THE PROCESS OF PERSONAL DEVELOPMENT

A Critical Study Of The Theories Of
Bernard Lonergan And Carl Rogers On
Personal Development

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"Our problem is to open our vision to more of human experience, to develop and free our methods so that they will as far as possible do justice to the richness and breath of man's experience. This can be done only by analysing the philosophical presuppositions"

Rollo May

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0. INTRODUCTION

My choice of the topic "The Process of Personal Development" was a highly personal one. It sprang from my own experience of sharing the problems of personal growth and particularly in being forced to face the fact of personal suffering and breakdown.

In January 1969, at the recommendation of the Archbishop of Dublin, the Irish Minister for Justice appointed me to the full-time position of chaplain to St. Patrick's, Mountjoy Prison, Dublin, the Irish state institution for serious juvenile offenders up to the age of twenty one years.

For three years I was engaged in the daily task of trying to help young people whose personal lives I was privileged to share. During regular interviews over long periods, I tried to encourage the struggle of hundreds of young people to grow. As I did so, I became more and more aware that my attitudes as a counsellor were of vital importance. It was during these years that I became gradually convinced of the need to explore further the process of personal development.

I discovered in the writings of Carl Rogers, a description of personal growth in a therapeutic context, which in many respects seemed to resonate with the findings of my own experience. In studying Rogers's therapeutic relationship, I was interested to discover an emphasis on the counsellor's attitudes, such as empathic understanding and acceptance, the importance of which I myself had been forced to recognize after much trial and many errors.

Again and again in the writings of Martin Buber, I came across his stress on the need to study and treat the wholeness of the person, a wholeness which defies any reduction to a synthesis of mechanisms. Buber's 'I-Thou' relation-

ship was the only means which I could find which seemed to promote that 'regeneration of an atrophied personal center' about which he speaks. By following Buber's insistent conviction that a counsellor must 'confirm' as well as accept the other person, I found that I was able to share the other person's struggle to grow in a much more helpful (if also personally demanding) manner.

In order to be in a better position to evaluate Rogers's account of personal development and in order to experience his therapeutic community (the 'basic encounter group') at first hand, I attended the fourth session of the 1973 'La Jolla Program' at the University of California , San Diego. There I had an opportunity to clarify various points with Rogers and to try to make up my own mind on the value of the 'basic encounter group' experience in promoting personal development

In examining what appeared to me as a somewhat disappointing picture of the 'fully-functioning' person (Rogers's ideal end-product of the therapeutic process), it became increasingly clear to me that this deficient picture was traceable to Rogers's (implicity) inadequate philosophical anthropology. In addition, his attempt to explain the process of personal development which he had witnessed in therapy seemed to me to be rather limited.

In turning to the writings of Bernard Lonergan, I discovered a more searching approach to these issues. Lonergan's philosophical and theological investigations of the thought of St. Thomas Aquinas had brought him into critical contact with such topics as the nature of the knowing process, of transcendent truth and value and of religious experience, all of which seemed to me to be vital (if often neglected) factors in personal growth-theory.

However, Lonergan's views on personal development had to be disengaged from wider contexts. He had described his treatise Insight as a "Study of Human Understanding" and,

in including an account of personal development, his concern was to explain the nature of genetic insight rather than to formulate a fully differentiated theory of human growth. Similarly, his recent work on method was entitled Method in Theology, and while its first part treated of method in general, of the human good, of meaning and of religion, these accounts were intended to facilitate the development of a method for theology rather than to be fully developed accounts in themselves.

Because of these factors, I decided to limit the scope of this dissertation to an examination of the process and goal of personal development in the interpersonal and community contexts, eventually bringing the views of Lonergan and Rogers into critical contrast. My 'modus operandi' has been to be mainly expository in the first six chapters, reserving critical comments for chapter seven.

Again,because of these factors, I must ask for patient indulgence from my reader. My first chapter, entitled "Bernard Lonergan and the Process of Personal Development", gives an account of Lonergan's views on method in general and on genetic method in particular. It is cast in the language of Insight, which may prove somewhat irksome to the reader unfamiliar with Lonergan's thought. Because my concern has been to remain as faithful as possible to Lonergan's original formulation, I have preserved his own terms in my account, indicating (where possible) corresponding traditional terms.

The second chapter on "Lonergan and the Goal of Personal Development" takes up such questions as essential and effective freedom, the occurrence of personal conversion and the achievement of self-transcendence, all of which Lonergan regards as key issues in describing the goal of personal development.

The third chapter examines Carl Rogers's account of the therapeutic relationship and of the therapeutic process. Again, I have presented Rogers's account in his own terms and

I have tried to clarify these terms by including Rogers's definitions. In addition, I have outlined the parallel accounts of Martin Buber and Abraham Maslow concerning the therapeutic relationship and the therapeutic process, in order to highlight the areas in which they agree or disagree with Rogers.

The fourth chapter is a description of Rogers's account of the outcomes of the therapeutic process and of the goal of personal development: the 'fully-functioning ' person. I have focused principally on Rogers's notion of the 'organismic valuing process' which, he claims, should guide 'fully-functioning' living. I have also showed how Abraham Maslow's 'self-actualizing' person and especially how Victor Frankl's 'self-transcending' person differ significantly from Rogers's 'fully-functioning' person. In addition, I have examined Rogers's paradoxical approach to the question of freedom.

In the fifth chapter, I have tried to assemble Lonergan's scattered references to community into a systematic account, underlining the role which the carriers, elements and functions of meaning play in his theory of the formal constituent of community. In order to be in a position to contrast it with Rogers's account of the growth of community, I have developed Lonergan's theory of community somewhat: firstly, by attempting to explain the structure of community and secondly, by setting out to explain community growth.

"Carl Rogers and the Therapeutic Community" is the title of the sixth chapter, which examines the conditions, the process and the outcomes of Rogers's 'basic encounter group' in the context of the remarkable growth in popular demand for this kind of community experience, especially in the United States. I have also questioned the efficacy of the 'basic encounter group' in promoting personal development (in the light of W. R. Bion's theory of group dynamics).

In the seventh chapter, I have endeavoured to bring out as clearly as possible "The Contrasting Horizons of Lonergan

and Rogers", by attempting to evaluate critically their respective horizons of method, of science, of freedom, of commitment, of the process of development, of feelings, values and the Transcendent, of community, of cognitional theory and of philosophical anthropology.

(By way of synthesis, I have also outlined a brief theory of the process of personal development in an appendix).

This dissertation is not an 'apologia' for or against the views of either Bernard Lonergan or Carl Rogers. It is an effort to reach greater insight into the process of personal development. It rests on the conviction that any such attempt to understand (and 'a fortiori'to promote) personal development must inevitably rely on a philosophical anthropology. In opting for a philosophy of transcendence, it urges with Victor Frankl that it is a fundamental anthropological truth that self-transcendence is the goal of human existence and it seeks to formulate a theory of the process of personal development which aims at such a goal.

Clearly such a philosophy of transcendence requires to be justified. However, an adequate justification would take us far beyond the confines of this dissertation and so it will have to await another occasion.

SECTION ONE

PERSONAL AND INTERPERSONAL DEVELOPMENT

1. BERNARD LONERGAN AND THE PROCESS OF PERSONAL DEVELOPMENT

1.1 METHOD

According to Lonergan, a method is:

" .... a normative pattern of recurrent and related operations yielding cumulative and progressive results" (1).

There are, therefore, distinct operations and each is related to the others. The set of relations forms a pattern, where pattern is described as the correct manner of proceeding with a task, where operations in accordance with the pattern may be repeated indefinitely and where the fruit of such repetition is not repetitious but is usually progressive.

This is the method of the natural sciences, where progressive results are expected. For Lonergan, it is a prior normative pattern of operations and not only a pattern of logical operations on propositions, terms and relations. It includes describing and formulating problems, observation and discovery.

11.1 Heuristic Structure

According to Lonergan, method has a 'heuristic' function: it aims at transforming an unknown into a known. Thus, it lies between ignorance and complete knowledge. It is not complete knowledge, otherwise there would be no coming to know. It is not mere ignorance, because it aims to replace ignorance with knowledge. Lonergan calls this intermediate position 'intending'. The 'intended' is the unknown which is to be known (2). Method utilizes such 'intending' by outlining a definite

pattern of recurrent and related operations to be performed if one is to move from the initial intending of the question to an eventual knowledge of what has been intended.

It may well be asked how an inquiry can be methodical, if method consists in ordering means (a pattern of operations) to achieve an end, when the end is knowledge and the knowledge has not yet been fully achieved. Lonergan's solution is to make use of what he calls a heuristic notion and a heuristic structure. He writes:

"A heuristic notion is the notion of an unknown content"(3). For Lonergan, a 'notion' is a dynamic intending by intellect. A heuristic notion is such a dynamic intending which anticipates the characteristics of the act of understanding through which the unknown might become known. A heuristic structure is an ordered set of such dynamic anticipations (4). Lonergan remarks that a heuristic structure may be formulated by naming the unknown (e.g. 'x'), by working out its properties (e.g., in a series of algebraic equations) and by using these properties to direct, order and guide the inquiry.

We shall now differentiate Lonergan's understanding of pre-scientific inquiry from his understanding of classical, statistical and genetic methods.

11.2 Pre-Scientific Inquiry

According to Lonergan, pre-scientific inquiry aims to understand the 'nature of' something. (This is not to be confused with the philosophical 'natura'). It seeks to understand the 'nature of' things in their relations to our senses. Because similars are to be understood similarly, we anticipate the 'nature of' to be the same for all similar data. Thus we speak loosely of the nature of sound, of heat, etc., by classifying data according to the similarities they display to our senses (5) rather than to similarities in their scientific classifications.

11.3 Classical Method

According to Lonergan, empirical science anticipates more exactly. It classifies data not according to their similarity to the senses but according to its own scientifically determined criteria. It then seeks some correlation of function which states the relations between the data thus classified. Thus, the (empirical) scientist anticipates some unspecified correlation to be specified or some indeterminate function to be determined. In empirical science, the task of specifying or determining is usually carried out by tabulating measurements mathematically and by reaching an insight into these measurements. The insight is then expressed through some general correlation or function to be verified.

Lonergan names the anticipation of such insights classical heuristic structure (6). It is classical in the sense that it handles the kind of insight associated with the names of Gallileo, Newton or Einstein. It is a structure, because it involves a related set of operations. It is heuristic, because while it anticipates insights of this type and while it prescinds from their as yet unknown contents, it nevertheless works out their general properties in order to give a methodical guide to investigations.

11.4 Statistical Method

The classical method of empirical science results in verifiable hypothesis, laws and eventually theories. Its conclusions concern what would be if all other things were equal. On the other hand, Lonergan points out that statistical solutions concern concrete situations, such as the sequences of occasions on which motor accidents cause fatalities. The doctor attempts to diagnose the cause of death according to the method of medicine (which is classical), whereas the statis-

tical investigator defines the number of accidents of a particular kind which cause death. He counts instances within a defined area and gives a general view of things as a whole. Statistical science is empirical but, according to Lonergan, it does not correlate spatial or temporal variables. It attends to frequencies of classes of events (7). Whereas the classical inquirer, in seeking the essential, refuses to disregard differences, the statistical inquirer distinguishes significant from random differences. Thus, he abstracts from merely random differences and he seeks to discover intelligible regularities which he names probabilities. Probabilities can be expressed mathematically and can be verified. Statistical inquiry, therefore, investigates what classical inquiry chooses to neglect: the non-systematic in concrete instances.

11.5 Genetic Method

Genetic method finds its heuristic notion in development (8). For Lonergan, in the plant, there is the single development of the organism. In the animal, there is the twofold development of the organism and psyche. In man, there is the fourfold development of organism, psyche, intelligence-and-reasonableness and responsibility.

Whereas classical method anticipates a constant system to be discovered and statistical method anticipates that data will not conform to system, genetic method anticipates an intelligibly related sequence of systems: its aim is to master the sequence itself, to understand the development and so to proceed from the correlation of regularities at each stage of the development to the succeeding correlation (9).

1.2 DEVELOPMENT

We shall now examine Lonergan's detailed elaboration

genetic method. In order to preserve the original clarity of his exposition, we shall retain his own terminology, indicating in parentheses the equivalent Aristotelian term where possible. Briefly, Lonergan refers to:

primary matter as potency or empirical residue;
substantial form as central form;
the act of existence (esse) as central act;
accidental potency as conjugate potency (10);
accidental habit (habitus) as conjugate form;
accidental activity as conjugate act (11).

The following are Lonergan's principles of development , i.e. they are the 'sources' which govern it.

12.1 The Principle of Emergence

The principle of emergence states that otherwise coincidental manifolds (random or chance juxtapositions) of lower conjugate acts invite higher integration by higher conjugate forms (12). So chemical elements are higher integrations of otherwise coincidental manifolds of subatomic events. Organisms are higher integrations of otherwise coincidental manifolds of chemical processes. Sensitive consciousness is a higher integration of otherwise coincidental manifolds of changes in neural tissues. Accumulating insights are higher integrations of otherwise coincidental manifolds of images of data.

12.2 The Principle of Correspondence

The principle of correspondence requires that different manifolds of underlying events require different higher integrations. So the chemical elements have different atomic numbers grounded in the differing underlying manifold. Different aggregates of aggregates of chemical processes involve different organisms. So neural events in the eye and

in the ear produce different conscious psychic experiences. Different data lead to different insights and theories. This principle is a flexible one (13).

12.3 The Principle of Finality

The underlying manifold is an upwardly but indeterminately directed dynamism towards an ever fuller realization of being, according to the principle of finality (14). This dynamism is what Carl Rogers refers to as "the forward moving forces of life itself" (15). Any actual realization is merely a barrier to be further transcended by the principle of finality.

An integration can be static as well as dynamic. An integration is static when it dominates the lower manifold completely and firmly resists change. An integration is dynamic when it not only systematizes the lower manifold but keeps adding to it and modifying it until the principle of correspondence gradually eliminates it and by the principle of emergence, a new integration is introduced.

12.4 The Principle of Development

The principle of development states that development consists in a linked sequence of dynamic higher integrations. An initial coincidental manifold is systematized and modified by a higher integration so as to call forth a second integration. The second integration leads to a third and so on until the possibilities of full development are exhausted. (16)

12.5 The Principle of Increasing Differentiation

The principle of increasing differentiation accounts for the fact that in a series of successive stages in a development, initial integrations can be understood in a generic manner only whereas subsequent integrations can be increasingly

differentiated in an explanatory manner. The specific intelligible differentiation of the ultimate stage is generated in the process from the initial stage (17).

12.6 The Principle of Minor Flexibility

The principle of minor flexibility allows that development can pursue the same ultimate goal along different routes. The initial manifold determines very generically what the ultimate goal can be but circumstances can lead a development along any of a set of alternative linked sequences. For instance, men can achieve authentic moral self-transcendence in the decision to commit themselves to deciding consistently in accordance with responsible judgement. But there are many different factors which can influence men to make such a decision, including religious commitment (18).

12.7 The Principle of Major Flexibility

The principle of major flexibility allows for a shift in the ultimate objective of a development. In biology, there is the fact of adaptation. In Freud's depth psychology, there is the fact of sublimation. In cognitional activity, there is the emergence of insight which can lead to further questions changing the focus of inquiry to a different area of data. We shall see that intellectual, moral and total conversion replace an unauthentic with an authentic objective in conscious development (19).

12.8 Definition of Development

In the light of the above principles, Lonergan defines development as:

> "A flexible linked sequence of dynamic and increasingly differentiated higher integrations, that meet the tension

of successively transformed underlying manifolds through successive applications of the principles of correspondence and emergence" (20).

12.9 Examples of Development

We will now briefly illustrate Lonergan's principles od development in four areas.

Firstly, there is the development of the cell. An unstable chemical element easily forms a compound. The compound may be more or less stable and vast aggregates of compounds provide a coincidental manifold of processes that find a higher integration in the cell. The cell is a dynamic integration and through division it duplicates either in reproduction or in growth. In the latter case, there is development as there is an increase in differentiation (21). Thus, the initial manifold becomes ever more intricately patterned in higher integrations: the principle of correspondence repeatedly cancels earlier integrations and the principle of emergence calls forth an ever more differentiated integration.

Secondly, neural development supplies the underlying manifold for psychic development. Lonergan explains:

> "The latter is conditioned by the former but it consists neither in neural tissues nor in neural configurations nor in neural events but in a sequence of increasingly differentiated and integrated sets of capacities for perceptiveness, for aggressive or affective response, for imaginative projects, for memory and for skilfully and economically executed performance" (22).

Thus, while psychic capacities are grounded in the underlying neural manifold, there is a distinction between the two.

Thirdly, in the development of intelligence, otherwise coincidental manifolds of data or images are integrated by insights. The effort to formulate such insights gives rise to further questions which in turn direct attention to further

data and so the cycle of development begins to turn and spiral upwards in a sequence of higher viewpoints through successive applications of the principles of correspondence and emergence (23).

Fourthly, in the case of moral choice, a man can transform not only the environment in which he lives but his own spontaneous living. For living exhibits an otherwise coincidental manifold of possibilities into which a man can introduce a higher system by his own understanding of himself and by his own deliberate choices. Such is Lonergan's view.

Angyal sums up development:

> "Life processes do not merely tend to preserve life but transcend the momentary status quo of the organism, expanding itself continually and imposing its autonomous determination upon an ever increasing realm of events" (24).

1.3 GENETIC METHOD

13.1 The Unified Structure Grounding Development

Firstly, in a plant, in an animal or in man, there is to be affirmed an existing individual unity, according to Lonergan. By central potency, (Aristotle's primary matter), it is individual. By central form, (Aristotle's substantial form), it is an intelligible unity, identity, whole. By central act, (the act of existence), it is existent.

Secondly, besides central potency, form and act there are conjugate (accidental) potencies, forms and acts. Throughout a development, central potency, form and act remain constants, i.e. it is the same individual existing unity that develops organically, psychically, intelligently, reasonably, responsably and spiritually. Therefore, when we study development, we are studying conjugate potency, form and act (25).

Thirdly, conjugate acts are occurrence, events, functioning: for example, the organic acts of intussuception, assimilation and excretion, the psychic acts of perception, conation, imagination and affective response, the intellectual acts of insight and formulation, the rational acts of reflective understanding and judgement, the moral acts of deliberating and deciding. Furthermore the above acts recur and their recurrence is regular. So we can speak of schemes of recurrence. However such regularity is not fixed or rigid as is, for example, the rate of acceleration of falling bodies. When trying to understand the functioning of the organism, the psyche, intelligence, rationality or responsibility, we must think not merely of some single scheme of recurrence but of a flexible circle of ranges of schemes. The same organism, psychic habits, intellectual development, rational development and moral development can result in widely differing operations in different circumstances (26).

Fourthly, conjugate forms are implicitly defined by empirically established explanatory correlations. The conjugate forms of the organism, the psyche, intelligence, rationality and responsibility can be discovered by proceeding from the schemes of organic, psychic, intellectual, rational and moral recurrence to the underlying correlations. One first discovers a regularity of events. One then proceeds to search for an abstract relation that is verified in the events, that implicitly defines the explanatory specification of the events, that fixes the conjugate forms by fixing their relation to one another. It must be remembered however that organic, psychic, intellectual, rational and moral events are recurrent in <u>flexible circles of ranges of schemes</u> and not merely in single schemes (27). Lonergan insists on this point.

13.2 <u>The Process of Development</u>

In the course of time, conjugate forms advance

from generic indeterminacy to specific determination. Consequently the flexible circle of schemes of recurrence both moves and expands. Operations that were impossible or inefficient at an earlier stage now become possible and effective. The infant can neither walk nor talk but the adult has perfected both operations.

Now where the physical scientist searches for single sets of conjugate forms and schemes of recurrence, the psychologist or the anthropologist seeks to determine genetic sequences of conjugate forms and consequent sequences of flexible schemes of recurrence,(according to Lonergan).

Hence whereas classical method is concerned to discover laws in regular events, genetic method is concerned with sequences in which correlations and regularities change(28). Accordingly the principle object of genetic method is to master the sequence itself, to understand the development and so to proceed from the correlations and regularities of one stage to those of the next. As we have seen its heuristic structure lies in the notion of development itself.

13.3 General Procedures of Genetic Method

133.1 The Direction of Development: Differentiation

Development is from generic indeterminacy towards specific perfection. Both the infant and the adult perceive and respond but there is a world of a difference. Increasing specific perfection is a matter of character becoming set, temperament fixed and skills aquired. There is a transition from generic potentiality to specific determination.

133.2 The Mode of Development: Spiral

A sequence of conjugate forms is a sequence of higher integrations of lower manifolds of events whose grouping together would otherwise be a coincidence. This sequence is

intelligible inasmuch as each higher integration modifies the lower manifold of events which it systematizes so as to call forth the next higher integration in the sequence. Thus if the lower manifold of events can be called conjugate potency, the mode of operation is a spiraling operation of potency, form and act. Forms emerge and operations occur in accordance with them and are made possible by them. According to Lonergan, these forms transform the manifold into material for the next higher integration and so on as the spiral proceeds.

133.3 The Field of Development: Finality

Besides the general direction of development and its general mode of operation, there is the field in which it occurs. Metaphysically, it could be called finality. Lonergan describes it as an upward but indeterminately directed dynamism of proportionate being (29). Scientifically, it can be called generalized emergent probability. It is this dynamism which provides the developing organism, psyche, intelligence, rationality or responsibility with an environment in which it can function. As we have seen, it has a twofold flexibility, major (i.e. a change of goal) and minor (i.e. a variety of routes to reach that goal).

13.4 Particular Procedures of Genetic Method

The student of development will not be able to use the particular procedures of physical science based on mathematical measuring. When one mounts to the higher integrations of organism, psyche, intelligence, rationality and responsibility, measuring looses its significance because the higher integration is to a large extent independent of the lower quantities in the lower manifold it systematizes. The student of development must therefore work out his own procedures to suit the particular area he investigates. Thus, Lonergan points out, procedures can vary and develop.

134.1 Organic Development

a) Integration and Operation

Lonergan observes that the sciences which study organic development such as physiology and biology refer to a procedure which reveals a higher integration in an underlying manifold of cells, chemical processes and physical changes. He names this the higher system as Integrator. The higher system is a set of conjugate forms. This set is related to the lower manifold as the conjugates implicitly defined by the correlations which account for additional regularities in the otherwise coincidental manifold (30).

However the organism grows and develops. Thus its higher system is not only integrator but Operator. Not only does it integrate the underlying manifold: it calls forth its own replacement by a more specific and effective integrator. Whereas the higher system as integrator corresponds to a set of conjugate forms or laws of the classical type, the higher system as operator effects a transition from one set of forms or laws to another set. Although this transition may be a regular development, its regularity is not the same as the regularity which obeys classical laws. It is the higher regularity of an emergent trend which conforms to a new and different set of classical laws. In the general case, this operator is what we have called the upward dynamism of proportionate being named finality. It can operate because of instability in the underlying manifold and because of imperfection and therefore inadequacy in the higher integration. Thus the higher integration not only permits but promotes the instability. The generic and rudimentary and undifferentiated character of the higher system can become specific and effective and differentiated.

b) The Law of Effect

There appears to be a general principle of development which Lonergan calls the law of effect. It states that

development takes place along the lines of successful functioning. For example, a tree in a forest shoots out new branches at its top rather than at its sides. This principle can help to specify our operator. Thus the law of effect dictates that the ground of functioning advances to a new ground of functioning when functioning occurs successfully. This specification, though extremely general, gives some determination to the direction of development. It poses further questions, fuller insights and eventually a more scientific understanding of the operator (3I).

134.2 Psychic, Intellectual and Moral Development

Lonergan uses essentially the same heuristic structure in the study of psychic, intellectual and moral development. In the animal, there is psychic development supervening upon organic development. In man, there is moral development supervening upon intellectual, intellectual development supervening upon psychic and psychic development supervening upon organic. There are important differences between the various kinds of development. In the organism, both the underlying manifold of events and the higher systems are unconscious. In intellectual development, both the underlying manifold of sensible presentations and the higher system of insights and formulations are conscious. Likewise in moral development, both the underlying manifold of judgements concerning human living and the higher system of moral choices and decisions are conscious. However in psychic development, the underlying neural manifold is unconscious whereas the supervening higher system is conscious.

Lonergan points out that the higher the level of integration, the greater the freedom from material limitation; the more dominant the dynamic aspect of the operator, the more significant the laws of development and so the fuller the development on the subordinate as well as on the higher levels. Thus organic differentiation reaches its maximum in animals

and psychic differentiation reaches its maximum in man (32).

a) Psychic Development

The proximate underlying manifold of psychic development consists in the events and processes of the nervous system. This system is at once part of the organism and the seat of the manifold of events which have their higher integrations in conscious perceptions and co-ordinated responses.

Psychic development is that higher integration on the move, and the movement is twofold. The 'lateral' movement is an increasing differentiation of the psychic events in correspondence with particular afferent and efferent nerves. The 'vertical' movement is an increasing proficiency in integrated perception and in appropriate response. A study of animal behaviour would reveal a flexible circle of ranges of schemes of recurrence at any stage of a development. These schemes would contain correlations of the type which lead to classical laws. Such study would reveal the higher system as integrator at any given stage of a development. A further study of successive stages of normal and abnormal successions, of similarities and differences of successions in different species and genera, of increasing differentiation, would lead to the data for understanding the nature of the higher system as operator (33). So Lonergan claims.

b) Intellectual Development

There is a parallel development in human intelligence. Here the lower and otherwise coincidental manifold is given by sensible presentations and imaginative representations. According to the principle of correspondence, insights emerge to unify and correlate elements in the sensible flow. Insights lead to the formulation of such unification in concepts, suppositions, definitions, postulates, hypotheses and theories. Furthermore, when such conceptual constructions are examined, applied concretely and tested, they reveal

further questions. Thus whereas the conceptual construction is the higher system as integrator, the emergence of further questions brings about its transition into operator.

Further questions lead to further insights and yet further questions and so a multiplicity of insights accumulates into viewpoints. Lower viewpoints lead to higher viewpoints. Such is the spiral of development which occurs in commonsense or in mathematics or in philosophy, according to differences in the route the spiral takes. Unlike organic and psychic development, intellectual development is very free from material limitation. Furthermore it has an exceptional principle of control: its own capacity for critical reflection (34).

c) Moral Development

There is a further parallel in moral decision and moral choice. Human living exhibits a coincidental manifold of objects of desire, intelligible orders and values into which man can introduce a higher system through his own understanding of himself and through his own deliberate moral choices. Just as decision or choice is the higher system as integrator, so the dynamic exigency for consistency between knowing and doing promoting further deliberation and ever more authentic moral choice, is the higher system as operator. Moral choice can increase in disinterestedness in its response to values and so promote the moral authenticity of individuals and the consequent authenticity of communities (35).

134.3 Integral Personal Development

Since organic, psychic, intellectual and moral development are not independent processes but are interlocked, moral development integrating intellectual development in a higher system, intellectual development integrating psychic, psychic development integrating organic, Lonergan proceeds to reflect on the overall integral development of man. Since each level of development has its own laws and schemes of recurrence and each human action comprises a complex series

of components, physical, chemical, neural, organic, psychic, intellectual-rational and moral, each occurring at its own level, the problem of studying integral human development is extremely complex (36).

a) The Unified Sub-Structure Grounding Development

At any stage in a development, a man is an individual existing unity as we saw when discussing genetic method. This unity is differentiated by physical, chemical, organic, psychic, intellectual-rational and moral conjugates. These conjugates ground the flexible schemes of recurrence which occur in ordinary behaviour, in bodily movement, in interaction with persons and things, in the 'inner' experiences of affectivity, understanding, judgement, decision, choice and commitment. Thus, development is grounded in substance.

b) The Anticipated Law of Effect

When a man develops, he moves from what he was not towards what he may become. Circles of schemes of recurrence are flexible. They shift and expand because neural, psychic, intellectual, rational and moral conjugates pertain to systems on the move: the functioning of the higher integration involves changes in the underlying manifold and these changes in turn call forth a modified higher integration. In accordance with the law of effect, development is in the direction in which it succeeds. However in psychic, intellectual and moral development, there is the anticipated law of effect. It is because one wants to develop that one can ask further questions, discover solutions etc. One can develop skills through functioning. One can develop the moral habit of willingness through repeated decisions and choices. Karen Horney points out that "the ultimate driving force is the person's unrelenting will to come to grips with himself, a wish to grow and to leave nothing untouched which prevents growth" (37).

We shall see that Rogers's actualizing tendency corresponds to Lonergan's anticipated law of effect (38).

c) The Law of Integration

The initiative of development may be organic, psychic, intellectual, moral or external but the development will be sporadic unless the principle of correspondence between the different levels is satisfied. The initiative may be organic and since the organism is upward directed, an organic initiative may call forth psychic images or feelings. So a man sleeps, wakes, eats, seeks shelter, loves and has children. The initiative may be psychic. So there is intersubjectivity, companionship, the sharing of feeling, labour, leisure, achievement and failure. Here, the development is in perceptiveness, in sentiment and in emotional response. The initiative may be intellectual. So a man questions, understands, checks and judges. The initiative may be moral. So a man deliberates, makes a judgement of value, decides, chooses, and acts. The initiative may come from an external source. So the empathic understanding and the unconditional positive regard of a significant other can enable a man to symbolize distorted or repressed feelings in psychotherapy (39).

Development is only initiated when a new scheme of recurrence is established in a man's action, in his choosing and deciding, in his thinking and judging, in his perception and feeling or in the organic background of his action. According to Lonergan,there must be complementary adjustments at other levels. Unless these adjustments come about, development may recede and atrophy or a man may become an uncoordinated group of unrelated and unintegrated schemes of recurrence: his unity and harmony may be destroyed.

Thus, development must be integrated and the law of integration states that development at any level must lead to complementary adjustments and developments at other levels. "The law of integration, then, is a declaration of what is meant by human development", writes Lonergan (40).

d) The Law of Sublation

We have noted that the initiative of a development can occur at any level and that it leads to complementary adjustments at other levels. We must now consider the overall relationship between the various levels of development.

Lonergan introduces Karl Rahner's notion of sublation in order to clarify this relationship. For Rahner, what sublates goes beyond what is sublated. It introduces something new: it puts everything on a new basis. Far from interfering with what is sublated, it includes, preserves and develops it in a fuller and richer context (41).

Thus, moral development sublates intellectual development, intellectual development sublates psychic development, psychic development sublates neural development and neural development sublates organic development. This hierarchical relationship in which higher levels of development include and go beyond lower levels, is what is meant by the law of sublation. It ensures that particular developments become developments in the overall unity of the person (42).

e) The Law of Tension

Development is of the subject in the subject, i.e. it takes place in the subject as limited. However, it is also from the subject as he is to the subject as he is to become, i.e. as he can transcend himself. This opposition between limitation and transcendence reveals itself as a conscious tension.

A man develops according to the principle of finality but his development is not regular, according to a fixed law or habit or scheme or settled spontaneity. On the contrary, development introduces a new law, habit, scheme or spontaneity.

However, development is problematic in man. On the one hand, man as perceiving and feeling, enjoying and suffering, tends to function as would an animal in its environment, i.e., self-centered in a world of stimuli and responses. On the other hand, the same man as inquiring and understanding,

reflecting and judging, deliberating and deciding , choosing and acting, tends through a higher spontaneity, towards a different mode of operation. He seeks to know the universe of being, of which he is but a part. He seeks to bring about the good of value, of which he is but one among a hierarchical order of values.

Thus there is a tension in human consciousness: an opposition between its center in the world of sense tending towards self-centeredness and its center in the world of meaning and value tending towards self-transcendence. This tension grounds what Lonergan calls the law of limitation and transcendence which we have abbreviated as the law of tension (43). All development is development in so far as it goes beyond the initial subject. In the case of man, this going beyond is anticipated in the basic desire for meaning and value. Again all development is development inasmuch as it possesses a point of departure. In the case of man, the concrete point of departure is the self-centered sensitive psyche which tends to orient itself within its surrounding environment. Both the basic desire for meaning and value and the sensitive psyche form one unity which is an identity a whole. It is the same 'I' which on different though related levels of operation, has opposed tendencies towards self-centeredness and self-transcendence. Norbert Luyten underlines this:

> "Or plus encore que la complexité, l'unité de notre être humain s'impose avec l'évidence immédiate d'une expérience fondamentale" (44).

f) The Law of Genuineness

The law of genuineness concerns conscious and unconscious components in a development.

Every development involves a starting-point in the subject as he is, a term in the subject as he is to be and a process from the starting-point to the term. When a development is conscious, there is some apprehension of the

starting-point, the term and the process. However, such apprehensions can be correct or incorrect. If they are correct, then the conscious and unconscious components of the development are operating from the same starting-point along the same path towards the same goal. If they are mistaken then the conscious and unconscious components are operating to some extent in opposition and there is conflict which impedes development. The law of genuineness is conditional. It states that if a development is conscious, then its success demands correct apprehensions of its starting-point, its process and its goal (45).

We have noted the tension in human consciousness due to its center in the world of sense opposing its center in the world of meaning and value. There is tension in human consciousness due to the divergence between one's apprehension one's self as one is and one's apprehension of one's practicable ideal self. Thirdly, there is tension in human consciousness due to the distortion or denial of feelings to awareness (46). One could name other tensions.

Genuineness is the allowing of these tensions into consciousness thereby promoting the harmonious co-operation between conscious and unconscious factors in a development. It refuses to put questions aside, to push problems down, to avoid issues. It admits its failure to face an issue. It seeks to uncover rationalization. It refuses to distort or deny or submerge feeling. It uncovers in the person higher synthesis as operator, which cannot be realized in decisions alone, in judgements alone, in insights alone, in feelings alone, in inner impulses alone: it is a creative response that meets the needs of all of these in a concrete intelligible synthesis; a response in which a man becomes alive, sensitive, feeling, intelligent, reasonable and responsible; a response which carries a man towards self-transcendence (47). Genuineness is difficult to achieve and easy to loose. It is consistent only in the authentic man.

1.4 CONCLUSIONS

We have examined Lonergan's view that development is a flexible linked sequence of dynamic and increasingly differentiated higher integrations.

We then examined his account of genetic method, which aims at grasping the intelligibility in the sequence. We also enumerated the principles which, Lonergan claims, govern the sequence of a development.

Next, we applied his genetic method in the context of organic, psychic, intellectual and moral development. Finally, we applied it to the study of integral personal development.

We noted Lonergan's claim that the procedure of integration and operation enabled him to offer some explanation of the dynamism which governs the sequence in a development (and that he also admits that this procedure, like all procedures for understanding development, can be adapted and improved). Likewise, we saw that he formulates the laws of integration and sublation in order to explain how developments on particular levels promote adjustments on other levels in the subject and how the overall unity of the person is maintained throughout a development.

In our critique, we shall examine Lonergan's approach to the study of development and particularly his formulation of a specific method to pursue that study. We shall contrast his approach with that of Carl Rogers, whose theory of development we shall examine in chapter three.

2. BERNARD LONERGAN AND THE GOAL OF PERSONAL DEVELOPMENT

2.1 PERSONAL DEVELOPMENT AND FREEDOM

We shall now examine the topic of freedom. Carl Rogers allows himself to be forced into the contradiction of affirming the fact of freedom in therapeutic practice (i.e. 'effective' freedom), while denying the possibility of freedom in principle (i.e. of 'essential' freedom) (1). We shall now examine the contrasting approach of Lonergan to the topic.

We shall then explain Joseph de Finance's distinction between vertical and horizontal exercises of freedom. This distinction will enable us to grasp what Lonergan intends by intellectual, moral, affective and total conversion, which are key factors in his theory of personal development. We shall then examine Lonergan's goal of personal development: self-transcendence.

21.1 The Fact of Contingence

We have seen that Lonergan contrasts classical method and its systematic laws with statistical method which seeks intelligibility in the non-systematic (2). He remarks that in recognizing the validity of statistics, science has now abandoned the old determinism and in affirming the existence of the non-systematic, it has established the fact of contingence in the material universe. This does not establish the contingence of human acts i.e. freedom. To account for human contingence, one must undertake a study of the sensitive flow, of

practical understanding, of judgements of value, of decision and of choice. In the coincidental manifolds of sensitive presentations, practical understanding grasps practical courses of action, which rationality reflects upon, reasonableness judges to be of value and moral responsibility decides and chooses. Courses of action are then either concretely realized or not, in a process of higher integration (3).

21.2 The Intelligibility of the Real

To realize the significance of the emergence of courses of action, we must affirm that intelligibility is intrinsic to being and that such intelligibility can be either spiritual or material (4).

According to Lonergan, intelligibility is spiritual when it is an intelligility which is also intelligent. Intelligibility is material, when it is an intelligility which is not also intelligent (5). Whereas material reality is subject to law and is therefore intelligible, spiritual reality is partly leglislative: it creates the laws of the distinctly human level of operations. It is therefore intelligible, not only through subjection to law but also through it's own intelligence This intelligence is manifest through the higher systematization which it imposes on lower levels of being. Thus, systematization is not imposed on spiritual reality as the law of gravity is imposed on material reality. On the contrary, it is generated by practical insight, reflection, evaluation, decision and choice. These activities are governed by a different kind of law.

21.3 The 'Laws' of Spirit

The laws of matter are investigated by empirical scientists, as we have seen (6). When Lonergan affirms that the spirit is leglislative, he means that the spirit creates

intelligible orders that are parallel to the intelligibilities investigated by empirical scientists. However, there are analogous 'laws' of the spirit. These are the principles and norms that govern spirit in the exercise of its legislative function (7). They differ radically from the laws of matter, both in nature and in content. Whereas the laws of matter are abstract and can only be applied by the addition of further non-systematic determinations, the 'laws' of spirit reside in the concrete dynamic structure of cognitional and moral operations (8). The concrete application of these 'laws' is effected through spirit's own operations within the structure. They are not imposed from an external source.

21.4 Moral Contingence

There is a radical difference between the contingence of the act of moral choice and the general contingence of existence and occurrence in the material universe. The latter is contingent, not because it is free, but because it is involved in the non-systematic character of frequency and material individuality. The contingence of the act of moral choice, on the other hand, does not arise from the non-systematic. It arises because choice imposes further intelligibility on an otherwise coincidental manifold of sets of courses of action. It depends on intelligent inquiry, rational reflection and responsible judgements of value. It is a contingent imposition of intelligibility, because moral decision, moral choice and moral action do not necessarily follow true judgements of value. Even when there is only one possible course of action, it is still possible to choose not to act.

Thus, to deny moral contingence is to affirm that moral choice necessarily follows from practical insight and true judgements of value. This contradicts the common experience of a factual divergence between what one actually does and

what one knows one ought to do (9). The fact that one's choices and actions sometimes obey one's true judgements of value, does not justify the conclusion that all one's choices and actions necessarily obey one's true judgements of value: on the contrary, one is aware that this is not always the case.

21.5 Freedom

For Lonergan, freedom is the contingence that arises in the order of spirit: of intelligent understanding, rational reflection, reasonable judgements of value and morally responsible decisions, choices and actions. According to Lonergan, it has a twofold ground. Firstly, its object is a mere possibility. Secondly, its agent is contingent, not only in his existence but in his activity, i.e., in the extension of his reasonable judgements of value to his responsible decisions, choices and actions.

Lonergan notes that the affirmation of freedom is not merely the denial of moral determinism: it is also the affirmation of auto-determinism, as Norbert Luyten points out (10). Thus, it requires an exercise of moral responsibility. An intelligent grasp of a possible course of action does not necessarily mean that it ought to be executed. Critical reflection can uncover mixed motives. A true judgement of value can indicate that it is not a morally good course of action. Moral responsibility can prompt one to decide against executing it. Moral decision, therefore is not just an automatic consequence of the exercise of practical intelligence. It is a new and higher integration that realizes a course of action and in so doing, both exercises free moral responsibility and also constitutes the subject as morally good or evil (11).

21.6 Essential and Effective Freedom

One is essentially free inasmuch as one can grasp

possible courses of action in practical insights, critically reflect upon them, evaluate them and choose to act on one of them. However, one is effectively free to the extent that one is open to grasping, motivating and executing a broader or a narrower range of possible courses of action.

Lonergan points out that a consideration of effective freedom is meaningless, unless essential freedom exists (12). Thus, Rogers's technique of psychotherapy which aims to broaden effective freedom, is a futile exercise unless essential freedom is postulated. We shall see that Rogers falls into the contradiction of affirming effective freedom in clinical practice, while denying the possibility of essential freedom in theory (13).

According to Lonergan, freedom can be effectively limited in a number of ways:

216.1 External Circumstance

Whatever one's external circumstances may be, they effectively curtail the range of possible courses of action and they limit the possibility of enlarging that range. One cannot swim in the Sahara desert.

216.2 The Sensitive Subject

Limitations can arise from one's psychoneural state which is the proximate underlying coincidental manifold integrated by intelligence, reasonableness and responsibility (14). Normally, intellectual and psychoneural development are adapted to one another. But deviations can occur. An unconscious fear of unwanted insights can block the emergence of psychic contents, by repressing from empirical consciousness a scheme which would suggest an insight (15). This blocking is achieved pre-consciously by inhibiting the neural demands for psychic representation (16).

216.3 The Subject as Intelligent

There can be further limitations on effective freedom due to aberrations in intellectual development. An

exclusion of correct insight can arise (17). This is due to the repression and inhibition which we have mentioned. It can lead to a failure in insight and to a consequent exclusion of those further questions which would modify incomplete insights. Thus, insights can degenerate into oversights and an incomplete accumulation of insights can constitute a lopsided viewpoint which effectively limits freedom (18).

Furthermore, intellectual development can be incomplete. One has to struggle to understand and until one has understood, one still has to learn. When one understands more and more, one has a broader base from which to acquire further insights. Courses of action are governed by practical insights. Until one's practical intelligence develops, only a narrow range of possible courses of action will occur to one. This narrowness effectively limits freedom (19).

216.4 The Subject as Moral

Effective freedom can be limited by incomplete moral development. Failure in moral responsibility can allow one to respond intentionally to satisfactions rather than to values. When satisfactions conflict with values, one's freedom may be limited in effect (20).

Furthermore, besides individual moral choices (conjugate acts) there are moral habits (conjugate forms). The overriding moral habit is willingness. Willingness is the state in which external persuasion is not needed to bring one to a responsible moral decision (21). One of the aims of moral development is to reach a state of universal willingness where one decides to choose spontaneously and consistently in accordance with true judgements of value. When moral development is incomplete, willingness is half-hearted and one's freedom is effectively limited. One's performance fails to match one's aspirations (22).

Effective freedom can therefore be limited at all levels in the conscious subject: empirical, affective, intellectual, rational and moral. It can also be limited at the pre-conscious neural level. Nonetheless, these limitations do not amount to a negation of essential freedom in principle.

The existence of essential freedom can be personally verified by reflecting on one's understanding of the data of one's own conscious activities. In so far as one can grasp the dynamic structure of one's own grasping of possible courses of action, one's practical insights, one's critical reflection, one's judgements of value, one's decisions, one's choices and one's consequent action or lack of action, one can weigh this evidence and so personally verify the existence of essential freedom in one's own conscious activities (23).

21.7 Horizontal and Vertical Freedom

The limitation of effective freedom leads us to the distinction between horizontal and vertical exercises of freedom, which Joseph de Finance formulates:

217.1 Horizontal Freedom

A horizontal exercise of freedom is a choice or decision which occurs within an established horizon (24). A horizon is a maximum field of choice from a determinate standpoint. A horizontal exercise of freedom is therefore a choice of means from a determinate standpoint:

> "La volonté est donc envisagée ici selon son appétit de nature, comme un désir éclairé dont l'horizon est le bonheur. Nous proposons d'appeler cette forme de liberté la liberté horizontale. Elle n'implique, en effect, par elle-même, aucune ascension, aucun sursaut" (25)

217.2 Vertical Freedom

A vertical exercise of freedom is a set of judgements and decisions by which one moves from one horizon to another:

> "..... le choix des moyens est dominé par un choix logiquement préalable: le choix de ce que nous voulons être, le choix du plan où nous situons notre Je véritable et, en conséquence, le choix de l'ordre axiologique où nous nous reconnaissons, de la'maxime' pratique que nous adoptons". "Nous appelerons cette forme de liberté, liberté verticale parce que, à la différence de la précédente, elle comporte de soi ascension et descente" (26)

Such a vertical exercise of freedom may mean a deepening or a broadening of the old horizon. But it may also mean an about-face and a new beginning: it may require a repudiation of the old horizon. Such an about-face, a new beginning, is what Lonergan means by conversion (27).

21.8 Freedom and Conversion

The about-face or new beginning which Lonergan calls conversion can be intellectual, moral and affective, total or ecstatic, depending on whether the movement is towards truth, towards value, towards the Transcendent or towards interpersonal truth and interpersonal value.

218.1 Intellectual Conversion

Intellectual conversion involves a vertical exercise of freedom by which one rids one's self of the illusion that knowing is like looking, that objectivity is merely seeing what is there to be seen and that the real is what is 'out-there-now-to-be-looked-at' or 'in-here-now-to-be-looked-at'. According to Lonergan, it is possible to break out of this illusion only by distinguishing the world of immediacy from the world mediated by meaning; by discovering that knowing the world and knowing one's self is a compound activity of

experiencing, understanding and judging. It is only possible to acknowledge the facts about human knowing and so to pronounce the world mediated by meaning to be the real world, to the extent that one can show the process of experiencing, understanding and judging to be a process of self-transcendence. This involves that new beginning, that fresh realization of the nature of knowing, which Lonergan calls intellectual conversion (28).

218.2 Moral and Affective Conversion

Moral conversion changes the criterion of one's choice from satisfactions to values. One gradually arrives at the existential moment when one discovers for one's self that one's choosing affects one's self no less than the choosen or rejected object. One realizes that it is up to each one to decide for himself what he is to make of himself. This is the time for a vertical exercise of freedom. Moral conversion consists in opting for the truly good: for values rather than satisfactions, where values and satisfactions conflict (29).

Affective conversion consists in gradually training one's self to respond to one's affective apprehensions of values rather than to one's affective apprehensions of satisfactions. This is achieved by reinforcement (i.e. by advertence and approval) and curtailment (i.e. by disapproval and distraction).

Neither conversion is easy to achieve. One must uncover and dispel bias. One must increase one's knowledge of human reality. One must cultivate affective responses to values and one has to reexamine one's scales of preference in values. Moral and affective self-transcendence are only achieved after a consistent effort to respond affectively, to decide and to act in accordance with true judgements of value (30).

218.3 Total Conversion

Total conversion consists in being grasped by what Tillich calls 'Ultimate Concern' and what the I4th century author called 'the cloud of unknowing' (3I). It is orientation into mystery: other-worldly falling in love. It demands total and permanent self-surrender, without conditions or reservations. It is a dynamic state that is prior to and the principle of subsequent acts. It is true joy and fulfilment (32). Total conversion is a mode of self-transcendence. It is conversion to a total being-in-love which is the ground of all self-transcendence, whether in the pursuit of truth, in the realization of human values or in the orientation one adopts to the meaning and goal of existence.

