Dorsch, Fabian 2010 In his paper, The Transparency of Experience, M.G.F. Martin has put forward a wellknown – though not always equally well understood – argument for the disjunctivist, and against the intentional, approach to perceptual experiences. In this article, I intend to do four things: (i) to present the details of Martin’s complex argument; (ii) to defend its soundness against orthodox intentionalism; (iii) to show how Martin’s argument speaks as much in favour of experiential intentionalism as it speaks in favour of disjunctivism; and (iv) to argue that there is a related reason to prefer experiential intentionalism over Martin’s version of disjunctivism. application/pdf https://folia.unifr.ch/global/documents/304021 https://folia.unifr.ch/documents/304021/files/DorschTransparencyImaginingSeeing_altered.pdf eng info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1080/13869795.2010.501901 info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess License undefined Philosophical Explorations. - Taylor & Francis. - 2010, vol. 13, no. 3, p. 173-200 disjunctivism hallucinations imagination intentionalism object awareness perception transparency visualising info:eu-repo/classification/udc/1 Transparency and imagining seeing http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501