Dorsch, Fabian 2010 One prominent ambition of theories of colour is to pay full justice to how colours are subjectively given to us; and another to reconcile this first-personal perspective on colours with the third-personal one of the natural sciences. The goal of this article is to question whether we can satisfy the second ambition on the assumption that the first should and can be met. I aim to defend a negative answer to this question by arguing that the various kinds of experienced colour resemblances – notably similarities in hue distance, sameness in superdeterminables, and colour resemblances between surfaces, volumes and illuminants – cannot be accounted for in terms of the mental representa-tion of the scientifically studied properties, which colours are best identified with in response to the second ambition. application/pdf https://folia.unifr.ch/global/documents/304047 https://folia.unifr.ch/documents/304047/files/DorschColourResemblanceRealism_finaldraft.pdf eng info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.4000/estetica.1794 info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess License undefined Rivista di estetica / Luca Angelone. - Labont; Rosenberg& Sellier. - 2010, vol. 43, no. 1, p. 85-108 info:eu-repo/classification/udc/1 Colour Resemblance and Colour Realism http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501