218.4 Conversion and Sublation

Conversion may be only intellectual or only moral or only total. When all three are present, it is possible to grasp their relationship to one another in terms of what we have called sublation (33). We saw that what sublates goes beyond what is sublated, while including and preserving it. It develops what is sublated in a fuller and richer context.

So moral conversion goes beyond the value truth, to values in general. It promotes the subject from cognitional towards moral self-transcendence. It sets him on a new level of consciousness but this in no way interferes with his quest for truth, including self-truth. He must first apprehend the real, both in the world and in himself, before he can respond to value.

Total conversion goes beyond moral conversion. The human capacity for self-transcendence is grounded in the unrestricted conscious desire for meaning and value. This capacity is completely fulfilled only when total conversion transforms the subject into a subject-in-love without limits or qualifications. It does not negate the fruits of cognitive or moral conversion. On the contrary, the human pursuit of truth and goodness is included and transformed in the

overall context and purpose of the Transcendent.

Lonergan points out that the order of conversions is not necessarily intellectual, moral and total. Commonly, total conversion to the Transcendent reveals values in their true light and so promotes moral conversion. Similarly, the value truth is highlighted by moral conversion and so it slowly brings about intellectual conversion. The order can therefore be reversed.

218.5 Ecstatic Conversion

Intellectual, moral, affective and total conversion occur within a personal context and so we can refer to them globally as personal conversion.

An analogous vertical exercise of freedom can occur in an interpersonal context which both proceeds from and furthers personal conversion. I can pierce through my initial perceptions, feelings, ideas and judgements concerning another. I can undergo an 'about-face' a new beginning, which takes me out of myself. This means dropping the old perspectives and feelings, ideas and judgements about the other. It demands that I enter a new perspective and a new horizon: the accurate perspective, the present horizon of the other. This 'about-face' ammounts to an interpersonal conversion which I shall name 'ecstatic' (34).

Ecstatic conversion enables me not only to enter into an accurate, appreciating, true, accepting, confirming and loving perspective of the other as he presently is. It also inspires me to grasp in a non-analytic manner, who and what the other is capable of becoming. The intellectual, moral and affective conversion which grounds my knowing and loving the other as he truly is, can also foster his personal conversion towards the self which he is capable of becoming.

Ludwig Binswanger describes this effort to enter the 'Gestalt' or 'world' of another. One must:

> "..... leave out as far as possible all judgements on this individual, be they moral, aesthetic, social,

medical or in any other way derived from a prior point of view, and most of all (one's) own judgement, in order not to be prejudiced by them and in order to direct (one's) gaze at the forms of existence in which this particular individuality is in-the-world" (35).

Rollo May adds that while one participates in the 'Gestalt' of another, one must simultaneously preserve one's own 'Gestalt'. One must avoid being swallowed up by the other (36). Binswanger notes that the effort to rise above one's own perspective and so to enter into that of another, is extremely demanding:

"Love alone, and the imagination originating from it can rise above this single point of regard" (37).

Martin Buber describes what I mean by ecstatic conversion in terms of an effort to 'imagine the real' in another in order to 'make him present':

"Applied to intercourse between men, 'imagining' the real means that I imagine to myself what another man is at this very moment wishing, feeling, perceiving, thinking, and not as a detached content but in his very reality, that is as a living process in this man" (38).

'Imagining the real' in another leads me to 'make him present'. I so enter the other's living situation that something of what he is experiencing, feeling, thinking, loving etc. surges up in myself in a manner that could not otherwise be achieved.

According to Buber, my 'making present' of another induces the process of his inmost self-becoming (39). I confirm him in his being as a man. Furthermore, in breaking through to the other and in knowing him in all his otherness I break through my own solitude in a meeting which transforms both of us:

"It is from one man to the other that the heavenly bread of self-being is passed" (40).

Ecstatic conversion can therefore promote personal conversion and self-transcendence in one's self as well as in the other.

2.2 PERSONAL DEVELOPMENT AND TRANSCENDENCE

We shall now contrast a psychology grounded in transcendence with a psychology grounded in immanence. This will later serve to distinguish Lonergan's goal of personal development from that of Carl Rogers. In addition, we shall elaborate Lonergan's four modalities of self-transcendence: cognitive, moral, affective and total.

22.1 Immanence and Transcendence

Eric Voegelin distinguishes a psychology of orientation from a psychology of motivation:

> "It will be useful to introduce the terms of psychology of orientation and psychology of motivation in order to distinguish a science of the healthy psyche, in the Platonic sense, in which the order of the soul is created by transcendental orientation, from the science of the disorientated psyche which must be ordered by a balance of motivations" (41).

A psychology of motivation depends on an immanentist notion of the human person. It speaks of personal development in terms of achievement, success and self-realization. It tries to order the conscious self by means of a balance of motivations. Voegelin remarks that such is the psychology of the 'modern' man, that is of the man who ".... is intellectually and spiritually disorientated and hence motivated primarily by his passions" (42). Inasmuch as it is grounded in a 'pneumopathological' anthropology, a psychology of motivation is incomplete. It confuses the disease with the 'nature of man' and so its goal of personal development falls short of being fully human.

A psychology of orientation, on the other hand, stresses that order is created in the conscious self by its orientation towards transcendence. It insists that personal

development consists in the gradual achievement of self-transcendence which is the highest form of actualization or realization of self. Søren Kierkegaard depicts this crucial difference between immanence and transcendence:

> "There are many differences - and eternity can surely remove every other difference: but one difference between man and man it cannot remove, the difference of eternity between whether you lived in such a way that there was truth in you, that something higher existed for which you really suffered or whether you lived in such a way that everything turned upon your profit (43).

For a psychology of motivation, personal profit, material or psychological, is the goal of personal development. For a psychology of orientation, the important thing is whether the self can be present to and live under a meaning and value which transcends it. Furthermore, as Kierkegaard points out, full personal development is not possible unless the self relates itself to the Transcendent:

> " .... the self cannot of itself attain and remain in equilibrium and rest by itself, but only by relating itself to that power which constituted the whole relation" (44).

For Kierkegaard, the alternative is a "disrelationship of despair" of the self with itself, which is the characteristic of Voegelin's immanentist man (45).

22.2 Lonergan's Theory of Self-Transcendence

Lonergan examines self-transcendence as the fulfilment of man's basic conscious desire for personal meaning and personal value (46). For Lonergan, personal development is authentic only when it leads to the transcendence of self, where transcendence is somehow a 'getting beyond' self, Likewise for Norbert Luyten, it is this 'getting beyond' self, (dépassement) which confers on man his unique dignity:

"C'est là précisément le statut unique de l'homme, qui fait sa dignité, et n'hésitons pas à le dire, qui lui confie une tâche exaltante, qu'il est le seul à pouvoir accomplir: pétrir ce monde d'intelligibilité ..." (47).

222.1 Cognitive Self-Transcendence

Firstly, the subject, i.e. the conscious human self, is only potentially a subject when he is in a dreamless sleep. Secondly, when he dreams, there is a minimal degree of consciousness by which the self relates to some subjective need or something 'other' (48). Thirdly, the experiencing subject senses perceives, feels and moves about in the world of immediate experience. Fourthly, the intelligent subject questions the data provided by the experiencing subject. He reaches insights which he formulates into concepts. These insights take the subject beyond the narrow world of immediacy into the much larger world mediated by meaning and regulated by value (49).

Lastly, the rational subject goes beyond questions for understanding to questions for reflection. He moves beyond imagination and guesswork, hypothesis and theory and he asks himself has he truly understood. He weighs the evidence for and against the correctness of his insight and only then does he judge what is so.

Thus, the rational subject reaches beyond himself not only to what appears to be so, to what he imagines to be so, to what he thinks to be so, to what he wishes to be so but to what in fact is so, independent of the subject. He reaches the real, the objective. In doing so, he transcends himself cognitively (50) because he reaches objective truth.

The subject not only experiences, understands and judges about a world of objects. He can also know his own knowing and evaluating: he can experience, understand and judge his own experiencing, understanding, judging and deciding (51). Furthermore, he can know the subject who

performs these conscious activities: his own self. He can become consciously aware that his real self is a source of true personal meaning and true personal value. True self-knowledge is the crowning achievement of cognitional self-transcendence (and also its most difficult achievement, as Socrates pointed out).

We noted that intellectual conversion consists in ridding one's self of the illusion that knowing is like looking and in discovering in one's self that knowing is a compound activity of experiencing, understanding and judging. Intellectual conversion is an essential factor in the achievement of full and authentic self-transcendence.

222.2 Moral and Affective Self-Transcendence

The moral subject integrates the rational subject. He asks, not whether this or that is so but whether this or that is worthwhile. He deliberates, evaluates and decides, not only about what best serves his own interests or about what is most to his advantage: he also deliberates about values, about what is not just apparently good but what is truly good. Here consciousness becomes conscience and conscious operations are authentic in the measure that they are responses to values.

According to Lonergan, besides being concerned with values in general, the authentic moral subject is consistent in his response to values in a rising scale of preference. At the lowest point, he responds to the vital values of health and strength. These are preferred to the work and suffering involved in aquiring and restoring them. Next, he is concerned with social values which the good of order regulates through institutions, roles and tasks. He prefers the social values of the community to the vital values of its individual members. Next, he is concerned with cultural values. Besides his operating and cooperating, he must find a meaning and a value in his own living. "It is the function of culture to discover, express, validate, criticize,

correct, develop, improve such meaning and value", according to Lonergan (52). Next, he is concerned with personal values which he prefers to cultural values. Personal value is the person in his self-transcendence: as loving and as being loved, as an originator of authentic value in himself and as a promoter of authentic value in others and in his milieu (53).

Moral self-transcendence becomes affective when the subject falls in love: when he breaks out of his own isolation and spontaneously functions, not just for himself, but for others (54). There are various kinds of being-in-love. There is the love of intimacy. Its milieu is one's family and the circle of one's close friends. There is the love of concern for the welfare of one's fellow man. Its milieu is the local community, the state, the economy and the polity. Finally, there is the love of the Transcendent (55).

Thus, the free moral subject is responsible for his own personal development. Such development is authentic only when the subject learns to transcend himself: when he responds to values rather than to satisfactions and when he chooses a true scale of preference in values. It is the function of moral and affective conversion to replace satisfactions with values in one's intentional responses as well as in one's affective responses. To the extent that such conversion occurs, the moral subject can achieve moral and affective self-transcendence.

222.3 Total Self-Transcendence

The highest modality of self-transcendence is being-in-love with the Transcendent (56). As experienced, it is being-in-love in an unrestricted manner. All love is self-surrender but being-in-love with the Transcendent is being-in-love without limits or qualifications, conditions or reservations. Just as unrestricted questioning is the ground of cognitive self-transcendence and unrestricted

desire for good is the ground of moral self-transcendence, so too the capacity to be in love in an unrestricted manner is the ground of total self-transcendence. The fulfilment of that capacity is an immediate dynamic state of consciousness which results from a total conversion to the Transcendent. As such, it is not mediated by meaning. It is an allowing of one's self to be possessed by an experience of mystery (57).

22.3 Conclusion

We have contrasted a psychology of 'motivation' , which, Voegelin claims, leads to self-centeredness, with a psychology of 'orientation', which, he claims, leads to self-transcendence. We then examined Lonergan's theory of self-transcendence, differentiating cognitive, moral, affective and total self-transcendence. We noted Lonergan's contention that a man actualizes his innate capacities fully and authentically only when he transcends himself.

We may therefore conclude that, in Lonergan's view, the authentic goal of personal development is the achievement of self-transcendence. Thus from this viewpoint, any theory of personal development which fails to take account of man's capacity for self-transcendence in all its modes, will fail to promote complete development. According to the Austrian psychiatrist Victor Frankl, it ignores:

> " .... the fundamental anthropological truth that self-transcendence is one of the basic features of human existence. Only as a man withdraws from himself in the sense of self-centered interest and attention will he gain an authentic mode of existence" (58).

3. CARL ROGERS AND THE PROCESS OF PERSONAL DEVELOPMENT

3.1 ROGERS'S CLIENT-CENTERED THERAPY

Rogers's theory of the process of personal development is the fruit of a lifetime of continual involvement in interpersonal and in group psychotherapy (I).

Rogers was brought up in a fundamentalist American Protestant environment where, according to himself, the atmosphere was narrowly religious. His parents were extremely strict and he was taught to be serious-minded and industrious. He partly attributes his early interest in physical science and in scientific method to these strong background influences (2).

Early in his university studies he deserted the physical sciences to study theology, coming into contact with a wide spectrum of different Christian and oriental viewpoints. However, he soon developed a distaste for the kind of religious teaching which he received. He wrote:

> "I felt that questions as to the meaning of life and the constructive improvement of life for individuals would probably always interest me but I could not work in a field where I would be required to believe in some specific religious doctrine" (3).

He therefore turned to psychology:

> "I wanted to find a field in which I could be sure my freedom of thought would not be limited" (4).

He remarks that from the outset of his career as a psychologist, he began to rely solely on his own experience, rejecting any of the classical models of the human person, Freudian or behaviourist. He became steadily more convinced that the method of the physical sciences was unsuited to a full study

of man: it failed to do justice to conscious subjectivity. Nevertheless his disenchantment with scientific methodology did not quench his desire to formulate his therapeutic experience into a scientific theory (5). Unfortunately the only model of science which he inherited was grounded in logical positivism. Although critical of its shortcomings in the sphere of subjectivity, he did not see fit to repudiate its ideal of exact scientific measurement. Convinced that by the standard of the physical sciences theory in the human sciences was in the infant stage, he was determined to make a beginning in his own field (6). Consequently, as well as formulating the data of his therapeutic experience in a phenomenonological description, he began to search for new ways of measuring changes in personality, especially conscious changes (7).

Rogers's principal contribution to the field of psychotherapy, however, lies not in the area of measurement but in the development of a technique of psychotherapy which is now variously referred to as 'non-directive' or 'client-centered' or simply 'Rogerian'.

Rogers insists that client-centered therapy is not a mere technique: it is a set of personal attitudes which ground the therapist's use of technique (8). It's fundamental tenet is that the most important therapeutic factor in promoting personal growth is the therapist's attitude towards the client. Rogers believes that concern for the dignity and worth of the person is basic to all therapy. This concern should manifest itself in the therapist's respect for the right and capacity of the client to direct himself and to choose the course of his own development. Thus the client-centered therapist avoids dominating the client: he is 'non-directive' (9). He refuses to dissect, diagnose, manipulate or interpret. He allows the client to choose his own values and goals. Rogers observes that the therapist can implement

this kind of respect for others only in so far as such respect has become an integral part of his own personality. He summarizes the attitudinal orientation which he regards as optimal for the client-centered counsellor:

> "Perhaps it would summarize the point being made to say that, by the use of client-centered techniques, a person can implement his respect for others only so far as that respect is an integral part of his personality make-up; consequently the person whose operational philosophy has already moved in the direction of feeling (Rogers's emphasis) a deep respect for the significance and worth of each person is more readily able to assimilate client-centered techniques which help him to express this feeling" (10).

In the following two sections of this chapter, we shall examine the conditions and the process of client-centered therapy. In both cases, we shall structure the presentation as follows. Firstly, we shall set out a formal statement of the theory, expressed in a series of descriptive statements. Secondly, we shall explain these statements in a series of corresponding definitions. Thirdly, we shall clarify and amplify the original statement. Lastly, we shall present parallel accounts of the process of personal development, noting their agreement or disagreement with Rogers's views.

3.2 THE THERAPEUTIC RELATIONSHIP

32.1 Formal Statement

If personal development is to occur in therapy, it is necessary, Rogers states, that the following conditions be present (11):

(i) That two persons are in contact i.e. that they have the minimum essential relationship over a period of time;

(ii) That the first person (the client) is in a state of incongruence, being vulnerable or anxious;

(iii) That the second person (the therapist) is congruent in the relationship;

(iv) That the therapist experiences unconditional positive regard for the client;

(v) That the therapist experiences empathic understanding of the client's internal frame of reference;

(vi) That the therapist's empathic understanding and unconditional positive regard for the client is successfully communicated to the client;

32.2 Definitions

322.1 Contact

According to Rogers, two people are in contact or they have the minimal essential relationship, when each makes a perceived difference in the experiential field of the other (12)

322.2 Incongruence

When a discrepancy exists between the self as symbolized in awareness and the actual experience of the organism, then there is a state of incongruence between self and experience. There is also a state of incongruence when there is a discrepancy between the self as privately symbolized in awareness and the self as publicly presented to others (13).

322.3 Congruence

When self-experiences are accurately symbolized and included in the self-concept, there is a state of congruence between self and experience. Furthermore, when the self-concept is also the self which is revealed to others, there is a state of congruence between the private and the public self. Total congruence, therefore, is a correspondence between self-experience, the self as symbolized privately in

awareness and the self as publicly presented (14).

322.4 Vulnerable

When incongruence between self and experience creates psychological disorganization, anxiety and threat, then the person is vulnerable (15).

322.5 Anxiety

Anxiety refers to a state of uneasiness or tension whose cause is unknown to the client. When this tension enters awareness as a conscious state of incongruence, Rogers refers to it as threat (16).

322.6 To Experience (verb)

To experience is to receive the impact of sensory and physiological events which are happening in the organism. To experience in awareness is to symbolize these sensory and visceral occurrences accurately in consciousness (17).

322.7 Experience (noun)

This term refers to all that is presently happening in the organism which is potentially available to awareness. It includes unconscious as well as conscious events (18).

322.8 Unconditional Positive Regard

If my perception of another's self-experience makes a positive difference in my experiential field, then I am experiencing positive regard for the other. If I perceive the other's self-experiences in such a way that no self-experience is discriminated as more or less worthy of positive regard, then I am experiencing unconditional positive regard for the other. Rogers also refers to unconditional positive regard as 'acceptance' or 'prizing'. Its characteristics are warmth, liking, sympathy and respect (19).

322.9 Empathy

To be empathic with regard to another is to perceive the internal frame of reference of the other with accuracy and with the emotional components and meanings which pertain to it

as if one were the other, without ever loosing sight of this 'as if' qualification. Thus empathy is not a state of emotional identification (20).

322.10 Internal Frame of Reference

The internal frame of reference of the subject is the realm of experience which is available to his conscious awareness at any given moment. It includes the full range of sensations, perceptions, meanings and memories which are available to consciousness. To relate to another without empathy is to relate to the other from an external frame of reference (21).

32.3 Clarification

If a relationship is to be therapeutic, it is necessary that the therapist be unified, integrated and congruent in the relationship. Complete congruence means an accurate matching of what the therapist experiences, what he is aware of and what he communicates. Unless this congruence is present, it is unlikely that the client will develop as a result of the relationship. Sidney Jourard observes:

> " Effective therapists seem to follow this implicit hypothesis: if they are themselves in the presence of the patient, if they let their patient and themselves be, avoiding compulsions to silence, to reflection, to interpretation, to impersonal technique, and kindred character disorders, but instead strive to know their patient, involving themselves in his situation, and then responding to his utterences with their spontaneous selves, this fosters growth" (22).

The therapist must experience a warm caring acceptance for the client which Rogers calls unconditional positive regard. This means that he accepts the client's person unconditionally. He responds to negative, painful and fearful

feelings as much as to positive, pleasant and confident feelings: sometimes he may be unable to do so if he feels threatened by some aspect of the client's feelings.

Rogers also refers to unconditional positive regard as 'prizing'. He points out that it is the fact that the therapist values or 'prizes' the whole person of the client, (the fact that the therapist feels and communicates an unconditional positive regard for the experiences of which the client is frightened as well as for the experiences about which the client is pleased) which seems to be the most potent element in the therapeutic process. Victor Frankl agrees:

> "What is important, apparently, is the human relationship between the doctor and the patient: the personal encounter or in Jaspers's term, the 'existential communication', seems to matter" (23).

It is also necessary that the therapist should experience an accurate understanding of the client's world as experienced from within. He must understand the client's world as if it were his own without ever ignoring the 'as if' qualification. Rogers describes this kind of understanding as 'empathic'. The therapist can sense the client's anger, fear or confusion without allowing his own anger, fear or confusion to become bound up with it. He can move about freely in the client's world, communicating his understanding of what the client is clearly aware as well as clarifying meanings in the client's experience of which the client himself is only dimly aware. His response always corresponds to the client's mood and his tone of voice, gestures and facial expressions convey his ability to share the client's feelings (24).

Finally, it is necessary that the client should experience and be consciously aware of the therapist's congruence, prizing and empathy. It is not enough that these attitudes be present in the therapist: he must successfully communicate them to the client (25).

32.4 Martin Buber and the Therapeutic Relationship

Martin Buber's I-Thou relationship is very similar to Rogers's therapeutic relationship (26). Where Rogers speaks of 'contact' as the first characteristic of the relationship, Buber speaks of a twofold movement. The first movement is a 'primal setting at a distance'; the second, is 'entering into relation' (27). One can only enter into relation with what has been set at a distance, with what has become an independent opposite. However, it is only for a man that an independent opposite exists. Only a man can enter into a true relation with another man. When he fails to do so, the distance thickens and he 'experiences' or 'uses' the other as an 'It', i.e. as an object rather than as a subject (28).

Like Rogers, Buber repudiates the subject-object relationship (the I-It relationship) as unhelpful in therapy. A therapist treats a client as 'It' when he analyses him according to a set of pre-formulated categories. Buber believes that such an approach fails to grasp the wholeness in a man. It treats him as a unity made up of parts and analyses him in terms of these parts. However, it fails to restore his unity (29).

In a true subject-subject relationship (an I-Thou relationship), a man enters into a full relationship with another. Two people 'happen' to each other and according to Buber, there is an essential remainder which is common to both of them yet beyond the sphere of each. He calls this the 'sphere of the between' (das Zwischenmenschliche). Here a man takes his stand in a real relation with another man: he addresses him as Thou and the ensuing relationship is mutual, direct, present and intense.

Corresponding somewhat to Rogers's distinction between congruence and incongruence there is Buber's distinction between 'being' and 'seeming'. 'Being' proceeds from

what one really is; 'seeming' proceeds from what one wishes to appear to be. For Buber, the choice between 'being' and 'seeming' is fully conscious and so deliberate. For Rogers, the choice between congruence and incongruence may be conscious or unconscious. If one is referring to the correspondence between what is unconsciously experienced and what is symbolized in awareness, then the choice between congruence and incongruence is not a conscious one. If one is referring to the correspondence between what is symbolized in awareness and what is consciously communicated to others, then the choice is obviously a deliberate one. Both Rogers and Buber agree that when incongruence or 'seeming' ammounts to a deliberate lie, then the true helping relationship is destroyed (30).

Corresponding to Rogers's 'unconditional positive regard' there is Buber's acceptance. According to Buber, every true relationship between persons begins with 'acceptance':-

> "By acceptance I mean being able to tell or rather not to tell but only to make it felt to the other person that I accept him just as he is" (31).

Unlike Rogers, Buber distinguishes acceptance from what he calls 'confirmation'. In a public dialogue with Rogers in 1957, Buber insisted that not merely acceptance but confirmation is necessary in a helping relationship:

> "Acceptance is not yet what I mean by confirming the other .... Confirming means first of all accepting the whole potentiality of the other and making even a decisive difference in his potentiality .... I not only accept the other as he is but I confirm him, in myself and then in relation to this potentiality that is meant by him and it can now be developed, it can evolve, it can answer the reality of life" (32).

Confirming the other, therefore, means helping him to struggle against himself. He trusts in the therapist who

provides a ground for his life which has lost its base. because of this trust, he can make an effort to grow. As we shall see when we discuss Buber's theory of polarity, confirming means strengthening the positive pole against the negative pole in the growing person (33).

Abraham Maslow agrees with Buber's distinction between acceptance and confirmation. He speaks of it in terms of 'therapeutic dissociation' (34). On the one hand, the therapist must experience the 'Weltanschauung' of the client in a genuine I-Thou encounter. On the other hand, he must implicitly non-accept him since he is trying to help him to grow towards something which he has not yet achieved.

Although Buber stresses confirmation as against mere acceptance, he nevertheless adopts an essentially 'non-directive' approach in a helping relationship. He insists that all genuine relationship means acceptance of otherness. The true helper does not analyse or evaluate or impose himself on another. He addresses the other as Thou and he allows the potentiality of the other to unfold through the meeting. Buber contrasts the propagandist with the educator:

> "The propagandist who imposes himself, does not really believe even in his own cause, for he does not trust it to attain its effect of its own power without his special methods ..... The educator, who unfolds what is there, believes in the primal power which has scattered itself and still scatters itself in all human beings, in order that it may grow up in each man in the special form of that man. He is confident that this growth needs at each moment only that help which is given in meeting and that he is called to supply that help" (35).

Corresponding to Rogers's empathic understanding of the client's inner frame of reference, there is what Buber calls 'imagining the real' in another (36). As we have seen in our discussion of ecstatic conversion, 'imagining the real' means imagining what another man is at this moment wishing,

feeling, perceiving and thinking, not as a detached content but as a living process:

> " .... it means to perceive the dynamic center which stamps his every utterance, action and attitude with the recognizable sign of uniqueness" (37).

'Imagining the real' in another is not mere emotional fantasy or sympathy. It is a bold swinging into the life of the other demanding the most intense stirring of one's being (38).

Buber disagrees with Rogers that the therapeutic relationship can be fully mutual or reciprocal. Rogers writes:

> "I am able to see this individual as he is in that moment and he really senses my understanding and acceptance of him. And that, I think, is what is reciprocal and is perhaps what produces change" (39).

Buber believes that the therapist must practise 'inclusion' (Umfassung) (40). He must live the meeting again and again not merely from his own end but also from that of the client. However, he must not allow the client to practise a corresponding 'inclusion', i.e. to experience the relationship from the viewpoint of the therapist. Buber believes that if this occurs, the relationship is fundamentally altered into a friendship

The therapist's non-reciprocal practice of 'inclusion' does not mean that he treats the client as an object, as an 'It'. The therapeutic encounter remains an I-Thou relationship based on mutuality and trust. According to Buber, just as all real living is meeting, so too all true healing takes place through meeting. He declares that if the therapist is satisfied to analyse the client then:

> " .... he may be successful in some repair work. At best he may help a soul which is diffused and poor in structure to collect and order itself to some extent. But the real matter, the regeneration of an atrophied personal center, will not be achieved. This can only be done by one who grasps the buried latent unity of

the suffering soul with the great glance of the doctor" (41).

Lastly, Buber agrees with Rogers that the client must know that he is understood or prized or made present by the therapist. True personal growth is accomplished:

> " .... pre-eminently in the mutuality of the making present - in the making present of another self and in the knowledge that one is made present in his own self by the other ...." (42).

32.5 Abraham Maslow and the Growth Relationship

Maslow distinguishes the growth-orientated person from the deficiency-orientated person. The former has sufficiently satisfied his basic need for security, belongingness, love, respect and self-esteem. He is motivated primarily by his desire to actualize himself. Maslow variously defines self-actualization as an ongoing realization of one's capacities, as a fuller acceptance of one's self and an increasing tendency towards a unified integration of personality (43).

Contrasting with the growth-orientated person there is the deficiency-orientated person. According to Maslow, the latter lacks an adequate feeling of security, belongingness, love, respect and self-esteem. Unlike the growth-orientated person who has adequately satisfied these needs, the deficiency-orientated person is excessively dependent on other people's affection to fulfil his needs (44).

Like Rogers's therapist who shows unconditional positive regard for his client, Maslow's growth-orientated person shows 'Being-love' for another. 'Being-love is unneeding and unselfish. It is admiring and non-possessive. It is independent, autonomous, unjealous, unthreatened and disinterested. It is altruistic, generous and fostering. It is eager to help the other to actualize himself and it is proud of his triumphs. It is end rather than means. Maslow declares:

"I may say that B-love, in a profound but testable sense, creates the partner.... it gives him self-acceptance, a feeling of love-worthiness, which permits him to grow" (45).

Parallel to Rogers's empathic understanding of the client, there is Maslow's 'Being-cognition', i.e. cognition of the being of another. He distinguishes this from 'Deficiency-cognition', i.e. cognition which compares, judges, approves and uses the other. The 'Being-cognizer' is non-comparing, non-evaluating and non-judgemental. He can grasp the hidden potential in another. He is acutely and penetratingly perceptive. Maslow remarks:

"The good therapist must be able to listen in the receiving rather than taking sense, in order to be able to hear what is actually said rather than what he expects to hear or demands to hear" (46).

The 'Being-cognizer' attends to the other as intrinsically valuable. He is fascinated by him and he experiences feelings such as awe, wonder, amazement, reverence, humility and exaltation towards him. He is unmotivated, desireless, self-transcending and self-forgetful. He is passive rather than active. He experiences a choiceless, desireless awareness of the other - a sort of 'gazing' (47). Maslow remarks that in many ways the 'Being-cognizer' is godlike: he is all-loving, all-forgiving, all-accepting, all-admiring, all-understanding, all-amused and all-bemused (48).

32.6 Complacency and Concern in Aquinas

Parallel to Buber's distinction between acceptance and confirmation, there is the distinction between complacency and concern which Frederick Crowe documents in the writings of St. Thomas Aquinas. He finds two quite distinct yet complimentary kinds of love in Aquinas's thought. In the first case, love is passive and quiescent, i.e. complacent. In the

second case, love is active and tends towards an end, i.e. concerned (49). (In passing, Crowe also mentions a third sense of love in Aquinas: the love of 'gaudium').

Crowe claims that for St. Thomas, the first act of willing is not an impulse to a term, but is itself a term. That is to say, willing in this first sense is the end of a process, a coming to rest. It is a consent in the good. It corresponds to Rogers's prizing and to Buber's acceptance. It is what Rollo May describes as 'philia':

> "Philia is the relaxation in the presence of the beloved which accepts the other's being as being; it is simply liking to be with the other, liking to rest with the other, ... Philia does not require that we do anything for the beloved except accept him, be with him and enjoy him" (50).

According to Crowe, a further sense of willing in Aquinas's writings is a tendency towards a term. It is 'intentio boni', an 'inclinatio'. It is a transition from passivity to activity. It adverts to what is lacking or to what is not yet and it tries to bring about or create what ideally could be. It moves from complacency to concern, in Crowe's language, from 'complacentia' to 'inclinatio' in the language of Aquinas, (and later to the 'quies' which is a 'gaudium'). Just as Buber insists that the therapist must go beyond acceptance to confirmation and 'making present', Crowe notes that for Aquinas, besides complacency there is concern. In Rollo May's perspective, 'philia needs 'agapé':

> "Philia in turn needs agapé. We have defined agapé as esteem for the other, the concern for the other's welfare beyond any gain that one can get out of it; disinterested love, typically the love of God for men" (51).

32.7 Conclusion

We have described Rogers's therapeutic relationship.

We noted that the therapist and the client must be in contact; that the therapist must be congruent in the relationship; that he must experience unconditional positive regard or acceptance towards the client; that he must achieve an empathic understanding of the client's internal frame of reference; that the client must be consciously aware of the therapist's positive regard and empathic understanding. Lastly, we saw that Buber, Crowe, and May make a further important distinction which Rogers rejects: they distinguish two different but related kinds of positive regard, one of which is passive, called acceptance or complacency or 'philia', the other of which is active, called confirmation or concern or 'agapé'.

Rogers asserts that the therapeutic process can be initiated only when these conditions are present and to the degree in which they are present.

3.3 THE THERAPEUTIC PROCESS

33.1 Formal Statement

When the conditions mentioned in 32.I are fulfilled over a period of time, the following process of change occurs in the client (52):

(i) The client is increasingly free in expressing his feelings;

(ii) His expressed feelings have increasing reference to the self;

(iii) He increasingly differentiates between the various objects of his feelings and perceptions and his experiences are more accurately symbolized;

(iv) His expressed feelings increasingly refer to the incongruence between some of his experiences and his concept of self;

(v) Because of the therapist's unconditional positive regard, he is able to experience in awareness the threat of such incongruence;

(vi) He experiences fully in awareness, feelings which have hitherto been distorted or denied to awareness;

(vii) His concept of self becomes reorganized to assimilate these hitherto distorted or denied feelings;

(viii) Since his experience is now less threatening, his concept of self becomes increasingly congruent with his experience and he does not distort or deny feelings in awareness;

(ix) He becomes increasingly able to experience the therapist's unconditional positive regard without threat;

(x) He increasingly feels positive self-regard;

(xi) He increasingly experiences himself as the locus of evaluation;

(xii) He reacts to experience less in terms of his conditions of worth and more in terms of the organismic valuing process;

(xiii) He experiences in awareness the actualizing tendency of the organism and this tendency becomes the criterion of the organismic valuing process;

(xiv) As his concept of self develops, there is an increase in self-actualization.

33.2 Definitions

332.I Feeling

Feeling denotes an emotionally tinged experience together with its personal meaning (53).

332.2 Self-Experience

Self-experience refers to anything in the phenomenal

field which is discriminated as 'I' or 'me'. In general self-experiences are the raw material from which the organized self-concept is formed (54).

332.3 Self, Self-Concept, Self-Structure

These terms refer to the organized 'Gestalt' composed of perceptions of the characteristics of 'I' or 'me', together with the perceptions of the relationships of 'I' or 'me' to others and to life in general. It includes the values attached to these perceptions. The self is thus a fluid changing 'Gestalt' which is available to awareness. Rogers employs the term'self-concept' to refer to the client's awareness of himself whereas he uses the term 'self-structure' to indicate the same 'Gestalt' from an external frame of reference. (The term 'Ideal Self' denotes the self-concept which the client would most like to possess) (55).

332.4 Awareness, Symbolization, Consciousness

These terms refer to the same phenomenon. Consciousness or awareness is the symbolization of some portion of experience by means of a (symbolic) image, i.e. an image which refers to some real or imaginary object. Such images usually arouse or are aroused by feelings (56).

332.5 Availability to Awareness

When an experience can be freely symbolized without denial or distortion, then it is available to awareness (57).

332.6 Accurate Symbolization

When the symbols which constitute our awareness match or correspond to the 'real' experience, then experiences are said to be accurately symbolized in awareness (58).

332.7 Threat

Threat is the state of anxiety which exists when an experience is perceived or anticipated as incongruent with the concept of self (59).

332.8 Distortion in Awareness, Denial to Awareness

Material which is inconsistent with the concept of self cannot be freely admitted to awareness. According to Rogers, as soon as an experience is dimly perceived as incongruent with the self-concept, the organism reacts to distort the meaning of the experience, thus rendering it consistent with the self-concept. Alternatively, the organism may deny the experience to awareness if the threat is too great (60).

332.9 Positive Self-Regard

This term is used to denote a positive satisfaction which has become associated with a particular self-experience or a group of self-experiences, where such satisfaction is independent of the positive regard of others. When a person perceives himself in such a way that no self-experience is discriminated as more or less worthy of positive regard than any other, then he is experiencing unconditional positive self-regard (61).

332.10 Locus of Evaluation

This term indicates the source of evidence for values. When that source is within the person himself, the locus of evaluation is internal. When the source of evidence lies in the judgements of value of others, then the locus of evaluation is external (62).

332.11 Conditions of Worth

The self-structure is characterized by a condition of worth when a self-experience or a set of related self-experiences is either avoided or sought solely because the person discriminates it as being more or less worthy of self-regard. A condition of worth arises when the positive regard of a significant other is conditional i.e. when the significant other prizes the person in some respects but not in others. This selective positive regard is internalized in conditions of worth (63).

322.12 Organismic Valuing Process

This term denotes an ongoing process where values are not fixed, where experiences are being accurately symbolized and where experiences are continually being revalued in terms of the satisfactions which they afford the organism (64).

322.13 Actualizing Tendency

For Rogers, this term denotes the inherent tendency of the organism to develop all its capacities in ways which either maintain or enhance the organism. This basic actualizing tendency is the only postulate in Rogers's theoretical system (according to himself) (65).

322.14 Self-Actualizing Tendency

This term refers to the general actualizing tendency of the organism when it actualizes that portion of its experience which is consciously symbolized as the self.(66).

33.3 Clarification

If the conditions described in 32.I are realized, i.e. if the client perceives the therapist as congruent, as showing unconditional positive regard for him and as understanding him with empathy, then the above process will take place: the client will move away from a static rigid functioning towards a fluid changing functioning.

In the following paragraphs I shall clarify this process indicating the operation of Lonergan's principles and laws in LARGE TYPE.

As a result of the therapeutic process, the client gradually increases his awareness of his experiences and feelings. He becomes progressively more capable of differentiating the objects of these experiences and feelings and thus he is able to symbolize them more accurately in awareness (according to the PRINCIPLES OF CORRESPONDENCE AND EMERGENCE) (67). As he does so he becomes more aware of the incongruence between

his concept of self and these newly symbolized experiences and feelings (contradicting the PRINCIPLE OF CORRESPONDENCE) (68). Hitherto, these experiences and feelings have been distorted or denied to awareness, being incompatible with the concept of self. This awareness of incongruence is anxious or threatening (as a result of the LAW OF TENSION) (69). Consequently, the client must reorganize his concept of self, (higher system as OPERATOR), to include the experiences and feelings which have previously been distorted or denied to awareness (as the PRINCIPLE OF CORRESPONDENCE requires) (70). This reorganization of the concept of self (higher system as INTEGRATOR), brings about increasing congruence between the self and the now-symbolized experiences and feelings. Furthermore it allows him to symbolize new experiences and feelings without distortion or denial (in accordance with the LAW OF GENUINENESS). It continually modifies the concept of self (INTEGRATION AND OPERATION), in order to include these new experiences and feelings (as the PRINCIPLES OF EMERGENCE AND CORRESPONDENCE demand) (71).

The client is increasingly able to experience the unconditional positive regard of the therapist without threat and so he increasingly feels unconditional positive self-regard. Consequently, the locus of evaluation becomes internal and he is able to evaluate more in terms of the organismic valuing process and less in terms of his conditions of worth.

Trust in the organismic valuing process leads to a greater awareness of the actualizing tendency of the organism (or the PRINCIPLE OF FINALITY) (72). This actualizing tendency becomes the criterion of evaluation and of choice. The client experiences satisfaction in behaviour which maintains or enhances the organism both in the immediate present as well as in the long range (in accordance with the LAW OF EFFECT) (73). Furthermore, as well as the actualizing tendency in the organism there is a harmonious actualization of the self, as a result of the development in the self-concept (in accordance

with the ANTICIPATED LAW OF EFFECT) (74).

Rogers analyses the various developments in therapy as processes on a number of continua. The client moves from wherever he may be on each continuum towards its upper end (in accordance with the PRINCIPLE OF DEVELOPMENT) (75). Initially, there are a number of seperate continua but they gradually merge as the process continues, (under the influence of the LAW OF SUBLATION) (76). Rogers explains:

> "In general, the process moves from a point of fixity, where all the elements and trends described above are seperately discernible and seperately understandable, to the flowing peak moments of therapy in which all these threads become inseperably woven together. In the new experiencing with immediacy which occurs at such moments, feeling and cognition interpenetrate, self is subjectively present in the experience, volition is simply the subjective following of a harmonious balance of organismic direction. Thus, as the process reaches this point the person becomes a unity of flow, of motion. He has changed, but what seems most significant, he has become an integrated process of changingness" (77).

As we shall see when discussing Rogers's goal of personal development and when examining the outcomes of his basic encounter group, process and goal coincide in Rogers's philosophy of development: the goal of development is to be process, 'to become an integrated process of changingness'.

33.4 The Actualizing Tendency as Postulate

Rogers emphasizes that the actualizing tendency is the only postulate in his theory of personal development. However, there is very wide agreement among growth psychologists about the validity of postulating such a dynamic tendency in human personality. We shall note the views of just a few of these to validate Rogers's postulate.

We have seen that by 'actualizing tendency' Rogers means an inherent capacity in the organism to develop its capacities in ways which maintain or enhance its functioning. Angyal's description of this tendency is very similar:

> "Life is an autonomous dynamic event which takes place between the organism and the environment. Life processes do not merely tend to preserve life but transcend the momentary status quo of the organism, expanding itself continually and imposing its autonomous determination upon an ever increasing realm of events" (78).

Gordon Allport observes this tendency in the process of becoming of personality. This process:

> " .... is governed by a disposition to realize all its possibilities, i.e., to become characteristically human at all stages of development" (79).

He speaks of this disposition as a striving of the 'proprium' (a term almost synonymous with Rogers's 'self') and he contrasts 'propriate striving' with those theories of motivation which stress homeostasis and tension reduction (80).

In 1954, Abraham Maslow publishes a survey of all the evidence which lead him to postulate a self-actualizing tendency. He comments:

> "We can certainly now assert that at least a reasonable, theoretical and empirical case has now been made for the presence within the human being of a tendency toward, or need for a growing in a direction that can be summarized in general as self-actualization .... and specifically as growth toward each and all of the sub-aspects of self-actualization, i.e., he has within him a pressure toward unity of personality, toward spontaneous expressiveness, toward full individuality and identity, toward seeing the truth rather than being blind, toward being creative, toward being good and a lot else" (81).

For Maslow, self-actualization means realizing "fuller and fuller being" and by this he means realizing the good of value (82).

Maslow's self-actualizing tendency and Rogers actualizing tendency both express what Lonergan means by the principle of finality (83): the upward but indeterminately directed dynamism of proportionate being. In the context of personal development, Lonergan speaks of the principle of finality in terms of a pure detached and unrestricted desire to know and to choose in accordance with true judgements of value (84).

For Martin Buber, self-actualization and self-realization are secondary: the realization of the sphere of the 'between' takes priority. It is in true dialogue that the self realizes or actualizes itself:

> "The dynamic glory of being a man is first bodily present in the relation between two men each of whom in meaning the other also means the highest to which this person is called, and serves the self-realization of this human life as one true to creation without wishing to impose on the other anything of his own realization" (85).

We may conclude that there is considerable support for the existence of a basic actualizing tendency within the human organism and within the conscious self, as Maslow's survey claims to have established.

33.5 Conclusion

We have examined the process of personal development which occurs in Rogerian therapy, noting its various aspects: feelings become more accurately symbolized in awareness; self-structure is more congruently reorganized to assimilate previously distorted or denied feelings; greater congruence diminishes the threat of the therapist's positive regard and so promotes positive self-regard. Throughout the process, we noted how Lonergan's principles and laws of development are operative.

Furthermore, we saw that as the locus of evaluation

becomes more organismic, personal development is guided by an innate dynamism which Rogers calls the 'actualizing tendency of the organism' and which is a manifestation of what Lonergan calls the principle of finality.

Lastly, we observed that for Rogers, the process of therapy is optimal when the client becomes a unity of flow. Not only does he change: he becomes an "integrated process of changingness" (86).

4. CARL ROGERS AND THE GOAL OF PERSONAL DEVELOPMENT

4.1 OUTCOMES OF THE THERAPEUTIC PROCESS

We shall examine Rogers's goal of personal development in two sections.

In the first section, we shall describe the immediate outcomes of the therapeutic process, dwelling on Rogers's theory of the organismic valuing process. We shall also discuss the role of tension in the achievement of personal development.

In the second section, we shall describe the ideal outcome of Rogers's therapy: the 'fully-functioning' person. We shall note the similarity between Rogers's fully-functioning person and Maslow's self-actualizing person and how Frankl's self-transcending person differs from both of them. Lastly, we shall consider Rogers's paradoxical account of freedom and determinism.

41.1 Formal Statement

The following statement concerns those outcomes of the therapeutic process which Rogers declares to be relatively permanent (1). He notes that:

(i) The client is more congruent, more open to his experience and less defensive;

(ii) He has less need to distort or to deny his experience to awareness;

(iii) He is consequently more realistic in his perceptions of self and of others;

(iv) He continually reorganizes his self-concept to include new experiences;

(v) As a result of increased congruence between self and experience, he is less vulnerable to threat;

(vi) As a consequence of less distortion and denial, his perception of his ideal self is more realistic and more achievable;

(vii) As a consequence of the congruence between self-experience, self-concept and ideal self, tension is reduced;

(ix) He has increased positive self-regard and he can experience increasing positive regard for others;

(x) He perceives the locus of evaluation as residing within himself, i.e. in the organismic process;

(xi) He tends to direct his actions according to the organismic valuing process;

41.2 Definitions

412.1 Defence

Defence is the response of the organism to threat. It's aim is to maintain the current self-structure through distortion and denial (2).

412.2 Openness To Experience

This term denotes the manner in which an internally congruent person meets new experience (3).

412.3 Vulnerability

Vulnerability refers to the state of incongruence between the self-structure and self-experience when it is desired to emphasise the potentialities of this state for creating psychological disorganization (4).

412.4 Ideal Self

The term ideal self denotes the self-concept which the client would most like to possess (5).

41.3 Clarification

Firstly, the outcomes of the therapeutic process indicate that, as a result of increased congruence and increased openness to experience, the client reorganizes his self-structure in a more realistic manner. According to Rogers, the self now tends to be fluid, to be process and to be whatever is happening in the organism.

Secondly, greater congruence and more openness encourage the client to formulate a more realistic concept of his ideal self. As a result of his growth in therapy, he is more determined to achieve this self.

Thirdly, Rogers observes that congruence between self-experience, the self-concept and the ideal self lead to an overall reduction in tension (6). Nonetheless, Rogers agrees with Maslow that 'adjustment', 'reduction in tension', 'homeostasis' or 'equilibrium' are inadequate as goals of personal development. He emphasises that the self continually strives to actualize itself by progressively achieving the ideal self in accordance with the organismic valuing process (7).

41.4 Rogers's Organismic Valuing Process

Rogers describes the functioning of the organismic valuing process in the client. It is the allowing of:

> " .... his total organism, his conscious thought participating, to consider, weigh and balance each stimulus, need and demand and its relative weight and intensity. Out of this complex weighing and balancing he is able to discover that course of action which seems to come closest to satisfying all his needs in the situation, long range as well as immediate needs" (8).

For Rogers, reliance on the organismic valuing process is what is required to fulfil Søren Kierkegaard's phrase, "to be that self which one truly is" (9). In other words the Rogerian aim is to be that self which one truly is organismically (10). To the extent that the client is open to all of his experiences, feelings and impulses, together with his memories of past experiences, he can have a relatively accurate perception of the complexity of the situation and so he can evaluate it. Rogers remarks that the organismic valuing process bears strong resemblences to the infant's way of valuing, in its immediacy. However, to infant immediacy, the adult adds recollection of the past and projection into the future.

In an article entitled "Toward a Modern Approach to Values", Rogers indicates the value directions which his clients tend to take as they increasingly trust in the total organism (11). On the one hand, pretence is negatively valued; the compelling feeling 'I ought to do or to be this' is negatively valued; pleasing others for its own sake is negatively valued: On the other hand, being real is positively valued; self-direction is positively valued; the client's self, his feelings, his experiences are positively valued; being a process is positively valued; deep relationships are positively valued. More recently, Rogers writes:

> "I find it significant that when individuals are prized as persons, the values they select do not run the full gamut of possibilities .... I dare to believe that when the human being is inwardly free to choose whatever he deeply values, he tends to value those objects, experiences and goals which contribute to his own survival growth and development ...." (12).

