Grossmann, Volker 2002 This paper shows in a simple game-theoretic model that it can be rational for non-altruistic individuals to adopt a personal value-based norm to reciprocate. Moreover, it is argued that such a behavioral commitment is feasible and thus self-binding. Reciprocal behavior has become a stylized fact in experimental labor markets. Our analysis suggests that in laboratory experiments “workers” may provide high effort either because they adopted the norm to behave reciprocally fair or because they fear to “work” with an “employer” who adopted the norm to punish unkind behavior. application/pdf https://folia.unifr.ch/global/documents/326069 https://folia.unifr.ch/documents/326069/files/1-s2.0-s0167487001000666-main.pdf eng info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1016/S0167-4870(01)00066-6 info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/issn/0167-4870 info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess Rights reserved Journal of Economic Psychology. - Elsevier BV. - 2002, vol. 23, no. 1, p. 27-48 Reciprocal behavior Personal norms Experimental labor market Fair wage-effort hypothesis info:eu-repo/classification/udc/33 Is it rational to internalize the personal norm that one should reciprocate? http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501