposiciones, una sociedad que mire al futuro con esperanza y sin miedo y con la firme voluntad de no dar un paso atrás. Desde la independencia y la pluralidad de ideas, con espíritu crítico, sin adhesiones inquebrantables confiamos en la capacidad de JLRZ para seguir liderando este proyecto colectivo.

Hola buenos días ya somos casi 5000 vamos a ser muchísimos más, del cine, del teatro, de la música, de la TV: vamos a luchar para que Z sea el próximo presidente de gobierno, y vamos a luchar con lo único que sabemos hacer todos nosotros, con la palabra... a luchar y a ganar. En la clausura del acto se va a pasar un video que han hecho unos grandísimos artistas... y ante la tristeza de esa derecha nosotros luchamos por la alegría y apostamos por la alegría. Cuando se acabe el video hemos acabado el acto. Muchas gracias.

## Transcriptions of the two main electoral songs

### **PP: Revolución Popular**

Si tienes nuevas ideas  
y piensas que algo debe cambiar,  
si crees que todo es posible,  
ven a la revuelta popular.  
Buscamos gente valiente,  
soñadores que puedan imaginar,  
soñar con una España nueva,  
vivir en un mundo de igualdad.  
*Uniremos nuestras ilusiones,  
lucharemos por defender nuestros valores,  
por el futuro de los españoles,  
avanzaremos en todas direcciones.*  
Sabes que es nuestro momento,  
no podemos dejarlo escapar.  
No, no esperes más tiempo,  
ahora te tienes que mojar.  
*Uniremos nuestras ilusiones,  
lucharemos por defender nuestros valores,  
por el futuro de los españoles,  
avanzaremos en todas direcciones.*  
Hoy queremos invitarte,  
a un proyecto de justicia y libertad,  
la historia está de nuestra parte,  
juntos vamos a revolucionar.  
Habrá que currar muy duro,  
no nos lo van a regalar,  
somos la apuesta del futuro,  
nos llaman Partido Popular.  
*Uniremos nuestras ilusiones,  
lucharemos por defender nuestros valores,  
por el futuro de los españoles,  
avanzaremos en todas direcciones.*  
Con cabeza y con corazón,  
viviremos todos esta canción,  
con cabeza y con corazón,  
montaremos esta revolución.

### **PSOE: Defender la Alegría**

Defender la alegría como una trinchera,  
defenderla del caos y de las pesadillas,  
de la ajada miseria y de los miserables,  
de las ausencias breves y las definitivas.  
*Defender la alegría (x 4).*  
Defender la alegría como un atributo,  
defenderla del pasmo y de las anestias,  
de los pocos neutrales y los muchos neutrones,

## Appendix II

de los graves diagnósticos y de las escopetas.  
Defender la alegría como un estandarte,  
defenderla del rayo y la melancolía.  
*Defender la alegría (x 12).*

## Appendix III

### Glossary of the main parties (1977-2011)

AFA	Agrupación de electores Frente Autonómico
AHI	Agrupación Herreña Independiente
AIC	Agrupaciones Independientes de Canarias
AIC-ATI	Agrupaciones Independientes de Canarias
AM	Asamblea Majorera
AMAIUR	
AP-PDP-PAR	Alianza Popular + Partido Aragonés Regionalista
AP-PDP-UPN	Alianza Popular + Unión del Pueblo Navarro
AP-PDP-UV	Alianza Popular + Unión Valenciana
BNG	Bloque Nacionalista Galego
CC	Coalición Canaria
CC-AHI-NC	Coalición Canaria-Agrupación Herreña Independiente-Nueva Canarias
CC-NC-PNC	Coalición “Coalición Canaria-Nueva Canarias”
CC-PNC	Coalición Canaria-Partido Nacionalista Canario
CD	Coalición Democrática
CDS	Centro Democrático y Social
CD-UCD	Centristes de Catalunya-UCD
CG	Coalición Galega
CHA	Chunta Aragonesista
CIC	Candidatura Independiente del Centro
CIP	Coalición “La Izquierda Plural”
CiU	Convergencia i Unió
Compromís-Q	Coalición “Bloc-Iniciativa-Verds-Equo-Coalició Compromís”
CP	Coalición Popular
CP	Coalición Popular
CP-AP	Coalición Popular-Alianza Popular
CP-CG	Coalición Popular Centristas de Galicia
CPM	Candidatura Progresista Menorquina
CS	Catalunya al Senat
EA	Eusko Alkartasuna
EA-EUE	Coalición Eusko Alkartasuna - Euskal Ezkerra
EC-FED	Esquerra de Catalunya - Front Electoral Democratic
EE	Euskadiko Ezquerria
EE	Euskadiko Ezquerria
EE	Euskadiko Ezquerria
EE	Euskadiko Ezquerria
EFS	Agrupación de electores Eivissa y Formentera al Senat
Entesa	Per L’Entesa
ENTESA	= IU
Entesa Catalana de Progrés	
Entesa CP	Entesa Catalana de Progrés (PSC-PSOE, ERC, IC-V)
ERC	Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya amb Front Nacional de Catalunya i Partit Social Demòcrata de Catalunya
FAC	Foro de Ciudadanos
GBAI	Geroa Bai
HB	Herri Batasuna
IC	Iniciativa per Catalunya
ICV-EUiA	Iniciativa per Catalunya Verds-Esquerria Unida i Alternativa
ICV-EV	Iniciativa per Catalunya - Els Verds
Independiente	Candidato independiente (Soria)
Independiente	Independiente Lanzarote
Independientes	Candidatos independientes
IU	Izquierda Unida

## Appendix III

NA-BAI	Nafarroa Bai
PA	Partido Andalucista
PAR	Partido Aragonés Regionalista
PAR	Partido Aragonés Regionalista
PDC	Pacte Democràtic per Catalunya
PDL	Coalición Popular
PDP	Coalición Popular
PIL	Partido de Independientes de Lanzarote
PNV	Partido Nacionalista Vasco
PP	Partido Popular
PP-CG	PP - Coalición Centristas de Galicia
PP-PAR	Partido Popular - Partido Aragonés
PP-UE	Coalición “Partido Popular-Extremadura Unida”
PSA-PA	Partido Socialista de Andalucía - Partido Andaluz
PSC-PSOE	Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya
PSD	Por un Senado Democrático
PSdG-PSOE	Partido Socialista de Galicia
PSE-EE	Partido Socialista de Euskadi-Euskadiko Ezquerria
PSE-PSOE	Partido Socialista de Euskadi
PSE-PSOE	Partido Socialista de Euskadi (PSE-PSOE)
PSOE	Partido Socialista Obrero Español
PSOE-A	Partido Socialista Obrero Español de Andalucía
PSP-US	Partido Socialista Popular - Unidad Socialista
PSP-US	Partido Socialista Popular - Unidad Socialista
PSUC	Partit Socialista Unificat de Catalunya
SM	Senadores Majorerros
SPD	Senadores para la Democracia
UCD	Unión de Centro Democrático
UCD-CD	Coalición Electoral Unió del Centro i la Democracia Cristiana de Catalunya
UEC	Unió de L'Esquerra Catalana
UN	Unión Nacional
UPC	Unión del Pueblo Canario
UPN	Unión del Pueblo Navarro
UPN	Unión del Pueblo Navarro - Coalición PP
UPyD	Unión, Progreso y Democracia
UV	Unión Valenciana