He remarks that instead of following a universal value system which is imposed by some group 'out there', the client discovers the possibility of following universal value directions which emerge within the experience of his own organism (13).

We shall discuss Rogers value system in our critique.

Meanwhile, it is important to note that when Rogers speaks of 'experiencing', he appears to concentrate on sensory experiencing and feeling. Although he occasionally mentions 'conscious thought' and 'choice', their function seems to be to recall how former courses of action satisfied or failed to satisfy experiential and affective needs and so to 'choose' a present course of action which would satisfy similar needs (14). He neglects to integrate the satisfaction of these experiential and affective needs into the satisfaction of the overall human need which is much wider. Though it sublates affectivity and experience, the overall human need is guided by the basic desire for personal meaning and personal value.

41.5 Maslow's Deficiency and Growth-Value Processes

Maslow distinguishes between deficiency values and growth values. He agrees with Rogers that some values can be 'uncovered' in therapy but he insists that there are other values which are created or chosen by the conscious subject. These values are not of a biological origin but rather tend to be developed in an intellectual or moral, personal or social context (15).

Deficiency values include the basic needs for security, belongingness, love, respect and self-esteem. Growth values consist in the ongoing actualization of one's potentialities, the fuller understanding and acceptance of one's own person and the tendency to bring about personal unity and integration. Thus the satisfaction of deficiency needs does not lead to a state of equilibrium: it promotes the emergence into consciousness of higher needs.

Like Rogers, Maslow stresses openness to experience. He recognizes that the organism is the source of those values which can be 'uncovered' or 'discovered' in therapy. However, he insists that these are not the only values. He points to

the existence of higher values which are chosen or created by the subject: personal values, intellectual values, social values and religious values.

Maslow criticizes Rogers and the existential therapists for overemphasizing 'uncovering' and 'discovering the self in therapy and undervaluing 'choosing' and 'creating' the self through conscious decisions (16). Nevertheless, he admits that the possibility of choosing growth values rests on the satisfaction of deficiency needs. He also admits that 'uncovering' therapy fosters growth values:

> "For instance, in the long run, uncovering therapy lessens malice, fear, greed, etc., and increases love, courage, creativeness, kindness, altruism, etc., leading us to the conclusion that the latter are 'deeper' more natural and more intrinsically human than the former ...." (17).

He points out that if deficiency needs are not satisfied, there is a danger of what he calls "pseudo-growth by bypassing the ungratified need" (18).

Maslow declares that an attempt to formulate a naturalistic system of values by means of an empirical description of human tendencies (such as Rogers attempts) must discover:

> " .... where he (i.e. man) is heading, what is his purpose in life, what is good for him and what is bad for him, what will make him feel virtuous and what will make him feel guilty, why choosing the good is often difficult for him and what the attractions of evil are" (19),

He observes that while "the group of thinkers who have been working with self-actualization" (including Rogers) exhort a man to actualize himself by looking for the sources of his action in his own deep inner nature, they do not sufficiently warn him that:

> " .... most adults don't know how to be authentic and

that if they 'express' themselves, they may bring catastrophe not only upon themselves but upon others as well" (20).

He accuses these thinkers of being remiss in several respects. He says that they have implied that " .... if you emit action from within, it will be good and right behaviour" (21). However, this implies the postulate that " .... this inner core, this real self, is good, trustworthy, ethical" (22), a postulate which clearly requires to be proved. These thinkers do not attempt to do so.

Furthermore, Maslow is convinced that morally good action requires more than the direction of the organismic valuing process. It needs a system of values. He declares that:

"The state of being without a system of values is psychopathogenic, we are learning. The human being needs a framework of values, a philosophy of life, a religion or a religion-surrogate to live by and understand by, in about the same sense that he needs sunlight, calcium or love" (23).

He points out that traditional value-systems have broken down, leaving a value inter-regnum with it's accompanying value-illnesses such as anhedonia, anomie, apathy, amorality etc. He urges:

"We need a validated, usable system of human values that we can believe in and devote ourselves to (be willing to die for), because they are true rather than because we are exhorted to 'believe and have faith'. Such an empirically based Weltanschauung seems now to be a real possibility, at least in theoretical outline" (24).

41.6 Growth and Tension

Because he is more conscious of higher growth needs, Maslow lays greater stress on the continuing existence of

growth-tension in the 'self-actualizing' or 'fully-functioning' person than Rogers does. This tension is also highlighted by Gordon Allport who speaks of 'propriate striving' and by Rollo May who speaks of the abiding tension of 'eros'.

Maslow points out that 'equilibrium' or 'homeostasis' theories deal with the short-term reduction of tension in individual episodes, ignoring the long-term development of the person. Allport agrees:

> "Deficiency motives do, in fact, call for a reduction of tension and a restoration of equilibrium. Growth motives, on the other hand, maintain tension in the interest of distant and often unattainable goals. As such, they distinguish human from animal becoming" (25).

Lonergan, as we have seen, not only realizes the link between tension and personal development. He also formulates a law of tension (which he calls the law of limitation and transcendence). This law states that there is an opposition in human consciousness between it's center in the world of sense, tending towards self-centeredness and it's orientation into the intelligible world of meaning and value, tending towards self-transcendence (26). For Lonergan, personal development is authentic only when conscious awareness of this tension leads a man to transcend himself cognitively, affectively, morally and totally, by means of conversion.

For Martin Buber, the root of conscious tension lies in man's sharing in both finitude as well as infinity. Man is the "only creature who has potentiality" (27). He is the "crystallized potentiality of existence" (28). Not only is a man who he is: he is capable of becoming all that he has been created to become. This distinction between actuality and potentiality grounds Buber's theory of man as a polar reality.

In his dialogue with Rogers, Buber describes this polarity. Speaking about the 'problematic person' he says:

"When I grasp him more broadly and more deeply than before, I see his whole polarity and then I see how the worst in him and the best in him are dependent on one another, attached to one another. And I can help, I may be able to help him just by helping him to change the relation between the poles: not just by chance, but by a certain strength that he gives to the one pole in relation to the other ...." (29).

Buber insists to Rogers that he can strengthen or help the person to strengthen the one pole. He also remarks that it is possible to strengthen the force of direction within the person, since polarity is often directionless. Buber helps the 'problematic person' to face the tension of this internal struggle against himself: he helps him to direct his life along the path of his own choice.

Rogers notes that the initial stages of therapy are characterized by tension reduction, due to increased congruence between self-experience and the self-structure. Although he allows for the role of tension in growth, he does not clearly distinguish between tension due to deficiency (which he tries to eliminate in therapy) and the tension of growth. Furthermore, he does not emphasize tension as an indispensable factor in the realization of the ideal self. On the contrary, since the self is governed by the organismic valuing process and since there is increasing congruence between the self and the ideal self, it is reasonable to suppose that the ideal self would tend to be dominated by the immediate world of sense rather than by the transcendent world mediated by meaning and regulated by value. As we shall see, Rogers description of the 'fully-functioning' person is more suggestive of self-centeredness than of self-transcendence.

41.7 Conclusion

We have examined the outcomes of the therapeutic process as Rogers formulates them. We have focused chiefly on the emergence of the organismic valuing process, noting that while it takes cognizance of experience and feeling in the world of immediacy, it tends to neglect the unrestricted human desire to know and to love in a transcendent world mediated by meaning and guided by values.

We underlined the ambiguous role of tension in Rogers's theory of the ideal self and we contrasted it with the stress on growth-orientated tension in the views of Maslow, Allport, Buber and Lonergan.

We may conclude that it is necessary to distinguish two different kinds of tension. The first is deficiency orientated. Rogers's technique of psychotherapy helps to reduce it by promoting the accurate symbolization of experience and affectivity. The second is growth orientated. It is a necessary conscious dimension of a man who, as both limited and transcending (Lonergan), both finite and sharing in infinity (Buber), both deficiency-orientated and growth-orientated (Maslow), attempts to realize his authentic ideal self.

4.2 ROGERS'S THEORY OF THE FULLY-FUNCTIONING PERSON

42.1 Formal Statement

This statement contains a hypothetical picture of the optimal person who emerges at the end point of Rogers's psychotherapy. The 'fully-functioning' person has the following characteristics (30):

(i) He is open to all of his experience, without any need to distort or deny it in awareness;

(ii) Hence all of his experiences are available to awareness;

(iii) All conscious symbolizations are as accurate as the experiential data will permit;

(iv) His self-structure is congruent with his self-experience;

(v) His self-structure is a fluid 'Gestalt' flexibly changing in the process of assimilating new experiences and in the process of realizing the ideal self;

(vi) He experiences himself as the locus of evaluation;

(vii) His process of valuing is continually organismic;

(viii) He has no conditions of worth and he experiences unconditional positive self-regard as well as unconditional positive regard for others;

(ix) He adapts to the newness of the moment in unique and creative behaviour;

(x) He experiences the most complete freedom and commitment;

(xi) He is a person-in-process, i.e., he is continually in process of further self-actualization.

42.2 Definitions

422.1 Freedom

A person experiences the most complete freedom:
a) when he wills to choose his own attitude in any given set of circumstances;
b) when he wills or chooses to follow the course of action which is the most economical vector in relation to all the internal and external stimuli (i.e. which is most satisfying). This same course of action may be said to be determined by

all the factors in the existential situation (31).

422.2 Commitment

Commitment is the functioning of the person who is searching for the total organismic direction which is emerging within himself including the direction of conscious mind (32).

42.3 Clarification

The 'fully-functioning' person is fully open to his experience. Every stimulus, whether it originates in the organism or in the environment, is freely relayed through the nervous system without distortion. Whether the stimulus is the impact of a configuration of form, colour or sound, from the environment or from the sensory nerves, or a memory trace from the past, or a visceral sensation of fear, disgust or pleasure, or a feeling of loving tenderness, Rogers's 'fully-functioning' person will 'live' it completely in awareness.

The 'fully-functioning' person will live in an 'existential' manner. Each moment is new and so he never completely finishes the task of integrating and reorganizing his self-structure. This structure emerges from experience. It is not imposed on experience in a rigid manner. Rogers describes 'fully-functioning' living thus:

> "It seems to mean letting my experience carry me on, in a direction which appears to be forward, towards goals that I can but dimly define, as I try to understand at least the current meaning of that experience. The sensation is that of floating with a complex stream of experience, with the fascinating possibility of trying to comprehend it's ever-changing complexity" (33).

Elsewhere Rogers adds:

> "Such living in the moment, then, means an absence of

rigidity, of tight organization, of the imposition of structure on experience. It means, instead, a maximum of adaptability, a discovery of structure in experience, a flowing, changing, organization of self and personality" (34).

The 'fully-functioning' person finds in his organism a trustworthy means of arriving at the most satisfying behaviour in each existential situation. Since he is open to experience, he has access to all the available data in the situation which could be relevant to his choice of behaviour: social demands; his own complex and sometimes conflicting needs; his memory of similar situations; his perception of the uniqueness of this situation etc. He can:

" .... permit his total organism, his conscious thought participating, to consider each stimulus, need and demand, its relative intensity and importance, and out of all this complex weighing and balancing, discover that course of action which would come closest to satisfying all his needs in the situation" (35).

The 'fully-functioning' person is creative and self-actualizing. Because of his sensitive openness to the world and his trust in his own ability to form new relationships with his environment, he is creative in living and in behaviour. He is not necessarily adjusted to his culture and he is rarely a conformist. He lives constructively, in as much harmony with his culture as a balanced satisfaction of his needs require.

The 'fully-functioning' person will not be irrational, according to Rogers. When human nature is 'fully-functioning', it is constructive, trustworthy and rational:

"I have little sympathy with the prevalent concept that man is basically irrational and that his impulses, if not controlled, would lead to the destruction of others and self. Man's behaviour is exquisitely

> rational, moving with subtle and ordered complexity towards the goals his organism is endeavouring to achieve" (36).

He points out that defence, threat and incongruence often prevent this organismic rationality from emerging into consciousness:

> "But in our hypothetical ('fully-functioning') person, there would be no such barriers, and he would be a participant in the rationality of his organism" (37).

The only control he would need to exercise would be to balance one organismic need against another.

It is evident that the term 'rationality' has a particular denotation in Rogers's writings. It appears to refer to a conscious following of the laws of organic nature rather than to a conscious ordering of that nature according to the analogous laws of spirit. For Lonergan, as we have seen, the intellectual and rational processes are not only intelligible: they are also intelligent. Thus, not only do they follow intelligible orders: they also create them. Rogers seems to ignore this dimension of 'rationality'. (38).

42.4 Maslow's Theory of the Self-Actualizing Person

Maslow describes the 'fully-functioning' person as a self-actualizing person. The self-actualizing person has peak experiences more frequently, more intensely and more perfectly than the average person. We shall now examine Maslow's description of a peak experience. He points out that the characteristics of peak experiences are not clearly distinguishable from one another: they are different aspects of the one changed reality, the conscious self (39).

During a peak experience a person feels that he is at the height of his powers. He feels more perceptive and intelligent, more effortless and graceful. He is 'at

his best'. More than at other times, he feels himself to be the responsible creating center of his activities, more self-determining and free. he is less inhibited by blocks, cautions and fears. He accepts, respects and loves himself and others as persons of worth. He is more spontaneous, expressive, childlike, natural, relaxed, unaffected, unreserved, unself-conscious. He is most unique and individual. He is intensely present here-and-now. He is non-needing and non-motivated. He experiences joy. He is more poetic, playful and exuberant. He is complete. He has reached a certain perfection. He feels graced, fortunate and surprized by joy. If he is a religious person, he tends to adore, thank and praise God. He tends to experience an all-embracing love for everyone and everything. He experiences life as good and worthwhile (40).

Most importantly, the peak-experiencing person simultaneously arrives at a goal and steps beyond it. In actualizing himself and in thus experiencing acute self-identity, he also transcends this identity (41). In becoming intensely aware of himself, he also becomes self-forgetful. He becomes absorbed in perceiving, in doing, in enjoying and in creating (42). As Maslow expresses it, he tends to fuse with the world and with others (43).

Thus, Maslow's self-actualizing person includes Rogers's 'fully-functioning' person but goes beyond him. He is more conscious of choice decision and responsibility. While the 'fully-functioning' person is content to 'be' himself as organismic process, the self-actualizing person is not content until he has transcended himself.

42.5 Frankl's Theory of the Self-Transcending Person

Victor Frankl objects to appointing self-actualization or self-realization as the ultimate goal of personal development.

In the first place, he feels that the world and its objects become mere means to achieve man's end. He criticizes Maslow's contention that " the environment is no more than means to the person's self-actualizing ends" (44). In the second place, Frankl asks whether man's primary intention or ultimate goal can be adequately described by self-actualization and he replies:

> "I would venture a strictly negative response to this question. It appears to me to be quite obvious that self-actualization is an effect and cannot be the object of intention" (45).

Self-actualization is therefore an effect or an accompaniment of development. An adequate goal of personal development must go beyond self-actualization to the sphere of human existence where a man chooses what he will do and what he will be in the objective world of meaning and values (46).

It is a fundamental tenet of Frankl's psychotherapy ('logotherapy'), that self-transcendence is the essence of existence. By 'existence' he means the specifically human mode of being. He declares that existence is authentic only to the extent to which it points to something that is not itself. Being human cannot be it's own meaning:

> "It has been said that man must never be taken as a means to an end. Is this to imply that he is an end in itself, that he is intended and destined to realize and actualize himself? Man, I should say, realizes and actualizes values. He finds himself only to the extent to which he looses himself in the first place, be it for the sake of something or somebody, for the sake of a cause or a fellow man, or 'for God's sake' " (47).

Furthermore, Frankl points out that man transcends his being towards an 'ought'. Only when he does so, can he rise above

the level of the somatic and the psychic and enter the realm of the genuinely human. (48).

Frankl concludes that self-actualization and self-realization are inadequate as goals of personal development. They can only promote inauthenticity:

> "If psychotherapy is to remain therapy and not become a symptom within the pathology of the time (Zeitgeist), then it needs a correct picture of man" (49).

42.6 The Paradox of Freedom and Determinism

Rogers describes the conflict between freedom and determinism as a paradox. He poses the question of whether personal freedom can have any real meaning in the present-day world of science, where logical positivism, strict behavourism and Freudianism claim a growing ability to predict and control human behaviour. He quotes B.F. Skinner, one of the most vociferous contemporary advocates of American behaviourism:

> "The hypothesis that man is not free, is essential to the application of scientific method to the study of human behaviour" (50).

According to Skinner, man is completely determined from without. He acts only in response to an external stimulus. Skinner claims to be able to control not only his behaviour but also his motivation, by means of what he calls positive and negative reinforcement (51):

> "The free inner man who is held responsible for his behaviour .... is only a pre-scientific substitute for the kinds of causes which are discovered in the course of scientific analysis. All these alternative causes lie outside the individual" (52).

Skinner claims that his techniques of reinforcement are becoming so refined that a man can still 'feel' free, he can still 'choose' whatever he wishes and nevertheless be completely under Skinner's control (53).

On the one hand, Rogers agrees with Skinner that if he is to attempt to develop scientific research methods in the field of psychotherapy, then 'ipso facto' he must be committed to the postulate of complete determinism, like any other scientist. In the scientific world, every thought, feeling and activity of the client is presumed to be determined by what preceded it. There is no room for freedom.

On the other hand, Rogers is aware that it is the client's experience of freedom in psychotherapy which is one of the most powerful elements in the promotion of personal growth:

> " .... the freedom I am talking about is essentially an inner thing, something which exists in the living person quite aside from any of the outward choices of alternatives which we so often think of as constituting freedom. I am speaking of the kind of freedom which Victor Frankl vividly describes in his experience of the concentration camp .... 'everything can be taken from a man but one thing: the last of the human freedoms - to choose one's own attitude in any given set of circumstances, to choose one's own way'" (54).

This freedom of attitude is a feature of the client who has benefited from Rogers's psychotherapy. He no longer distorts or denies feelings or experiences. He no longer chooses or evaluates under pressure from external circumstances. He experiences a new freedom to 'choose his own attitude, to choose his own way'.

Rogers admits that these two positions, freedom and determinism are dialectically opposed. He insists that we must accept both positions as true, nevertheless. It ammounts to a 'deep and lasting paradox' similar to the apparent contradiction between the wave and the corpuscular theories of light, despite which "physics has made

important advances" (55). He concludes:

> "We cannot profitably deny the freedom which exists in our subjective life, any more than we can deny the determinism which is evident in the objective description of that life. We will have to live with that paradox" (56).

Rollo May points to the existence of the same paradox in the field of psychoanalysis, where determinism is also postulated. The analyst finds himself in the anomalous position of believing that the patient must have an illusion of freedom if he is to change. The analyst is therefore forced to cultivate an illusion. May quotes:

> "'As psychotherapy progresses, the experience of freedom increases, so that successfully analysed people report experiencing more freedom in the conduct of their lives than they did prior to psychotherapy. If this freedom is illusory, the purpose of therapy or at least the result of successful therapy, is to restore an illusion, even though most therapists believe that successful therapy increases the accuracy with which the patient perceives himself and his world'" (57).

Logically this means that an illusion is most effective in promoting change in personality: that truth is not fundamentally relevant to action whereas illusion is. May concludes

> "I do not labour the point that this resolution of the dilemma is untenable" (58).

42.7 Rogers's Attempt to Solve the Paradox

In a recent attempt to save the liberty of the 'fully-functioning' person, Rogers tries to reconcile freedom with determinism. He writes:

> "We could say that in the optimum of therapy, the

person rightfully experiences the most complete and absolute freedom. He wills or chooses to follow the course of action which is the most economical vector in relation to all the internal and external stimuli, because it is that behaviour which will be most deeply satisfying. But this is the same course of action which from another vantage point may be said to be determined by all the factors in the existential situation" (59).

Rogers claims that whereas the 'fully-functioning' person can choose freely (in Rogers's sense), the deficient person can not. The latter is defensive: he denies or distorts experience in awareness. The 'fully-functioning' person not only experiences but:

" .... utilizes the most absolute freedom when he spontaneously, freely, and voluntarily chooses and wills that which is absolutely determined" (60).

According to Rogers, this picture of freedom does not contradict the picture of the psychological universe as a determined sequence of cause and effect. Freedom is the fulfilment by the 'fully-functioning' person of the ordered sequence of his life. He moves out voluntarily and responsibly to play his significant part in a world whose determined events move through him and through his spontaneous choice. He observes:

"I see this freedom of which I am speaking, then, as existing in a different dimension than the determined sequence of cause and effect" (61).

This manner of apparently reconciling freedom with determinism enables Rogers to share the client's subjective experience of free choice (as a therapist) while also enabling him to study the client's behaviour (as a 'scientist):

"For me it provides the rationale for the subjective reality of absolute freedom of choice, which is so profoundly important in therapy, and at the same time

the rationale for the complete determinism which is the very foundation stone of science" (62).

We may conclude that , for Rogers, psychological 'science' involves the postulate of absolute determinism, while psychological practice is based on the experience of freedom. However, in the final analysis, since the difference between freedom and determinism is dimensional rather than essential, Rogers would be forced to conclude that logically man must be determined, despite therapeutic evidence to the contrary.

42.8 Rogers's Theory of Commitment

The implications of Rogers's theory of the organismic valuing process are expressed in his theory of commitment:

> "Thus commitment is more than a decision. It is the functioning of an individual who is searching for directions which are emerging within himself" (63).

Whereas for Lonergan, commitment is a binding decision based on a set of value judgements, for Rogers, commitment is a total organismic direction which includes 'conscious mind'. Commitment is something which the organismic valuing process uncovers:

> "In my judgement, commitment is something that one discovers within one's self. It is a trust of one's total reaction rather than of one's mind only. It has much to do with creativity" (64).

Commitment (like the organismic system of valuing), consists in 'being process'. It comes to 'be' in the becoming of the 'fully-functioning' person as he increasingly trusts in his spontaneous experience and feeling as well as in his 'conscious mind'. Commitment is something he 'achieves'.

It is evident that whereas the immediate world of experience is continuously and spontaneously in process, the

world mediated by meaning and regulated by value is not only experienced. It is also understood by intelligence, checked and controlled by reflection, affirmed by rationality and chosen by responsibility. Rogers proposes that commitment should be regulated or at least guided by spontaneity, whereas Lonergan insists that commitment should be firmly based on responsible decision. We shall discuss the implications of both these positions in our critique.

42.9 Conclusion

We have been discussing Rogers's ideal goal of personal development: the 'fully-functioning' person. We noted that the latter has developed beyond defensiveness, distortion and denial. Congruence between self-experience and self-structure leaves him open to all that is spontaneously happening in his organism. He tends to evaluate his experiences and actions according to the organismic process. Above all he has discovered a new freedom and so he commits himself to a continual process of further self-actualization. He 'floats' in a 'complex stream of experience' and this appears to be what Rogers means by 'exquisitely rational' behaviour.

We noted that Maslow's description of the self-actualizing person bears many similarities to Rogers's description of the 'fully-functioning' person. However, Maslow observes that self-actualization requires not only self-awareness but self-forgetfulness: in actualizing himself the 'fully-functioning' person also transcends himself.

We observed how Victor Frankl insists on inverting this order. He declares that self-actualization cannot be the 'intention' or 'goal' of personal development. At most it is a side-effect. The adequate goal of personal development must be centered in the world of meaning and value and it can only be achieved through the transcendence of self.

Lastly, we examined Rogers's paradoxical affirmation of practical freedom and theoretical determinism. We followed his attempt to explain away this apparent contradiction by affirming that freedom and determinism are merely different dimensions of the one reality.

We may conclude that Rogers's goal of personal development is organismic self-centeredness, which contrasts with Frankl's goal of self-transcendence and Maslow's goal which at least tends towards self-transcendence. We may also conclude that Rogers's subservience to positivist scientific method prompts him to desert the evidence of his experience of freedom, in an illogical affirmation of theoretical determinism.

In our critique, we shall question the doubtful adequacy of organismic self-centeredness as a goal of personal development and the incoherence of the dual affirmation of freedom and determinism.

SECTION TWO

PERSONAL DEVELOPMENT AND COMMUNITY

5. BERNARD LONERGAN AND COMMUNITY

5.1 THE HUMAN GOOD

In order to situate community within the wider context of the human good, we shall present a pattern of interrelated terms and we shall attempt to relate each to the other. We shall follow Lonergan's pattern, with a few additions (I), and minor modifications (2), to suit our topic, community. We shall consider: human potentiality; its actuation in an individual context; its actuation in a social context; its achievement of an end or good.

A threefold division of ends, into the particular good, the good of order and the good of value, will dictate a corresponding division in the other categories.

51.1 Schema of the Human Good (3).

HUMAN POTENTIALITY	INDIVIDUAL ACTUATION	SOCIAL ACTUATION	ENDS
Capacity, Need	Operation, Spontaneity	Cooperation, Intersubjectivity	Particular Good
Plasticity, Perfectibility	Development, Skill	Institution, Role, Task	Good of Order
Freedom	Orientation, Conversion	Personal Relations, Ecstatic Conversion	Good of Value

51.2 Clarification of the Schema

512.1 First Row

We note that individual have needs. To satisfy these needs they operate according to their capacities. Sometimes their operations are governed by the detached spirit of intelligent inquiry but more often they are dictated by sensitive spontaneity, i.e. by needs and desires, pleasures and pains, enjoyment and privation (4).

As well as operating, individuals cooperate. Primitive cooperation is regulated by intersubjective spontaneity, that elementary communion alive with feeling which grounds the mutual help and support one finds in families, tribes and clans (5). This spontaneous operating and cooperating by individuals, produces instances of the particular good, i.e. objects or actions which meet the needs and desires of a particular individual at a given time.

512.2 Second Row

Operating individuals cooperate in groups and they do so by creating institutions where their cooperation is governed by certain roles to be fulfilled or certain tasks to be achieved (e.g. the state, the family, the school). Roles and tasks require the development of skills according to the plasticity and perfectibility of the individuals fulfiling them. The concrete manner in which this cooperation works out is called the good of order (6). It is not seperate from instances of the particular good although it is distinct from them. It consists:

(i) in the manifold recurring instances of the particular good;

(ii) in the order which ensures that operations are cooperations, so that all desirable instances of the particular good are in fact produced;

(iii) in the inter-dependence of the desires and decisions of individuals with their actual performance.

It is to be noted that the good of order is not an ideal blueprint: it is the actually functioning set of relationships which in fact guides the cooperation of individuals. Thus, it integrates the feelings and desires of sensitive spontaneity and intersubjectivity.

512.3 Third Row

Individuals and groups are free to determine themselves and to choose their own orientation (7). To the degree that they are self-transcending, they choose the truly good, whether it be the 'ontic' value of persons or the qualitative value of beauty, truth or good actions. In doing so, they bring about the good of value, i.e. the truly good. This includes true instances of the particular good, a true good of order and a true scale of preferences between values and satisfactions. Furthermore, in doing so, they are originators of value: authentic persons achieving self-transcendence by means of their good choices. In so far as they will authenticity in themselves and promote it in others, they promote a true good of value, i.e., true personal and true qualitative values. However, full self-transcendence is not a spontaneous achievement (8). Men can fail to perceive accurately, to respond affectively to values over satisfactions over satisfactions, to understand correctly, to judge reasonably, to decide and to act responsibly. It is only by means of conversion that they can free themselves from the unauthentic. This consists in a firm commitment to attention in experience, to values in affective responses, to intelligence in understanding, to reasonableness in judgement and to responsibility in decision, choice and action (9).

Individuals relate to one another within a pattern of personal relations. Personal relations occur to the degree that individuals experience, feel about, understand, accept and love each other. Just as the individual can achieve self-transcendence through personal conversion, so too he can experience an ecstatic conversion in an interpersonal relat-

ionship. He can pierce through his initial perceptions, feelings, ideas and judgements about another, in order to reach an accurate, appreciating, true and loving perspective of the other as he truly is and as he is capable of becoming. In transcending himself, he can promote self-transcendence in the other (10).

When a group of individuals are joined by common experience, by common and complementary insights, by similar judgements of fact and value and by parallel commitments, they form a community, as we shall discover. When they get out of touch, misunderstand one another, judge in opposed manners and commit themselves to contrary goals, they become alienated or estranged from one another (11).

51.3 Conclusion

We have been speaking of the human good. We noted that it is both individual and social. We saw that not only do individuals operate to meet their own needs but they cooperate to meet one another's needs. They develop skills, fulfil roles and accomplish tasks all of which are structured by means of the institutional frameworks created by society. They operate and cooperate freely and so they advance in authenticity through genuine personal relations. They bring about the good of value which includes a true good of order, together with worthwhile instances of the particular good. In the process of cooperating, they share their experience, feeling, meaning and value and so they bring about community. Before we can clarify the notion of community, we must first discuss the topic of meaning.

5.2 MEANING

We shall examine Lonergan's account of meaning under three headings: Carriers of Meaning; Elements of Meaning;

Functions of Meaning.

52.1 Carriers of Meaning

521.1 Intersubjectivity

Primitive intersubjectivity concerns spontaneous action. Lonergan alludes to the elemental 'We' which precedes the essential 'We' resulting from the love of an 'I' for a 'Thou' (12). The former is a vital and functional 'We'. It operates when one man instinctively tries to save another man's life. It is spontaneous rather than deliberate. Buber refers to it as the 'primitive We' which precedes true individuality and independence (13).

Beyond the primitive intersubjectivity of action, there is intersubjectivity of feeling. Max Scheler distinguishes four varieties (14).

Firstly, there is community of feeling and fellow-feeling. Both of these are intentional responses and therefore they presuppose the apprehension of objects. In community of feeling, two or more people respond in a similar way to a similar object or experience. In fellow-feeling, a first person responds to an object or experience while the other person or persons respond to the feeling manifested by the first. In the former case, an army platoon mourns its fallen leader. In the latter case, the platoon sympathizes with its leader who has just heard of his wife's death. As we shall see, fellow-feeling plays a large part in Rogers's encounter groups.

Secondly, there is psychic contagion and emotional identification. Both of these have a vital rather than an intentional basis. Psychic contagion is the sharing of the emotion of another without adverting to the object of that emotion. One is sad when others are weeping, even though one does not know why they are weeping. Emotional identification consists in the suspension of personal differentiation in

favour of vital unity. For example, an infant identifies emotionally with his mother.

Rollo May traces this vital community of feeling to the operation of the 'daimonic', i.e. "any natural urge which has the power to take over the whole person" (15). He points out the phenomena of lynch mobs and mass violence, where the mob spirit is stirred up and individual consciousness is surrendered in the group 'mind'. Excitement is provided with clouded individual consciousness or conscience. I have observed the same kind of vital emotional communion in some encounter groups.

521.2 Intersubjective Meaning

Besides intersubjectivity of action and feeling, there are intersubjective communications of meaning. Such are smiles, gestures, facial and bodily movements, pauses, variations in pitch and tone of voice, etc.

Bruno Snell distinguishes three basic forms of bodily movement; purposive (Zweck-), expressive (Ausdrucks-), and mimetic (Nachahmungsbewegungen-) movements. Purposive movements consist in gestures such as nodding, pointing, beckoning and also in speech. They are deliberate and express what the performer wants. Expressive movements are the exterior manifestations of inner experiences. They express what the performer feels. Mimetic gestures imitate of represent another being with whom the performer identifies. They indicate what the performer is or what he pretends to be (16).

The point which Lonergan emphasises is that movements such as the smile are meaningful. A smile is not merely a certain combination of physiological movements of the lips, facial muscles and eyes. It is a combination with a meaning. The meaning of a smile is different from the meaning of a frown. A smile is natural and spontaneous: we do not learn to smile as we learn how to speak. A smile is global: it expresses what one person means to another. A smile can have

many meanings: there are smiles of recognition, of friendliness, of welcome, of joy, of love, as well as smiles of smug satisfaction, of contempt, of sarcasm, of bitterness etc. Whereas linguistic meaning is objective, the meaning of a smile or of a gesture is intersubjective: it reveals or betrays one conscious subject to another (17). Alfred Schutz describes intersubjective meaning thus:

> "In the simplest case, that of a face-to-face relationship, another's body, events occurring on his body (blushing, smiling), including bodily movements (wincing, beckoning), activities performed by it (talking, walking, manipulating things), are capable of being apprehended by the interpteter as signs" (18).

521.3 Feelings and Symbols

Lonergan defines a symbol as " .... an image of a real or imaginary object that evokes a feeling or is evoked by a feeling" (19). Rogers's usage of the term symbol, both in interpersonal and in group therapy, corresponds to that of Lonergan and so we shall adhere to it rather than to its wider usage by other writers (20).

In our critique we shall distinguish feelings which are states or trends and feelings which are intentional responses. Here we are concerned with feelings as related.

Feelings are related to objects, to one another and to their subject. They are related to objects: one loves a friend, fears suffering, enjoys a view. They are related to one another through changes in the object: one regrets the departure of a friend, one rejoices at the relief of suffering, one is disappointed in a clouded view.

Feelings are related to one another through personal relationships: love, gentleness, tenderness and intimacy form a group; so do alienation, hatred, harshness and violence. Feelings may conflict and yet come together: one can mix love with hate, joy with sadness, intimacy with cruelty.

Lastly, feelings are related to their subject. They give power and body to his living. They are the means by which he initially apprehends values and so they carry him towards moral self-transcendence as well as selecting a person or an object for the sake of whom or of which he transcends himself (21).

The same objects can evoke different feelings and so different symbolic images in different subjects. This may be due to differences in age, sex, temperament, etc., but it may also be due to development. For example, the child is afraid of strangers, whereas the adult may be attracted to them. Thus, affective development produces a determinate orientation in life, i.e. specific affective capacities, dispositions and habits. What such affective habits are in any given person, can be specified by the various symbols awakened by specific feelings. Inversely, these habits can be specified by the feelings which awaken determinate symbols.

Affective development involves a transvaluation and a transformation of symbols. What affected the subject formerly, now leaves him unmoved. The child who once feared strangers, is now indifferent to them. Furthermore, symbols which formerly did not affect the subject, now move him. The five year old boy is affectively indifferent as to whether his companion is another boy or a girl: not so the fifteen year old!

Although affective development is a normal occurrence, affective aberration is also common. In examining the process of Rogers's interpersonal therapy, we saw that the incongruent person distorts his feelings in awareness or even denies them altogether in awareness. He fails to symbolize these feelings accurately in awareness and so a conflict develops between the self as vaguely conscious and the self as consciously symbolized (22). The result is an alienation from the self. Lonergan observes that what is vaguely

conscious in such a manner yet not accurately symbolized in awareness, seems to be what some psychiatrists mean by the unconscious. Thus, therapy consists in the gradual experiencing, identifying and symbolizing of one's affectivity. Lonergan terms this the self-appropriation of feeling (23). It is a central occurrence in Rogers's basic encounter group and also in his interpersonal therapy.

Symbols play a vital role in the self-appropriation of feeling because they obey the laws of image and feeling, rather than the laws of logic. They can therefore meet the needs of feeling much more effectively. Symbols use the representative figure rather than the logical class. They can convey multiple meanings at the same time. They can even defy the principle of excluded middle and allow the simultaneous coincidence of opposites: of love and hate, of affection and repulsion.

Symbols can be compounded in order to express many shades of emotional meaning. The same painting or the same concerto can awaken both joy and sadness, calm and excitement. Thus, symbols can express what logical discourse shuns: internal tensions, conflicts, struggles and incompatibilities. Where logic appeals to dialectic to solve its conflicts, affectivity makes use of symbols to meet its needs.

The principal need of affectivity is to communicate internally. Values are first apprehended through the intentional responses of feeling. But before that, feelings must reveal objects and objects must awaken feelings. The symbols which accompany these awakened feelings can then communicate affective contents to other levels of consciousness. Lonergan writes:

> "It is through symbolic images that mind and body, mind and heart, heart and body communicate" (24).

The need to communicate feeling is external as well as internal. We can use symbols to communicate feelings to another, by endowing gestures and actions with symbolic meaning.

We may also use language: we may try to explain our symbolic images to another. However, in order to do so, we must go beyond the elemental context of the symbol, to the mediating context of linguistic expression. We must use this linguistic context to communicate the hints, clues and relations which enable the other to reconstruct the elemental context of our feeling.

The other may translate our affective symbols into a further symbolic context. So the interpretative systems of Freud, Jung and Adler, rely heavily on symbols. The other may refrain from using an interpretative system. So Carl Rogers resists interpreting the feelings of his clients, believing that therapeutic goals are best fostered when the client symbolizes his own feelings in awareness (25). His basic encounter group provides a non-interpretative context where such personal affective symbolization is possible. Rollo May observes:

> "But the greatest danger in the therapeutic process lies right here: that the naming for the patient will be used not as an aid for change but as a substitute for it. He may stand off and get a temporary security from diagnosis, labels, talking about symptoms and then be relieved of the necessity of using will in action and in loving. This plays into the hands of modern man's central defence, namely intellectualization - using words as a substitute for feelings and experience. The word skates always on the edge of the danger of <u>covering up</u> the daimonic as well as disclosing it" (26).

We are now in a better position to distinguish symbols from the other carriers of meaning. For it is in the internal affective context of communication that symbols have their original and accurate meanings, meanings which have not yet been explicitated or interpreted. Jaspers declares:

> "The symbol cannot be interpreted except by other symbols. The understanding of a symbol does not, therefore, consist

in grasping its significance in a rational way but in experiencing it existentially in the symbolic intention ...' i.e. symbols are experienced rather than conceptualized (27).

521.4 Linguistic Meaning

Meaning can expand enormously when it is embodied in a set of linguistic signs. While intersubjective and symbolic meaning are confined to the immediate world of spontaneity, language opens up the far larger world mediated by meaning. Signs are invented and refined, modified and controlled, in order to mediate the meaning of this larger world. Thus, language mediates the meaning of the worlds of literature and science, religion and philosophy.

We must distinguish technical and literary language from ordinary language (28). The technical language of science and philosophy elaborates a special vocabulary, a logic and a methodology. Literary language floats between logic and symbol. It is full of figures of speech. It induces its hearer to feel as well as to understand.

Our concern is with the ordinary language of the human community. Such language is the product of the common sense of that community. Lonergan understands common sense as a nucleus of habitual insights possessed by the members of a group, such that the addition of one or two more will enable one to understand any one of an open series of concrete situations (29). Whereas science is the specialization of intelligence in the abstract and the general, common sense is the specialization of intelligence in the particular and the concrete. Unlike science or philosophy, common sense regards linguistic exactitude as tedious and pedantic. Lonergan writes:

> "As the proverb has it, a wink is as good as a nod. For common sense not only says what it means; it says it to someone; it begins by exploring the other fellow's intelligence; it advances by determining what further insights have to be communicated to him; it undertakes

> the communication, not as an exercise in formal logic, but as a work of art; and it has at its disposal not merely all the resources of language but also the support of modulated tone and changing volume, the eloquence of facial expression, the emphasis of gestures, the effectiveness of pauses, the suggestiveness of questions, the significance of omissions" (30).

Thus, one incarnate subject can communicate an insight to another, by grasping what the other has yet to grasp and also what act or sign or sound would make him grasp it. Such communication is logical, in the sense that it is intelligent and reasonable but not in the sense that it conforms rigidly to a set of general rules of universal validity.

Language in the common sense mode is obviously one of the principal carriers of meaning between the members of an encounter group.

521.5 Incarnate Meaning

Incarnate meaning is the meaning of a person, of his way of life, of his speech and of his action. It usually incorporates all or most of the other carriers of meaning. Lonergan writes:

> "The bodily presence of the other is the presence of the incarnate spirit of the other; and the incarnate spirit reveals itself to me by every shift of the eyes, countenance colour, lips, voice, tone, fingers, hands, arms, stance .... It works immediately on my subjectivity, to make me share the others seriousness or vivacity, ease or embarrassment, joy or sorrow" (31).

Obviously, incarnate meaning is the fundamental carrier of meaning in an interpersonal or basic encounter group context.

52.2 Elements of Meaning

We shall now discuss the elements of meaning embodied in the above carriers. We may distinguish sources, acts, terms

of meaning and the subject who means (32).

522.1 Sources of Meaning

The sources of meaning are all intended acts and all intended contents, whether in the incoherent consciousness of the dream state or in the empirical, affective, intellectual, rational, moral or transcendent consciousness of the wakeful state.

522.2 Acts of Meaning

We can sub-divide acts of meaning into potential, formal, full, constitutive, effective and instrumental acts.

a) Potential Acts

Potential acts of meaning are elemental. The distinction between meaning and meant has not yet emerged. Intersubjective acts, feelings and gestures, affective symbols, acts of sensation and acts of insight are all potential acts of meaning: meaning and meant are potentially distinguishable.

b) Formal Acts

Formal acts of meaning are acts of conceiving, thinking, supposing, defining and formulating. It is here that the distinction emerges between meaning and what is meant, e.g. the distinction between the act of conceiving and what has been conceived. However, the exact status of the 'meant' is still unclear. Still, meaning and meant are formally distinguished.

c) Full Acts

Full acts of meaning are the acts of judging and believing. here the status of the meant is made clear. It is established whether it is merely an object of thought or a real thing in the real world of human experience or in the transcendent world: meaning and meant are fully distinguished.

d) Constitutive Acts

Constitutive acts of meaning are judgements of value, decisions, choices and commitments. They transform the individual who makes them and they become part of his meaning.

When they are shared by a group of individuals, they become common and they bring about community.

e) Effective Acts

Effective acts of meaning are human actions. They persuade or command others. They establish man's command over nature and they govern the construction of the artificial world of industry and commerce, of technology and urbanization.

f) Instrumental Acts

Instrumental acts of meaning are expressions. They externalize or exhibit for interpretation by others, the potential, formal, full, constitutive or effective acts of meaning of the subject.

522.3 Terms of Meaning

Terms of meaning are what is meant. In potential acts of meaning, meaning and meant are not distinguished. In formal acts, the distinction has appeared but the exact status of the term is undecided. In full acts, the status of the term is decided. It is so or it is not so. In constitutive acts, one settles one's attitude to something or to someone; one decides what to do about something. In effective acts, one tries to bring about something.

522.4 The Subject who Means

It is evident that acts of meaning are the acts of someone who means. They are the conscious acts of a conscious subject. The sources of meaning are the acts and contents which occur on all the levels of a subject's consciousness: incoherent, empirical, affective, intellectual, rational, moral and transcendent.

52.3 Functions of Meaning

We may distinguish four functions of meaning: cognitive, efficient, constitutive and communicative. We shall be concerned chiefly with the constitutive and communicative

functions of meaning, in formulating a theory of community.

523.1 Cognitive Function of Meaning

The world of the infant is a world of immediacy: a world that can be seen, touched, sucked, heard and smelt. It is confined to his immediate surroundings. It is a world of images and feelings. It is not affected by insight or concept, reflection or judgement, deliberation or choice.

When the child masters language his world expands enormously. He learns words. Words denote not only the objects of his immediate experience but also what is absent or what will be present. He learns from others what they have learned, what they remember, what they believe. He can learn from history, literature, science, philosophy and religion. His world can become vast.

This larger world is mediated by meaning (33). It is not just the sum total of the worlds of experience of all men, living or dead. It goes beyond the world of experience. What is meant is not only experienced: it is understood and judged as well. It is this addition of understanding and judgement that makes the world mediated by meaning possible. The scientist's insight into his data, his hypothesis and theory, are beyond the immediate world of his data and experiments although they are linked with it. The logician sees a mark on paper which denotes the 'null class'. However, he cannot see the 'null class'. It belongs to the world of understanding and judgement: the world mediated by meaning.

Besides the mediation of the external world by meaning, there is also the mediation of the internal world of feelings by means of symbols (34). As we have seen, this mediation consists in the experiencing and the symbolization of feelings which have hitherto been distorted or denied in conscious awareness (35).

523.2 Efficient Function of Meaning

In addition to knowing, there is doing. A man's action is not merely random but planned. First of all, he

intends to act. Then he imagines, plans, weighs up the various possibilities, chooses, cooperates and executes his intended activity. The whole process and its product are governed by meaning. The result is the man-made world of technology, capital investment, urban development, jet travel and instant communications.

523.3 Constitutive Function of Meaning

As well as transforming nature through meaningful activity, man also transforms himself (36). A man learns a language and develops skills. Initially, his puzzling for himself, his finding out for himself, his judging for himself, his deciding for himself, his choosing for himself, his acting for himself, are all concerned with objects. Eventually however, he reaches a critical point when he realizes that his questions and answers, judgements and decisions, choices and deeds, affect himself as a subject more deeply than they affect the objects with which he is concerned. Lonergan observes:

> "They accumulate as dispositions and habits of the subject; they determine him; they make him what he is and what he is to be" (37).

In other words, conscious acts constitute part of the personal meaning of the subject.

Human acts occur in social contexts (38). Thus, the whole fabric of human society, the family, the social customs, the cultural traditions, the state, the law, the political institutions, are all constituted by human meaning. To change their meaning is to change the concrete state of affairs. To rewrite or to reinterpret the constitution, is to change the state. For example, the declaration by the Supreme Court of the United States that abortion is constitutional, radically affects the meaning of the family in that country.

Not only is this world constituted by meaning: it is freely constituted. It is the product of freely self-constituting subjects. When self-constituting subjects also

transcend themselves cognitionally, morally, affectively and totally, then their world constituted by meaning is an authentic world. As we shall see, this world is a world of community.

When men fail in self-transcendence, they become alienated from themselves and from one another, communities disintegrate into collectivities and human living becomes meaningless. The world of the essential 'We' dissolves into a world of 'Them' and as R. D. Laing describes it:

> "In this collection of reciprocal indifference, of reciprocal inessentiality and solitude, there appears to exist no freedom" (39).

Such is the world which B. F. Skinner would construct:

> "Freedom and Dignity .... are the possessions of the autonomous man of traditional theory and they are essential to practices in which a person is held responsible for his conduct and given credit for his achievements. A scientific analysis shifts both the responsibility and the achievement" (40)

In such a world community disappears, to be replaced by what Skinner calls "a technology of behaviour" (41).

523.4 Communicative Function of Meaning

What one man means is communicated to another. In discussing the carriers of meaning, we saw that meaning can be communicated intersubjectively, symbolically, linguistically or incarnately. Thus, meaning which originates in individual minds becomes shared meaning (42). To the extent that it is shared, it becomes refined and developed, deepened and transformed, (or impoverished and deformed). Individual meaning becomes common meaning and community becomes possible. The conjunction of constitutive and communicative functions of meaning lead us to the notion of community.

5.3 COMMUNITY

We are now in a position to examine the topic of community in the light of our accounts of meaning and of the human good. Lonergan has not elaborated or developed his theory of community. He treats the subject sporadically throughout his writings. We must therefore introduce our own order in the following elaboration.

