<oai_dc:dc xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/ http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:creator>Challet, Damien</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>De Martino, Andrea</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Marsili, Matteo</dc:creator>
  <dc:date>2008</dc:date>
  <dc:description xmlns:ns0="xml" ns0:lang="en">We explore the effect of discounting and experimentation in a simple model of interacting adaptive agents. Agents belong to either of two types and each has to decide whether to participate a game or not, the game being profitable when there is an excess of players of the other type. We find the emergence of large fluctuations as a result of the onset of a dynamical instability which may arise discontinuously (increasing the discount factor) or continuously (decreasing the experimentation rate). The phase diagram is characterized in detail and noise amplification close to a bifurcation point is identified as the physical mechanism behind the instability.</dc:description>
  <dc:format>application/pdf</dc:format>
  <dc:identifier>https://folia.unifr.ch/global/documents/300590</dc:identifier>
  <dc:identifier>https://folia.unifr.ch/documents/300590/files/challet_dis.pdf</dc:identifier>
  <dc:language>eng</dc:language>
  <dc:relation>info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1088/1742-5468/2008/04/L04004</dc:relation>
  <dc:rights>info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess</dc:rights>
  <dc:rights>License undefined</dc:rights>
  <dc:subject>info:eu-repo/classification/udc/53</dc:subject>
  <dc:title xmlns:ns1="xml" ns1:lang="en">Dynamical instabilities in a simple minority game with discounting</dc:title>
  <dc:type>http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_816b</dc:type>
</oai_dc:dc>