<oai_dc:dc xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/ http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:creator>Dorsch, Fabian</dc:creator>
  <dc:date>2011</dc:date>
  <dc:description xmlns:ns0="xml" ns0:lang="en">The aim of this article is to present the disagreement between Moran and Walton on  the nature of our affective responses to fiction and to defend a view on the issue  which is opposed to Moran’s account and improves on Walton’s. Moran takes  imagination-based affective responses to be instances of genuine emotion and treats  them as episodes with an emotional attitude towards their contents. I argue against  the existence of such attitudes, and that the affective element of such responses  should rather be taken to be part of what is imagined. In this respect, I follow Walton;  and I also agree with the latter that our affective responses to fiction are, as a  consequence, not instances of real emotion. However, this gives rise to the challenge  to be more specific about the nature of our responses and explain how they can still  involve a phenomenologically salient affective element, given that propositionally  imagining that one feels a certain emotion is ruled out because it may be done in a  dispassionate way. The answer —already suggested, but not properly spelled out by  Walton— is that affectively responding to some fictional element consists in  imaginatively re-presenting an experience of emotional feeling towards it. The central  thought is that the conscious and imaginative representation of the affective character  of an instance of genuine emotion itself involves the respective phenomenologically  salient affective element, despite not instantiating it.</dc:description>
  <dc:format>application/pdf</dc:format>
  <dc:identifier>https://folia.unifr.ch/global/documents/303908</dc:identifier>
  <dc:identifier>https://folia.unifr.ch/documents/303908/files/DorschEmotionalImagining.pdf</dc:identifier>
  <dc:language>eng</dc:language>
  <dc:relation>info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.5565/rev/enrahonar/v46n0.197</dc:relation>
  <dc:rights>info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess</dc:rights>
  <dc:rights>License undefined</dc:rights>
  <dc:source>Enrahonar. - 2011, vol. 46, p. 153-176</dc:source>
  <dc:subject xmlns:ns1="xml" ns1:lang="en">imagining/imagination</dc:subject>
  <dc:subject xmlns:ns2="xml" ns2:lang="en">fiction</dc:subject>
  <dc:subject xmlns:ns3="xml" ns3:lang="en">emotion</dc:subject>
  <dc:subject xmlns:ns4="xml" ns4:lang="en">affective states</dc:subject>
  <dc:subject xmlns:ns5="xml" ns5:lang="en">representational art</dc:subject>
  <dc:subject xmlns:ns6="xml" ns6:lang="en">Kendall Walton</dc:subject>
  <dc:subject xmlns:ns7="xml" ns7:lang="en">Richard Moran</dc:subject>
  <dc:subject xmlns:ns8="xml" ns8:lang="en">experiential imagining</dc:subject>
  <dc:subject xmlns:ns9="xml" ns9:lang="en">emotional imagining</dc:subject>
  <dc:subject xmlns:ns10="xml" ns10:lang="en">propositional
imagining</dc:subject>
  <dc:subject>info:eu-repo/classification/udc/1</dc:subject>
  <dc:title xmlns:ns11="xml" ns11:lang="en">Emotional Imagining and Our Responses to Fiction</dc:title>
  <dc:type>http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501</dc:type>
</oai_dc:dc>