Firstly, we shall discuss Lonergan's theory of the formal constituent of community. Secondly, we shall attempt to relate this theory to the structure of the human good which we have examined. Thirdly, we shall formulate an explanatory synthesis of the structure of community, by applying Lonergan's theory of dynamic structure to his theory of the formal constituent of community. Fourthly, we shall formulate a theory of the process of development of community, utilizing the method and procedures which we have examined in chapter one. Lastly, we shall give a brief outline of the breakdown of community.

53.1 The Formal Constituent of Community

Community is not just a group of people in contact with one another: it is the achievement of common meaning and common value, (according to Lonergan) (43).

Common meaning is potential when there is a common field of experience. When men see, hear, touch, taste, smell, and feel about a common range of objects or a common circle of persons, then common meaning is potential. When men withdraw from this common field, they get out of touch.

Common meaning is formal when there is common, complementary, or mutual understanding in a group. When dullness blunts understanding, when oversights replace insights, when mutual distortion clouds mutual understanding, then men

withdraw from common understanding. There is only misunderstanding, incomprehension and mutual incomprehension.

Common meaning is actual when there are common judgements or when there is mutual acceptance in a group: areas in which all affirm or deny in the same manner. When common judgements are lacking, when men consider true what others hold to be false, when men reject one another, then they withdraw from common agreement and they reside in different 'worlds', i.e., they have different horizons of meaning.

Common meaning is actively realized in common values, goals and policies, i.e., in the choices, decisions and mutual commitments to action which guide men's lives. Such commitments are freely undertaken. They are the basis of the love which keeps families together, the loyalty which the state expects of it's citizens, the dedication to research which is found in scientific groups. Furthermore, the relationships which ground these feelings are usually alive with feeling: shared feelings concerning values and a common scale of preferences in affective responses to values.

Thus, community is realized when common meaning has been achieved, when common values have become the common aim, when mutual feelings draw people to one another, when common orientations in affective apprehension draw them to common values, when mutual commitments bind them to common and complementary tasks. Lonergan observes:

> "Community coheres or divides, begins or ends, just where the common field of experience, common understanding, common judgement, common commitments begin and end" (44).

Thus, communities differ in kind, in extent, in permanence and in cohesiveness.

We have said that common meaning and common values constitute community. Such common meaning and common values are doubly constitutive. In each individual, they are constitutive of the individual as a member of the community. In

the group of individuals, they are constitutive of the community itself (45).

53.2 Community and the Structure of the Human Good

We shall now situate community within the structure of the human good, by relating the carriers, elements, and functions of meaning to one another.

We saw that the structure of the human good rests on three related levels: the particular good, the good of order and the good of value. On the first level, we saw that the needs and capacities of individuals lead them not only to operate but to cooperate in bringing about recurring instances of the particular good. On the second level, we saw that such cooperation is achieved through institutions such as the family, the state and the educational system (46). These institutions are constituted by common meaning: they are the product of potential, formal, full, constitutive and effective acts of meaning which become common among the members of a group.

Such institutions create roles and set tasks for their members. Meaning exercises a cognitive function when members develop skills according to their plasticity and perfectibility. Meaning exercises an efficient function in guiding the actual performance of members as they bring about or fail to bring about the good of order.

On the third level, we saw that individuals are free and responsible. They can opt (or fail to opt) for the fourfold conversion which leads to cognitive, moral, affective and total self-transcendence. Meaning exercises a constitutive function when they constitute themselves or fail to constitute themselves as individual instances of the good of value.

Meaning exercises a communicative function when individuals relate to one another interpersonally. They

share their personal experiences, their affective orientations, their personal meaning and their personal values, intersubjectively, symbolically, linguistically and incarnately, by means of the carriers of meaning. In interpersonal relationships, more or less transcending individuals can undergo an ecstatic conversion. Meaning exercises a cognitive function when, in a series of acts of meaning, they experience, appreciate, understand and prize each other as the other is and as he can become. Meaning exercises constitutive and communicative functions when personal self-transcendence promotes interpersonal self-transcendence, by means of essential 'I-Thou' relationships.

Members of a group communicate with each other in a series of acts of meaning. Their interpersonal relationships become communal through the mediation of meaning in its communicative function. Mutual experience becomes common experience. Mutual affection fosters a common affective orientation to values. Meaning exercises a cognitive function when mutual understanding broadens into common and complementary understanding of a common world. A commonly accepted set of judgements declares what is true and false in that world. Mutual acceptance and mutual concern uncover a common appreciation of values resulting in common decisions about common goals, together with common commitments to cooperative action. Common meaning and common values are thus realized and this realization constitutes community. The conjunction of the constitutive and communicative functions of meaning, therefore, bring about community (47).

Personal and interpersonal self-transcendence promote transcendence in the community. Thus, the 'essential We' (48) of community brings about a true good of value, i.e. a true good of order which promotes a sustained succession of true instances of the particular good and a true scale of preferences regarding values. Thus, meaning in its constitutive and communicative functions has not only constituted commun-

ity: it has constituted an authentic community of self-transcending subjects. Martin Buber declares:

> " .... the prophetic insight teaches that a human community can only truly exist in so far as it becomes a true community" (49).

We have continually highlighted the role of meaning in the above account, in order to show how the whole fabric of the human good and the formal constituent of community is dependent on the carriers, elements and functions of meaning.

53.3 The Structure of Community

We shall now attempt to formulate an explanatory synthesis of community.

533.1 Objective

Our objective is to explain the structure of community.

533.2 Method

We shall employ classical method. The heuristic structure of classical method is the anticipation of some correlation or function that states the relation of things, not to our senses but to one another (50). We shall therefore be anticipating some correlation between the elements which constitute community.

533.3 Procedure

We shall examine community in terms of a dynamic structure, as it provides a useful heuristic framework for our purposes.

Briefly, there is a dynamic structure when:

(i) there are parts, e.g. musical notes or the conscious acts of a subject;

(ii) the parts are related, e.g. a scale of musical notes or the relationships between the acts of perceiving, understanding, judging and deciding;

(iii) the parts are activities, e.g. the actual playing of

the musical scale or the actual performance of the related activities of perceiving, understanding, judging and deciding;

(iv) the parts form a unity, e.g. a symphony or an act of knowing (51).

When the principle of unity comes from without, as in the case of a symphony (where it is the performers who bring about the unity), then the structure is materially dynamic. When the unity comes from within, as in the case of the act of knowing (where the various parts assemble themselves into a unity), then the structure is formally dynamic.

With regard to any dynamic structure one can ask: what are the basic assumptions; what are its basic elements; what are the basic relations between the elements; what is the principle of unity binding the elements together.

We shall now examine community in the light of these considerations. We shall discover that it fulfils the requirements of a formally dynamic structure.

533.4 Basic Assumptions

We must assume the possibility of the occurrence of common meaning and common values. Thus, it is presupposed:

(i) that a group of conscious subjects are in contact with each other;

(ii) that each subject is conscious on empirical, affective, meaning and valuing levels of consciousness, where each level grounds proportionate acts of meaning, i.e. potential, formal, full, constitutive, effective and instrumental acts;

(iii) that each subject engages at least minimally in such acts of meaning;

(iv) that such acts of meaning contain corresponding contents of meaning.

533.5 Basic Elements

The basic elements consist in common experience,

common feelings, common meaning and common values, where these elements are contents. They are the product of the appropriate acts of a group of subjects. Such acts are the potential, formal, full, constitutive, effective and instrumental acts of meaning which we have examined. Potential acts contain experience and feeling. Formal and full acts contain meaning. Constitutive and efficient acts bring about values. Instrumental acts express all four sets of contents externally for interpretation by others. Thus, contents become common contents. Experience becomes common experience, shared and mutual affective responses develop common feelings, personal and mutual meaning becomes common meaning, personal and mutual responses to values realize common values.

533.6 Basic Relations

There is a sublation between the basic elements, i.e. common values, common meaning, common feelings and common experience sublate one another. We have seen that sublation occurs when any higher process incorporates a lower process to achieve the goals of the higher process, while preserving the lower process intact (52). Common experience, feelings, meaning and values are sublated to one another through the sublation of the corresponding acts which produce them.

Formal acts of meaning depend on the contents of potential acts: conceiving, thinking, defining etc. depend on what has been perceived, questioned, understood. Full acts of meaning settle the status of the contents of formal acts: what is judged to be true or false depends on what has been understood. Constitutive acts of meaning depend on the contents of full acts: judgements of value, decisions and choices depend on a knowledge of reality and especially on a knowledge of human reality, which is provided by the contents of full acts of meaning. In addition, constitutive acts depend on the apprehensions of values attained by feelings. Thus,

constitutive acts also depend on an awareness of the symbolic contents of potential acts. Effective acts of meaning are dependent on the contents of cognitive and constitutive acts: action follows knowledge and decision. Instrumental acts of meaning are dependent on the contents of all the other acts which they express externally in such a way that experience, feelings, meaning and values can become common.

We can see therefore that common experience, common feelings, common meaning and common values are related to one another hierarchically: common values sublate common meaning and common affectivity; common meaning sublates common experience. Thus, sublation expresses the basic relations between the basic elements.

533.7 Basic Principle of Unity

a) Proximate Principle

The proximate principle of unity consists in a basic shared desire to communicate. Common experience, common feelings, common meaning and common values are realized through an ongoing process of communication. A group of conscious subjects communicate the contents of their acts of meaning to one another by means of the various carriers of meaning. They thereby share their experiential, affective, meaning and valuing consciousness with one another. Such common sharing of consciousness is grounded in their basic shared desire to communicate.

b) Remote Principle

The remote principle of unity consists in a basic shared human desire for community. The expansion of a common consciousness on the part of a group of subjects is the product of a basic shared human desire for community, i.e. for common experience and common affective responses which would lead to common meaning and common values. This basic shared desire is the expression in it's social dimension of the individual subject's basic desire for personal meaning and personal value (53).

The latter, in turn, is the expression in a personal context of the principle of finality: " .... the upwardly directed dynamism of proportionate being" (53).

This basic shared desire promotes common experience, common feelings, common meaning and common values. Furthermore, it promotes common experience towards the realization of common meaning and both common meaning and common feelings towards the achievement of common values. In order to do so, it makes use of the process of communication.

533.8 Symbolic Representation of the Structure

a) Diagram



COMMUNICATION ⟶ COMMON EXPERIENCE AFFECTIVITY MEANING VALUES ═══ COMMUNITY

b) Key to Symbols

(i) A, B, C, etc., represent a group of subjects, conscious on empirical, affective, meaning and valuing levels.

(ii) The parallel lines within each circle represent acts of meaning on the part of each subject (i.e., potential, formal, full, constitutive, effective and instrumental acts).

(iii) The projection of the parallel lines represents the basic desire for communication on the part of each subject. Their projection so that they will intersect, represents the basic desire for community.

(iv) Those parts of the parallel lines which are outside each circle represent the contents of the acts of meaning (i.e., experience, feelings, meaning and value).

(v) The field of intersection of the parallel lines represents the contents of meaning which have become common (i.e., common experience, common feelings, common meaning and common values).

533.9 Conclusion

We may conclude that community is the realization of common experience, common feeling, common meaning and common values through a self-constituting process of communication.

By analysing community in terms of a formally dynamic structure, we explained this process of self-constitution in terms of the basic relations (sublation) between its elements (common experience, common feeling, common meaning and common values) and the basic principle of unity which governs these relations (a basic shared desire to bring about common meaning and common values through a process of communication).

53.4 The Process of Development of Community

We must distinguish between the process of personality development within the context of community and the process of community development. The latter consists in the

ever greater realization of common experience, common affective orientations, common meaning and common values. Both processes are interconnected but in this chapter we are concerned only with the process of development of community.

534.1 Objective

Our objective is to explain the process of community development. To do so , we shall adapt some of the procedures which we studied in chapter one. We must emphasise that we are concerned to explain the process of community development rather than to elaborate a highly differentiated account of the development itself. Thus our account of community development does not aim to be complete but serves to highlight the process.

534.2 Method

We shall employ genetic method. As we have seen, the heuristic structure of genetic method lies in the notion of development. We anticipate a flexible linked sequence of dynamic and increasingly differentiated higher integrations, where each higher integration is a classical correlation, such as we reached in our understanding of the structure of community (54). Whereas in that case we sought a correlation between the elements of community and a basic unifying principle, in this case we are considering a sequence of such correlations and we are attempting to grasp the intelligibility latent in that sequence.

534.3 Procedures

a) The Field of Development

The field of development is finality which, in this context, expresses itself as a basic shared desire to develop an increase in common meaning and common values (55).

b) The Direction of Development

The direction of community development is towards an increasing differentiation of common meaning and common values.

c) The Mode of Development

The mode of development is spiral. There is a recurrent interaction between community-as-communicating, the achievement of an increase in common meaning and common values and the occurrence of a new and higher integration of community. One integration of community (FIRST ACT) is capable of development (SECOND ACT) through communication (development as POTENTIAL). Thus, it calls forth a new expansion in common meaning and common values (development as FORMAL) which completes the spiral in a new and higher integration of community (development as ACTUAL). This higher integration is capable of further development (SECOND ACT) etc., as the process repeats itself (ACT-ACT, POTENCY, FORM, ACT-ACT etc.), in a recurring spiral of higher integrations of community.

d) Sublation

In our theory of the structure of community, we noted that the contents of common experience, common feelings, common meaning and common values are sublated to one another through a sublation of the corresponding potential, formal, full, constitutive, effective and instrumental acts of meaning of a group of conscious subjects.

e) Integration and Operation

We shall make use of the procedure of integration and operation in order to illustrate how the integration of common meaning and common values which is achieved through a process of communication, is capable of further higher integration through further communication. As we have seen, the relevant heuristic structure is: 'specify the operator' (56). In the case of community, we can specify the operator, 'community-as-communicating', by differentiating it as a four-level process of sharing experience, sharing feelings, sharing meaning and sharing values: communication consists in such sharing.

534.4 Principles Governing the Process

The development of community is governed by all the

principle of development which we have examined in chapter one: the principles of finality, development, increasing differentiation, major and minor flexibility and, most significantly, the principles of emergence and correspondence. We recall that the principle of emergence states that otherwise coincidental manifolds of lower data invite higher integrations. The principle of correspondence states that different manifolds of data require different integrations (57).

534.5 The Process

The process of development takes place through sustained communication by a group of subjects interacting at the conscious levels of experience, affectivity, meaning and value (58). These levels are distinguishable, not seperable.

a) Empirical Level

A group of conscious subjects in contact with each other experience, (i.e. see, hear, taste, smell, touch , perceive etc.) one another and a common world (INTEGRATOR). The ongoing experience of individuals and pairs (OPERATOR) adds to the common field which is continually modified and enlarged (INTEGRATOR), as personal and interpersonal experience is progressively shared. Thus, the principles of emergence and correspondence call forth new integrations of common experience (INTEGRATOR) in a recurring spiral sequence.

b) Affective Level

A group of conscious subjects share mutual affection for one another as well as a common appreciation for their common world (INTEGRATOR). Mutual appreciation and common appreciation become more sensitive and refined (OPERATOR) as feelings progressively respond to values over satisfactions (INTEGRATOR). Responses to values become more differentiated (OPERATOR) and a common scale of preferences in affective responses to values is established (INTEGRATOR). Again we have a recurring spiral sequence of higher integrations of feeling, called forth by the principles of emergence and correspondence.

c) Meaning Level

The experiencing and feeling group of conscious subjects wonder about one another and about their common experience (OPERATOR). Wonder provokes inquiry and inquiry sparks insight, whether in mutual understanding of one another or in common understanding of their common world. Individual insights are partial and they provoke further inquiry (OPERATOR), yielding an expanding series of common and complementary insights which constitute a common viewpoint (INTEGRATOR). Viewpoints develop (OPERATOR) and are revised in more comprehensive viewpoints (INTEGRATOR) etc.

Common understanding invites common judgement (INTEGRATOR). Expanding viewpoints show up weaknesses in partial common judgements (OPERATOR) and promote more comprehensive common judgements (INTEGRATOR) etc. (59).

Successive applications of the principles of emergence and correspondence promote a recurring spiral sequence of higher integrations of common understanding and common judgement, i.e. of common meaning

d) Valuing Level

The group of subjects experiencing, feeling about, understanding and accepting one another and their common world, grow in admiration for one another as instances of personal value and in appreciation of truth, good acts, etc. as qualitative values (INTEGRATOR). Their common judgements of value promote (OPERATOR) common decisions, common choices and common or complementary commitments (INTEGRATOR). These, in turn, direct cooperative action (OPERATOR) which brings about instances of the good of value (INTEGRATOR) etc., as a recurring spiral sequence of higher integrations realize an ever more authentic and comprehensive good of value.

e) Overall Sublating Level

Common values, common meaning, common feeling and common experience are related to one another in an overall

hierarchical integration which we have called sublation.

Because of the law of integration, a development occurring on any particular level instigates a corresponding development on other levels. For example, a development in common understanding provokes corresponding development on other levels: it urges common judgements of fact and of value and it may also urge a further sharing of common experience.

Furthermore, since development occurring on any particular level involves development on other levels, it also involves development in the overall sublation of common experience, common feeling, common meaning and common values. We can name a sequence of such developing sublations, the Integral Development of Community.

It is to be noted in the above account that at any stage of a development, it is the same integration which acts as both integrator and operator. As integrator it consolidates the development up to that point, As operator it promotes further development in accordance with the principles of emergence and correspondence.

534.6 Definition of the Process

We can now define the process of integral community development as an upwardly spiraling sequence of higher sublations of common experience, common affectivity, common meaning and common values, where each succeeding sublation is both integrator and operator and so calls forth its own replacement through successive applications of the principles of emergence and correspondence.

534.7 Symbolic Representation of the Process

a) Diagram



b) Key to Symbols

(i) The basic shared desire to achieve common meaning and common values is represented by the upward direction of the spiral.

(ii) The increasing diameter of the loops in the spiral expresses the increasing realization of common meaning and common values.

(iii) The mode of development of community as a recurring spiral sequence of community-as-integrated (ACT), community-as-communicating (development as POTENTIAL), increase-in-common-meaning-and-common-values (development as FORMAL), community-as-newly-integrated (development as ACTUAL), is represented by the spiral itself, i.e. POTENCY, FORM, ACT recurring.

(iv) The double 'ACT' (printed ACT-ACT), represents the twofold function of each ACTual integration of community. As FIRST ACT ('in actu primo'), it acts as the INTEGRATOR of a development. As SECOND ACT ('in actu secundo'), the same integration acts as OPERATOR, i.e. it actually operates to bring about new development in community. As we have seen, this development is POTENTIAL when there is communication among members of a group, FORMAL when an increase in common meaning and common values has occurred, ACTUAL when this increase is integrated as FIRST ACT etc., as the process repeats itself: ACT-ACT, POTENCY, FORM, ACT-ACT recurring.

534.8 Conclusion

We have seen that the process of community development is characterized by a sequence of higher sublations of common experience, common affectivity, common meaning and common values. Our aim has been to grasp the intelligibility immanent in the process which governs the sequence. We therefore applied genetic method.

The application of the general procedures of genetic method enabled us to describe the process of community devel-

opment as:

(i) dynamic, upward-directed and increasingly differentiated;

(ii) a recurring spiral interaction between community-as-communicating, (POTENCY), the achievement of an increase in common meaning and common values, (FORM), and the higher integration of community, (ACT).

The application of the procedure of Integration and Operation together with the theory of sublation, enabled us to explain the process by grasping that each overall sublation (and each particular integration on any level) is both integrator and operator (i.e. FIRST ACT as well as SECOND ACT). As integrator (as FIRST ACT), it consolidates the development at any stage in a coordinated unity. As operator (as SECOND ACT), it calls forth its own replacement in a higher sublation (or integration as the case may be), by means of successive applications of the principles of emergence and correspondence.

53.5 The Breakdown of Community

To achieve a balanced understanding of community development, we must also have some understanding of community breakdown. Our account will be limited to a brief consideration of the process of community breakdown, together with some of it's contributory causes.

535.1 The Fact of Community Breakdown

Men can withdraw from the field of common experience and so get out of touch with one another: they cease to live in the same common world. Feelings of mutual appreciation and intimacy can disolve into feelings of mutual contempt and alienation. Men can feel attracted to opposing scales of value. They can fail to understand one another and so lapse into misunderstanding and mutual incomprehension. They can judge in opposed in opposed manners and so withdraw into different worlds. They can fail to agree on common values and common

social goals and so operate to achieve contradictory world orders. In short, community can disintegrate into collectivity and love can fade into indifference (60).

535.2 The Process of Community Breakdown

We have seen that various factors can introduce a tension into individual consciousness thereby limiting effective freedom (61). We must now examine how individual, group and general bias can introduce a tension in community which can lead to the breakdown of community. Lonergan refers to this tension as the dialectic of community.

For Lonergan, a dialectic is a concrete unfolding of linked but opposed principles of change (62). Thus, in a dialectic there is:

(i) an aggregate of determinate events;
(ii) the events may be traced to one or both of two opposed principles;
(iii) the principles are linked;
(iv) they are modified by the changes resulting from them.

Applying this to community, we can observe:

(i) that there is a tension in community (63);
(ii) that it is traceable to two opposing principles, spontaneous intersubjectivity and practical common sense (64);
(iii) that both principles are linked; (the members of a community as spontaneous, relate to one another intersubjectively; as intelligently and reasonably exercising common sense, they cooperate to bring about a a common good of order; inversely, the order which they bring about is an ordering of the immediate desires and fears of spontaneous intersubjectivity;)
(iv) that the changing good of order which is concretely realized both modifies the spontaneous intersubjective living of the community and provokes the further inquiry,insights, judgements, choices, commitments and cooperative actions of a modified common sense

Thus we can say that there is a dialectic of comm-

unity. We shall trace it to three principal causes: Individual Bias, Group Bias and General Bias.

535.3 The Causes of Community Breakdown

a) Individual Bias

Firstly, there is the bias of individuals called egoism (65). Whereas sensitive spontaneity is concerned with the immediate present of desire and feeling, intelligence is concerned with universalization and order. Egoism is an interference of sensitive spontaneity with the full development of intelligence, reasonableness and responsibility. Intelligence, strongly motivated by spontaneous desires and fears, does reach understanding but it fails to give full freedom of scope to intelligent inquiry. It fails to ask those further questions which would profoundly modify egoistic solutions. The biased egoist withdraws from common understanding and judgement. He fails to cooperate in bringing about a true good of order: Instead, he operates for his own selfish good. He fails to transcend himself and so to realize a true good of value. He fails to promote transcendence in others. Unauthentic himself, he fosters unauthenticity and failure in community.

b) Group Bias

Secondly, there is the bias of groups (66). Primitive community is intersubjective. Sensitive spontaneity binds individuals together in groups where sentiment and desire, familiarity and loyalty, are the forces of cohesion. Group bias is due to the tension between intersubjective feeling and desire, on the one hand and the demands of intelligent inquiry, reasonable judgement and responsible decision and action, on the other. When both factors support one another, the tension disappears .

However, intelligence is ever productive of new ideas. Fresh ideas motivate responsible social change. The intersubjective group resists change, especially those changes

which threaten to destroy its disproportionate advantage. Groups more favoured in circumstance and ability tend to succeed where less favoured groups fail. Individual groups neglect or oppose fruitful ideas. The demands of intelligence, reasonableness and responsibility are compromised. Understanding is blurred. Judgement is distorted. Common meaning becomes impossible to realize. Group interest blocks a true good of order and group gain replaces a true good of value. Classes and factions develop, conflicts and even violence ensue and community is destroyed.

c) General Bias

Thirdly, there is the general bias of common sense (67). Common sense is the specialization of intelligence in the particular and the concrete. It considers the affairs of the present moment and evolves an immediate solution. However, it tends to neglect the long-term costs. Thus, for example, the short-term technological boom in western society raises the long-term problems of energy depletion and environmental pollution. Self-interest favours the community with immediate gain but it also threatens the community with long-term decline. Common insights still occur, common judgements are still made, common decisions are still reached, cooperative action is still governed by institutions. But insight is short-sighted and values are mixed with disvalues. The long-term good of order is neglected and community sows the seeds of its own collapse.

We have seen how individual, group and general bias manifest the dialectical tension of community. To pursue the matter further would be to show how the various kinds of bias can be reversed and how breakdown can be noted and combatted as it occurs in community (68). However, these topics would take us too far afield.

53.6 Summary

We have presented Lonergan's general views on community and we have attempted to systematize and develop them somewhat in an effort to reach an explanatory synthesis of the process of development of community.

Initially, we discussed the context of community in our account of the human good. We analysed the fabric of community in our differentiation of the carriers, elements and functions of meaning. We concluded that the formal constituent of community is the achievement of common meaning and common values.

We then formulated an explanatory synthesis of the structure of community. Within that structure, we arrived at an explanatory synthesis of the process which governs community development. Lastly, we noted the fact of community breakdown and we attempted to account for its chief causes.

6. CARL ROGERS AND THE THERAPEUTIC COMMUNITY

6.1 THE TREND TOWARDS GROUPS

61.1 Origins of the Trend

Carl Rogers describes the group movement as " .... the most rapidly spreading social invention of the century and probably the most potent" (1). He refers to a particular kind of therapeutic community which he has christened the 'basic encounter group'. This planned intensive group experience is also variously referred to as a 'T-group', ('T' standing for training laboratory in group dynamics), 'sensitivity training', a 'laboratory in human relationships', a 'workshop in person-centered group leadership' or a 'Synanon group' (when it caters for drug addicts) (2).

The geographical focus of the group movement is the United States (and California in particular) but group 'growth centers' have also spread to Europe and Asia. The movement had a twofold simultaneous origin. In 1947, Kurt Lewin voiced the opinion that training in human relations skills was a vital though neglected part of education. His followers organized the first 'T-group' in Bethel, Maine, shortly after his death in 1947 (3).

During the same post-war period, Carl Rogers was involved in the training of counsellors to help returned war veterans. He discovered that learning was greatly increased when formal lectures were complemented by several hours of daily group experience. He became convinced that if trainee counsellors could relate closely to one another in groups, they would become aware of themselves and of those hidden attitudes which impede the therapeutic relationship (4).

Since the post-war period, Rogers has maintained a steady interest in group therapy. However, it was not until the 1960's when the so-called 'growth-groups' grew out of the therapy groups and 'growth centers' mushroomed all over the United States, that Rogers began to devote most of his time to group work.

Encounter groups have functioned in very diverse settings. They have operated in industry, in education, in churches of various denominations, in prisons, as well as in the so-called 'growth centers'. Likewise, group members have reflected a wide spectrum of professional occupations: industrial executives, university students and faculty members, psychotherapists and psychiatrists, delinquents and prisoners, married couples and divorcees, religious ministers and drug addicts (5).

It is important to note that whereas Rogers's initial interpersonal therapy (and to some extent his early group therapy) was primarily intended for the so-called 'ill' members of society, his basic encounter group was primarily organized to promote the further growth of what contemporary society regards as its 'normal' and 'healthy' members (6).

61.2 Rogers's Basic Encounter Group

Rogers writes that the basic encounter group:

> " .... usually consists of ten to fifteen persons and a facilitator or leader. It is relatively unstructured, providing a climate of maximum freedom for personal expression, exploration of feelings and interpersonal communication. Emphasis is on the interactions among the group members, in an atmosphere which encourages each to drop his defences and facades and thus enable the person to recognize and change self-defeating attitudes, test out and adopt more innovative and constructive behaviours and subsequently to relate more adequately and effectively to others in his everyday life ...." (7).

Encounter group programs vary from three-week intensive sessions to week-long groups, 'marathon' groups and periodic groups which meet regularly over an extended period (8). Most common is the 'two-and-a-half-day group' which meets more or less continuously over that period.

As Rogers's groups are unstructured, the major problem which the members face is how they are going to use their time together. According to Rogers, it gradually becomes clear that the unspoken aim of nearly all the group members is to discover ways of relating to one another. As a sense of trust gradually builds up, feelings and attitudes of group members towards themselves and towards their fellow group members are gradually explored. 'Masks' and facades are progressively lowered and the real feelings of real people become expressed more and more. Rogers observes that feelings, especially negative feelings which are normally surpressed or at least unexpressed, are found to be acceptable in the group. A group member is "more accepted the more real he becomes" (9). Thus, a sense of warmth and liking develops among group members and this leads to a heightened awareness of self-feeling in individual members.

61.3 Rogerian Groups and Non-Directivity

Rogers continues to foster the client-centered or non-directive orientation in his encounter groups. He lists the principal practical hypotheses which guide his facilitation of groups. He believes that:

(i) a facilitator can develop a climate of trust which reduces defensiveness and promotes freedom of expression in a group;

(ii) in such a climate, group members really listen to one another, really hear one another and express their immediate feeling reaction to one another;

(iii) mutual expression of feeling leads to mutual acceptance;

(iv) mutual acceptance encourages self-acceptance: each member begins to accept his whole being, "emotional, intellectual and physical - as it is, including its potential" (10);

(v) members confront one another in 'feedback': they freely communicate to one another how the other appears (11).

Rogers's style of group 'facilitation' is apparently 'non-directive' and it is very similar to his style of participation in interpersonal therapy. He himself claims:

> "In no basic philosophical way, so far as I can see, does this approach differ from that which I have adopted for years in individual therapy" (12).

There is one very significant 'philosophical' difference, I believe: Rogers participates as a full and equal member in an encounter group. Unlike his reflective and less expressive participation in interpersonal therapy, he feels free and even tries to express his own feelings and attitudes in encounter groups. I am convinced that this noticeably differentiates his group work from his interpersonal therapy. He himself admits:

> "My behaviour is often quite different in a group from what it used to be in a one-to-one relationship" (13).

As we shall see, this difference in behaviour casts serious doubts on the claim that a Rogerian facilitator is 'non-directive' in an encounter group.

6.2 COMMUNITY, ALIENATION AND GROUPS

Rogers claims that the basic need which draws people into encounter groups is the human need to experience a sense of community. He observes that this sense of community is threatened by the dehumanization of modern culture:

> "We live in an increasingly impersonal milieu formed by

scientific technology, industrial technology and urban crowding .... Another element is the increasing computorization of industry, government, education and even medicine. This is not necessarily bad in itself; it simply keeps underlining the depersonalized image the person has of himself as a mechanically filed and stimulated object, dealt with by utterly uncaring machines and bureaucrats" (14).

Rogers points out that modern culture leads to isolation and alienation from self and others, a view which is echoed by Frankl (15), May (16), Buber (17), Mowrer (18) and the existential therapists (19).

Rogers observes that people hunger for something which they often fail to find in churches, schools, urban areas and even in marriage and family life: personal relationships which are warm and real, where feelings can be freely expressed, where sorrows and joys can be shared, where all is known and all is accepted. People long for a sense of community and they look to encounter groups to satisfy this longing. That there is a quest for community among encounter group participants, is borne out by the results of a survey of an analysis of different encounter group orientations published in 1973:

" .... our interviews and group protocols indicate that a large number of subjects joined the groups with the explicit purpose of establishing permanent friendships and with the unstated or unconscious one of finding a permanent group" (20).

Rogers believes that the encounter group movement can help to bring back a sense of community in institutional settings. Consequently, he has conducted encounter groups among industrial executives, in educational establishments (21), among married couples (22) etc., sometimes with alarming results, as we shall see.

In order to foster the encounter movement, he spons-

ored the La Jolla Program of the Center for Studies of the Person, an encounter-based workshop in human relationships directed by Rogers's colleague William Coulson and others. The program consists in a series of encounter groups and community meetings aimed at the training of group facilitators (23). The hope is that participants will be able to benefit from the experience and so contribute to a sense of community in their own respective institutions.

6.3 ROGERIAN GROUPS AND OTHER TRENDS

Encounter groups can be differentiated according to whether they are leader-centered and so 'directive' or member-centered and so 'non-directive'.

Psychoanalytic groups (24), Transactional Analytic groups (25), Psychodrama groups (26), Gestalt groups (27), Esalen Eclectic groups (28), Synanon groups (29) and Rational-Emotive groups (30) and even 'T-groups' (31). tend to place an emphasis on the structuring activity of the group leader. The resulting group process differs therefore from the Rogerian group process which stresses that the group leader facilitates personal development most effectively when he acts as a group member rather than as a group 'leader'.

In my account of the group process, I shall concentrate on the Rogerian orientation. I shall rely chiefly on the descriptions of the encounter group formulated by Carl Rogers and William Coulson, as well as on my own personal experiences in Rogerian groups at the La Jolla Program, 1973. (32). I shall also draw on some of the most recent evaluative studies of the encounter group movement.

6.4 THE PROCESS OF ENCOUNTER

64.1 The Condition for the Process

According to William Coulson, the sole necessary and sufficient condition for the encounter process to occur is that there should be an occasion for it (33). This occasion must possess the following characteristics:

641.1 Extended Time

The occasion is one of slowing the normal pace of life for long enough that people will really notice one another, really listen to one another, really hear one another. It should allow people to express to one another what they are ordinarily too embarassed or too afraid to express: their feelings (34). To achieve all this people need an extended period of time together. Coulson calls the resulting group atmosphere the 'Plenum of Presence':

> "To see whom we are with, in this moment, in this place; to stop for now the frantic pace of daily activity and daily deciding, to be silent if necessary, to look around and notice who is here - this is the powerful plenum in which the encounter group operates, the here and the now. This is where persons become present to one another" (35).

641.2 Unstructuredness

The occasion must not be cluttered with requirements, not even the requirement of being a 'good' group member, who follows all the 'canons' of encounter: 'Stay with the Here-and-Now' or 'Express Feeling, not Thought' ! (36).

Coulson has observed that if people are told what they are expected to do in a group, they will tend to do it. If a leader sets a topic to be discussed or an exercise to be performed, people gladly conform, in order to avoid having to reveal themselves and their feelings (37).

A group leader who so manipulates a group in order to force encounter, errs, according to Coulson. He takes away

the opportunity, which people rarely have, of being what they want to be, without being expected to 'perform'. He also errs, says Coulson, because it is not necessary to manufacture the events of encounter (38).

Coulson is particularly critical of the various gimmicks, games and non-verbal exercises which have become popular in encounter groups, as the title of his book "Groups, Gimmicks and Instant Gurus", would suggest. He points out that the expression of touch can imply the existence of real affection and real confirmation between people: it naturally expresses a genuine closeness which already exists (39). However, some encounter leaders seem to think that the order can be reversed: that people can first touch one another artificially and as a consequence, feel close to one another. Coulson declares that in such situations, touch becomes meaningless and personal relationships are trivialized (40).

641.3 Permission to be Different

The occasion which becomes encounter carries with it the implicit permission to be different from one's ordinary self: to risk one's self, to be open and honest, to become transparent to other members (41).

People are normally unable to assume permission to depart from ordinary social discourse. They have a tendency to waste the group's time chattering and vying for leadership. However, Coulson has found that if a so-called 'facilitator' is present, if it is implied that he knows what he is doing and if he does nothing except that he tries to be himself in so far as he can, then the group members can assume permission to be open:

> "The encounter will happen, then, if you give people sufficient time together without a distracting task and put someone with them as leader who will not do traditional leaderly things - who knows enough not to get people organized, not to tell them 'how to encounter', not to set an agenda or get motions passed and most assuredly

not to put them through tricks, for they will do them" (42).

64.2 The Process

Rogers has not attempted to formulate a theory of the process of encounter comparable in precision to his theory of the process of interpersonal therapy (43). He describes the process on two occasions, observing:

> "I am not aiming at a high-level theory of the group process but rather at a naturalistic observation, out of which, I hope, true theory can be built" (44).

Where it is possible to do so without distorting Rogers's meaning, we shall employ the same terms in the following account as we did in our account of the process of interpersonal therapy, in order to highlight the parallel between the two processes.

Rogers points out that his account does not follow a rigidly causal or sequential order:

> "The interaction is best thought of, I believe, as a rich and varied tapestry, differing from group to group, yet with certain kinds of trends evident in most of these intensive encounters and with certain patterns tending to precede and others to follow" (45).

The following is roughly the sequential pattern of stages in the process.

642.1 'Milling Around'

The key feature of this stage is the refusal by the facilitator to lead the group, to set a topic or to formulate rules of procedure. He declares that the group members have total freedom and that the only responsibility which he will take is for his own behaviour in the group. The result is an initial period of confusion, polite 'cocktail-party talk', frustration and lack of continuity (46). The group may resort to various strategies in order to cope

with this awkwardness: various people may make an unsuccessful bid for leadership; rules may be suggested; very often there is a resort to politeness and formality, in order to maintain personal distance; humour may serve as a camouflage for uncertainty and embarrassment; a task may be proposed to fill the void (47).

According to Jack and Lorraine Gibb, close collaborators of Rogers, the key emotions of this stage are fear and distrust. These feelings reveal themselves in role-playing (members tend to respond to one another as 'types'), in evaluation (members tend to analyse and judge one another) and in formality (48).

642.2 Incongruence

Group members tend to reveal their 'public' selves to one another and only gradually, fearfully and ambivalently do they reveal their 'private' or inner selves. A group member remarks:

> "There is a self which I present to the world and another one which I know more intimately. With others I try to appear able, knowing, unruffled, problem-free. To substantiate this image I will act in a way which at the time or later seems false or artificial or 'not the real me'" (49).

As we have seen, this discrepancy between the private and public selves is part of what Rogers means by incongruence (50). It's manifestations are façade-building and gamesmanship (51).

642.3 Expression of Past Feelings

Tentatively and somewhat fearfully, members begin to take the risk of exposing themselves in spite of ambivalent feelings about the trustworthiness of the group. There is an initial description of feelings, usually in reference to past events, i.e. in reference to the There-and Then: to something existing outside the group in time and in place.

642.4 Expression of Negative Feelings

Rogers remarks:

"Curiously enough, the first expression of genuinely significant 'here-and-now' feeling is apt to come in negative attitudes towards other group members or the group leader" (52).

Very often it is the leader who is the focus of anger, chiefly because he 'fails' to give 'proper' guidance to the group.

Rogers suggests two reasons for this outburst of negative feeling. Firstly, it is one of the best ways of testing the freedom and trustworthiness of the group (53). Secondly, deeply positive feelings are more difficult and dangerous to express than negative ones. To admit to liking or loving, leaves one vulnerable and open to rejection. To admit to anger or dislike leaves one, at most, open to attack.

642.5 Expression of Increasing Openness

Gradually, a sense of trust develops. Group members begin to feel a certain risky freedom in the atmosphere of the group. Each one begins to realize that the group is in part his group:

"The problem of trust formation is the problem of attaining membership. One achieves genuine belonging by trusting himself and the group .... As the group grows, fear decreases and trust increases" (54).

Growth in trust is manifest in increasing openness and honesty among group members. At this stage, it is most likely that someone will reveal himself in a significant way. He takes the risk of letting the group know some deeper facet of himself. Gerard Haig remarks:

"Regardless of with whom it takes place, trainer or member, it is the revelation of the 'I' to the other and the other to the 'I' that is the core healing and redemptive activity in the sensitivity training group" (55).

Openness and honesty appear to be two central factors in promoting change in encounter groups (56).

642.6 Expression of Immediate Feelings

Increasing trust, openness and honesty tend to bring the immediate feelings of one member towards another, out into the open. Sometimes feelings are positive: 'I like your warmth and your smile'. Sometimes they are negative: 'I feel threatened by your silence' or 'I feel myself experiencing strong feelings of dislike for you'. According to Rogers, such honest and open expression of feeling is possible only because of the climate of trust which has developed in the group (57).

642.7 Acceptance and Empathic Understanding

Rogers feels that one of the most fascinating aspects of the intensive group experience is the natural and spontaneous capacity of the ordinary group member to share the pain and suffering of others in a therapeutic manner (58). A spirit of 'real listening', 'real hearing', 'real caring' and 'real prizing' develops in the group, similar to the 'unconditional positive regard' and 'empathic understanding' which Rogers discovered to be the significant helpful attitudes in his interpersonal therapy. He has become increasingly convinced that a deeply perceptive and facilitating attitude is common among group members and he believes that the ability to be therapeutic or healing is far more widespread among 'ordinary' people than is normally realized (59).

642.8 Experience of Self-Acceptance

The acceptance and empathic understanding of other group members leads to self-acceptance (i.e. positive self-regard). For Rogers, self-acceptance tends to mean the acceptance of self-feelings and self-experiences (60). A group member who is learning to accept himself becomes more open to change. He is closer to his feelings and to all that is happening in his 'organism', his self-structure is no longer so rigidly organized and so he is more open to change.

642.9 Growth in Congruence

Rogers refers to growth in congruence as the 'crack-

ing of facades'. Mutual transparence gradually replaces tact, cover-up, 'intellectualizing' and polite conversation. There is a transition from Buber's 'seeming' to his 'being' (61). The frank expression of self by some members has set a headline that deeper and more basic encounter is possible and the group seems to move almost intuitively in that direction. Rogers writes:

> "Gently at times, almost savagely at others, the group demands that the individual be himself, that his current feelings not be hidden, that he remove the mask of ordinary social intercourse" (62).

642.10 Feedback and Confrontation

In the course of this free, expressive, honest and congruent interaction, the individual group member receives a great deal of information about how he appears to others and about how they react to him. Rogers calls this frank exchange 'feedback' (63). Whether positive and warm or negative and upsetting, Rogers claims that 'feedback' is constructive because of the atmosphere of trust in the group (64).

Feedback of a particularly forceful kind sometimes occurs when one member confronts another in anger and this usually results in a deep closeness between the pair:

> " .... the incredible fact experienced over and over by members of the group was that, when a negative feeling was fully expressed to another, the relationship grew and the negative feeling was replaced by a deep acceptance for the other" (65).

I believe that 'feedback' and 'confrontation' significantly differentiate the group relationship from the relationship in interpersonal therapy. The facilitator expresses his feelings and attitudes towards the group member much more freely than does the interpersonal therapist to the client (66).

642.11 The Basic Encounter

Positive and negative 'feedback' tend to deepen group relationships, leading to what Rogers describes as 'basic encounter'. He illustrates:

> "A man tells through his tears, of the tragic loss of his child, a grief which he is experiencing for the first time, not holding back his feelings in any way. Another says to him, also with tears in his eyes, 'I've never before felt a real physical hurt in me from the pain of another. I feel completely with you'. This is basic encounter" (67).

This illustration of basic encounter is particularly close to what Max Scheler describes as 'fellow-feeling' and it resembles Buber's 'making present (68). Rogers borrows another of Buber's terms when he remarks that:

> "Such I-Thou relationships (to use Buber's term again) occur with some frequency in these group sessions and nearly always bring a moistness to the eyes of the participants" (69).

The question may well be asked as to whether Rogers use of the term I-Thou (in Buber's sense) is justified here. We shall discuss this in our critique.

Such closeness leads to what Rogers understands as confirmation:

> " .... a kind of confirmation of myself, of the uniqueness and universal qualities of men, a confirmation that when we can be human together something positive can emerge" (70).

Rogers is convinced that when one person is real with another, he has an 'astonishing ability' to heal the other with a real and understanding 'love', whether that person be facilitator or member (71).

642.12 Clarification

The process of encounter is a movement from fear and distrust towards acceptance and trust; from incongruence

and facade to congruence and openness; from formality and role-playing to warmth and intimacy; from basic distance to basic relationship (72). In the individual member, the growing climate of trust promotes a movement from incongruence, anxiety and threat towards the experience and expression of feelings for self and others.

Initially, these feelings may be negative or tentative but gradually they become warm and positive. The caring comprehension and deep 'prizing' by other members of the group promote warm self-understanding and positive self-regard. Rogers regards the following statement of a former participant in one of his groups as typical:

> "I am more open, spontaneous. I express myself more freely. I am more sympathetic, empathic and tolerant. I am more confident. I am more religious in my own way. My relations with my family, friends and co-workers are more honest and I express my likes and dislikes and true feelings more openly. I admit ignorance more readily. I am more cheerful. I want to help others more" (73).

However, not all reports of encounter experiences are so glowing and there is evidence that casualties do occur (74). We may therefore conclude that for some encounter participants, the open and frank expression of positive and negative feelings can lead to more spontaneous and warm interpersonal closeness. For others, however, the same frank and open expression of feeling can have seriously detrimental outcomes.

64.3 The Facilitation of the Process

643.1 Rogers's Basic Attitudes as a Facilitator

Rogers is aware that he does not facilitate the group as a 'tabula rasa' and so he thinks that it is important to state clearly the basic attitudes and convictions with which he approaches an encounter group. He aims:

a) To Trust in the Group Process

Given a reasonably facilitating climate in the group, Rogers trusts the group to further its own potential and that of its members. He remarks that he has:

" .... gradually developed a great deal of trust in the group process. This is undoubtedly similar to the trust I came to have in the process of therapy in the indivual, when it was facilitated rather than directed" (75).

Rogers remarks that the group resembles an organism which has its own direction even though he cannot predict that direction (76). When a group member is exhibiting what Rogers judges to be psychotic behaviour, Rogers has learned to rely on the other group members to be as helpful as he hopes to be himself:

"I rely on the wisdom of the group more than on my own and am often deeply astonished at the therapeutic ability of the members" (77).

b) To Have No Specific Goals For the Group

Rogers writes:

"I usually have no specific goal for a particular group and sincerely want it to develop its own directions" (78).

He notes that whenever he has a specific (as against a general) goal in mind for a group, the group members usually resist his aim. He does have a general goal in mind, however. He hopes that there will be some sort of process movement in the group and he believes that he can predict its general direction:

"The group will move - of that I am convinced but it would be presumptuous to think that I can or should direct that movement towards a specific goal" (79).

c) To be a Facilitator-Member of the Group

Rogers hopes to become as much a participant as a facilitator in a group. He dislikes the facilitator who withholds himself from emotional participation in the group. He distrusts the 'expert' who analyses the group process and the reactions of the group members. He believes that such a facil-

itator denies his spontaneous feelings and provides a model for group members' imitation (80). At times, he expresses feelings and attitudes aimed at facilitating the growth of another member. At other times, he expresses feelings which have as their goal the opening of himself to further growth.

d) To be 'Totally' Present

Rogers says that he tries to be present as a 'whole' person - in both 'cognitive' as well as 'affective' modes - when he facilitates a group. However, he admits that this is very difficult to achieve:

> "I have not found this easy to achieve since most of us seem to choose one mode rather than the other at any given instant" (81).

e) To be Unstructuring and Non-Directive

Rogers opens the initial group session in a very relaxed fashion, with no more than a simple sentence such as:

> "I suspect we will know each other a great deal better at the end of these group sessions than now" (82),

or:

> "I'm a little uneasy but I feel somewhat reassured when I look around at you and realize we're all in the same boat" (83).

He has found that a facilitator who pushes a group, manipulates it, makes rules for it or tries to direct it, is less effective: he destroys the group's trust in him or he converts the members into his worshipful followers (84).

643.2 Perceptivity in Experiencing

Rogers listens as carefully, accurately and sensitively as possible to each member who expresses himself, whether superficially or otherwise. He believes that such listening 'validates' the person. Every member who speaks is worth understanding and worthwhile. Rogers admits that this 'listening' tends to be selective and to that extent 'directive': he is less interested in the details being recounted than in the significance which the experiences have for the speaker - especially

the emotional significance:

> "It is to these meanings and feelings that I try to respond" (85).

