Madiès, Thierry Taugourdeau, Emmanuelle 2020 Our paper presents a model of decentralized leadership with fiscal equalization and imperfect trade liberalization. The degree of trade integration (reflected by trade costs) turns out to have an effect on both state corporate taxes and ex-post vertical equalization transfers. Our main results are the following: when public goods are highly valued by the citizens of the federation, ex post equalization transfers are welfare enhancing compared to tax competition, whatever the degree of trade integration. However, when citizens do not have strong preferences for the public good, ex post vertical transfers turn out to be welfare deterioring for low levels of trade integration while they are welfare improving compared to tax competition when trade integration is sufficiently deep. application/pdf https://folia.unifr.ch/global/documents/309504 https://folia.unifr.ch/documents/309504/files/2020_Madies_Vertical.pdf eng info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1007/s00355-020-01251-5 info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess License undefined Social Choice and Welfare. - Springer. - 2020, vol. 55, p. 453-475 Economics and Econometrics Social Sciences info:eu-repo/classification/udc/33 Vertical Transfers and Tax Competition : Does Trade Integration Matter? http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501