<oai_dc:dc xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/ http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:creator>Zhang, Xin-Jie</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Tanga, Yong</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Xiong, Jason</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Wang, Wei-Jia</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Zhang, Yi-Cheng</dc:creator>
  <dc:date>2020-02-15</dc:date>
  <dc:description xmlns:ns0="xml" ns0:lang="en">Interacting with each other, individuals in a population form various social network  topologies. Models of evolutionary games on networks provide insight into how the  collective behaviors of structured populations are influenced by individual decision  making and network topologies. In a hierarchical society, many social resources are  allocated according to certain social rankings, such as class, social status, and social  hierarchy. In this context, to climb the social ladder, individuals will try to improve their  social ranking among the population. It is essential to understand the impact that  changes in social ranking have on decision making, which very few literature discuss.  To capture this social nature, a ranking game model on networks was introduced in  this study. Three decision-making strategies – random, follow, and centrality-based –  are introduced. Systematic numerical simulations of the different strategies are  conducted on three social network topologies: random, small-world, and scale-free  networks. The results reveal that the rankings of the whole population evolve  differently with various dynamics in network topologies and social liquidities. The  centrality strategy leads to relatively larger than average centrality, while the follow  strategy tends to form networks with significantly larger edge density, indicating overall  improvements for the whole population. Notably, the centrality strategy results in the  least similarity, lowest survival rate, and highest liquidity, showing that this strategy  allows larger social-structure changes with relatively better social mobility. In contrast,  for the random and follow strategies, the social network becomes more rigid.  However, in all cases, individuals are observed to appear in different ranking  positions. This ranking game model could serve as a basis for further sophisticated  ranking-related evolutionary games on social networks, with implications for  policymaking in ranked social scenarios.</dc:description>
  <dc:format>application/pdf</dc:format>
  <dc:identifier>https://folia.unifr.ch/global/documents/308399</dc:identifier>
  <dc:identifier>https://folia.unifr.ch/documents/308399/files/zha_rgn.pdf</dc:identifier>
  <dc:language>eng</dc:language>
  <dc:relation>info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1016/j.physa.2019.123140</dc:relation>
  <dc:rights>info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess</dc:rights>
  <dc:rights>License undefined</dc:rights>
  <dc:source>Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications. - 2020, vol. 540, p. 123140</dc:source>
  <dc:subject>info:eu-repo/classification/udc/53</dc:subject>
  <dc:title xmlns:ns1="xml" ns1:lang="en">Ranking game on networks: The evolution of hierarchical society</dc:title>
  <dc:type>http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501</dc:type>
</oai_dc:dc>