Rogers tries to hear not only what a member may be saying but what he may not be saying but may want to say:

> " .... to become involved in someone else's 'silent scream'" (86).

Rogers tries to reach out so that a group member may realize that whatever happens to him or within him, be it joy or pain, Rogers is very much 'with' him:

> "I think I can usually sense when a participant is frightened or hurting, and it is at these moments that I give him some sign, verbal or non-verbal, that I perceive this and am a companion to him as he lives in that hurt or fear" (87).

643.3 Acceptance

Rogers tries to accept the group exactly as it is and where it is: if a group wishes to 'intellectualize' or to discuss quite superficial problems or if it is emotionally closed and frightened of communication, he is not upset. Thus, he avoids tactics which force here-and-now communication and feeling within the group. He is convinced that, at least, such strategies lead to discipleship: at worst, they violate the privacy of the individual group members (88).

Rogers also accepts the individual member's wish to commit himself or not to commit himself to the group. He accepts a member's silence, provided that it does not represent an unexpressed pain. He accepts a member's statements at their face value and he refrains from interpreting or judging or evaluating. As in his interpersonal therapy, Rogers's regard for the group member is unconditional. Although he responds more to his present feelings, he refuses to make here-and-now rules.

643.4 Empathic Understanding

As in his interpersonal therapy, Rogers tries to

understand the exact meaning and (in so far as possible) the full emotional impact of what a member is communicating. He tries to grasp the internal frame of reference of the speaker. In Buber's language, he tries to 'imagine the real' in the other (89). In Binswanger's perspective, he tries to enter the 'meaning-matrix' of the other, while at the same time preserving his own 'meaning-matrix' (90). Lieberman's survey of encounter groups confirms that it seems to be the appreciating and supportive understanding of the listener which confers on self-disclosure it's potential for change (91).

643.5 Operating in Terms of Feeling

Rogers declares:

> "I have learned to be more and more free in making use of my own feelings as they exist in the moment, whether in relation to the group as a whole or to one individual or to myself" (92).

In being more expressive of feeling, Rogers therefore acts somewhat differently in groups than he did in interpersonal therapy. He tries to voice any persisting feelings which he experiences towards an individual or towards the group (93), whereas in interpersonal therapy he would remain silent about these feelings. He writes:

> "When asked a question, I try to consult my own feelings" (94).

He trusts these feelings, impulses and fantasies which surface in him and he tries to be as expressive of negative and frustrated feelings as he is of positive and warm feelings. He believes that he functions best in a group when his 'owned' feelings - positive or negative - are in immediate interaction with those of another group member. He observes:

> "It is the closest I get to an I-Thou relationship" (95).

643.6 Congruence

Above all, Rogers tries to be congruent (i.e.'real') in his reaction to group members. He expresses what he feels for others and how he reacts to them, as openly and as honestly

as possible. When it seems appropriate, he is willing to be open and to share his own distress with the group. He notes that whenever he has failed to do so, he has not listened as well as he otherwise might have (96).

Although he tries to be 'real' in a group, Rogers refuses to be evaluative or diagnostic or judgemental of group members' reactions. He merely reports to individual group members how he reacts to them in the group.

643.7 Spontaneity

Rogers writes:

"Spontaneity is the most precious and elusive element I know " (97).

As we have seen, Rogers's philosophy of development stresses that the 'fully-functioning' person floats in the complex stream of his immediate experience (98). Thus, Rogers himself tries to express the flow of his own experience as spontaneously as he can in an encounter group. Sometimes he expresses himself verbally and sometimes non-verbally. Sometimes his expression involves the physical movements of touch or change in position in the group. Rogers believes that artificiality is the greatest enemy of spontaneity and so he avoids the planned exercises and gimmicks which have become the feature of some other encounter orientations (99). Likewise, in order to avoid provoking an artificial 'self-consciousness' in group members, he avoids comments on the group process (100).

643.8 The Power of the Facilitator as Model

Rogers claims to be non-directive and non-manipulative in a group (101). Nevertheless, he is aware that " the way I serve as a facilitator has significance in the life of the group" (102). He also admits that "my behaviour is often quite different in a group from what it used to be in a one-to-one relationship"(103), because "I have learned to be free in making use of my own feelings" (104). He finds "I do something very spontaneously and it is highly effective" (105).

Thus, Rogers is conscious that a facilitator's behaviour can be a "model for the group" (106).

Other encounter writers highlight the role of the facilitator in terms of modelling. Gibb admits that the "leader-as-person can be a powerful influence in the group" (107). Hobart Thomas affirms that the facilitator's essential task is to allow himself to be known by others (108). Frederick Stoller is convinced that the leader's behaviour is so powerful that it is a substitute for rules in a group (109). Sidney Jourard sees the group leader as an exemplar. "I 'lead' by example", he admits (110).

Leonard Krasner has advanced the hypothesis that:

> "Probably the most effective way to 'control' another person's behaviour is to 'be spontaneous' in the relationship with them" (111).

The charge has therefore been levelled against Rogers that he tends to minimise the inevitability of some degree of manipulation in any influence situation; that he makes the unrealistic assumption that by choosing 'proper' goals and techniques in an influence situation, he can sidestep the problem of manipulation and control (112). Herbert Kelman remarks:

> "He (Rogers) seems to argue that, when an influencing agent is dedicated to the value of man as a self-actualizing process (113) and selects techniques that are designed to promote this value, he can abrogate his power over the influence and maintain a relationship untainted by behaviour control" (114).

Kelman feels that a certain amount of control is inevitable.

6.5 OUTCOMES OF ENCOUNTER

65.1 Individual Outcomes in Three Phases

Coulson describes encounter effects in three phases:

651.1 Openness

According to Coulson, the initial period after the

termination of the encounter group is characterized by emotional openness towards others. The former participant is still bathing "in the afterglow of the workshop experience" and he wants to be open in his everyday life, as though the whole world were an encounter group (115). However, the less permissive world of day-to-day living puts pressure on him to modify his encounter behaviour.

According to Coulson, he is reluctant to return to caution and artificiality. He has learned that how he spontaneously feels is also how others spontaneously feel, if only he can reach them. He has learned to take risks in order to do so.

651.2 Crisis

Enthusiasm for spontaneous openness is rarely met with the same enthusiasm in the world of family, friends and work. Frankness is resisted by tact, diplomacy, formality and even hostility. Gradually, encounter behaviour is replaced by the 'normality' of everyday facade, role-playing and distance (116).

651.3 Residue

Nonetheless, Coulson believes that the former encounter participant has learned. He is left with a "residue of new knowledge and new hope ...." (117). He is now fully 'in charge' of his own life situation and he has experienced his potential kinship with other human beings.

According to Coulson, the former encounter participant has a new capacity to get close to what is going on inside himself, a capacity to contact the source of authority in himself represented by feeling. He writes:

> "Encounter groups are more part of the tradition of moral education than they are the scientific tradition of psychology or the medical tradition of psychiatry, for they have most to do with learning to be in touch with one's self and with becoming more of what one wishes to be" (118).

The former encounter member has also learned that he can call on people: he can be more present and open with people when he wishes to be. Greater awareness of himself and less need to defend himself against threatening experience, gives him a greater sensitivity to the full range of other people's feelings.

65.2 Individual, Relational and Institutional Outcomes

Rogers tends to paint a more enthusiastic and wide-sweeping picture of encounter outcomes than does Coulson. He notes changes in individuals, in relationships and in organizations.

652.1 Individual Outcomes

Rogers reports that he has seen individuals alter their self-concepts considerably as they explore their feelings in an accepting climate and as they receive tough and tender feedback from other caring members:

> "I have seen persons begin to realize and bring into being more of their potential through their behaviours both in the group and afterwards. Time and time again I have seen individuals choose a whole new direction for their lives - philosophically, vocationally and intellectually - as a result of an encounter group experience" (119).

The question may be asked whether these new 'directions' represent personal development or merely personal change, as we shall see in our critique.

Rogers also admits that some people go through an encounter group experience untouched, noting no significant personal change then or later. He claims that others who are seemingly untouched by the group experience, change at a later date.

652.2 Relational Outcomes

Rogers is equally sanguine about the changes which occur in relationships as a direct result of encounter:

"I have known individuals for whom the encounter experience has meant an almost miraculous change in the depth of their communication with spouse and children. Sometimes, for the first time real feelings are shared ..." (120

He points to fathers who have been able to communicate with their sons for the first time; teachers who have transformed their classes into personal and caring learning groups; seminarians who have made great strides in translating love and brotherhood into real communication and caring for one another. In short, Rogers believes that encounter can transform relationships in openness, in trust and in warmth.

However, that an exaggerated emphasis on intersubjective emotional spontaneity is potentially disruptive of commitment to relationship, is clearly evident in Rogers's recent book, Becoming Partners: Marriage and Its Alternatives, which is based on his experience with married and divorced people. He writes:

"It is becoming increasingly clear that a man-woman relationship will have permanence only to the degree that it satisfies the emotional, psychological, intellectual and physical needs of the partners" (121).

Although Rogers merely claims to be reading the signs of the times rather then advocating a change in the meaning of marriage, the whole tone of his book exhalts spontaneity, feeling and change to the apparent neglect of value, decision, choice and commitment.

We learn that by the year 2000, permanent commitment, "the attitude of possessiveness - of owning another person - which has historically dominated sexual unions - is likely to be greatly diminished" (122). There will be sexual freedom for adolescents and adults. Each person will be assured of "lasting infertility in early adolescence" (123). Couples will remain together only if they "feel deeply commited to each other" (124). "There may be a mutual agreement as to whether or not the marriage includes sexual faithfulness to

one's mate" (125). They will decide to have children only when they have shown evidence of a mature commitment to each other.

Rogers's book consists in a series of biographical histories of contemporary 'marriages of three', 'communal marriages', 'experimental unions', etc. He tells us that:

> " .... these are all gropings towards some new form of man-woman relationship for the future" (126).

It is clear that when the criterion of value is emotional spontaneity, change takes precedence over the more traditional criteria which stress decision and commitment.

652.3 Institutional Outcomes

We have mentioned that Rogers has conducted encounter groups in institutional settings and we shall now examine the consequences of his largest educational undertaking, by way of an example of the effect of encounter on institutions.

In 1967, Rogers published an article entitled "A Plan for Self-Directed Change in an Educational System", in which he proposed that encounter groups, which seemed to have powerful effects on individuals, could could also be applied in stagnant educational systems (127). He wrote that educational systems had to discover a climate conducive to personal growth, where innovation was no longer frightening, where the creative capacities of administrators, teachers and students would be encouraged rather than stifled, where self-directed learning would take precedence over teaching. Rogers claimed that the encounter group could effect such a revolution.

As a result of his article, Rogers and his staff were invited to conduct a three-year series of encounter groups among the administrators, faculty members and students of the large Californian Catholic school system run by the Sisters of the Immaculate Heart of Mary. Six hundred nuns ran one university, eight high schools and fifty primary schools. One year after the encounter project had ended, there were only two schools and no nuns left in the original

system (128).

Rogers had urged that a large number of encounter groups should be held over a concentrated period of time, among administrators, among faculty members and among students of the various institutions and subsequently among groups composed of all three sectors. He had warned:

> "It cannot be denied that when problems, especially interpersonal problems, are faced openly rather than swept under the rug; when interpersonal relationships are substituted in place of roles and rules, then a certain amount of constructive turbulence is inevitable" (129).

Very quickly it became apparent that whereas some individuals did appear to benefit from the experience of encounter, the various educational institutions were decidedly disrupted by the experiment. Divisions developed between the faculty members and the administrators and on one occasion a near-riot developed between black and white university students.

Conflict eventually developed between the Cardinal-Archbishop of Los Angeles and the Immaculate Heart Order, resulting in the nuns departure from the diocesan schools and from their order. 320 of them formed another order. The disruption was complete (130). A faculty member commented:

> "It would be unrealistic to think that the two events, the encounter project and the conflict with the cardinal, just happened simultaneously .... I think we need a clear sifting of the evidence to show, if possible, how Encounter Facilitated Revolution in a Static Society" (131).

William Coulson tries to explain:

> "In organizational life, when interpersonal problems arise, the norm is to push them away .... In the encounter group, the norm is to go into that which is interpersonally awkward. And thus there is immediately a conflict between the group way and the institutional way"(132).

Coulson states quite cleary that, unlike Rogers, he wishes to

paint a 'dim picture' of the effects of encounter groups within educational institutions. He is convinced that " .... encounter groups are disruptive of institutional life" (133).

Rogers, on the contrary, sees positive effects in institutions as a result of encounter. For instance, remarking that:

> "In our schools, colleges and universities there is a most desperate need for more participation on the part of learners in the whole programe .... " (134),

he quotes one enthusiastic comment by an organizer of an encounter project with such an aim:

> "'One outcome is that students will immerse themselves in schools all over the city, observing classes, sitting in on faculty meetings, interviewing teachers, students and administrators. Our students will <u>then</u> describe what <u>they</u> need to know, to experience, to do, in order to teach. They will then gather faculty and other students around them to assist them in accomplishing their own goals'. Here is self-directed change at its best" (135).

During the La Jolla Program of the Center for Studies of the Person, in August 1973, Rogers admitted to the participants that he thought his encounter group activities were subversive of institutions. However, he added that the subversion of sterile institutions was something he was personally pleased about ! Elsewhere he explains:

> "It will not surprize readers .... that I predict, as change is brought about, an increasing degree of turbulence and criticism <u>in the whole educational system</u>. Whether the faculty and administrators will be polarized remains to be seen. At least there will be ample opportunity to talk out differences and explore new alternatives if those first tried seem unsatisfactory. It is the boldest and most promising venture I know of in educational systems at the present time" (136).

6.6 ROGERIAN ENCOUNTER AND PERSONAL DEVELOPMENT

66.1 W. R. Bion and Basic Assumption Groups

Rogers does not study the dynamics of his basic encounter group. We shall therefore examine the process of his group in the light of W. R. Bion's theory of group dynamics which has acquired something of the status of a 'classic' but, more important, is particularly suited to the study of Rogerian encounter, as we shall see.

Our interest lies not so much in the actual dynamics of Rogerian encounter, as in the very important consequences which Bion's theory has for alleged personal development in Rogers's groups (137).

661.1 The Work Group

In his theory Bion distinguishes the 'work group' from the 'basic assumption group'.

A 'work group' is structured. It emphasises cooperation to achieve or bring about something (138). Its activity is related to a task and so the development of skills are often necessary. Thus, it aims at development in practical intelligence which is orientated towards action. Action inevitably means contact with the 'real' and so it demands a respect for truth. Therefore, according to Bion, work groups lead to development.

661.2 The Basic Assumptions

Work group function is often obstructed and is sometimes assisted by other mental activities which are accompanied by powerful emotional drives (139). These activities can be given some intelligible cohesion if it is assumed that they are governed by certain basic assumptions common to all group members. These assumptions are conscious, although they are not usually adverted to by the group members. The same spectrum of emotions accompanies each of the various basic assumpt-

ions. However, according to Bion, a different combination of emotions in each case yields a perceptibly different overall emotional tone which serves to differentiate each of the basic assumptions from one another.

Bion notes that a group may be a work group which has more or less happily combined one of the basic assumptions. On the other hand, it may lack work group function and so it may be governed by any one of the basic assumptions at a time, sometimes alternating from one basic assumption to another.

a) Dependency Groups

When a group is reacting emotionally according to the first basic assumption, it is assumed by the members that the group has met:

> " .... in order to be sustained by a leader on whom it depends for nourishment, material and spiritual, and protection" (140).

According to Bion, its emotional tone is one of depression and even guilt. The group members feel an emotional need to depend on someone or something and when the group 'leader' plays the part of a dependable 'pseudo-deity', then the group proceeds smoothly.

b) Pairing Groups

When a group is reacting emotionally according to the second basic assumption, its members assume that the purpose for which the group has met is to allow 'pairing' to take place between its members (141). The overall emotional tone of the pairing group is an air of hopeful expectation that some future event: marriage, group therapy, or some new kind of community, should be developed or fostered. Bion remarks that it is not so much the reference to some future event which is significant, as the feeling of hopefulness itself. This hopeful feeling distinguishes the pairing group from each of the other basic assumption groups. Bion regards

this pairing between group members as a 'precursor' of sexuality (142).

The 'leader' of a pairing group is either a person or an idea or a utopia which will save the group from feelings of destructiveness, alienation and despair. Thus, the leader is a sort of 'Messiah' but it is a 'Messiah' that must remain unborn. According to Bion, 'Messianic' hope must never be fulfilled if it is to play its part in the pairing group. When work-group function obtrudes in a pairing group, in the guise of attempting to produce a 'Messiah' then the feeling of hope is weakened and destructiveness and despair (in no way radically influenced) again make their existence felt (143). Thus, according to Bion, tolerance of hope among pairing-group members is a function of the second basic assumption and not a sign of personal development.

c) Fight-Flight Groups

When a group is reacting according to the third basic assumption, its members assume that the purpose for which the group has met is to fight something or to run away from something. The overall emotional tone of the fight-flight group is one of anger and hate (144). Its leader is someone whose demands on the group are felt to afford an opportunity for flight or aggression and if he makes other demands on the group, he is ignored.

661.3 Characteristics of the Basic Assumptions

a) 'Valency'

Bion observes that participation in basic assumption groups requires no training, experience or special competence. It exacts no further mental development. It is instinctive and instantaneous, making no demands on its members to cooperate. Bion borrows the term 'valency' from the scientists in order to express this:

" .... capacity for instantaneous involuntary combination of one individual with another, for sharing and acting on

a basic assumption" (145).
Bion's 'valency' corresponds somewhat to Lonergan's 'primitive intersubjectivity' (146).

b) Non-Verbal Communication

Bion remarks:

"I have been forced to the conclusion that verbal exchange is a function of the work group. The more the group corresponds with the basic-assumption group, the less it makes any rational use of verbal communication" (147).

Rather than develop language as a mode of thought, basic-assumption groups make use of an existing language as a mode of action, according to Bion. They tend to use a simple and even debased form of language, prefering the immediately understood intersubjective carriers of meaning to linguistic communication.

c) Personal or Non-Personal Leader

The'leader'in a basic assumption group need not be a person. In a dependent of fight-flight group, the'leader' can be the history and tradition of the group, which acts as a sort of group 'bible'. In a pairing group, the leader is always an unborn 'Utopia' or 'Messiah' which is the object of the feelings of hope.

d) Heightened Sense of Emotion

Bion reports a pleasurable "feeling of vitality" in basic assumption groups (148). He considers Freud's view that in a group, emotions become extraordinarily intensified, while intellectual activity becomes markedly reduced. Bion distinguishes. In a basic-assumption group, where structure and organization are absent and so are unable to deal with the basic assumptions, emotions are intensified and intellectual activity is rather rudimentary. However, in a work group, (or for instance when Bion interprets the process of a group), intellectual activity of a high order is possible in the group, together with an awareness of the emotions of the accompanying basic assumption (when a basic assumption accompanies work-

group function) (149).

e) Opposition to Development

Bion comments that basic-assumption groups try to suppress new ideas which would entail development on the part of group members. In fight-flight groups and in dependent groups, the new idea is felt to oppose the 'leader', be it a bible or a person. In pairing groups, the new idea threatens to give birth to the 'Utopia' which must remain unborn. Bion writes:

> "The crux of the matter lies in the threat of the new idea to demand development and the inability of basic-assumption groups to tolerate development" (150).

He concludes that basic-assumption groups are opposed to development, because development is dependent on understanding. The feeling of vitality compensates for the lack of development.

66.2 Rogerian Groups and the Basic Assumptions

As I have pointed out above, Rogers has not analysed the dynamics of his basic encounter group. Thus, I base the following account on an application of Bion's theory to Rogers's account of the group process, as well as on my own personal observations while participating in Rogerian encounter groups.

662.1 The Dynamics of Rogerian Groups

The early stage of Rogerian encounter, 'milling around', often betrays a desire for work-group function, coupled with the first basic assumption, dependency. The group searches for a task, a structure and a leader. The Rogerian facilitator's refusal to lead or structure, together with the group's rejection of rival leadership claims, tend to effect a transition from the first to the third basic assumption. The desire for dependency gives way to the desire to fight the confusion which threatens to overwhelm the group.

'Cocktail-party' talk and other strategies are adopted to achieve this. At this stage in the process, the overall emotional tone of the group is one of distrust and fear, mounting at times to anger. Work-group function fades almost completely

As trust develops and openness increases, there is a further transition to the second basic assumption, i.e. pairing. Members gradually begin to 'encounter' one another (in Rogers's sense of the term), in the hope that true I-Thou relations, true confirmation and real community are possible. This pairing tends to dominate the remaining stages of Rogerian encounter (in my experience). Sidney Jourard's account of the group process would appear to support this view (151).

662.2 Characteristics of Rogerian Groups

We shall now analyse Rogerian groups in the light of Bion's basic assumptions.

a) 'Valency'

Rogerian groups are neither structured nor ordered. They do not encourage the differentiation of roles in the group and they refuse to set tasks for the group members. Communication tends to be spontaneous, instinctive and intersubjective. Thus, in my experience, Bion's 'valency' is all that is required for 'successful' participation in Rogerian encounter: development is certainly not required (whatever about the possibility of its occurrence).

b) Non-Verbal Communication

Rogerian group members tend to grow increasingly impatient of what is termed 'intellectualizing' in encounter circles, (the attempt to explain ideas or feelings in rational terms). Lieberman notes that group members tend to attack cognitive expression as 'rationalization' and 'defensiveness' and to stress 'grit feelings' as the basic medium of interpersonal exchange (152). Rogers himself aims:

" ....to have the whole person present, in both his affective and cognitive modes" (153).

He admits, however, that he has:

" .... not found this easy to achieve, since most of us tend to choose one mode rather than the other at any given instant" (154).

In my experience, the 'feeling mode' almost inevitably dominates encounter groups (155). Cognitive meaning is employed only in so far as it mediates the symbolic communication of feeling. Indeed, a whole new 'language' has developed in encounter circles and it's vocabulary is exceedingly limited. Numerous 'vogue' expressions tend to dominate exchanges such as: "I'm not sure if I'm where you're 'at', at the moment", or "I'm in a good place, right now". Certain unwritten 'rules' tend to govern the kind of exchanges which occur: one must never begin an observation with "You are so and so ...."; instead one must begin "I feel that you are so and so ...." or "You come accross to me as so and so ...." or "I have feelings of so and so when you ...." etc.; similarily it is 'forbidden' to say "We": one must speak only for one's self and so begin with "I". I think that Bion's term 'debased' is not an unfair description of such exchange. (Bion uses the term 'debased' in the sense of simplified rather than in the pejorative sense).

c) Change as 'Leader'

Group members are filled with hope that change is possible: Change in openness, spontaneity, sympathy, empathy and expressivity. The hope is that such change will promote truer, more real and more 'confirming' relationships and that a sense of community will develop. This euphoria for change corresponds to Bion's 'Messiah'. Rogerian encounter does not seem to promote a process of change leading to a goal (such as transcendence, for instance). Instead, it tends to set up 'changingness' as a utopia in itself (156). Kurt Back calls this phenomenon the 'mythology of change'. He writes:

"We can see here the value put on change, on the regeneration of experience pure and simple .... The impression that sensitivity training (i.e. encounter groups) is worthwhile .... makes the change experience acceptable. The vocabulary of change, change agents, gut learning, spontaneity, authenticity, is all directed towards some change in everyday life, no matter what. In the same vein Kenneth Burke has put forward a concept of the 'God-term', the term which represents the principal value in a society. Change might be such a term now .." (157).

d) Heightened Emotions

It is clear from our account that one of the dominant effects of encounter is a feeling of closeness within the group, together with a heightened sense of feeling in the individual group members. Rogers writes:

"Thus, as sessions proceed, an increasing feeling of warmth and group spirit and trust is built up ..." (158).

Sometimes this warmth is described as 'love' (159). Rollo May criticizes the use of the term 'love' in this kind of context: it amounts to a confusion between the spontaneous emotional honesty of the immediate moment and the ever-deepening unity of the enduring relationship (160).

The fact that heightening of feeling is the feature most heavily emphasized by participants and writers on encounter, strengthens my view that Rogerian encounter groups fulfil Bion's requirements as basic-assumption groups (161).

e) Development

The most significant point now arises. Bion contends that basic-assumption groups are totally opposed to development and we have been attempting to show that Rogerian groups tend to fulfil the requirements of basic-assumption groups. Can we therefore conclude that there is at least a serious doubt that encounter groups lead to the development which is claimed?

Rogers himself admits:

> "There is a great deal of debate as to whether the intensive group experience produces any significant change and especially whether it produces any lasting change in behaviour" (162).

It is evident that group participants experience strong feelings within themselves and towards others in encounter groups; however, Bernard Forer notes that in the case of 'too many':

> "In subsequent follow-up it is apparent that the emotional effects have faded away as though they had had a thrill and remembered having had it. But their human relationships and their self-conceptions remain placidly unbudged" (163).

Lieberman tries to explain why this is so. He contends that experiencing (such as encounter groups provide) and development are two quite distinct things which are sometimes opposed:

> "It is likely that encounter group leaders emphasize two sometimes opposed values: encounter groups are a place to experience, to live, to enjoy, to feel; and encounter groups are a place to learn, to change, to develop" (164).

662.3 Conclusion

We may conclude that the Rogerian basic encounter group would appear to fulfil the various requirements of Bion's basic-assumption group. Thus, if Bion's conclusion is accurate, the implication is that while Rogers's basic encounter group may lead to personal change it is at least questionable whether it leads to significant personal development.

We may also conclude that while the encounter group may lead to a 'sense of' community, its disruptive and even destructive consequences in the instances we have mentioned (165) raise serious questions with regard to the validity of its indiscriminate application in institutional settings. We shall discuss both of these questions in our critique.

SECTION THREE

COMPARATIVE CRITIQUE

7. THE CONTRASTING HORIZONS OF LONERGAN AND ROGERS

7.1 HORIZONS OF METHOD

71.1 Lonergan's Genetic Method

Our opening chapter explained briefly Lonergan's approach to method and to heuristic structure. We noted that he distinguishes the method of pre-scientific inquiry from classical, statistical and genetic methods (1). We must now question whether such preoccupation with method fosters the progressive results which he claims.

Lonergan's interest in method dates back to his major studies in the 1940's, notably his accounts of 'operative grace' and 'verbum' in the writings of St. Thomas Aquinas (2). He claims that what he discovered in these undertakings was not only what Aquinas said on the topics of 'gratia operans' and 'verbum' (3). In addition, he gradually began to discover the 'mind' of Aquinas: in relentlessly following the argumentation of St. Thomas, Lonergan began to grapple with what was going forward as Aquinas questiones, puzzled, tentatively understood, revised and affirmed his doctrines. In reviewing the 'verbum' articles, L.-B. Geiger wrote:

> "L'Auteur (Lonergan) a estimé avec raison qu'il importait avant tout de bien dégager le donné, la realité psychologique dont le philosophe ou le théologien entendent parler. C'est en partant d'une vue précise des réalités en cause qu'on pourra donner leur signification exacte aux concepts métaphysiques chargés de les traduire analogiquement.... Présenter la doctrine thomiste du verbe sans d'abord élucider la

nature de l'acte de l'intellection, cet 'intus-legere' sans lequel nous ne saurions jamais que nous savons, c'est en rester fatalement à une description superficielle et le plus souvant, le P. Lonergan le montre, trahir la pensée de S. Thomas sans s'en rendre compte" (4).

Lonergan's preoccupation with the act of 'intelligere' led to his massive study of understanding, Insight, in the course of which he distinguishes the various kinds of scientific understanding which we have outlined. This latter differentiation led him to the additional task of explicitating the different kinds of scientific anticipation (i.e. what he terms 'heuristic structure') which would be relevant in furthering these kinds of understanding. Lonergan does not mean to imply that the formulation of a methodological heuristic structure is a magical guarantee of progressive results. He writes:

"The function of method is to spell out for each discipline the implications of the transcendental precepts Be attentive, Be intelligent, Be reasonable, Be responsible. Nor does the explicitness of method make the occurrences of discoveries infallible. The most it can achieve is to make discoveries more probable. The greater the number of investigators following sound method, the greater the likelihood that someone will attend to the data that are significant. The greater the likelihood of attention focusing on the data that are significant in the solution of current problems. the greater the likelihood of the intelligent hypothesis being proposed, the greater the likelihood of there being worked out the proper series of experiments to check and verify the hypothesis" (5).

In the context of our topic personal development, I have explained Lonergan's claim that genetic heuristic structure anticipates an insight into the sequence of developing integrations, each of which is itself intelligible in

a 'classical' manner (6). I would suggest that the methodical search for such insight is a valid and worthwhile endeavour. Furthermore, I would suggest that while Lonergan has not formulated a definitive account of genetic method, (he emphasizes that Insight is a study of human understanding rather than a treatise on human development), he has nonetheless formulated a germane heuristic framework for the study of personal development (7). In addition, he has attempted to give a limited explanation of the data of personal development in the light of his heuristic structure, admitting that his particular procedures of genetic method are extremely general and in need of further development.

71.2 Rogers's Adaptation of Classical Method

I have observed that Rogers's principal contribution to personal growth-theory has been at the practical level and at the level of description (8). He points out that, in the field of psychotherapy, explanatory theory is still at a primitive stage comparable to the initial discovery of radioactivity by the Curies (9). Furthermore, he insists that theory - all theory, from the theory which he presents to the one which will replace it in a decade - is an ongoing process, ever subject to development and correction (10).

My criticism here is not with Rogers's theoretical achievement but with his theoretical anticipation, i.e. with his heuristic structure, which appears to rely on an effort to adapt classical procedures. As we followed his attempt to understand his data on the process of therapy, we noted that he attempts to explain the process as progressive movement on a number of related continua and that he attempts to explain the development at each stage by means of the categories of congruence, reorganized self-structure, the actualizing process etc (11). While these categories afford some

insight into the development at each of the stages on the continua, they do not generate insight into the latent intelligibility in the sequence of stages (12). I would suggest that the fact that Rogers does not evolve a specific method to study development and the consequent fact that he does not formulate a specific heuristic structure to guide his investigations, result in a less developed explanation of his descriptive data than might otherwise be possible.

7.2 HORIZONS OF SCIENCE

72.1 Lonergan's Pluralist Approach

We have examined Lonergan's explicitation of three kinds of 'scientific' explanation: classical, statistical and genetic (13). As we have presented them, Lonergan's classical and statistical methods are clothed in the language of empirical science and I feel that this requires some comment.

Our account relies chiefly on Lonergan's original theory of method in Insight (14). Now Lonergan emphasizes that Insight is an 'essay in aid of self-appropriation' (15), i.e. an instrument to help the reader in his efforts to attain a reflex grasp of his own acts of understanding in science, mathematics, common sense and philosophy. It is not therefore a treatise on methodology. Lonergan choose mathematics and natural science to illustrate the occurrences of insight:

(i) because the results of mathematics and natural science exhibit a precision which aids a clear and distinct grasp of the nature of the act of insight;

(ii) because he wanted to highlight the transition from the old mechanism to relativity and from the old determinism to statistical laws;

(iii) because the thought of empirical science is methodical and Lonergan was convinced that a clear understanding of the method of empirical science would offer the possibility of making the transition to what he named transcendental method which, he claims, grounds all particular methods. Transcendental method (in Lonergan's sense), consists in:

> " .... a reflexive grasp .... of the dynamic structure immanent and recurrently operative in human cognitional activity" (16).

Thus, Lonergan does not intend to imply that all 'scientific' explanation is mathematical. On the contrary, he remarks:

> " .... when one mounts to the higher integrations of the organism, the psyche and intelligence, one finds that measuring looses both in significance and in efficacy" (17).

Furthermore, Lonergan's account of classical method can be broadened and applied outside the framework of mathematical tabulation, while retaining its heuristic anticipation of an insight into things as related to one another (18).

72.2 Rogers's Positivist Approach

In contrast to Lonergan, Rogers inherited a logical positivist notion of science, with its emphasis on measurement (19). His preoccupation with measurement is illustrated by his account of the embryonic state of the 'science' of psychology:

> "For example, it seems to me right and natural that in any new field of scientific endeavour, the observations are gross, the hypotheses speculative and full of errors, the measurements crude. More important, I hold the opinion that this is just as truly science as the use of the most refined hypotheses and measurements in a more fully developed field of study. The crucial question in either case is not the degree of refine-

ment but the direction of the movement. If, in either case, the movement is towards more exact measurement, toward more clearcut and rigorous theory and hypotheses .... then there is a healthy and growing science" (20).

Nevertheless, Rogers is aware of the shortcomings of positivism. He writes:

"There is a rather widespread feeling in our group that the logical positivism in which we were professionally reared is not necessarily the final philosophical word in an area in which the phenomenon of subjectivity plays such a vital and central part" (21).

Still, I feel that Rogers must be criticized for not facing up to the fact that personal development is not quantifiable: as his own experience must surely have borne out. In addition, he does not seem to have given sufficient consideration to the fact that what a science of personal development most needs is to be firmly grounded in an adequate philosophy of man instead of in a pseudo-scientific model which tends to reduce man to a machine (22). Rogers reacts against the latter point and asks:

"Is there some view possibly developing out of an existentialist orientation, which might preserve the values of logical positivism and the scientific advances which it has helped to foster and yet find more room for the existing subjective person who is at the heart and base of our system of science" (23).

Rogers himself has continually searched for new methods of measuring personality change which would do more justice to subjectivity (24). However, it is his homage to positivism combined with his awe of the methodology of empirical science which is ultimately responsible for his contradictory answer to Skinner's determinist dogma (which we shall examine), a contradiction which even prompts him to commit the capital 'scientific' sin: to contradict the data of his own experience (25).

7.3 HORIZONS OF FREEDOM

73.1 Lonergan's Affirmation of Freedom

We have noted that Lonergan deduces the existence of the contingent from the presence of the non-systematic in the material universe (26). This view is grounded in his affirmation of the intelligibility of proportionate being and in his differentiation of the intelligibility of systematic process (27) from the intelligibility reached by statistical inquiry (28). He writes:

> "It remains, then, that the object of statistical inquiry is the coincidental aggregate of events, that is, the aggregate of events that has some unity by spatial juxtaposition or by temporal succession or by both but lacks unity on the level of insight and of intelligible relation. In other words statistical inquiry is concerned with the non-systematic" (29).

Thus, statistical inquiry tries to discover a particular kind of intelligibility in this non-systematic process. While Aristotle might attempt to account for the manifest continuity of the terrestrial series of accidents by invoking the continuous influence of the rotating celestial spheres, Lonergan tries to illustrate how statistical science reaches an intelligibility in the series which it names probability, and which it expresses mathematically (30). Lonergan argues that the very existence of laws of the non-systematic is an implicit denial of material determinism and so an affirmation of material contingence. According to Lonergan, the scientific world regards material determinism as obsolete. Thus, he would declare that Rogers's (and Skinner's) affirmation that complete determinism is "the very foundation stone of science" has already been scientifically superseded by the discoveries of statistical science (31).

We have noted that Lonergan affirms the radical difference between material contingence and what he terms the contingence of the act of moral choice (32). He insists that the existence of the former does not establish the existence of the latter. Material contingence is due to the existence of the non-systematic in the material universe. According to Lonergan, the existence of moral contingence is due to the further intelligibility which the act of moral choice imposes on a coincidental manifold of possible courses of action, an intelligibility which is freely imposed. By underlining the existence of contingence in the material universe and by showing how freedom can be generically related to the sphere of contingence, Lonergan prepares the ground for a discussion of freedom without the inhibition of Rogers's 'a priori' postulate that " complete determinism (and so moral determinism) .... is the very foundation stone of science" (33).

Nevertheless, Lonergan quite clearly states that:

> "While this analysis goes beyond determinism by its acknowledgement of statistical laws and of autonomous sciences, it does not imply freedom" (34).

He adds:

> " .... a positive account of freedom must arise from an examination of the act of will and of its intellectual antecedents" (35).

Lonergan's positive account of freedom is based on his analysis of the cognitional acts which culminate in moral choice and moral action (36). He would establish the fact of essential freedom, not 'a priori', but by inviting the individual to reflect on the process of his choosing and acting. I think that it is not unreasonable to affirm that most people have some personal experience of having chosen and acted in a manner at variance with what they judged to be truly right and good. They are aware that they are free to choose what is morally evil as well as what is morally good, what is irresponsible as well as what is responsible. At the limit, they are

consciously aware that they are free to choose not to act, when only one possible course of action is open.

However, a spontaneous awareness of the fact of personal freedom is one thing: a differentiated account of such awareness is quite another. Clearly, an adequate articulation of one's personal verification of the fact of essential freedom demands some facility in cognitional analysis, - a facility which, I would suggest, is possessed only by the initiated. Thus, we must presume that the full implementation of Lonergan's invitation to personal verification will be attempted only by the few.

73.2 Rogers's Paradoxical Affirmation of Freedom and Determinism

Rogers's theoretical account of freedom is based, not on the data of his experiences in therapy but on his uncritical acceptance of Skinner's postulate:

> "The hypothesis that man is not free is essential to the application of scientific method to the study of human behaviour" (37).

This uncritical acceptance is further grounded in Rogers's positivist notion of scientific method which we have criticized (38).

On the one hand, Rogers's theoretical solution to the 'paradox' of essential freedom is patently inadequate. It involves him in the contradictory assertion that what appears to be free (and what the data of his therapy establishes to be free) is really also determined: the difference between freedom and determinism is one of dimension only (39). This statement reduces Rogers's solution to the absurd but he is willing to acquiesce in the absurd:

> "I share this conviction that we must live openly with mystery, with the absurd .... If, in response to this, you say, 'But these views cannot both be true', my answer

is, 'This is a deep and lasting paradox with which we must learn to live'" (40).

Such an affirmation of incoherence makes further argument with Rogers impossible.

On the other hand, Rogers's practical achievement in the field of interpersonal and (to a lesser extent, I feel) in the field of group therapy does appear to promote effective freedom. His clients report an increasing ability to be consciously aware of their self-feelings and self-experiences and to risk the conscious awareness of hitherto denied and distorted feelings (41). It seems clear that the altering of the self-structure to include such experience and feeling lessens defensiveness in general and so promotes a greater openness to experience and a greater effective freedom of moral choice. However, the fact that Rogers does not attempt to treat the inadequacies in the intellectual and moral development of his clients, together with the fact that he stresses 'being one's self' (in Rogers's sense of 'being' the fluid changing flow of one's organism), leads him to neglect that 'vertical' exercise of freedom which Lonergan calls conversion. It also leads him to neglect the confirmation of his clients (in Buber's sense of the term (42)), being satisfied with 'unconditional positive regard'. Thus, I feel that Rogers does not exhaust the potential of his excellent therapeutic relationship.

Lastly, I would suggest that Rogers's 'organismic' or 'fully-functioning' living, with its implied underplaying of judgements of value and moral choice, would very likely undermine effective freedom in the long run. The stimulation of spontaneous experiencing and feeling, without a corresponding promotion of intellectual and moral awareness could lead to the 'submergence' of spirit by body of which Norbert Luyten speaks:

> "Là où l'esprit réussit à imposer sa domination, le corps lui serait complément et aide; tandis que là où l'esprit relâche ou résigne sa domination, le corps lui deviendrait

obstacle et entrave; car du fait même la loi de la matérialité prendrait le dessus et submergerait, pour ainsi dire, l'autonomie spirituelle de l'homme (43).

7.4 HORIZONS OF COMMITMENT

74.1 Lonergan's Permanent Decision

We have seen that, for Lonergan, commitment is a binding decision which is based on a set of value-judgements (44).

In the context of Lonergan's theory of personal development, commitment plays a vital role in moral conversion, when one decides that one will consistently choose in accordance with true judgements of value (45). Furthermore, commitment is the crowning achievement of moral self-transcendence, inducing one to make permanent decisions regarding lifelong dedications and occupations (46).

In the context of interpersonal development, mutual commitment is the final fruit of what I have called ecstatic conversion (47). Not only does it enable one person to enter into a perceptive, appreciating, true, accepting, confirming and loving perspective of another person as he is and as he can become: it also enables both of them to cement that relationship in an enduring state of being-in-love which promotes their mutual self-transcendence.

In the context of the development of community, Lonergan declares that common commitment is the essential factor in actually realizing community: it is common and complementary commitments which regulate the cooperation of individual members of a group (48). They pledge themselves to undertake more or less permanent roles and to carry out interrelated tasks which bring about common meaning and common values and so constitute community.

In short, for Lonergan, personal, interpersonal and community commitments are key factors in promoting the transcendence of individuals, of pairs and of groups. I would suggest that Lonergan's stress on commitment is a logical consequence of the fact that his theory of personal development is grounded in a philosophy of man which stresses that auto-determination (and so auto-commitment) is one of the clearest marks of being human.

74.2 Rogers's 'Organismic' Commitment

Rogers's theory of commitment follows logically from his theory of the organismic process (49). We have seen that he understands commitment to be:

> " .... more than a decision. It is the functioning of an individual who is searching for the directions which are emerging within himself" (50).

We have also seen that, for Rogers, commitment is not something one imposes on one's self. It is something which one uncovers in the changing flow of one's organismic experience (51). It consists in 'being' this organismic process as it seeks to actualize the potentialities of one's personality. Victor Frankl is highly critical of this 'potentialism', declaring that it undermines true responsibility and true commitment. Frankl emphasizes that one must choose from among the many different possible ways in which one could actualize one's potential: one must decide and commit one's self:

> "Potentialism involves an attempt to avoid this burden of responsibility. Under the pressure of time and in the face of life's transitoriness, man is often beguiled into believing that he can escape the necessity of making responsible choices. His efforts, however, are in vain, for wherever he turns he is confronted with the exigences of life and the demand to make meaningful and valuable and thus existential commitments. Thus, the problem

really just begins when potentialism ends"(52).

Furthermore, I believe that Rogers's organismic theory of commitment has serious implications for development. In the personal context, his approach leads him to underline the biological, experiential and affective dimensions of personal growth. In choosing 'being one's organismic process' as the goal of personal development, Rogers tends to encourage the individual to '<u>be</u> that self which one truly is' (in Rogers's organismic sense rather than in Kierkegaard's original sense (53)), instead of helping him to <u>transcend</u> himself. In other words he tends towards a philosophy of immanence rather than a philosophy of transcendence.

In the interpersonal context, (as for instance among married couples), Rogers's over-emphasis on being one's spontaneous self leads him to dismiss permanent commitment in marriage as a mere:

> " .... attitude of possessiveness - of owning another person - which has historically dominated sexual unions" (54).

In the past, Rogers neglect of commitment has permitted him to risk the danger of contributing to marriage break-up by conducting encounter groups (with their potentiality for sparking off other emotional involvements) among married individuals who were deliberately not accompanied by their spouses (55).

As I shall later elaborate, I feel that Rogers's over-stress on intersubjective spontaneity in the context of community leads him to attach such importance to achieving a '<u>sense</u>' of community that he undermines the very basis of community. I would affirm that the latter consists in the common commitment to a good of order and that if this commitment is weakened then a community can weaken and even collapse (as happened in the case of the Immaculate Heart experiment (56)).

7.5 HORIZONS OF THE PROCESS OF DEVELOPMENT

75.1 Lonergan's Approach to Development

I have pointed out that Lonergan's 'central potency', 'central form' and 'central act' correspond to the traditional 'primary matter', 'substantial form' and 'the act of existence', while his 'conjugate potency', 'conjugate form' and 'conjugate act', correspond (almost) to the traditional 'accidental potency', 'accidental form' and 'accidental activity' (57). Lonergan is quite explicit that his account of development concerns conjugate (i.e.accidental) potency, form and act. He writes:

> " .... besides central potency, form and act, there are conjugate potencies, forms and acts. Moreover, the central potency, form and act are constants throughout development; it is the same individual existing unity that develops organically, psychically, intellectually; and so development is to be formulated in terms of conjugate potency, form and act" (58).

Thus, in discussing Lonergan's account of development, we are concerned exclusively with accidental development.

Lonergan precedes his study of genetic method with an account of the 'principles' governing development (59). His account of these principles is an 'a posteriori' attempt to highlight the intelligibility immanent in the process of development. Although he does not clarify his use of the term 'principle' in the context of development, he outlines his general use of the term on another occasion:

> "First, then, a principle is first in an ordered set, 'primum in aliquo ordine'. If the ordered set consists in propositions, then a principle will be the premises from which the rest of the propositions may be deduced. If the ordered set consists, not in propositions but in

real causes and real effects, then the principle consists in the causes .... Secondly, how does the principle produce its effects? It does so spontaneously" (60).

Thus, Lonergan's 'principles' of development are the causes which govern it.

The aquisition of the skill of piano-playing may serve to illustrate Lonergan's principles. Playing the piano consists in a manifold of conjugate acts such as sitting on the piano-stool in front of the piano, placing one's hands on the key-board, using one's eyes to read a pattern of signs which are musically meaningful, translating this pattern into a series of finger and wrist movements, pressing the piano-keys which sound the notes etc. The juxtaposition of these activities would be otherwise coincidental if they were not integrated or structurally unified in some way. The principle of emergence states that such conjugate activities can be integrated by higher schemes of conjugate forms (i.e. accidental habits), such as the coordinated development of finger dexterity, wrist suppleness, facility in sight reading, sensitivity in interpretation etc. (61).

The principle of correspondence states that such schemes of conjugate forms differ when the conjugate activities which they integrate differ (62). So piano-playing and type-writing are different integrations, although they involve many identical components. The principle of finality governs the fact that to master the skill of piano-playing, one must continually modify one's technique in a series of higher integrations (63). The principle of development governs the fact that these gradually emerging higher integrations form not a random or chance series but a linked sequence (64). One's advance in piano-playing is a gradual achievement where the next step depends on one's mastery of the previous one: one can attempt runs only when one has achieved considerable facility in fingering, scales etc. The principle of increasing differentiation accounts for the fact that one may eventually

succeed in mastering a concerto where one is presently limited to a simple melody (65). The principle of major flexibility allows that one goal of development may be substituted for another: a good pianist may become an excellent typist (66).

Thus, the gradual aquisition of the skill of piano-playing is a flexible linked sequence of higher integrations, which are continually modified as sight-reading improves, interpretation becomes more nuanced, technique becomes more proficient etc., i.e. as the underlying manifold is successively transformed (67).

Lonergan's general procedures of genetic method, (i.e. the field, the direction and the mode of development), can also be illustrated by the above example. We have already outlined how finality and increasing differentiation are operative. We can also observe how the spiral mode of development operates, as actual performance of playing the piano (development as POTENTIAL) gradually increases one's skill in piano-playing (development as FORMAL), which in turn modifies one's further performance (development as ACTUAL), which is again open to further perfection (development as POTENTIAL) and so on as one gradually increases in proficiency in a spiral sequence of linked higher integrations (68).

