Fehr, Ernst Herz, Holger Wilkening, Tom 2013 Authority and power permeate political, social, and economic life, but empirical knowledge about the motivational origins and consequences of authority is limited. We study the motivation and incentive effects of authority experimentally in an authority delegation game. Individuals often retain authority even when its delegation is in their material interest—suggesting that authority has nonpecuniary consequences for utility. Authority also leads to over provision of effort by the controlling parties, while a large percentage of subordinates underprovide effort despite pecuniary incentives to the contrary. Authority thus has important motivational consequences that exacerbate the inefficiencies arising from suboptimal delegation choices. {JEL C92, D23, D82) application/pdf https://folia.unifr.ch/global/documents/306477 https://folia.unifr.ch/documents/306477/files/ernstfehrholgerherzandtomwilkening-thelureofauthority.pdf eng info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1257/aer.103.4.1325 info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess License undefined The American Economic Review. - 2013, vol. 103, no. 4, p. 1325-1359 Economics Econometrics info:eu-repo/classification/udc/33 The Lure of Authority: Motivation and Incentive Effects of Power http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501