<oai_dc:dc xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/ http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:creator>Schelker, Mark</dc:creator>
  <dc:date>2012</dc:date>
  <dc:description xmlns:ns0="xml" ns0:lang="en">Improving transparency and enabling the principal to hold its agents accountable is a  major issue in any principal agent relationship. This paper focuses on the role of  public auditors in this task and presents evidence on the impact of auditor term length  and term limits on government performance measured by state credit ratings at the  US State level. I find no clear evidence for the influence of auditor term length, but  strong evidence for a positive and significant influence of term limits on state credit  ratings. Auditors who face a binding term limit are associated with higher credit  ratings.</dc:description>
  <dc:format>application/pdf</dc:format>
  <dc:identifier>https://folia.unifr.ch/global/documents/309378</dc:identifier>
  <dc:identifier>https://folia.unifr.ch/documents/309378/files/2012_schelker_influence.pdf</dc:identifier>
  <dc:language>eng</dc:language>
  <dc:relation>info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1007/s11127-010-9688-4</dc:relation>
  <dc:rights>info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess</dc:rights>
  <dc:rights>License undefined</dc:rights>
  <dc:source>Public Choice. - 2012, vol. 150, p. 27-49</dc:source>
  <dc:subject xmlns:ns1="xml" ns1:lang="en">Economics and Econometrics</dc:subject>
  <dc:subject xmlns:ns2="xml" ns2:lang="en">Sociology and Political Science</dc:subject>
  <dc:subject>info:eu-repo/classification/udc/33</dc:subject>
  <dc:title xmlns:ns3="xml" ns3:lang="en">The influence of auditor term length and term limits on US state general obligation bond ratings</dc:title>
  <dc:type>http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501</dc:type>
</oai_dc:dc>