With regard to the particular procedures of genetic method, it must be stated that Lonergan does not pretend to have formulated a fully differentiated or closed account. He points out that the student of development must continually adapt, modify and develop his procedures to suit the subject-matter of his inquiry (69). I feel that this is particularly true of the law of integration and operation (70). While Lonergan tries to show that it is the same higher integration which both integrates the lower manifold and at the same time acts to bring about its own replacement in a still higher integration (i.e. it is both integrator and operator), his attempt to specify the operator (i.e. to explain how the operator actually brings about further development) by means of the law of

effect is rather general and rudimentary and would require much more specification (71). Lonergan does not deny this:

> "Clearly, though this specification of the operator (by means of the law of effect) is extremely general, it offers some determination of the direction of development. Its application to concrete instances may not only confirm it but also give rise to further questions. The further questions will lead to further instances and so to still further questions" (72).

However, to be fair to Lonergan, I must underline that his aim is to develop a worthwhile and basically valid genetic method, rather than to give a full account of personal development. He observes:

> "A heuristic structure is only the framework in which investigation is to introduce specific laws and particular facts. The question before us is not whether we have dealt adequately with human development. The question before us is not whether we have established the fertility of the heuristic structure or even whether we have explained its precise mode of application. Our topic is genetic method and the sole question is whether the key idea of the method has been found" (73).

For Lonergan, this key idea is that genetic method is concerned not with classical laws as such but with emergent trends and that the object of genetic method can be formulated only by introducing categories in which the notion of emergence and its implications are set forth adequately (74). I would suggest that Lonergan succeeds in outlining a fertile heuristic structure which could be quite stimulating to the personal growth-theorists who are often limited by a positivist and so-called 'scientific' methodological approach. This can inhibit rather than enlighten their effort to understand personal development, by excluding all categories which are not in some way measurable.

It may be objected that Lonergan's account of personal development - and especially of conscious development - is too analytic in approach. It may be urged that personal development is a unified process and that Lonergan appears to divide and compartmentalize it.

Lonergan insists that although cognitional activity is a dynamically unified process, distinct although not seperable activities can be consciously distinguished by the subject (75). These activities, as we have seen, can be subsumed under the headings of experiencing (i.e. seeing, hearing, perceiving etc.), feeling, meaning (i.e. questioning, understanding, reflecting, weighing the evidence, judging) and evaluating (i.e. making judgements of value, choosing and deciding). He is careful to point out (in the law of integration) that when a development occurs on any one level, corresponding adjustments are necessary on other levels if the development is to be integrated and if the overall unity of the person is to be preserved. He also points out (in the law of sublation) how the various levels of conscious activity are hierarchically related to one another, so that overall integral personal development is a unified process (76). Thus, I feel that Lonergan's analysis does not amount to a fragmentation: it is a differentiation of the various levels on which a development can be initiated as well as an insistence that true personal development is an ordered, integrated and unified process which involves the whole person. We shall examine Lonergan's approach to cognitional analysis in more detail when we consider his cognitional horizon (77).

75.2 Rogers's Approach to Development

Rogers's account of personal development is based on his experiences in the 'non-directive' practice of psychotherapy which he pioneered (78). Perhaps his most significant contribution to therapy was his formulation of the key factors which

enter into a successful therapeutic relationship: sufficient contact between therapist and client, unconditional acceptance of the client by the therapist, empathic understanding of the client's inner frame of reference by the therapist and the successful communication of these attitudes to the client (79).

In my account of Rogers's therapeutic relationship, I also outlined the modifications which Martin Buber proposed to Rogers in the course of their public dialogue (80). He insisted that while a helping relationship must begin with acceptance, it cannot end there (81). In addition to accepting the client, the helping partner must also confirm him in his struggle against himself (82). Buber contends that by boldly swinging into the life of the client, the helping other can 'imagine the real' in the other, he can 'make him present' and so help him to direct his life along the path of his own choice (83).

My own experience in counselling delinquents would incline me to agree with Buber's modification of Rogers's approach. While I am personally convinced that Rogers is right in avoiding an analytic or interpretative approach to the client (such as trying to analyse him into Freudian or some other pre-formulated diagnostic categories, at least during the relationship), I am equally convinced that merely accepting him is not enough. The client tends to cry out for something more and I feel that the therapist's failure or refusal to provide it is a hindrance rather than a help to development. While I agree with Buber's condemnation of the 'propagandist' (84), (and to this extent with Rogers's 'non-directive' approach), I believe that the therapist must nonetheless lead the client to discover for himself (if possible), the true path which he must follow. I have personally found that I can help another only by trying to strengthen or support him (or 'confirm' him, in Buber's language) as he struggles to conquer his own tendencies to resist change or development.

Furthermore, I very much doubt whether complete 'non-directivity' is possible in a truly helping relationship. Rogers tends to minimise the influence which the 'non-directive' therapist has on the client (as I shall point out again when discussing Rogers's basic encounter group (85)). While Rogers insists that the therapist should be congruent or real in the therapeutic relationship, I think that this is not enough: he must also be sensitive, appreciative, true and good in himself. If he fails in these areas, if his own development is in some way stunted, then I feel that he may tend to have a detrimental influence on the growth of the client. Rogers seems to underestimate this danger rather seriously (86).

Rogers account of the process of development is expressed in terms of increasing congruence and the reorganization of self-structure to include hitherto distorted or denied feelings and experiences etc. According to Rogers, these changes encourage the client to rely increasingly on the organismic process as a guide to 'fully-functioning' living (87). While I do not want to underestimate the therapeutic value of Rogers's attempt to promote an accurate awareness of submerged feelings and experiences (especially among seriously disturbed clients), I feel that his tendency to portray 'fully-functioning' living in terms of sensitivity to one's feelings and experiences and to 'whatever is happening in one's organism', appears to be too biological in its overall emphasis. It seems to undermine what Victor Frankl calls:

> " .... the fundamental anthropological truth that self-transcendence is one of the basic features of human existence" (88).

In other words, I would suggest that Rogers 'organismic' emphasis leads him to exaggerate the experiential and affective dimensions of personal development, to the neglect of its transcendent dimensions.

7.6 HORIZONS OF FEELINGS, VALUES AND THE TRANSCENDENT

76.1 Lonergan's Treatment of Feeling

We have seen that Lonergan's goal of personal development is the gradual achievement of cognitive, moral, affective and total self-transcendence and that this achievement is aided by the occurrence of intellectual, moral, affective and total conversion (89). We shall examine the cognitive aspect of transcendence in our discussion of Lonergan's and Rogers's cognitional horizons. Here, we shall examine the contrasting approaches of Lonergan and Rogers to feelings, values and the Transcendent.

We have noted that, for Lonergan, both moral and affective conversion concern the changing of the criterion of one's choices and affective responses from satisfactions to values, where values and satisfactions conflict (90). We have also noted Lonergan's view that values are initially responded to intentionally by feelings (91). Both of these views are grounded in von Hildebrand's differentiation of feelings as states or trends, from feelings as intentional responses (92). We must now examine this distinction.

Von Hildebrand distinguishes feelings which are non-intentional states or trends from feelings which are intentional responses, a distinction also made by Rollo May (93). According to von Hildebrand, states have causes of which they are effects, e.g. fatigue, irritability, bad humour, anxiety, etc. Trends have goals towards which they tend, e.g. hunger, thirst, sexual discomfort etc. Both of these kinds of feeling are non-intentional: they do not presuppose or arise out of the prior perception or representation of the cause or goal.

In contrast, feelings which are intentional responses react to what is first apprehended, i.e. they respond to 'objects' and not merely to causes or goals.

In a first stage, the object bestows something on the subject and von Hildebrand speaks of this as 'being affected'. The direction is from the object to the subject:

"We receive, we 'endure' something when the object affects our soul" (94).

For instance, we are hurt by the hostile attitude of our neighbour.

In a second stage, there is an intentional affective response by the subject to the object. The direction is therefore from the subject to the object:

"I, by my response, impart something to the object" (95).

This response has a spontaneous active character, even in view of the fact that what we impart to the object presupposes knowledge of the object and depends upon the nature of this object. For example, I resent or I forgive the hostile attitude of my neighbour.

According to von Hildebrand, affective intentional responses regard two main classes of objects: on the one hand, the agreeable or disagreeable, the satisfying or dissatisfying, the pleasant or unpleasant; on the other hand, values, whether personal values or qualitative values, such as beauty, understanding, truth, virtuous acts etc. It is important to note that for von Hildebrand, intentional responses to the agreeable or disagreeable are <u>ambiguous</u>: what is agreeable may be evil and what is disagreeable may be truly good. On the other hand, intentional responses to values <u>ut sic</u> are good: they may also be agreeable, pleasant or satisfying but they may not. (Note that von Hildebrand uses the terms 'pleasant', 'agreeable' and 'satisfying' as synonomous with subjectively 'pleasurable' (96); if one understands 'satisfying' in the sense of truly self-fulfilling, then obviously the distinction between intentional responses to values as against satisfactions evaporates because what is of true value is also truly satisfying and vica versa). Thus, when one's criterion of intentional response is whether or not the 'object' is agreeable, pleasant or satisfying, one

runs the risk of responding to evil instead of to good. When one's criterion of intentional response is value (whether or not the 'object' is also pleasant, agreeable or satisfying), then this risk is removed.

Lonergan's contention that values are initially apprehended by feelings does not imply that one's moral choices are determined by one's affective responses: merely that feelings which are intentional responses can carry one towards true values. Furthermore, they can strengthen and deepen one's moral choices and decisions and (in the case of falling in love, for instance) they can help to choose an 'object' for the sake of whom or of which one transcends one's self morally and affectively. Thus, I suggest that by affirming von Hildebrand's distinction, Lonergan succeeds in creating a harmony between feelings as intentional responses and true moral values. It also enables him to speak of the development of feelings (which are intentional responses) through reinforcement and curtailment, again in harmony with moral development (97).

76.2 Rogers's Treatment of Feeling

Rogers does not distinguish between different kinds of feeling. As we have seen, he invites the 'fully-functioning' person to respond to the feelings which the organismic process uncovers (98). He declares that the organism is continually weighing and balancing stimuli and needs and so it chooses that course of action which comes closest to satisfying all its needs in the situation, long-range as well as immediate. The healthy organism will of itself choose more 'growth-enhancing' and 'socialized' goals (99). However, there are a number of factors which can lead us to question the validity of the organismic process in reference to feeling.

Firstly, Rogers is not explicit about the relationship between the various components in the 'total organism'.

He does not structure experiencing, feelings and impulses, 'conscious thought' and 'choice' in any hierarchical order. One is lead to ask what precisely does the 'weighing and balancing' in the organismic process. Is it feeling or 'conscious thought' or 'choice'? Rogers would appear to maintain that it is the 'total organism' which does the 'weighing and balancing' (in which 'thought' and 'choice' merely participate as elements) (100). However, this leaves Rogers open to the accusation that when feeling is overwhelming enough, it could govern personal decision and action, since feeling appears to be at least of equal moment with the other 'organismic' components. Now to suggest that feeling might be allowed to dominate action is to seriously undermine the guiding role of morally responsible choice and decision.

Secondly, Rogers does not distinguish feelings which are states or trends from feelings which are intentional responses. Are we therefore to conclude that when he urges the 'fully-functioning' person to 'be' his feelings that he attributes equal moment to 'being' tired or hungry and to 'being' in love (in the sense of responding intentionally to the personal value of another)? Furthermore, Rogers does not explicitly distinguish feelings about the pleasurable from feelings about the truly good. Thus, he does not account for affective responses which may be decidedly disagreeable, which may not come closest to satisfying <u>all</u> the needs in the situation, yet which may be morally compelling (101). For instance, loyal and self-sacrificing love may choose one overriding value to which all other values and need-satisfactions are regarded as secondary.

Thirdly, there is considerable testimony that Rogers's therapy promotes the conscious awareness of feeling, (including hitherto distorted or denied feeling) and to the extent that it can succeed in doing so, I feel that personal living can be enriched. However, if feelings are to remain an enrichment of, rather than a replacement for, authentic moral choices,

then surely they must be guided by judgements of value. Thus, some feelings must be encouraged while others may have to be discouraged (102). Rogers discourages the client from guiding feelings in such a manner. He encourages the client to 'be' an ever-changing process of feelings, impulses, experiences etc., i.e. to 'be' whatever he is experiencing in his organism.

I would suggest that to the extent that the development of feeling is not integrated in the overall moral development of the person, then the role of spontaneity can be exaggerated and this can have seriously disruptive personal, interpersonal and social consequences (103).

76.3 Lonergan's Criterion of Values

We have seen that, for Lonergan, the immediate criterion of value is the judgement of value of the morally self-transcending person (104). Thus, the truth (or falsehood) of such value judgements has its ground in the presence (or absence) of moral self-transcendence in the subject. In addition, such judgements of value presuppose a knowledge of human living, of human possibilities and of the proximate and remote consequences of projected courses of action. They presuppose the realization by the subject that to some extent he 'creates' himself by his moral choices, and that such choices are the means by which he achieves true self-transcendence and so true personal development.

Furthermore, we have seen that, for Lonergan, values have a social as well as an individual criterion. Besides the particular good, Lonergan outlines the nature of the social good, which he terms the 'good of order' (105). The latter includes the former but it orders it such that a balanced and interdependent plurality of instances of the particular good is brought about. Thus, I would suggest that Lonergan respects the fact that there are (individual and social) acts which are

objectively good and others which are objectively evil (106).

76.4 Rogers's Criterion of Values

In contrast, Rogers's criterion of values is the individual 'organismic' process, as we have seen (107). To be guided by the 'organismic' process means to live 'existentially':

> "The sensation is that of floating with a complex stream of experience, with the fascinating possibility of trying to comprehend its ever-changing complexity" (108).

Thus, it consists, not in ordering one's experience by means of an objective value-judgement which transcends one's self, (as in Lonergan's view) but in living in one's 'organismic' experience. It consists in permitting the total organism:

> " .... to consider each stimulus, need and demand, its relative intensity and importance and out of all this complex weighing and balancing, discover that course of action which would come closest to satisfying all one's needs in the situation" (109).

Such a criterion of values tends to be governed by need satisfaction, a criterion which I would suggest is inadequate (as Maslow (110), Frankl (111) and Lonergan (112) point out. Frankl is particularly insistent that while need satisfaction and self-actualization may be a consequence of personal development, they cannot constitute its goal. He declares that:

> " .... an adequate view of man can only be properly formulated when it goes beyond homeostasis, beyond self-actualization, to the sphere of human existence in which man chooses what he will do and what he will be in the midst of an objective world of meanings and values" (113).

Thus, while I can accept that Rogers's interpersonal therapy might promote much more than need-satisfaction in practice, I feel that his formulation of the 'fully-functioning' person in theory, is neither fully adequate nor fully human. It is couched in the language of immanence rather than transcendence.

Rogers tends to ignore the social dimension of the valuing process. There appears to be no social limitation on the 'organismic' valuing of the individual. Rogers dismisses the social dimension of the valuing process by making a sort of 'act of faith'. He writes:

> "I dare to believe that when the human being is inwardly free to choose whatever he deeply values, he tends to value those objects, experiences and goals which contribute to his own survival, growth and development and to the survival and development of others. I hypothesize that it is characteristic of the human organism to prefer such actualizing and socialized goals when he is exposed to a growth-promoting climate" (114).

I believe that a generalized application of this solution to the social dimension of human choice could lead to a chronic individualism which could seriously undermine the good of order. Rogers tends to trust too much in the organismic valuing process of his 'fully-functioning' person who (at least as formulated by Rogers), seems to be more self-centered than self-transcendent.

76.5 Rogers, Lonergan and the Transcendent

We have examined the role which openness to the Transcendent plays in Lonergan's approach to personal development: he tries to integrate the whole area of religious experience, in the spirit of Gordon Allport's warning that:

> " .... a psychology that impedes the understanding of the religious potentialities of man scarcely deserves to be called a logos of the human psyche at all" (115).

Rogers tends to sidestep this dimension of human experience. Although he often quotes Kierkegaard's phrase 'to be that self which one truly is' in support of his 'organismic' living, he seems to ignore the fact that Kierkegaard clearly grounds the self in its relation to the Transcendent:

> " ....the self cannot of itself attain and remain in

equilibrium and rest by itself, but only by relating itself to that Power which constituted the whole relation" (116).

Although both Buber (117) and Frankl (118) agree that the therapist must not interfere in the realm of the patient's relationship to the Transcendent, both of them take this relationship into account in helping to 'heal' the patient. Maslow emphasizes that this dimension of human experience must be recognized and studied in a theory of personal development. Although he finds the answers proposed by 'organized religion' somewhat inconclusive, he nevertheless declares:

"But what the more sophisticated scientist is now in the process of learning is that, though he must disagree with most of the answers .... religious questions themselves - and religious quests, the religious yearnings, the religious needs themselves - are perfectly respectable scientifically, that they are rooted deep in human nature, that they can be studied, described, examined in a scientific way and that the churches were trying to answer perfectly sound human questions" (119).

Thus, I think that Lonergan must be commended for highlighting an area of personal experience which has very often been neglected in theories of personal development.

7.7 HORIZONS OF COMMUNITY

77.1 Lonergan's Theory of Community

I have presented Lonergan's theory of community in the context of his schema of the structure of the human good (120). It might be contended that this schema is somewhat arbitrary since it overlaps. Lonergan describes how he arrived at his schema:

"The human good is at once individual and social and some

> account of the way the two aspects combine has now to be attempted. This will be done by selecting some eighteen terms and gradually relating them to one another" (121).

As we have seen, he does so by differentiating ends into: the particular good, the good of order and the good of value (122). He then groups his categories around these ends.

In the first place, it must be noted that these ends not only overlap but include one another hierarchically: the good of order includes and orders worthwhile instances of the particular good and the good of value includes a true good of order and true instances of the particular good. However, by differentiating these ends, Lonergan highlights the various dimensions of the human good: that it consists in particular concrete instances; that these concrete instances are ordered; that the particular instances and the order which governs them may (or may not) be truly good (123). In so doing, Lonergan succeeds in relating to one another in a structured manner, a very complex set of categories comprizing the human good (which is his aim). I do not think that his schema is the only one which could be formulated, nor do I believe that he exhausts the categories which comprize the human good. However, I would submit that his schema is a useful framework in which to consider the formation of community.

In the second place, Lonergan emphasizes that the good of order is not to be understood as a theoretical or ideal blueprint (124). It is the concrete structure which actually guides the operating and cooperating individuals. This does not mean that it is not intelligible or that it does not obey norms. On the contrary, according to Lonergan it should obey the conscious human norms of intelligence, reasonableness and responsibility (125). However, being concrete it includes much more. Lonergan writes:

> "It has a basis in institutions but it is a product of much more, of all the skill and know-how, all the industry

and resourcefulness, all the ambition and fellow-feeling of a whole people, adapting to each change in circumstances, meeting each new emergency, struggling against every tendency to disorder" (126).

We have seen that Lonergan presents his theory of community in terms of meaning (127). In his account of the carriers of meaning, he illustrates how intersubjectivity, feelings, symbols and the incarnate subject can complement language as additional mediators of community meaning (127). By doing so, I feel that he enriches a purely structural account of community with those non-linguistic dimensions which give it concreteness and 'aliveness'. Similarly, by highlighting the constitutive and communicative functions of meaning, he demonstrates how meaning can not only mediate but constitute community (128).

Lonergan's theory of the formal consitiuent of community is grounded in cognitional rather than sociological categories. His theory draws on the social dimension of his analysis of cognitional activities (129). He points out that experiencing is not only a private affair: it is also shared among a group of people. So too, in the case of feelings, in the case of understanding and judgement (meaning) and in the case of deliberating and deciding (evaluating): all these conscious activities can be shared, leading to a common and differentiated consciousness among the members of a group (130). By carefully structuring his theory of community (131) such that it includes all these elements, not seperately and disjointedly but functionally related and dynamically unified, I would submit that he succeeds in giving a balanced account of community which is nevertheless open to further differentiation - the latter because Lonergan's categories are grounded in the activities of consciousness, the sources of such further meaningful differentiation (132).

My purpose in applying Lonergan's principles and laws of development to his theory of community (133) was to show that the process of community development is not simply a growth in

affectivity resulting in a greater 'sense of community', as Rogers would seem to claim (134). As I tried to show, it is a higher sublation of common experience, common affectivity, common meaning and common values (135). By using the term sublation, I wished to highlight the fact that overall community development is a unified process which hierarchally integrates developments in its particular elements (136).

I think that it should be pointed out that Lonergan's account of community, as I have presented it, is somewhat schematic, in the sense that it concentrates on structure. As I have pointed out (137) Lonergan has not yet concentrated on elaborating a specific and developed account of community, although he would insist that his structure is nonetheless valid. His theory needs to be further developed by applying it concretely to different kinds of community and by showing how the structure operates in case.

Furthermore, Lonergan outlines community development as though it were a gradual and progressive process. While I have shown that Lonergan is also fully aware of community breakdown, I would suggest that these two approaches need to be completed by a third, which would integrate both of them in a wider synthesis. I think that it would be necessary to show that concrete living communities are often involved in a simultaneous struggle between development and decline and that development can also occur as a result of breakdown and not just in opposition to it. For instance, the revelation that a nation's government has been corrupt can have a cleansing as well as a traumatic effect on its citizens.

77.2 Rogers's Theory of the Basic Encounter Group

772.1 The Encounter Group and the Good of Order

A comparison between Rogers's account of instit-

utional change and Lonergan's account of the good of order is illuminating. In examining Lonergan's schema of the human good, we saw that he distinguishes two interpenetrating goods (138). He notes that individuals cooperate according to intersubjective spontaneity (as for instance in encounter groups) to bring about instances of the particular good. He also notes that individuals cooperate in institutional frameworks (which define roles and assign tasks) to bring about a concrete good of order (139). He notes that whereas intersubjective spontaneity is an elementary communion grounded in desire and feeling, institutional cooperation is grounded in common sense (which is governed by intelligence, reasonableness and responsibility) (140). We examined Lonergan's attempt to explain the tension of individual consciousness in terms of the exaggerated claims of spontaneity over the claims of intelligence, reasonableness and responsibility (141). We also examined his explanation of community tension in terms of the exaggerated claims of spontaneous intersubjectivity over the claims of common sense and its good of order, common values and common commitments (142).

I feel that this analysis throws some light on the disruptive effects of Rogers's encounter groups, both on relationships and on institutions. Rogerian groups build up a strong elemental communion of feeling which is intersubjective. In my experience, they oppose institutional cooperation guided by roles (such as 'leader' and 'member'), tasks (such as set topics), and a good of order (such as the formulation of rules, spoken or unspoken, which might govern the functioning of the group). The only commitment which they exact is that the group members remain in one another's presence over an extended period of time. Any effort to introduce order into the proceedings is usually countered with the charge of 'intellectualizing' (which it is and, I feel, should be since to be human is also to be intelligent).

Thus, when encounter groups are applied in instit-

utional settings (such as in educational establishments and among married couples), they tend to over-highlight spontaneous openness and feelingful interaction among persons whose relationships are ultimately grounded in commitment to role and task. Now inasmuch as spontaneity can enrich roles and tasks with warmth and closeness, then it can foster a 'sense of community' which is often lacking in large institutional settings. However, when the claims of spontaneity are exaggerated (as happened in the Immaculate Heart experiment), then roles and tasks tend to be undermined and the good of order can be so weakened that it may collapse in disruption (as did the Immaculate Heart Educational System). Community (in the sense of commitment to the achievement of common meaning and common values) is destroyed.

The evidence would seem to point to such an exaggeration of spontaneity in Rogerian encounter groups (143).

772.2 Rogers's 'Organismic' Approach

It is evident that Rogers's theory of the basic encounter group is closely linked with his theory of interpersonal therapy. His 'organismic' approach in the latter case (144) leads him to picture community in 'organismic' terms also. He writes:

> "To me the group seems like an organism, having a sense of direction of its own even though it could not define that direction intellectually .... it seems to me that a group recognizes unhealthy elements in its process, focuses on them, clears them up or eliminates them and moves on towards becoming a healthier group. This is my way of saying that I have seen the 'wisdom of the organism' exhibited at every level from cell to group" (145).

While there may be similarities between organisms and groups, I feel that there is a significant difference which Rogers does not mention. An organism is governed by an ordered structure whose functions are determined by biological laws. A

group of conscious subjects can be structured in a human manner only through the free exercise of its members' conscious and meaningful activities. It is only when a group of subjects who share their experience in common, consciously and freely seek common understanding and common judgements among themselves, that common decisions are made concerning common and complementary commitments and common action to bring about a common order is undertaken. However, the emergence of this order is not determined by a physical law, as is the order in an organism. On the contrary, it must be consciously created and encouraged. However, my experience of Rogerian encounter would suggest that it discourages rather than encourages such an emergence of order.

772.3 The Basic Encounter Group and Personal Development

I have found that encounter groups stimulate a heightening of sensation and feeling and to that extent they are an enrichment of human experience (146). In doing so, they can help to promote what Lonergan calls the self-appropriation of one's spontaneous self (147) and what Rollo May refers to as a highlighting of 'wish' on the level of awareness (148). However, I have not experienced them as promoting full personal development, where by such development is meant the gradual achievement of cognitive, affective, moral and total self-transcendence. It seems to me that Rogers's 'fully-functioning' person lives in his experience (or at least he aims to do so), rather than attempting to transcend it. Thus, he sets up 'changingness' as a goal rather than making use of change to reach a higher goal. In other words, he tends towards immanence rather than transcendence. In Rollo May's terms, he fails to proceed from 'wish' to 'will' and decision (149).

I would tend to agree with Bion that the pleasurable feeling of vitality which accompanies 'non-work' group function would appear to be a compensation for the lack of develop-

ment rather than a sign of development (150). The fact that people are so anxious to seek out this heightened sense of vitality supports Rollo May's view:

> "The vast need of our society for touch and the revolt against its prohibition are shown in the growth of all forms of touch therapy, from Esalen on down to the group therapy in the next room. These rightly reflect the need, but they are in error in their anti-intellectual bias and in the grandiose aims which they assert for what is essentially a corrective measure. They are also in error in their failure to see that this is an aspect of the whole society which must be changed, and changed on a deeper level involving the whole man" (151).

In my experience, Rogerian groups tend to neglect this 'deeper level involving the whole man' and to this extent they fail to promote a balanced overall development in their participants.

772.4 The Influence of the Facilitator

During my own encounter group experiences, I have noticed the strong influence which a 'spontaneous' and 'open' facilitator (or indeed group member) can have on other participants, especially on the weak or troubled. I would be inclined to think that there is much truth in Krasner's statement that one of the most effective ways of (deliberately or not) 'controlling' another person, is to be 'spontaneous' and 'open' in a relationship with him (152). I would therefore seriously question Rogers's claim that a facilitator is 'non-manipulative' in a group, even when he is apparently 'non-directive' and 'non-structuring' in the Rogerian sense.

Furthermore, I feel that Rogers's claim to be 'real' yet also non-judgemental in his reactions could be misleading. He writes:

"To attack a person's defences seems to me judgemental. If one says 'You're hiding a lot of hostility' or 'You are being highly intellectual, probably because you are afraid of your own feelings', I believe such judgements and diagnoses are the oppositive of facilitative. If, however, what I perceive as the person's coldness frustrates me or his intellectualizing irritates me or his brutality to another person angers me, then I would like to face him with the frustration or the irritation or the anger that exists in me. To me this is very important" (153).

However, I would suggest that while Rogers's spontaneous openness and his communication of his own feeling-reactions may not be explicitely judgemental or evaluative (and so not hurtful), nonetheless they implicitely communicate a clear message of how Rogers reacts to the group member. To this extent they could have quite a strong influence on him.

Thus, since it is likely that a 'spontaneous' facilitator may have considerable personal influence on group members, the question of his own personal development is of vital importance. If, as Lonergan claims, true personal development consists in the gradual achievement of transcendence, then I think it is arguable that a facilitator whose own personal development falls short, may have a limiting or even a detrimental influence on other group members (154). In addition, if his own horizon of personal development is effectively limited to the affective-experiential dimension, then it is likely that he will tend to promote spontaneity in feeling and experiencing, while neglecting to foster its integration in the overall integrated experiential-affective-cognitive-moral-and-total development of the person. In my experience, it is not unfair to fault some Rogerian facilitators on this account. I would share Ronald Laing's conviction (as reported by Friedenberg):

"To the degree that our own growth and humanness have not

been warped or stunted, each of us will be able to and will wish to support the growth and humanness of others" (155).

772.5 Encounter Groups and Community

The unstructured extended time in which the encounter experience takes place leads to that 'common' consciousness which William Coulson calls a 'sense of community':

> "The self-consciousness that can lead to a heightened sense of community comes when people have the kinds of occasion that imply the permission to say how they feel" (156).

Coulson points out that a sense of community can occur when there is shared attention to shared events (i.e. when there is common experiencing). The encounter group is a place where mutual experiencing, mutual trust and mutual openness can promote warm feelings of closeness which Coulson names a 'sense of community'.

In our chapter on Lonergan's theory of community, we saw that (for Lonergan) community is only elemental when people share their experience and feelings in common (157). Community is fully realized only when common meaning, common values and common commitments are added to this common experiencing. Thus, in his view, a sense of community is only the beginning of the realization of true community. Kurt Back would appear to support this view:

> "Sensitivity training (i.e. the basic encounter group) is thus an excellent synthetic community experience for a population that has lost the meaning of community but not its sentimental appeal" (158).

Lieberman concludes his survey with the hypothesis that perhaps the import of encounter groups lies not in 'people-changing' but in 'people-providing'. (159). He believes that encounter groups provide intense, meaningful but transitory relationships.

These serve as a momentary relief from the chronic boredom which some people suffer in contemporary society. Lieberman points out that in the encounter group, responsibility and feeling for others is severely limited in space and time. Unlike other institutions where people search for community, such as the family, the state or the church, the encounter group requires no common commitment to the future from its members. Neither does it require the achievement of common meaning or common values. I would suggest that the most that such a group can foster is an ephemeral and somewhat artificial experience of a 'sense of community', an experience which does not encourage the formation of a true and enduring community (160).

Lieberman disagrees with Rogers that the kind of closeness which encounter groups foster is permanently transforming. He writes:

> "Note, too in sharp contrast, for example, to Rogers's perception of encounter groups, that although we believe that the groups are superbly engineered for this transitory and temporary but meaningful experience with regard to people-providing, our data offer sparse evidence that such experiences lead to altered states in the person beyond the confines of the group" (161).

My criticism would go beyond that of Lieberman. I would question whether the transitory and temporary experience of a 'sense of community' in encounter groups can go anywhere near fulfiling the basic human desire for community, which is the social manifestation of the basic human desire for personal meaning and personal value. With Buber I would assert:

> " .... all sentimentality, all exaggeration and over-enthusiasm must be kept away from our thinking on community. Community is never mood and even where it is feeling, it is always the feeling of a <u>state of existence</u>. Community is the inner constitution of a common life ..." (162).

I would suggest that this inner constitution of a

common life occurs only when shared experience and shared feeling are deepened and made more permanent by common understanding, common judgements, common values and above all, common and complementary commitments. The 'sense of community' which arises in an encounter group can be no more than a temporary respite: it cannot replace those more permanent and adequate communities in which alone, men can fulfil their interpersonal nature.

7.8 HORIZONS OF COGNITIONAL THEORY

78.1 Lonergan's Critical Realism

Lonergan's contribution to personal growth-theory is, in part, the fruit of his herculean labours in cognitional analysis. I feel that it is necessary to consider briefly his approach if we are to be in a position to evaluate his categories of development critically.

We have seen that Lonergan's account of intellectual conversion is based on his analysis of the act of knowing (163). According to Lonergan, intellectual conversion consists in ridding one's self of the illusion that knowing is like looking; that objectivity is seeing what is there to be seen and not seeing what is not there; that the 'real' and the 'objective' is the already-out-there-now-to-be-looked-at or, as the case may be, the already-in-here-now-to-be-looked-at (164). According to Lonergan, this illusion overlooks the distinction between the world of immediacy and the world mediated by meaning (165).

The world of immediacy is the sum total of what is seen, heard, touched, tasted, smelled, felt, etc, i.e., 'experienced'. According to Lonergan, this is the empiricist's 'real' world: for the empiricist, the world of understanding and conceiving, reflecting and judging, deliberating and deciding, is merely subjective (166).

Lonergan points out that the world of immediacy is only a portion of the world mediated by meaning. The latter is known, not by sense experience alone, but by understanding and judgement in addition. Knowing, therefore, is a whole whose parts are dynamically structured. The parts are experiencing, understanding and judging (167). As Lonergan describes it, knowing is:

> " .... not experience alone, not understanding alone, not judgement alone; it is not a combination of only experience and understanding or of only experience and judgement; finally it is not something totally apart from experience, understanding and judgement" (168).

For Lonergan, correlative to knowing there is the known. What is known is the real, the objective. His criteria of objectivity are the compound criteria of experiencing, of understanding and of judging. What is real is not just 'looked at', or experienced: it is 'given' in experience, organized and extrapolated in understanding and <u>fully</u> known only in judgement.

The relevance of Lonergan's account in the context of personal development becomes apparent when the 'to be known' are the data of human consciousness. According to Lonergan, the data which the conscious self <u>experiences</u> are the conscious activities of sensing, perceiving, imagining, feeling, questioning, understanding, conceiving, reflecting, judging, deciding, communicating etc.

One may object that this account of the data of knowing is too analytic. However, Lonergan insists that:

> " .... the aim is not to set forth a list of the abstract properties of human knowledge but to assist the reader in effecting a personal appropriation (169) of the concrete dynamic structure (170) immanent and recurrently operative in his own cognitional activities" (171).

Thus, Lonergan's analysis is concretely performed: it is not abstract or merely logical. The reason why Lonergan undertakes

such a painstaking analysis in Insight is that:

> " .... such an appropriation can occur only gradually, and so there will be offered (in Insight), not a sudden account of the whole of the structure, but a slow assembly of its elements, relations, alternatives and implications" (172).

According to Lonergan, since the real (in this case the real which we are considering is the data of consciousness) is not only experienced but understood and judged as well, a distinction must be made between consciousness of self and knowledge of self (173). Consciousness is merely the experience of knowing. When the 'to be known' is the conscious self, then self-consciousness consists in the experiencing of one's self-experiencing, self-feeling, self-understanding, self-judging and self-evaluation. It follows that one knows one's true self fully only when one has experienced, understood and judged one's self-experiencing, self-feeling self-understanding, self-judgement and self-evaluation (174).

I would suggest that the value of the above analysis is that, in the context of personal development, it enabled Lonergan to distinguish clearly between the different dimensions of self-transcendence and to formulate his theory in the categories of consciousness rather than in an arbitrarily chosen set of categories. That Lonergan's categories are not arbitrary,can be personally verified if the reader is willing to make a deliberate effort to appropriate the dynamic structure of his own conscious activities (175). He will be able, not only to distinguish the various components in the knowing process, but also to grasp their concretely experienced interrelatedness, interdependence and integrated unity. Thus, I would submit that while Lonergan's analysis leads to greater differentiation, it does not lead to fragmentation.

Lonergan's account contrasts with that of Rogers, whose theory lacks such a grounding.

78.2 Rogers's Implicit Empiricism

Rogers does not explicitate a cognitional theory. However, his implicit empiricist approach emerges clearly in his writings and I believe that it has serious implications for his growth-theory. For instance, when Rogers attempts to define 'experience' and 'perception' he remarks:

> "When we perceive that 'this is a triangle', 'this is a tree', 'this is my mother', it means that we are making a prediction that the objects from which the stimuli are received would, if checked in other ways, exhibit properties which we have come to regard from past experience as being characteristic of triangles, trees and mothers" (176).

I would disagree that what we perceive is that 'this is a triangle', What we perceive is a pattern of black marks on paper; what we understand is the intelligibility of the pattern of triangularity; what we judge is that 'this is a triangle'. Thus, Rogers's approach is that of Lonergan's empiricist who believes that knowing is like looking and that the real is the already-out-there-now-real and the already-in-here-now-real.

In the first place, this empiricist approach leads Rogers to subjectivism and theoretical relativism. He asserts:

> "Man lives essentially in his own personal and subjective world and even his most objective functioning in science, mathematics and the like is the result of subjective purpose and subjective choice .... Although there may be such a thing as objective truth, I can never know it; all I can know is that some statements appear to me subjectively to have the qualification of objective truth. Thus, there is no such thing as scientific knowledge: there are only individual perceptions of what appears to each person to be such knowledge" (177).

In the second place, (and much more importantly for his growth-theory), Rogers's empiricism leads him to formulate a truncated account of the data of consciousness and so of its

development. As we have said, Lonergan claims that the data which the conscious self experiences are the conscious activities of sensing, perceiving, imagining, feeling, questioning, understanding, conceiving, reflecting, judging, deliberating, deciding, choosing and acting. For Rogers, the 'real' has a tendency to be synonomous with the 'experienced' and so his account of the 'real self' tends to highlight the 'experienced' self: the more that one is in touch with one's 'organismic' experience, the more 'real' one becomes and the more one becomes 'that self which one truly is' (178).

Lonergan points out that the empiricist not only experiences the real but understands and judges it in addition. However, Lonergan adds:

> " .... he fancies that what he knows in judgement is not known in judgement and does not suppose an exercise of understanding but simply is attained by taking a good look at the 'real' that is already out there now" (179).

Rogers appears to encourage knowledge of the data of consciousness by means of introversion, i.e. by taking a sort of inward 'look' and by 'uncovering' what is already-in-here-now-real. However, such an inward 'look' reveals one's self-experiencing only. It must be completed by self-understanding and self-judgement, if one is to reach true self-knowledge. It must be further completed by self-evaluation and self-concern, if one is to reach true self-acceptance and true self-realization.

Now Rogers's therapy can induce a heightening of one's conscious self-experiences, self-feelings, feelings towards others, 'conscious thought' and 'choice'. However, because self-feeling and self-experiencing are often much more vividly experienced in consciousness than 'conscious thought' (including self-meaning) and 'choice' (including self-evaluation) and because Rogers does not differentiate between a heightening of self-consciousness and true self-knowledge, I feel that he does not adequately facilitate true self-knowledge and true self-esteem and therefore true self-realization.

I think that it is reasonable to affirm that therapy which is to promote authentic humanness (understood as the achievement of self-transcendence) must lead to true self-knowledge and true self-evaluation and not merely to heightened self-consciousness.

7.9 HORIZONS OF PHILOSOPHICAL ANTHROPOLOGY

79.1 The Call for a Philosophical Anthropology

Although Rogers criticizes the logical positivist approach which he inherited as being less than adequate to deal with the phenomenon of subjectivity, he does not seem to advert to the even greater deficiency of a psychotherapy which is not grounded in an adequate philosophical anthropology. Other writers in the American 'Human Potential' movement in psychology have freely admitted its lack of an adequate philosophy of man (180). For instance, Abraham Maslow writes:

> "From the European writers, we can and should pick up their greater emphasis on what they call 'philosophical anthropology', that is the attempt to define man and the differences between man and any other species, between man and objects and between man and robots. What are his unique and defining characteristics? What is as essential to man that without it he would no longer be defined as man. On the whole, this is a task from which American Psychology has abdicated" (181).

In a similar vein, Ronald Laing warns that:

> "Any theory not founded on the nature of being human is a lie and a betrayal of man" (182).

I would suggest that not only is it a betrayal of man: it tends to deform personal existence and personal development. As Laing adds:

"An inhuman theory will inevitably lead to inhuman consequences" (183).

79.2 Eric Voegelin's Hypothesis of the Eclipse of Reality

In this context of inadequate philosophical anthropology, I propose to examine the hypothesis of the German historian Eric Voegelin. His hypothesis is the fruit of his massive labours in the philosophy of history (184).

Voegelin contends that by an act of imagination, man can shrink himself to a Sartrean 'self' that is condemned to be free. To this shrunken or contracted 'self' God is dead, the past is dead, the present is the flight from the 'self's' non-essential facticity, towards being what it is not, the future is the field of possibilities among which the 'self' must choose its project of being beyond mere facticity, and 'freedom' is the necessity of making a choice that will determine the 'self's' own being. Voegelin remarks that the Sartrean 'self' is damned not to be able to be free (185).

Voegelin observes that a man who engages in deforming himself to a 'self' (186) does not cease to be a man; nor does the surrounding reality of God, the world and society change its structure. Thus, a friction develops between the contracted 'self' and reality. However, according to Voegelin, the man who has thus deformed himself tends to lessen the friction, not by "leaving the prison of his selfhood" (187) but by again putting his imagination to work and by thus surrounding his 'imaginary self' (i.e. his contracted self) with an imaginary reality: intentionally or unintentionally he creates what Voegelin calls 'Second Reality' in order to eclipse or obscure the 'First Reality' of God, the world etc. However, the friction cannot be entirely removed and a conflict develops between the 'world' of his imagination and the real world, a conflict which manifests itself in a fluctuation of 'moods' between elation and despair. Thus, the

contracted 'self' denies the fullness of his own humanity. Voegelin remarks:

> "He will deny his humanity and insist he is nothing but his shrunken self; he will deny ever having experienced the reality of common experience; he will deny that anybody could have a fuller perception of reality than he allows his self; in brief, he will set the contracted self as a model for himself as well as for everybody else" (188).

Furthermore, a man's act of deforming himself is part of his constitutive meaning. Thus, it is as 'real' as the man who commits it. So a conflict <u>with</u> reality becomes a disturbance <u>within</u> reality. Voegelin observes that this distortion of reality with its attendant disturbances in consciousness leads to a shift from the projection of 'Second Realities' to a preoccupation with 'self-analysis'. Thus, the emphasis shifts to psychology. According to Voegelin, psychology now becomes burdened with the task of examining the 'moods' which are the consequences of deformed existence, such as optimism, pessimism, egoism, altruism, egomania, monomania, nihilism etc. (189).

Voegelin analyses this historical process of deformation into two periods of about equal length, marked by a shift in accent from the projection of new 'Second Realities' to 'self-analysis' by deformed and projecting existence. He writes:

> "In the century from Turgot, Kant and Condorcet to Hegel, Comte and Marx, the weight lies on the construction of philosophies of history, of the great designs that will justify the deformation of humanity as the meaning and end of history and assure the contracted self of its righteousness when it imposes itself on society and the world at large. In the century from Kierkegaard and Stirner, through Nietzsche and Freud, to Heidegger and Sartre, the weight shifts towards the inquiry concerning deformed existence" (190).

According to Voegelin, this shift in preoccupation means that the early projections of 'Second Reality' purposely designed to eclipse historical reality, have performed their task so well that, to the late-comers in the movement of deformation, historical consciousness of a fuller humanity is eclipsed and so the new preoccupation is with the 'contracted self' (191). Voegelin remarks:

> "When the contracted self rises, the reality of God will be eclipsed; and since God can be eclipsed but not abolished, the mood of elation cannot be sustained; the presence of God makes itself felt in the fluctuation of the mood from the earlier confidence of self-assertion to the later anxiety and despair" (192).

Voegelin observes that the consequence of this eclipse of God is the rise of Nietzsche's 'Superman'. However, he points out that the projection of such a 'man-god' is doomed to failure: it cannot overcome the 'Nothing' since the 'Nothing' which eclipses God has been projected.

Thus, Voegelin's hypothesis is that the contraction of man's humanity to a 'self' by means of an act of imagination, together with his projection of a surrounding 'Second Reality' which eclipses God etc. by means of a second act of imagination, result in a <u>deformation within reality</u>. Man's consciousness of his true humanity becomes clouded with untruth and manifests itself in a fluctuation of 'moods' from elation to despair.

79.3 Rogers's Theory and Voegelin's Hypothesis

I would suggest that Voegelin's hypothesis throws considerable light on the puzzling phenomenon of the contemporary 'Human Potential' or 'Third Force' movement in American psychology - a movement of which Carl Rogers is one of the major representatives. Perhaps it is significant that the movement had its cultural origins in a section of contemporary society where the reality of God has become increasingly clouded, where religious practice has declined, where objective values

have been more and more in question (if not rejected) (193), and where there has been a progressive preoccupation with the problems of meaningless, boredom, alienation, etc. and their psychological 'symptoms' such as anxiety, anomie, depression etc. It seems arguable that the movement represents another instance of the contemporary shift from the traditional occupation with the Transcendent as the ultimate explanation and ultimate goal of human existence, to a preoccupation with the 'self' as its own ultimate explanation and justification and with 'self-actualization' and the fulfilment of human potential as the ultimate goal of human existence.

The language of the'Human Potential' movement is somewhat euphoric. It tends to deify the potential of the human person. Rogers's terms such as 'fully-functioning', 'self-actualizing', 'being one's self as a process of changingness', 'existential living', 'organismic functioning' etc., give the impression that Nietzsche's 'Superman' may not be a Utopian dream after all. Sensitivity training (i.e. the basic encounter group) has even been described as a search for salvation (194).

The movemement is puzzling because despite its obviously sincere desire to promote truly human living and full personal development, some of its protagonists exhibit a certain resistance to the sphere of the Transcendent (195) and to the sphere of objective values (196). For example, in reply to my remark to Rogers (197) that, unlike Buber (whose I-Thou relationship is rooted in the Eternal Thou and whose theory of community is grounded in its Center), he makes no reference to the possible existence of this dimension of 'fully-functioning' living, Rogers replied that I was welcome to make this transition if I felt that I could: he preferred to confine himself to the data of experience.

Could it be that Rogers's 'experience' and that of many of his clients is the product of a culturally inherited truncation which Voegelin describes; that it is therefore governed by a clouded perception of reality which tends to shrink optimal

human living to a vivid experiencing of one's 'self'; that it is accompanied by Voegelin's projection of 'Second Reality' which, apart from eclipsing the reality of God, objective values, etc., projects a Euphoric theory of 'organismic' 'fully-functioning' living as the goal of personal development; i.e. that it leads to an immanentist philosophy of man?

One way or the other, I feel it is evident that Rogers's account of the process and especially of the goal of personal development is grounded in immanentist philosophical anthropology in general and in a truncated analysis of the data of consciousness in particular. While his account of personal development shows that he has closely observed and tried to promote emotional change in his clients, sometimes with healing results, it also shows that he tends to over-emphasize this aspect of development, neglecting the overall development of his client.

79.4 Lonergan's Theory and Voegelin's Hypothesis

I do not think that such an accusation can be levelled against Lonergan. While some readers may be tempted to criticize him because he expresses his theory of personal development in cognitional rather than in metaphysical categories, I feel that they risk doing him less than justice. In Insight, Lonergan shows that his cognitional categories are paralleled by corresponding metaphysical elements of the Aristotelean system (198). Furthermore, I think it can be shown that Lonergan's approach with its emphasis on experiential and affective as well as on cognitive, moral and total dimensions of development, is quite compatible with and strongly influenced by Aquinas's hylomorphic approach to the study of man (to which Lonergan owes his foundational inspiration) (199).

