Francis, Tomi 2026 This paper concerns the difficulty of avoiding an additive version of the Very Repugnant Conclusion. An impossibility theorem is provided which shows that we cannot avoid this version of the Repugnant Conclusion even if we deny the Mere Addition Principle and closely related principles which place limits on the badness of adding happy people, such as “Dominance Addition” and additive “Non-Sadism” conditions. I argue that the impossibility theorem shows that the additive version of the Very Repugnant Conclusion cannot reasonably be avoided by population-ethical means alone. One must instead either deny structural conditions such as acyclicity, adopt a radically unorthodox fixed-population axiology, or accept this version of the Very Repugnant Conclusion. application/pdf https://folia.unifr.ch/global/documents/336674 https://folia.unifr.ch/documents/336674/files/foliadeposit-1-repugnancewithoutmereadditionpublishedpdfcc-by.pdf eng info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1017/S0266267125100631 info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/issn/0266-2671 info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess CC BY Economics and Philosophy. - Cambridge University Press (CUP). - 2026, p. 1-29 Population ethics population axiology repugnant conclusion mere addition impossibility theorem Éthique de la population Axiologie de la population Conclusion répugnante Simple addition Théorème d'impossibilité Repugnance without Mere Addition http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501