Bos, Olivier Gomez-Martinez, Francisco Onderstal, Sander Truyts, Tom 2021 We study the relative performance of the first-price sealed-bid auction, the second-price sealed-bid auction, and the all-pay sealed-bid auction in a laboratory experiment where bidders can signal information through their bidding behaviour to an outside observer. We consider two different information settings: the auctioneer reveals either the identity of the winning bidder only, or she also reveals the bidders’ payments to an outside observer. We find that the all-pay sealed-bid auction in which the bidders’ payments are revealed outperforms the other mechanisms in terms of revenue, while this mechanism underperforms in terms of efficiency relative to the winner-pay auctions. application/pdf https://folia.unifr.ch/global/documents/323685 https://folia.unifr.ch/documents/323685/files/jebo.pdf eng info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1016/j.jebo.2021.04.001 info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/issn/0167-2681 info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess CC BY Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. - Elsevier BV. - 2021, vol. 187, p. 448-469 Auctions Signalling Experiments Laboratory Experiment info:eu-repo/classification/udc/33 Signalling in Auctions: Experimental Evidence http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501