More importantly, I do not believe that Lonergan can be accused of truncating the data of human consciousness or of eclipsing the surrounding reality of God, values, etc., i.e. of immanentism. He is very painstaking in his analysis

of the cognitional operations of sensing, perceiving, feeling, inquiring, imagining, understanding, conceiving, formulating, reflecting, marshalling and weighing the evidence, judging, deliberating deciding and believing, as well as of the data of religious experience (200). Besides, he makes a thorough effort to trace the sources of what he calls the 'flight from understanding' which could obviate Voegelin's projections (201).

Furthermore, Lonergan's detailed analysis of the data of consciousness could foster a much needed dialogue between the philosophical anthropologists and the personal growth-theorists many of whom so badly need an adequate philosophical anthropology. Thus, his approach could pave the way for a more accurate,true and complete grounding philosophy among psychologists and so sponsor the kind of technique which might promote true personal development. As Victor Frankl observed in 1958:

> "If psychotherapy is to remain therapy and not become a symptom within the pathology of the time (Zeitgeist), then it needs a correct picture of man; it needs it at least as much as it needs exact technique" (202).

Might I suggest that it needs it <u>more</u> than it needs technique and that it is the task of the philosophical anthropologists to supply the need; that they can do so only by collaborating in an ongoing process of fruitful search; and that Lonergan's genetic method might provide an adaptable heuristic framework in which to further the search. He himself remarks in concluding his introduction to <u>Insight</u>:

> "I can but make the contribution of a single man and then hope that others, sensitive to the same problems, will find that my efforts shorten their own labour and that my conclusions provide a base for further developments" (203).

7.10 CONCLUSION

I have been contrasting the horizons of Lonergan and Rogers in the various spheres of method, science, freedom, commitment, the process of development, feeling, values, the Transcendent, community, cognitional theory and philosophical anthropology.

In doing so, it has become increasingly evident that in most instances sharply different views have been proposed. It is therefore logical to ask: why this divergence? Are not both of these authors genuinely trying to understand personal development, Lonergan in a theoretical and Rogers in a practical context? Do not both of them adopt the same point of departure: the fundamental struggle of the person to become more human? Why then do they articulate more or less opposed theories of personal growth?

I believe that while the views of Lonergan and Rogers on various topics can be compared and contrasted, criticized and evaluated, the basic reason for their diverse conclusions on the nature of personal development lies, not chiefly in their different horizons of method, science, etc. but in their contrasting horizons of philosophical anthropology. In other words, their most significant difference lies in the fundamentally different option which each of them makes concerning the nature of being human - an option which guides their investigations in personal growth-theory.

I have tried to bring out that Rogers's theory of personal development is implicitly grounded in an immanentist philosophy of man and I have explored Eric Voegelin's hypothesis concerning the historical development of this view. Such a philosophy proposes that man is his own final end and that his fundamental task is to actualize his potential to the greatest possible extent. Rogers sets out to foster this task in his theory of the 'fully-functioning' person whom he encourages

to 'be' himself as dictated by the 'organismic valuing process' (204). Victor Frankl indicates the shortcomings in such a view of man:

> "Through a merely psychological analysis, the human phenomena are, as it were, taken out of the noölogical space and levelled down to the psychological plane. Such a procedure is called psychologism. It entails no less than the loss of a whole dimension. Moreover, what is lost is the dimension that allows man to emerge and rise above the level of the biological and psychological foundations of his existence. This is an important issue, for transcending these foundations and thereby transcending oneself signifies the very act of existing. Self-transcendence, I would say, is the essence of existence; and existence, in turn, means the specifically human mode of being" (205).

I have tried to show how Lonergan's theory of personal growth is explicitly grounded in a transcendent philosophy of man. The fundamental tenet of such a philosophy is that man is not his own end: his end is to transcend himself by realizing objective truth and objective values and by opening himself to the experience of Mystery. Such a view guides Lonergan's growth-theory which stresses that the goal of personal development is the achievement of cognitive, moral, affective and total self-transcendence. In other words Lonergan's equivalent of the 'fully-functioning' person transcends his experience. He gradually tries to become his true, loving, affectionate self and he is consciously orientated towards the Transcendent.

It seems to me that a fundamental choice has to be made concerning the nature of man and that personal growth-theory will necessarily be influenced (however implicitly) by such a choice. Furthermore, I would suggest that to make a basic option for an immanentist view of man is to truncate one's account of the human person and to distort one's view of reality. I would agree firmly with Frankl that:

"It appears, in conclusion, that those theories which are based upon the reduction of tension as in homeostasis theory, or the fulfilment of the greatest number of immanent possibilities as in self-actualization, when weighed, are found wanting. It is the contention of the author, that an adequate view of man can only be properly formulated when it goes beyond homeostasis, beyond self-actualization, to the sphere of human existence in which man chooses what he will do and what he will be in the midst of an objective world of meanings and values"(206).

It is my conclusion that because Rogers does not formulate an explicit philosophical anthropology, his investigations are implicitly guided by an immanentist view of man, a view which, I feel, is inadequate. On the other hand, Lonergan's theory of personal development is firmly grounded in a philosophy of transcendence and while his account of the process of development is still embryonic, his goal of the process is the only one which can promote true humanity, in my view. Perhaps the import of this conclusion was well expressed by Rollo May:

"Our problem is to open our vision to more of human experience, to develop and free our methods so that they will as far as possible do justice to the richness and breath of man's experience. This can be done only by analysing the philosophical presuppositions" (207).

A P P E N D I X

A. TOWARDS A THEORY OF THE PROCESS OF PERSONAL DEVELOPMENT

A.1 OBJECTIVE

My objective is to sketch in brief outline, a theory of the process of true personal development, by synthesizing elements from the preceeding chapters. I shall try to illustrate how genetic method, which we examined in chapter one, can be applied within the context of a transcendent goal of personal development, as described in chapter two, in order to afford a limited insight into the process of personal growth. I shall also indicate interpersonal and community factors which can facilitate growth, as seen in chapters three to six. The corrections and fundamental options adopted in chapter seven will guide the theory.

I must emphasize that my aim is strictly limited to an effort to illustrate the process and goal of personal development and so my differentiation of the development itself will be schematic only.

A1.1 Presuppositions of the Theory

A11.1 The Structure of Personality

The theory adopts as its starting point an account of the structure of personality which differentiates the conscious subject into the categories of experiencing, feeling, meaning and value, where such categories form a hierarchically interlocked and dynamically unified structure (1).

A11.2 The Fact of Freedom

The theory presupposes that the conscious subject is

essentially free to grow, although it allows that such growth may be limited by various factors, such as external circumstances or limitations in the subject as sensitive, as affectionate, as intelligent and reasonable or as responsible (2).

A11.3 The Goal of Development

The theory depends on a philosophy of man which views personal development as a gradual process towards a goal of complete self-transcendence. The achievement of such self-transcendence can be differentiated as a fourfold interrelated (3) and hierarchically interlocked (4) process which fosters affective, cognitive, moral and total development (5).

A.2 METHOD

I shall apply Lonergan's genetic method, therefore anticipating that (in accordance with the principle of development (6)), personal growth will consist in an intelligible linked sequence of higher and more differentiated integrations at the levels of personal experience, personal feeling, personal meaning and personal value, together with a linked sequence of overall higher integrations in the unified subject (7).

A2.1 Procedures

To determine the course of the development, I shall adopt Lonergan's general and particular procedures.

A21.1 General Procedures

a) The Field of Development: Finality

In the context of personal development the principle of finality expresses itself as a basic conscious desire for true personal meaning and true personal value on the part of the developing subject (8).

b) The Direction of Development: Differentiation

Development manifests itself in the structured personality as a movement towards increasing specific differentiation at the levels of experience, affectivity, personal truth and personal value, governed by the principle of increasing differentiation (9).

c) The Mode of Development: Spiral

Personal development takes place by means of a recurring spiral sequence of potency, form and act (as explained in the symbolic representation below) at each specific level of development as well as in the overall integrated subject (as dictated by the principle of development (10).

A21.2 Particular Procedures

a) Integration and Operation

I shall use Lonergan's procedure of integration and operation, which attempts to explain how one specific or overall integration acts both as Integrator and as Operator: it both consolidates the development up to that point and also acts to bring about a new and higher integration (11).

b) The Anticipated Law of Effect

Lonergan admits that his attempt to specify how the operator actually brings about change is very general. He makes use of the anticipated law of effect which states that personal development occurs because the conscious subject wants to develop and therefore deliberately takes the appropriate steps to become more attentive (experience), more affectionate (affectivity), to become his true self (meaning) and to become truly good and loving (value). (12).

A21.3 Principles Governing the Process

a) The Principle of Emergence

The principle of emergence governs the fact that the conscious subject may emerge as a more sensitive, more affectionate, truer and better person (13).

b) The Principle of Correspondence

The principle of correspondence guides the conscious subject's development of the appropriate sequence of specific higher integrations of feeling, meaning and value, as well as the consequent sequence of overall higher integrations which unify his overall development (14).

A2.2 Conditions of the Process of Personal Development in The Interpersonal and Community Contexts.

I shall now apply Lonergan's heuristic structure to the data of personal development in the interpersonal and community contexts. Although the experience of a true interpersonal relationship and a true community experience must be distinguished, for the purposes of examining its contribution to personal growth, I shall treat community as a compound plurality of true interpersonal relationships (15).

A22.1 Description

If there are two (or more) persons, one of whom I shall name 'the growing self' and the other(s) whom I shall name 'the helping other(s)', they may be related as follows in a 'helping' relationship.

(i)	Experience	The two (or more) persons must be in sensory contact over an extended period (16).
(ii)	Feeling	The helping other(s) respond(s) to the growing self with true affection.
(iii)	Meaning	a) The helping other(s) penetrate(s) through the growing person's false self and gradually understand(s) his true self. b) The helping other(s) grasp(s) the depth of the growing self, i.e., he (they) begin(s) to glimpse his ideal self.
(iv)	Value	a) The helping other(s) accept(s) all that

the growing self is and complacently prize(s) his true self (17).

b) The helping other(s) is (are) concerned to help the growing self to realize his ideal self and so confirm(s) him (18).

(v) Total Level — The growing self may find himself grasped by the experience of the Holy (19).

(vi) Overall — Although it is possible to differentiate the relationship as above, the overall relationship(s) is (are) truly integrated and unified 'I-Thou' relationship (s) (20).

A2.3 The Process of Personal Development

A23.1 Description

Parallel to the above process in the helping other(s), the following process takes place in the growing subject:

(i) Experience — The growing self becomes increasingly more aware of his inner and outer experience (21).

(ii) Feeling — The growing self becomes increasingly more aware of his feelings (including states, trends and intentional responses). He gradually reinforces his intentional responses to values (22).

(iii) Meaning — a) The growing subject increases in true self-understanding and corrects false self-understanding. This leads to a reorganization of the self-concept in order to integrate his self-experiences, self-feelings and self-understanding fully (23).

(iv) Value — a) There is increasing self-acceptance of all that his self-understanding tells the growing self that he truly is (24).

There is self-complacency in the true self as good, countering self-hate.

b) There is an increasing complacency in the ideal self.
There is a growing concern to realize this ideal self.
There is a consequent self-confirmation of certain aspects of the self as it progressively realizes the ideal self.

(v) Total Level — The conscious subject may experience an increasing 'gaudium' in the awareness of Mystery.

(vi) Overall — The conscious self becomes an integrated unity in which the total level integrates and transforms the valuing level, which in turn integrates and transforms the meaning level and so on. The result is a conscious integrated process towards affective, cognitive, moral and total self-transcendence, by means of affective, intellectual, moral and total conversion (25).

A23.2 Explanatory

The principle of finality made more specific through the anticipated law of effect, expresses itself as a basic conscious desire to achieve true personal meaning and true personal value. Through successive applications of the principles of correspondence and emergence, a linked sequence of dynamic and increasingly differentiated higher integrations results, both at specific and at overall levels. We may outline the process as follows (26)

(i) Experience — The increasing awareness of all his experience (INTEGRATOR) in the growing subject leads to a decrease in his tendency to distort new experience (OPERATOR), which is therefore fully conscious (INTEGRATOR) and so on in a linked sequence of experiential integrations.

(ii) Feeling — The increasing awareness of all his feelings (INTEGRATOR) means that the growing subject has less need to deny his feelings to awareness (OPERATOR). He is increasingly open to new feelings (OPERATOR) which are fully integrated in consciousness (INTEGRATOR) and so on in a linked sequence of affective integrations which gradually promote affective conversion and affective self-transcendence.

(iii) Meaning — The growing subject tends to repudiate his false self as he gains more understanding of his true self (INTEGRATOR). This leads to the emergence of further questions (OPERATOR), which foster greater insight into the true self (INTEGRATOR), clearer awareness of the ideal self (OPERATOR) and so a gradual realization of the ideal self (INTEGRATOR), in a linked sequence of higher integrations of personal truth (eventually promoting intellectual conversion and cognitional self-transcendence.

(iv) Value — The growing subject eliminates self-hate and grows in acceptance of himself as good (INTEGRATOR). He is concerned to increase in goodness (OPERATOR) and so he is complacent in the ideal self. Thus, he becomes concerned to realize this ideal self and its progressive realization takes place in a linked sequence of higher integrations of personal goodness promoting moral conversion and moral self-transcendence.

(v) Total Level — The conscious subject may experience a deepening awareness of Mystery (analogous INTEGRATOR) and so he may turn towards the Transcendent.

(vi) Overall At any stage in the developmental process there is an overall higher integration (INTEGRATOR) in which total self-transcendence may sublate moral, affective and cognitional self-transcendence (when all four are present). This higher integration is dynamic (OPERATOR) and so it replaces itself in a linked sequence of overall higher integrations (INTEGRATOR), as complete conversion and complete self-transcendence is gradually achieved. Thus, a specific development at any level promotes parallel developments at other levels and so a development occurs in the overall unified subject (as the principles of emergence and correspondence dictate) (27).

A23.3 Symbolic Representation of the Process

a) Diagram



b) Key to Symbols

(i) The basic conscious desire to realize true personal meaning and true personal value on the part of the developing subject is represented by the upwardly directed spiral.

(ii) The increasing diameter of the loops in the spiral, express the increasing achievement of personal truth and personal goodness.

(iii) The mode of development is represented by the recurring spiral sequence of POTENCY, FORM and ACT. This spiral action occurs at each specific level of development, as well as at the overall integral level, as follows. Any particular integration (ACT) of personal feeling, personal meaning or personal value and consequently any overall integration of personal growth, is open to further development (development as POTENTIAL) (28). As I have noted this development takes place when the Operator initiates growth at any specific level (development as FORMAL). The specific development is complete only when a new higher specific integration is produced by the Integrator (development as ACTUAL). This causes other parallel spiral developments (at other levels) in accordance with the law of integration (29) and so a development takes place in the overall integrated subject.

(iv) The double ACT (printed 'ACT-ACT'), highlights the twofold function of each ACTual integration of specific or of overall integral development. As FIRST ACT ('in actu primo'), it acts as the Integrator of the specific or of the overall development. As SECOND ACT ('in actu secundo'), the same integration acts as Operator, i.e., it actually operates to bring about further specific and so eventually overall development.

A2.4 The Goal of Personal Development

As I have argued in chapter seven, the goal of true personal development and so the realization of the true self, is the achievement of complete self-transcendence (30). Thus, the goal of the process governing such an achievement is the gradual integration of experiential, affective, intellectual, moral and total developments, as the subject moves progressively towards affective, cognitional, moral and total self-

transcendence.

A2.5 Conclusion

The application of the procedure of integration and operation to the data of personal development affords:

(i) a limited understanding of the latent intelligibility in the sequence of integrations (and consequent schemes of recurrence) at the experiential, affective, intellectual-rational, and moral levels of development;

(ii) some grasp of the latent intelligibility in the sequence of overall higher and sublating integrations in the developing and self-transcending subject.

I have noted that the above theory is an outline only. It requires a further differentiation of the specific developments at each level. It also requires a more penetrating study of precisely how the Operator in Lonergan's theory actually brings about specific developments, i.e. how the anticipated law of effect operates in achieving specific personal development.

N O T E S

CHAPTER ONE

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(1) Bernard Lonergan, Method in Theology, London: Darton Longman and Todd, 1972, p.4 (henceforth referred to as Method). Lonergan's preoccupation with method dates back to his major studies of Aquinas,notably his articles on Aquinas's understanding of 'verbum': c.f. Lonergan, Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas, London: Darton, Longman and Todd,(1968 publication of Lonergan's set of articles in Theological Studies, 7, (1946), pp.349-392; 8, (1947), pp.35-79; 404-444; 10, (1949), pp.3-40, 359-393). For what Lonergan (in Insight, p.434) describes as "an excellent outline of these articles", c.f. L.-B. Geiger, O.P., Review: "Verbum Articles", Bulletin Thomiste, 8, (1952), pp.477-479.

(2) C.f. Bernard Lonergan, "Cognitional Structure", Collection, (papers by Bernard Lonergan, edited by Frederick Crowe), Montreal: Palm, 1967, p.228.

(3) Bernard Lonergan, Insight, London: Longmans, 1957, p.392 Lonergan clarifies: " .... prior to the understanding that issues in answers, there are the questions that anticipate answers; and as has been seen, such anticipation may be employed systematically in the determination of answers that as yet are unknown; for while the content of a future cognitional act is unknown, the general characteristics of the act itself not only can be known but can supply a premise that leads to the act".

(4) C.f. ibid., p. 36 , where he quotes an example from algebra: "Suppose that the problem is to determine when first after three o'clock the minute hand exactly covers the hour hand. Then, one writes down: Let 'x' be the number of minutes after three o'clock. Secondly, one infers that while the minute hand moves over 'x' minutes,

the hour hand moves over 'x/12' minutes. Thirdly, one observes that at three o'clock the hour hand has a fifteen minute start. Hence,

$$x = \frac{x}{12} + 15 = 16\frac{4}{11}$$

The procedure consists in

(1) giving the unknown a name or symbol,

(2) inferring the properties and relations of the unknown,

(3) grasping the possibility of combining these properties and relations to form an equation and

(4) solving the equation".

C.f. ibid., p.392. C.f. also note (9) below.

(5) C.f. ibid., p.44.

(6) C.f. ibid., pp.35f. On the mathematical expression of classical method and its limitations, c.f. note (9) below.

(7) C.f. ibid., pp.53f.

(8) C.f. ibid., p.459.

(9) C.f. ibid., p.461. Lonergan states clearly the limits of mathematical measurement in the context of trying to explain personal development: "The extraordinary success of the physical sciences naturally enough led investigators of the organism, the psyche and intelligence to a servile rather than an intelligent adoption of the successful procedures. In physics and chemistry, measuring is a basic technique that takes inquiry from the relations of things to our senses to their relations to one another. But when one mounts to the higher integrations of the organism, the psyche and intelligence, one finds that measuring looses both in significance and in efficacy". C.f. ibid., p.463. Thus, measurement must be abandoned in classical method when it studies non-quantifiable data (such as the structure of personality or community), even though it still seeks to grasp the relations of things to one another. Likewise mathematical measurement has

no assignable efficacy when genetic method studies development.

(10) Conjugate potencies correspond to the "quinque genera potentiarum animae" of Aquinas. C.f. S. Theol. Ia, q. 78, a.1. They include the 'faculties' of the soul.

(11) For Lonergan's account of these elements, c.f. Insight, pp.431-437.

(12) C.f. ibid., p.451. Note that this principle (and the following principles) regards conjugate (or accidental) development.

(13) C.f. ibid., pp.451-452.

(14) C.f. ibid., p.452. C.f. also ibid., p.451, where Lonergan observes: "Finality is not 'principium motus in alio inquantum aliud; it is not 'id cuius gratia'; it is 'principium motus in eo in quo est'". This principle does not operate ad infinitum: " .... the initial manifold is subjected progressively to ever more intricate arrangements and patterns; the principle of correspondence repeatedly forces out earlier integrations and, on each occasion, the principle of emergence evokes a more definitely differentiated integration. Eventually, full intelligible differentiation is reached, and development yields place to maturity". C.f. ibid., pp.454-455.

(15) Carl Rogers, Client-Centered Therapy, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1951, p.195.

(16) C.f. Lonergan, Insight, p.452.

(17) C.f. ibid., p.453.

(18) C.f. ibid., p.453.

(19) C.f. ibid., pp.453-454. C.f. 21.8 below.

(20) Ibid., p.454.

(21) Lonergan expresses it thus: "The cell .... sets up not a static but a dynamic integration. It is ever intussuscepting fresh materials and extruding others that have served their purpose. Nor is it content merely to maintain the balance of this process, but heads towards the duplication of its dynamic pattern and then it divides.

Such a division may be an instance of reproduction or of growth. In the former case, there is the multiplication of life in different instances. In the latter case, there is development". C.f. ibid., p.454.

(22) Lonergan comments on the distinction between these capacities and the underlying manifold: " .... the distinction between the two is emphasized by the difference between the normal single integration of capacities and the abnormality of multiple personality in which a single individual exhibits at different times quite different integrations of perceptive, associative, emotive, conative, and operative characteristics". C.f. ibid., p.456.

(23) C.f. ibid., p.458

(24) A. Angyal, Foundations for a Science of Personality, New York: Commonwealth Fund, 1941, p.48.

(25) C.f. Lonergan Insight, p.459. While Lonergan's statement that underlying conjugate (accidental) development there is an individual enduring unity (substance) is widely agreed upon, his claim that the source of this individuality is central potency (primary matter) is very questionable: primary matter(as pure potency)is by definition indeterminate and so cannot of itself be the principle of individuation. However, this topic does not (directly) concern us in examining conjugate development.

(26) C.f. ibid., p.459.

(27) C.f. ibid., p.460. (N.B. conjugate form=accidental habit).

(28) Lonergan clarifies: " .... the outstanding difference between classical and genetic method. Classical method is concerned to reduce regular events to laws. Genetic method is concerned with sequences in which correlations and regularities change..... If a mathematical illustration is helpful and not too much out of place, one might say that genetic method is concerned with a seq-

uence of operators that successively generate further functions from an initial function". C.f. ibid., p.461.

(29) Lonergan explains why he considers the principle of finality to be indeterminately directed: "Finality has been conceived as the upwardly but not determinately directed dynamism of proportionate being. Its realization may be regular but its regularity is not according to law, according to settled spontaneity, according to acquired habit, according to existing schemes of recurrence; on the contrary, it is a change in the law, the spontaneity, the habit, the scheme; it is the process of introducing and establishing a new law, spontaneity, habit, scheme. Its point of departure necessarily is the subject as he happens to be; but its direction is against his remaining as he is ...." c.f. ibid., pp.472-473.

(30) C.f. ibid., p.466. According to Lonergan, it is the set of conjugate forms (i.e. accidental habits) which accounts for the integration. Development consists in the gradual differentiation of these conjugate forms which integrate it. 'Otherwise' the development would be coincidental.

(31) C.f. ibid., p.467.

(32) C.f. ibid., p.468.

(33) C.f. ibid., p.468.

(34) C.f. ibid., p.469.

(35) C.f. Lonergan, Method, p.121.

(36) Lonergan stresses both the unity and complexity in integral development. He points out , for instance, that organic, psychic and intellectual development are not three independent processes: "They are interlocked, with the intellectual providing a higher integration of the psychic and the psychic providing a higher integration of the organic. Each level involves its own laws, its flexible schemes of recurrence, its interlocked sets of conjugate forms. Each set of forms stands in an emergent correspondence to otherwise coincidental manifolds

on the lower levels. Hence a single action can involve a series of components, physical, chemical, organic, neural, psychic and intellectual and the several components occur in accord with the laws and realized schemes of their appropriate levels". C.f. Lonergan, Insight, p.470.

(37) Karen Horney, Self-Anaylsis, New York: Norton, 1942, p.175.

(38) C.f. 33.4 below.

(39) C.f. 32.1, (4), (5), below.

(40) Lonergan, Insight, p.472.

(41) C.f. Karl Rahner, Hörer des Wortes, München: Kösel, 1963, p.40. The relationship of sublation, where the higher level of consciousness goes beyond yet includes the lower, is grounded in the relationship between body and spirit. As Norbert Luyten expresses it: "Le corps ne s'oppose donc pas formellement à l'esprit en tant qu'il est formé par lui, en tant que l'esprit se manifeste et s'exprime en lui; mais en tant qu'il délimite la sphère matérielle que l'esprit transcende, tout en l'assumant". C.f. La Condition Corporelle de l'Homme, (Discours Rectoral), Fribourg: Editions Universitaires, 1957, p.24. (The text also appears in Luyten, Ordo Rerum, Fribourg: Editions Universitaires, 1969.) Compare also Luyten's notion of 'assumption' in his explanation of the relationship between the new and old substantial forms. C.f. ibid., appendix I, pp.36-37.

(42) C.f. Lonergan, Method, pp.241-243.

(43) C.f. Lonergan, Insight, pp.472-474. Norbert Luyten traces this opposition to the material and spiritual dimensions of man: "C'est dans cette 'coincidentia oppositorum' dans l'identification à l'intérieur du même sujet d'un corps bien matériel et d'un esprit échappant à la matérialité que se noue le problème de l'homme". C.f. "L'Homme dans la Conception de S. Thomas", in Norbert Luyten (Ed.), L'Anthropologie

de Saint Thomas, Fribourg: Editions Universitaires, 1974, p.41.

(44) Norbert Luyten, La Condition Corporelle de l'Homme, p.34. This 'fundamental experience' follows from the "indivisible unity of human reality". C.f. "The Significance of the Body in a Thomist Anthropology", in Philosophy Today, vol.7, No.3/4, Fall, 1963, Celina, p.181.

(45) Lonergan, Insight, p.475.

(46) C.f. 32.1 (2), below.

(47) C.f. Lonergan, Insight, p.478.

C H A P T E R T W O

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(1) C.f. 4.4, 4.5.

(2) C.f. 11.3, 11.4. C.f also 73.1 on the non-systematic.

(3) C.f. Lonergan, Insight, p.617.

(4) C.f. ibid., pp.674, 516-520.

(5) C.f. ibid., p.617.

(6) C.f. 11.3

(7) C.f. Lonergan, Insight, p.618.

(8) C.f. 533.3. C.f. also 78.1 below.

(9) C.f. Lonergan, Insight, p.619.

(10) Prof. Luyten analysed freedom in terms of auto-determination in a series of lectures in Philosophical Anthropology, University of Fribourg, 1973.

(11) Lonergan, Insight, p.619.

(12) C.f. ibid., p.620.

(13) C.f. 4.4, 4.5.

(14) C.f. Lonergan, Insight, p.622.

(15) C.f. ibid., p.192.

(16) C.f. ibid., p.193.

(17) Lonergan calls this 'scotosis'. C.f. ibid., p.I9I.

(18) C.f. ibid., pp.13-19.

(20) Lonergan, Method, p.240.

(21) Lonergan, Insight, p.623.

(22) C.f. ibid., p.624.

(23) C.f. Lonergan, "Cognitional Structure", in Collection, pp.224-227. Such verification is extremely demanding.

(24) C.f. Lonergan, "Metaphysics as Horizon", in Collection, pp.213-214.

(25) Joseph de Finance, Essai sur l'Agir Humain, Rome: Presses de l'Université Grégorienne, 1962, pp.284-285.

(26) Ibid., pp.287-288. De Finance points out: "Autre

chose est la détermination du moyen le plus apte à atteindre une certaine fin, autre chose la détermination de cette fin, qui varie nécessairement selon l'étage où le Je choisit de se placer".

(27) C.f. Lonergan, Method, pp.237-238.

(28) C.f. ibid., p.240.

(29) C.f. 76.1 below for an account of this distinction.

(30) C.f. ibid., chapter 2, section 4.

(31) C.f. D.M.Brown, Ultimate Concern: Tillich in Dialogue, New York: Harper and Row, 1965; c.f. also William Jonston, The Mysticism of the Cloud of Unknowing, New York: Desclée, 1967.

(32) Lonergan describes the subject who has been totally converted. he becomes ".... a subject in love, a subject held, grasped, possessed, owned through a total and so an other-worldly love". C.f. Method, p.242. The term 'Total' denotes 'religious' throughout.

(33) C.f. 134.3 (d).

(34) Lonergan does not formulate an interpersonal category called 'ecstatic conversion'. However, in his discussion of critical history, he speaks of an ecstatic exercise of understanding, where the historian moves from one perspective into another. I have transferred this shift in perspective into an interpersonal context and broadened it to include appreciating, accepting, confirming and loving, as well as understanding the other.

(35) Ludwig Binswanger, "The Case of Ellen West", in Rollo May, (Ed.), Existence, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1958, p.268.

(36) C.f. Rollo May, Love and Will, New York: Dell, 1969, p.262.

(37) Binswanger, art. cit., in May,(Ed.), Existence, p.268.

(38) Martin Buber, "Distance and Relation", in The Knowledge of Man, London: Allen and Unwin, 1965, p.70, (henceforth referred to as Knowledge).

(39) C.f. ibid., p.71.

(40) C.f. ibid., p.71.

(41) Eric Voegelin, The New Science of Politics, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1952, p.186.

(42) Ibid., p.185.

(43) Søren Kierkegaard, Journals 1853-55, London: Fontana, 1968 edition, p.248.

(44) Søren Kierkegaard, The Sickness unto Death, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969, p.147.

(45) C.f. ibid., p.147.

(46) C.f. Lonergan, Method, pp.104-109. C.f. also Insight, pp.636-639.

(47) Norbert Luyten, "L'Homme dans la Conception de S. Thomas", in Norbert Luyten, (Ed.), L'Anthropologie de Saint Thomas, p.49.

(48) Ludwig Binswanger, Le Rêve et l'Existence, Tournai: Desclée, 1954.

(49) C.f. Lonergan, "Existenz and Aggiornamento", in Collection, p.243.

(50) Lonergan uses 'Cognitive Self-Transcendence' technically.

(51) C.f. Lonergan, "Cognitional Structure", in Collection, pp.224-227.

(52) Lonergan, Method, p.32.

(53) C.f. ibid., pp.31-32.

(54) C.f. ibid., p.289.

(55) C.f. ibid., p.105.

(56) C.f. ibid., p.106.

(57) There is considerable evidence that religious experience broadly conforms to the above description. Friedrich Heiler points to the various areas common to the world religions including Judaism, Christianity, Islam, Zorastrian Mazdaism, Hinduism, Buddhism, Taoism: that there is a Transcendent reality; that he is immanent in human hearts; that he is supreme beauty, truth, righteousness, goodness; that he is love, mercy, compassion;

that the way to him is through prayer, self-denial, love of one's neighbour. C.f. "The History of Religions as a Preparation for the Cooperation of Religions", in M.Eliade and J.Kitagawa, The History of Religions, Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1959, pp.142-153.

(58) Victor Frankl, Psychotherapy and Existentialism, Middlesex: Pelican, 1973, p.53.

CHAPTER THREE

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(1) C.f. Rogers, On Becoming a Person, London: Constable, 1967, pp.110, 163-181, 199, 205, 276, (henceforth referred to as Person); Freedom to Learn, Columbus, Ohio: Merrill, 1969, pp.151-153, 273, (henceforth referred to as Freedom); "A Theory of Therapy, Personality and Interpersonal Relationships", (henceforth referred to as Therapy), in S. Koch (Ed.), Psychology: A Study of a Science, Vol.III, Formulations of the Person and the Social Context , New York: Mc Graw-Hill, 1959, p.186.

(2) C.f. Rogers, Person, p.7.

(3) Ibid., p.8.

(4) Ibid., p.8.

(5) C.f. Rogers, Therapy, pp.187-188.

(6) C.f. ibid., p.190.

(7) C.f. Rogers, "A Tentative Scale for the Measurement of Process in Psychotherapy", Research in Psychotherapy, Washington D.C.: American Psychological Association, 1959.

(8) C.f. Rogers, Client, p.19.

(9) Rogers observes: "He can only be as non-directive as he has achieved respect for others in his own personality organization". C.f. ibid., p.21.

(10) Ibid., pp.21-22. Rogers adds: "In our experience, such a philosophy is likely to be held by the person who has a basic respect for the worth and significance of himself". C.f. ibid., p.22, footnote 1.

(11) C.f. Rogers, Therapy, p.213; Person, pp.33-35, 282-284; Client, chapters 2 and 4; Freedom, chapter 4.

(12) C.f. Rogers, Therapy, p.207.

(13) C.f. ibid., p.203. Rogers defines 'to symbolize' as

to 'be conscious of' by means of an image. C.f. 332.4.

(14) C.f. ibid., pp.205-206. Jourard agrees: "It would seem that we can propose a hypothesis that could be tested, namely, that spontaneous self-disclosure in a therapist reinforces or is a condition for authentic disclosure and growth in the patient while impersonality, technical behaviour and resistance to being, reinforces the like in the patient". C.f. The Transparent Self, New York: Van Nostrand, p.150.

(15) C.f. ibid., pp.203-204.

(16) C.f. ibid., p.204.

(17) C.f. ibid., p.197.

(18) C.f. ibid., p.197.

(19) C.f. ibid., p.208.

(20) C.f. ibid., p.210. Buber prefers to speak of 'inclusion' rather then empathy: "Empathy means, if anything, to glide with one's own feeling into the dynamic structure of an object .... or even of an animal or a man and as it were to trace it from within, understanding .... the object with the perceptions of one's own muscles; it means to transpose one's self over there and in there. Thus it means the exclusion of one's own concreteness, the extinguishing of the actual situation of life, the absorption in pure aestheticism of the reality in which one participates. 'Inclusion' is the opposite of this. It is the extension of one's concreteness, the fulfilment of the actual situation in life, the complete presence of the reality in which one participates. It's elements are first, a relation, of no matter what kind between two persons, second an event experienced by them in common, in which at least one of them actively participates, and third the fact that this one person, without forfeiting anything of the felt reality of his activity, at the same time lives through the common event from the standpoint of the other". C.f.

Buber, Between Man and Man, London: Collins (Fontana), I96I edition, pp.124-125.

(21) C.f. ibid., p.210.

(22) Sidney Jourard, The Transparent Self, p.139.

(23) Victor Frankl, Psychotherapy and Existentialism, p.79.

(24) O. H. Bown's description of his experiences bears out my own experiences in counselling: "I can allow a very strong feeling or emotion of my own to enter the therapeutic relationship and expect that the handling of this feeling from me by the client will be an important part of the process of therapy for him .... I think this feeling says to the client, I have a real hunger to know you, to experience your warmth, your expressivity, in whatever form it may take, to drink as deeply as I can from the experience of you, in the closest, most naked relationship we can achieve. I do not want to change you to suit me: the real you and the real me are compatible ingredients of a potential relationship, which transcends but in no way violates our seperate identities" . Quoted in Rogers, Client, pp. 160, 164.

(25) C.f. Rogers, Therapy, p.213.

(26) C.f. Buber, I and Thou, Edinburg: T.& T. Clarke, 1958, pp.3-34.

(27) C.f. Buber, "Distance and Relation", in Knowledge, p.60.

(28) C.f. ibid., pp.22-23; I and Thou, p.23.

(29) C.f. Buber, "What is Man", in Between Man and Man,p.155.

(30) R. D. Laing refers to incongruence or 'seeming' as 'collusion'. By collusion he means a game played by two people whereby they deceive each other. C.f. Self and Others, Middlesex: Penguin, 1971, pp.108-124.

(31) Martin Buber, "Dialogue between Martin Buber and Carl R. Rogers" in Knowledge, (appendix), p.181.

(32) Ibid., p.182.

(33) C.f. 41.6 above.

(34) Abraham Maslow, Towards a Psychology of Being, New York:

Van Nostrand, 1968, p.104, footnote 1.

(35) Buber, "Elements", in Knowledge, p.83. Fritz Perls agrees: " .... anything you can do to help the other person discover himself is always good. Only what we discover ourselves is truly learned". C.f. Fagan and Shepherd (Eds.), Gestalt Therapy Now, New York: Harper and Row, p.37.

(36) Buber, "Distance", in Knowledge, p.70.

(37) Buber, "Elements", in Knowledge, p.80.

(38) C.f. ibid., p.81.

(39) Ibid., p.177.

(40) C.f. Buber, I and Thou, p.132.

(41) Ibid., p.133.

(42) Buber, "Distance", in Knowledge, p.71.

(43) Maslow, op.cit., p.42.

(44) C.f. ibid., p.25.

(45) Ibid., p.43.

(46) Ibid., p.87.

(47) C.f. ibid., p.86.

(48) C.f. ibid., p.93. C.f. Maslow, Religions, Values and Peak Experiences, New York: Viking, 1970 edition, chapter 3.

(49) C.f. Frederick Crowe, "Complacency and Concern in the Thought of St. Thomas", in Theological Studies, Vol. 20, (1959), pp.1-39, 198-230, 343-382. In reference to the love of complacency Crowe examines St. Thomas's 'complacentia'. He observes that, for Aquinas, complacency is distinct from and precedes desire, which is a second step, and joy, which is a third: "Prima ergo immutatio appetitus ab appetibili vocatur amor, qui nihil est aliud quam complacentia appetibilis; et ex hac complacentia sequitur motus in appetibile, qui est desiderium; et ultimo quies, quae est gaudium". C.f. S. Theol. I-II, q.26, a.2 c. (Crowe does not pursue the study of the highest dimension of love: 'gaudium'). He writes: "I think I may claim strong support from L. B. Geiger,

Le problème de l'amour chez saint Thomas d'Aquin, (Montreal-Paris, 1952). Although there is only a passing mention of complacency (pp.100, 114, 115), the general lines concur with what I have found in Saint Thomas: there is an emphasis on the role of intellect in specifying the good in itself as the object of will. Love is the pure affective presence of the subject to the object, depending on the intellectual grasp of the good (p.74)". C.f. Crowe, art. cit., p.20, footnote 40. In reference to the love of concern, Crowe explores Aquinas's notions of 'inclinatio' and 'intentio boni': " .... sicut in intellectu est aliqua species quae est similitudo objecti, ita oppertet in voluntate, et in qualibet vi appetitiva, esse aliquid quo inclinetur in suum objectum: cum nihil aliud sit actus appetitivae virtutis quam inclinatio quaedam, ut supra dictum est (q.6, a.4)". C.f. S. Theol.,I-II, q.50, a.5, ad 1m. "Appetere autem nihil est aliud quam aliquid petere, quasi tendere in aliquid ad ipsum ordinatum". C.f. De Veritate, q. 22, a.1 c. Crowe again refers to Geiger in this context: c.f. Geiger, op. cit., pp.41ff. For further numerous references to St. Thomas c.f. Crowe's articles, e.g., S. Theol., II-II, q. 23, a.6, ad 1m: " .... operatio autem voluntatis .... perficitur in inclinatione appetentis ad rem sicut ad terminum".

(50) Rollo May, Love and Will, p.317.

(51) Ibid., p.319.

(52) C.f. Rogers Therapy, p.216; Person, pp.65, 126-128.

(53) C.f. Rogers, Therapy, p.198.

(54) C.f. Rogers, Therapy, p.200.

(55) C.f. ibid., p.200.

(56) C.f. ibid., p.198. Verbal symbols can perform this task.

(57) C.f. ibid., p.198.

(58) C.f. ibid., p.198. Compare May, Love and Will, pp.161-164, where he speaks of the personalization and integ-

ration of daimonic urges.

(59) C.f. Rogers, Therapy, p.204. Perls refers to threatening experiences as the 'impasse' and he regards this as the key to 'organismic change'. C.f. Fagan and Shepherd, op. cit., p.137.

(60) C.f. Rogers, Therapy, p.205. Perls refers to distortion and denial as the "avoidance of unfinished business". C.f. Fagan and Shepherd, op. cit., p.136.

(61) C.f. Rogers, Therapy, p.209. May observes: "This growing awareness of one's body wishes and desires - processes which are obviosly related to the experiencing of identity - normally also bring heightened awareness of one's self as a being and a heightened reverence for being itself". C.f Love and Will, p.263.

(62) C.f. Rogers, Therapy, p.210.

(63) C.f. ibid., p.209.

(64) C.f. ibid., p.210.

(65) C.f. ibid., p.196. Compare also 12.3 above.

(66) C.f. ibid., pp.196-197. Compare with 134.3 f above.

(67) C.f 12.1 and 12.2 above.

(68) C.f. 12.2 above.

(69) C.f. 134.3 e above

(70) C.f. 12.2 above

(7I) C.f. 134.1 a above, (on Integration and Operation).

(72) C.f. 12.3 above.

(73) C.f. 134.1 b above.

(74) C.f. 134.3 b above.

(75) C.f. 12.4 above.

(76) C.f. 134.3 d above.

(77) C.f. Rogers, Person, p.158.

(78) A. Angyal, Foundations for a Science of Personality, New York: Commonwealth Fund, 1941, p.48. C.f. also Rogers, Client, pp.487-491.

(79) Allport, Becoming, p.27.

(80) Allport remarks that the latter theories maintain that

motivation entails only one property in the organism: " .... a disposition to act, by instinct or by learning, in such a way that the organism will as efficiently as possible, reduce the discomfort or tension. Motivation is regarded as a state of tension which leads us to seek equilibrium". C.f. ibid., p.48.

(81) C.f. Maslow's survey in Motivation and Personality, New York: Harper, 1954 edition.

(82) Maslow, Towards a Psychology of Being, p.155.

(83) C.f. 12.3 above.

(84) C.f. Lonergan, Insight, pp.348-350, on the pure desire to know. C.f. ibid., pp.623-624 on 'universal willing'.

(85) Buber, "Elements", in Knowledge, p.85. Nonetheless, Buber admits the existence of the actualizing tendency: (the educator) " .... sees every personal life as engaged in such a process of actualization, and he knows from his own experience that the forces making for actualization are all the time involved in a microcosmic struggle with counterforces. He has come to see himself as a helper of the actualizing forces .... he believes in the effect of the actualizing forces, that is, he believes that in every man what is right is established in a single and uniquely personal way". C.f. ibid., p.83.

(86) Rogers, Person, p.188. Compare this with Perls''paradoxical theory of changingness': "Briefly stated it is this: that change occurs when one becomes what one is, not when he tries to become what he is not". C.f. Fagan and Shepherd, op.cit., p.77.

CHAPTER FOUR

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(1) C.f. Rogers, Therapy, p.218; Freedom, pp.282-287; Client, pp.179-185; Person, pp.226-241, 248-253, 256-263.

(2) C.f. Rogers, Therapy, pp.204-205.

(3) C.f. ibid., p.206.

(4) C.f. ibid., pp.203-204.

(5) C.f. ibid., p.200.

(6) C.f. 41.1 (vii).

(7) C.f. 41.6.

(8) C.f. Rogers, Person, p.118.

(9) Søren Kierkegaard, The Sickness Unto Death, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1941 edition, p.29.

(10) Rogers's organismic valuing process resembles William Schutz's 'pre-logical thinking': "This means that the total body is involved in resolving a problem and there are some stirrings going on prior to the brain comprehending the problem and arriving at a logical solution. If a person can become aware of these preliminary stirrings and make use of them, he can aquire a quicker and sounder way to reach conclusions .... Not that these feelings are invariably right. But teaching an awareness of their existence will allow them to be noticed and evaluated by each person". C.f. Joy, Middlesex: Pelican, 1973, p.64.

(11) Rogers, "Toward a Modern Approach to Values", in Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, No 68, (1964), pp. 160-167.

(12) Rogers, Freedom, p.254.

(13) C.f. ibid., p.255.

(14) C.f. Rogers, Person, pp.118-119.

(15) C.f. Maslow, Towards a Psychology of Being, p.13.
(16) C.f. ibid., p.12.
(17) Ibid., p.194.
(18) Ibid., p.58, footnote 5.
(19) Ibid., p.205.
(20) Ibid., p.161.
(21) Ibid., p.161.
(22) Ibid., p.161.
(23) Ibid., p.206.
(24) Ibid., p.206.
(25) Gordon Allport, Becoming, p.68.
(26) C.f. 134.1 b above.
(27) Buber, as quoted by Maurice Friedman, Knowledge, introductory essay, p.15.
(28) Ibid., p.18.
(29) Buber "Dialogue" in Knowledge, p.180.
(30) C.f. Rogers, Therapy, p.234; Client, p.184; Freedom, chapter 14; Person, chapter 9.
(31) C.f. Rogers, Freedom, pp.268-294.
(32) C.f. ibid., pp.271-274.
(33) Ibid., p.154.
(34) Ibid., p.285.
(35) Ibid., p.286.
(36) Ibid., p.291.
(37) Ibid., p.291.
(38) C.f. 21.2 above.
(39) Maslow, Towards a Psychology of Being, pp.103-104. C.f. also, Maslow, Religions, Values and Peak Experiences, pp.19-29.
(40) Maslow, Towards a Psychology of Being, pp.104-114. William Schutz speaks of the experience of 'joy' in remarkably similar terms: "Joy is the feeling that comes from the fulfilment of one's potential. Fulfilment brings to an individual the feeling that he can cope with his environment; the sense of confidence in himself as a significant, competent, lovable person who

is capable of handling situations as they arise, able to use fully his own capacities and free to express his feelings. Joy requires a vital, alive body, self-contentment, productive and satisfying relations with others and a successful relation to society". C.f. Joy, p.15. Frankl observes that joy can make life meaningful only if it itself has meaning. It's meaning lies not in itself but in the object to which it is directed. C.f. The Doctor and the Soul, Middlesex: Pelican, 1973, p.55.

(41) C.f. Maslow, Towards a Psychology of Being, p.114.

(42) C.f. ibid., p.37.

(43) Buber insists that the experience of fusion is imagined only. The ecstatic union which is experienced is really the enrapturing dynamic of relation which goes beyond itself and is " .... felt so forcefully that it's parts seem to fade before it, and in the force of it's life, the I and the Thou, between which it is established are forgotten". C.f. I and Thou, p.87.

(44) Maslow, Motivation and Personality, 1954 edition, p.117, as quoted in Frankl, Psychotherapy and Existentialism, p.52.

(45) Frankl, ibid., p.52.

(46) C.f. ibid., p.57.

(47) Ibid., p.83.

(48) C.f. ibid., p.129.

(49) Ibid., p.135.

(50) B. F. Skinner, Science and Human Behaviour, New York: Macmillan,1953, p.477.

(51) "Give me the specification and I'll give you the man ! ", writes Skinner. C.f. Walden Two, New York: Macmillan, 1948, p.243. For a treatment of reinforcement c.f. Beyond Freedom and Dignity, Middlesex: Pelican, 1973, chapter 2.

(52) Skinner, Science and Human Behaviour, p.477.

(53) "Now that we know how positive reinforcement works and how negative does'nt, we can be more deliberate and hence more successful in our cultural design. We can achieve a sort of control in which the controlled, though they are following a code much more scrupulously than was ever the case under the old system, nevertheless feel free. That's the source of the tremendous power of positive reinforcement - there is no restraint and no revolt. By a careful cultural design we control not the final behaviour but the inclination to behave - the motives, the desires, the wishes. The curious thing is that case the question of freedom never arises". C.f. Skinner, Walden Two, p.218.

(54) Rogers, Freedom, p.268.

(55) Ibid., p.275.

(56) Rogers, "The Place of the Person in the New World of the Behavioural Sciences", Severin (Ed.), Discovering Man in Psychology, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1973 edition, p.224.

(57) Rollo May, Love and Will, pp.197-198.

(58) Ibid., p.198.

(59) Rogers, Freedom, p.294.

(60) Ibid., p.295.

(61) Ibid., p.269.

(62) Ibid., p.295.

(63) Ibid., p.273.

(64) Ibid., p.273.

C H A P T E R F I V E

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(1) The categories 'spontaneity' and 'intersubjectivity' have been added to the original schema which Lonergan presents in Method, p.48; for an account of both, c.f Insight, pp.211-216, 219-222. Lonergan speaks of the 'ecstatic' development of understanding in his account of critical history in Method, pp.185-196. I have used this term in conjunction with 'conversion' to account for the shift in perspective which occurs when an 'I-Thou' relationship replaces an 'I-It' relationship.

(2) In the schema in Method, Lonergan uses the term 'terminal value' in place of 'good of value'. I have followed his earlier use in Insight, pp.597-598.

(3) The ends are distinct, not seperate. Thus, they overlap.

(4) C.f. Lonergan, Insight, p.215.

(5) C.f. ibid., p.212.

(6) C.f. ibid., pp.213-214, 596-597; Method, p.49. Lonergan emphasizes that the good of order is not merely theoretical but concrete. He does not mean that it not normative: simply that it is not Utopian or arbitrary.

(7) C.f. Method, p.50.

(8) C.f. Lonergan's account of authenticity and unauthenticity in "Existenz", Collection, pp.246-247 and 76.3 below.

(9) C.f. Method, p.231.

(10) For the background to the formulatiom of this category, c.f. Lonergan, Method, p.188.

(11) C.f. ibid., p.53. On alienation, c.f. 6.2 below.

(12) C.f. ibid., p.57.

(13) C.f. Martin Buber, Knowledge, introductory essay by Maurice Friedman, p.39.

(14) C.f. Manifred Frings, Max Scheler, Pittsburg: Duquesne

University Press, 1965, pp.56-66. For examples of 'community of feeling' c.f. Buber, Between Man and Man p.214. For a treatment of 'fellow-feeling' c.f. "Distance and Relation", Knowledge, p.70.

(15) Rollo May, Love and Will, p.123.

(16) C.f. Bruno Snell, Der Aufbau der Sprache, Hamburg, 1952, chapters 1 and 2, as elaborated by Alfred Schutz, in Collected Papers, The Hague: Nijhoff, 1971, vol. I, pp.320-321.

(17) C.f. Lonergan's phenomenology of a smile in Method, pp.59-61.

(18) C.f. Alfred Schutz, op.cit., vol.I, p.39.

(19) C.f. Lonergan, Method, p.64.

(20) C.f. Rogers, Therapy, p.198. For example, Eric Voegelin points to the function of symbolism in the self-illumination of society. C.f. The New Science of Politics, p.27. Alfred Schutz outlines the function of symbolism as a referent to reality which transcends everyday experience. C.f. op. cit., vol I, p.331.

(21) C.f. Lonergan, Method, p.31. C.f. also 76.1 below.

(22) C.f. 322.2 above. C.f. also Rogers, Therapy, p.226. Rollo May observes: "It is the symbolic meanings which have gone awry in neurosis .... ". C.f. Love and Will, p.211. On its consequence, self-alienation, c.f.cht.6 (16)

(23) C.f. Lonergan, Method, p.34, footnote 6.

(24) Ibid., p.67. 'Mind', 'Body' &'Heart' denote figuratively.

(25) C.f. Rogers, Client, p.287.

(26) Rollo May, Love and Will, p.174.

(27) Karl Jaspers, Philosophie, Berlin, 1932, vol. III, chapter 1, p.16, as freely translated by Alfred Schutz, in op.cit., vol.I, pp.331-332.

(28) C.f. Lonergan, Method, p.71.

(29) C.f. Lonergan, Insight, p.175.

(30) Ibid., p.177.

(31) Lonergan, "Dimensions of Meaning", Collection, p.264.

(32) Lonergan's account in Method, pp.73-76, does not include the subject who means. For an account of the subject of conscious acts, c.f. Insight, pp.324-325.

(33) C.f. Lonergan, "Dimensions of Meaning", Collection, p.253.

(34) C.f. Lonergan, Method, p.77.

(35) C.f. 33.1 (vi) above.

(36) C.f. Lonergan, "Dimensions of Meaning", Collection, p.254.

(37) Lonergan, "Existenz and Aggiornamento", Collection, P.242. Victor Frankl declares: "Man cannot avoid decisions. Reality inescapably forces man to decide. Man makes decisions in every moment, even unwittingly and against his will. Through these decisions man decides upon himself .... Man is not a thing among others - things determine each other - but man is ultimately self-determining. What he becomes - within the limits of endowment and environment - he has made himself". C.f. Psychotherapy and Existentialism, p.43.

(38) C.f. Lonergan, "Existenz and Aggiornamento", Collection, p.244.

(39) R. D. Laing, The Politics of Experience, Middlesex: Penguin, 1967, p.71. C.f. Buber's account of the 'collectivity' in "Elements of the Interhuman", Knowledge, pp.72-75. On alienation, c.f. 6.2 below.

(40) B. F. Skinner, Beyond Freedom and Dignity, Middlesex: Penguin, 1973, p.30.

(41) C.f. ibid., p.10.

(42) C.f. Lonergan, "Existenz and Aggiornamento", Collection, p.245.

(43) C.f. ibid., p.245.

(44) Lonergan, Method, p.79.

(45) C.f. ibid., p. 79, where Lonergan speaks of the formal constituent of community as common meaning. He makes it clear, however, that common meaning is actively

realized in choices, decisions and commitments (which depend on judgements of value). In order to underline the role of common values, I have explicitely named the realization of common values as well as the achievement of common meaning as the formal constituent of community. Later in Method Lonergan explicitely includes common values in the formal constituent of community: ".... community exists inasmuch as there is a commonly accepted set of meanings and values shared by people in contact with one another". C.f. ibid., p.298. Elsewhere, Lonergan stresses collective responsibility in community: "It is in this collective responsibility for common or complementary action that resides the principal constituent of the collective subject referred to by 'We', 'Us', 'Ourselves', 'Ours'". C.f. "Cognitional Structure", Collection, p.237.

(46) C.f. Lonergan, "Dimensions of Meaning", Collection, pp.254-255.

(47) C.f. Lonergan, Method, pp.78-79. Rollo May states: "Communication presupposes community which, in turn, means a communion between the consciousness of the persons in the community". C.f. Love and Will, p.156.

(48) Buber writes: "The genuine 'We' is to be recognized in its objective existence, through the fact that in whatever of its parts it is regarded, an essential relation between person and person, between I and Thou, is always evident as actually or potentially existing. For the word always arises between an I and a Thou and the element from which the 'We' receives its life is speech, the communal speaking that begins in the midst of speaking to one another". C.f. "What is Common to All", Knowledge, p.106.

(49) Buber, Good and Evil, New York: Scribners, 1952, p.27.

(50) C.f. Lonergan, Insight, p.44. C.f. 11.1 above.

(51) For a detailed account of dynamic structure, c.f.

Lonergan, "Cognitional Structure", Collection, pp. 222-224.

(52) C.f. Lonergan, Method, p.241. C.f. 134.3 d above.

(53) C.f. also Lonergan, Insight, p.462. Victor Frankl observes: " .... man is not primarily interested in any psychic conditions of his own but rather is oriented towards the world, towards the world of potential meanings and values which, so to speak, are willing to be fulfilled and actualized by him". C.f. Psychotherapy and Existentialism, p.47. Rollo May describes this basic desire in terms of 'eros': "It is eros, the power in us yearning for wholeness, the drive to give meaning and value to our variegation, form to our otherwise impoverishing formlessness, integration to counter our disintegrative trends". C.f. Love and Will, p.78.

(54) C.f. Lonergan, Insight, p.454.

(55) C.f. Rollo May, Love and Will, p.79.

(56) C.f. Lonergan, Insight, p.466: Communication is operator.

(57) C.f. ibid., p.451.

(58) C.f. Lonergan, Method, p.363: "Community constitutes and perfects itself through communication".

(59) Buber insists on the continuous revision of common meaning in a truly living community. "In a truly living community of opinion, the common opinion must ever again be tested and renewed in genuine meetings; the 'men who hold the same views' must ever again loosen up one another's views as they threaten to become encrusted, must ever again help one another to confront the changing reality in new, unprejudiced looking. Yes, the reciprocal pointing out, the reciprocal giving-to-see, the reciprocal testing and correcting in the common viewing must be the process through the opinion is time after time reborn". C.f. A Believing Humanism, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1967, p.211.

(60) C.f. Lonergan's account of the process of community decline in Method, pp.52-55, 360-361.

(61) C.f. 216.1 - 216.4 above.

(62) C.f. Lonergan, Insight, p.217.

(63) C.f. ibid., p.215.

(64) C.f. 535.3 a and b below for Lonergan's explanation of why spontaneous intersubjectivity and practical common sense can be opposed to one another and so can lead to tension in community.

(65) C.f. ibid., pp.218-222.

(66) C.f. ibid., pp.222-225.

(67) C.f. ibid., pp.225-232.

(68) Lonergan attempts tc ao so in his theory of 'Cosmopolis'. C.f. Insight, pp.232-240.

CHAPTER SIX

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(1) Carl Rogers, Encounter Groups, Middlesex: Pelican, 1973 edition, p.9 (henceforth referred to as Groups).

(2) For an account of the various emphases in the group movement, c.f. ibid., pp.12-13.

(3) C.f. ibid., p.10.

(4) Ibid., p.10. C.f. also Carl Rogers, "The Process of the Basic Encounter Group", (henceforth referred to as "Process"), In J. Bugental, Challenges of Humanistic Psychology, New York: McGraw-Hill. 1967, p.262, (henceforth referred to as Challenges).

(5) Rogers, Groups, pp.9-10. C.f. also Rogers, "Process", in Bugental, Challenges, p.261.

(6) C.f. Rogers, Groups, pp.11-12.

(7) Quoted in William Coulson et al., (co-directors), The La Jolla Program, (brochure of the summer institute of the Center for Studies of the Person), La Jolla, California.

(8) C.f. Rogers, "Process", in Bugental, Challenges, p.262.

(9) Rogers, Groups, p.16.

(10) Rogers, Freedom, pp.306-307.

(11) C.f. Rogers's account in Groups,pp.14-15.

(12) Ibid., p.51.

(13) Ibid., p.51.

(14) Ibid., p.163.

(15) C.f. Victor Frankl, Psychotherapy and Existentialism, p.50, where Frankl notes the frequency of 'noögenic' neuroses, due to meaninglessness and what he calls 'existential vacuum'.

(16) May writes: "It may sound surprizing when I say, on the basis of my own clinical practice as well as that of my

psychological and psychiatric colleagues, that the chief problem of people in the middle decade of the twentieth century is emptiness". C.f. Rollo May, Man's Search for Himself, New York: Signet, 1967 edition, pp.13-14. May defines alienation as "a loss of the capacity to be intimately personal". C.f. Love and Will, p.71 and also pp.162, 292.

(17) C.f. Buber's account of 'collectivism' in Between Man and Man, p.242 and in "Elements", Knowledge, p.73.

(18) "Over the centuries, an ideology which supremely stressed personal dedication to a 'larger' Power or Order has deteriorated into a way of life which encourages or at least condones deep personal estrangement and alienation". C.f. O. H. Mowrer, The New Group Therapy, New York: Van Nostrand, 1964, p.24.

(19) C.f. Rollo May (Ed.), Existential Psychology, New York: Random, 1969 edition, for a good survey of the existentialist approach. C.f. also May, Existence, New York: New York: Simon and Schuster, 1958, pp.56-59.

(20) Morton Lieberman et al. (Eds.), Encounter Groups: First Facts, New York: Basic Books, 1973, p.151 (henceforth referred to as Encounter Facts).

(21) C.f. Rogers, Freedom, pp.302-342. C.f. also William Coulson, Groups, Gimmicks and Instant Gurus, New York: Harper and Row, 1972, pp.99-154, (henceforth referred to as Gimmicks).

(22) C.f. Rogers, Groups, pp.45-47, 76. C.f. also Rogers, Becoming Partners: Marriage and Its Alternatives, New York: Delta, 1973 edition, for Rogers's approach to marriage.

(23) "Permeating the program - in the style of leadership exemplified by the majority of the staff and also presented in the 'content' sessions - is a person-centered philosophy of group leadership, a view which emphasises that there is a maximum growth for both

group and facilitator when the facilitator participates as a person in his group rather than as any sort of expert. Quoted from The La Jolla Program, in Rogers, Groups, p.152.

(24) Psychoanalytically orientated groups are guided by the classical principles of psychoanalysis. They focus on the dynamics of the group and also on the individual members of the group from the perspective of the historical development of each one. C.f. Karl Menninger, Theory of Psychoanalytic Technique, New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1964 edition. C.f. also Lieberman, Encounter Facts, p.13.

(25) Transactional Analytic groups concentrate on the relationship which the leader forms with each member in turn. The leader analyses the 'transactions' between the various 'ego states' ('parent', 'adult' and 'child') within each individual group member, rather than between group members. C.f. Eric Berne, Principles of Group Treatment, New York: Grove Press, 1966.

(26) Psychodrama groups emphasize role-playing as a therapeutic technique. C.f. J. L. Moreno (Ed.), Group Psychotherapy: A Symposium, New York: Beacon, 1945.

(27) Gestalt groups place a heavy emphasis on the role of the leader. He tries to force members to focus on the 'Here-and-Now', on body posture, on muscular-skeletal factors etc. C.f. Fagan and Shepherd (Eds.), Gestalt Therapy Now, New York: Harper 1970.

(28) Esalen Eclectic groups concentrate on a number of leader-led techniques and exercises which aim to liberate somatic restrictions. The emphasis is on body-experiencing by group members and between group members. C.f. William Schutz, Joy, Middlesex: Pelican 1973 edition.

(29) The Synanon movement organizes groups among drug addicts. The focus is anger. Members systematically explore and attack the weak points of each individual participant.

C.f. Lieberman, Encounter Facts, pp.72-77.

(30) Rational-Emotive therapy groups underline the group leader's role in highlighting the irrationality of individual group members' emotional disturbances. Such groups are highly structured. C.f. Albert Ellis, Reason and Emotion in Psychotherapy, New York: Lyle Stuart, 1962.

(31) C.f. Lieberman, Encounter Facts, p.11, where he outlines the role of the 'T-group' leader. The function of the latter is to interpret for the group what is happening within the group as a whole, as well as to comment on the interactions between individual group members. Thus, he makes what Rogers calls 'process' comments.

(32) In order to experience the Rogerian variety of encounter at first hand, I attended the fourth session of the 1973 La Jolla Program, the annual summer institute run by the Center for Studies of the Person, La Jolla, California, (of which Rogers in the Resident Fellow). There I had the opportunity to ask questions of Rogers, Coulson and their associates, as well as to participate both as a member and as a facilitator in a series of basic encounter groups and 'community meetings'. With regard to evaluative studies, I shall refer chiefly to Morton Lieberman's Encounter Groups: First Facts, (Encounter Facts above), a comparative study of 17 encounter groups of different orientations, published in 1973. Unfortunately, Lieberman's procedures are based on highly sophisticated computerized measurement techniques, the suitability of which is of questionable validity in the study of personal change and personal development. I shall therefore confine my references to Lieberman's more general observations and conclusions. I shall also refer to Arthur Burton, Encounter, San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1969, a collection of essays by various writers on

the theory of encounter.

(33) C.f. Coulson, Gimmicks, p.41.

(34) Coulson distinguishes 'feelings' from 'emotions': "I want to lay it down again that feelings are not really the same as emotions, though often we use the words interchangeably. I am defining 'feelings' as 'the things that are hard to say' and it in finally saying them that one often gets emotional. An encounter group is feelingful but it is not always emotional". C.f. ibid., p.46.

(35) Ibid., p.55. Coulson's use of the expression 'the here and the now' differs significantly from the usual use of the expression in encounter circles. The latter has its origins in Fritz Perls's Gestalt Therapy. He explains: "To me nothing exists except the now. Now=experience=awareness=reality. The past is no more and the future is not yet. Only the now exists ....". "I maintain that all therapy that has to be done can only be done in the now". C.f. Fritz Perls, "Four Lectures", in Fagan and Shepherd (Eds.), Gestalt Therapy Now, New York: Harper, 1970, pp.14, 17. Perls's emphasis has lead some encounter leaders to forbid any expressions in the group other than those which refer to immediate experiences and feelings. Coulson regards this as a falsification of the 'here-and-now'. C.f. Gimmicks, p.56. Lieberman agrees: "Here-and-now is not enough; add the personal there-and-then". C.f. Encounter Facts, p.425.

(36) C.f. Lieberman, ibid., pp.422-428.

(37) C.f. Coulson, Gimmicks, pp.41, 43.

(38) C.f. ibid., p.42.

(39) C.f. ibid., p.54. C.f. also Rollo May, Love and Will, chapter 2.

(40) C.f. Coulson, Gimmicks, p.53.

(41) C.f. ibid., p.42. Rogers writes: "I can speak very

personally about this, because risk-taking is one of the many things I myself have learned in encounter groups. Though I do not always live up to it, I have learned that there is basically nothing to be afraid of". C.f. Rogers, Groups, p.117.

(42) Coulson, Gimmicks, p.43. C.f. also Rogers, Groups, pp.52-53.

(43) C.f. Rogers, Therapy, pp.184-256.

(44) Rogers, "Process", in Bugental, Challenges, p.263; c.f. also Groups, p.21.

(45) Ibid., p.22.

(46) W. R. Bion observes that: " .... a silence falls on the group. After a while disultory conversation breaks out again and then another silence falls". C.f. Bion, Experiences in Groups, London: Tavistock, 1961, p.30.

(47) C.f. Jack and Lorraine Gibb, "Humanistic Elements in Group Growth", in Bugental, Challenges, pp.163-168.

(48) C.f. Lack and Lorraine Gibb, "Role Freedom in a TORI Group", in Burton, Encounter, p.44.

(49) Rogers, Groups, p.23. C.f. also 32.2 above.

(50) Gerard Haig speculates: "This western culture .... develops in each of us a programmed self which exists in varying degrees of congruence in relation to our own inner experience". C.f. "Psychotherapy as Interpersonal Encounter", in Bugental, Challenges, p.223.

(51) C.f. Eric Berne, Games People Play, New York: Ballantine, 1973 edition.

(52) Rogers, Groups, p.25.

(53) C.f. Rogers, "Process", in Bugental, Challenges, p.265.

(54) J. and L. Gibb, art. cit., in Bugental, Challenges, p.164. C.f. also Frederick Stoller, "A Stage for Trust", in Burton, Encounter, p.92.

(55) Gerard Haig, art. cit., in Bugental, Challenges, p.255.

(56) O. H. Mowrer writes: "Letting others know our weaknesses and needs involves 'coming out into the open' and is the

only thing that is radically - and relatively swiftly - curative, corrective and redemptive". C.f. The New Group Therapy, p.93. C.f. ibid., p.230.

(57) C.f. Rogers, Groups, p.28.

(58) C.f. ibid., p.28.

(59) Compare Buber, "Distance", Knowledge, p.71. C.f. also Jourard, The Transparent Self, p.139.

(60) The various examples which Rogers gives would appear to stress feelings, e.g. : "'I am a dominating person'; 'I don't think that I have ever really loved anyone'; 'I wanted to be the way I felt .... and that the only way I could achieve this was by fully accepting the experience, by yielding to shock and grief'". C.f. Rogers, Groups, p.33.

(61) C.f. Buber, "Elements", Knowledge, p.77.

(62) Rogers, Groups, pp.34-35.

(63) C.f. ibid., p.35.

(64) Lieberman is less sanguine about the significance of feedback. He notes that participants judge it to be the most important learning although his survey did not rate it high in terms of its contribution to personal growth. C.f. Encounter Facts, pp. 423, 361.

(65) Rogers, Groups, p.40.

(66) C.f. 643.8 below. C.f. also Lonergan's account of authenticity in 22.2 above.

(67) Rogers, Groups, pp.39-40.

(68) C.f. our account of fellow-feeling in 521.1 above. C.f also Buber, "Distance", Knowledge, p.70.

(69) Rogers, Groups, p.40. Rogers use of the term 'I-Thou' relationship seems to refer chiefly to a deep emotional rapport with another. This use of the term is not as profound as Buber's original use, which includes 'imagining the real' in another in order to 'make him present': c.f. 32.4 above.

(70) Rogers, Groups, p.41. C.f. also our discussion of

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confirmation in 32.4 above.

(71) C.f. Rogers, Groups, p.42.

(72) C.f. Gibb, art. cit., in Burton, Encounter, chapter 3.

(73) Rogers, Groups, p.43.

(74) Rogers admits: "A number of individuals have sought individual or group psychotherapy following an encounter group. In some instances this seemed a most positive step, leading to growth, while in others it is a reasonable question whether the experience brought such rapid and painful change that the individual was forced to seek further help. This last I personally regard as unfortunate. C.f. Groups, p.75. Lieberman is much more insistent than Rogers on the possible dangers of encounter: "Our study did find group experiences damaging to 8 percent of those who began the groups, a figure which most people would not consider 'safe'..... It appears that previous studies of encounter groups and the claims of practitioners, tend to minimize negative effects. This minimization seems to be explained by limited follow-up contact with members after the group, insufficiently careful attention to the existence of negative outcomes during the group, and ideological rejection of 'negative effects' as a meaningful concept". C.f. Encounter Facts, pp.425-426.

(75) Rogers, Groups, p.49.

(76) Compare this analogy between the group process and the organism with Rogers's organismic process in 41.4 above.

(77) Rogers, Groups, p.63.

(78) Ibid., p.50.

(79) Ibid., p.51.

(80) C.f. Rogers, Groups, p.73.

(81) Ibid., p.52. My experiences at the La Jolla Program would lead me to believe that the 'cognitive' mode is definitely frowned upon by both participants and facilitators in Rogerian groups. C.f. note (155) below.

(82) Ibid., p.52.

(83) Ibid., p.52.

(84) C.f. ibid., p.71.

(85) Ibid., p.53.

(86) Ibid., p.43.

(87) Ibid., p.53.

(88) C.f. ibid., p.54. The latter is clearly a grave matter.

(89) C.f. Buber, "Distance", in Knowledge, p.70.

(90) Binswanger adds: "Love alone and the imagination originating from it, can rise above this single point of regard". C.f. Binswanger, "The Case of Ellen West", in Rollo May (Ed.), Existence, p.268. C.f. also Rollo May, Love and Will, p.262.

(91) C.f. Lieberman, Encounter Facts, pp.358-359.

(92) Rogers, Groups, p.57.

(93) Notice a certain similarity between the approaches of Rogers and Bion. C.f. note (137) below.

(94) Ibid., p.60.

(95) Ibid., p.60. C.f. also note (69) above.

(96) C.f. Rogers, Groups, p.61. Compare also 32.1 (iii) and 322.3 above (on congruence).

(97) Rogers, Groups, p.62.

(98) C.f. Rogers, Freedom, p.154. C.f. also 42.3 above.

(99) C.f. Coulson, Gimmicks, chapters 1 and 2.

(100) C.f. Rogers, Groups, p.62.

(101) C.f. ibid., p.71.

(102) Ibid., p.52.

(103) Ibid., p.51.

(104) Ibid., p.57.

(105) Ibid., p.62.

(106) Ibid., p.73.

(107) Gibb, art. cit., in Burton, Encounter, p.55.

(108) C.f. Hobart Thomas,"Encounter - The Game of No Game", in Burton,Encounter, p.88.

(109) C.f. Frederick Stoller, "A Stage for Trust", in Burton, Encounter, p.88.

(110) Jourard, The Transparent Self, p.170. C.f. also chapter 18.

(111) Quoted in ibid., p.150.

(112) C.f. Frank Severin, Discovering Man in Psychology, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1973 revised edition, p.225.

(113) C.f. 33.4 above.

(114) Herbert Kelman, A Time to Speak, San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1968, pp.18-19. Kelman adds that a certain amount of control is inevitable and that to deny this is to deny the possibility of subtle manipulation - a factor which has serious ethical implications.

(115) C.f. Coulson Gimmicks, p.90. C.f. also Lieberman, Encounter Facts, chapter 4.

(116) C.f. Coulson, Gimmicks, pp.92-93.

(117) Ibid., p.93.

(118) Ibid., p.94.

(119) Rogers, Groups, p.75.

(120) Ibid., p.76.

(121) Rogers, Becoming Partners: Marriage and Its Alternatives, New York: Delta, 1973 edition, p.8. C.f. also Groups, p.45: "There is another risk or deficiency in the basic encounter group. Until very recent years it has been unusual for a workshop to include both husband and wife. This can be a real problem if significant change has taken place in one spouse during or as a result of the workshop experience .... One of the frequent after-effects of the intensive group experience is that it brings out into the open for discussion marital tensions which have been kept under cover".

(122) Rogers, Becoming Partners, p.7.

(123) Ibid., p.8.

(124) Ibid., p.8

(125) Ibid., p.8.

(126) Ibid., p.11.

(127) Rogers, "A Plan for Self-Directed Change in an Educat-

ional System", Educational Leadership, Vol.24 (May 1967), pp.717-731.

(128) "We did some job ! ", Coulson remarks. C.f. Gimmicks p.99.

(129) Ibid., p.101.

(130) C.f. Rogers, Groups, pp.85-89, for another example of the disruptive application of encounter groups in a school.

(131) Coulson, Gimmicks, p.130.

(132) Ibid., p.101.

(133) Ibid., p.125.

(134) Rogers, Groups, p.144.

(135) Ibid., p.146.

(136) Ibid., p.150.

(137) I apply Bion's theory to Rogerian groups with the following reservation. Both Rogers and Bion are 'non-directive' in the sense that they refuse to 'lead' their groups. However, whereas Rogers voices his perception of the spontaneous reactions of the individual group members to himself (and vica versa), Bion voices the spontaneous reactions of the group as a whole to himself (and vica versa). Although this does differentiate the two processes (Bion's members tend to become more angry with him than do Rogers's), I do not think that this invalidates my application of Bion's conclusions to Rogerian groups. In my own experience, the latter lack 'work group' function and they betray clear 'basic assumption' characteristics.

(138) C.f. Bion, Experiences in Groups, p.143.

(139) C.f. ibid., p.146.

(140) Ibid., p.147.

(141) C.f. ibid., p.151.

(142) Bion is a Freudian in background and he postulates that the pairing group is grounded in sexuality. My own experiences would suggest that the deeper need is for

intimacy. Rollo May would appear to support this: "For human beings, the deeper need is not for sex per se but for relationship, intimacy, acceptance and affirmation". C.f. Love and Will, p.311.

(143) C.f. Bion, Experiences in Groups, p.152.

(144) C.f. ibid., p.166.

(145) Ibid., p.153.

(146) C.f. 521.1 above.

(147) Ibid., p.185.

(148) C.f. ibid., p.159.

(149) C.f. Freud, Group Psychotherapy and the Analysis of the Ego, London: Hogarth, 1922, Vol.18. C.f. Bion, Experiences in Groups, p.174.

(150) Ibid., p.156.

(151) "At the time I am in dialogue with another, everyone else is part of the background, spectators. Whenever two others have commenced to encounter one another, letting dialogue unfold in words, feelings and actions, I become part of the audience ....". C.f. The Transparent Self, p.167.

(152) C.f. Lieberman, Encounter Facts, p.422.

(153) Rogers, Groups, p.52.

(154) Ibid., p.52.

(155) For instance, during one session of an encounter group, I was asked, "What does it feel like to be a celibate priest ?" I began to explain that while there were sometimes 'feelings' attached to being celibate and to being a priest, the overriding and guiding consideration for me was what both of these meant to me. I was quickly interrupted by a buzz of, "Quit the 'intellectualizing' ! We want to know how you feel about it".

(156) Rogers describes this 'changingness': "It seems to mean letting my experience carry me on, in a direction which appears to be forward, towards goals that I can but dimly define as I try to understand at least the

current meaning of that experience". C.f. Freedom, p.154.

(157) Kurt Back, Sensitivity Training and the Search for Salvation, Russell Sage Foundation, 1972. C.f. also Lieberman, Encounter Facts, p.447.

(158) Rogers, Groups, p.145.

(159) C.f. Coulson, Gimmicks, p.177.

(160) C.f. Rollo May, Love and Will, p.278.

(161) Frederick Stoller also speaks of 'heightened self-awareness': c.f. art.cit., in Burton, Encounter, p.82. Lieberman's survey reports a relative frequency of 'intense emotional experiences': c.f. Encounter Facts, p.364.

(162) Rogers, Groups, p.74.

(163) Bertram Forer, "Therapeutic Relationships in Groups", in Burton, Encounter, p.34.

(164) Lieberman, Encounter Facts, p.325.

(165) C.f. 652.3 above.

CHAPTER SEVEN

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(1) C.f. 11.3, 11.4, 11.5 above.

(2) C.f. Bernard Lonergan, Grace and Freedom: Operative Grace in the Thought of St. Thomas, London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1972; Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas, London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1968.

(3) C.f. Conn O'Donovan, Introducing Bernard Lonergan, (casettes containing six lectures on the thought of Bernard Lonergan), Cork: Mercier Communications.

(4) L.-B. Geiger, "Review" of Bernard Lonergan, "The Concept of Verbum in the Writings of St. Thomas Aquinas" in Bulletin Thomiste, 8, (1952), p.479.

(5) Bernard Lonergan, Philosophy of God and Theology, London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1973, p.48. However one must also bear in mind that (as Luyten points out): "L'histoire de la science, surtout de la science en train de se faire, nous montre que l'intuition a souvent eu le pas sur la méthode, et que maintes découvertes fertiles ont été faites sur des bases méthodologiques douteuses". C.f. Norbert Luyten, Teilhard De Chardin, Fribourg: Editions Universitaires, 1965, p.66.

(6) C.f. 11.5 above.

(7) C.f. Lonergan, Insight, introduction, pp.xvii-xxx.

(8) C.f. 3.1 above.

(9) C.f. Rogers, Therapy, p.190, No 6.

(10) C.f. ibid., p.190, No 6.

(11) C.f. 33.3 above; c.f. also Rogers, Person, chapter 7.

(12) C.f. Rogers, Therapy, p.220; c.f. also 13.2 above.

(13) C.f. 11.3, 11.4, 11.5 above.

(14) C.f. Lonergan, Insight, pp.33-44, 53-66, 458-479.

(15) C.f. ibid., introduction, xxii.

(16) C.f. ibid., xxi-xxii

(17) Ibid., p.463.

(18) C.f. 11.3 above. C.f. also chapter 1, note (9).

(19) C.f. Rogers, Therapy, p.186; Person, chapter 1.

(20) Rogers, Therapy, p.189.

(21) Ibid., p.251.

(22) C.f. Rogers, Freedom, chapter 13.

(23) Rogers, Therapy, p.251.

(24) C.f. Rogers and Dymond (Eds.), Psychotherapy and Personality Change, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954,

(25) C.f. 73.2 below.

(26) C.f. 21.1 above.

(27) C.f. 11.3 above.

(28) C.f. 11.4 above.

(29) Lonergan, Insight, p.56.

(30) Ibid., pp.57-58.

(31) Rogers, Freedom, p.295.

(32) C.f. 21.4 above.

(33) Rogers, Freedom p.295.

(34) Lonergan, Insight, p.617.

(35) Ibid., p.608.

(36) C.f. 21.1 above.

(37) B. F. Skinner, Science and Human Behaviour, New York: Macmillan, 1953, p.477.

(38) C.f. 72.2 above.

(39) C.f. 42.7 above.

(40) Rogers, Freedom, p.275.

(41) C.f. Rogers, Person, chapter 5.

(42) C.f. 32.4 above.

(43) Norbert Luyten, La Condition Corporelle de l'Homme, p.27.

(44) C.f. 42.8 above.

(45) C.f. 218.2 above.

(46) C.f. 222.2 above; c.f. also Lonergan, "Existenz" in

Collection, p.245.

(47) C.f. 218.5 above.

(48) C.f. 51.2 above.

(49) C.f. 41.4 above.

(50) Rogers, Freedom, p.273; c.f. also 42.8 above.

(51) C.f. Rogers, Freedom, p.273.

(52) Victor Frankl, Psychotherapy and Existentialism, p.54.

(53) C.f. Kierkegaard, The Sickness Unto Death, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1941 edition, p.29.

(54) Rogers, Becoming Partners, pp. 7-8. C.f. also 652.2 above.

(55) C.f. Rogers, Groups, pp.45-46. More recently, Rogers has avoided this practice, encouraging special groups for married couples instead.

(56) C.f. 652.3 above.

(57) C.f. 13.1 above.

(58) Lonergan, Insight, p.459.

(59) C.f. 1.2 above.

(60) Lonergan, "Bernard Lonergan Responds", in Phillip Mc Shane, Foundations of Theology, p.227.

(61) C.f. 12.1 above.

(62) C.f. 12.2 above.

(63) C.f. 12.3 above

(64) C.f. 12.4 above.

(65) C.f. 12.5 above.

(66) C.f. 12.7 above.

(67) C.f. 12.8 above.

(68) C.f. 13.3 above.

(69) C.f. Lonergan, Insight, pp.463-464.

(70) C.f. 134.1 a above.

(71) C.f. 134.1 b above.

(72) C.f. Lonergan, Insight, p.467.

(73) Ibid., p.478.

(74) C.f. ibid., p.479.

(75) C.f. Lonergan, "Cognitional Structure" in Collection pp.221-239.

(76) C.f. 134.3 d above.

(77) C.f. 78.1 below.

(78) C.f. 3.1 above.

(79) C.f. 3.2 above.

(80) C.f. 32.4 above.

(81) C.f. "Dialogue between Martin Buber and Carl R. Rogers", in Buber, Knowledge, p.182.

(82) C.f. 32.4 above.

(83) C.f. Buber, "Elements" in Knowledge, p.182.

(84) C.f. Buber, "Elements" in Knowledge, pp.82-83.

(85) C.f. 772.4 below.

(86) C.f. Herbert Kelman, A Time to Speak, San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, p.19.

(87) C.f. 42.3 above.

(88) Frankl, Psychotherapy and Existentialism, p.53.

(89) C.f. 21.8 above.

(90) C.f. 218.2 above.

(91) C.f. 521.3 above.

(92) C.f Dietrich von Hildebrand, Christian Ethics, New York: McKay, chapter 17,

(93) C.f. Rollo May, Love and Will, pp.91, 310, where May destinguishes 'needs' (which include drives) from 'desires'.

(94) von Hildebrand, Christian Ethics, p.209.

(95) Ibid., p.209.

(96) C.f. ibid., pp.34-63, 39-40, 213.

(97) C.f. Lonergan, Method, p.32.

(98) C.f. 41.4 above.

(99) Rogers, Freedom, p.254.

(100) C.f. ibid., p.286.

(101) C.f. 42.3 above.

(102) C.f. Lonergan, Method, p.32.

(103) For examples, c.f. Rogers, Groups, chapter 4. C.f. also Becoming Partners, passim.

(104) C.f. 218.2, 223.2 above. C.f. also Method, pp.36-41.

(105) C.f. 512.2 above.

(106) C.f. Lonergan, Insight, chapter 18.

(107) C.f. 41.4 above.

(108) Rogers, Freedom, p.154.

(109) Ibid., p.286.

(110) C.f. 41.5, 42.4, above.

(111) C.f. 42.5 above.

(112) C.f. Lonergan, Method, pp.30-34.

(113) C.f. Frankl, Psychotherapy and Existentialism, p.57; c.f. also Frankl, "Philosophie und Psychotherapie, Zur Grundlegung einer Existenzanalyse", Schweizerische medizinische Wochenschrift, 69: 707 (1939).

(114) Rogers, Freedom, p.254.

(115) Gordon Allport, Becoming, p.98.

(116) Kierkegaard, The Sickness Unto Death, p.147.

(117) C.f. Buber, Knowledge, p.133.

(118) C.f. Frankl, Psychotherapy and Existentialism, p.85.

(119) Maslow, Religions, Values and Peak Experiences, p.18.

(120) C.f. 51.1 above.

(121) Lonergan, Method, p.47.

(122) C.f. 51.2 above.

(123) Lonergan's criterion of the truly good is the judgement of value of the morally self-transcending subject.

(124) C.f. Lonergan, Method, p.49.

(125) C.f. ibid., p.231, where Lonergan discusses the precepts: 'Be attentive', 'Be intelligent', 'Be reasonable', 'Be responsible'.

(126) C.f. ibid., pp.49-50. C.f. chapter 5, note (6) on norms.

(127) C.f. 5.2 above.

(128) C.f. 523.3 and 523.4 above.

(129) C.f. Lonergan, "Dimensions of Meaning" in Collection, p.254.

(130) C.f. 53.1 above.

(131) C.f. 53.1 above.

(132) C.f. 522.1 above.

(133) C.f. 53.4 above.

(134) C.f. 6.2 above.

(135) C.f. 534.6 above.

(136) C.f. 533.6 and 534.3 d above.

(137) C.f. 5.3 above.

(138) C.f. 5.1 above.

(139) C.f. 512.2 above.

(140) C.f. 512.1 above.

(141) C.f. 134.3 e above.

(142) C.f. 53.5 above.

(143) C.f. Rogers, Groups, pp.85-89.

(144) C.f. 41.4 above.

(145) C.f. Rogers, Groups, p.50.

(146) I noticed that this seemed to be a common occurrence among group members with whom I participated.

(147) C.f. Lonergan, Method, p.34, footnote 6; C.f. also chapter 5, note (23) above.

(148) C.f. Rollo May, Love and Will, p.262.

(149) C.f. ibid., pp.262-268.

(150) C.f. 662.2 e above.

(151) Rollo May, Love and Will, p.327, note 33.

(152) C.f. 643.8 above.

(153) Rogers, Groups, p.60.

(154) C.f. 643.8 above.

(155) E. Friedenberg, Laing, London: Fontana, 1973, p.29. Laing himself declares that: "Psychotherapy must remain an obstinate attempt of two people to recover the wholeness of being human through the relationship between them". C.f. The Politics of Experience, p.45.

(156) Coulson, Gimmicks, p.170.

(157) C.f. 53.1 above.

(158) Kurt Back, Sensitivity Training and the Search for Salvation, quoted in Lieberman (Ed.), Encounter Facts, p.452.

(159) C.f. Lieberman (Ed.), Encounter Facts, chapter 17.

(160) Lieberman writes that common commitments (and so community) are " .... won at a higher price in more enduring social systems than in encounter groups". C.f. ibid p.453.

(161) Ibid., p.453.

(162) Buber, A Believing Humanism, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1969 edition, p.89.

(163) C.f. 218.1 above.

(164) C.f. Lonergan, Insight, pp.251-252, 412-415, 424-425.

(165) C.f. Lonergan, Method, pp.238-239, 213-214; c.f. also "Dimensions of Meaning" in Collection, pp.252-267.

(166) C.f. Lonergan, Method, pp.213, 239.

(167) C.f. the account of dynamic structure in 533.3 above. C.f. also Lonergan, "Cognitional Structure" in Collection, pp.222-224.

(168) Lonergan, "Cognitional Structure" in Collection, p.223.

(169) For Lonergan, to 'appropriate' means to 'take conscious possession of', i.e. to highlight in conscious awareness.

(170) C.f. 533.3 above. C.f. also chapter 5, note (51).

(171) Lonergan, Insight, introduction, p.xvii.

(172) Ibid., introduction, p.xvii.

(173) C.f. Lonergan, "Cognitional Structure" in Collection, p.225.

(174) C.f. ibid., p.224.

(175) Lonergan observes that the inverse task of trying to invalidate his account of cognitional structure would also involve a process of experiencing, questioning, understanding, judging and deciding, thus reaffirming the structure which it sets out to invalidate.

(176) Rogers, Therapy, p.199.

(177) Ibid., p.192.

(178) C.f. Rogers, Person, chapter 8.

(179) Lonergan, Insight, p.412.

(180) For a brief account of the movement, c.f. Rollo May (Ed.), Existential Psychology, New York: Random House, 1969.

(181) Maslow, "Existential Psychology - What's in it for us?", in May (Ed.), Existential Psychology, p.53.

(182) Laing, The Politics of Experience, p.45.

(183) Ibid., p.45.

(184) Voegelin's mature work is his Order and History, Lousiana: Lousiana University Press, 1956, of which three volumes have so far appeared. The following hypothesis appears in "The Eclipse of Reality", which is included in Maurice Natanson (Ed.), Phenomenology and Social Reality: Essays in Memory of Alfred Schutz, The Hague: Nijhoff, 1970, pp.185-194.

(185) Voegelin, Eclipse, p.185.

(186) Voegelin elaborates: "The contraction of his humanity to a self imprisoned in its selfhood .... becomes recognizable as a personal and social process in the eighteenth century, when man begins to refer to himself, not as Man, but as a Self, an Ego, an I, an Individual, a Subject, a Transcendental Subject, a Transcendental Consciousness, and so forth; and it reaches an intense clarity of its own structure in the twentieth century, when a Jean-Paul Sartre, whose formulae I have used in describing the contracted self, submits this type of deficient existence to the analysis of his L'être et le néant". C.f. ibid., p.185.

(187) Ibid., p.185.

(188) Ibid., p.186.

(189) Ibid., p.190.

(190) Ibid., p.190.

(191) Voegelin describes this new preoccupation: "For the shift of accents is accompanied by a change of mood from eighteenth century exhilaration by the projects of building a new world, and confidence of being equal to the task, to twentieth century disorientation, frustration, despair, and sense of damnation in face of the accumulated results of projecting". C.f. ibid., p.191.

(192) Ibid., p.193.

(193) C.f. Maslow, Towards a Psychology of Being, pp.205-206.

(194) Kurt Back, Sensitivity Training and the Search for Salvation, Russell Sage Foundation, 1972.

(195) Even Abraham Maslow, who wrote a book entitled Religions, Values and Peak Experiences, concludes that religious experience is really 'peak' human experience and does not imply the existence of any sphere beyond the purely human. C.f. p.36.

(196) C.f. Maslow, Towards a Psychology of Being, p.206.

(197) At the La Jolla Program, U.C.S.D., September 1973.

(198) Elsewhere Lonergan observes: "The fact is that my aim is 'vetera novis augere et perficere'. Nor is my procedure haphazard. Basically it is a matter of deriving basic terms and relations from the data of consciousness, of accepting traditional metaphysics in the sense that it is isomorphic with these basic terms and relations ....." C.f. "Bernard Lonergan Responds" in Phillip Mc Shane (Ed.), Language, Truth and Meaning, Dublin: Macmillan, 1972.

(199) C.f. L.-B. Geiger "Review" of Lonergan, The Concept of Verbum in the Writings of St. Thomas Aquinas, in Bulletin Thomiste, 8, (1952), pp.477-479.

(200) C.f. Lonergan, Insight, passim; "Cognitional Structure" in Collection, pp.221-239; Method, pp.6-13.

(201) C.f. Lonergan, Insight, pp.199-203.

(202) Frankl's paper was entitled "Existential Analysis and Dimensional Ontology". An abridged version was published in Psychotherapy and Existentialism, pp.127-135.

(203) Lonergan, Insight, introduction, p.xxx.

(204) C.f. 41.4 above.

(205) Frankl, Psychotherapy and Existentialism, pp.75-76.

(206) Ibid., p.57.

(207) Rollo May, "The Emergence of Existential Psychology" in May (Ed.), Existential Psychology, p.30.

A P P E N D I X

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(1) C.f. 78.1 above.

(2) C.f. 21.5 above.

(3) C.f. the law of integration in 134.3 c above.

(4) C.f. the law of sublation in 134.3 d above.

(5) C.f. 2.2, 7.9, 7.10 above.

(6) C.f. 12.4 above.

(7) C.f. 134.3 c above.

(8) C.f. 12.3 above.

(9) C.f. 12.5, 133.1 above.

(10) C.f. 12.4 above.

(11) C.f. 134.1 a above.

(12) C.f. 134.3 b above.

(13) C.f. 12.1 above.

(14) C.f. 12.2 above.

(15) Martin Buber writes: "The genuine We is recognized in its objective existence, through the fact that in whatever of its parts it is regarded, an essential relation between person and person, between I and Thou, is always evident as actually or potentially existing. For the word always arises only between an I and a Thou and the element from which the We receives its life is speech, the communal speaking that begins in the midst of speaking to one another". C.f. "What is Common to All" in Knowledge, p.106.

(16) C.f. 32.1 (i) above.

(17) C.f. 322.8, 32.6 above.

(18) C.f. 332.3 above.

(19) C.f. 218.3 above.

(20) C.f. 32.4 above.

(21) C.f. 33.1 above.

(22) C.f. ibid., (vi) above.

(23) C.f. 332.3 above.

(24) C.f. 332.9 above.

(25) C.f. 21.8, 22.2 above.

(26) C.f. 1.3 above.

(27) C.f. 134.3 d above.

(28) C.f. 133.2 above.

(29) C.f. 134.3 c above.

(30) C.f. 7.9, 7.10 above.

B I B L I O G R A P H Y

Comprehensive bibliographies of the writings of both Bernard Lonergan and Carl Rogers are available.

For a complete bibliography of Lonergan's earlier works, see Frederick Crowe, "Bibliography of the Writings of Bernard Lonergan", in Spirit as Inquiry: Studies in Honour of Bernard Lonergan, Continuum, 2, (1964), pp.543-549. A bibliography of Lonergan's more recent writings, together with a list of background articles, tapes and unpublished material on Lonergan, is published in David Tracy, The Achievement of Bernard Lonergan, New York: Herder and Herder, 1970, "Bibliography", pp.270-287.

A complete bibliography of the writings of Carl Rogers up to 1960, appears in Carl Rogers, "A Chronological Bibliography of the Publications of Carl R. Rogers, 1930-1960", On Becoming a Person, London: Constable, 1967 edition, pp.403-411. A list of most of Rogers's recent publications is included in Carl Rogers, "To Carry On: An Annotated Bibliography for Further Search", Becoming Partners: Marriage and Its Alternatives, New York: Delta, 1972, pp.221-243.

Thus, the following bibliography is limited to those works which have been considered in the preparation of this dissertation. It is divided into two sections.

"Section One: Primary Sources", contains a list of the writings of Bernard Lonergan and Carl Rogers which have a direct bearing on our theme "The Process of Personal Development".

"Section Two: Additional Sources", comprizes a list of those publications which have been found relevant in the elaboration, comparison, annotation and criticism of the theme, together with a limited selection of background sources.

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Lonergan, Bernard, "Cognitional Structure", first published in Continuum, Vol.2, Fall 1964, pp.530-542, and in the seperate printing of that issue: Spirit as Inquiry: Studies in Honour of Bernard Lonergan, Chicago: St. Xavier College, 1964, pp.230-242; also included in Bernard Lonergan, Collection, (see below).

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